

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
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PARTE I – NOTAS BREVES

União Europeia - política externa (1)

[FONTE: Politico, 13/02/2020]

EU foreign policy RIP

Josep Borrell's trip to Russia marked the end of Europe's geopolitical ambitions.



Borrell's real crime was to let the mask drop on the EU's powerlessness | EPA/EFE

Press play to listen to this article

-00:00

Matthew Karnitschnig is POLITICO's chief Europe correspondent.

European foreign policy died in Moscow last week. The burial will be held at sea this spring, some 35 fathoms under the Baltic, where a towering Russian vessel called "[Fortuna](#)" is laying the final section of the 1,230 kilometer-long Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany.

União Europeia - política externa (2)

[FONTE: Politico, 13/02/2020]

While the end of Europe's geopolitical ambitions was long in coming, the coup de grâce was a jaw-dropper, if only because it was self-inflicted.

In what is being called “the humiliation” in Europe's capitals, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell [stood](#) silent in Moscow last Friday as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dismissed the EU as an “unreliable partner” during a joint appearance on live television. The only response Borrell managed to muster to Lavrov's lengthy diatribe was a pained grin.

Back in the Brussels bubble, European parliamentarians reacted with outrage and calls for Borrell's resignation. Belgian MEP Assita Kanko even [asked](#) Borrell, a Spaniard, what had happened to the EU's *cojones*.

By asking the question, she unwittingly exposed the EU's dirty little secret: It has none.

The EU has always worked best when it sticks to what it knows, like regulation, trade and doling out subsidies across the bloc. High-stakes diplomacy has never been and — as Borrell proved — never will be the EU's strong suit for the simple reason that there is no consensus within the 27-member bloc on foreign policy.

Whether the issue is Russia or Turkey, China or even the U.S., negotiating a coherent position within the EU is next to impossible; not for reasons of party ideology, but because national interests often diverge.

União Europeia - política externa (3)

[FONTE: Politico, 13/02/2020]

The only tool the EU has to “punish” Russia is sanctions, which so far have had virtually no effect on Moscow’s malevolent behavior. (Wealthy Russians have largely succeeded in circumventing the restrictions by [buying](#) European passports from Cyprus and Malta.)

It hasn’t helped matters that the effort to box Russia in has been consistently undermined by the EU’s biggest member, Germany.

Berlin’s tendency to look the other way in the face of Russian provocations is [well documented](#). In recent years, the greatest example of that blind spot has been the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Many EU countries, not to mention the U.S., oppose the project for a variety of reasons, including that it will rob Eastern Europe of billions in transit fees that Russia now pays to deliver gas to the Continent.

Berlin has steadfastly refused to use its participation in the project as leverage against Moscow, where (as everywhere else but Germany) it is viewed as a key strategic initiative. Over the years, Nord Stream 2 has survived an illegal annexation, multiple poisonings, at least one assassination as well as attempts to undermine Western democracy too numerous to cite.

The Russian-German deal is so dear to Berlin, however, that the German government quietly offered to spend €1 billion last year to secure an American guarantee not to impose sanctions on the project.

União Europeia - Itália (4)

[FONTE: Politico, 11/02/2020]

Mario Draghi, political animal

The likely next Italian prime minister is much more than an ex-central banker.



Press play to listen to this article

-00:00

Mario Draghi is a politician-turned-central banker rather than the other way round.

The former president of the European Central Bank is the likely next prime minister of Italy after [the government led by Giuseppe Conte fell apart](#) amid squabbling over the country's coronavirus recovery plans. Draghi looks to have support from across the political spectrum for a government tasked with steering the country through the pandemic without the need for a destabilizing early election. On Thursday evening, the biggest party in parliament, the 5Star Movement, [voted to back a Draghi-led](#)

União Europeia - Itália (5)

[FONTE: Politico, 11/02/2020]

Rome-born Draghi, 73, is credited with saving the euro during the financial crisis of a decade ago when he said the ECB would do "[whatever it takes](#)" to protect the single currency.

But rather than having to export his skills as a central banker into the dangerous waters of Italian politics, Draghi already had sharp political skills while in central banking.

"He's a very sophisticated politician who cannot be reduced to the role of a banker," said Bruno Tabacci, a centrist lawmaker who has known Draghi since [the early 1980s](#). "When one has to run the ECB for eight years, having to deal with the head of the Bundesbank and succeeding in saving the eurozone, what more do you want than that?"

Draghi was director-general of the Italian Treasury during the turbulent early 1990s, when Italy was in the midst of a wave of privatizations and rocked by anti-corruption investigations that wiped out much of the political elite.


His father Carlo was also an official at the Italian central bank, the Banca d'Italia, and Draghi grew up professionally within the small geographical triangle in Rome formed by the central bank, the Treasury and the presidential palace.

He'll need all the skills he has developed to lead Italy — which has the [second-highest debt](#) in the eurozone and will receive [the largest share](#) of money (€209 billion) from the EU's coronavirus recovery fund.

União Europeia - Espanha / Catalunha (6)

[FONTE: La Vanguardia, 15/02/2020]

Resultados de Autonómicas Cataluña 2021



Resultados Totales de Autonómicas Cataluña Comunidad Autónoma

	Partidos	2021			2017		
		Escaños	Nº votos	% votos	Escaños	Nº votos	% votos
▲ 66,09%	PSC	33	650608	23,02%	17	606659	13,86%
▼ -0,33%	ERC	33	602273	21,31%	32	935861	21,38%
▼ -7,39%	Junts	32	567105	20,06%	34	948233	21,66%
-	VOX	11	217255	7,69%	-	-	-
▼ -8,04%	ECP	8	194017	6,86%	8	326360	7,46%
▲ 49,78%	CUP	9	188763	6,68%	4	195246	4,46%
▼ -78,03%	Cs	6	157428	5,57%	36	1109732	25,35%
▼ -9,20%	PP	3	108795	3,85%	4	185670	4,24%
-	PDeCAT	0	76947	2,72%	-	-	-
▲ 87,50%	Recortes cero	0	12663	0,45%	0	10287	0,24%
-	MPIC	0	5927	0,21%	-	-	-
-	FNC	0	4965	0,18%	-	-	-
-	PNC	0	4574	0,16%	-	-	-
-	PCTC	0	4492	0,16%	-	-	-
-	IZQP	0	2049	0,07%	-	-	-
-	Som Terres de L'Ebre	0	1407	0,05%	-	-	-

União Europeia - Espanha / Catalunha (7)

[FONTE: El País, 15/02/2020]

El Gobierno se siente reforzado y ve cómo se hunde la oposición del PP

El 'efecto Illa', una operación impulsada desde Moncloa, triunfa sin perjudicar a los aliados de ERC y Unidas Podemos. Pero el éxito de Vox es la gran contracara

[Carlos E. Cué](#)



Algunos, incluso internamente, criticaron a La Moncloa por poner las expectativas del *efecto Illa* demasiado altas. [Pero el resultado de las elecciones catalanas](#), mucho mejor del esperado incluso por los más optimistas del Gobierno y el PSC, consolida al presidente, Pedro Sánchez, y su [arriesgada apuesta sorpresa de colocar a su ministro de Sanidad](#)

EUA - *Impeachment* de Donald Trump (1)

[FONTE: CNN, 13/02/2021]

Why Democrats blinked in the Senate impeachment trial

(CNN) — On Saturday morning, Democrats appeared to score a coup: Winning a surprise vote on calling witnesses in the [impeachment trial of former President Donald Trump](#).

On Saturday afternoon, Democrats agreed to end the trial without calling any witnesses.

If that seems odd to you, well, you are far from alone. The Democrats' rapid backtrack left almost everyone not in the Senate scratching their heads, wondering why the party blinked when it appeared to be on the verge of getting more testimony that would shine a light on exactly what Trump knew and when he knew it during the January 6 riot at the Capitol.

(Sidebar: Senate Democrats will point to the fact that they got a [statement from Washington GOP Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler](#) detailing her side of an angry call between House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy and Trump on the day of the riot. Sure. But why not depose Beutler as a witness?)

So, why did they do it? And then undo it?

The obvious answer is that [President Joe Biden](#) (or his surrogates) made clear to Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer that he did not want this trial dragging on -- especially if the outcome is not in doubt. Biden has largely avoided commenting about the ongoing trial other than to say that [he is interested in seeing how Republicans vote](#) on whether to convict or acquit Trump. But, behind the scenes, the Biden folks have made no bones about their desire for the trial to conclude quickly so that the attention of the country (and the Congress) can return to the President's efforts on battling the Covid-19 pandemic and the Senate can refocus on confirming his Cabinet nominees.

EUA - *Impeachment* de Donald Trump (2)

[FONTE: CNN, 13/02/2021]

Calling witnesses would, without any question, have lengthened the trial -- likely by a considerable amount of time. In the aftermath of the vote, Republicans aligned with Trump were saying that they had a list of [300 witnesses](#) they would try to call. And there appeared to be a desire among the centrist wing of the Democratic Party -- West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin, in particular -- to allow both sides to call an equal number of witnesses.

And, remember, that the Senate is coming up on a week-long President's Day recess, meaning that if Democrats had stuck to their guns on witnesses, the trial could have extended into early March (or much later).

There also wasn't any obvious path to convicting Trump -- even if there were more witnesses. The expectation going into Saturday was that there were five or six Republican senators who would likely vote to convict -- and that number solidified after Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who had suggested he was keeping an open mind on Trump's guilt, said Saturday morning that [he would be voting to acquit](#).

With McConnell on the "acquit" side, the chances of Democrats securing the 17 Republican votes they would need to convict Trump were, roughly, zero.

Given that, spending additional days (or, more likely, weeks) deposing witnesses would be a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing.

EUA - *Impeachment* de Donald Trump (3)

[FONTE: Declaração de Donald Trump, 13/02/2021]



DONALD J. TRUMP

- February 13, 2021 -

Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America

I want to first thank my team of dedicated lawyers and others for their tireless work upholding justice and defending truth.

My deepest thanks as well to all of the United States Senators and Members of Congress who stood proudly for the Constitution we all revere and for the sacred legal principles at the heart of our country.

Our cherished Constitutional Republic was founded on the impartial rule of law, the indispensable safeguard for our liberties, our rights and our freedoms.

It is a sad commentary on our times that one political party in America is given a free pass to denigrate the rule of law, defame law enforcement, cheer mobs, excuse rioters, and transform justice into a tool of political vengeance, and persecute, blacklist, cancel and suppress all people and viewpoints with whom or which they disagree. I always have, and always will, be a champion for the unwavering rule of law, the heroes of law enforcement, and the right of Americans to peacefully and honorably debate the issues of the day without malice and without hate.

This has been yet another phase of the greatest witch hunt in the history of our Country. No president has ever gone through anything like it, and it continues because our opponents cannot forget the almost 75 million people, the highest number ever for a sitting president, who voted for us just a few short months ago.

I also want to convey my gratitude to the millions of decent, hardworking, law-abiding, God-and-Country loving citizens who have bravely supported these important principles in these very difficult and challenging times.

Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun. In the months ahead I have much to share with you, and I look forward to continuing our incredible journey together to achieve American greatness for all of our people. There has never been anything like it!

We have so much work ahead of us, and soon we will emerge with a vision for a bright, radiant, and limitless American future.

Together there is nothing we cannot accomplish.

We remain one People, one family, and one glorious nation under God, and it's our responsibility to preserve this magnificent inheritance for our children and for generations of Americans to come.

May God bless all of you, and may God forever bless the United States of America.

EUA - *Impeachment* de Donald Trump (4)

[FONTE: Declaração de Donald Trump, 13/02/2021]

Why Convicting Trump is Key to Biden's Foreign Policy

With U.S. credibility so low, promoting democracy is harder than ever—so Washington should get its own house in order first.

[Jonathan Tepperman](#) February 12, 2021, 8:11 AM



A man walks past a wall of messages of support for the ongoing protests against the military coup in Yangon on Feb. 11. AFP/Getty Images

EUA - *Impeachment* de Donald Trump (5)

[FONTE: Declaração de Donald Trump, 13/02/2021]

These moves will be welcomed by human rights and democracy advocates, who have been [pressuring the White House](#) to do more in all these cases. But however well intentioned, they aren't likely to amount to much—something Biden's foreign-policy team is smart and experienced enough to understand.

Consider the new U.S. moves against the Tatmadaw (the name by which Myanmar's military is known). The first problem with them is that most of the country's top military leaders are *already* under sanctions: those imposed in 2019 in response to the ethnic cleansing of Myanmar's Rohingya population. The second, as Harvard's [Stephen Walt pointed out in Foreign Policy last week](#), is that the United States has limited business ties with Myanmar—bilateral trade amounts to around \$1.4 billion a year, about a tenth of Myanmar's annual trade with China—meaning there's not that much to cut. And the third is that the new sanctions could push

Myanmar closer to China, which will be eager to take advantage of the growing hostility between Washington and Naypyidaw by replacing any lost American aid with its own.

The Biden administration says that these sanctions are different from those imposed in the past, in part because they're being [coordinated with U.S. allies](#). But analysts such as Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies doubt that Japan and Singapore—some of the biggest investors in Myanmar, which means they could most effectively apply pressure—[share Washington's interest in disrupting trade flows](#).

Real as all these obstacles are, there's an even bigger problem with applying sanctions in a case like this: They rarely succeed in getting countries to change their behavior.



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL


O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (2)

[FONTE: Kishore Mahbubani / Público (entrevista) 22/12/2020]



“A China não tem aspirações de liderança mundial, só quer ser respeitada enquanto grande potência”

O diplomata e académico Kishore Mahbubani identifica uma impreparação estratégica, diplomática e emocional dos EUA para lidar com a China e diz que os norte-americanos ainda estão agarrados às armas com que dominaram o século XX.

22 de Dezembro de 2020, 6:30

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (3)

[FONTE: Kishore Mahbubani / Público (entrevista) 22/12/2020]



O título do mais recente livro de Kishore Mahbubani é propositadamente provocador: *A China Já Ganhou?* Esta pergunta, como assume o próprio, numa conversa, via Zoom, com o PÚBLICO, implica, no entanto, uma outra, potencialmente mais provocadora até: será que os Estados Unidos podem perder?

É precisamente esse o desafio a que se propôs o investigador do Asia Research Institute, da Universidade Nacional de Singapura, e antigo diplomata desta “cidade-Estado”, com mais de 30 anos de carreira – que incluiu a presidência do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (2001-2002) –, quando decidiu escrever sobre o conflito EUA-China, numa obra [editada em Portugal pela Bertrand](#).

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (4)

[FONTE: Kishore Mahbubani / Público (entrevista) 22/12/2020]

Diz que um dos objectivos do livro é o de tentar esclarecer alguns equívocos sobre a competição geopolítica entre EUA e a China. Qual é o equívoco mais gritante para si?

Há muitos equívocos e o mais fundamental de todos tem a ver com a forma como os americanos olham para a China, acreditando que tem as mesmas ambições que os EUA. Os EUA acreditam no conceito de

liderança global. Acham que têm de sair de casa para irem consertar o mundo, defender a liberdade e lutar em guerras. Os chineses ficam desconcertados com esta visão e com estes objectivos. Não compreendem porque é que, tendo o rendimento médio dos 50% americanos mais pobres baixado significativamente nos últimos 30 anos, os EUA gastaram cinco biliões de dólares em guerras no pós-11 de Setembro. Para a China isto é bizarro. A China não tem estas aspirações de liderança mundial, só quer ser respeitada enquanto grande potência. Se os EUA saírem do Médio Oriente, a China não vai a correr tomar o seu lugar. Se os EUA se focassem em melhorar as condições de vida dos seus cidadãos e se a China fizesse o mesmo, não existiria qualquer contradição entre os dois países. É possível evitar este conflito e provar que ele é desnecessário. Precisamente porque se baseia na percepção errada de que a China quer substituir os EUA como o país "número um" do mundo.

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (5)

[FONTE: Kishore Mahbubani / Público (entrevista) 22/12/2020]

No livro sublinha que a China não tem o “impulso missionário de conquistar o mundo” ou de “tornar toda a gente chinesa”, ao contrário dos EUA. Explique melhor.

Até certo ponto, é justo dizer que aquilo que os EUA tentaram fazer a nível global foi bom para o mundo. Procuraram melhorar as condições de vidas humanas e muitas das suas intenções foram válidas. O próprio John F. Kennedy [ex-Presidente dos EUA] disse que os americanos estavam dispostos a pagar qualquer preço e a carregar qualquer legado em nome da defesa da liberdade. Mas os EUA ainda se retratam como a cidade brilhante no cimo do monte. E dizem: “Transformem-se numa ‘América’ e serão bem-sucedidos”. Durante muitas décadas isso até foi verdade. Mas a eleição de Trump e o seu comportamento enquanto Presidente vieram confirmar que os EUA deixaram de ser a cidade brilhante no cimo do monte. Estamos a falar de um líder que [chamou aos países africanos de “países merdosos”](#). Como é que se pode ser essa cidade brilhante quando se insulta desta forma? Chegou a altura de os americanos serem mais modestos e fazerem um processo de auto-reflexão sobre as forças e fraquezas da sua sociedade. Por outro lado, os chineses acreditam que mais ninguém pode ser como a China. Não querem ser a cidade brilhante no cimo do monte. Dizem simplesmente: “O nosso sistema é bom para a China, mesmo que não o seja para os outros. Por isso, façam o que quiserem e escolham o sistema de Governo que vos aprouver, nós não queremos, nem vamos, transformar ninguém”. Os EUA dizem que a China é uma ameaça à democracia. As outras duas maiores democracias do mundo, em termos populacionais, a par dos EUA, são a Índia e a Indonésia. Estas duas democracias [estão preocupadas com o crescimento da China](#), disso não há dúvidas. Mas não olham para a China como uma ameaça ao sistema democrático. É mais um exemplo da má avaliação americana à natureza da China.

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (6)


[FONTE: Kishore Mahbubani / Público (entrevista) 22/12/2020]

Afirma que os EUA nunca desenvolveram uma grande estratégia para lidar com a China. Porquê?

Foi essa a conclusão a que cheguei após um almoço e uma conversa de duas horas com o Dr. [Henry Kissinger \[ex-secretário de Estado e conselheiro presidencial dos EUA\]](#) em Nova Iorque, em Março de 2018. E ele autorizou-me a citá-lo nesse sentido no livro. Tal realidade deve-se ao facto de os EUA se terem habituado a vencer toda e qualquer disputa dos últimos 100 anos. Desde que emergiram como principal potência do globo, venceram a I Guerra Mundial contra a Alemanha, venceram a II Guerra Mundial contra a Alemanha e o Japão, resolveram o desafio económico japonês e derrotaram a União Soviética sem disparar um único tiro. Esta sucessão de triunfos fez os americanos acreditarem que nunca mais vão perder um conflito. É por isso que escolhi para título do livro a pergunta: A China já ganhou? Porque essa questão implica uma outra, igualmente relevante: os EUA podem perder? Para os americanos essa ideia é inconcebível. O meu livro é uma prenda para os meus amigos americanos [risos], para que parem para reflectir sobre o facto de esta disputa com a China ser totalmente diferente de todos os outros desafios que já enfrentaram. A China é a civilização mais antiga do mundo, a sua população é quatro vezes maior que a dos EUA e vive um período de renascimento vigoroso. O maior erro que os EUA estão a cometer é o de desvalorizarem a China.

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (7)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council]



The Longer Telegram: Toward A New American China Strategy

 **Atlantic Council**
SCOWCROFT CENTER
FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft's legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

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O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (8)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council]

The Significance of the China Challenge

1. The rise of China represents the most significant postwar challenge to US leadership of the global political, economic, and security order—a challenge that is already causing many European, Asian, and even Middle Eastern allies to hedge their strategic bets between the United States and China.
2. The postwar strategic primacy of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region—which has already become the greatest source of global economic growth, climate change, and unresolved security tensions in the twenty-first century—is now under significant challenge by the emergence of China as a military peer-competitor and preeminent economic power.
3. The unfolding attitude, policy, and posture of China's party-state toward a future international rules-based order, and the often equivocal responses by the past Trump administration, has increasingly brought into question the continued validity of the universal values of liberal democracy, free markets, and open societies that were established by previous US administrations over the last three-quarters of a century.

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (9)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council]

DEFINING US CORE NATIONAL INTERESTS

The cornerstone of US strategy must be a definition of core national interests. This should be the product of a disciplined, time-limited, inter-agency process. It should also be subject to approval by the leadership of all relevant congressional committees, although this will inevitably be controversial. These bipartisan conclusions should then be incorporated in a presidential directive that is able to win continuing acceptance across administrations. This codification of core US interests should include the following:

- **protecting the United States from the threat of nuclear attack**, or the threat or use of other weapons of mass destruction, including any such threats from nonstate actors
- **ensuring the US nuclear umbrella is credibly extended to treaty allies**, as well as honoring other US security obligations to allies as outlined in individual treaty arrangements
- **sustaining the operational effectiveness of the United States' global network of forty-seven treaty allies**, and the political support necessary at home and abroad to sustain that network
- **maintaining US global conventional military dominance over any other adversary**, in all theaters and in all current and emerging military technologies, platforms, and domains including AI, space, and cyberspace, thereby preventing strategic leapfrogging by any other state
- **maintaining regional conventional US military predominance in the Indo-Pacific region** so that the United States can prevail in the event of armed conflict, thereby deterring China from any such military challenge

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (10)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council]

- **arming Taiwan to enable it, alongside the United States, to deter any future armed attack, cyberattack, or naval blockade** by the PRC, and in the event of any such Chinese action, to be equipped militarily to defeat it, recognizing that a failure to do so will cause a collapse of the credibility of US security assurances, including among treaty allies
- **resisting Beijing's efforts to erode Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands** and its associated EEZ, recognizing that a failure to do so will undermine the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951
- **preventing any further advancement of China's territorial claims in the South China Sea**, recognizing that a failure to do so would render invalid US global interest in maintaining the norm of freedom of navigation and further erode the credibility of the United States in the minds of Indo-Pacific allies
- **maintaining the United States' status as the largest national economy globally** as measured by GDP at market exchange rates, or, if that proves to be unachievable, to establish an effective economic condominium with major democratic allies that collectively remains, on balance, larger than China, recognizing that a failure to maintain economic dominance will result in a further acceleration in China's assertive international strategic behavior
- **retaining US global leadership in all major categories of critical emerging technology**, including AI, or do so through joint leadership with close US allies

O objetivo da China no mundo e os EUA (11)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council]

- **maintaining the US dollar's global reserve currency status** including in digital currency markets and other emerging financial-technology platforms
- **preventing catastrophic global climate change** by ensuring that all countries take necessary national action, consistent with the size of their historic and prospective greenhouse emission footprints, to keep global temperature increases within 1.5° centigrade in this century
- **defending, extending, and as necessary reforming the current rules-based liberal international order** and associated multilateral system built by the United States since 1945, as well as its ideological underpinnings, including the international political and security system anchored in the United Nations; the global economic system anchored in the Bretton Woods institutions and based on the principles of open trade, investment, technology, and talent markets; as well as the international legal, humanitarian, and human-rights order anchored in three principle multilateral human rights covenants

O objectivo da China no mundo e os EUA (12)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Kevin Rudd


prime minister of Australia

Kevin Rudd, in full **Kevin Michael Rudd**, (born September 21, 1957, Nambour, Queensland, Australia), Australian politician, who served as leader of the [Australian Labor Party](#) (ALP; 2006–10; 2013) and [prime minister](#) of Australia (2007–10; 2013).

Rudd grew up on a farm in Eumundi, Queensland. Politically active from his youth, he joined the ALP in 1972. He attended the [Australian National University](#) in [Canberra](#), where he earned a bachelor's degree in Asian studies before embarking on a diplomatic career. From 1981 to 1988 he served in Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, holding embassy posts in [Stockholm](#) and Beijing. He left the department to become chief of staff for Queensland opposition leader Wayne Goss—a position he retained after Goss became premier of Queensland in 1989. Rudd served as director general of the state cabinet office from 1992 to 1995. Entering the private sector, he worked for two years as a senior consultant for the accounting firm KPMG Australia.

Kevin Rudd

QUICK FACTS



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BORN

September 21, 1957 (age 63)
Nambour, [Australia](#)

TITLE / OFFICE

[Prime Minister, Australia](#)
(2013-2013)
[Prime Minister, Australia](#)
(2007-2010)

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

[Australian Labor Party](#)

O objetivo da China no mundo e os EUA (13)

[FONTE: Kevin Rudd / Foreign Affairs March - April 2021]

Short of War

How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation From Ending in Calamity

BY KEVIN RUDD March/April 2021

KEVIN RUDD is President of the Asia Society, in New York, and previously served as Prime Minister of Australia.

Officials in Washington and Beijing don't agree on much these days, but there is one thing on which they see eye to eye: the contest between their two countries will enter a decisive phase in the 2020s. This will be the decade of living dangerously. No matter what strategies the two sides pursue or what events unfold, the tension between the United States and China will grow, and competition will intensify; it is inevitable. War, however, is not. It remains possible for the two countries to put in place guardrails that would prevent a catastrophe: a joint framework for what I call "managed strategic competition" would reduce the risk of competition escalating into open conflict.

O objetivo da China no mundo e os EUA (14)

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The Chinese Communist Party is increasingly confident that by the decade's end, China's economy will finally surpass that of the United States as the world's largest in terms of GDP at market exchange rates. Western elites may dismiss the significance of that milestone; the CCP's Politburo does not. For China, size always matters. Taking the number one slot will turbocharge Beijing's confidence, assertiveness, and leverage in its dealings with Washington, and it will make China's central bank more likely to float the yuan, open its capital account, and challenge the U.S. dollar as the main global reserve currency. Meanwhile, China continues to advance on other fronts, as well. A new policy plan, announced last fall, aims to allow China to dominate in all new technology domains, including artificial intelligence, by 2035. And Beijing now intends to complete its military modernization program by 2027 (seven years ahead of the previous schedule), with the main goal of giving China a decisive edge in all conceivable scenarios for a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. A victory in such a conflict would allow President Xi Jinping to carry out a forced reunification with Taiwan before leaving power—an achievement that would put him on the same level within the CCP pantheon as Mao Zedong.

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[FONTE: Kevin Ruud / Foreign Affairs March - April 2021]

BEIJING'S LONG VIEW

In the United States, few have paid much attention to the domestic political and economic drivers of Chinese grand strategy, the content of that strategy, or the ways in which China has been operationalizing it in recent decades. The conversation in Washington has been all about what the United States ought to do, without much reflection on whether any given course of action might result in real changes to China's strategic course. A prime example of this type of foreign policy myopia was an address that then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered last July, in which he effectively called for the overthrow of the CCP. "We, the freedom-loving nations of the world, must induce China to change," he declared, including by "empower[ing] the Chinese people."

The only thing that could lead the Chinese people to rise up against the party-state, however, is their own frustration with the CCP's poor performance on addressing unemployment, its radical mismanagement of a natural disaster (such as a pandemic), or its massive extension of what is already intense political repression. Outside encouragement of

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[FONTE: Kevin Ruud / Foreign Affairs March - April 2021]

MANAGED STRATEGIC COMPETITION

The deeply conflicting nature of U.S. and Chinese strategic objectives and the profoundly competitive nature of the relationship may make conflict, and even war, seem inevitable—even if neither country wants that outcome. China will seek to achieve global economic dominance and regional military superiority over the United States without provoking direct conflict with Washington and its allies. Once it achieves superiority, China will then incrementally change its behavior toward other states, especially when their policies conflict with China's ever-changing definition of its core national interests. On top of this, China has already sought to gradually make the multilateral system more obliging of its national interests and values.

But a gradual, peaceful transition to an international order that accommodates Chinese leadership now seems far less likely to occur than it did just a few years ago. For all the eccentricities and flaws of the Trump administration, its decision to declare China a strategic competitor, formally end the doctrine of strategic engagement, and launch a trade war with Beijing succeeded in making clear that Washington was willing to put up a significant fight. And the Biden administration's plan to rebuild the fundamentals of national U.S. power at home, rebuild U.S. alliances abroad, and reject a simplistic return to earlier forms of strategic engagement with China signals that the contest will continue, albeit tempered by cooperation in a number of defined areas.

Sugestões de leitura

