

# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica**

## **a crise do mundo globalizado**


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2020-2021  
SESSÃO Nº 25**



# PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (1)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 45]



**Figure 3.1. The Geopolitical World: Beginning of the Twenty-First Century**



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (2)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 2]

## Four Pillars of Power

A nation's claim to power rests on four pillars: (1) overwhelming military strength and the willingness to use it; (2) surplus economic energy to enable it to provide aid and invest in other states; (3) ideological leadership that serves as a model for other nations; and (4) a cohesive system of governance.

The first pillar is the military. This period of transition from a world dominated by superpowers to a polycentric power system is marked by significant changes in the nature of warfare. The United States, by far the world's strongest traditional military power, has overwhelming strength in tanks, aircraft, naval fleets, and superbly equipped armed forces.

The second pillar, economic capacity, is even more important than the military. The United States, Europe, and Japan have yet to recover fully from the deep recession of 2008. This is reflected in the caution which Washington has recently displayed in responding to political and military crises throughout the world. Its foreign policy has been strongly influenced by high domestic unemployment and huge indebtedness that have preoccupied the country while turmoil rages in the Middle East. The fear that countries like China and Japan will withdraw their bond holdings also tempers Washington's geopolitical actions.

The third pillar is ideological leadership. Americans have taken pride in their ideals, which are a blend of the principles of freedom of expression and religion, concern for human rights, the rewards of free enterprise, and the practice of democracy in governance. Since the founding of the republic, these principles have been widely embraced throughout the world.



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (3)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, pp. 2-3]

The fourth pillar is political cohesiveness. In the United States the recent stalemate between the two major parties has been a factor in undermining America's ability to provide international leadership. A government that can suddenly be shut down, budgets that cannot be agreed upon, and a proposed health system that has divided the nation are poor models for international friends and foes alike.

With respect to these pillars, China, for its part, lacks the capacity to apply military power beyond its contiguous Asian borders. Instead, it relies on economic trade and investment to extend its influence. In doing so, the Chinese have used their sovereign funds to purchase or invest in natural resources throughout the world. While such economic initiatives have been welcomed, the political fallout from these actions has often been rising suspicion and opposition on nationalistic and environmental grounds. Moreover, the need for China to focus on building its own national infrastructure and realign its populace from rural agricultural to urban industrial and service pursuits sets a limit on China's foreign aid capacities. Although the mixture of state and private capitalism as practiced in China has been adopted in many other countries, the repressive nature of the Chinese Communist regime has been widely rejected as an ideological model by people who yearn for individual freedom as well as economic advancement.

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (4)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 3]

## **Hierarchical Order of Power**

Pundits have debated whether the new century is destined to become the Chinese era or whether the United States will retain its global dominance. Recently, this debate faded from the public agenda as it became plain that both countries have exhibited substantial weaknesses along with their inherent strength. The United States is beset by war weariness, economic problems, and political dysfunction. China has failed to match its economic power with commensurate military strength, and its economic growth, overly dependent upon exports, has slowed down. Its repressive Communist regime also has failed to be embraced as a model by other nations of the world.

Instead of a world ordered by superpowers, an international geopolitical system that is emerging is polycentric and polyarchic. It is built on a hierarchical combination of great and regional powers. The major powers are first-order states with the capacities and ambitions to expand their influence beyond the regions within which they are located. Competing with major powers are the regional powers, or second-order states. Their geopolitical reach is regionally confined. The United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and Japan are major powers. Iran, Turkey, Australia, and South Africa are representative examples of regional powers. India and Brazil are at an intermediate stage. While their reach currently is regional, they have the potential to become major powers. In time, they gain enough strength and ambition to try to influence affairs throughout their regions by the application of military and/or economic muscle. Examples are Iran's actions within Iraq and Ethiopia's in Somalia.

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (5)

[FONTE: Statista / Global Fire Power ]

## 2021 Military Strength Ranking

GFP | ANNUAL RANKING


Ranking the total available active military manpower by country, from highest to lowest.

The finalized Global Firepower ranking below utilizes **over 50 individual factors** to determine a given nation's **PowerIndex ('PwrIdx')** score with categories ranging from military might and financials to logistical capability and geography.

Our unique, in-house formula allows for smaller, more technologically-advanced, nations to compete with larger, lesser-developed ones and special modifiers, in the form of bonuses and penalties, are applied to further refine the annual list. Color arrows indicate year-over-year trend comparison (**Increase**, **Stable**, **Decline**).

### The World's Most Powerful Militaries

Countries ranked highest on the Global Firepower PowerIndex (0.000=perfect/most powerful)



Takes into account (among others): weapon numbers, weapon diversity, natural resources, available industries, manpower, financial stability  
Source: Global Firepower






# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (6)

[FONTE: Statista]

**The 20 countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020**  
*(in billion U.S. dollars)*




# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (7)

[FONTE: Eurostat / Banco Mundial]

## The 2017 results of the International Comparison Program **China, US and EU are the largest economies in the world**


In 2017, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the **European Union with 27 Member States** (EU) represented 16.0% of world GDP, expressed in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). **China** and the **United States** were the two largest economies, with shares of 16.4% and 16.3% respectively. Other countries (outside the EU) with a share larger than 1% are shown in the visual below.



*Note: The European Union represents the European Union with 27 Member States after 1 February 2020.*

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (8)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 67]





# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (9)

[FONTE: CFR / Global Conflict Tracker]

≡ COUNCIL *on*  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

100

Global Conflict Tracker

*Last updated April 30, 2021*

Center for Preventive Action →

ALERT: Attacks Against Afghan Security Forces Surge in First Quarter ↓

View by

Impact on U.S. Interests

Conflict Status


Filter by

Region ▼

Types of Conflict ▼

Impact on U.S. Interests

- Critical
- Significant
- Limited



Scroll down to explore the conflicts



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (10)

[FONTE: CFR / Global Conflict Tracker]

≡ COUNCIL on  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

100

Global Conflict Tracker

*Last updated April 30, 2021*

Center for Preventive Action →

ALERT: Attacks Against Afghan Security Forces Surge in First Quarter ↓

View by  
Impact on U.S. Interests

Conflict Status

Filter by

Europe and Eurasia ▼

Types of Conflict ▼

Conflict Status

- Worsening
- Unchanging
- Improving

Scroll down to explore the conflicts



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (11)

[FONTE: CFR / Global Conflict Tracker]

≡ COUNCIL on  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

100

Global Conflict Tracker

*Last updated April 30, 2021*

Center for Preventive Action →

ALERT: Attacks Against Afghan Security Forces Surge in First Quarter ↓

View by

Impact on U.S. Interests

Conflict Status


Filter by

Middle East and  
North Africa ▼

Types of Conflict ▼

Conflict Status

- Worsening
- Unchanging
- Improving




Scroll down to explore the conflicts





# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (12)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 9]



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (13)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 5]

## KEY FINDINGS


- The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated 0.34 per cent on the 2020 GPI. This is the ninth time in the last 12 years that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year 80 countries recorded deteriorations in peacefulness, while 81 recorded improvements.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 27<sup>th</sup> on the GPI.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world, although it recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness. The region is home to 13 of the 20 most peaceful countries, and only two European countries are not ranked in the top half of the index.
- Peacefulness improved on average in the *Militarisation* domain, but deteriorated in both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains.
- Of the 23 GPI indicators, eight recorded an improvement, 12 had a deterioration, with the remaining three indicators not registering any change over the past year.
- After years of improvements in average military spending, there was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP for the first time in five years. 79 countries had deteriorations on this indicator.
- Despite the overall deterioration in the *safety and security* domain, there were a number of indicators which improved on average, including the *homicide rate* and *terrorism impact* indicators. Total deaths from terrorism are now at their lowest point in the last decade.

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (14)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 11]

## Percentage change in score by GPI indicator, 2020

The number and intensity of internal conflicts increased, but total conflict deaths fell.





# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (15)

















































































[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p.8]

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
1	Iceland	1.078	↔	29	Poland	1.657	↓ 1	=57	Greece	1.877	↑ 8
2	New Zealand	1.198	↔	30	Estonia	1.68	↑ 3	=57	Liberia	1.877	↓ 1
3	Portugal	1.247	↔	31	Italy	1.69	↑ 6	59	Malawi	1.885	↓ 14
4	Austria	1.275	↔	32	Costa Rica	1.691	↑ 2	=60	Equatorial Guinea	1.891	↑ 10
5	Denmark	1.283	↔	33	Botswana	1.693	↓ 2	=60	The Gambia	1.891	↔
6	Canada	1.298	↔	34	Latvia	1.7	↓ 2	62	North Macedonia	1.9	↑ 2
7	Singapore	1.321	↔	35	Uruguay	1.704	↔	63	Madagascar	1.905	↓ 8
8	Czech Republic	1.337	↓ 1	36	Lithuania	1.705	↔	=64	Cyprus	1.92	↓ 2
9	Japan	1.36	↑ 2	37	Taiwan	1.707	↔	=64	Vietnam	1.92	↓ 5
10	Switzerland	1.366	↔	38	Spain	1.712	↑ 1	66	France	1.93	↓ 3
11	Slovenia	1.369	↓ 2	=39	Kuwait	1.723	↑ 5	67	Eswatini	1.934	↑ 9
12	Ireland	1.375	↔	=39	Mongolia	1.723	↑ 7	68	Oman	1.941	↑ 1
13	Australia	1.386	↔	41	United Arab Emirates	1.752	↑ 6	69	Montenegro	1.944	↓ 2
14	Finland	1.404	↔	42	United Kingdom	1.77	↓ 2	70	Kazakhstan	1.948	↓ 4
15	Sweden	1.479	↑ 3	43	Ghana	1.776	↓ 2	71	Moldova	1.95	↓ 3
16	Germany	1.494	↑ 6	44	Zambia	1.794	↑ 5	72	Jordan	1.958	↑ 3
=17	Belgium	1.496	↑ 6	45	Chile	1.804	↓ 17	73	Nepal	1.974	↓ 1
=17	Norway	1.496	↔	46	Sierra Leone	1.82	↓ 4	74	Argentina	1.978	↑ 3
19	Bhutan	1.501	↓ 4	47	Senegal	1.824	↑ 7	75	Paraguay	1.991	↑ 11
20	Malaysia	1.525	↔	48	South Korea	1.829	↑ 9	76	Dominican Republic	1.992	↑ 6
21	Netherlands	1.528	↓ 5	49	Indonesia	1.831	↓ 6	77	Sri Lanka	2.003	↓ 4
22	Romania	1.541	↑ 3	50	Laos	1.843	↓ 2	78	Cambodia	2.011	↑ 3
23	Mauritius	1.544	↑ 1	51	Serbia	1.846	↑ 1	79	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.04	↓ 1
24	Hungary	1.559	↓ 5	52	Tanzania	1.85	↑ 6	80	Jamaica	2.041	↔
25	Slovakia	1.568	↓ 4	53	Namibia	1.861	↑ 8	81	Rwanda	2.049	↑ 4
26	Croatia	1.615	↑ 1	54	Timor-Leste	1.863	↓ 3	82	Guyana	2.05	↑ 8
27	Qatar	1.616	↑ 3	55	Albania	1.872	↓ 2	83	Morocco	2.057	↑ 1
28	Bulgaria	1.628	↓ 2	56	Panama	1.875	↓ 6				



# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (16)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p.9]

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
84	 Peru	2.066	↑ 3	112	 Djibouti	2.215	↓ 6	138	 Niger	2.608	↓ 11
85	 Kosovo	2.07	↓ 6	113	 El Salvador	2.243	↓ 2	139	 India	2.628	↑ 2
=86	 Bolivia	2.074	↓ 3	114	 Thailand	2.245	↓ 1	140	 Colombia	2.646	↑ 3
=86	 Cuba	2.074	↑ 2	115	 Guatemala	2.267	↑ 1	141	 Cameroon	2.65	↓ 1
88	 Trinidad and Tobago	2.078	↑ 4	116	 Turkmenistan	2.276	↓ 1	142	 Iran	2.672	↓ 5
89	 Guinea	2.082	↑ 7	=117	 Algeria	2.287	↔	143	 Palestine	2.699	↓ 1
90	 Ecuador	2.085	↓ 17	=117	 Mauritania	2.287	↑ 1	144	 Mali	2.729	↔
91	 Angola	2.087	↓ 2	119	 Honduras	2.288	↑ 4	145	 Israel	2.775	↑ 1
92	 Tunisia	2.09	↓ 1	120	 Azerbaijan	2.3	↑ 12	146	 Lebanon	2.828	↑ 2
93	 Kyrgyz Republic	2.094	↑ 2	121	 United States of America	2.307	↔	147	 Nigeria	2.865	↔
94	 Belarus	2.111	↑ 4	122	 Burkina Faso	2.316	↓ 13	148	 Ukraine	2.927	↑ 1
=95	 Gabon	2.116	↓ 1	123	 South Africa	2.317	↑ 3	149	 Venezuela	2.936	↓ 4
=95	 Georgia	2.116	↑ 4	124	 Republic of the Congo	2.343	↑ 1	150	 Turkey	2.959	↑ 2
97	 Bangladesh	2.121	↑ 7	125	 Kenya	2.375	↓ 3	151	 North Korea	2.962	↓ 1
98	 Lesotho	2.131	↑ 5	126	 Brazil	2.413	↓ 3	152	 Pakistan	2.973	↑ 1
=99	 Armenia	2.135	↑ 15	127	 Myanmar	2.424	↑ 2	153	 Sudan	3.043	↓ 2
=99	 Mozambique	2.135	↑ 2	128	 Saudi Arabia	2.443	↑ 3	154	 Russia	3.049	↔
=101	 Guinea-Bissau	2.157	↑ 9	129	 Philippines	2.471	↑ 6	155	 Central African Republic	3.237	↑ 3
=101	 Papua New Guinea	2.157	↓ 5	130	 Egypt	2.481	↓ 2	156	 Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.243	↔
103	 Uzbekistan	2.158	↓ 1	131	 Zimbabwe	2.485	↓ 1	157	 Libya	3.258	↔
104	 China	2.166	↓ 4	132	 Burundi	2.506	↑ 6	158	 Somalia	3.302	↓ 3
105	 Cote d' Ivoire	2.169	↑ 7	133	 Ethiopia	2.526	↑ 3	159	 Yemen	3.411	↔
106	 Benin	2.182	↓ 35	134	 Chad	2.538	↓ 1	160	 South Sudan	3.447	↑ 1
107	 Tajikistan	2.188	↑ 1	135	 Nicaragua	2.553	↓ 15	161	 Iraq	3.487	↓ 1
108	 Togo	2.201	↓ 3	136	 Eritrea	2.567	↑ 3	162	 Syria	3.539	↔
109	 Uganda	2.202	↓ 3	137	 Mexico	2.572	↓ 3	163	 Afghanistan	3.644	↔
110	 Bahrain	2.209	↑ 9								
111	 Haiti	2.211	↓ 18								

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (17)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 13]

## Regional Overview



**Only two of the nine regions in the world improved in peacefulness in 2020: North America and Russia and Eurasia. South America experienced the largest average deterioration and was the only region to record deteriorations across all three domains GPI domains: Safety and Security, Militarisation and Ongoing Conflict.**

Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region in the world, which it has held since the inception of the GPI. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness and remained the least peaceful region, a position it has held since 2015.

North America recorded an improvement of 1.28 per cent, with Russia and Eurasia having a slightly smaller improvement of 1.23 per cent. North America was the only region to record improvements across all three domains, while Russia and Eurasia recorded improvements in *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* but a deterioration on *Militarisation*.

South America had the biggest fall in peacefulness, with deteriorations across all three domains.

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a slight deterioration of 0.5 per cent but as a large region, changes in peacefulness varied substantially between countries.

The deterioration in Asia-Pacific's overall score was driven by indicators in the *Militarisation* and the *Ongoing Conflict* domains. There were particularly notable deteriorations on *deaths from internal conflicts*, increasing *military expenditure* and a weaker commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

South America and Central America and the Caribbean both recorded deteriorations on the 2020 GPI. While South America's average deterioration in peacefulness was driven by deteriorations on *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security*, the fall in peacefulness in Central America and the Caribbean was driven by changes in *Ongoing Conflict*.

### ASIA-PACIFIC

Peace deteriorated slightly in the Asia-Pacific region in the 2020 GPI, with a 0.2 per cent average decrease in peacefulness. The deterioration was driven by increasing deaths from *internal conflict*, increasing *military expenditure* and a weaker commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*. However, there were improvements in the *homicide rate* and *violent crime* indicators.

Five countries in Asia-Pacific continue to rank in the top 25 of the GPI. New Zealand ranks first in the region and second overall in the 2020 GPI, despite a deterioration in its score of 2.3 per cent. This was driven by a significant deterioration in *terrorism impact* because of the white-nationalist terror attack on two mosques in Christchurch on March 15 2019. Fifty-one people were killed in the attacks.<sup>1</sup>




# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (18)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 13]

## Regional GPI results, 2019

Only two regions became more peaceful from 2019 to 2020.



Source: IEP

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (19)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p.14-16]

## Europe

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Iceland	1.078	0.014	1
2	Portugal	1.247	0	3
3	Austria	1.275	0.011	4
4	Denmark	1.283	-0.001	5
5	Czech Republic	1.337	-0.007	8
6	Switzerland	1.366	0.001	10
7	Slovenia	1.369	0.022	11
8	Ireland	1.375	-0.005	12
9	Finland	1.404	-0.044	14
10	Sweden	1.479	-0.027	15
11	Germany	1.494	-0.051	16
11	Belgium	1.496	-0.054	17
13	Norway	1.496	-0.003	17
14	Netherlands	1.528	0.037	21
15	Romania	1.541	-0.039	22
16	Hungary	1.559	0.038	24
17	Slovakia	1.568	0.026	25
18	Croatia	1.615	-0.022	26
19	Bulgaria	1.628	0.026	28
20	Poland	1.657	0.016	29

## Asia-Pacific

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	New Zealand	1.198	0.027	2
2	Singapore	1.321	-0.023	7
3	Japan	1.36	-0.01	9
4	Australia	1.386	-0.01	13
5	Malaysia	1.525	-0.003	20
6	Taiwan	1.707	-0.017	37
7	Mongolia	1.723	-0.062	39
8	South Korea	1.829	-0.032	48
9	Indonesia	1.831	0.061	49
10	Laos	1.843	0.047	50
11	Timor-Leste	1.863	0.058	54
12	Vietnam	1.92	0.039	64
13	Cambodia	2.011	-0.028	78
14	Papua New Guinea	2.157	0.05	101
15	China	2.166	0.019	104
16	Thailand	2.245	-0.007	114
17	Myanmar	2.424	-0.024	127
18	Philippines	2.471	-0.046	129
19	North Korea	2.962	0.041	151
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.892	0.004	

# Geopolítica, poder e conflitos (20)

[FONTE: Global Peace Index 2020 / Institute for Economics and Peace, p.14-16]

## North America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Canada	1.298	-0.009	6
2	United States of America	2.307	-0.036	121
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.803	-0.023	

## South America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Uruguay	1.704	-0.007	35
2	Chile	1.804	0.163	45
3	Argentina	1.978	-0.011	74
4	Paraguay	1.991	-0.065	75
5	Guyana	2.05	-0.025	82
6	Peru	2.066	0.007	84
7	Bolivia	2.074	0.029	86
8	Ecuador	2.085	0.112	90
9	Brazil	2.413	0.052	126
10	Colombia	2.646	-0.005	140
11	Venezuela	2.936	0.206	149
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.159	0.041	

## Russia & Eurasia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score change	Overall Rank
1	Kazakhstan	1.948	0.016	70
2	Moldova	1.95	-0.001	71
3	Kyrgyz Republic	2.094	-0.01	93
4	Belarus	2.111	-0.004	94
5	Georgia	2.116	-0.005	95
6	Armenia	2.135	-0.122	99
7	Uzbekistan	2.158	-0.008	103
8	Tajikistan	2.188	0	107
9	Turkmenistan	2.276	0.011	116
10	Azerbaijan	2.3	-0.189	120
11	Ukraine	2.927	0.012	148
12	Russia	3.049	-0.04	154
REGIONAL AVERAGE		2.271	-0.028	





## PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (1) [FONTE:

Aaron David Miller e Richard Sokolsky / Washington Post, 13/08/2020]

**An 'alliance of democracies' sounds good. It won't solve the world's problems.**

If America wants to lead, its leaders will have to deal with all types of governments

Richard Sokolsky



Democratic presidential nominee and former vice president Joe Biden at a campaign event Wednesday in Wilmington, Del. (Olivier Douliery/AFP/Getty Images)

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (2) [FONTE:

Aaron David Miller e Richard Sokolsky / Washington Post, 13/08/2020]

To advance American interests, Washington and its democratic partners will need to find a way to work productively with these countries even if they are not democratic and don't respect human rights.

Two decades ago, under the leadership of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, the [Community of Democracies](#) was formed with a mandate to strengthen democratic institutions, advance common democratic values and standards, and promote cooperation in supporting new and emerging democratic societies. Its primary focus was not tackling the most serious global problems, in part because progress on climate change, improving global trade, reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating international terrorism all require cooperation and accommodation with governments that aren't democracies — you can't take on a global pandemic, for instance, without Russia and China. As Brookings scholar Theodore J. Piccone [observed](#) in a 2008 report on the efficacy of the Community of Democracies, "If the world's democracies have so much trouble finding common ground in promoting democracy and human rights, then surely there is little hope for a more ambitious agenda of cooperation, particularly on issues that by their nature require the cooperation of non-democracies."



# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (3) [FONTE:

Aaron David Miller e Richard Sokolsky / Washington Post, 13/08/2020]

Geography, political culture, security, history and economics play key roles, too, in producing conflicting interests in the democratic camp. History is replete with examples of discord among democracies: from tensions between the United States, France, Britain and Israel resulting from the 1956 Suez crisis; to America caught between Britain and Argentina over the status of the Falkland Islands; to French opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Where you stand in the world has a good deal to do with where you sit. And this invariably leads to different politics, calculations and interests, even among the closest of friends. Trump's overall approach to foreign relations is clearly an aberration. But our allies now question whether America remains as committed to democratic values and is fit to lead.

A Biden administration might be in a position to repair much of this damage. But given Biden's domestic priorities and other foreign policy challenges, the idea of assembling a functional and durable organization of the world's democracies to do what he wants — "to strengthen our democratic institution, honestly confront nations that are backsliding, and forge a common agenda" — seems like a tall order because of the diversity of views that are likely to exist even among mostly like-minded democratic governments, including on how to engage with the globe's more troublesome actors. And because few nations, including the United States, will have the will, skill, time or resources during a global pandemic to fulfill the mandate of the alliance of democracies Biden wants to create.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (4) [FONTE:

Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

### **China and Russia Turn Deeper Ties into a Military Challenge for Biden**

"You face a two-front war where we don't have a two-front military," said one former Trump official.

[Amy Mackinnon](#) April 20, 2021, 12:35 PM



Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) and Russian President Vladimir Putin smile during the welcoming ceremony on the final day of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, on April 27, 2019. VALERY SHARIFULIN/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images

Deepening military and diplomatic cooperation between Russia and China is worrying U.S. defense planners, who fear the two frenemies that share military technology and many foreign-policy goals will complicate the Biden administration's plan to reassert U.S. leadership.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (5) [FONTE:

Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

"Our sense is that [China] is paying very close attention to what's going on as they did initially with things in the Ukraine," the senior defense official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "I think it's fair to say that they are looking closely to determine how they might leverage lessons learned into their own national interests."

There's no evidence so far to suggest Beijing and Moscow are actually coordinating their parallel pressure campaigns, according to 11 current and former officials and experts who spoke to *Foreign Policy*. But the buildups are stretching the U.S. President Joe Biden's attention at a particularly bad time. As the Pentagon has broken with the 1990s-era concept of planning for two major wars at the same time, the split screen of Chinese fighter jets over Taiwan and Russian troops massing near Ukraine is giving the Pentagon's strategic planners a particularly uncomfortable preview of what the future could hold.

"You face a two-front war where we don't have a two-front military," said Elbridge Colby, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration. "If NATO is expecting U.S. forces to bail it out simultaneously with a fight over Taiwan, we can't do them both. We don't have the assets. That can create huge problems for us."



# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A crescente cooperação China-Rússia (6)

[FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

Russia's recent military buildup near Ukraine's border has also served as a reminder that although China may be the strategic priority for years to come, Moscow still has the capacity to wreak havoc in Europe.

"I want the pivot to Asia, but I don't want it to come at the expense of focusing on the threat of Putin today," said Michael McFaul, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia under former U.S. President Barack Obama.


For years, China and Russia have engaged in a tactical alliance in the United Nations Security Council, banding together to counter the influence of the United States and its European allies—Britain and France—who have liberally pursued economic sanctions and military intervention. That cooperation has only increased in recent years, including on votes regarding Syria. Outside of U.N. headquarters, Russia and China have intensified their once-chilly relationship in recent years by redoubling bilateral trade in key areas like energy and arms. Both are interested in circumventing the U.S.-dictated financial order that helps undermine Washington's global dominance. They have also united over their deep skepticism about U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (7) [FONTE:

Frederick Kempe / Atlantic Council, 20/04/2021]

### **Why growing Chinese-Russian common cause poses Biden's nightmare**



Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's Xi Jinping walk down the stairs as they arrive for a BRICS summit in Brasilia, Brazil November 14, 2019. REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino/File Photo

President Joe Biden faces a nightmare scenario of global consequence: increasing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation aimed at undermining US influence and at upending Biden's efforts to rally democratic allies.

It is the most significant and underrecognized test of Biden's leadership yet: It could be the defining challenge of his presidency.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (8) [FONTE:

Frederick Kempe / Atlantic Council, 20/04/2021]

In an only thinly veiled warning to Japan and South Korea, it added, "China and Russia understand the weight of their ties... To be honest, no country in the region can stand alone against either China or Russia, let alone fight against the powers at the same time. It would be disastrous for any country which tends to confront China and Russia through forging an alliance with the US."

Asked last October about the possibility of a formal military alliance with China, Russian President Vladimir Putin [said](#), "theoretically, it is quite possible."

In any case, there's nothing theoretical about the military escalations around Ukraine and Taiwan.

Over the past week, Russia has amassed the largest concentration of troops along Ukraine's border since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Ukrainian government officials say Putin has brought more than [forty thousand](#) troops near Ukraine's eastern border for "combat training exercises" over a period of two weeks.

At the same time, China has ramped up its military overflight incursions into Taiwan's air defense zone to unprecedented levels, having flown more than [250 sorties](#) near the island this year. Just this past Monday, the Chinese military [sent](#) twenty-five warplanes Taiwan's way, a record high since Taiwan began disclosing figures last year.



# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (9) [FONTE:

Frederick Kempe / Atlantic Council, 20/04/2021]

### **How the great-power drama complicates Biden's agenda**

The Biden administration this week responded to Putin with the carrot of a summit meeting and the stick of new sanctions. On Tuesday, Biden [called](#) Putin, signaling he is not looking to escalate tensions with the leader he only a month ago [agreed](#) was a "killer."

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken [stood](#) beside NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg as they condemned Russia's military buildup. The Biden administration's strongest rebuke came Thursday when it [announced](#) new economic sanctions against thirty-eight Russian entities accused of election interference and cyberattacks, expelled ten diplomats, and introduced measures banning US financial institutions from trading newly issued Russian state debt and bonds.

China's incursions over Taiwan came shortly after the US State Department [issued](#) guidelines loosening the rules for US government officials engaging with Taiwan. Blinken has [said](#) the administration is concerned by China's "increasingly aggressive actions" and is committed to ensuring that Taiwan "has the ability to defend itself." The United States further demonstrated its support on Wednesday by [sending](#) an unofficial delegation consisting of a former US senator and two former US deputy secretaries of state to Taiwan.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (10) [FONTE:

Matthew Kroening, The Return of Great Power Rivalry...]

### *The Democratic Advantage in Great Power Competition*

Of course, social science is not physics. The strongest relationships we have are general tendencies, not hard and fast rules. And most of these findings have been challenged by other scholars and are the subject of ongoing debate.<sup>59</sup> Yet, there is more than enough theory and evidence to suggest that there is something different about democracies.

Moreover, the advantages possessed by democracies are not trivial, but are central to gaining and maintaining global mastery. To become a leading global power, a state must possess economic, diplomatic, and military strength. Democracies, on average, possess stronger economies, diplomacy, and militaries than their autocratic competitors. We can, therefore, aggregate these mid-level findings about a democratic advantage in discrete areas into a bigger theory about domestic political institutions and international power and influence. Democracies should enjoy a systematic advantage in international geopolitics.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (11)

[FONTE:

Matthew Kroening, The Return of Great Power Rivalry...]

Some see the constraints on government power in democracies as a weakness, but, in fact, they are democracy's greatest strength. These constraints facilitate economic growth by giving individuals and businesses confidence that they will be able to reap the rewards of their labors, investments, and innovations. They help democracies attract capital and develop as financial centers, because investors know their money will be safe and will likely generate positive rates of return over the long run. They make for stronger alliances and international diplomacy, because democratic commitments tend to be more reliable and because others have less to fear from powerful democracies. They lead to superior military performance; since people do not fear their governments, their governments need not fear them, and governments can focus on external enemies. They innovate in military technology and operational concepts. In addition, protections for free speech lead to open debate that informs democratic leaders in foreign policy, including on matters of war and peace.


Combined, this is an impressive array of positive attributes and should lead us to conclude that democracies, on average, will be better able to amass international power and influence than their autocratic rivals.



# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (12)

[FONTE:  
Matthew Kroening, The Return of Great Power Rivalry...]



**FIGURE 1.1** A Schematic of the Argument

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA? A contra-coligação China-Rússia (13)

[FONTE:

Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

## The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers

*Azar Gat*

### THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY

TODAY'S GLOBAL liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam—and it is the lesser of the two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the societies from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction—particularly by nonstate actors—that makes militant Islam a menace.

The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (14) [FONTE:

Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

Liberal democracy's supposedly inherent economic advantage is also far less clear than is often assumed. All of the belligerents in the twentieth century's great struggles proved highly effective in producing for war. During World War I, semiautocratic Germany committed its resources as effectively as its democratic rivals did. After early victories in World War II, Nazi Germany's economic mobilization and military production proved lax during the critical years 1940–42. Well positioned at the time to fundamentally alter the global balance of power by destroying the Soviet Union and straddling all of continental Europe, Germany failed because its armed forces were meagerly supplied for the task. The reasons for this deficiency remain a matter of historical debate, but one of the problems was the existence of competing centers of authority in the Nazi system, in which Hitler's

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Contingency was responsible for the United States' emergence in the New World—and its ability to save the Old World.

“divide and rule” tactics and party functionaries' jealous guarding of their assigned domains had a chaotic effect. Furthermore, from the fall of France in June 1940 to the German setback before Moscow in December 1941, there was a widespread feeling in Germany that the war had practically been won. All the same, from 1942 onward (by which time it was too late), Germany greatly intensified its economic mobilization and caught up with and even surpassed the liberal

democracies in terms of the share of GDP devoted to the war (although its production volume remained much lower than that of the massive U.S. economy). Likewise, levels of economic mobilization in imperial Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded those of the United States and the United Kingdom thanks to ruthless efforts.



# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (15) [FONTE:

Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

Because the totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war, and these countries were subsequently threatened by Soviet power, they lent themselves to a sweeping restructuring and democratization. Consequently, smaller countries that chose capitalism over communism had no rival political and economic model to emulate and no powerful international players to turn to other than the liberal democratic camp. These small and medium-sized countries' eventual democratization probably had as much to do with the overwhelming influence of the Western liberal hegemony as with internal processes. Presently, Singapore is the only example of a country with a truly developed economy that still maintains a semiauthoritarian regime, and even it is likely to change under the influence of the liberal order within which it operates. But are Singapore-like great powers that prove resistant to the influence of this order possible?

The question is made relevant by the recent emergence of nondemocratic giants, above all formerly communist and booming authoritarian capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. Some believe that these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence, and outside influence.

# Um erro estratégico dos EUA?

## A contra-coligação China-Rússia (16) [FONTE:

Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

That future has arrived, and it is nothing less than a new cold war: The constant, interminable Chinese computer hacks of American warships' maintenance records, Pentagon personnel records, and so forth constitute war by other means. This situation will last decades and will only get worse, whatever this or that trade deal is struck between smiling Chinese and American presidents in a photo-op that sends financial markets momentarily skyward. The new cold war is permanent because of a host of factors that generals and strategists understand but that many, especially those in the business and financial community who populate Davos, still prefer to deny. And because the U.S.-China relationship is the world's most crucial—with many second- and third-order effects—a cold war between the two is becoming the negative organizing principle of geopolitics that markets will just have to price in.

This is because the differences between the United States and China are stark and fundamental. They can barely be managed by negotiations and can never really be assuaged.



# Sugestões de leitura

