

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

**2020-2021
SESSÃO Nº 28**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (1) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



OFFICIAL NAME
Al-Mamlakah al-Maghribiyyah
(Kingdom of Morocco)

FORM OF GOVERNMENT
constitutional monarchy with
two legislative houses (House
of Councillors [120¹]; House
of Representatives [395])

HEAD OF STATE
King: [Muhammad VI](#)

HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
Prime Minister²: Saadeddine
El Othmani

CAPITAL
[Rabat](#)

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Arabic; Tamazight²


OFFICIAL RELIGION
Islam

MONETARY UNIT
Moroccan dirham (DH)

POPULATION
(2020 est.) 35,955,000

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (2) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]


Ethnic composition (2000)



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Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (3) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Religious affiliation (2010)



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Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (4) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (5) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



Western Sahara

REGION, AFRICA

OFFICIAL NAME(S)

Western Sahara; Al-Ṣaḥrā' al-Gharbiyyah (Arabic)

POPULATION

(2019 est.) 566,100

TOTAL AREA (SQ MI)

97,344

TOTAL AREA (SQ KM)

252,120

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (6)

[FONTE: Morocco World News / A “marcha verde”, a deslocação de cerca 350.000 pessoas de Marrocos (e Mauritânia) para o Sara Ocidental em 1975]



Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (7)

[FONTE: Morocco World News 6/11/2018 / A “marcha verde”, a deslocação de cerca 350.000 pessoas de Marrocos (e Mauritânia) para o Sara Ocidental em 1975]

Green March: 43 years Later, Morocco Still Attached to Its Land

Rabat - Since Spain occupied [Western Sahara](#) in 1884, Morocco had severely resisted it to end the occupation and retake the southern provinces.

In the 1970s, [King Hassan II](#) decided to adopt a new peaceful strategy that would put pressure on Spain, especially since General Franco, Spain's leader at the time, was sick.


On October 16, 1975, King Hassan II called upon his people to stage a peaceful march towards the southern provinces in Western Sahara and to gather in the Moroccan town of Tarfaya, 100 kilometers north of Laayoune.

Hassan II's speech launching the [Green March](#) came on the date when the International Court of Justice ruled that the Western Sahara was a no-man's land prior to Spanish occupation. The court also acknowledged the existence of legal ties of allegiance between the sultan of Morocco and the resident Sahrawi tribes.

“We have to do one thing dear people and that is to undertake a peaceful march from the north, the east, the west to the south. It behooves us to act as one man in order to join the Sahara,” King Hassan II said.

The purpose was to free the southern provinces from the remaining Spanish occupation.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (8) [FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]



Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (9) [FONTE: El País, 20/05/2021]


Qué está pasando en Ceuta: claves de la crisis migratoria entre España y Marruecos

La crisis de Ceuta deja un sinfín de interrogantes y un reto inmediato: cómo gestionar la acogida repentina de miles de personas, entre ellas cientos de menores. Interior no aclara el procedimiento de devolución

¿Qué pasa en Ceuta? [La noche del domingo se desataron rumores en Marruecos sobre la laxitud](#) de las fuerzas de seguridad marroquíes en la costa; durante la madrugada del lunes, centenares de personas se aproximaron a los espigones que los separan de la ciudad autónoma para bordearlos a nado o a pie. La gendarmería, efectivamente, mostró una "inusual pasividad", según fuentes de las fuerzas de seguridad españolas. La tarde del martes se contaban ya 8.000 inmigrantes en la ciudad autónoma, la mayoría marroquíes, pero también algunos subsaharianos. Decenas continuaron entrando durante el día. La mayoría son hombres jóvenes, pero hay familias enteras y al menos 1.500 menores, algunos de muy corta edad, según fuentes del Gobierno de Ceuta.


Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (10) [FONTE: El País, 20/05/2021]

Crisis migratoria en Ceuta



Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (11) [FONTE: El País, 20/05/2021]

Situación en la frontera de El Tarajal



Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (12) [FONTE: El País, 20/05/2021]

¿Cuál ha sido el desencadenante? El motivo aparente ha sido la acogida del [líder del Frente Polisario y presidente de la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática \(RASD\), Brahim Gali, de 73 años](#). España aceptó la entrada de Gali, aquejado de covid-19, para que ingresase en un hospital de Logroño, un gesto que disgustó a Marruecos. Pero el desencadenante real fue [el reconocimiento por parte de Donald Trump, en diciembre, de la soberanía marroquí sobre el Sáhara Occidental](#). Eso ha llevado a Rabat a ejercer una presión nunca vista sobre España y la Unión Europea para que “abandonen la zona de confort” de la ONU, en palabras de las autoridades marroquíes y para que secunden los pasos de Trump.

¿Cuál es la postura del Gobierno? [El Gobierno se ha volcado en la resolución de la crisis de Ceuta](#), que ha desatado la alarma máxima en el Ejecutivo. El presidente —que habló en una comparecencia institucional de la necesidad de defender “la integridad territorial” de España— voló este martes a Ceuta y Melilla y multiplicó sus gestiones diplomáticas, en especial con la UE. El asunto monopolizó el Consejo de Ministros, donde se evidenció un fuerte malestar con Marruecos. Buena parte del Ejecutivo está trabajando en distintos frentes para resolver la crisis diplomática más grave desde que el presidente llegó a La Moncloa. Sánchez decidió en la noche del lunes desplegar el Ejército en Ceuta y, desde primera hora de este martes, multiplicó sus llamadas, que han incluido a líderes europeos pero también a Felipe VI y al líder de la oposición, Pablo Casado.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (13) [FONTE: El País, 20/05/2021]

¿Cuál es la postura de Marruecos? [El Gobierno de Marruecos guarda silencio](#) sobre lo sucedido. La única declaración por parte de un representante marroquí fue la de la embajadora en España, Karima Benyaich, quien afirmó este martes que “hay actos que tienen consecuencias y se tienen que asumir”, antes de ser llamada a consultas a Rabat.

¿Cuál ha sido la reacción de la Unión Europea? [La Comisión Europea ha llamado la atención este martes a Marruecos por su papel](#) en la crisis de Ceuta. “Las fronteras españolas son las fronteras europeas”, ha advertido a Rabat la comisaria europea de Interior, Ylva Johansson, en un discurso en la Eurocámara. La responsable de los asuntos fronterizos y del nuevo pacto migratorio de la UE, en fase de negociación, aseguró seguir con preocupación la afluencia de migrantes “sin precedentes” detectada en el enclave español en África, y ha exigido a Rabat que cumpla con sus obligaciones de controlar las salidas irregulares y que asegure que aquellos “que no tienen derecho a quedarse sean devueltos de forma ordenada y efectiva”.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (14) [FONTE: Politico, 19/05/2021]

Morocco uses migrants to get what it wants

Mass arrivals in Ceuta show how Europe pays for border controls with money and power

When 6,000 people pushed off a Moroccan beachfront Monday, swam around two border walls and waded into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, the question was why Morocco's normally aggressive border patrols had let them get that far.

The answer: It was a message. With Morocco, the European Union has made the same mistake it made with Turkey just five years ago. It has granted massive leverage to an unpredictable partner by striking a deal in which Morocco receives assistance in exchange for preventing refugees from travelling into Europe.

That means when Spain does something Morocco doesn't like, Rabat can play hardball by opening up its borders, however briefly. [Monday's crossings](#) prompted Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to hastily return home from a summit in Paris. Units of the Spanish army have deployed to Ceuta, where tanks are now parked on the beach. More people crossed into Ceuta on Monday than arrived in both Ceuta and Spain's other African enclave Melilla in all of 2020 or 2019. Spain's other common destination for migration, the Canary Islands, didn't see more than 1,500 arrivals in a day last year.

Morocco's move was a reminder that Spain better keep good relations. Rabat was outraged last month by Madrid's decision to allow Brahim Ghali, the 73-year-old leader of the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi rebel group that disputes control of Western Sahara with Morocco, to enter Spain to receive medical treatment for COVID-19.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (15) [FONTE: Morocco World News 8/02/2020]

Morocco Won't Trade Palestine for US Support in Western Sahara



Washington, D.C. - Four days have passed since the American news website [Axios](#) published a report claiming that Israel is trying to pressure the Trump administration into recognizing [Western Sahara](#) as part of Morocco in exchange for the normalization of relations between Rabat and Tel Aviv. The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meanwhile, has not yet denied the rumors.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (16) [FONTE: Morocco World News 8/02/2020]

Normalization contradicts Morocco's position on Palestine

If Morocco makes a deal with Israel, it could also create a frenzy on the Moroccan streets. The vast majority of Moroccans reject normalization with Israel without a solution guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian people.

While the Western Sahara is the primary political issue in Morocco, the Palestinian issue also holds significant value in the shared conscience of the Moroccan people, for its historical and religious connotations.

In addition, the Moroccan government has been steadfast on the issue and remained at the forefront of countries defending the rights of the Palestinian people in building their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. King Mohammed VI and the Moroccan government have expressed this position on many occasions.

For example, Morocco was one of the first countries to express unequivocal rejection of President Trump's decision to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (17) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 12/12/2020]

Morocco savors US recognition of Western Sahara in Israel normalization deal

Disputed region's independence movement vows to fight on until Moroccan forces withdraw, while its key backer, Algeria, remains silent




RABAT, Morocco (AFP) — Morocco basked in US recognition of its sovereignty over the Western Sahara Friday after outgoing US President Donald Trump changed policy on the decades-old dispute in return for Rabat agreeing to normalize relations with Israel.

For Western Sahara's Polisario Front, which has campaigned for independence for the former Spanish colony since the 1970s, Trump's announcement marked a major setback and drew a promise to fight on until Moroccan forces withdraw.

Marrocos, Ceuta e os fluxos migratórios para a Europa (18)

[FONTE: Cartoon Laisà García]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (1) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]




A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (2) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

People

Population composition

Xinjiang is inhabited by more than 40 different ethnic groups, the largest of which are the [Uighurs](#) and the [Han](#) (Chinese). In addition to [Hui](#) (Chinese Muslims), other groups include [Mongolians](#), [Khalkha](#), [Kazakhs](#), [Uzbeks](#), Tungusic-speaking [Manchu](#) and Sibos, [Tajiks](#), [Tatars](#), Russians, and Tahurs.



A mosque in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China.

Image: © Tamir Niv/Shutterstock.com

The Han migration altered the pattern of population distribution and ethnic composition of Xinjiang. In 1953 about three-fourths of the population lived south of the mountains in the Tarim Basin. The Han influx was directed mainly to the Junggar Basin because of its resource potential. The Kazakhs, the third largest [minority group](#) in the region, are nomadic herders in the steppes of the Junggar Basin; they are especially concentrated in the upper [Ili \(Yili\) River](#) valley.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (3) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

The indigenous peoples of Xinjiang practice a variety of cultural traditions. The dominant **Uighur** are sedentary farmers whose social organization is centred upon the village. Many of the important Uighur cultural forms are rooted in **Islam**. Spoken Uighur predominates despite the popularization of **Mandarin Chinese**. Islam itself has revived since the onslaught of the **Cultural Revolution** during the 1960s and '70s, and there are now numerous mosques and a training academy for clergy. The popular Uighur performing arts tradition called *muqam* emphasizes ancient songs and dances accompanied by traditional instrumental groups. Professional troupes, first organized in the 1950s, are dominated by Uighur balladeers and dancers, although administrative duties are often performed by Han troupe members.



Kazakh yurt

Kazakh *ger* (yurt) in the Pamirs, western Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, western China.

Image: © Stefano Tronci/Shutterstock.com

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (4) [FONTE: History Today Vol. 70 Issue 1 January 2020]

A Uighurs' History of China



A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (5) [FONTE: History Today Vol. 70 Issue 1 January 2020]

It is impossible to make sense of the current crisis without an understanding of the historical background. This is well documented and the present generation of Uighurs, many of whom are the descendants of previous activists, are profoundly conscious of the distinctive trajectory of Uighur history, a history that is intertwined with, though not completely subsumed in, the history of the regional great power, China.

Xinjiang, in the far north-west of China, is almost three times the size of France: officially it is not a province but an 'autonomous region' in deference to its non-Chinese population, the Uighurs –although the level of autonomy is minimal. Uighurs are not ethnically or culturally Chinese, but a Turkic people whose language is close to the Uzbek of nearby Uzbekistan and distantly related to the Turkish of Turkey. Often described as a minority, until recently they constituted the majority population of Xinjiang, which they regard as their homeland and refer to as Eastern Turkestan (*Sharqi Turkestan*). The approximately 11 million Uighurs in Xinjiang – just under half the total population – are historically and culturally Muslim, as are most other smaller ethnic groups of that region, the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and the Chinese-speaking Hui: that is immediately obvious from their dress, their food and their built environment.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (6)

[FONTE: History Today Vol. 70 Issue 1 January 2020]

Origins

Uighurs have lived in eastern Turkestan – to distinguish it from western

Turkestan, the Turkic-speaking states of the Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union – since the great migration or expansion of the Turkic peoples from the Mongolian steppes, which began in the sixth century. By the 11th century, Islam in its Sufi form was the dominant religion after ruling elites loyal to Buddhism were defeated in battle. The history of the Uighurs in early modern times is the story of Islamic city states, notably those based in Kashgar and Khotan, ruled by caliphs, who were both temporal rulers and spiritual leaders of Naqshbandi Sufi orders. The apogee of Sufi supremacy began in the late 16th century when the Saidiya khanate collapsed and the region fell under the sway of the Khojas, powerful political figures who were also spiritual leaders of the Naqshbandi order. In 1679 the legendary Appaq Khoja, a descendant of the sheikhs of Samarkand, took power in Kashgar. His mausoleum is now a tourist attraction but the family tombs that it contains are still venerated by Uighurs.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (7) [FONTE: History Today Vol. 70 Issue 1 January 2020]

Republics and warlords

When the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, Xinjiang remained notionally a province within the newly proclaimed but weak Republic of China and the Chinese warlord governors of Xinjiang were effectively independent. There were sporadic attempts to create independent Muslim states, most significantly the two Eastern Turkestan Republics based respectively in Kashgar in the 1930s and in Ghulja (Yining in Chinese) in the north of Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949.

In 1949, after the Nationalist Guomindang under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek were defeated in the Civil War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. The Ghulja Republic was 'peacefully liberated' and integrated into the new state. Resistance, often armed, continued into the 1950s, principally in southern Xinjiang. In 1955 the PRC created the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region as a concession to the non-Han population and in parallel with similar arrangements for Tibet and Inner Mongolia. When the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966 central authority was weakened and centrifugal forces emerged, including Uighur demands for independence by groups such as the East Turkestan People's Party.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (8) [FONTE: NYT, 16/11/2019]

THE XINJIANG PAPERS

'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims

More than 400 pages of internal Chinese documents provide an unprecedented inside look at the crackdown on ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region.

BY AUSTIN RAMZY AND CHRIS BUCKLEY NOVEMBER 16, 2019 阅读简体中文版

[illegible]

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (9) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



A Uighur woman confronting police during protests in Ürümqi, Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, northwestern China, July 2009.

Ng Han Guan/AP Images

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (10) [FONTE: NYT, 16/11/2019]

Secret Speeches

The ideas driving the mass detentions can be traced back to Xi Jinping's first and only visit to Xinjiang as China's leader, a tour shadowed by violence.

In 2014, little more than a year after becoming president, he spent four days in the region, and on the last day of the trip, two Uighur militants staged a suicide bombing outside a train station in Urumqi that injured nearly 80 people, one fatally.

Weeks earlier, militants with knives had gone on a rampage at another railway station, in southwest China, killing 31 people and injuring more than 140. And less than a month after Mr. Xi's visit, assailants tossed explosives into a vegetable market in Urumqi, wounding 94 people and killing at least 39.

Against this backdrop of bloodshed, Mr. Xi delivered a series of secret speeches setting the hard-line course that culminated in the security offensive now underway in Xinjiang. While state media have alluded to these speeches, none were made public.

The text of four of them, though, were among the leaked documents — and they provide a rare, unfiltered look at the origins of the crackdown and the beliefs of the man who set it in motion.

“The methods that our comrades have at hand are too primitive,” Mr. Xi said in one talk, after inspecting a counterterrorism police squad in Urumqi. “None of these weapons is any answer for their big machete blades, ax heads and cold steel weapons.”

“We must be as harsh as them,” he added, “and show absolutely no mercy.”

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (11) [FONTE: Amnistia Internacional]



UYGHURS TELL OF CHINA-LED INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN ABROAD

It has been nearly three years since China launched an unprecedented campaign of mass detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in northwestern China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang).

During this time, details about the treatment of the estimated 1 million or more people who have been held in "transformation-through-education" or "vocational training" centres have continued to trickle out. But the true scope and nature of what is taking place in Xinjiang remains obscured.

The Chinese government originally denied the existence of the detention camps. Later, it began claiming that the facilities were "vocational training" centres to help rid Uyghurs and others of their "extremist" thoughts and provide them with job training – even highly educated intellectuals, businesspeople and retirees.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (12) [FONTE: The Xinjiang Data Project]

ASP
ASIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE

The Xinjiang Data Project

The Xinjiang Data Project

The Xinjiang Data Project brings together rigorous, empirical research on the human rights situation for Uyghurs and other non-Han nationalities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in western China. It focuses on a core set of topics including mass internment camps, surveillance and emerging technologies, forced labour and supply chains, the 're-education' campaign, deliberate cultural destruction and other human rights issues.

Drawing on open source data including satellite imagery, Chinese government documents, official statistics and a range of authoritative reports and academic studies, the Xinjiang Data Project documents the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing program of human rights abuses and tech-enhanced authoritarianism in Xinjiang, and explores its global implications.

Explore Map

EXPLAINER
'Family de-planning' report

EXPLAINER
Disinformation on Xinjiang


EXPLAINER
Xinjiang Data Project first quarterly update - December 2020

EXPLAINER
Exploring Xinjiang's detention system

DANGCHEN-GUAN

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (13) [FONTE: Guardian, 24/05/2020]

Researchers have mapped more than 380 suspected detention facilities in Xinjiang



Guardian graphic. Source: ASPI's International Cyber Policy Center, Xinjiang Data Project

Many are also near industrial parks; there have been widespread reports that inmates at some internment camps have been used as forced labour.

“Camps are also often co-located with factory complexes, which can suggest the nature of a facility and highlight the direct pipeline between arbitrary detention in **Xinjiang** and forced labour,” the report said.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (14) [FONTE: CNN, 17/07/2019]

Muslim nations are defending China as it cracks down on Muslims, shattering any myths of Islamic solidarity

For decades, some Muslim leaders tried to adopt a motto of transnational solidarity on some issues, from the Palestinian cause to the plight of Muslims in Kosovo. But those causes often were "very convenient for them politically," Ibrahim said -- and with the Uyghurs, the political cost is too high. "I don't think there's ever been such a thing as Muslim solidarity," Ibrahim added. "And I think this particular issue has only highlighted that."

In recent years, global issues involving the persecution of Muslim populations have been just as likely to divide the Islamic world. Whereas Iran supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's repression of the country's uprising, Saudi Arabia and its allies supported the rebels, including some of its most radical elements. In Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and elsewhere, Muslim countries have been at odds, often to catastrophic effect.

As one of the [world's largest lenders](#), China wields formidable influence. In Pakistan, typically a champion of Muslim struggles worldwide, criticizing China is taboo, according to Ibrahim. Beijing's economic juggernaut has bailed the country out on several occasions. Other poor Muslim-majority states -- such as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, which rely heavily on Chinese trade -- are also signatories to Friday's letter.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (15) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 17/12/2020]

OIC widely criticised for failing to condemn China's persecution of Uighurs



A coalition of 150 organisations sent a [letter](#) criticising the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's failure to condemn China over its abusive treatment of Uighur Muslims. The groups also called on the Muslim intergovernmental organisation to demand accountability from Beijing for its actions.

During a news conference on Thursday organised by the youth-led Free Uyghur Now, organisations, politicians and rights groups came together to urge the OIC to reverse its stance on China's treatment of its Muslim minorities.

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (16) [FONTE: The Arab Weekly, 27/05/2018]

Iran doesn't really care about Muslims if they're in China or Russia



Iran's official propaganda depicts the country's head of state Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the "Guardian Commander of Muslims" – Vali-ye Amr-e Moslemin. He is said to be the protector of Muslims all over the world and a champion of the Palestinian cause.

However, the regime in Tehran repeatedly turns a blind eye to the sufferings of Muslims in Russia and China, both of which are considered strategic allies by Iran in its struggle against the United States.

The most recent example of the regime's hypocrisy was Khamenei's first reaction to the new US Embassy in Jerusalem and the clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protesters. On May 17, Khamenei thundered against Israel: "Beit al-Moqaddas (Jerusalem) is the capital of Palestine. America and those greater or smaller than America and its satellites can't do a damned thing about the divine truth and tradition of Palestine."



Blood and thunder. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks in Tehran.

(A)

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (17) [FONTE: SCMP, 22/07/2019]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's 'happy Xinjiang' comments 'mistranslated' in China

- Turkish officials claim Beijing refused to correct the record when error spotted in statement of meeting with Xi Jinping



Jun Mai

+ FOLLOW

Published: 10:00pm, 22 Jul, 2019

[Why you can trust SCMP](#)



Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing earlier this month. Photo: Reuters

A China e o Xinjiang: região chinesa ou opressão de outro povo? (18) [FONTE: Business Insider, 16/01/2021]

Turkey is accused of extraditing Uighur Muslims to China in exchange for COVID-19 vaccines



- The Turkish government has been accused of agreeing to deport Uighur Muslims to China to access COVID-19 vaccines.
- In recent years, China has forcefully cracked down on Uighurs around the world, using their religion to cite a national security threat. Turkey is home to the largest number of diasporic Uighurs in the world.
- In late December 2020, Beijing ratified a 2017 deal with Ankara to see people with criminal charges extradited to China.

Sugestões de leitura

