Política Internacional e Geopolítica a crise do mundo globalizado

INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
2020-2021
SESSÃO Nº3



PARTE I – NOTAS BREVES (Política Internacional)

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (1)

[FONTE: H. Lauterpacht, The Yale Journal Law, 1944, Junho, p. 385]

RECOGNITION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

By H. LAUTERPACHT †

I.

INTRODUCTORY

Principles of the Recognition of States. To recognize a community as a State is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by international law. If these conditions are present, existing States are under the duty to grant recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to declare the presence of requirements of full international personality, States already established fulfill that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of nations. This rule of law signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter. Although recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfillment of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obligations exist only to the extent to which they have been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted by reference to compelling rules of humanity and justice, either by the existing members of international society or by the community claiming recognition.1

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (2)

[FONTE: H. Lauterpacht, The Yale Journal Law, 1944, Junho, p. 385]


The Problem of Recognition in the Science of International Law. The majority of writers still adhere to the view that the act of recognition as such is not a matter governed by law, but a question of policy. They urge that recognition is the result of a decision taken not in obedience to a legal duty, but in pursuance of the exigencies of national interest. If this is so, it will be asked, how is it that recognition looms so large in the writings of those very jurists who hold that it is outside the law? The answer is that, while denying the quality of law to the act of recognition, some of them maintain that this act of policy, once accomplished, entails legal consequences inasmuch as it is the starting point of international personality with all the rights pertaining thereto; that, in any case, the form and the circumstances of recognition are of legal interest and necessitate the consideration of such questions as the distinction between de jure and de facto recognition, implied recognition, and conditional recognition; and that important questions of law arise when that act of policy constitutes so-called premature recognition in disregard of the rights of existing States. But the dominant fact remains that the very commencement of the international personality of States and their legal right to existence are declared by these writers to be outside the orbit of international law.

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (3)

[FONTE: Al Jazeera 22/09/2020]

International recognition

The United Nations has 193 member states. Of those, 162 (84%) recognise Israel and 138 (72%) recognise the State of Palestine.



Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (4)

[FONTE: Al Jazeera 22/09/2020]

Explainer: Where do Arab states stand on normalising Israel ties?

A roundup of where other Arab countries stand after the UAE and Bahrain establish formal ties with Israel.



After the UAE and Bahrain normalised Israel ties, Trump said he expected other Arab nations to follow suit, without mentioning names [File: Anadolu]

22 Sep 2020

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain are the latest countries in the Arab region to formally establish diplomatic ties with Israel in deals brokered by the United States. 6

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (5)

[FONTE: Al Jazeera 22/09/2020]

The only two Arab countries Israel has signed peace treaties with are Egypt and Jordan, in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Egypt and Jordan share borders with Israel and have both fought wars with Israel in the past.

But the latest normalisation deals with Israel come as part of a broader diplomatic push by US President Donald Trump and his administration, who earlier this year revealed the so-called Middle East peace plan, which has been categorically rejected by the Palestinians.

Various reports have shown that some Gulf Arab states have established covert ties with Israel in recent years, with some relationships dating back to the 1990s, when the US-brokered Oslo Accords was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Other countries have seemed less reluctant to publicise their relations with Israel, including Oman and Sudan, whose officials have met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent years.

While many Arab states say they remain committed to the Arab Peace Initiative – which calls for Israel's complete withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied after 1967 in exchange for peace and the full normalisation of relations – speculations have been rife that some countries in the region would soon join the bandwagon.

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (6)

[FONTE: Times of Israel, 23/10/2020]

'Yes, yes': Why peace with Khartoum would be true paradigm shift for Israel

The big, poor African state and the small, rich Gulf monarchies couldn't be more different; for a start, unlike Bahrain and the UAE, Sudan actually went to war against Israel

By Raphael Ahren 23 October 2020, 6:31 am

Yes to removal of Sudan from the US list of state sponsors of terror. Yes to a billion-dollar aid package. And yes to normalization with Israel?

The remarkable tale of Sudan turning from a symbol of the Arab world's rejection of the Jewish state, into its latest potential peace partner, could be summed up by referring to three no's that, in the span of 53 years, look set to become three yes's.

Many Israelis still associate Khartoum with the <u>"Three No's"</u> — "No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel" — formulated by an Arab League summit held in the Sudanese capital shortly after the end of the Six-Day War in 1967.

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (7)

[FONTE: Times of Israel, 23/10/2020]



A demonstrator gives the victory sign at a protest, in Khartoum, Sudan, Oct. 21, 2020. Protesters took to the streets in the capital and across the country over dire living conditions and a deadly crackdown on demonstrators in the east earlier in the month. (AP Photo/Marwan Ali)

\$335 million in compensation to the victims of the 1998 bombings of two US Embassies in Africa (Sudan didn't perpetrate the attacks, which killed more than 4,000 people, but granted asylum to the terrorists). In exchange, US President Donald Trump vowed to remove the country from its lists of state sponsors of terrorism, where it has been since 1993.

Rumo à normalização das relações diplomáticas de Israel com os países árabes? (8)

[FONTE: Times of Israel, 23/10/2020]



Clockwise, from top left: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his office in Jerusalem, Sept. 13 2020 (Alex Kolomiensky/Yedioth Ahronoth via AP, Pool); Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok at the Elysee palace in Paris, Sept. 30, 2019. (AP Photo/Thibault Camus); US President Donald Trump at the White House, Oct. 21, 2020 (AP Photo/Alex Brandon); Sudanese Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of the military council, west of Khartoum, June 29, 2019 (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)

According to Hebrew media reports, Jerusalem and Khartoum will announce the establishment of diplomatic ties over the weekend or early next week.

Other reports indicated that Hamdok is willing in principle to normalize relations with the Jewish state, but insists his country's yet-to-be-formed transitional parliament must first approve such a move.


Thus a Sudan-Israel deal seems to be a question of when, and not if.

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Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (1) [FONTE: FT, 20/10/2020]

Sweden bans Huawei and ZTE from 5G telecoms networks

October 20, 2020



Sweden has become the latest country to ban Chinese telecoms groups Huawei and ZTE from its 5G mobile networks as it took aim at what it labelled Beijing's spying and "theft of technology".

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (2) [FONTE: FT, 20/10/2020]

"This is what we must consider when building the 5G network of the future. We cannot compromise with Sweden's security," Mr Friberg added.

The ban in Sweden, which is home to Huawei's biggest rival Ericsson, is the latest move in a geopolitical fight over Huawei as the US pushes its allies to exclude Chinese telecoms equipment from the planned new 5G mobile networks.

Anders Ygeman, Sweden's minister for energy and digitalisation, said the new conditions would give a "much more secure 5G network" but insisted they were not targeted at any individual country or company, despite only Huawei and ZTE being named.

Tele2, Sweden's second-largest telecoms operator, has used Huawei as well as other suppliers in its early 5G network launched in May.

It said on Tuesday that it did not foresee any problem in fulfilling the new security conditions "in time" and instead hailed the decision to proceed with auctions of 5G spectrum next month after several delays. Tele2 and Norway's state operator Telenor used Huawei in their 4G network in Sweden.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (3) [FONTE: SCMP, 21/10/2020]

In banning Huawei and ZTE, Sweden calls China a national security threat

Prohibition has already drawn a response from Beijing, but stark description may lead to retaliation against telecoms giant Ericsson Stockholm's statement contrasts with other European countries that have been trying to deal with China more diplomatically

One of them is Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel has been accused of postponing the introduction of a new IT Security Act that could apply limits on Huawei, which has worked closely with the leading German telecoms provider, Deutsche Telekom.

In July, Britain ordered Huawei equipment to be purged completely from its 5G network by 2027, becoming one of the first European countries to do so.

Italy has put up costly bureaucratic hurdles for operators using high-risk vendors, making it uneconomical to choose Huawei or ZTE.

Tim Rühlig, an expert on EU-China relations at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, said that Swedish authorities banned Huawei in the most explicit way possible.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (4) [FONTE: Global Times, 5/08/2020]

Swedish singer Zara Larsson boycotted by Chinese netizens for condemning China and ending collaboration with Huawei



Photo taken on Nov. 20, 2019 shows Huawei's exhibition booth during a press preview for the 2019 World 5G Convention in Beijing, capital of China.(Xinhua/Li Xin)

After ending collaboration with Chinese mobile giant Huawei to promote a new smart phone, Swedish singer Zara Larsson condemned China in an interview with Swedish broadcaster TV4, provoking Chinese netizens, who accused the singer of judging the country out of ignorance.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (5) [FONTE: Guardian, 17/09/2018]

China accuses Sweden of violating human rights over treatment of tourists

Lily Kuo Mon 17 Sep 2018 06.53 BST

This article is more than 2 years old

Beijing demands an apology over 'brutal abuse' of three Chinese tourists by police in Stockholm

Chinese tourists complain after being removed from hostel in Sweden - video

A disagreement between Chinese tourists and a hostel in Stockholm over check-in time has turned into a diplomatic spat between China and Sweden, after Beijing criticised Sweden for violating the human rights of Chinese citizens.

China has demanded an apology from Sweden and issued a safety alert for its tourists in the country after it said that three tourists had been "brutally abused" by Swedish police on 2 September.

The Zengs, a family of three, had arrived at a hostel in Stockholm around midnight, hours before their booking. They were allowed to wait in the lobby until the staff ordered them to leave and police forcibly ejected them.

Bizarre video footage posted online shows police carrying the group outside, while the son yells in English: "This is killing. This is killing." Another clip shows the three lying on the ground crying loudly while the mother wails in Chinese: "Save me."

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (6) [FONTE: Reuters, 15/11/2019]

China, Sweden escalate war of words over support for detained bookseller

STOCKHOLM/BEIJING (Reuters) - Beijing has doubled down in its criticism of Stockholm's support for Gui Minhai, a book publisher detained in China, after Sweden's minister for culture attended a literary award ceremony in his honor.

The Chinese ambassador to Sweden had threatened Minister of Culture Amanda Lind with a ban on entering China if she attended the prizegiving on Friday.

After the ceremony where Lind defended freedom of speech, China's embassy in Stockholm said in a statement on Saturday that Lind's attendance was a "serious mistake".

It did not reference the potential ban but warned that "wrong deeds will only meet with bad consequences."


"Giving an award to such a criminal is an outright political farce ... It also constitutes a gross interference in China's judicial sovereignty," the statement said.

Gui Minhai, a Chinese-born Swedish citizen, was abducted in Thailand in 2015 and is now detained in China. When based in Hong Kong, he published books critical of China's leaders, and the case has soured ties between Sweden and China.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (7) [FONTE: Reuters, 15/11/2019]

Sweden's lonely boxing match with Beijing

Battle over bookseller blows up diplomatic relations with China.



Swedish Culture and Democracy Minister Amanda Lind receives an award in 2019 on behalf of Gui Minhai, a Swedish bookseller who is imprisoned in China | Fredrik Sandberg/TT News Agency/AFP via Getty Images

VÄSTERÅS, Sweden — On a recent weekday in the Swedish industrial town of Västerås, about an hour's drive west from Stockholm, Mayor Anders Teljebäck admitted defeat.

The municipal council had just voted to shut down a three-year partnership with Jinan, a Chinese city in Shandong province. As part of the state-funded program, called "residents' dialogue," Chinese officials

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (8) [FONTE: Político, 12/02/2020]

But after just a year, momentum had stalled — amid a high-profile spat between Stockholm and Beijing over human rights — and the Swedish town voted to end the partnership.

"We see that we won't make the type of progress that we want to make," Teljebäck conceded, speaking at his office in city hall.

Västerås is a microcosm of what is happening across Sweden, where officials and business leaders are waking up to the reality of dealing with the Chinese one-party state, after years spent looking for ways to tighten trade and diplomatic ties with Beijing.

"We didn't think we could turn China into a democracy, of course" — Anders Teljebäck, Västerås mayor

The deteriorating human rights situation in China — which has come under fire for its incarceration of its Muslim population in Xinjiang province — and Beijing's increasingly muscular military and diplomatic stance abroad has caused some European governments, like Sweden, to rethink their willingness to engage.

But as Stockholm found out when a Swedish NGO <u>awarded a prize to a Chinese dissident</u>, pushing back against Beijing means putting yourself in the line of fire of a nation with a growing arsenal of diplomatic weapons — very often, alone.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (9) [FONTE: The Local, 1/10/2020]

OPINION: China's attacks on Sweden are unacceptable in a democracy



In September 2019, journalist Kurdo Baksi was accused of "insanity" by the Chinese embassy. In a spokesperson's remarks, Baksi's defence of publisher Gui Minhai was attacked with words such as "insanity", "ignorance", "anti-China" and he was accused of not understanding democracy. The embassy's goal was openly stated, to silence Baksi: "We urge Baksi to immediately stop. We urge him not to live in a world of fantasy and self-delusion, and never underestimate the ability of Swedish people to discern right and wrong."

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (10) [FONTE: The Local, 1/10/2020]



China's ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou. Photo: Magnus Hjalmarson Neideman/SvD/TT

Free and open societies all over the world are under attack from the regime of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Chinese regime is using its increased economic power to threaten governments, silence critics and force media to obedience. When the biggest dictatorship in the world becomes the biggest economy, the threats to democracies all over the world are obvious. Chinese leaders are acting with the logic of a global dictatorship because they have interests all over the world.

CPC has the vision of China being the dominant power in the world, thereby replacing the US as a global leader – something the US today voluntarily abdicates from. Regionally, China is projecting its rising military force in Southeast Asia against its neighbours with the elimination of the treaty based on "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong as an initial step. Increased military pressure against Taiwan, border tensions with India and maritime power projection in the South China sea gives evidence of Chinese regional strategy.

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (11) [FONTE: Político, 4/08/2020]

In the home of Volvo, Sweden's ties with China under strain

Agreement dating back 34 years brings closer cooperation between Gothenburg and Shanghai — but there are calls for it to be curtailed.



Employees work on the production line at the Volvo car factory in Torslanda, Gothenburg | Adam Ihse/AFP via Getty Images

Suécia vs China: as tensões político-económicas (12) [FONTE: Político, 4/08/2020]

The agreement, which comes up for renewal every two years, has been the basis for joint working between the two cities in a diverse range of sectors. Among other things, it has been credited with helping pave the way for the billion-dollar 2010 buyout of Gothenburg-based Volvo Cars, the city's commercial crown jewel, by the Zhejiang Geely Holding Group — a move that saved the iconic carmaker from going under.

"China is a big partner here in Gothenburg ... but we have to do the right thing," Fogelklou told POLITICO. "Our suggestion for the agreement was don't renew it."

First signed back in 1986, the cooperation agreement covered port operations, public transport and waste management before being extended in 2003 to promote cooperation in various areas including economy, trade, science, technology and culture.

"We don't have to be that naive" — Jörgen Fogelklou, Gothenburg councilor

For many years the agreement was uncontroversial, and officials carried out visits in both directions under its auspices.

However, as Swedish and wider European relations with China have worsened in recent years — over Beijing's human rights record as well as the imposition of draconian anti-protest laws in Hong Kong and fears over Chinese technology firms' involvement in Europe's 5G network — Gothenburg's alignment with Shanghai and with China more broadly has come into question.



PARTE II – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (1) [FONTE: Nick Holdstock, China's Forgotten People (IB Tauris, 2015)]



Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (2) [FONTE: Nick Holdstock, China's Forgotten People (IB Tauris, 2015) e Wikipedia]



Area ^[1]		
• Total	1,664,897 km ² (642,820 sq mi)	
Area rank	<u>1st</u>	
Highest elevation (K2)	8,611 m (28,251 ft)	
Lowest elevation (Lake Ayding ^[2])	–154 m (–505 ft)	
Population (2010 Cens	sus)[<u>3]</u>	
· Total	21,815,815	
• Estimate (2018)[4]	24,870,000	
· Rank	25th	
 Density 	15/km ² (40/sq mi)	
Density rank	<u>29th</u>	
Demographics ^[5]		
• Ethnic composition (2010 Census)	45.84% <u>Uyghur</u> 40.48% <u>Han</u> 6.50% <u>Kazakh</u> 4.51% <u>Hui</u> 2.67% Other	
Languages and dialects	Uyghur (official) ^[6] Mandarin (official) Kazakh Kyrgyz Oirat Mongolian 43 other languages	

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (3) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Uighur

Uighur, Chinese (Pinyin) **Weiwu'er**, also spelled **Uygur** or **Uyghur**, a Turkic-speaking people of interior Asia. Uighurs live for the most part in northwestern China, in the Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang; a small number live in the Central Asian republics. There were some 10,000,000 Uighurs in China and at least a combined total of 300,000 in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 21st century.

The Uighur language is part of the Turkic group of Altaic languages, and the Uighurs are among the oldest Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia. They are mentioned in Chinese records from the 3rd century CE. They first rose to prominence in the 8th century, when they established a kingdom along the Orhon River in what is now north-central Mongolia. In 840 this state was overrun by the Kyrgyz, however, and the Uighurs migrated southwestward to the area around the Tien (Tian) Shan ("Celestial Mountains"). There the Uighurs formed another independent kingdom in the Turfan Depression region, but this was overthrown by the expanding Mongols in the 13th century.


The Uighurs are mainly a sedentary village-dwelling people who live in the network of oases formed in the valleys and lower slopes of the Tien Shan, Pamirs, and related mountain systems. The region is one of the most arid in the world; hence, for centuries they have practiced irrigation to conserve their water supply for agriculture. Their principal food crops are wheat, corn (maize), *kaoliang* (a form of sorghum), and melons. The chief industrial crop is cotton, which has long been grown in the area. Many Uighurs are employed in petroleum extraction, mining, and manufacturing in urban centres.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (4) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Large numbers of Han (ethnic Chinese) began moving into Xinjiang after the establishment of the autonomous region in the 1950s. The influx became especially pronounced after 1990, and by the late 20th century the Han constituted two-fifths of Xinjiang's total population. Over time economic disparities and ethnic tensions grew between the Uighur and Han populations that eventually resulted in protests and other disturbances. A particularly violent outbreak occurred in July 2009, mainly in Ürümqi, in which it was reported that nearly 200 people (mostly Han) were killed and some 1,700 were injured. Violent incidents increased after that and included attacks by knife-wielding assailants and by suicide bombers. Chinese authorities responded by cracking down on Uighurs suspected of being dissidents and separatists. The authorities' actions included shootings, arrests, and long jail sentences until 2017, when the Chinese government initiated a thorough crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang. Citing a need for greater security, the government set up cameras, checkpoints, and constant police patrols in Uighur-dominated areas. The most controversial governmental undertaking—which was met by protests from human-rights organizations was the indefinite detention of up to one million Uighurs in "political training centres," heavily fortified buildings that were likened to the reeducation camps of the Mao Zedong era. In August 2018 the United Nations called upon China to end the detention, but government officials denied the existence of the camps.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (5) [FONTE: The Geopolítics, 8/05/2019]

The Geopolitics



Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (6) [FONTE: The Geopolitics, 8/05/2019]

China and Xinjiang: The Fate of BRI

Subhranil Ghosh & Sreemoyee Majumder May 8, 2019

Investments have either built or doomed empires. For the former to be materialized, investments are to be made considering factors beyond the purely economic ones. In contemporary times the greatest spectacle of investment is the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), inducing development and investment in almost 152 countries across the globe. The BRI is a Xi Jinping initiative, ostensibly aimed at creating a 21st century Maritime Silk route to enhance the culture of the peaceful and cooperative cross-border trades, inherent in the process of globalization. This claim is, however, the most debated issue of 21st-century global politics. This trillion dollars Chinese project has been criticized as a Chinese weapon to consolidate its dominance in global trade, a claim most prominently made by India.


Simultaneously questions have been raised about its ultimate success. In this light, the Soviet economic slowdown of the 1970s following its gigantic investments in Siberia and the far east has often been brought into parallel with China and its East-west trade project's possible fate. Analyzing that, especially in the context of China's huge investment strategy in its underdeveloped and politically disturbed north-western region of Xinjiang province will be our focal point of discussion. But before that, a brief look at the history of Siberian curse on the Soviet economy is imperative.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (7) [FONTE: The Geopolitics, 8/05/2019]

Xinjiang – the anomaly in the Chinese equation

Xinjiang located at the north-western part of the Chinese mainland has a religio-cultural homogeneity with the bordering Central Asian states rather than that with China. While this geographic position along with its abundant natural wealth, on one hand, has made Xinjiang the most significant possession of China's economic geography, on the other hand, it is the root cause of the major ethnic crisis that the People's Republic of China is yet to cope up with. Naturally, the Muslim domination of the ethnic-demographic composition of Xinjiang, mainly comprised of the Uighur ethnicity, stands in sharp contrast with the mainstream national patriotic values proselytized by Communist China. Although realizing its geo-strategic significance, the Chinese state has for long adopted developmental process in the region, only to aggravate the ethnic tension.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (8) [FONTE: The Xinjiang Data Project]



Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (9) [FONTE: The Xinjiang Data Project / CNN, 2020]


"The contents of this document are really significant to all of us because it shows us the paranoid mindset of a regime that's controlling the upand-coming super power of this globe," Zenz told CNN.



A redacted version of part of a Chinese government PDF document which was leaked to CNN, showing records of detainees in Xinjiang.

CNN sent a copy of the document to both the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the local government in Xinjiang, to see if they could verify its authenticity. There was no response.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (10) [FONTE: ASPI, Policy Brief Report nº 26/2020]



Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (11) [FONTE: ASPI, Policy Brief Report nº 26/2020]

What's the problem?

The Chinese government has facilitated the mass transfer of Uyghur and other ethnic minority¹ citizens from the far west region of Xinjiang to factories across the country. Under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour, Uyghurs are working in factories that are in the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global brands in the technology, clothing and automotive sectors, including Apple, BMW, Gap, Huawei, Nike, Samsung, Sony and Volkswagen.

This report estimates that more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and 2019, and some of them were sent directly from detention camps.² The estimated figure is conservative and the actual figure is likely to be far higher. In factories far away from home, they typically live in segregated dormitories,³ undergo organised Mandarin and ideological training outside working hours,⁴ are subject to constant surveillance, and are forbidden from participating in religious observances.⁵ Numerous sources, including government documents, show that transferred workers are assigned minders and have limited freedom of movement.⁶

China has attracted international condemnation for its network of extrajudicial 're-education camps' in Xinjiang.⁷ This report exposes a new phase in China's social re-engineering campaign targeting minority citizens, revealing new evidence that some factories across China are using forced Uyghur labour under a state-sponsored labour transfer scheme that is tainting the global supply chain.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (12) [FONTE: ASPI, Policy Brief Report nº 26/2020]

Appendix

Table 1: Transfers of Uyghurs out of Xinjiang

Transfers of Uyghurs out of	Chinese factories involved	International brands supplied
Xinjiang		by factory
From 2014 to mid-2018, Xinjiang's Nilka county transferred 390 people to work in other provinces of China. ¹⁵¹ In the first 6 months of 2019, the county transferred 551 people out of Xinjiang. ¹⁵²	KTK Group (今创控股集团 also known as Jiangsu Jinchuang Group) is mainly involved in rail transportation equipment, including design, research and development, and producing door systems, interiors, and other parts. 155	KTK Group's website says its customers include Alstom , Bombardier , CRRC and Siemens , and the company is a strategic partner with Alstom , Bombardier , CRRC and Hitachi . 156
That included workers sent to Changzhou, Jiangsu, dozens at a time. ¹⁵³ In July 2019, 41 Uyghur workers were transferred to KTK Group in Changzhou. ¹⁵⁴		A subsidiary of Chinese rail manufacturer, CRRC Co. Ltd, is currently building ¹⁵⁷ Melbourne's new high-capacity trains after jointly securing ¹⁵⁸ a AU\$2 billion (US\$1.5 billion) contract with two other companies.
In May 2017, 1,200 people were transferred from Lop, Hotan Prefecture, out of Xinjiang—700 of them to Nanchang, Jiangxi, to work at O-Film Technology Co. Ltd. ¹⁵⁹ Five months later, the Hotan Government contacted O-Film Technology hoping to supply another 1,300 workers. ¹⁶⁰	O-Film Technology Co. Ltd (欧菲光科技股份有限公司) manufactures compact camera modules and touchscreen components for smartphones, laptops and cars. ¹⁶²	Strategic partners listed on O-Film Technology's website include: Acer, ASUS, Amazon, BAIC Motor, Changan Automobile, Dell, GAC Group (automobiles), Geely Auto, General Motors, HP, HTC, Huawei, Lenovo, LG, Meizu, Microsoft, Oppo, SAIC Motor, Samsung, SGMW, Sony, Vivo, Xiaomi and ZTE. 163
At the end of 2017, a Uyghur worker who claimed to have worked at O-Film Technology said that there were more than a thousand Uyghur workers at the company. ¹⁶¹		O-Film Technology also manufactured key components of iPhone 8 and iPhone X camera technologies for Apple in 2017 ¹⁶⁴ and is currently on Apple's supplier list. ¹⁶⁵ In 2017, Apple's CEO Tim Cook personally visited the company. ¹⁶⁶
As reported in early 2019, 46 workers (including Kazakhs) ¹⁶⁷ were transferred from Tekes county, Xinjiang, to work at Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co. Ltd in Nanjing in eastern China's Jiangsu Province. ¹⁶⁸	Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co. Ltd (南京新一棉纺织有限 公司 / 南京新一棉纺织印染 有限公司) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Victory City International Holding Ltd (冠华国际控股有限公司) and produces high-grade cotton, knitting yarns and CVC yarns. 169	Victory City's customers include Calvin Klein , Carter's , Li-Ning , according to a report by China Galaxy Securities, a Chinese brokerage and investment bank. ¹⁷⁰

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (4) [FONTE: DW, 26/11/2019]

Volkswagen defends presence in China's Xinjiang amid uproar over Uighur abuses

VW is under pressure for working with the Chinese government in Xinjiang after evidence of human rights abuses against Uighurs in the region.

Meanwhile, the German and US governments urged China to uphold human rights.



As international outrage over <u>human rights abuses in Xinjiang province</u> grows, German carmaker Volkswagen (VW) has vehemently defended its presence in the region, where it operates a production facility in Urumqi.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (13) [FONTE: HRW, 17/09/2020]

UN Chief Should Denounce China's Abuses in Xinjiang

Publicly Call for Closing Detention Camps

September 17, 2019



(New York) – United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres should join the growing number of those speaking out publicly against <u>China's</u> mass detention of over one million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, and World Uyghur Congress, said in a <u>letter</u> to the secretary-general released on September 17, 2019.

By publicly and unequivocally condemning the Chinese government's abusive policies and calling for the immediate closing of its "political education" camps in Xinjiang, Guterres would make an important contribution in addressing one of the most pressing human rights issues during his tenure leading the United Nations.

"Secretary-General Guterres should use the weight and authority of his office to unambiguously call on China's leadership to shut down Xinjiang's abusive detention centers," said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. "The countless victims of China's latest wave of repression depend on his leadership in standing up to Beijing and demanding an end to the persecution."

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (14) [FONTE: Global Times, 4/09/2020]

Xinjiang population growth best answers Western smear campaign on Uygurs





Xinjiang Photo:VCG

Recently, an anti-China pseudo-scholar from Germany named Adrian Zenz (who calls himself Zheng Guoen in Chinese) has published a paper titled "Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP's Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang." The paper cites false statistics and highly misleading sources, drawing a ridiculous conclusion that ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region are under the threat of "genocide." However, his analysis and conclusion are neither in line with scientific research standards nor academic norms.

Conflitos identitários: a China e os uigures do Xinjiang (15) [FONTE: Global Times, 4/09/2020]



According to official statistics, the overall population in Xinjiang continued to grow steadily from 2010 to 2018. During this period, the population of permanent residents increased by 13.99 percent, among which the Uygur population increased by 25.04 percent, and the Han population 2.0 percent. Clearly, the growth rate of the Uygur population is nearly twice that of the overall residents and is way higher than that of the Han population. The Uygur population has increased by more than 2.5 million people in merely eight years. What kind of "genocide" is this? Zenz, with his anti-China stance, fabricated his conclusion without any basis.

Nobody knows Xinjiang better than the local Chinese citizens. At present, the people's livelihood in Xinjiang has greatly improved. Citizens there now live in peace and tranquility. And people of all ethnic groups are as united as pomegranate seeds.

In the recent outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in Xinjiang, the government has, as always, put humanity as the top priority. The government took quick and appropriate actions, providing nucleic acid tests and professional treatments free of charge. Thanks to such comprehensive efforts, China has put an end to the spread of coronavirus in Xinjiang with no deaths. Till September 4, there has been no infection for 17 consecutive days in Xinjiang and the whole of society is back to normal.

Sugestões de leitura

