

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
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SESSÃO Nº13**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Are the Middle East and the Near East the Same Thing?

What do you call the region that encompasses southwestern Asia and northeastern Africa: the [Middle East](#) or the [Near East](#)?

Middle East essentially supplanted Near East in the early 20th century, although the two are now used interchangeably among English speakers. **So, for all intents and purposes, Middle East and Near East refer to the same region when used today.**

This hasn't always been the case. The term Near East was coined in the 19th century when Westerners divided the "Orient" into three parts: the

Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. The Near East included the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, while the Middle East ranged between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia—quite a small region compared with what we consider to be the Middle East today. (The Far East encompassed Asian countries facing the Pacific Ocean.) As Europe geared up for World War II, however, the term Middle East began to be used by the British military to refer to both regions. Middle East soon became the dominant term.

Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (3) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Today we consider the Middle East to span from Morocco to the [Arabian Peninsula](#) and Iran. (Some scholars use the acronym MENA—Middle East and [North Africa](#)—as they feel it more accurately describes the region of their research.) While Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria may seem to be geographical outliers, their similar sentiment, religion, and policies have led them to be considered part of this region. Other countries are often lumped in with the Middle East by current events, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, although they may not technically belong.

One important cultural note to keep in mind: both of these terms are completely Eurocentric, meaning that the Western English-speaking historians named the region on the basis of its position relative to Europe. With recent trends in academia to de-Westernize core education, the term Middle East can seem a bit old-fashioned. Until a new name carves its way into public discourse, however, we're stuck with Middle East to describe the region.

Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (4) [FONTE: Lisa Romeo, “Moyen-Orient et Proche-Orient” in Les clés du Moyen-Orient, 18/04/2011]

MOYEN-ORIENT ET PROCHE-ORIENT

ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 18/04/2011

Par Lisa Romeo

Les expressions « Moyen-Orient » et « Proche-Orient » représentent deux entités relevant d'une logique géopolitique, et non pas géographique, assez floues, couramment utilisées aujourd'hui dans les médias et que l'on a tendance à confondre. L'Orient a marqué pendant des siècles les limites de l'influence européenne : il est proche, moyen ou extrême en fonction de la distance qui le sépare du Vieux continent. Quelles sont les origines et les évolutions de ces deux termes ?

Origines des notions de Moyen-Orient et Proche-Orient

L'expression de Moyen-Orient vient de la traduction de l'anglais *Middle East*. Elle remonte au début du XX^{ème} siècle et est utilisée pour la première fois en 1902 par l'historien et stratège naval américain Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914). Le *Middle East* anglo-saxon désigne alors les territoires situés entre la Méditerranée, l'Empire des Indes britanniques et l'Asie orientale, soit la Péninsule arabique, le Golfe, la Mésopotamie et le monde persan. Quant au Proche-Orient, il est considéré comme l'espace englobant les Balkans, l'Anatolie, le Levant et l'Égypte. La notion de Moyen-Orient s'inscrit ici dans le cadre des ambitions du British India Office d'étendre son influence aux contrées qui marquent la route des Indes.

Après la Première Guerre mondiale, les Français utilisent l'expression de Proche-Orient comme un synonyme du terme « Levant » qui date du XVI^{ème} siècle. Avec l'instauration des régimes mandataires français dans les années 1920, la Syrie et le Liban sont ainsi désignés comme des États du Proche-Orient, alors que la Palestine, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, sous mandat britannique, sont considérés par les Britanniques comme appartenant à la zone Moyen-Orient. On tend alors à assimiler le terme de Proche-Orient à la vision française et celui de Moyen-Orient à une approche plus anglo-saxonne.

Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (5)

[FONTE: Lisa Romeo, “Moyen-Orient et Proche-Orient” in Les clés du Moyen-Orient, 18/04/2011]

L'élargissement du terme de Moyen-Orient après la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la région devient stratégique avec le développement de la production pétrolière dans le Golfe et en Iran. Ainsi les Occidentaux repensent-ils la région de manière plus vaste, intégrant progressivement le Proche-Orient dans un Moyen-Orient élargi. Le Proche-Orient désigne alors généralement les espaces de l'est méditerranéen, de la Turquie à l'Egypte, mais reste indissociable du terme de Moyen-Orient.

Le Moyen-Orient peut ainsi se définir par l'Orient arabe (Syrie, Liban, Israël, Palestine, Jordanie, Irak, Egypte, Arabie Saoudite, Koweït, Emirats arabes unis, Qatar, Bahreïn, Oman, Yémen) ou être élargi à des Etats non arabes tels que la Turquie et l'Iran. Parfois, Djibouti, le Soudan ou la Libye sont également inclus à ce vaste ensemble géopolitique. La délimitation du Moyen-Orient est donc indéfiniment modulable selon les critères politiques et analytiques de l'approche. A titre d'exemple, on peut noter que l'ONU comprend par Moyen-Orient les Etats du Proche-Orient s'étendant de l'Egypte à la Turquie mais également l'Afghanistan, l'Iran et l'Ethiopie.

Enfin, l'Afrique du Nord est généralement exclue de la sphère moyen-orientale et les géographes et historiens arabes séparent communément le Maghreb (Occident) constitué du Maroc, de Algérie, de la Tunisie et parfois de la Mauritanie et de la Libye au Machrek (Orient).

Le Moyen et le Proche-Orient sont donc des notions qui varient selon l'approche envisagée, mais qui désignent une zone particulièrement stratégique, carrefour entre les continents asiatiques, européens et africains, berceau des trois principales religions monothéistes (judaïsme, christianisme et islam) et vaste région ethniquement et culturellement très riche.

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Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (6) [FONTE: União Europeia / EEAS 2021]



Middle East & North Africa (MENA)



"A Window on the World" - Personal blog by HR/VP Josep Borrell

The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU.

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06/01/2021

EU perceptions in Morocco: New poll results

Médio Oriente: um conceito proteiforme de usos variáveis (7) [FONTE: União Europeia / EEAS 15/06/2016]

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Middle East and North Africa (MENA)



15/06/2016 - 12:29

EU relations with Region

The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU.

The policy of the EU towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries has two main objectives:


- Encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features (**European Neighbourhood Policy**)
- Encourage regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU (**Union for the Mediterranean**)

Via the **Middle East Peace process**, the European Union is actively supporting efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is also a member of the so-called Middle East Quartet (US, EU, Russia and UN)

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (1)

[FONTE: Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute / Monthly Report August 2020]

Figure 1. US, Russia, and China's Principal Middle Eastern Relationships




Source: Produced by MGSSI

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (2)


[FONTE: Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute / Monthly Report August 2020]

Figure 3. Chinese investment in the Middle East (by sector)
(Millions of US\$)



Source: Produced by MGSSI based on the China Global Investment Tracker

Figure 4. Chinese investment in the Middle East (by country)
(Millions of US\$)



Source: Produced by MGSSI based on the China Global Investment Tracker

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (3)

[FONTE: Jonathan Fulton / Atlantic Council “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East”, 2019]



Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, September 3, 2018. Andy Wong/POOL Via REUTERS

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (4) [FONTE:

Jonathan Fulton / Atlantic Council “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East”, 2019 — Parcerias da China no Médio Oriente e Norte de África]

State	Level	Year Signed
Algeria	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	2014
Djibouti	Strategic Partnership	2017
Egypt	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	2014
Iran	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	2016
Iraq	Strategic Partnership	2015
Jordan	Strategic Partnership	2015
Kuwait	Strategic Partnership	2018
Morocco	Strategic Partnership	2016
Oman	Strategic Partnership	2018
Qatar	Strategic Partnership	2014
Saudi Arabia	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	2016
Turkey	Strategic Partnership	2010
United Arab Emirates	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership	2018

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (5)

[FONTE: Jamil Anderlini / FT, 9/09/2020]

China's Middle East strategy comes at a cost to the US

Beijing gains in oil and influence as successive presidents in Washington withdraw



Critics of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq have always believed the real motivation was taking control of the world's second-largest proven oil reserves.

Even the architects of Operation Iraqi Freedom were convinced Iraqi oil revenues would quickly [fund reconstruction](#) of a US client state that would help redraw the contours of the Middle East in America's favour. But if oil and influence were the prizes, then it seems China, not America, has ultimately won the Iraq war and its aftermath — without ever firing a shot.

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (6)

[FONTE: Mercy Kuo (entrevista) / The Diplomat, 1/12/2020]

China and the Middle East: Conflict and Cooperation

Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into Asia affairs. This conversation with Dr. Guy Burton – adjunct professor of international relations at Vesalius College in Brussels and author of “China and the Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present” (Taylor & Francis 2020) – discusses China’s strategic interests in the Middle East and its changing approach to the region.

Compare and contrast China’s past and present strategic interests in the Middle East.

There’s been a lot of attention on China as an economic actor in the region in recent years, especially in the wake of its Belt and Road Initiative. I wanted to tell China’s story from another angle, through war and rivalry from a historical perspective.

Viewed this way, it becomes clear that China’s regional involvement is neither recent nor as peaceful as it likes to portray itself. In the 1950s-60s, it identified closely with nationalist governments and movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Eritrea, and the Gulf and their struggles against colonial rule and imperialism, including financial and military assistance.



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, left, is greeted by Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of their talks at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Tuesday, March 21, 2017 in Beijing, China.

Credit: Etienne Oliveau/Pool Photo via AP

Uma nova grande potência no *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a China (7)

[FONTE: Mercy Kuo (entrevista) / The Diplomat, 1/12/2020]

Why should the U.S. and Europe be concerned about China's role in the Middle East?

From a security perspective, I'd argue that U.S. fears are overblown. Since Obama, U.S. policy makers have feared that pulling out of the Middle East and pivoting to East Asia would leave the former space open to China. But there's little sign that will happen. For one, China shows little willingness to become a major regional security provider. Its interventions over the Syrian war and in response to ISIS have been limited. It provided little practical assistance. For another, its current military presence is currently very modest. Only in 2017 did it open its first naval base in the region, in Djibouti.

At the same time, there is scope for the West to work with China where their interests overlap – although it does so on its own terms and in parallel with Western efforts. For example, China participated in anti-piracy operations off Somalia after 2009. It was also an important interlocutor between the West and the Sudanese and Iranian governments over Darfur and the 2015 nuclear deal respectively.

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e a Rússia (1) [FONTE: Foreign Policy, 20/01/2017]

Why Putin Is So Committed to Keeping Assad in Power

Putin's growing military support for the beleaguered Syrian leader is meant to send a clear message to other anxious despots about Russian loyalty to its friends.

Colum Lynch • October 7, 2015, 2:34 PM



O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e a Rússia (2) [FONTE: Foreign Policy, 20/01/2017]

For more than three years, Russia's top diplomats have time and again assured American, Arab, and European policymakers that they are not wedded to President Bashar al-Assad.

But with Russian airplanes escalating an air campaign against the groups trying to oust the beleaguered Syrian leader, Russian President Vladimir Putin is showing just how far he'll go to keep Assad — Moscow's key surviving Arab ally — in power.

Saving Assad from meeting the same fate as other regional despots like Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi and Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak is emerging as a key facet of Russia's Middle East strategy.

***Saving Assad from meeting the same fate
as other regional despots like Libya's
Muammar al-Qaddafi and Egyptian leader
Hosni Mubarak is emerging as a key facet
of Russia's Middle East strategy.***

By propping up one of the region's most vilified leaders, Moscow is sending a powerful message about its willingness to act aggressively in a region where many of America's closest allies are feeling insecure — and questioning Washington's commitment to have their backs in the future.

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e a Rússia (3) [FONTE: RT News, 20/01/2017. MAPA: CIA, The World FactBook]

Up to 11 Russian warships allowed simultaneously in port of Tartus, Syria – new agreement

Published time: 20 Jan, 2017 13:45 Edited time: 22 Jan, 2017 13:12



An agreement signed by Russia and Syria stipulates that up to eleven Russian warships will be able to dock in the Syrian port of Tartus at any one time. The move is designed to boost defense capabilities, the document states.



O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e a Rússia (4) [FONTE: Eugene Rumer e Andrew S. Weiss / Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 24/10/2019]

A Brief Guide to Russia's Return to the Middle East

Is Russia trying to replace the United States as the Middle East's main power broker?

The Return of Global Russia

Despite the chaos unleashed by U.S. President Donald Trump's abrupt pullout from northern Syria, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia wants to displace the U.S. role in the Middle East completely. Russian leaders likely want Moscow to be seen as on equal footing with the United States and as a regional power broker.

The Kremlin has been careful not to get overextended. It has deployed a relatively small number of military personnel to Syria and has conducted military operations in a way designed to minimize the risk of Russian casualties. Of course, the Russian military has been anything but restrained while conducting a brutal air campaign that has killed countless Syrian civilians. But they have been careful not to put large numbers of their personnel at risk.

How is Russia capitalizing on changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East under Trump?

Setting aside the spectacle of Trump's extremely impulsive approach to managing U.S. foreign policy, the sad reality is that the United States has overextended itself in the Middle East over the past two decades, and Russia has not. The Kremlin has shied away from large-scale military commitments to the Middle East. We have not seen Putin sending 100,000 troops anywhere in the Middle East.

The Kremlin has been pursuing very different objectives than what the United States tried to achieve under former presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush. Russia was content with the status quo. It was not interested in democracy promotion; it was interested in stability. Russian leaders continue to see U.S. policy as very destabilizing for the entire region, including the recent spike in U.S. tensions with Iran.

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e o Irão (5) [FONTE: Foreign Policy, 10/05/2018]

What Iran Really Wants in Syria

Misperceptions of Tehran's true intentions could lead to disaster.

Payam Mohseni • May 10, 2018, 12:53 PM



The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force, General Qassem Suleimani, attends celebrations marking the 37th anniversary of the Islamic revolution on February 11, 2016 in Tehran. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria e o Irão (6) [FONTE: Foreign Policy, 10/05/2018]

Misperceptions of Iran's strategic intentions could lead to military confrontation and an escalatory cycle — especially on the heels of U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear agreement.

Rather than provoking military confrontation with Israel, Iran's actions in Syria are first and foremost about preserving the Syrian government as part of the “*axis of resistance*”

Rather than provoking military confrontation with Israel, Iran's actions in Syria are first and foremost about preserving the Syrian government as part of the “axis of resistance”


— a longstanding alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, among others. Iran is also seeking to establish a balance of power — including deterrence — with other regional and international actors with interests in Syria. Recent Iranian actions that may be considered provocative, such as the Iranian drone that allegedly breached Israeli airspace, are tactics for drawing red lines and raising the costs for Israel if it chooses to confront Iran within Syria.

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria, a Turquia, a Rússia e os curdos (7)

[FONTE: Lara Seligman / Foreign Policy, 16/10/2019]

Turkey Advances on Kobani in Latest Broken Promise

Erdogan told Trump he would not attack the symbolically important Kurdish-held town in northern Syria.



O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria, a Turquia, a Rússia e os curdos (8) [FONTE:

Jonathan Marcus / BBC, 23/10/2019]

Russia, Turkey and Syrian government on the same page - but for how long?

The diplomatic and military choreography tells the story in a nutshell.

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets his Turkish opposite number to underscore Moscow's role as the would-be guarantor of stability in the region. Russia and Turkey will soon be mounting joint patrols to help delineate the boundary of the new, so-called security zone. Meanwhile, withdrawing US special forces vehicles are pelted with vegetables and rubbish as they leave their erstwhile Kurdish allies to their fate.

The Turkish incursion into Syria and the US retreat have huge implications for both Syria itself and the region at large. Some of the impact is immediate and some potentially long-term.

This is, in the first instance, a victory for the Turks, for Russia and for the Syrian government. Turkey has on the face of things got a large part of what it wanted. It keeps its troops and allied militias in those areas of Syria that it already controls. Russia and Syria appear to have agreed to ensure the departure of Kurdish forces from a broad swathe of territory running across almost the whole frontier zone.

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria, os EUA, a Turquia e os curdos (9) [FONTE: Lt. Cmdr.

Joshua M. M. Portzer, U.S. Navy / Military Review, May-June 2020]



Kurdish-led militiamen ride atop military vehicles 17 October 2017 as they celebrate victory over the Islamic State in Raqqa, Syria. (Photo by Erik De Castro, Reuters)

The People's Protection Units' Branding Problem

Syrian Kurds and Potential Destabilization in Northeastern Syria

Lt. Cmdr. Joshua M. M. Portzer, U.S. Navy



A U.S. military commander (second from right) walks with Kurdish fighters from the People's Protection Units (YPG) 25 April 2017 at a YPG headquarters that was hit by Turkish airstrikes in Mount Karachok near Malikiya, Syria. (Photo by Rodi Said, Reuters)

a substantial portion of the anti-Syrian government forces, their exclusion from the committee has been particularly problematic for the negotiations process.

Why the United States Is Involved

In the summer of 2014, the U.S. government began aiding the YPG via air support during the IS siege of Kobani.⁸ U.S.-led airdrops continued through 2015. Vis-à-vis this partnership in the "global war on terror," the YPG became a nonstate proxy-extension of the U.S. fight against the IS. President Barack Obama's "Assad must go" messaging helped elevate the YPG and its partnering contingent, the SDF, to become a center of mass away from the Alawite regime during the civil war.⁹ As noted, the YPG and Kurdish footprint in the Rojava autonomous region also offered a small-scale proof-of-concept that a stable democratic government could persist in the Middle East. As of 2019, the YPG's anti-IS campaign arguably has been the largest dividend derived from Capitol Hill's investment of YPG-armament and general funding.

What does Everybody Want?

Turkey, the YPG, and the United States have differing, often conflicting, aspirations for the fate of the YPG, other Kurds in Rojava, and the region itself.

Turkey. As noted by Dr. Tim Cook and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), there are multiple items at play concerning Turkey's agenda.¹⁰ Currently, there are approximately three million refugees from the Syrian civil war in Turkey.¹¹ Erdoğan is under a lot of domestic pressure to act. Politically, the party is much weaker than it has been in years past, having lost its majority in parliament for the first time in 2015.¹² The ruling party also suffered an unanticipated loss in the summer of 2019 in Istanbul's mayoral election.¹³ As mentioned, Turkey has

O *puzzle* estratégico do Médio Oriente: a guerra da Síria, os EUA e a Arábia Saudita (10)

[FONTE: John Hannah / Foreign Policy, 3/05/2019]

It's Time for Saudi Arabia to Stop Exporting Extremism

Trump should not waste his opportunity to begin repairing Wahhabism's trail of wreckage.

[John Hannah](#) May 3, 2019, 7:03 PM



Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump meet in the White House on March 20, 2018. Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

Here's a sobering fact: Even after the destruction of the Islamic State's territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, there are today [more](#) jihadis fighting in more countries than there were on Sept. 11, 2001. The horrific Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka last month are simply exhibit A. The harsh reality is that despite the United States' important successes in killing terrorists on the battlefield and preventing another 9/11-scale attack, the

problem of radical Islamist terrorism is not shrinking. On the contrary, it has steadily morphed and metastasized. After nearly 18 years, and enormous expenditures and loss of life, the United States still has no proven strategy for reducing the number of young Muslims around the world susceptible to jihadism.

It's been clear to U.S. policymakers for years that hard power alone—military action to kill terrorists and disrupt terrorist plots—is not by itself a winning formula. While necessary for long-term success, hard power on its own is simply insufficient. Also essential is a strategy for combating the extremist ideology that serves as the central building block of jihadism—the totalitarian, intolerant, ultraconservative interpretations of Islam that systematically dehumanize all those holding different beliefs, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Killing terrorists has proven a relatively straightforward task. Killing the state of mind—the idea that helps radicalize and then, in far too many instances, weaponize young Muslims to kill nonbelievers—has been a vastly more difficult undertaking.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (1)

[FONTE: H. Lauterpacht, The Yale Journal Law, 1944, Junho, p. 385]

RECOGNITION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

By H. LAUTERPACHT †

I.

INTRODUCTORY

Principles of the Recognition of States. To recognize a community as a State is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by international law. If these conditions are present, existing States are under the duty to grant recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to declare the presence of requirements of full international personality, States already established fulfill that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of nations. This rule of law signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter. Although recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfillment of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obligations exist only to the extent to which they have been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted by reference to compelling rules of humanity and justice, either by the existing members of international society or by the community claiming recognition.¹

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (2)

[FONTE: H. Lauterpacht, The Yale Journal Law, 1944, Junho, p. 385]

The Problem of Recognition in the Science of International Law. The majority of writers still adhere to the view that the act of recognition as such is not a matter governed by law, but a question of policy. They urge that recognition is the result of a decision taken not in obedience to a legal duty, but in pursuance of the exigencies of national interest. If this is so, it will be asked, how is it that recognition looms so large in the writings of those very jurists who hold that it is outside the law? The answer is that, while denying the quality of law to the act of recognition, some of them maintain that this act of policy, once accomplished, entails legal consequences inasmuch as it is the starting point of international personality with all the rights pertaining thereto; that, in any case, the form and the circumstances of recognition are of legal interest and necessitate the consideration of such questions as the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* recognition, implied recognition, and conditional recognition; and that important questions of law arise when that act of policy constitutes so-called premature recognition in disregard of the rights of existing States. But the dominant fact remains that the very commencement of the international personality of States and their legal right to existence are declared by these writers to be outside the orbit of international law.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (3) [FONTE: WSJ, 16/12/2020]

As Arab States Recognize Israel, Egypt's 'Cold Peace' Points to Challenges Ahead

Egypt was the first Arab country to recognize Israel more than 40 years ago, but the relationship shows the challenges of translating government ties into grass roots goodwill

By and Amira El-Fekki December 16, 2020



U.S., Israel, U.A.E., Bahrain Sign 'Abraham' Peace Accords


President Trump presided over the signing of a peace agreement between Israel, the U.A.E. and Bahrain.
(Originally published Sept. 15, 2020)

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (4)


[FONTE: WSJ, 16/12/2020]

- Regional countries that recognize Israel (year of recognition)
- Regional countries that **don't** recognize Israel
- Regional countries “warming” to Israel

North Africa



Middle East



Note: Israel has diplomatic relations with more than 160 countries.

Sources: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WSJ and news reports

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (5) [FONTE: CFR, 11/12/2020]

COUNCIL *on*
FOREIGN
RELATIONS

IN BRIEF

What Morocco's Agreement With Israel Means for the Wider Middle East

By Philip H. Gordon, *CFR Expert* | December 11, 2020

With six Arab states having established relations with Israel, a new Middle East is taking shape. But the diplomatic progress, facilitated by the Trump administration's compensation to those states, has its limits.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (6) [FONTE: CFR, 11/12/2020]

How significant is it that Morocco now becomes the sixth Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel?

It clearly adds to the momentum behind Arab-Israeli normalization. Only two Arab states, Egypt and Jordan, had formally recognized Israel in the seventy-two years between its founding in 1948 and 2020. But with Morocco now following in the footsteps of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan, four more have done so this year alone. The Israel-Morocco deal will reportedly allow for direct flights between the two countries, as well as expanded tourism and business exchanges that will help both their pandemic-stricken economies. Normalization further reduces Israel’s diplomatic isolation and adds to its legitimacy, a long-standing goal of Israeli governments and its population across the political spectrum. At the same time, Moroccan officials have not committed to opening an embassy in Israel—only “liaison” offices—and deny that the agreement entails full diplomatic relations, underscoring the enduring limits to Arab-Israeli rapprochement.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (7)


[FONTE: CFR, 11/12/2020]

Are other Arab states likely to follow?

In time, yes. There is a lot of speculation that next could be Oman, which has already publicly hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, though the new sultan seems to want to proceed cautiously. The biggest prize for Israel, though, would be recognition by Saudi Arabia, which has so far denied any intention to follow its neighbors. Normalization would be highly controversial in Saudi Arabia, where conservative clerics are already chafing at recent social reforms and the public has been conditioned by decades of visceral anti-Israel propaganda in schools and in mosques. Saudi leaders, as the self-proclaimed custodians of the two holy mosques, in Mecca and Medina, also worry about the withering criticism they would receive from regional rivals in Iran and Turkey, who would accuse them of betraying Muslims by selling out the Palestinians. Unconditional Saudi normalization with Israel would also violate the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, launched by then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, which offered normalization with Israel only in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Under these circumstances, it's hard to see King Salman departing from the conditions established by his late brother Abdullah. Current Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman—from a generation for whom the Palestinian cause no longer resonates with the same intensity—could have a different view once he assumes the throne.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (8)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (9) [FONTE:

Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), political and economic [alliance](#) of six Middle Eastern countries—[Saudi Arabia](#), [Kuwait](#), the [United Arab Emirates](#), [Qatar](#), [Bahrain](#), and [Oman](#). The GCC was established in [Riyadh](#), Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Arab and Islamic [cultures](#). Presidency of the council rotates annually.

While membership of the GCC remained consistent throughout its first several decades, changes in regional relationships sometimes led to speculation on changes in membership. Expansion appeared possible when the interests of Gulf countries aligned with those of other Arab states. [Jordan](#) and [Morocco](#), two other Arab monarchies, were invited to join the GCC in 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring uprisings. Morocco declined, while Jordan's application remained delayed because of internal GCC disagreements. Conflicting interests at times led to rifts. [Egypt](#) and fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain instated a blockade against Qatar in 2017. In December 2018 Qatar's [emir](#) skipped the GCC's annual summit and sent an envoy instead, though he sent his [prime minister](#) in 2019 as tensions seemed to thaw. The blockade was lifted during the following annual summit, held in January 2021, with Qatar's emir in attendance.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (10) [FONTE: Jane Kinninmont Middle East and North Africa Programme | May 2019 / Chatam House]

Research Paper

Jane Kinninmont

Middle East and North Africa Programme | May 2019

The Gulf Divided

The Impact of the Qatar Crisis

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (11)

[FONTE: Jane Kinninmont Middle East and North Africa Programme | May 2019 / Chatam House]

Summary

- Since June 2017, Qatar has been subject to a boycott by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt (the Arab Quartet). This has created a deep and lasting rift with ripple effects across the Middle East and Horn of Africa. It has also divided the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), hitherto one of the only functioning regional organizations in the Arab world, which has in effect been suspended because three of its members are boycotting Qatar.
- The dispute has reached a stalemate, but not the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ often held to be necessary for a conflict to be resolved. Instead, the leaders of the countries concerned appear content to live with this new rift – and in some ways are drawing strength from it, by using a new external enemy to bolster nationalist sentiment.
- The main reason for the rift is that the countries of the Arab Quartet object to Qatar’s support for political Islamist movements across the Middle East, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Quartet has raised the stakes with a list of 13, wide-ranging demands for Qatar to change its policies – including that Qatar should close down highly influential state-funded broadcaster, Al Jazeera. This demand has helped Qatar to contend that it is being punished for supporting pro-democracy movements and free media, rather than acknowledge that some of the Quartet’s criticisms may be justified.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (12)

[FONTE: Jane Kinninmont Middle East and North Africa Programme | May 2019 / Chatam House]

Table 1: Drivers and motivations of the Arab Quartet

	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Bahrain	Egypt
Leaders/ personalities	Rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and a strong, strategic alliance with Abu Dhabi leadership, has encouraged development of a shared view of the Muslim Brotherhood.	Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has been preoccupied with Qatar/Muslim Brotherhood threat for years. There is a view in the UAE that Qatar's 'Father Emir', Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, is still pulling the strings in Doha.	Long-running border disputes between Bahrain and Qatar had been resolved under King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa, and there had even been plans for a 'Friendship Causeway' to link the main island of Bahrain to Qatar (reducing Bahrain's dependence on Saudi Arabia for imports).	President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi has accused Qatar of consistently trying to undermine the Egyptian regime.
Family/party	Saudi Arabia opposed Emir Hamad's bloodless 1995 coup against his father and allegedly supported a failed counter-coup in 1996. The Qatari leadership is regarded as having been closer to former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Al Saud than to his successor, Mohammed bin Salman.	Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed is publicly unchallenged when it comes to foreign policy, although there are suggestions that Dubai is less supportive of the trade embargo because of its role as a hub for Gulf (and wider) trade.	Historical conflicts between the two dynasties had been largely relegated to the past, but some parts of the Al Khalifa family still resent Qatar.	The Egyptian military accused Qatar, among others, of orchestrating the 2011 uprising that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Former president Mohammed Morsi (elected in 2012 but swiftly deposed in the 2013 coup) was convicted of spying for Qatar in 2016.
Regime security	Saudi Arabia has accused Qatar of supporting Saudi dissidents, specifically those associated with the <i>sahwa</i> movement, who have some ideological commonalities with the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, the previous crown prince had worked with some of them against Al-Qaeda.	The UAE has accused Qatar of directly supporting, funding and training Muslim Brotherhood dissidents in the country. In 2013 the UAE convicted 69 people on charges of plotting a coup on behalf of the Brotherhood.	Bahrain's local Muslim Brotherhood party enjoys a good relationship with the government. The government has latterly found it more politically expedient to accuse Qatar of funding and backing the largely Shia Islamist opposition – an accusation it has more usually levelled at Iran.	Egypt has blamed Qatar for supporting the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Mohammed Morsi, who was overthrown in a coup in 2013.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (13) [FONTE: Anne Gadel / Institut

Montagne, 13/01/2021]

Diplomatic Thaw in the Gulf, a Superficial Unity?

The Al-Ula Agreement likely presents Trump with a final diplomatic victory in the region, in addition to the series of normalization agreements signed by Arab countries with Israel. However, it mainly presents an opportunity for MBS and, to a lesser extent, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Zayed](#) (MBZ) to send a somewhat equivocal signal to the Biden administration. The new American president may choose to read it as a symbol of the Sunni leaders' goodwill in overcoming their antagonisms towards Qatar and presenting a united front on fundamental issues. However, the willingness of the Saudi and Emirati leaders to set aside their differences with Qatar could read as a reflection of their ability to oppose signs of openness that this administration will give to Iran, in the event that the Vienna Agreement (JCPOA) is renegotiated. It is also an opportunity for the Saudi prince to reorient his diplomatic approach towards posing as a champion of Gulf unity, thus beginning to restore his tarnished image on the international scene following the Khashoggi affair. **By placing himself as a figure of reconciliation between feuding Gulf states, he may be able to buy himself time and present himself as a regional champion that Biden would find it difficult to be without.** Despite this, it is unlikely he will enjoy the same broad support with the new American president as he has with Trump, as Biden is likely to quickly cut off military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

O reconhecimento de Israel e o fim da “guerra-fria” Arábia Saudita-Qatar (14)

[FONTE: Anne Gadel / Institut Montagne, 13/01/2021]

The United Arab Emirates, who would have been happy with the post-2017 status quo continuing for years to come, are clear losers of the diplomatic move. **The relationship between MBS and MBZ will certainly be put to the test, and the recent normalization of relations with Israel is therefore particularly welcome in balancing the regional strength of Abu Dhabi's allies.**

Meanwhile, Iran is the biggest loser of all. The reopening of Saudi airspace to Qatari flights means losing the \$100 million a year windfall that the Emirate was paying Tehran for overflights of its airspace. Even if the nations of the Gulf remain without a unified strategy towards Iran, as we have discussed, these signs of a *détente* will not work in Iran's favor in the immediate future.

Finally, as a natural counterpart of the deal, Qatar will need to be less critical of Saudi policy in Yemen. Now compelled to provide signs of friendship to its new Saudi "*best enemy*", it will nonetheless stand alongside Kuwait and Oman in calling for an end to hostilities. **Yemen, after all, remains the great loser of any geopolitical reconfigurations in the Gulf, even in times of relative warmth.**




PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (1)

[FONTE: Global Times, 2/12/2020]

China makes vaccines global, US does it selfishly



The race to approve and distribute a COVID-19 vaccine continues to grip the world with baited breath. If successful, this will allow countries to return to a somewhat normal state as soon as possible.

Hopefully, this will finalize and end some of the bitter feelings some countries have expressed to others. For example, as the coronavirus surged across Italy and beyond earlier this year, finger-pointing against China started in earnest. Political figures and media outlets in parts of the Western world began suggesting that blame for the natural outbreak of the virus should lay squarely on China.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (2)

[FONTE: Global Times, 24/12/2020]

UAE first country to roll out Chinese COVID-19 vaccine for mass use



Sinopharm's COVID-19 vaccine. Photo: VCG

The United Arab Emirates has become the world's first country to offer Chinese-developed COVID-19 vaccines to all citizens and residents for free as part of its efforts to achieve nationwide immunity against the coronavirus.

Local Chinese people told the Global Times that they have a relatively high enthusiasm for the Chinese vaccine, and many Chinese working in local educational institutes or Chinese state-owned companies have already been vaccinated, with no serious adverse reactions reported.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (3)

[FONTE: Nature, 14/12/2020]

Arab nations first to approve Chinese COVID vaccine — despite lack of public data

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain say the vaccine is 86% effective, but scientists would like to see data to support the claim.

But scientists not involved in developing and approving the Chinese vaccines are finding it hard to make sense of the data behind the latest announcements. The UAE reported the phase III efficacy data before Sinopharm did, and the company has yet to confirm that they are correct. Neither the UAE, Bahrain nor Sinopharm have released the data used to make the 86% efficacy claims. “They give no real data. That’s a bit weird,” says Zhengming Chen, an epidemiologist at the University of Oxford, UK. “It’s difficult to tell how well the vaccine works. I hope it is real.”

Sinopharm did not respond to *Nature*’s request for more detail on its trial results.

Scientists would like to see data on the number of infections in the groups that received the vaccine and in those that were given a placebo. Such data are used to calculate a vaccine’s effectiveness — and have been released by the makers of several other leading coronavirus vaccines, including that developed by Pfizer and BioNTech. They released some detailed data in a [press release](#) in November, before the UK authorization, and published the phase III trial results on 10 December in the *New England Journal of Medicine*¹.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (4)

[FONTE: The Economist, 13/01/2021]

Bahrain and the UAE are relying on a Chinese-made vaccine

They are hoping for both political and public-health benefits


Jan 13th 2021

ASIDE FROM the ubiquitous masks, visitors to Dubai would be hard-pressed to know there was a pandemic raging. Bars and malls are busy. Hotels that were four-fifths empty last spring hit 70% occupancy in December. Tourists have flocked to Dubai to escape lockdowns at home. A recent spike in daily infections—they have more than doubled since November—has not dented the sense of normality. By spring that perception may be a reality: Dubai seems well on its way to widespread covid-19 immunity.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), of which Dubai is part, ranks second in the world in vaccinations per head. By January 13th it had administered almost 13 doses for every 100 residents, behind only Israel (see chart). Since the vaccines require two doses, the number of people fully inoculated is lower. Still, the UAE aims to inoculate half the population by April. Bahrain, another Gulf country, ranks third, with almost six doses per 100 residents. Even that is double the rate in America.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (5)

[FONTE: The Economist, 13/01/2021]



The Economist

Perhaps the biggest difference is that Bahrain and the UAE rely on a vaccine made by Sinopharm, a state-backed Chinese firm. Early on they adopted a product that elsewhere has met scepticism. The move has speeded up their push for herd immunity. It will also pay political dividends, deepening ties with China and positioning the UAE, a regional power, for an ambitious sort of vaccine diplomacy.

Known as BBIBP-CorV, the vaccine is one of two developed by Sinopharm.

China broke with protocol last summer by offering its citizens the experimental jab, unlike Western vaccine-makers, which waited for trials to show their products were safe and effective. Many countries have been reluctant to approve BBIBP-CorV because it lacks reliable trial data.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (6)

[FONTE: The Economist, 13/01/2021]

Despite an inauspicious beginning, it is gaining credibility—largely thanks to Gulf countries. The UAE began late-stage trials in July with 31,000 volunteers. Bahrain started its own trial in August. Both authorised it in December after declaring it 86% effective. Yet they have not published data to support their findings; officials in the Gulf say it is Sinopharm's decision. “We're part of this study, but we don't actually have the right to disclose this type of information,” says Dr al-Manea.

It seems unlikely that Sinopharm will submit its vaccine to a stringent national regulator. Instead it is being scrutinised by the World Health Organisation (WHO), which could grant it emergency authorisation by March. Some countries remain sceptical: in the Philippines, for example, there are reports of reluctance to take the vaccine. Scientists in Brazil announced on January 12th that another Chinese vaccine, manufactured by Sinovac, was only 50% effective, far below the 78% initially reported. The data, the first from late-stage trials, had been delayed for weeks.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (7)

[FONTE: The Economist, 13/01/2021]

There are few reservations in the Gulf about BBIBP-CorV. Partly this is due to public trust in governments with a reputation for being well-run. Scores of Emirati officials, among them the health minister and the ruler of Dubai, have posted photos of themselves receiving the vaccine. Both countries have fared well during the pandemic. The UAE has logged 723 deaths from covid-19, and Bahrain 356, which (as a share of population) ranks them well below countries both in the West and in the Arab world. Testing is widespread and fast.

It helps to be a police state with little tolerance for dissent. The Emirati government has condemned “rumours” about vaccines and warns of punishment for spreading them. Local newspapers carry stories about happy residents queuing up for jabs; there are rather fewer articles asking questions about vaccine-trial data.

Bahrain and the UAE are also offering the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, which has won approval from Western regulators. But they have much less of it. In Dubai it is available only to the old and to key workers (the rest of the population should be eligible by April). Still, that could assuage any concerns from expats. Some residents, though, say they prefer the Sinopharm jab because it is based on an inactivated strain of the SARS-cov-2 virus, a long-established way of making vaccines, rather than the new mRNA technology used by Pfizer and other Western manufacturers.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (8)

[FONTE: Global Times, 15/01/2021]

Why were US media silent on Pfizer vaccine deaths?: Global Times editorial

By Global Times

Published: Jan 15, 2021 08:00 PM



An illustration shows vials of a COVID-19 vaccine and syringes with the logos of US pharmaceutical company Pfizer and German partner BioNTech. Photo: AFP

Twenty-three elderly Norwegian people died after receiving Pfizer vaccines. Thirteen of them have been assessed and common side effects may have contributed to severe reactions in them, according to the Norwegian Medicines Agency.

Norway is a small Northern European country and only about 25,000 people have been vaccinated with Pfizer vaccines. Twenty-three deaths are a large number. But surprisingly, mainstream English-language media did not report the incident immediately, as if they had already reached a consensus. Major US and UK media were obviously downplaying their deaths.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (9)

[FONTE: Global Times, 15/01/2021]

Chinese health experts call to suspend Pfizer's mRNA vaccine for elderly after Norwegian deaths

By Zhang Hui

Published: Jan 15, 2021 01:58 PM



Pfizer Photo:VCG

Chinese health experts called on Norway and other countries to suspend the use of mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccines produced by companies such as Pfizer, especially among elderly people, due to the vaccines' safety uncertainties following the deaths of 23 elderly Norwegian people who received the vaccine.

The new mRNA vaccine was developed in haste and had never been used on a large scale for the prevention of infectious disease, and its safety had not been confirmed for large-scale use in humans, a Chinese immunologist said.

A China e a “diplomacia das vacinas” no Médio Oriente e fora dele (10)

[FONTE: The Washington Post, 15/01/2021]

Norway adjusts advice after vaccine deaths but isn't alarmed

COPENHAGEN, Denmark — Norwegian officials have adjusted their advice on who gets the COVID-19 vaccine in light of a small number of deaths in older people, leaving it up to each doctor to consider who should be vaccinated.

The Norwegian Medicines Agency on Thursday reported a total of 29 people had suffered side effects, 13 of them fatal. All the deaths occurred among patients in nursing homes and all were over the age of 80.

The agency listed fever and nausea as side effects which “may have led to the deaths of some frail patients,” Sigurd Hortemo of the Norwegian Medicines Agency said in the body’s first report of the side effects.

More than 30,000 people have received the first shot of the Pfizer or Moderna coronavirus vaccine in the Scandinavian country since the end of December, according to official figures.

“We are not alarmed by this. It is quite clear that these vaccines have very little risk, with a small exception for the frailest patients,” Steinar Madsen, medical director with the agency, told Norwegian broadcaster NRK.

“Doctors must now carefully consider who should be vaccinated. Those who are very frail and at the very end of life can be vaccinated after an individual assessment,” he added.

Sugestões de leitura

