

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (1)

[FONTE: Assinatura em Washington / EUA do Tratado do Atlântico Norte, 4 de Abril de 1949]



A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (2)

[FONTE: NATO, 24/09/2020]



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Member countries

Last updated: 24 Sep. 2020 15:21

At present, NATO has 30 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other member countries are: Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004), Albania and Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020).



A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (3)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/06/2020]

NATO sets its sights on China

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's secretary-general, envisages a more global alliance

Jun 9th 2020

EVEN AS IT grapples with short-term troubles, among them another spat between America and Germany, NATO is starting to plan for the next ten years: how to adapt to the rising power of China? Finding an answer may be vital if the alliance is to retain a sense of purpose in 2030.

The source of the latest turbulence, as so often in recent years, is President Donald Trump. On June 5th the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Mr Trump had decided to reduce the number of American forces in Germany by 9,500 by September, more than a quarter of the 34,500 currently stationed there. A memorandum said to have been signed by the president's national security adviser, Robert O'Brien, would cap the number of American troops who could be in Germany at any time (swelling through exercises or rotations) at 25,000, compared with the present limit of 52,500. Mr Trump has long complained about Germany's failure to come close to honouring its promise to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Some of the troops could be relocated to Poland, which does achieve that target, though whether Poland ends up with more American forces than envisaged under an agreement reached with America last autumn remains unclear.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (4)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/06/2020]

Beyond these immediate concerns, NATO is starting to look ahead to its priorities for the longer term. At their London summit last December NATO leaders gave Mr Stoltenberg the task of considering how the alliance should prepare for the next decade. His conclusions will feed into a summit next year. As a start, on June 8th he launched his “reflection on NATO 2030”.

He outlined three ways in which the alliance must adapt. One is to ensure that it stays strong militarily, investing in new technologies. Second, it needs to become more united politically (something that may become easier beyond Mr Trump’s time in office), bringing a broader range of policies together to strengthen NATO’s 30 members. The experience of covid-19, for example, suggests there needs to be a wariness of over-reliance on Chinese supplies, something NATO will no doubt consider as it updates its “baseline requirements” for national resilience, to ensure members have the necessary robustness in telecoms and other infrastructure, as well as the ability to deal with mass casualties. Third, and most strikingly, Mr Stoltenberg envisages the alliance taking a more global approach—in particular, adjusting to China’s rise.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (5)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/06/2020]

In reality, China has become hard for the alliance to ignore. Mr Stoltenberg sees “China coming closer to us” in all sorts of ways, from the Arctic to Africa, and from cyberspace to 5G networks and other infrastructure investment in Europe, not to mention intensified joint exercises with Russia. China is the world’s second-largest military spender, Mr Stoltenberg points out, and is deploying cruise missiles that can reach the whole of NATO. Just as important, if unstated, is that NATO needs to shape up on China if it is to continue to matter to America, which is ever more concentrated on its great-power challenger and, under Mr Trump, worryingly ambivalent about the alliance.

What might NATO’s stance on China look like in practice? Ian Brzezinski of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank based in Washington, DC, suggests the alliance could establish a NATO-China Council, along the lines of the talking-shop it has with Russia. He urges deeper consultation and more robust military exercises with partners in the Pacific. Mr Brzezinski would also like to see NATO establish one of its “centres of excellence” in the region, and a small military headquarters there to co-ordinate exercises and contribute to regional awareness. (Already, Japan has joined NATO’s cyber centre of excellence, based in Tallinn in Estonia.)

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (6)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/06/2020]

Mr Stoltenberg is not yet ready for such details. He cautions that the new focus on China is “not about moving NATO into the South China Sea”. But he sees closer collaboration with like-minded countries in the region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. As an early sign of this, Australia’s defence minister will attend the meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels next week—the first participation in a general meeting of this type, unrelated to discussion of a specific mission, such as the NATO-led Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.

It is still early days for NATO’s thinking on the challenge of China’s growing power. But one idea will guide its emerging strategy: that the alliance itself offers a key advantage. Even though China’s GDP may before long outweigh America’s, the alliance has nearly a billion people and half the world’s military and economic might. One of Joe Biden’s main foreign-policy advisers, Tony Blinken, last month stressed the importance of working with other democracies in Asia and Europe. On its own, he said, America is about 25% of the world economy; “when China is engaged in practices that are unfair, and we want them to change, it’s a lot harder for them to ignore 60% of the world’s GDP than it is to ignore a quarter of it.” Mr Trump may be unimpressed by that argument, but his potential successor clearly sets a lot of store by it. ■

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (7)

[FONTE: Shannon Tiezzi /The Diplomat, 3/12/2020]

NATO Huddles With Asia-Pacific Democracies to Talk China

NATO members, along with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, gathered virtually to discuss the rise of China.



Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, Dec. 2, 2020.

Credit: [NATO](#)

NATO, the transatlantic alliance binding together the United States, Canada, and 28 European countries – including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – is turning its focus to China in a bid to adapt to changing global realities.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (8)

[FONTE: Shannon Tiezzi /The Diplomat, 3/12/2020]

Calls for NATO to [implement a united response to the China challenge](#) have been gaining steam in the past few years. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [has spoken out](#) previously about the rise of China and its implications for the alliance. The United States [is pressing hard](#) to get its partners and allies around the world on side in its strategic competition with China, including launching the U.S.-EU dialogue on China [in October 2020](#). The incoming Biden administration has pledged to do even more to partner with allies on the China challenge.

In another step in that direction, on December 2, the foreign ministers of the NATO members, along with delegations from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, gathered virtually to discuss the rise of China and the implications for the global balance of power. Ahead of the meeting, the U.S. Mission to NATO made its stance clear, [tweeting that](#) China's "infrastructure grab & use of predatory lending has global implications, including in #Europe."

During the NATO foreign ministers meetings, "Secretary Pompeo emphasized the threat the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses to Allied security interests and encouraged increased cooperation to safeguard against the CCP's malign activities," Cale Brown, principal deputy spokesperson at the U.S. State Department, [said in a statement](#).

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (9)

[FONTE: Shannon Tiezzi /The Diplomat, 3/12/2020]

However, forging a truly unified NATO response to China's rise will be difficult. Attitudes and approaches toward China vary wildly within the grouping, from the United States' forward-lean into competition to more pro-China governments in Turkey and Hungary. Many other NATO members, including Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, tend to prioritize the benefits of trade and economic relations with China over the potential security risks.

When asked about the new NATO report, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying rebutted the idea that China posed a threat to the transatlantic alliance. "China has never practiced anything like 'coercive diplomacy' or 'intimidating diplomacy,'" Hua told reporters at the [daily press briefing](#) on December 1. "As for 'threats' or 'challenges', can anyone give us an example of any security threat posed by China to other countries? China has always been a builder of world peace and defender of the international order."

"We hope NATO will uphold a correct view on China, look at China's development and domestic and foreign policies in a rational manner, and do more things that are conducive to international and regional security and stability," Hua concluded. "China stands ready to conduct dialogue and cooperation with NATO on the basis of equality and mutual respect."

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (10)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack which is not immediately reported to the Parties shall be terminated when the Security Council has determined that the attack has been terminated and the Parties have agreed to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 1 For the purpose of this Treaty the territory of any of the Parties is deemed to include its territory in Europe, its islands and possessions in the area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and its possessions in the North Atlantic area.

NATO 2030:

United for a New Era

Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection
Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General

12

25 November 2020

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (11)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

2 Introduction and Main Findings

2.1 A Strategic Anchor in Uncertain Times

NATO enters the eighth decade of its existence with both a longer record of success and a wider assortment of looming challenges than its founders could have foreseen when they signed the Washington Treaty in April 1949. In the thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet threat that called NATO into existence, the Western Alliance has defied innumerable predictions of its imminent demise. It ended two wars and ethnic cleansing in the Western Balkans, extended the hand of partnership to Russia and other former adversaries, stepped up to the threat of terrorism directed against NATO territory, engaged abroad including in Afghanistan, and responded with clarity, unity, and resolve to the threat posed by Russian aggression in the Euro-Atlantic region. Today, NATO stands as history's most successful alliance, encompassing nearly a billion people and half of global GDP across a space that stretches from the Pacific coast of North America to the Black Sea.

**“NATO stands
as history's
most success-
ful alliance.”**

Yet, future uncertainties demand that NATO continues to adapt. The world of the next ten years will be very different than the world that the Alliance inhabited either during the Cold War or the decades that immediately followed. It will be a world of competing great powers, in which assertive authoritarian states with revisionist foreign policy agendas seek to expand their power and influence, and in which NATO Allies will once again face a systemic challenge cutting across the domains of security and economics. Well-known threats like terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations will persist, even as new risks loom from pandemics and climate change, and as emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) present both dangers and opportunities for the Alliance.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (12)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

China

The scale of Chinese power and global reach poses acute challenges to open and democratic societies, particularly because of that country's trajectory to greater authoritarianism and an expansion of its territorial ambitions. For most Allies, China is both an economic competitor and significant trade partner. China is therefore best understood as a full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player or an only Asia-focused security actor. While China does not pose an immediate military threat to the Euro-Atlantic area on the scale of Russia, it is expanding its military reach into the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Arctic, deepening defence ties with Russia, and developing long-range missiles and aircraft, aircraft carriers, and nuclear-attack submarines with global reach, extensive space-based capabilities, and a larger nuclear arsenal. NATO Allies feel China's influence more and more in every domain. Its Belt and Road, Polar Silk Road, and Cyber Silk Road have extended rapidly, and it is acquiring infrastructure across Europe with a potential bearing upon communications and interoperability. A number of Allies have attributed cyber attacks to actors based in China, identified intellectual property theft with implications for defence, and been subjected to disinformation campaigns originating in

“The scale of Chinese power and global reach poses acute challenges to open and democratic societies.”

China, especially in the period since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. China's stated policies include an ambition to become a world leader in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 and by 2049 to be the world's leading global technological superpower.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (13)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

At the NATO London Leaders Meeting in November 2019, Allies recognised that China presents both opportunities and challenges that must be addressed together as an Alliance. Looking out to 2030, NATO must provide a position of security and strength to contribute to Allies' relations with China and guard against any attempts by Beijing to employ coercion against them. This requires that China be unable to exploit differences between Allies. The Alliance must enhance its understanding of China's capabilities, activities, and intentions that affect Euro-Atlantic security, with a clear-eyed understanding of risk, threat, and opportunity. NATO must redouble its efforts to help Allies to build resilience and maintain their technological edge or respond to critical weaknesses that could affect the security of the Alliance as a whole. Above all, it must show political cohesion and remain a platform for consultation on China's actions and Allies' reactions; defending Allies' values and an international order based on rules. In parallel, NATO should be open to the possibility of constructive dialogue with China when it serves its interests, and should continue to identify opportunities and prospects to tackle a number of global challenges.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (14)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

Recommendations:

1. NATO should enhance its ability to coordinate strategy and safeguard Allies' security vis-à-vis China. There is a critical need to increase Allies' political coordination at NATO on issues where China's approach runs counter to their security interests. The Alliance should continue its ongoing efforts to infuse the China challenge throughout existing structures and committees, including on

“NATO should consider establishing a consultative body to discuss all aspects of Allies' security interests vis-à-vis China.”

cyber, hybrid, EDTs, space, arms control, and non-proliferation. The Alliance should consider establishing a consultative body, in support of existing efforts, to bring together NATO Allies, and other institutions and partners

as relevant, to exchange information, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of Allies' security interests vis-à-vis China. If Allies are threatened by China, NATO must be able to demonstrate its ability to be an effective actor to provide protection.

2. NATO must devote much more time, political resources and action to the security challenges posed by China – based on an assessment of its national capabilities, economic heft, and the stated ideological goals of its leaders. It needs to develop a political strategy for approaching a world in which China will be of growing importance through to 2030.

“NATO must devote much more time, political resources and action to the security challenges posed by China.”

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (15)

[FONTE: NATO 2030]

3. NATO must increase capacity to anticipate and react to Chinese activities that undermine Allies' security. This should include steps to:
 - Increase information-sharing analysis on China within the Alliance;
 - Continue efforts to build resilience and counter cyber attacks and disinformation that originate in China;
 - Expand efforts to assess the implications for Allies' security of China's technology capability development;
 - Invest in its ability to monitor and defend against any Chinese activities that could impact collective defence, military readiness and/or resilience in SACEUR's Area of Responsibility;
 - Continue to identify vulnerabilities of key sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the EU;
 - Uphold NATO cohesion when Allies engage China bilaterally and through formats such as the 17+1 format and Belt Road Initiative;
 - Adapt to China's integrated MCF doctrine by encouraging Allies to increase technological and military engagement with Allies more vulnerable to Chinese penetration.
4. NATO should keep open the prospect of political dialogue with China on shared interests and differences, for example in arms control. It should maintain contacts with China on issues of mutual interest; and proactively engage China's representatives when doing so is in NATO's interests. It should be open to engagement with China at different levels and to opportunities for cooperation, including considering establishing a de-confliction mechanism at the military level, should China's role in the Euro-Atlantic area warrant. In all of its actions toward China, NATO should continue to show that it has no quarrel with the Chinese people and that any actions it undertakes are defensive in nature and in response to the stated intentions or actions of the current Chinese Government.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (16)

[FONTE: SCMP, 5/12/2020]

South China Sea: how a Spratlys radar system could give the PLA an information edge

Beijing's crisis management plans to deal with rising US-China tensions include its artificial structures in the disputed area. Communications network aims for information superiority in the region but remote location makes them vulnerable.



China built seven permanent islands in the South China Sea between 2013 and 2017. Photo: AP

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (17)

[FONTE: SCMP, 5/12/2020]

China built the seven permanent islands between 2013 and 2017 and claims they are home to naval garrisons, coastguard personnel, maritime inspectors, meteorological observation stations and other scientific research centres, as well as rest stops for Chinese fishermen.

Michael Dahm, a senior researcher at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in the US, said in August that the main purpose of the Chinese outposts was to facilitate information superiority over the US in the region, to counter American military advantage.

Writing in the online South China Sea Military Capabilities series, Dahm said the artificial islands were equipped with substantial C4ISR capabilities and counter-C4ISR capabilities – a US defence acronym for command, control, communications, computers used in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Collin Koh, a research fellow at the maritime security programme at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the role of the Spratlys outposts would be as significant multipliers for the PLA in times of both peace and possible conflict.

"In times of conflict, these outposts serve as ISR targeting nodes that help extend the PLA's projection of kinetic military power further afield, beyond the South China Sea – most pertinently into the open maritime domain of the western Pacific Ocean," he said.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (18)

[FONTE: The Economist, 5/12/2020]

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Great white hulls

A new law would unshackle China's coastguard, far from its coast

It is the world's biggest, and intends to use its muscle



A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (19)

[FONTE: Asian Military Review, 9/9/2019]



The Haijing 3901 and its sister ship are believed to be the largest coast guard ships in the world.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (20)

[FONTE: The Economist, 5/12/2020]

A new law would unshackle China's coastguard, far from its coast

It is the world's biggest, and intends to use its muscle

Dec 5th 2020

THE ZHAOTOU-CLASS cutter may be a lowly coastguard ship. But it is no pushover. At 12,000 tonnes, it is the world's largest vessel built for such use. It looms over most American or Japanese destroyers. Its roomy deck accommodates two helicopters, a 76mm gun and a thicket of other weaponry. China has two of them. One is deployed on its east coast. The newest, CCG 3901 (the letters stand for "China Coast Guard"), set sail in 2017 on its maiden patrol of the South China Sea, its designated sphere of operation. Nowhere around China's shores are waters more contested. The arrival of the behemoth is intended to make a point: China backs its claims in that area with a panoply of steel.

Soon CCG 3901 will have extra ammunition. In November China published a draft law that would empower the coastguard to demolish other countries' structures built on Chinese-claimed reefs, and to board and expel foreign vessels. In some circumstances it could even fire on hostile ships. The deadline for public comment expired as *The Economist* went to press.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (21)

[FONTE: The Economist, 5/12/2020]

In 2013 China merged several civilian maritime law-enforcement agencies into a new unified one, called the Chinese Coastguard Bureau. Five years later this was put under the command of the People's Armed Police, a paramilitary force that reports to the Central Military Commission, the country's supreme military body. In effect, this turned China's coastguard into a branch of the armed forces—much like its counterparts in America and India.

It has also benefited from a shipbuilding spree. Today China's coastguard has more than 500 ships. In the region, Japan is a distant second with 373. Others trail far behind. Taiwan has 161, the Philippines 86 and Indonesia a mere 41. China's ships have got beefier, too. A decade ago China had just ten vessels with a full-load displacement of at least 1,500 tonnes (about the size of a small warship). By 2015 it had 51 such ships. Today it has 87, says the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think-tank.

Many of the coastguard's ships now dwarf the largest warships in the region's smallest navies. The most capable, says Olli Suorsa of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, are "essentially navy ships painted white", minus the missiles (though that is also true of Japan's coastguard). The Type 818 patrol ship, for instance, is a modified version of the Chinese navy's Type 054A frigate. Such large ships are less agile than smaller ones, but they convey suitable menace.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (22)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]

'Victim complex' drives NATO to view China as a rival



NATO leaders pose for a group photo at the NATO Summit in London, Britain, on December 4, 2019. Photo: Xinhua

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) foreign ministers will hold a virtual session on Wednesday, with the attendance of non-NATO colleagues, to address a rising China that has become a "full-spectrum systemic rival," for which analysts warned China to get prepared for possible coercion from the organization and its non-member partners although NATO's influence and relevance have been declining.

NATO, born along with the Cold War, cannot cast aside its ideology-driven strategy in assessing the situation and making policies, but it is also facing problems from within and a more complicated world that limits its expansion of targets, observers said.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (23)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]

NATO is seen as an outdated organization that has no reason to exist if it does not set an enemy and vigorously hype threats from the enemy.



But the "threats" are imaginary out of victim paranoia, analysts said, noting China has always uphold peaceful development, posing no military threats to NATO members at all, and stigmatizing Chinese technology development just aims to portray China as an enemy.

Zhang Junshe, a senior research fellow at the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, told the Global Times on Wednesday that the NATO report is heavily influenced by the US' Cold War mentality.

Except for some friendly visits and joint exercises, which are by no means dangerous, the Chinese military has almost never reached the regions the NATO report cited to prove China's increasing reach - Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Arctic, Zhang said, noting the report is really hyping up the "China threat" theory.

China pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, and its weapons are developed for self-defense. China is the only major nuclear power that has promised not to be the first to use a nuclear weapon, Zhang said.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (24)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]

EU should remain independent from US-China rivalry



Illustration: Tang Tengfei/GT

The EU recently signaled its increasing desire to bond with the US as President-elect Joe Biden prepares to enter the White House. In order to gain strategic autonomy and raise its voice in the international community, Brussels hopes to get Washington on board by hyping the so-called "China challenge," despite the structural contradictions between the two sides.

A draft EU plan seeking to rebuild the transatlantic partnership with the US listed proposals covering every sector from digital regulation to tackling the Covid-19 pandemic, calling it a "once-in-a-generation" opportunity to forge a new alliance to counter China's rise, reported the Financial Times.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (25)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]



Biden's election has raised hopes for Europe to mend ties after the US went through the Obama administration's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and then the Trump administration's solo game.

Setting up a united front on technology is one of the main aims. Another report by Politico said that the European Commission will propose a "Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council" to set joint standards on new technologies in order to prevent China from establishing economic dominance in a number of high-value sectors.

Holding up high the so-called "China challenge" reveals the Western world's anxiety about China gaining an advantage in the era transiting from informatization to digitalization while both the US and Europe are struggling with the pandemic and economic contraction.

Amid the epidemic, China has seen rapid development in digitalization, with wide application of big data analysis and artificial intelligence, further raising the Western World's desire to set up obstacles to contain the development of Chinese technology.

A NATO, uma futura aliança global? (26)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]



Rebuilding the transatlantic partnership will not be easy. The honeymoon won't last forever, especially when the basic contradictions of the two sides remain.

Meanwhile, the Chinese economy is gaining momentum with its technologies thriving through the years of suppression by the US-led anti-China clique. It has become a crucial player in the digitalization arena. Recently, China proposed the Global Initiative on Data Security to uphold data and supply chain security and advance the digital economy, which has been actively responded to by a growing number of countries.

With nearly 1 billion netizens, China is the world's largest big data market. Cutting the market out of the global arena may not be a realistic approach for the EU and the US.

On the other hand, China and the EU have been holding talks in order to promote cooperation despite the pandemic. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin in September said that it is natural that China and the EU, with their different history, culture, social systems and development stages, have differences on some issues, but that it won't and shouldn't affect mutual dialogue and cooperation.

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PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES


O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (1) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

IFG ANALYSIS | BREXIT

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GOVERNMENT

Preparing Brexit

How ready is the UK?



Joe Marshall | Maddy Thimont Jack
Jess Sargeant | Nick Jones

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (2) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

Summary

In the four and a half years since the EU referendum, a huge amount of government time and resource has gone into preparing for life outside the EU. Although the UK left the political institutions of the EU in January, very little changed in practice. But there are now just eight weeks to go until the end of the transition period, when – deal or no deal – the UK will leave the single market and customs union, marking the start of a much more distant relationship with the European Union. The scale of the task to prepare businesses, people and the government itself is huge.

An agreement on the future relationship with the EU could make transitioning to these new trading terms less disruptive. It could, for instance, avoid new tariffs and streamline some of the most extensive new red tape. A deal would not, however, fundamentally change what both government and business need to do to prepare – much of which is the same regardless of the outcome of negotiations. But this message has not cut through to the public. And the government is only now making clear how urgent it is to act.

Despite the devastating effects of the coronavirus crisis, both in the UK and EU, the Johnson government chose not to extend the transition period. In doing so, it has effectively gambled that the UK can withstand the inevitable disruption from its preferred outcome, with minimal time to prepare – and that more time wouldn't have improved readiness. This is a high-risk bet, made riskier still with every week that passes without clarity on the outcome of the negotiations and in which the resurgence of coronavirus demands ever greater government and public attention, forcing most of the country back into lockdown. We assess how ready the government, business and individuals are for the end of the transition period and identify key areas of concern.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (3) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

But three key challenges remain:






- **The Northern Ireland protocol will not be fully implemented by January.** There remain decisions for the UK–EU Joint Committee, and the UK government, to make about how the protocol will operate in practice. The infrastructure needed to administer new processes on GB–NI trade, particularly on extensive agri-food checks, will not all be operational by 1 January 2021. This means the UK government will need to make a trade-off between applying the letter of EU law and facilitating the flow of goods. If it chooses the former, the disruption to trade will be more extreme, likely leading to long queues at the GB–NI border and limiting choice for NI consumers. If it chooses the latter, it will risk ending up before the European Court of Justice.
- **The EU should acknowledge that fully implementing the Northern Ireland protocol by January will be almost impossible and be ready to show some flexibility. But to make this work, the UK government needs to prove that it will not renege on its international obligations. The powers taken in the UK Internal Market Bill have undermined trust so the first step should be removing the offending clauses.**

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (4) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

- The government has bought itself more time to prepare the GB–EU border, but **poor trader readiness and EU checks from January mean disruption is inevitable.** More work is needed to ensure that new border controls, to check customs paperwork and carry out inspections, are introduced without causing major disruption to trade. The government is just about on track to deliver the IT systems, infrastructure and people needed at the border. But even then, it still needs to make sure traders know how to navigate the new ways of working – and are prepared for EU controls from January. The government’s decision to delay most border controls on GB imports has bought more time to prepare, but this means the preparation task will stretch well into 2021.
- **The government’s plans to manage traffic flows and minimise disruption will be vital. It is likely that the government will need to consider light-touch enforcement or further delays to new import controls to minimise disruption at the border. It will also need to clearly communicate the changes to import processes as checks are introduced in 2021.**

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (5) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

Figure 2 Phase-in of checks and processes at the GB–EU border from 1 January 2021

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July
Exports 	UK export controls: UK customs export declarations and safety and security declarations.* Trucks using the Kent ports will also need a 'Kent Access Pass' from the 'Check an HGV' system. EU import controls: Full customs checks, including: customs declarations, duty and excise payments, sanitary and phytosanitary documents and checks, and safety and security declarations.						
Imports 	Phase 1: Full customs checks for controlled goods, basic controls on other goods. Most importers of most goods can defer customs declarations and duty payments for six months from the point of import.			Phase 2: Additional agri-food products will require pre-notification and documentation.		Phase 3: Full import controls on all goods. Agri-food goods must pass through a Border Control Post.	
Systems 	10 key border systems must be ready, including GVMS for GB–EU transit and 'Check an HGV' for traffic management						Border systems need to be at full capacity. GVMS available for all GB–EU trade.**
Infrastructure 	Must be ready for transit and traffic management***						Border Control Posts needed for full customs checks and Sanitary and Phytosanitary controls.
People 	Additional staff needed at Border Force and HMRC. More private-sector vets and customs agents required.						All government agencies to be fully staffed. 35,000–50,000 customs agents needed.

Note: This diagram shows a simplified version of the UK government's approach to phasing in checks at the GB–EU border and key deadlines for new systems, infrastructure and people to facilitate them. Full details can be found in the government's Border Operating Model. * Some controlled goods will need additional paperwork. ** GVMS may not be used by all British ports that handle GB–EU trade.

*** Infrastructure also required for ATA carnet processes and CITES endangered species checks.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (6) [FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]


Therefore government faces difficult decisions from the end of the year:

- The government will need to be ready to **manage the impact of the transition period ending alongside coronavirus**. It will need to step up its contingency plans and prepare to make difficult decisions about where to prioritise resources. Unlike its preparations for a possible no deal last year, the government will now need to do this alongside a resurgence of coronavirus. This will be difficult, and the government has made its task harder still with its decision not to extend the transition period. Even if the UK civil service has the necessary resources to do so, the devolved administrations, local authorities and businesses may well be overwhelmed.
- **The government should learn from its initial handling of the pandemic and its 2019 no-deal Brexit preparations, working closely – and sharing information more openly – with other parts of the public sector and devolved administrations. But ministers will need to have a clear strategy for how they will handle the competing demands they will unavoidably face.**
- The government will need to grapple with the **economic consequences of Brexit**. It will need to identify which businesses will be viable in the longer term outside the single market and customs union, and which will not. This would be an extremely difficult task at the best of times, but has been made harder still by the devastating economic effect of the Covid crisis. With limited resources and political bandwidth, balancing its Brexit response against the ongoing demands of the pandemic and its domestic policy agenda will be difficult.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (7)

[FONTE: Institute for Government, Novembro 2020]

Figure 2 **New public bodies and functions being taken on by existing public bodies after the end of the transition period**



O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (8) [FONTE: Le Monde, 4/12/2020]

Les négociations post-Brexit dans l'impasse

Après une semaine de négociations ratées, Britanniques et Européens ont décidé de faire une « pause ». Ils comptent sur Boris Johnson et Ursula von der Leyen pour débloquer la situation.



Michel Barnier, à Londres, le 30 novembre 2020. SIMON DAWSON / REUTERS

Les négociateurs britanniques et européens ont décidé, vendredi 4 décembre, de faire une « pause » dans les pourparlers post-Brexit après une semaine infructueuse à Londres. Ils comptent sur le premier ministre Boris Johnson et la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, pour débloquer la situation.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (9) [FONTE: Le Monde, 4/12/2020]

Veto français ?

Sans accord pour régir leur relation à l'avenir, le Royaume-Uni et l'UE échangeront selon les règles de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, synonymes de droits de douane ou de quotas, présentant le risque d'un choc économique s'ajoutant à celui créé par la pandémie de Covid-19.

La France a prévenu vendredi matin qu'elle n'hésiterait pas à mettre son veto si le texte ne lui convenait pas, en particulier s'il menaçait l'avenir de ses pêcheurs. « *S'il y avait un accord qui n'était pas bon (...), nous nous y opposerions* », a dit le secrétaire d'Etat français aux Affaires européennes, Clément Beaune, [sur Europe 1](#). Avec un veto ? « *Oui. Chaque pays a le droit de veto* », a-t-il averti, répétant que le risque d'un non-accord

« *existe* » et qu'il « *faut s'y préparer* ». Ce coup de pression sur les négociations traduit l'inquiétude croissante de Paris de voir l'UE accorder trop de concessions aux Britanniques par crainte d'un « *no deal* ».

Selon un diplomate européen, cette appréhension est partagée par d'autres capitales, comme Rome, Madrid, Bruxelles et Copenhague. « *Nous ne voulons pas nous enfermer dans une relation déséquilibrée pour les décennies à venir* », explique-t-il.

Signe des divergences qui gagnent les Etats membres, plusieurs sources européennes affirment à l'inverse que l'Allemagne, qui occupe la présidence tournante de l'UE, et la Commission européenne poussent pour obtenir un accord.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (10) [FONTE: FT, 5/12/2020]

UK and EU agree to 'last throw of the dice' in Brexit trade deal talks

Negotiations remain deadlocked after call between Boris Johnson and Ursula von der Leyen

December 5 2020



Boris Johnson talks to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen from his office at Chequers © Andrew Parsons/10 Downing Street

The UK and the EU have agreed to make one final attempt to secure a post-Brexit trade deal, with talks set to resume in Brussels on Sunday, in what British officials claim is "the last throw of the dice".

Boris Johnson and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen agreed during a phone call on Saturday that an eleventh hour push should be made to get a deal over the line.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (11) [FONTE: FT, 5/12/2020]

The UK prime minister, who once claimed that Britain could “have our cake and eat it” on Brexit, is now facing one of the biggest decisions of his premiership: a trade off between “control” and access to the EU market. Official forecasts say no deal would cost the UK economy £40bn next year.

With little time left to ratify any deal that is reached, the calendar is further complicated by Mr Johnson’s intention to come forward next week with a finance bill that would violate the Brexit treaty he agreed with EU leaders last year.

European Council president Charles Michel and other senior EU figures have balked at the idea that the bloc could find itself in the final stages of negotiating a treaty with Mr Johnson at the same time as his government moves to contravene its existing deal. Mr Michel warned on Friday that a trade deal would be impossible if last year’s divorce deal is not upheld.

Both sides see a window to get a deal done before a long-scheduled summit meeting of EU leaders in Brussels on Thursday and Friday.

O pós-*Brexit* e a relação do Reino Unido com a União Europeia (12) [FONTE: FT, 5/12/2020]

On the issue of the level playing field, talks are stuck over EU demands for detailed, enforceable, commitments from Britain on its future subsidy policy.



EU officials said problems also persist over how to ensure Britain upholds environmental and labour standards.

Negotiators are also split over how to enforce any deal that is agreed, with Brussels insisting on the right to take unilateral action against imports of

British goods in the event of level-playing field breaches, as well as a right to cross-retaliate — restricting market-access for one sector as punishment for British breaches of good faith in another.

The EU side also wants European companies to be able to pursue the UK government through the British courts over suspected violations of the deal.

Ms von der Leyen has to contend with a [disgruntled group of governments](#) including [France](#), the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain and Italy, which have warned Mr Barnier that they will [reject any deal](#) that does not contain robust level playing field guarantees to protect their economies from unfair British competition.

Sugestões de leitura

