

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
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SESSÃO Nº 5**




PARTE I – NOTAS BREVES

(Política Internacional)

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (1)

[FONTE: NBCNews, 9/11/2020]



Hover over the map for details

3




O regresso à “normalidade” da América (2)

[FONTE: NYT, 9/08/2017]

2016 Presidential Election Results

AUG. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM ET

In 2016, Donald J. Trump won [the Electoral College](#) with 304 votes compared to 227 votes for Hillary Clinton. Seven electors voted for someone other than their party's candidate. Visit our [2020 election results pages](#) for the latest updates.



O regresso à “normalidade” da América (3)

[FONTE: CNN, 9/11/2020]

What Joe Biden's win means for the world



See the moment CNN called the race for Joe Biden 00:59

Joe Biden's [victory in the US presidential election](#), defeating incumbent conservative populist Donald Trump, could mark the beginning of a dramatic shift in America's attitude toward the world. But does that mean things are [going back to normal](#)?

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (4)

[FONTE: CNN, 9/11/2020]


Much has changed since Biden was last in the White House as former President Obama's Vice President. America's enemies, some goaded by Trump, others enabled by him, are more entrenched. Russia's President Vladimir Putin, China's President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and others exploited Trump's vanity and molycoddled his ego, while reaping their own gains -- some are now effectively leaders for life.

Biden promises to be different, to reverse some of Trump's more controversial policies including on climate change, and to work more closely with America's allies. On China, he says he'll continue Trump's tough line on trade, theft of intellectual property and coercive trade practices by co-opting rather than bullying allies as Trump did. On Iran, he promises Tehran will have a way out of sanctions if it comes into compliance with the multinational nuclear deal he oversaw with Obama, but which Trump ditched. And with NATO, he is already trying to rebuild confidence by vowing to strike fear in the Kremlin.

These are easy crowd-pleasers for the veteran politician, who for many years chaired the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Steeped in traditions of US global leadership that champion democracy and human rights, he was an advocate for US interventions in the Balkans and Darfur, though without success; and pushed nuclear non-proliferation.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (5)

[FONTE: CNN, 9/11/2020]



world order, managing their expectations for a new presidency will be key.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will also be a new challenge for Biden. Erdogan is stoking conflicts

in Syria, Libya and Armenia -- and even spiking tensions with Greece and France -- to distract from his failings at home. Trump's desire to disengage from the region had signaled to Erdogan that America would not lead allies to constrain him; the Turkish leader has since damaged the NATO alliance by buying Russian weapons, and backing attacks on America's Middle East and European allies' interests in a way unlikely to have been tolerated by previous US administrations.

Trump isn't the only one to blame for the power vacuum that made this possible -- the outgoing president only accelerated the disengagement drift of the Obama-Biden era. For the next four years, Obama's own isolationist legacy will haunt Biden's relations with allies, too, particularly in the Mideast.

During his own tenure, Obama let fall America's Middle East partners -- President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt -- during the 2011 "Arab Spring," causing other Middle East allies to fear they too could be dumped by America. He took US troops out of Iraq and was drawing them down in Afghanistan long before Trump took office. His failure to punish Syrian dictator al-Assad for gassing his own people convinced even allies in Europe that the US was in retreat, and prompted several Gulf States to spend big on their own defense.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (6)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Joe Biden

Nov 7, 2020

[Joe Biden](#)

vice president of United States

Alternative Title: Joseph Robinette Biden

Early life and career in the Senate

Biden, who was raised in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and New Castle county, Delaware, received a bachelor's degree from the [University of Delaware](#) in 1965 and a law degree from [Syracuse University](#) in New York in 1968. During this time he married (1966) Neilia Hunter, and the couple later had three children.



Joe Biden

QUICK FACTS



[View Media Page](#)

BORN

November 20, 1942 (age 77)
[Scranton, Pennsylvania](#)

TITLE / OFFICE

[Vice President Of The United States Of America, United States \(2009-2017\)](#)
[United States Senate, United States \(1973-2009\)](#)

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

[Democratic Party](#)

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (7)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Presidential runs and vice presidency

Biden pursued the [1988](#) Democratic presidential nomination but withdrew after it was revealed that parts of his campaign stump speech had been [plagiarized](#) from British [Labour Party](#) leader [Neil Kinnock](#) without appropriate [attribution](#). His [2008](#) presidential campaign never gained momentum, and he withdrew from the race after placing fifth in the Iowa Democratic caucus in January of that year. (For coverage of the 2008 election, see [United States Presidential Election of 2008](#).) After Barack Obama amassed enough delegates to secure the Democratic presidential nomination, Biden emerged as a front-runner to be Obama's vice presidential running mate. On [August](#) 23 Obama officially announced his selection of Biden as the Democratic Party's vice presidential nominee, and on August 27 Obama and Biden secured the Democratic Party's nomination. On November 4 the Obama-Biden ticket defeated [John McCain](#) and his running mate, [Sarah Palin](#), and Biden also easily won reelection to his U.S. Senate seat. He resigned from the Senate post shortly before taking the oath of office as vice president on January 20, 2009. In November [2012](#) Obama and Biden were reelected for a second term, defeating the Republican ticket of [Mitt Romney](#) and [Paul Ryan](#).

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (8)

[FONTE: CFR-Council on Foreign Relations]

Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Vice President Joe Biden has long been an influential voice on foreign policy issues in Washington. First elected to the Senate in 1972 at age 29, Biden has spent more time in Congress than any candidate. He chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and sits on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security. Biden ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988. His campaign was tainted, however, when he was accused of plagiarizing a stump speech from a British Labour Party leader.

He returned to the Senate to become a prominent foreign policy voice in the 1990s, particularly on the Balkans conflicts. He has traveled to the region many times and was a proponent for U.S. intervention there. Biden has also been a strong advocate for nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

Biden's proposal for resolving the conflict in Iraq continued to generate discussion late into 2007. Biden, along with CFR President Emeritus Leslie H. Gelb, back creation of a federal state in Iraq with Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia autonomous regions. Biden was also one of the only candidates to support using U.S. ground forces to end the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (9)

[FONTE: Eric Posner / Project Syndicate, 6/11/2020]



English



43

Biden's Precarious Victory

Nov 6, 2020 | ERIC POSNER

After surviving a grueling election campaign and a cliff-hanger election, Joe Biden will most likely enter the White House with a significant achievement under his belt, but little to look forward to. Congressional Republicans and a right-wing Supreme Court will ensure that any attempt at meaningful reform or governance is dead on arrival.

CHICAGO – Joe Biden has survived a grueling election campaign and a cliff-hanger election. Next, he must fend off legal challenges from US President Donald Trump's campaign. While he will most likely enter the White House on January 20, 2021, he will wonder when he gets there whether the prize he sought for so long is a poisoned chalice.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (10)

[FONTE: Eric Posner / Project Syndicate, 6/11/2020]

Biden's Precarious Victory

ERIC POSNER

After surviving a grueling election campaign and a cliff-hanger election, Joe Biden will most likely enter the White House with a significant achievement under his belt, but little to look forward to. Congressional Republicans and a right-wing Supreme Court will ensure that any attempt at meaningful reform or governance is dead on arrival.

43




In the past, a newly elected president could expect some cooperation from the opposing party in passing legislation. Biden should expect nothing of the kind. Republican members of Congress largely beat expectations in the election and will see no reason for compromise. If Republicans retain their majority in the Senate, they can and will try to undermine the Biden administration, to create the conditions for an anti-Democratic backlash in the 2022 midterm elections. Progressive bills will be dead on arrival, and sorely needed constitutional reforms of the Electoral College, voting laws, and the presidency will not occur. More likely, Americans will have to endure sporadic government shutdowns amid a cold civil war that maintains a status quo of paralysis – at best.

Many of Biden's nominations will also face hostility in a Republican-controlled Senate. Republicans probably will not deny him a secretary of state or an attorney general, but they will ensure that the executive branch is understaffed. Having incurred no electoral punishment for their hardball tactics over judicial nominations, they will block and delay all confirmations of federal judges.

Even if Democrats win a majority in the Senate, Biden will face formidable obstacles. With the confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett a week before the election, Republicans will enjoy a 6-3 majority on a Supreme Court that was already leaning more rightward than any court since the 1930s. Today's Court will continue chipping away at the legal foundations of US regulatory agencies and advancing socially conservative values, as it has for the last two decades. Even if Biden can push progressive legislation through a divided Congress, he will still face the prospect of the Court striking it down. Indeed, the Court might finally deal a deathblow to the Affordable Care Act, the signature achievement of Biden's former boss, Barack Obama.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (11)

[FONTE: The Atlantic, 7/01/2014]



Robert Gates Thinks Joe Biden Hasn't Stopped Being Wrong for 40 Years

"I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades," former Defense Secretary Robert Gates says of Vice President Joe Biden in his new book coming out later this month.

[Philip Bump](#) January 7, 2014

"I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades," former Defense Secretary Robert Gates says of Vice President Joe Biden in his new book coming out later this month. Gates' assessment of Biden's boss is only slightly better, depicting an Obama administration with very murky lines of communication on military issues.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (12)

[FONTE: Real Clear Politics, 13/05/2019]

Gates Stands By Statement That Biden Has Been Wrong On Nearly Every Major Foreign Policy Question

Posted By **Tim Hains**
On Date May 13, 2019



O regresso à “normalidade” da América (13)

[FONTE: Real Clear Politics, 13/05/2019]

MARGARET BRENNAN: I was rereading your memoir before we sat down to talk and you said in your memoir, Joe Biden is impossible not to like.

Quote: "He's a man of integrity, incapable of hiding what he really thinks, and one of those rare people you know you could turn to for help in a personal crisis. Still, I think he's been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades."

Would he be an effective commander-in-chief?

ROBERT GATES: I-- I don't know. I don't know. I-- I think I stand by that statement. He and I agreed on some key issues in the Obama administration. We disagreed significantly on Afghanistan and some other issues. I think that the vice president had some issues with the military. So how he would get along with the senior military, and what that relationship would be, I just-- I think, it-- it would depend on the personalities at the time.

MARGARET BRENNAN: He's a peer of yours. Does that mean you're older?

ROBERT GATES: Yes.

MARGARET BRENNAN: You think he's right for this moment?

ROBERT GATES: I think I'm pretty busy and pretty active but I think-- I think having a President who is somebody our age or older, in the case of Senator Sanders, is- I think it's problematic. I think that you don't have the kind of energy that I think is required to be President. I think-- I'm not sure you have the intellectual acuity that you might have had in your sixties. So, I mean it's just a personal view. For me, the thought of taking on those responsibilities at this point in my life would be pretty daunting.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (14)

[FONTE: Foreign Affairs, Março-Abril, 2020]

Why America Must Lead Again

Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

By nearly every measure, the credibility and influence of the United States in the world have diminished since President Barack Obama and I left office on January 20, 2017. President Donald Trump has belittled, undermined, and in some cases abandoned U.S. allies and partners. He has turned on our own intelligence professionals, diplomats, and troops. He has emboldened our adversaries and squandered our leverage to contend with national security challenges from North Korea to Iran, from Syria to Afghanistan to Venezuela, with practically nothing to show for it. He has launched ill-advised trade wars, against the United States’ friends and foes alike, that are hurting the American middle class. He has abdicated American leadership in mobilizing collective action to meet new threats, especially those unique to this century. Most profoundly, he has turned away from the democratic values that give strength to our nation and unify us as a people.

Meanwhile, the global challenges facing the United States—from climate change and mass migration to technological disruption and infectious diseases—have grown more complex and more urgent, while the rapid advance of authoritarianism, nationalism, and illiberalism has undermined our ability to collectively meet them. Democracies—paralyzed by hyperpartisanship, hobbled by corruption, weighed down by extreme inequality—are having a harder time delivering for their people. Trust in democratic institutions is down. Fear of the Other is up. And the international system that the United States so carefully constructed is coming apart at the seams. Trump and demagogues around the world are leaning into these forces for their own personal and political gain.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., served as Vice President of the United States from 2009 to 2017 and is a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (15)

[FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 29/04/2020]

In Defense of the Blob

America's Foreign Policy Establishment Is the Solution, Not the Problem

By Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, and William Inboden April 29, 2020

HAL BRANDS, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 2015-2016.

PETER FEAVER, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, served as special adviser for strategic planning and institutional reform at the National Security Council staff in 2005-2007 and as director for defense policy and arms control in 1993-1994.

WILLIAM INBODEN, William Powers, Jr., Executive Director of the Clements Center for National Security and an Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, served at the State Department in 2002-2005 and as senior director for strategic planning on the National Security Council staff in 2005-2007.

The foreign policy establishment has seen better days. During the Obama administration, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes derided it as “the Blob,” mocking its stodgy hawkishness. Then Republicans joined the chorus, with the Trump administration declaring war on mainstream foreign policy and national security professionals

O regresso à “normalidade” da América (16)

[FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 29/04/2020]

The only problem with this argument is that every component of it is wrong. The foreign policy establishment is not a closed cabal, American statecraft has not been a giant failure, and scrapping professionalism for amateurism would be a disaster. In truth, the foreign policy establishment is an American strength rather than weakness. It is more open-minded and accountable than its critics allow. It acts as a storehouse of accumulated professional wisdom, providing intellectual ballast to the ship of state. On balance, the establishment's practical track record has been impressive, with some well-known fiascos outweighed by many quiet successes. And the current administration's foreign policy blunders—including in its response to the current pandemic—demonstrate what happens when the establishment's experience and expertise are rejected. In short, the Blob is not the problem. It is the solution.



PARTE II – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (1) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

1.6 BILLION
MUSLIMS IN THE WORLD


85% SUNNI



15% SHIA

Julia Ro/CFR *cfr*

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (2) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]



A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (3) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

Origins of the Schism

Mohammed unveiled a new faith to the people of Mecca in 610. Known as Islam, or submission to God, the monotheistic religion incorporated some Jewish and Christian traditions and expanded with a set of laws that governed most aspects of life, including political authority. By the time of his death in 632, Mohammed had consolidated power in Arabia. His followers subsequently built an empire that would stretch from Central Asia to Spain less than a century after his death. But a debate over succession split the community, with some arguing that leadership should be awarded to qualified individuals and others insisting that the only legitimate ruler must come through Mohammed's bloodline.

A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic community, over the objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law. The opposing camps in the succession debate eventually evolved into Islam's two main sects. Shias, a term that stems from *shi'atu Ali*, Arabic for "partisans of Ali," believe that Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis, meaning followers of the *sunna*, or "way" in Arabic, of Mohammed, are opposed to political succession based on Mohammed's bloodline.

Ali became caliph in 656 and ruled only five years before he was assassinated. The caliphate, which was based in the Arabian Peninsula, passed to the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus and later the Abbasids in Baghdad. Shias rejected the authority of these rulers. In 680, soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph killed Ali's son, Husayn, and many of his companions in Karbala, located in modern-day Iraq. Karbala became a defining moral story for Shias, and Sunni caliphs worried that the Shia Imams—the descendants of Husayn who were seen as the legitimate leaders of Muslims (Sunnis use the term "imam" for the men who lead prayers in mosques)—would use this massacre to capture public imagination and topple monarchs. This fear resulted in the further persecution and marginalization of Shias.

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (4) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

An ancient religious divide is helping fuel a resurgence of conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries. Struggles between Sunni and Shia forces have fed a Syrian civil war that threatens to transform the map of the Middle East, spurred violence that is fracturing Iraq, and widened fissures in a number of tense Gulf countries. Growing sectarian clashes have also sparked a revival of transnational jihadi networks that poses a threat beyond the region.

Islam's schism, simmering for fourteen centuries, doesn't explain all the political, economic, and geostrategic factors involved in these conflicts, but it has become one prism through which to understand the underlying tensions. Two countries that compete for the leadership of Islam, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, have used the sectarian divide to further their ambitions. How their rivalry is settled will likely shape the political balance between Sunnis and Shias and the future of the region, especially in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.

Alongside the proxy battle is the renewed fervor of armed militants, motivated by the goals of cleansing the faith or preparing the way for the return of the messiah. Today there are tens of thousands of organized sectarian militants throughout the region capable of triggering a broader conflict. And despite the efforts of many Sunni and Shia clerics to reduce tensions through dialogue and counterviolence measures, many experts express concern that Islam's divide will lead to escalating violence and a growing threat to international peace and security.

Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law.

Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed's grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Sunni majority. Islam's dominant sect, which roughly 85 percent of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims follow, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates.

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (5) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

Modern Tensions

Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the "guardianship of the jurist" (*velayat-e faqih*), a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between political leadership and religious scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams.


Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini's success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions.

Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.

Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980–1988 war with Iran and sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran.

The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren't monolithic—for many of them, identities and interests are based on more than their confession. Iraqi Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army that fought Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and Hezbollah clashed at times during the Lebanese civil war. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group in Yemen, battled the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi, several times between 2004 and 2010. Then, in 2014, the Houthis captured the capital Sana'a with ousted president Saleh's support.

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (6) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]



Julia Ro/CFR *cfr*

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (7) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

For their part, both mainstream and hard-line Sunnis aren't singularly focused on oppressing Shias. They have fought against coreligionists throughout history, most recently in the successive crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia's battles against [al-Qaeda](#) and related Sunni militant groups. Sharing a common Sunni identity didn't eliminate power struggles among Sunni Muslims under secular or religious governments.

But confessional identity has resurfaced wherever sectarian violence has taken root, as in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein, a dictator from the Sunni minority who ruled over a Shia-majority country. The bombing of a Shia shrine in Samara in 2006 kicked off a cycle of sectarian violence that forced Iraqis to pick sides, stirring tensions that continue today.

In the Arab world, Shia groups supported by Iran have recently won important political victories. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which has ruled since 1970, relies on Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect that makes up about 13 percent of Syria's population, as a pillar of its power. Alawis dominate the upper reaches of the country's military and security services and are the backbone of the forces fighting to support the Assad regime in Syria's civil war. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq unseated Saddam Hussein and instituted competitive elections, the Shia majority has dominated the parliament and produced its prime ministers. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia and political movement, is the strongest party in Lebanon. The Houthis, Shia militants in Yemen tenuously linked to Iran, have toppled the country's internationally recognized government. Iran, a majority Shia country, has seen its regional influence swell as its allies in these countries have accumulated power.

Sunni governments, especially Saudi Arabia, have increasingly worried about their own grips on power, a concern that was exacerbated during the protest movement that began in Tunisia in late 2010. The Arab Awakening, as the uprisings are known, spread to Bahrain and Syria, countries at the fault lines of Islam's sectarian divide. In each, political power is held by a sectarian minority—Alawis in Syria and a Sunni ruling family in Bahrain—where Shias are the majority. In Yemen, Houthi rebels have expanded their territorial control, which Saudi Arabia perceives as a potential beachhead for Iran on the Arabian peninsula, along vital shipping routes in the Red Sea and in territory abutting Saudi Arabia's own marginalized Shia minority.

A divisão sunitas / xiitas e as suas implicações no Médio Oriente (8) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

Flash Points

Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and security. The following arouse the most concern among regional specialists:

Rising Militancy

Sectarian violence intensified in 2013 and has grown since. Extremists were “[fueled by sectarian motivations](#)” in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, according to the U.S. State Department. After years of steady losses for al-Qaeda-linked groups, Sunni extremist recruitment is rising, aided by private funding networks in the Gulf, [particularly in Kuwait](#), with much of the violence directed at other Muslims rather than Western targets. Shia militant groups are also gaining strength, in part to confront the threat of Sunni extremism. In 2015, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for, among other attacks, bombing Shia worshippers in Kuwait; attacking Sunni and Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia; downing a Russian passenger plane in Egypt, killing over two hundred people; and a pair of suicide bombings in a Shia-majority district of south Beirut that killed more than forty people.

Humanitarian Crisis

The ongoing civil war in Syria has displaced millions internally, and more than four million civilians, mostly Sunni, are now refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The influx of more than one million mostly Sunni Syrians into Lebanon, a state that experienced its own fifteen-year civil war (1975–90), has burdened its cash-strapped government and put pressure on communities hosting refugees. Jordan and Iraq are struggling to provide housing and services to an impoverished and traumatized population. Turkey has provided considerable humanitarian aid, yet Ankara must increasingly balance “[the public’s sympathy for and unease toward refugees](#),” the International Crisis Group reports. The spillover of [migrants and refugees into Europe spiked in 2015](#), and countries with generous resettlement policies are bracing for a larger influx as the wars in the Middle East continue.

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (1) [FONTE: Al-Monitor, 6/11/2020]

Biden's campaign showed what his Middle East policy may be as president

The former vice president criticized President Donald Trump's sanctions on Iran and also spoke out on Turkey's role in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war leading up to the Nov. 3 vote.

[Adam Lucente](#)



Nov 6, 2020

Former Vice President Joe Biden is close to winning the presidency against incumbent President Donald Trump. The final weeks of the campaign showed what Biden's Middle East policy priorities might be if and when he is sworn in as commander in chief.

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (2) [FONTE: Al-Monitor, 6/11/2020]

Biden frequently referenced Iran toward the end of the campaign, and signaled he would favor a softer approach to the Islamic Republic. At an October [town hall](#), Biden said Trump's policies made Iran "closer to having enough nuclear material to build a bomb."

The Trump administration has continued to add [harsh sanctions](#) on Iran since leaving the [Iran nuclear deal](#) in 2018. Biden wants to conditionally reenter the agreement, which removed sanctions on Tehran in exchange for curbing its nuclear program. Biden would base whether he would return the United States to the deal on Iranian compliance, according to his [campaign website](#).

Biden also voiced support for the recent [normalization agreements](#) Israel has made with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan. At the town hall, Biden praised Trump for his role in brokering the deals, indicating that he may continue US policy in helping Israel secure more recognition from Arab states.

The Democratic nominee also frequently referenced the [Nagorno-Karabakh conflict](#) between Armenia and Azerbaijan as the race neared the Nov. 3 election. In a [campaign statement](#) in October, Biden criticized Turkish support for Azerbaijan and also called on Iran to stay out of the territorial conflict. Biden also [slammed Turkey's role](#) in the war in September.

Biden may usher in cooler relations with Turkey. In addition to his recent criticism of Turkey-Azerbaijan ties, Biden [angered many in Turkey](#) when he called President Recep Tayyip Erdogan an "autocrat" late last year.

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (3) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 21/09/2020]

Iran will not renegotiate nuclear deal if Biden wins US presidency, Zarif says



Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Monday that Tehran has no plans of renegotiating the 2015 nuclear deal, stressing that Washington must return to the accord "without condition".

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (4) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 21/09/2020]

Iran will not renegotiate nuclear deal

Under the deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran agreed to curb its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions against its economy.

Since the Trump administration unilaterally pulled the US from the accord in May 2018, it has reimposed sanctions on various sectors of the Iranian economy, including oil exports.

On Saturday, the US administration announced the "snapback" of all UN sanctions due to Tehran's supposed non-compliance with the agreement, a move which virtually every other member of the Security Council rejects.

'The United States did try its best to get a good deal. And the previous administration, where candidate Biden was the vice president, believed it was a good deal. Now, we're not going to negotiate a deal'

- Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (5) [FONTE: Sputnik, 8/11/2020]



*"Trump is gone and we and our neighbors are staying. Betting on foreigners **does not bring security, and disappoints**. We extend our hands to our neighbors in order to cooperate in achieving common interests of our peoples and countries," he tweeted in Arabic.*

Zarif called on "everyone to engage in dialogue as the only way to end differences and tensions", pointing out that "Together **we will build a better future** for our region".



Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (6) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 8/11/2020]

For Biden, reentering the Iran deal will not be an easy task

Israel warily eyes president-elect's plans to rejoin JCPOA and restart negotiations with Tehran, but some defense analysts see an opportunity to capitalize on Trump's sanctions

By [Judah Ari Gross](#) 8 November 2020, 8:17 pm

When US President-elect Joe Biden enters office in January, one of the most pressing issues that he and his staff will have to deal with is Iran and its pursuit of a nuclear bomb.

But with Tehran reportedly poised to amass enough fissile material to produce such a weapon in the coming months, his task will be exceedingly difficult and fraught, with profound geopolitical ramifications for Israel and the Middle East and beyond.

For Israel, preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon — which the military consistently ranks as the most significant threat facing the Jewish state — is a top priority.

Os EUA, o Irão e a geopolítica do Médio Oriente (7) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 8/11/2020]

Former US ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer predicted that Biden would indeed return to the JCPOA, even against the wishes of Israel.

"Of course there are always some issues on which we will disagree. I think [the] Iran nuclear program may be one of those. But I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will try to talk very seriously about this with the prime minister rather than doing anything unilaterally," Kurtzer told Israel's Army Radio on Sunday.

Researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies, one of Israel's premier think tanks, issued similar warnings in a paper released Sunday outlining the potential ramifications for Israel of the US president-elect's national security policies.

"Biden has been opaque on the Iranian demand, presented as a precondition for entering negotiations, that all sanctions are lifted and compensation is made for the consequences of the re-imposed US sanctions. In any scenario, whether negotiations are renewed or Iran takes further escalatory steps, Israel should anticipate gaps between its interests and those of the United States," wrote research fellows Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky and Eldad Shavit.

Sugestões de leitura

