

# **A Geopolítica do Irão: O fim do acordo nuclear?**

POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL E GEOPOLÍTICA

Instituto Cultural D. António Ferreira Gomes

José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes

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# PARTE I – O Irão: um Estado com profundas raízes históricas

# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica e CIA, The World Factbook]



<b>Official name</b>	Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Īrān (Islamic Republic of Iran)
<b>Form of government</b>	unitary Islamic republic with one legislative house (Islamic Consultative Assembly [290 <sup>1</sup> ])
<b>Supreme political/religious authority</b>	Leader: <a href="#">Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei</a>
<b>Head of state and government</b>	President: <a href="#">Hassan Rouhani</a>
<b>Capital</b>	<a href="#">Tehrān</a>
<b>Official language</b>	Farsī (Persian)
<b>Official religion</b>	Islam
<b>Monetary unit</b>	rial (RIs)
<b>Population</b>	(2014 est.) 77,555,000

<sup>1</sup> Includes seats reserved for Christians (3), of which Armenian (2); Jews (1); and Zoroastrians (1).

EXPAND +



# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (2)

[Mapa: o Império Persa Sassânida por volta de 620 d.C. FONTE: Wikipedia]





# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (3)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## The Şafavids (1501–1736)

### SHAH ISMĀ'ĪL

In 1501 Ismā'īl I (reigned 1501–24) supplanted the Ak Koyunlu in Azerbaijan. Within a decade he gained supremacy over most of Iran as a ruler his followers regarded as divinely entitled to sovereignty. The Şafavids claimed descent—on grounds that modern research has shown to be dubious—from the Shī'ite imams. Muslims in Iran, therefore, could regard themselves as having found a legitimate imam-ruler, who, as a descendant of 'Alī, required no caliph to legitimate his position. Rather, Şafavid political legitimacy was based on the religious order's mixture of Sufi ecstaticism and Shī'ite extremism (Arabic *ghulū*), neither of which was the dusty scholasticism of the Sunni or Shī'ite legal schools. The dynasty's military success was based both on Ismā'īl's skill as a leader and on the conversion of a number of Turkmen tribes—who came to be known as the Kizilbash (Turkish: "Red Heads") for the 12-folded red caps these tribesmen wore, representing their belief in the 12 imams—to this emotionally powerful Sufi-Shī'ite syncretism. The Kizilbash became the backbone of the Şafavid military effort, and their virtual deification of Ismā'īl contributed greatly to his swift military conquest of Iran. In later years, though, extremist (*ghulāt*) zeal and its chiliastic fervour began to undermine the orderly administration of the Şafavid state. Ismā'īl's attempt to spread Shī'ite propaganda among the Turkmen tribes of eastern Anatolia prompted a conflict with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Following Iran's defeat by the Ottomans at the Battle of Chaldiran, Şafavid expansion slowed, and a process of consolidation began in which Ismā'īl sought to quell the more extreme expressions of faith among his followers. Such actions were largely preempted, however, by Ismā'īl's death in 1524 at the age of 36.

The new Iranian empire lacked the resources that had been available to the caliphs of Baghdad in former times through their dominion over Central Asia and the West: Asia Minor and Transoxania were gone, and the rise of maritime trade in the West was detrimental to a country whose wealth had depended greatly on its position on important east-west overland trade routes. The rise of the Ottomans impeded Iranian westward advances and contested with the Şafavids' control over both the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. Years of warfare with the Ottomans imposed a heavy drain on the Şafavids' resources. The Ottomans threatened Azerbaijan itself. Finally, in 1639 the Treaty of Qaşr-e Shīrīn (also called the Treaty of Zuhāb) gave Yerevan in the southern Caucasus to Iran and Baghdad and all of Mesopotamia to the Ottomans.

# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (4)

[FONTE: Wikipedia]



**Ismail I**, (July 17, 1487 – May 23, 1524), known in Persian as **Shāh Ismā‘il**, (Persian: شاه اسماعیل; full name: *Abū l-Muzaffar Isma'il bin Haydar as-Safavī*; Azerbaijani: بیرینجی شاه اسماعیل; *Şah İsmayıl Xətai*), was Shah of Iran (Persia) (1501)<sup>[1][2]</sup> and the founder of the Safavid dynasty which survived until 1736. Isma'il started his campaign in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1500 as the leader of the Safaviyya, a Twelver Shia militant religious order, and unified all of Iran by 1509.<sup>[3]</sup> Born in Ardabil, Iranian Azerbaijan, he was the king (shah) of the Safavid dynasty from 1501 to 1524.

The dynasty founded by Ismail I would rule for over two centuries, being one of the greatest Iranian empires (Persian empires) after the Muslim conquest of Persia and at its height being amongst the most powerful empires of its time, ruling all of Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, most of Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, as well as parts of modern day Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan at their height.<sup>[4][5][6][7]</sup> it also reasserted the Iranian identity in large parts of Greater Iran,<sup>[8]</sup> The legacy of the Safavid Empire was also the revival of Persia as an economic stronghold between East and West, the establishment of an efficient state and bureaucracy, their architectural innovations and their patronage for fine arts.


Ismail played a key role in the rise of Twelver Islam; he converted Iran from Sunni to Shi'a Islam, importing religious authorities from the Levant.<sup>[9]</sup> In Alevism, Shah Ismail remains revered as a spiritual guide.



# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (5)

[MAPA: Zonas de influência da Rússia e da Grã-Bretanha no Irão em inícios do século XX.

FONTE: Wikipedia]



# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (6)

[FONTE: Wikipedia]

## Entente anglo-russa

A **Entente Anglo-russa** ou a **Convenção Anglo-Russa de 1907** foi um acordo assinado em [31 de agosto de 1907](#), em [São Petersburgo](#), pelo [Conde Alexandre Izvolsky](#), Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros do [Império Russo](#), e [Sir Arthur Nicolson](#), embaixador do [Reino Unido](#) na [Rússia](#).

A convenção pôs fim a várias décadas do [Grande Jogo](#) entre as duas potências, definindo as respectivas [esferas de influência](#) na [Pérsia](#), no [Afeganistão](#) e no [Tibete](#). O seu principal objetivo era o de resolver a longa disputa entre as potências imperiais sobre suas respectivas periferias, embora também tenha servido aos seus objetivos diplomáticos mais amplos, ajudando a contrabalançar a influência alemã.<sup>[1]</sup> A Entente Anglo-russa, juntamente com a [Entente Cordiale \(1904\)](#) e a [Aliança franco-russa \(1892\)](#) formam a chamada [Tríplice Entente](#), entre o [Reino Unido](#), [França](#) e [Rússia](#).

A convenção teve três seções, que tratavam da [Pérsia](#), do [Afeganistão](#) e do [Tibete](#):

- A Pérsia foi dividida em três zonas: uma zona britânica no sul, uma zona russa no norte, e uma pequena zona neutra, servindo como tampão, no meio. A convenção teve muito cuidado para não chamar essas zonas de 'esferas de influência', para que não ficasse evidente que as grandes potências estavam dividindo a Pérsia.
- No que diz respeito ao Afeganistão, a Rússia reconheceu o país como um semi-protetorado da Grã-Bretanha e "abandonou os seus esforços anteriores para estabelecer relações diretas com o emir".<sup>[2]</sup>
- Após a [Expedição britânica no Tibete](#), ambas as potências concordaram em manter a integridade territorial desse Estado-tampão e "para lidar com [Lhasa](#) apenas através da [China](#), o poder [suserano](#)".<sup>[3]</sup>

O acordo relativo à Pérsia, que tinha 5 artigos, foi assinado sem a participação ou o conhecimento do governo persa, e assim teve uma dura resposta do [parlamento iraniano](#). A Pérsia só foi oficialmente informada do acordo mais tarde, em [16 de Setembro](#) de 1907. Do mesmo modo, o [emir](#) do Afeganistão se recusou a reconhecer o acordo sobre seu país. E os tibetanos nunca reconheceram direitos de suserania da [China](#) sobre o Tibete.

## Referências

1. F. William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order, Londres, Pluto Press, 2004, pp. 29-30.
2. Quoted from: Lowe, John. *The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem, 1865-1925*. Routledge, 1994. Page 138.
3. Quoted from: [Hopkirk, Peter](#). *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. [ISBN 1-56836-022-3](#). Page 520.



# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (7)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]


**Mohammad Mosaddegh**, Mosaddegh also spelled **Masaddiq** or **Mosaddeq**, (born 1880, [Tehrān](#), Iran—died March 5, 1967, Tehrān), Iranian political leader who nationalized the huge British oil holdings in [Iran](#) and, as [premier](#) in 1951–53, almost succeeded in deposing the shah.

The son of an Iranian public official, Mosaddegh grew up as a member of Iran's ruling elite. He received a Doctor of Law degree from the University of Lausanne in [Switzerland](#) and then returned to Iran in 1914 and was appointed governor-general of the important Fārs province. He remained in the government following the rise to power of Reza Khan in 1921 and served as minister of finance and then briefly as minister of foreign affairs. Mosaddegh was elected to the Majles (parliament) in 1923. When Reza Khan was elected shah (as [Reza Shah Pahlavi](#)) in 1925, however, Mosaddegh opposed the move and was compelled to retire to private life.

Mosaddegh reentered public service in 1944, following Reza Shah's forced abdication in 1941, and was elected again to the Majles. An outspoken advocate of [nationalism](#), he soon played a leading part in successfully opposing the grant to the [Soviet Union](#) of an oil [concession](#) for northern Iran similar to an existing British concession in southern Iran. He built considerable political strength, based largely on his call to nationalize the concession and installations in Iran of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (see [British Petroleum Company PLC](#)). In March 1951 the Majles passed his oil-nationalization act, and his power had grown so great that the shah, [Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi](#), was virtually forced to appoint him premier.

# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (8)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Mohammad Mosaddeq.  
*Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.*

The [nationalization](#) resulted in a deepening crisis in Iran, both politically and economically. Mosaddegh and his National Front Party continued to gain power but alienated many supporters, particularly among the ruling elite and in the Western nations. The British soon withdrew completely from the Iranian oil market, and economic problems increased when Mosaddegh could not readily find alternate oil markets.

# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (9)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica. IMAGEM: celebração nas ruas de Teerão do golpe de estado de 1953 que derrubou o governo de Mosaddegh.]

A continuing struggle for control of the Iranian government developed between Mosaddegh and the shah. In August 1953, when the shah attempted to dismiss the premier, mobs of Mosaddegh followers took to the streets and forced the shah to leave the country. Within a few days, however, Mosaddegh's opponents overthrew his regime and restored the shah to power in a coup orchestrated by the U.S. and Great Britain. Mosaddegh was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for treason and, after he had served his sentence, was kept under house arrest for the rest of his life. Iran retained nominal sovereignty over its oil facilities, but, under an agreement reached in 1954, it split revenues 50–50 with an international consortium that controlled production and marketing.

Mosaddegh's personal behaviour—which included wearing pajamas for numerous public appearances; speeches to the Majles from his bed, which was taken into the chambers; and frequent bouts of public weeping—helped focus world attention upon him during his premiership. Supporters claim the behaviour was a result of illness; detractors say he had a shrewd sense of public relations.



# Antecedentes histórico-políticos (10)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

**Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi**, (born October 26, 1919, [Tehrān](#), Iran—died July 27, 1980, [Cairo](#), Egypt), shah of [Iran](#) from 1941 to 1979, who maintained a pro-Western [foreign policy](#) and fostered economic development in Iran.


Mohammad Reza was the eldest son of [Reza Shah Pahlavi](#), an army officer who became the ruler of Iran and founder of the Pahlavi [dynasty](#) in 1925. Mohammad Reza was educated in [Switzerland](#) and returned to Iran in 1935. In 1941 the [Soviet Union](#) and Great Britain, fearing that the shah would cooperate with Nazi Germany to rid himself of their tutelage, occupied Iran and forced Reza Shah into exile. Mohammad Reza then replaced his father on the throne (September 16, 1941).

In the early 1950s a struggle for control of the Iranian government developed between the shah and [Mohammad Mosaddeq](#), a [zealous](#) Iranian nationalist. In March 1951 Mosaddeq secured passage of a bill in the Majles (parliament) to nationalize the vast British petroleum interests in Iran. Mosaddeq's power grew rapidly, and by the end of April Mohammad Reza had been forced to appoint Mosaddeq premier. A two-year period of tension and conflict followed. In [August](#) 1953 the shah tried to dismiss Mosaddeq but was himself forced to leave the country by Mosaddeq's supporters. Several days later, however, Mosaddeq's opponents, with the covert support and assistance of the [United States](#) and the United Kingdom, restored Mohammad Reza to power.

Under Mohammad Reza, the [nationalization](#) of the oil industry was nominally maintained, although in 1954 Iran entered into an agreement to split revenues with a newly formed international [consortium](#) that was responsible for managing production. With U.S. assistance Mohammad Reza then proceeded to carry out a national development program, called the [White Revolution](#), that included construction of an expanded road, rail, and air network, a number of dam and irrigation projects, the eradication of diseases such as malaria, the encouragement and support of industrial growth, and [land reform](#). He also established a literacy corps and a health corps for the large but isolated rural population. In the 1960s and '70s the shah sought to develop a more independent foreign policy and established working relationships with the Soviet Union and eastern European nations.

## Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

### QUICK FACTS



#### BORN

October 26, 1919  
[Tehrān, Iran](#)

#### DIED

July 27, 1980 (aged 60)  
[Cairo, Egypt](#)

#### NOTABLE FAMILY MEMBERS

Father [Reza Shah Pahlavi](#)



## PARTE II – A revolução islâmica de 1978/1979 e a hostilidade dos EUA

regresso do Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ao Irão, a 1/02/1979. FONTE: Wikipedia]



# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (2) [FONTE:

CNN, 16/07/2015]





# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (3) [FONTE:

CNN, 16/07/2015]



19 photos: 1979 Iran hostage crisis

Iranian students climb over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979.



# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (4) [FONTE:

CNN, 16/07/2015]

## **1) This conflict is often described as the United States' first brush with political Islam.**

In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini installed an anti-Western Islamic theocracy, which replaced the pro-Western monarchy of the Shah of Iran. The U.S. was referred to as "the Great Satan" by the new Iranian government, and Iranians looked at the United States with suspicion because of its role in keeping the Shah in power. Iranians felt the United States meddled too much in Iran's internal affairs, and were afraid the CIA was plotting to return the Shah to power. The Ayatollah himself blessed the hostage-taking at the embassy, further fueling the government's hard line against the United States.

## **2) The U.S. Embassy in Tehran warned Washington the embassy would be attacked.**

By October 1979, the Shah had fled Iran and was staying in Mexico. There, doctors discovered the Shah was suffering from an aggressive cancer and recommended he be admitted to a hospital in the United States. The situation in Tehran was already tense, and the head of the diplomatic mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran sent several cables to Washington, saying that if the Shah was allowed to come to the United States for treatment, the embassy would be taken. President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah into the United States, with much hesitation, and the Iranians were outraged. They saw this as an excuse to bring the Shah to the United States to plot his return to power. This was just weeks before the embassy was attacked.

# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (5) [FONTE:

CNN, 16/07/2015]

## **4) The hostages were released only after President Reagan was sworn in.**

Ted Koppel described this as the Iranians' last act of cruelty toward President Carter. Even though the United States and Iran had come to an agreement to free the hostages in December, the Iranians waited literally until the hour President Reagan was sworn in before allowing the plane with the hostages to take off. The Iranians had a deep hatred of Carter and wanted to deny him this last moment of victory as President.

## **5) After the hostages were released, they met with President Jimmy Carter.**

William Daugherty, who was held in solitary confinement for almost the entire time he was a hostage, said, "It was not a warm welcome" when Jimmy Carter flew to the U.S. military base in Germany to meet the hostages right after their release. The hostages were split on their thinking. Many felt they were left unprotected in the embassy after Carter made the decision to allow the Shah into the United States. Daugherty said that during the meeting, Carter went around to hug all the hostages, and many remained still with their arms at their sides and did not return his hug.

## **6) The former U.S. Embassy in Tehran has been preserved as a museum.**

The embassy in Tehran [is now an Islamic cultural center and a museum](#), preserved from the days when it was a prison in 1979. It stands as a symbol of the Iranian revolution, and is known in Iran as the "den of spies." Old typewriters, communication equipment, even old visa photos, are on display. Every year on the anniversary of the hostage taking, Iranians hold rallies where "Death to America" is chanted, just as it was in 1979.

# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (6) [FONTE:

Guardian, 11/02/2015]

## Declassified diplomacy: Washington's hesitant plans for a military coup in pre-revolution Iran

New documents about General Huyser's secret mission to Iran reveal US plans after the shah's departure



📷 Iranian Shia clerics address crowds of demonstrators in Tehran on 10 February 1979. Photograph: Alain Keler/Alain Keler/Sygma/Corbis

The president's man in Tehran was feeling the pressure and needed reassurance. On 12 January 1979, General Robert "Dutch" Huyser wrote to Harold Brown, US secretary of defense, and General David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make sure he knew what they wanted him to do.

# Khomeini e a revolução islâmica: na génese da hostilidade entre o Irão e os EUA (7) [FONTE:

Guardian, 11/02/2015]

“In my conversation with Secretary Brown the night of January 11, 1979, there seemed to be some doubt in your mind as to my understanding of US policy and my instructions,” Huyser wrote in a cable. “I believe I thoroughly understand and I am following them to the letter.” Huyser then outlined point by point his terms of reference as he understood them.

The Huyser cable is part of a trove of declassified US government documents that relate to the so-called Huyser mission, undertaken by the Carter administration at the height of the Iranian revolution. Thirty-six years later, many Iranians still believe Huyser was sent to Tehran to neutralise the Iranian army as part of a deal to put Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in power. The Americans, they say, naively thought Khomeini, an anti-communist, would protect their interests in the Persian Gulf after the Shah’s departure.

US officials from the time insist no such plot existed. They deny allegations of undermining the shah or that Huyser’s mission constituted interference in Iran’s sovereign affairs. But the absence of evidence has encouraged [conspiracy theories](#).

Now, release of the Huyser cable allows us to read in the general’s own words what he and his handlers believed were his orders. For the first time we can see what President [Jimmy Carter](#) and his national security team hoped to achieve. Far from showing evidence of a well-oiled conspiracy, the document reveals an astonishing lack of awareness on the part of US officials trying to manage events thousands of miles away that they had failed to understand from the start.



# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (1) [FONTE: Wikipedia]

<div> <div>Hezbollah</div> <div>حزب الله</div> <div><i>Hizbu 'llāh</i></div> </div>	
<b>Secretary-General</b>	<a href="#">Hassan Nasrallah</a>
<b>Founded</b>	1985; 34 years ago (official)
<b>Headquarters</b>	Beirut, Lebanon
<b>Ideology</b>	<div> Islamic nationalism<sup>[1]</sup> </div> <div> Anti-Zionism </div> <div> Anti-Western imperialism<sup>[2]</sup> </div> <div> Shia Jihadism<sup>[3]</sup> </div> <div> Khomeinism<sup>[3]</sup> </div> <div> Anti-West<sup>[4][5]</sup> </div> <div> Anti-Semitism<sup>[6]</sup> </div>
<b>Religion</b>	Shia Islam
<b>National affiliation</b>	<a href="#">March 8 Alliance</a>
<b>International affiliation</b>	<a href="#">Axis of Resistance</a>
<b>Colours</b>	Yellow · Green
<b>Parliament of Lebanon</b>	<div>12 / 128</div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
<b>Cabinet of Lebanon</b>	<div>2 / 30</div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
<div> <div>Party flag</div> <div>  </div> <div>Flag of Hezbollah</div> </div>	
<div> <div>Website</div> <div> <a href="http://www.moqawama.org">www.moqawama.org</a> </div> </div>	
<div> <div>Politics of Lebanon</div> <div> Political parties </div> <div> Elections </div> </div>	

Hezbollah	
Participant in the <a href="#">Lebanese Civil War</a> , <a href="#">Israeli–Lebanese conflict</a> , <a href="#">South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)</a> , <a href="#">2006 Lebanon War</a> , <a href="#">2008 Lebanon Conflict</a> , <a href="#">Syrian Civil War</a> and the <a href="#">Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017)</a>	
Primary target in <a href="#">War on Terror</a>	
<b>Active</b>	1985 – present
<b>Group(s)</b>	<div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unit 3800<sup>[7]</sup></li> </ul> </div>
<b>Headquarters</b>	Lebanon
<b>Size</b>	20,000 to 50,000
<b>Allies</b>	<div> <div>State allies:</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <a href="#">Iran</a></li> <li> <a href="#">Syria</a></li> <li> <a href="#">Russia</a><sup>[8]</sup></li> <li> <a href="#">Lebanon</a><sup>[9]</sup></li> <li> <a href="#">Iraq</a><sup>[10]</sup></li> <li> <a href="#">Cuba</a> (alleged)</li> <li> <a href="#">North Korea</a> (alleged, denied by North Korea)<sup>[11]</sup></li> <li> <a href="#">Venezuela</a> (alleged, denied by Venezuela)<sup>[12]</sup></li> </ul> </div> <div> <div>Non state allies:</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <a href="#">Amal Movement</a></li> <li> <a href="#">Houthis</a> (claimed by Yemeni Hadi government and allies, denied by Hezbollah)<sup>[13][14]</sup></li> <li> <a href="#">Hamas</a></li> <li><a href="#">Popular Mobilization Forces</a><sup>[15]</sup></li> </ul> </div>

# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Early Life And Career

Nasrallah was raised in the impoverished Karantina district of eastern [Beirut](#), where his father ran a small [grocery store](#). As a boy Nasrallah was an earnest student of [Islam](#). After the outbreak of civil war in [Lebanon](#) in 1975 caused the family to flee south from Beirut, Nasrallah joined Amal, a Lebanese [Shī'ite](#) paramilitary group with ties to [Iran](#) and Syria. Soon afterward he left for [Najaf, Iraq](#), to study at the Shī'ite seminary there. Following the expulsion of hundreds of Lebanese students from Iraq in 1978, he returned to Lebanon and fought with [Amal](#), becoming the group's [Al-Biqā'](#) valley commander. Following [Israel's](#) invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Nasrallah left Amal to join the nascent Hezbollah movement, a more-radical force that was heavily influenced by Ayatollah [Ruhollah Khomeini](#) and the 1979 [Islamic Revolution](#) in Iran.

In the late 1980s Nasrallah rose through Hezbollah's military ranks and became a leading figure in Hezbollah's clashes with Amal. As his potential for leadership became clear, he went to Iran to further his religious education in [Qom](#). He then returned to battle in Lebanon in 1989 until the end of the civil war in the following year. He assumed leadership of Hezbollah in 1992 after his predecessor, Sheikh ['Abbas al-Musawi](#), was killed by an Israeli missile.

## Leadership

Nasrallah's leadership of the organization was characterized by his populism. He relied on [charisma](#) and subtle charm to express his message. He was not a fiery or intimidating speaker. Rather, he came across as thoughtful, humble, and at times humorous. Moreover, under his leadership, Hezbollah [cultivated](#) an elaborate network of social welfare programs, which helped win the group broad grassroots support.

### Hassan Nasrallah

#### QUICK FACTS



#### BORN

August 31, 1960 (age 58)

[Beirut, Lebanon](#)

#### POLITICAL AFFILIATION

[Hezbollah](#)

# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (3) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 17/01/2014]





# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (4) [FONTE: Reuters, 7/02/2012]

BEIRUT (Reuters) - Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged Tuesday for the first time that his militant movement received financial and material support from Iran, but denied it took instructions from the Islamic Republic.

Nasrallah said Hezbollah previously only confirmed Iranian political and moral backing because it did not want "to embarrass our brothers in Iran," but had changed policy because Iran's leadership had announced its support in public.

"Yes, we received moral, and political and material support in all possible forms from the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1982," Nasrallah told supporters by videolink in a speech marking the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Mohammad.

"In the past we used to tell half the story and stay silent on the other half ... When they asked us about the material and financial and military support we were silent."

Nasrallah said Iran had not issued orders to Hezbollah since the movement was founded 30 years ago, adding that if Israel attacked Iran's nuclear sites, the leadership in Iran "would not ask anything of Hezbollah."

He said if that were to happen, Hezbollah's own leadership would "sit down, think and decide what to do."

Speculation has grown that Israel might be planning to attack Iranian nuclear facilities after strong public comments by Israeli leaders about Iran's atomic ambitions.

Many analysts believe that in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran, Hezbollah - which fought a punishing 34-day war with Israel in 2006 - would attack the Jewish state.

# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (5)

[FONTE: Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship / Carnegie Middle East, 29/03/2019]

## KEY PERIODS IN THE SYRIA-HEZBOLLAH RELATIONSHIP

- In the 1980s, Syria-Hezbollah relations were characterized by both cooperation and tension. Syria's ties with Iran and role in Lebanon's civil war allowed Hezbollah's rise to power. But Hezbollah's expanding influence came at the expense of Syria's local Shia ally.
- After the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, Hezbollah acquiesced to Syrian control. Syria's participation in negotiations with Israel caused simmering tensions between the allies. Yet Syria also used Hezbollah as leverage in those talks.
- Following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Hezbollah defended its relationship with Damascus as a crucial part of the resistance against Israel, the *raison d'être* for its arsenal.
- Hezbollah's 2012–2013 intervention in the Syrian war gave them the upper hand in their relationship with Damascus, which they sought to exploit by pursuing political aims in Syria, such as opening a front against Israel in the Golan Heights.
- Since 2015, the Assad regime has used Russia's military support to rebalance its relationship with Hezbollah and reverse the party's encroachment on Syrian society.

# Os instrumentos do Irão no exterior: o caso do Hezbollah no Líbano (6)

[FONTE: Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship / Carnegie Middle East, 29/03/2019]


## KEY THEMES

- Syria's relationship with Hezbollah has long been characterized by a pragmatic recognition of shifting power dynamics and the parallel pursuit of divergent political interests. Both sides understand that a weakened partner could lead to their own loss of power, which has consistently justified intervention to support the other.
- Syria and Russia appear opposed to attempts to open a new front against Israel in the Golan Heights, which could undermine Syrian sovereignty and threaten the Assad regime's fragile victory.
- The Syrian government enjoys the regional influence afforded by its close relationship with Hezbollah. In the aftermath of the Syrian war, the Assad regime will seek to rebalance relations with Hezbollah and regain its previous advantage.



## PARTE III – O Irão e a geopolítica da energia no Médio Oriente

# A diversidade étnico-religiosa do Irão e os recursos energéticos (1) [MAPA: Os diferentes grupos étnicos do Irão]



Sources: CIA World Factbook, [www.citypopulation.de](http://www.citypopulation.de), GlobalSecurity, 1996 Iran Census, Petroleum Economist, Times Atlas

# A diversidade étnico-religiosa do Irão e os recursos energéticos (2)


[MAPA: Os diferentes grupos étnicos do Irão e a localização de petróleo e gás natural]





# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (1)

[MAPA: Petróleo e presença militar dos EUA no Médio Oriente]




# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (2)

[MAPA: o estreito de Ormuz, no golfo Pérsico. FONTE: Wikipedia]



# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (3) [FONTE: National Geographic]


## Strait of Hormuz: The World's Key Oil Choke Point





# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (4) [FONTE: National Geographic]

## Strait of Hormuz: The World's Key Oil Choke Point



# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (5) [FONTE: Al-Monitor, 23/06/2015]



A helicopter from the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) hovers over an Iranian patrol ship during a transit through the Strait of Hormuz, Feb. 14, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Jumana El Heloueh)

## How security in Strait of Hormuz brings US, Iran closer

The Strait of Hormuz is the only outlet that connects the Gulf to the high seas, including to the Gulf of Oman. The strait was named after the Iranian Hormuz Island located at its northern tip.

# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (6) [FONTE: Al-Monitor, 23/06/2015]

## SUMMARY

Gulf and international security are closely linked to the security of the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently facing many challenges that require a joint action between all affected countries.

## AUTHOR

Abdul Jalil Zayd Marhoon

## POSTED

June 23, 2015

## TRANSLATOR

Sahar Ghoussoub

The straits, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and Gibraltar, are closely connected in terms of their operational roles. Any unrest in one strait is most likely to affect navigation in the others. The Strait of Hormuz has been facing particular challenges, which are mainly reflected in the ongoing [tension between Iran and the United States](#), not to mention the threat of terrorist activities, sea piracy and organized smuggling movements.

As part of the [US approach to Gulf security](#), the United States started, since the [Carter Doctrine](#) was issued in 1980, to reinforce direct military influence by increasing its maritime military presence in regional waters.

The Carter Doctrine, which called for direct military intervention in the Gulf, was issued to confront the Soviet and [Iranian powers](#) back then. This doctrine contrasted with the [Nixon Doctrine](#) (1969), according to which protecting regional security is closely linked to bilateral cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Nixon Doctrine was known as the Twin Pillars policy. In accordance with the Carter Doctrine, the [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force](#) was formed to confront the imminent expanding dangers in the Gulf.

Until late 1988, the US regional strategy was still focused on the potential threat of a major Soviet invasion in Iran. However, the US commander-in-chief, late Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, was convinced that the changing international scene would make the Soviet invasion scenario less probable. He thus shifted his attention to the possible emergence of a new threat: the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. Schwarzkopf's fears were translated into the US Central Command exercise, [Internal Look](#), in the summer of 1990.

The US military presence in the region has been continuously growing, culminating with the [Fifth Fleet](#) in 1995, which was the first new fleet established by the United States since World War II. The US presence in the Gulf currently plays the role of foreign balancer, particularly countering Iranian forces.

# A geopolítica do petróleo no Médio Oriente (7) [FONTE: Al-Monitor, 23/06/2015]

An old debate is resurfacing about how realistic the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is and how this may possibly be done.

One of the possibilities that was suggested in the 1970s by defense experts in this regard was the closure of the strait with a natural barrier, which was disregarded given the strait's geographical nature.

There were also fears among these experts that the closure of the strait would be done by sinking ships inside the Hormuz Strait. However, this possibility has also been ruled out because sinking a ship — or even a few — would not stop the navigation in Hormuz.

Third, concerns also grew that Iran would mine the strait so as to disrupt navigation. This was the most plausible possibility at the technical level.

Some believe that minesweepers could deal with such an option, but there is no guarantee that the situation would be completely under control.

In conclusion, one can say that the most important aspect of the security of the Strait of Hormuz is the political aspect. Military approaches alone are not enough to safeguard security, even if the balance of power is tipped toward the United States.

The security of Hormuz can be reinforced through political understandings between the region's states, and through the reinvention of the historical relations between Iran and the United States and overtures between the two countries.

The US policy experience in the Gulf over the past decades, and certainly since the days of Nixon, indicates that the United States ought to work on two parallel lines in order to ensure regional security. First, the United States should encourage the region's states to build bilateral or multilateral understanding, and second to build normal and prosperous US relations with all countries in the region.

Today more than ever, it seems that the United States has the opportunity to embark on these two paths, despite the tensions plaguing the Middle East.

A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue will pave the way for a new US approach to Gulf security, which would prove profitable and feasible for the region's countries.

Contrary to what it may seem at first glance, the growing conflicts and tensions in the Middle East are not an obstacle in the way of the US-Iranian rapprochement, but an essential catalyst for it.



## PARTE IV – A questão nuclear iraniana: o fim do acordo nuclear de 2015?

# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (1)

[IMAGENS: à esquerda — publicidade de empresas dos EUA ligadas à energia nuclear nos anos 1970; à direita — imagem de jornal iraniano de 1976 dizendo que 1/4 dos cientistas do programa nuclear do país são mulheres. FONTE: Wikipedia]

## GUESS WHO'S BUILDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.



The Shah of Iran is sitting on top of one of the largest reservoirs of oil in the world.

Yet he's building two nuclear plants and planning two more to provide electricity for his country.

He knows the oil is running out — and time with it.

But he wouldn't build the plants now if he doubted their safety. He'd wait. As many Americans want to do.

The Shah knows that nuclear energy is not only economical, it has enjoyed a remarkable 30-year safety record. A record that was good enough for the citizens of Plymouth, Massachusetts, too. They've approved their second nuclear plant by a vote of almost 4 to 1. Which shows you don't have to go as far as Iran for an endorsement of nuclear power.

**NUCLEAR ENERGY. TODAY'S ANSWER.**

BOSTON EDITION - EASTERN UTILITIES ASSOCIATES - NEW ENGLAND POWER COMPANY  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE - NEW ENGLAND GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANIES

یک چهارم گروه  
دانشمندان آتمی  
ایران خانمها  
هستند!

★ چگونه میتوان شوهر  
را با آتم آشتی داد؟  
★ زنان آتم شناس ایران  
خیاطی و آشپزی را  
نیز باندازه کارخوش  
دوست میدارند.

\* استاد «آزاد» بنیانگذار  
راکتور اتمی ایران  
میگوید: زنان دانشمند  
از پایه های دانش اتمی  
در ایران هستند.

از راست بچپ: دکتر مرآت - رقیه  
بافزاده اکبری - دکتر مهین دخت  
رحمانی - ژیه سعیدی - ماهر اکبر  
نیا - فرزانه محمدی - دکتر افرسیار  
دکتر زهره طالبیان زاده

# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (2)

[FONTE: Foreign Policy, 29/12/2010]

## The Shah's Atomic Dreams

More than three decades ago, before there was an Islamic Republic, the West sought desperately to prevent Iran's ruler from getting his hands on the bomb. New revelations show just how serious the crisis was -- and why America's denuclearization drive isn't working.

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BY **ABBAS MILANI**

DECEMBER 29, 2010

Of the many inaccuracies and obfuscations of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, one of the most persistent has been the claim that, in questioning the ultimate goals of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, the West is seeking to enforce a duplicitous double standard. According to this line of rhetoric, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, was a Western ally — or, in the language of the regime, a "lackey" — and thus America and Europe were willing and eager to help him get not one, but many, reactors. But since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, these critics allege, Iran is being singled out and persecuted. In 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad [told \*Der Spiegel\*](#), "It's interesting to note that European nations wanted to allow the shah's dictatorship the use of nuclear technology.... Yet those nations were willing to supply it with nuclear technology. Ever since the Islamic Republic has existed, however, these powers have been opposed to it."

Even some progressive intellectuals in the West have bought into this story, either supporting the regime's program or at least criticizing the U.S. stance on Ahmadinejad's current program as hypocritical given its past lenience toward the shah. The U.S. government itself, in what must be considered an inexplicable failure of public diplomacy, has never challenged this narrative — although it has access to hundreds of pages of documents that disprove the regime's allegations.



# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (3)

[FONTE: Foreign Policy, 29/12/2010]

Iran's nuclear program began in 1959 with a small reactor given by the United States to Tehran University as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program announced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in December 1953. But that only whetted the Iranian monarch's appetite: With his increased oil revenues, and with his new vision of Iran as the hegemonic force in the region, a nuclear program became for Shah Pahlavi the symbol of progress and power. He summoned Akbar Etemad, a trained nuclear physicist, to the royal court in 1973, told him of his desire to launch a nuclear program, and asked Etemad to develop a master plan.

Two weeks later, the shah met with Etemad again. He quickly read the 13-page draft document Etemad had prepared, then turned to the prime minister and ordered him to fund what turned out to be one of the most expensive projects undertaken by his regime. There was no prior discussion in the Majlis, where the constitutional power of the purse lay, or in any other governmental body or council. Like every major policy decision in those days, it was a one-man act. Thus was launched Iran's nuclear program.



# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (4)

[FONTE: Foreign Policy, 29/12/2010]

The shah's plans called for a "full-fledged nuclear power industry" with the capacity to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity. By 1977, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) had more than 1,500 employees (who were, on the shah's orders, allowed to become the highest-paid government employees). Pahlavi had arranged for the training of Iranian nuclear experts around the world (including a \$20 million endowment at MIT), engaged in an intensive search for uranium mines in Iran and all over the planet, and launched several nuclear research centers across the country. AEOI was in those days one of the most heavily funded programs in the country. In 1976, its budget was \$1.3 billion, making it, after the country's oil company, the single biggest public economic institution in the country.

While Germany and France showed immediate eagerness to sell Iran its desired reactors, the United States was initially reluctant to sell any, "without conditions limiting [the shah's] freedom of action," according to the text of a U.S. governmental memo. The German company Kraftwerk signed the first agreement to build the now-famous Bushehr reactor with an initial completion date of 1981 and an estimated cost of \$3 billion. As Bushehr was located in a dangerous zone that was prone to frequent and strong seismic activity, extra funds were set aside to protect the site against the dangers of an earthquake. It was said at the time that the German government was so eager to find a foothold in the Iranian market that it guaranteed Kraftwerk's investment against any loss. U.S. companies, on the other hand, were barred from these contracts until Washington's concerns about the shah's intentions were addressed.

# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (5)

[FONTE: Foreign Policy, 29/12/2010]

The shah was adamant that Iran should enjoy its "full rights," as he put it at the time, within the NPT — an agreement Iran had immediately signed upon its formulation and that calls for non-nuclear states to forfeit the search for a nuclear bomb in return for easy access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But Iran not only insisted on the right to have the full fuel cycle, it also was interested in processing plutonium — a faster way to a nuclear bomb than enriched uranium.

In remarks that echo Ahmadinejad's provocative boasts today, in February 1974, following a Franco-Iranian agreement to cooperate on uranium enrichment, the shah told *Le Monde* that one day "sooner than is believed," Iran would be "in possession of a nuclear bomb." The shah's surprising comment was at least partially in response to the 1974 Indian test of a nuclear weapon.

Realizing the repercussions of his comment, the shah ordered the Iranian Embassy in France to issue a statement declaring that stories about his plan to develop a bomb were "totally invented and without any basis whatsoever." The U.S. Embassy in Tehran, conveying the shah's message, reassured the State Department that he was "certainly not yet" thinking about leaving the NPT or joining the nuclear club.

# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (6)

[FONTE: The Times of Israel, 1/11/2013]

## Did Israel, under the shah, help start Iran's nuclear program?

A new documentary recalls the 'paradise in a bubble' of Israelis in Iran before 1979. It also suggests they played an initial role in setting Iran on the nuclear path

BY RAPHAEL AHREN | November 1, 2013, 2:50 pm | 27

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# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (7)

[FONTE: The Times of Israel, 1/11/2013]

S ometime in the late 1970s, Yaakov Nimrodi, who served as military attaché in Israel's unofficial embassy in Iran, hosted a number of high-ranking army officers at his Tehran home. Trying to impress his esteemed guests, Nimrodi asked his son Ofer to show them his skills on the piano. At first the child hesitated, but his father insisted, so he played a little bit. The Iranian generals loved the performance, and applauded heartily. Then Iran's chief of staff, Gen. Fereydoun Djam, speaking in Persian, called little Ofer over to him.

"He took off his gold watch and gave it to me as a present," Ofer Nimrodi, now 56, remembered. "I'm an 8-year-old boy, I have no idea what's happening. But [Djam] said, 'You played really nicely, you deserve it.' I looked at my dad and he said, 'No, General Djam, this is inappropriate, please.' But the Iranian general insisted, and more than 30 years later Nimrodi, a prominent businessman and former publisher of the Maariv daily, still possesses the watch.

There are countless such anecdotes that illustrate the close ties between the State of Israel and the Iranian regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi before he was deposed in 1979 — a relationship utterly unthinkable in the current political climate.

Before the Islamic Revolution, thousands of Israelis, mostly diplomats and businessmen, sought and found their fortunes in Iran. A gripping documentary, by Dan Shadur and Barak Heyman, tells this "untold story of the Israeli paradise in Iran."



# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (8)

[FONTE: The Times of Israel, 1/11/2013]

“Before the Revolution” — which is now being screened at film festivals, was shown on Israel’s YES satellite TV, and will hit international television screens later this year — does not ignore the more dubious aspects of Israel’s close ties with the dictatorial regime. The film contains some chilling quotes of Israelis who say they were aware of the regime’s human rights abuses (including torture of dissidents) but couldn’t be bothered with that, as they were busy making money and partying in the shah’s splendid palaces. It details the massive arms deals (Yaacov Nimrodi sold the Iranians advanced missile systems and 50,000 Uzi submachine guns). And it depicts a controversial framework of military and intelligence cooperation that likely included helping set up what became Tehran’s rogue nuclear program.

In one of the film’s many intriguing moments, Nachik Navot, who headed the Mossad’s branch in Tehran from 1969 to 1972, explains that the shah started Iran’s nuclear program as a means of deterrence against Iraq. Asked by filmmaker Shadur — an Israeli who grew up in Iran — who helped the Iranians develop their nuclear program, Navot quickly replies, “The heavens,” and then awkwardly averts his look away from the camera, clearly uncomfortable with the question.

Asked by The Times of Israel this week to expand on that topic, and whether he could state which countries or individuals assisted Iran with what became the rogue nuclear program, believed by Israel and others to be aimed at attaining nuclear weapons, Navot replied warily that he could comment “only on issues I am familiar with or was involved in.”

(Iran had formally launched a peaceful nuclear program in 1957, with the announcement of plans for cooperation with the US “in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” Iran opened a nuclear research center in Tehran a decade later, with a US-supplied research reactor. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. All formal US and European cooperation in this area ended with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. )

# A antiga ambição nuclear iraniana (9)

[FONTE: The Times of Israel, 1/11/2013]

"The Arab countries continue to be concerned with the close relations prevailing between Iran and Israel. A special grievance was the reported export of oil from Iran to Israel," read a report in the 1961 issue of the Middle East Record, a journal published annually by Tel Aviv University. The Arab League's secretary-general at the time worried that "Zionist penetration and influence in Iran were increasing daily," the journal reported, adding that the group recommended that "all Arab nations break off diplomatic relations with Iran, whose activity defeated the aim of economic boycott of Israel."

The shah admired Israel mainly because of its military success. "The cooperation with Israel was tremendous. Every Iranian general visited Israel and we visited them," Gen. Yitzhak Segev, Israel's military attaché from 1977 to 1979, says in "Before the Revolution."



Top Iranian military officials Hasan Toofanian and Bahram Ariana (left), meet with Israeli officers in the headquarters of the Israel Defense Forces, 1975. (photo credit: public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**, also called **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, agreement of July 1, 1968, signed by the [United Kingdom](#), the [United States](#), the [Soviet Union](#), and 59 other states, under which the three major signatories, which possessed [nuclear weapons](#), agreed not to assist other states in obtaining or producing them. The [treaty](#) became effective in March 1970 and was to remain so for a 25-year period. Additional countries later ratified the treaty; as of 2007 only three countries (India, [Israel](#), and Pakistan) have refused to sign the treaty, and one country ([North Korea](#)) has signed and then withdrawn from the treaty. The treaty was extended indefinitely and without conditions in 1995 by a [consensus vote](#) of 174 countries at the [United Nations](#) headquarters in [New York City](#).

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is uniquely unequal, as it obliges nonnuclear states to forgo development of nuclear weapons while allowing the established nuclear states to keep theirs. Nevertheless, it has been accepted because, especially at the time of signing, most nonnuclear states had neither the capacity nor the inclination to follow the nuclear path, and they were well aware of the dangers of proliferation for their security. In addition, it was understood in 1968 that, in return for their special status, the nuclear states would help the nonnuclear states in the development of civilian [nuclear power](#) (although in the event the distinction between civilian and military nuclear technology was not so straightforward) and also that the nuclear states would make their best efforts to agree on measures of [disarmament](#). In the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this inequality was a major complaint against the established nuclear powers. The treaty continues to play an important role in sustaining the international norm against proliferation, but it has been challenged by a number of events, including (1) [North Korea](#)'s withdrawal from the treaty in 2003 as it sought to acquire nuclear weapons, (2) evidence of the progress [Iraq](#) made in the 1980s on its nuclear program despite being a signatory to the treaty, and (3) allegations about uranium enrichment facilities in [Iran](#), yet another signatory to the treaty. The credibility of the nonproliferation norm has also been undermined by the ability of [India](#) and [Pakistan](#) to become declared nuclear powers in 1998 without any serious international penalty—and indeed by India establishing its own special arrangements as part of a bilateral deal with the United States in 2008.

## Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

### QUICK FACTS



### DATE

July 1, 1968

### PARTICIPANTS

[Soviet Union](#)  
[United Kingdom](#)  
[United States](#)

### KEY PEOPLE

[Alfonso García Robles](#)  
[Satō Eisaku](#)

### RELATED TOPICS

[Nuclear warfare](#)  
[Nuclear weapon](#)



# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (2) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

## Iran nuclear deal: Key details

🕒 7 May 2019

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Iran nuclear deal



In 2015, Iran agreed a long-term deal on its nuclear programme with a group of world powers known as the P5+1 - the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany.

It came after years of tension over Iran's alleged efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran insisted that its nuclear programme was entirely peaceful, but the international community did not believe that.

Under the accord, Iran agreed to limit its sensitive nuclear activities and allow in international inspectors in return for the lifting of crippling economic sanctions.

Here are the commitments set out in the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**.



# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (3) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

## Uranium enrichment



Enriched uranium is used to make reactor fuel, but also nuclear weapons.

Iran had two facilities - Natanz and Fordo - where uranium hexafluoride gas was fed into centrifuges to separate out the most fissile isotope, U-235.

Low-enriched uranium, which has a 3%-4% concentration of U-235, can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. "Weapons-grade" uranium is 90% enriched.

In July 2015, Iran had almost 20,000 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, it was limited to installing no more than 5,060 of the oldest and least efficient centrifuges at Natanz until 2026 - 15 years after the deal's "implementation day" in January 2016.

# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (4) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

## Changes agreed under Iran deal to limit nuclear programme



Iran's uranium stockpile was reduced by 98% to 300kg (660lbs), a figure that must not be exceeded until 2031. It must also keep the stockpile's level of enrichment at 3.67%.

By January 2016, Iran had drastically reduced the number of centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordo, and shipped tonnes of low-enriched uranium to Russia.

In addition, research and development must take place only at Natanz and be limited until 2024.

No enrichment will be permitted at Fordo until 2031, and the underground facility will be converted into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. The 1,044 centrifuges at the site will produce radioisotopes for use in medicine, agriculture, industry and science.

# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (5) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

## Plutonium pathway



Iran had been building a heavy-water nuclear facility near the town of Arak. Spent fuel from a heavy-water reactor contains plutonium suitable for a nuclear bomb.

World powers had originally wanted Arak dismantled because of the proliferation risk. Under an interim nuclear deal agreed in 2013, Iran agreed not to commission or fuel the reactor.

Under the JCPOA, Iran said it would redesign the reactor so it could not produce any weapons-grade plutonium, and that all spent fuel would be sent out of the country as long as the modified reactor exists.

Iran will not be permitted to build additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate any excess heavy water until 2031.



# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (6) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

'Break-out time'



Before July 2015, Iran had a large stockpile of enriched uranium and almost 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create eight to 10 bombs, according to the Obama administration.

US experts estimated then that if Iran had decided to rush to make a bomb, it would take two to three months until it had enough 90%-enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon - the so-called "break-out time".

The Obama administration said the JCPOA would remove the key elements Iran would need to create a bomb and increase its break-out time to one year or more.

Iran also agreed not to engage in activities, including research and development, which could contribute to the development of a nuclear bomb.

In December 2015, the IAEA's board of governors voted to end its decade-long investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.

The agency's director-general, Yukiya Amano, said the report concluded that until 2003 Iran had conducted "a co-ordinated effort" on "a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device". Iran continued with some activities until 2009, but after that there were "no credible indications" of weapons development, he added.

# O Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão (7) [FONTE: BBC,7/05/2019]

## Lifting sanctions



Sanctions previously imposed by the UN, US and EU in an attempt to force Iran to halt uranium enrichment crippled its economy, costing the country more than \$160bn (£118bn) in oil revenue from 2012 to 2016 alone.

Under the deal, Iran gained access to more than \$100bn in assets frozen overseas, and was able to resume selling oil on international markets and using the global financial system for trade.


However, in May 2018, US President Donald Trump abandoned the landmark deal and **in November that year, he reinstated sanctions targeting both Iran and states that trade with it.**

They led to a downturn in Iran's economy, pushing the value of its currency to record lows, quadrupling its annual inflation rate, driving away foreign investors, and triggering protests.

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (1) [FONTE: BBC, 2/05/2019]

## Economic growth in Iran

GDP growth rate %




2018/19 figs are IMF estimate/forecasts



# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (2) [FONTE: BBC, 2/05/2019]

## Iran's oil output

Production in millions of barrels per day



\*Quarterly data from 1st of each month

Source: OPEC

BBC

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (3) [FONTE: BBC, 2/05/2019]

At the start of 2018, Iran's crude oil production reached 3.8 million barrels per day (bpd), according to data gathered by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec). The country was exporting about 2.3 million bpd.


Most of the oil was bought by eight countries or territories that were granted six-month waivers by the US when sanctions on the Iranian energy sector took effect - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Greece and Italy.



By March, Iran's oil exports had fallen to 1.1 million barrels per day on average

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (4) [FONTE: BBC, 2/05/2019]

## Iran oil exports: Eight countries with US waivers



Source: SVB Energy International

BBC

**President Trump declared that he "intended to bring Iran's oil exports to zero"** when he decided to allow the SRE waivers expire on 2 May.

However, it is not clear how much further Iranian oil sales will drop.

China has insisted that its trade with Iran is perfectly legal and that the US has no jurisdiction to interfere. Turkey has said it cannot cut ties with a neighbour.

Iran could also export oil to cover humanitarian needs and might be able to evade the sanctions by exporting oil covertly - something analysts suspect it already does.



# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (5) [FONTE: ECFR, 7/02/2019]



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## Trading with Iran via the special purpose vehicle: How it can work

Iran sanctions mini-series  
Ellie Geranmayeh, Esfandiyar Batmanghelidj  
07th February, 2019

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*On 31 January, Germany, France and Britain announced the establishment of a special purpose vehicle aimed at facilitating legitimate trade with Iran*

Following weeks of speculation, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (the E3) have formally registered a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran – trade that the return of US sanctions has significantly hampered. This comes after months of technical coordination between member states led by the European External Action Service. While reactions in Tehran have been mixed, this is a significant demonstration of Europe's commitment to preserving the Iran nuclear deal after President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from it.

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (6) [FONTE: ECFR, 7/02/2019]

## Sovereign shield

An important element of the mechanism is its sovereign backing from the E3. The supervisory board of INSTEX will include senior European diplomats such as UK Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Simon McDonald; Miguel Berger, head of the economic department at the German Foreign Office; and Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, secretary-general of the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. The E3 governments are also shareholders of INSTEX.

The E3 have gone to great lengths to create a diplomatic shield around INSTEX and to share risk among the biggest economies in Europe. With the E3 having stuck their necks out, several other European countries are also considering joining the SPV as shareholders. While this does not eliminate the risk of US pressure on the mechanism, it does substantially raise the stakes for Washington should it seek to directly sanction or otherwise coerce a sovereign European entity or its senior management board – as it has with the European private sector.

It is important that the Iranian government now establishes another SPV to mirror INSTEX inside Iran. To persuade European companies to use the SPV, the Iranian entity will need to meet high standards of transparency in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (7) [FONTE: ECFR, 7/02/2019]

regulations. Thus, the E3 would prefer that the Iranian SPV was either a new company or operated under an Iranian bank that has not been subject to US secondary sanctions. This is likely to reduce the risk that the US administration will apply pressure to INSTEX's operations.

In theory, Iran should establish its SPV more quickly than the E3 did their mechanism, given that Tehran will not need to balance the interests of several countries. However, it is inevitable that this issue will be caught up in extensive political debate in Iran. To speed up this process, Tehran should carefully consider offers from the European Union and the E3 on technical assistance in launching an Iranian SPV.

## How INSTEX could work in practice

INSTEX is best understood as an international trade intermediary that provides services to ease trade between Europe and Iran. Although the new company is not a bank, it will have a role in coordinating payments relating to trade with Iran. This coordination is necessary. Iranian importers have struggled to purchase and receive euros from the Central Bank of Iran on time – as is necessary to make payments to European suppliers. Even when they do acquire euros, Iranian importers struggle to make payments to suppliers, as European banks remain hesitant to accept funds originating in Iran. This holds true even for humanitarian trade that is formally exempt from sanctions: several exporters of food and medicine to Iran have reportedly experienced disruptions in recent months, contributing to troubling shortages and sharp price increases.



# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (8) [FONTE: ECFR, 7/02/2019]

## Iran nuclear deal: Tehran may increase uranium enrichment

🕒 8 May 2019

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Iran nuclear deal




**Iran has suspended commitments under the 2015 international nuclear deal, a year after it was abandoned by the US.**

President Hassan Rouhani said he would keep enriched uranium stocks in the country rather than sell them abroad.



He also threatened to resume production of more-highly-enriched uranium in 60 days if other signatories did not act to protect Iran from US sanctions.

# O fim do Acordo de 2015 sobre o programa nuclear do Irã? (9)

[FONTE: "Iran-US relations: Nine cartoons tell the story" in BBC, 16/07/2015]



# Bibliografia





# Bibliografia

