

# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica**

## **a crise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

**2020-2021  
SESSÃO Nº 26**



## PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (1)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 97]



Figure 5.1. North and Middle America: Major Geopolitical Features



# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]





# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (3)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 97]

**Table 5.1. Four Stages of US Geopolitical Development**

<i>Stages</i>	<i>Inland</i>		<i>Geopolitical</i>	
	<i>Time Period</i>	<i>Transport</i>	<i>Power</i>	<i>Orientation</i>
Maritime	Colonial to 1803 (Louisiana Purchase)	River, road, hose	Manual, watermills	Securing Atlantic Seaboard
Continental	1803 to 1898 (Spanish-American War)	Rail, river, canal, horse	Coal, watermills	Continental unification and expansion
Continental-Maritime	1898 to World War II outbreak	Rail, highway	Oil, gas, coal, hydroelectric power (penstock turbines), internal combustion engine	Continental development, Caribbean and Pacific expansion
Maritime-Continental	1941 to present	Highway, rail, air, ocean shipping	All of above plus nuclear, wind, solar	US maritime ring and global reach

# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (4)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]





# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (5)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 281]



Figure 9.1. China Air Defense Identification Zone



# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (6)

[FONTE: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics The Geography of International Relations, p. 296]




Figure 9.2. East Asia: Major Geopolitical Features

# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (7)

[FONTE: RAND Project Air Force]

## An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard



### 10. Nuclear stability

(confidence in secure second-strike capability)

Country	1996, 2003, and 2010	2017
China	Low confidence	Medium confidence
U.S.	High confidence	

# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (8)

[FONTE: RAND Project Air Force]

## 2. U.S. vs. Chinese air superiority



In virtually any East Asian scenario, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft would play a critical role in blunting Chinese attacks. Since 1996, the United States has improved existing aircraft and introduced so-called fifth-generation aircraft, including the F-22 and F-35. China, meanwhile, has replaced many of its obsolete second-generation aircraft, which made up an overwhelming proportion of its force in 1996, with modern fourth-generation designs. These fourth-generation aircraft now constitute roughly half of the PLA Air Force's fighter inventory. The net effect of these changes has been to narrow, but not close, the qualitative gap between the U.S. and Chinese air forces.


To evaluate the impact of this change on the two scenarios considered, we employed tactical and operational air combat models, using the appropriate basing, flight distances, and force structure data. The models evaluate the number of fighter aircraft that the United States would need to maintain in the Western Pacific to defeat a Chinese air campaign. The results suggest that U.S. requirements have increased by several hundred percent since 1996. In the 2017 Taiwan case, U.S. commanders would probably be unable to find the basing required for U.S. forces to prevail in a seven-day campaign. They could relax their time requirement and prevail in a more extended campaign, but this would entail leaving ground and naval forces vulnerable to Chinese air operations for a correspondingly longer period. The Spratly Islands scenario would be easier, requiring roughly half the forces of the Taiwan scenario.



# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China? (9)

[FONTE: RAND Project Air Force]

## 9. U.S. vs. China cyberwar



China's cyber activities have become a major source of concern in the United States and allied countries. There is strong evidence that many of the hostile cyber espionage activities emanating from China are tied to the PLA. The PLA has maintained organized cyber units since at least the late-1990s, while the U.S. Cyber Command was only formed in 2009. Nevertheless, under wartime conditions, the United States might not fare as poorly in the cyber domain as many assume. Cyber Command works closely with the National Security Agency and can draw heavily on the latter's sophisticated toolkit.

Moreover, in evaluating the likely relative impact of cyber attacks, the target user's skills, network management, and general resiliency are at least as important as the attacker's capabilities. In all of these areas, the United States enjoys substantial advantages, though Chinese performance is improving. Chinese cyber security is suspect, and its civilian computers suffer from the world's highest rate of infection by malware. Both sides might nevertheless face significant surprises in the cyber domain during a conflict, and U.S. logistical efforts are particularly vulnerable, since they rely on unclassified networks that are connected to the Internet.

# Conflitos globais: a rivalidade EUA-China (10)

[FONTE: RAND Project Air Force]

## 10. Nuclear Stability

Country	1996, 2003, and 2010	2017
China	Low confidence	Medium confidence
U.S.	High confidence	

The nuclear scorecard evaluates crisis stability in the bilateral nuclear relationship rather than the advantage enjoyed by one side or the other. Specifically, the scorecard examines the survivability of both sides' second-strike capabilities in the face of a first strike by the other. When both sides maintain a survivable second-strike capability, the incentives for both the stronger and weaker parties to strike first diminish and stability is, in that sense, enhanced. The scorecard analysis considers the number, range, and accuracy of both sides' offensive weapons, as well as the number, mobility, and "hardness" of nuclear targets.

China has modernized its nuclear forces steadily since 1996, increasing their quantity as well as improving quality. It has improved survivability through the introduction of the road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-9) and DF-31A ICBMs and the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs), capable of carrying 12 modern JL-2 sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of approximately 7,400 km. In April 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense said that China has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles to some of its DF-5 missiles, and China is currently developing next-generation road-mobile ICBMs, SSBNs, and SLBMs. The United States has committed major funding to modernize its nuclear arsenal but, in keeping with both START and New START commitments and in contrast to China, is reducing the number of operationally deployed warheads and strategic delivery systems (Heavy Bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs).

Despite additions to the Chinese nuclear force and U.S. reductions, even by 2017, the United States will still enjoy a numerical advantage in warheads of at least 13 to one. A Chinese first strike could not plausibly deny the United States a retaliatory capability in any of the snapshot years considered. For its part, Chinese survivability has improved significantly. Nuclear exchange modeling suggests that, as late as 2003, only a handful of Chinese systems might have survived a U.S. first strike—and even this outcome would have depended largely on China deploying its single, unreliable Xia-class SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) prior to an attack. In the 2010 and 2017 cases, more Chinese warheads survive, and no foreign leader could contemplate a disarming first-strike against China with any degree of confidence.

# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (1)

[FONTE: Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts” in International Security, 2015]

Table 1. U.S. Defense Pacts, 1945–2014

OAS	NATO	ANZUS	Bilateral
Antigua & Barbuda (1981)	Albania (2009)	Australia (1951)	Israel (1962)*
Argentina (1947)	Belgium (1949)	New Zealand	Japan (1951)
Bahamas (1982)	Bulgaria (2003)	(1951–86)	Pakistan (1959)
Barbados (1967)	Canada (1949)		Philippines
Belize (1991)	Croatia (2009)		(1951)
Bolivia (1947)	Czech Republic (1999)		South Korea
Brazil (1947)	Denmark (1949)		(1953)
Chile (1947)	Estonia (2003)		Taiwan (1954)*
Colombia (1947)	France (1949)		
Costa Rica (1947)	Greece (1951)		
Cuba (1948–62, 2009)	Hungary (1999)		
Dominica (1979)	Iceland (1949)		
Dominican Republic (1947)	Italy (1949)		
Ecuador (1947)	Latvia (2003)		
El Salvador (1947)	Lithuania (2003)		
Grenada (1975)	Luxembourg (1949)		
Guatemala (1947)	Netherlands (1949)		
Guyana (1991)	Norway (1949)		
Haiti (1947)	Poland (1999)		
Honduras (1947)	Portugal (1949)		
Jamaica (1969)	Romania (2003)		
Mexico (1947)	Slovakia (2003)		
Nicaragua (1947)	Slovenia (2003)		
Panama (1947)	Spain (1981)		
Paraguay (1947)	Turkey (1951)		
Peru (1947)	United Kingdom (1949)		
St. Kitts & Nevis (1984)	West Germany (1955–90)		
St. Lucia (1979)	Germany (1990)		
St. Vincent (1981)			
Suriname (1977)			
Trinidad & Tobago (1967)			
Uruguay (1947)			
Venezuela (1947)			



# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (2)

[FONTE: Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts” in International Security, 2015]


Table 2. U.S. National Interests, 1945–2014

Security	Prosperity	Values
protect U.S. citizens and territory	maintain access to resources	promote democracy
prevent rise of great power rivals	maintain access to transit routes	promote capitalism
prevent spread of weapons of mass destruction	maintain access to markets	prevent genocide (1991)

# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (3) [FONTE: Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 13/05/2020]



The United States spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined



SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, April 2020.

NOTES: Figures are in U.S. dollars converted from local currencies using market exchange rates. Data for the United States are for fiscal year 2019, which ran from October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019. Data for the other countries are for calendar year 2019. The source for this chart uses a definition of defense spending that is more broad than budget function 050 and defense discretionary spending.


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# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (4) [FONTE: Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 13/05/2020]



The United States has historically devoted a larger share of its economy to defense than other members of the G7



SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2020.

NOTES: Data for the United States are for the fiscal year that ended on September 30 of the stated year. Data for all other countries are based on calendar years. The G7, or Group of Seven, is a forum for the countries that have the world's largest advanced economies. The 2019 data for the United Kingdom is a preliminary estimate. The source for this chart uses a definition of defense spending that is more broad than budget function 050 and defense discretionary spending.

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
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# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (5) [FONTE: Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 27/05/2020]



Non-defense discretionary programs include spending for investments




SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2021*, February 2020.  
NOTES: Discretionary health programs include National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, veterans' healthcare, administrative costs for Medicaid, and Indian Health Service.

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Defense spending accounts for **15 percent of all federal spending** and **roughly half of discretionary spending**. Total discretionary spending — for both defense and nondefense purposes — represents only about one-third of the annual federal budget. It is **currently below its historical average as a share of GDP and is projected to decline further**.

# A grande estratégia dos EUA: as alianças político-militares (6) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs]




## Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics

*by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.*

*Reviewed by G. John Ikenberry*

Coined by Nye in the late 1980s, the term "soft power" -- the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion -- is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates. This short book reintroduces the idea and argues for its relevance in forming post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy. Nye argues that successful states need both hard and soft power -- the ability to coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences. The United States can dominate others, but it has also excelled in projecting soft power, with the help of its companies, foundations, universities, churches, and other institutions of civil society; U.S. culture, ideals, and values have been extraordinarily important in helping Washington attract partners and supporters. Nye acknowledges the limits of soft power: it tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes. Indeed, societies often embrace American values and culture but resist U.S. foreign policies. But overall, Nye's message is that U.S. security hinges as much on winning hearts and minds as it does on winning wars.

# A grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (1) [FONTE: Sun Tzu, “A Arte da Guerra”]



## Sun Tzu's THE ART OF WAR

Bilingual Edition with Complete  
Chinese and English Text

Translated by Lionel Giles  
With a new foreword by John Minford

TUTTLE PUBLISHING  
Tokyo • Rutland, Vermont • Singapore

# A grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (2)

[FONTE: Andrew Scobell et Al, China's Grand Strategy. Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition (Rand Corp., 2020), p. 14

**Table 2.1**  
**China's Grand Strategies Since 1949**

Vision	Revolution	Recovery	Building CNP	Rejuvenation
Dates	1949–1977	1978–1989	1990–2003	2004–present
Key threats	Superpower-centric (military and political)	Economic weakness (underdeveloped)	Military and political weakness	Superpower-centric (hard and soft power)
Ways	External: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Autarky</li> <li>• Confrontation</li> </ul> Internal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobilization</li> <li>• Struggle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reform and opening</li> <li>• Cooperation</li> <li>• Low profile</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build hard power</li> <li>• Do something</li> <li>• Internal control</li> </ul>	External: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assertive</li> <li>• High profile</li> </ul> Internal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Control</li> <li>• Stability</li> </ul>
Means (in rank order)	1. Political 2. Military 3. Economic	1. Economic 2. Political 3. Military	1. Military 2. Economic 3. Political	Hard and soft power resources



# A grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (3)

[FONTE: Li, Q. and Ye, M. (2019), "China's emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 66-81.]

## China's emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why

Quan Li

*Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, and*

Min Ye

*Department of Politics,*

*Coastal Carolina University, Conway, South Carolina, USA*

### Abstract

**Purpose** – The purpose of this paper is to explore and test the motivation behind the evolution of China's vast network of partnerships around the globe since the end of the Cold War.

**Design/methodology/approach** – After combing through 24 types of partnerships with 78 countries, the authors empirically tested four hypotheses using data from Correlates of War and World Bank.

**Findings** – The analysis indicates that China's choice to build such an elaborate network is not random. On the contrary, it is largely determined by three factors: the need to counter the US pressure; the necessity of maintaining peace and stability along its borders and achieving the long-term goal of modernization.

**Originality/value** – The research is among the first attempts to comprehensively test the possible motivations behind China's partnership building efforts and provides a stepping stone for analyzing this important aspect of China's foreign policy.

**Keywords** China, Foreign policy strategy

**Paper type** Research paper

# A grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (4)

[FONTE: Li, Q. and Ye, M. (2019), "China's emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 66-81.]

伙伴关系名称	Partnership title
全面战略协作伙伴关系	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination
全天候战略合作伙伴关系	All-weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership
全方位战略伙伴关系	All-round Strategic Partnership
全球全面战略伙伴关系	Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century
全面战略合作伙伴关系	Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership
全面战略伙伴关系	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
互惠战略伙伴关系	Mutually Beneficial Strategic Partnership
创新战略伙伴关系	Innovative Strategic Partnership
战略协作伙伴关系	Strategic Partnership of Coordination
战略合作伙伴关系	Strategic Cooperative Partnership
战略伙伴关系	Strategic Partnership
战略合作关系/战略合作关系	Strategic Cooperation
更加紧密的发展伙伴关系	Closer Developmental Partnership
全方位友好合作伙伴关系	All-round Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation
全面友好合作伙伴关系	Comprehensive Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation
全方位合作伙伴关系	All-round Partnership of Cooperation
全面合作伙伴关系	Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership/Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation
重要合作伙伴关系	Important Cooperative Partnership
友好合作伙伴关系	Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation/Friendly and Cooperative Partnership/Friendly Cooperative Partnership
共同发展的友好伙伴关系	Partnership of Friendship/Friendly Partnership for Common Development
长期友好合作伙伴关系	Long-term Friendly and Cooperative partnership
全面合作关系	Comprehensive Cooperation
睦邻互信伙伴关系	Partnership of good Neighborliness and Mutual Trust
新型伙伴关系	New Partnership

# A grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (5)

[FONTE: Li, Q. and Ye, M. (2019), "China's emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 66-81.]

A brief overview of China's foreign policy strategy shows that from 1949 to the present, China changed from "Leaning one side" (一边倒) to a "Common Line" strategy (一条线战略), and finally to the contemporary "Partnership without alignment" (结伴不结盟). During the Cold War, except for two ten-year periods (1950–1960, 1972–1982) when China had a formal alliance with the Soviet Union and a quasi-alliance with the USA, respectively, China for the most part has kept a non-alignment policy to the extent that it is described as a "lonely power" with no close friends and possess no allies (Shambaugh, 2014)[3].

In 1982, China abandoned the "Common Line" strategy and formally announced a non-alliance policy during the 12th Party Congress. Deng Xiaoping at the opening of the conference specifically pointed out that maintaining the ability to make decisions independently has always been and will always be a core element of China's foreign policy. Not aligning with any major powers was considered key to such an independence. The non-alliance policy was reiterated in 1992 and 1997 during the 14th and 15th Party Congress. In a white paper entitled "China's Peaceful Development" published in 2011, China announced that it would not "form alliance with any other country or group of countries, nor does it use social system or ideology as a yardstick to determine what kind of relations it should have with other countries"[4]. After Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, the non-alignment policy was kept and during the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs convened in 2014, Xi specifically called for building a global network of partnerships. This policy is now summarized as "Partnership without alignment" (结伴不结盟). According to China's Foreign Minister, Wang Yi:

Building partnership is a distinctive feature of China's diplomacy. After the end of the Cold War which was marked by the confrontation between alliance of nations, we draw on the experience and lessons of history in a timely way and succeeded in developing a new approach of forming partners instead of allies. (Wang, 2015, pp. 7-8)



# A da grande estratégia da China e a inutilidade das alianças clássicas (6)

[FONTE: Li, Q. and Ye, M. (2019), "China's emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 66-81.]

## 6. Discussion

Traditional alliance theory does not fully explain why China seeks to establish as many as 24 different types of partnerships with various countries and regional groups. The framework of alliance and bandwagoning does not fully capture China's motivation behind building such a network. In our analysis of China's action, we find that three factors drive China's choice. First, facing the USA as the only super power in the post-Cold War era, China seeks to rely on its partners to counter US pressure. Such a motivation grows even stronger when the relative power of the USA over China increases. Instead of challenging the US primacy, it appears that China uses the partnership as a defensive mechanism to alleviate US pressure. Second, China puts a great emphasis on promoting cooperation with its neighboring countries through the partnerships. This indicates that maintaining a stable environment right outside its borders is indeed a top priority for China. Finally, countries that can contribute to China's modernization efforts are more likely to become its partner. This is consistent with China's long-term goal of transforming itself into a modern country by the middle of the twenty-first century.

Our study also reveals some counter intuitive results. For example, higher political stability increases the likelihood of establishing a partnership in the first place and elevating it to a strategic partnership, but it reduces the likelihood of a comprehensive strategic partnership. We suspect that specific features of some of the partner countries may contribute to the conflicting results. Further analysis is needed to explore this more deeply. In addition, explaining the formation of a partnership is only the first step of achieving a better understanding of China's diplomatic strategy. Other topics such as performance of these partnerships *vis-à-vis* partnerships established by other major powers await our investigation.



## PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES



# A União Europeia e a Índia (1) [FONTE:

Encyclopaedia Britannica]




## India



flag of India

National anthem of India



### OFFICIAL NAME

Bharat (Hindi); Republic of India (English)

### FORM OF GOVERNMENT

multiparty federal republic with two legislative houses (Council of States [245<sup>1</sup>]; House of the People [545<sup>2</sup>])

### HEAD OF STATE

President: Ram Nath Kovind

### HEAD OF GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister: Narendra Modi

# A União Europeia e a Índia (2) [FONTE: Worldometer]


## Countries in the world by population (2021)

#	Country (or dependency)	Population (2020)	Yearly Change	Net Change	Density (P/Km²)	Land Area (Km²)	Migrants (net)	Fert. Rate	Med. Age	Urban Pop %	World Share
1	<a href="#">China</a>	1,439,323,776	0.39 %	5,540,090	153	9,388,211	-348,399	1.7	38	61 %	18.47 %
2	<a href="#">India</a>	1,380,004,385	0.99 %	13,586,631	464	2,973,190	-532,687	2.2	28	35 %	17.70 %
3	<a href="#">United States</a>	331,002,651	0.59 %	1,937,734	36	9,147,420	954,806	1.8	38	83 %	4.25 %
4	<a href="#">Indonesia</a>	273,523,615	1.07 %	2,898,047	151	1,811,570	-98,955	2.3	30	56 %	3.51 %
5	<a href="#">Pakistan</a>	220,892,340	2.00 %	4,327,022	287	770,880	-233,379	3.6	23	35 %	2.83 %
6	<a href="#">Brazil</a>	212,559,417	0.72 %	1,509,890	25	8,358,140	21,200	1.7	33	88 %	2.73 %
7	<a href="#">Nigeria</a>	206,139,589	2.58 %	5,175,990	226	910,770	-60,000	5.4	18	52 %	2.64 %
8	<a href="#">Bangladesh</a>	164,689,383	1.01 %	1,643,222	1,265	130,170	-369,501	2.1	28	39 %	2.11 %
9	<a href="#">Russia</a>	145,934,462	0.04 %	62,206	9	16,376,870	182,456	1.8	40	74 %	1.87 %
10	<a href="#">Mexico</a>	128,932,753	1.06 %	1,357,224	66	1,943,950	-60,000	2.1	29	84 %	1.65 %
11	<a href="#">Japan</a>	126,476,461	-0.30 %	-383,840	347	364,555	71,560	1.4	48	92 %	1.62 %
12	<a href="#">Ethiopia</a>	114,963,588	2.57 %	2,884,858	115	1,000,000	30,000	4.3	19	21 %	1.47 %
13	<a href="#">Philippines</a>	109,581,078	1.35 %	1,464,463	368	298,170	-67,152	2.6	26	47 %	1.41 %
14	<a href="#">Egypt</a>	102,334,404	1.94 %	1,946,331	103	995,450	-38,033	3.3	25	43 %	1.31 %
15	<a href="#">Vietnam</a>	97,338,579	0.91 %	876,473	314	310,070	-80,000	2.1	32	38 %	1.25 %
16	<a href="#">DR Congo</a>	89,561,403	3.19 %	2,770,836	40	2,267,050	23,861	6.0	17	46 %	1.15 %
17	<a href="#">Turkey</a>	84,339,067	1.09 %	909,452	110	769,630	283,922	2.1	32	76 %	1.08 %
18	<a href="#">Iran</a>	83,992,949	1.30 %	1,079,043	52	1,628,550	-55,000	2.2	32	76 %	1.08 %
19	<a href="#">Germany</a>	83,783,942	0.32 %	266,897	240	348,560	543,822	1.6	46	76 %	1.07 %
20	<a href="#">Thailand</a>	69,799,978	0.25 %	174,396	137	510,890	19,444	1.5	40	51 %	0.90 %



# A União Europeia e a Índia (3) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

## Linguistic composition (2001)\*




\*Data are for the scheduled ("officially recognized") languages of India unless otherwise footnoted; Hindi (roughly 66%) and English (roughly 33%) are also spoken as lingua francas.

†Includes many nonscheduled ("not officially recognized") languages.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (4) [FONTE:

Encyclopaedia Britannica]

## Religious affiliation (2011)




# A União Europeia e a Índia (5)

[FONTE: BBC,

19/06/2019]

Brahma and the origins of caste



**India's caste system is among the world's oldest forms of surviving social stratification. The BBC explains its complexities.**

The system which divides [Hindus](#) into rigid hierarchical groups based on their karma (work) and dharma (the Hindi word for religion, but here it means duty) is generally accepted to be more than 3,000 years old.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (6)

[FONTE: BBC,

19/06/2019]



AFP

BR Ambedkar, a Dalit, authored India's constitution

In 1989, quotas were extended to include a grouping called the OBCs (Other Backward Classes) which fall between the traditional upper castes and the lowest.

In recent decades, with the spread of secular education and growing urbanisation, the influence of caste has somewhat declined, especially in cities where different castes live side-by-side and inter-caste marriages are becoming more common.


In certain southern states and in the northern state of Bihar, many people began using just one name after social reform movements. Despite the changes though, caste identities remain strong, and last names are almost always indications of what caste a person belongs to.



# A União Europeia e a Índia (7) [FONTE:

Encyclopaedia Britannica]


India major import sources (2016-17)



# A União Europeia e a Índia (8) [FONTE:

Encyclopaedia Britannica]

India major export destinations (2016–17)



# A União Europeia e a Índia (9) [FONTE: Foreign Policy, 23/11/2020]

## Why India Refused to Join the World's Biggest Trading Bloc

New Delhi chose protectionism over the RCEP. History suggests it made the wrong call.



Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waits for the arrival of Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli for a ceremonial reception at the Indian presidential house in New Delhi on April 7, 2018. Money Sharma/AFP via Getty Images

On Sunday, Nov. 15, 15 Asian nations representing nearly a third of the global economy signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), forming the world's biggest trading bloc. But one Asian economic giant was missing: India. Despite protracted negotiations, New Delhi refused to join the accord.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (10)

[FONTE: Foreign Policy, 23/11/2020]

Aspects of India's experience with free trade agreements have reinforced an ideological narrative of the importance of self-reliance. Even though the government's own research has shown that India has, in sum, [benefited](#) from the trade agreements it has signed in the past, critics have pointed out that as a result of previous agreements, India has negative trade balances with several RCEP member countries. Critics have also linked such agreements, such as FTAs with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN, to the decline of manufacturing in India. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India's minister for external affairs, recently [argued](#) that trade deals have led to deindustrialization, and while the minister did not mention specific sectors, trade associations argue that industries such as electronics and light manufacturing have suffered on account of FTAs. There is no denying that policy and regulatory reforms and the effort to build a supportive infrastructure did not accompany past trade deals, [limiting](#) potential gains from FTAs. One of the biggest complaints is that the absence of safeguards in former FTAs have [allowed](#) an unchecked flow of Chinese imports into India.

Apart from the legacies of the past, both national political parties, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress, despite significant other ideological differences, share a common distrust of free market economics. As a result, the BJP has faced little hostility from its most significant political rival when rejecting trade pacts. In fact, the negative tone of the narrative around past FTAs, many of which were negotiated during the Congress-led administration between 2004-14, might have led the opposition to vehemently oppose RCEP.



# A União Europeia e a Índia (11) [FONTE: FT

3/05/2021]

## EU and India set to revive talks on trade deal

Negotiations that stalled in 2013 now seen as vital to respond to China's rise



European Council president Charles Michel, top, at a virtual summit with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi last July © Yves Herman/Pool/AFP/Getty

The EU and India plan to revive long-stalled talks on a comprehensive trade deal as they seek to deepen economic ties and respond to China's rise.

The two sides could announce as soon as Saturday the relaunch of negotiations that were suspended in 2013 amid disagreements over tariff rules for car parts and free-movement rights for professionals.


# A União Europeia e a Índia (12)

[FONTE: FT

3/05/2021]

India is the EU's 10th largest trading partner

Total merchandise trade in 2020 (€bn)



Source: Eurostat

© FT

"There is clear momentum to strengthen our strategic relations on trade, digital, climate change and multilateralism," Von der Leyen wrote on Twitter after Monday's call. "I'm encouraged by the prospect of intensifying our trade and investment relations."

The fresh momentum comes at a time when the UK is pushing to secure its own trade deal with India.

Previous attempts by the EU and India to reach a pact foundered despite intensive work between 2007 and 2013. Problematic issues included India's reluctance to ease access for EU lawyers and to further open up its market to European car parts. New Delhi was frustrated by the EU's unwillingness to offer more generous rights for its professional service providers to work in Europe.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (13)


2020]

[FONTE: EU, July



As the world's two largest democracies, the European Union and India share a commitment to protecting and promoting human rights, a rules-based global order, effective multilateralism, sustainable development, and open trade.

The 15<sup>th</sup> Summit opens a new chapter in the EU-India Strategic Partnership.



### TOGETHER FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT

The EU accounts for around 9% of global GHG emissions, and India around 7%. The EU and India are working together for more ambitious climate action, a better environment and realising the clean energy transition.

#### Priorities:

- > To step-up cooperation to strengthen global action on climate change and the environment
- > EU cooperating with India for:
  - >> Implementation of the Paris Agreement
  - >> Transitioning towards more circular and resource-efficient economies
  - >> Accelerating the clean energy transition, focusing on energy efficiency and renewable energy
  - >> Climate and energy action at the local level

#### Instruments:

- > The Clean Energy and Climate Partnership implemented through:
  - >> Strategic Partnership for implementation of the Paris Agreement Project
  - >> Clean Energy and Climate Project
  - >> Cooperation with the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
- > New Partnership on Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy, including projects on resource efficiency, air pollution, and plastic and marine litter
- > Water Partnership
- > The Partnership on Smart and Sustainable Urbanisation

# A União Europeia e a Índia (14)

## 2020]

[FONTE: EU, July

### PARTNERS FOR PEACE & PROSPERITY

The Roadmap for EU-India cooperation 2020-2025 sets objectives based on shared priorities



#### OPEN AND FAIR TRADE

- > Work together to ensure a swift post-COVID economic recovery
- > Promote sustainable growth and jobs
- > Establish a regular High Level Dialogue on trade and investment at ministerial level
- > Work towards balanced, ambitious and mutually-beneficial trade and investment agreements.
- > Strengthen and reform the WTO
- > Enhance coordination on global economic governance, notably in the G20



#### FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

- > Enhance dialogue on foreign policy issues
- > Support regional and global peace and security, non proliferation, counter terrorism and the rule of law
- > Enhance cooperation in multilateral organisations
- > Set up a new Dialogue on maritime security
- > Consult on security and defence
- > Strengthen cybersecurity



#### DIGITALISATION

- > Jointly work to promote open, free, stable and secure cyberspace
- > Cooperate on sustainable digital infrastructure, service norms and regulatory frameworks
- > Uphold a high level of protection of personal data and privacy
- > Promote cooperation on the deployment of trustworthy artificial intelligence



#### HUMAN RIGHTS

- > Protect and promote human rights, children's rights, gender equality and women's empowerment
- > Reconvene the Human Rights Dialogue
- > Cooperate in multilateral organisations



#### SUSTAINABLE MODERNISATION

- > Adopt a sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based approach to connectivity.
- > Pursue environmentally, socially and fiscally sustainable projects
- > Accelerate the transition to more sustainable, socially just, resource-efficient, resilient and climate-neutral economies
- > Support smart and sustainable urbanisation, air quality, and sustainable water and waste management
- > Intensify cooperation between the EU and India on health security and pandemic crisis preparedness and response



#### RESEARCH AND INNOVATION

- > Strengthen cooperation through Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions and Horizon Europe
- > Increase the mobility of students and academic staff under Erasmus+
- > Implement the Euratom-India Agreement on research and training on peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- > Set up of a Working group for comprehensive space collaboration



# A União Europeia e a Índia (15) [FONTE: Público

8/05/2021. IMAGEM: European Commission / Euraxess]

## A declaração política UE-Índia em oito pontos

Do comércio aos direitos humanos e à resposta a Pequim, o que vai estar em cima da mesa dos líderes na cimeira UE-Índia no Porto.



### Partilha de interesses e valores

Uma parceria estratégica que tem como base “a partilha dos interesses, dos princípios e dos valores da democracia, da liberdade, do Estado de direito e do **respeito pelos Direitos Humanos**” e na defesa do multilateralismo para enfrentar os desafios globais.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (16) [FONTE: Público

8/05/2021]

## **Acordo de comércio**

Compromisso para o relançamento das negociações para **um acordo de comércio** "equilibrado, ambicioso, abrangente e mutuamente vantajoso". As negociações foram interrompidas em 2013, depois de sete anos infrutíferos. A questão do acesso aos mercados, fundamental para a União Europeia, merece apenas a promessa de incentivar soluções que permitam contornar o tradicional proteccionismo indiano.

## **Cooperação científica e tecnológica**

São muitas as áreas em que as duas partes se comprometem a melhorar a sua **cooperação científica e tecnológica**, desde a exploração espacial e os transportes aéreos, até ao domínio digital, passando pela inteligência artificial e pela cooperação no domínio da saúde, do combate a futuras pandemias, no reforço da OMS ou na produção de medicamentos.

## **"Migrações e mobilidade"**

É outro dos capítulos da cooperação futura que interessa particularmente à Índia, incluindo o livre acesso às universidades europeias e a imigração para a Europa.

# A União Europeia e a Índia (17)

[FONTE: Público

8/05/2021]

## Reforma do Conselho de Segurança

A União Europeia compromete-se com a futura **reforma do Conselho de Segurança da ONU**, que está bloqueada há quase uma década e que passaria pela sua abertura às novas potências emergentes, para além dos cinco membros permanentes actuais. A declaração refere um Conselho de Segurança "mais efectivo, transparente, representativo das realidades

## Avisos à China

As duas partes comprometem-se em contribuir para um "**espaço do Indo-Pacífico**" mais "**aberto**, inclusivo e regido pelas leis e normas internacionais", respeitando "a integridade territorial, a soberania, a democracia, o Estado de direito, a liberdade de navegação e a resolução pacífica das divergências". A mensagem é dirigida a Pequim e à prática de ingerência que leva a cabo no Mar da China do Sul.

## Crise climática

O **combate às alterações climáticas** foi o capítulo mais difícil de negociar entre as duas partes. Na quinta-feira à tarde, ainda havia divergências quanto a algumas expressões referentes à aposta "nos combustíveis limpos, como o hidrogénio", e nas energias renováveis. A Europa quer continuar a liderar este combate. A Índia ainda não está preparada para assumir compromissos mais firmes.

## "Conectividade"

Um segundo documento que o encontro de líderes vai aprovar é dedicado exclusivamente à chamada "**conectividade**", ou seja, ao desenvolvimento de redes de transportes e de comunicações que liguem os dois grandes espaços geográficos. Uma resposta à nova Rota da Seda lançada por Xi Jinping em 2013? Alguns analistas consideram que é esse também o objectivo.



# Sugestões de leitura

