

# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica**

## **a crise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

**2020-2021  
SESSÃO Nº 30**



## PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (2) [FONTE: US Library of Congress]





# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (3) [FONTE: Euractiv, 19/04/2021]

## **Greece, Israel sign historic \$1.65 billion defense agreement**



**Greece and Israel signed a \$1.65 billion defence agreement in which Israel's Elbit Systems Ltd. will operate a training centre for the Greek air force in a bid to tighten bilateral political and economic relations and includes the supply of 10 new M-346 training aircrafts produced by Italian company Leonardo, as well as the maintenance of the Greek air force's training fleet for a period of 22 years.**

The training centre will operate based on Israel's flight academy, while Elbit will upgrade and operate the Greek T-6 aircraft.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (4) [FONTE: Euractiv, 19/04/2021]

"I am certain this will upgrade the capabilities and strengthen the economies of Israel and Greece and thus the partnership between our two countries will deepen on the defence, economic and political levels," said Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz.

"We are honoured to have been awarded this contract to provide such an important capability to the Hellenic Air Force. This contract award attests to the leading position we hold in the area of pilot training solutions, providing tested know-how and proven technologies that improve operational readiness while reducing costs," Elbit Systems' president and CEO, Bezhalet (Butzi) Machlis, has said.

Israeli Ambassador to Greece, Yossi Amrani, said in an interview on Thursday that Greece and Israel are the Mediterranean anchors for stability, cooperation, security, and prosperity. "The relations are mutually beneficial for both countries. The relationship provides us with a strategic horizon. It provides us with an economic horizon with a regional horizon," he added.

Foreign ministers from Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates decided to strengthen their cooperation in a meeting in Nicosia on Friday. (Alexandros Fotiadis | EURACTIV.gr)


# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (5) [FONTE: Institute Montaigne / Spyros Blavoukos, 29/04/2021]

## The Greek-Israeli Relationship: Joining Forces to Tackle Turkey

Then, in 2020, they signed a deal for an undersea pipeline (EastMed) that would carry gas from new offshore deposits in the southeastern Mediterranean to continental Europe. **The more than \$6bn worth project is expected to satisfy about 10 percent of the European Union's natural gas needs, substantially limiting the EU's energy dependence from Russia.** Setting aside the technical complications and the economic rationale of such a mega-project at a time when the global economy is moving away from fossil fuels, these plans have further irked Turkey, which since then has been trying to create turbulence in the region and force them to cancel. In summer 2020, Greece and Turkey came yet once more to [the brink of a military imbroglio](#). This increase in tension very much owes to Turkey's growing unease over its gradual marginalization and its erratic response to this perspective.

It is worth noting that the deepening of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has the American blessing. The US, together with Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, signed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (East Med Act), in 2019, which reinstates their opposition to any destabilizing action in the region that would violate international law. In a joint declaration, the four countries [agreed to](#) "...defend against external malign influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East". **This initiative is indicative of the American interest in the energy developments in the region.** This policy approach has not changed with the new Biden administration, that seems to adopt an even harsher attitude towards Turkey.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (6) [FONTE: The Geopolitical Monitor]





# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (7)

[FONTE: Institute Montaigne / Spyros Blavoukos, 29/04/2021]


**A cornered and diplomatically battered Turkey gives more reasons to the two countries for further military cooperation,** given the precarious political and economic situation in the country and the unpredictability of the Erdoğan regime. Efforts to bring some life and warmth to the seriously damaged Turkish-Israeli relationship are underway, kicking off with discussions, in March 2021, for the mutual reopening of embassies in Tel Aviv and Ankara respectively. However, bolder and more far-reaching offers have been rejected by Israel, as was the case for a reported bilateral agreement, earlier in 2020, on the countries' shared exclusive economic zones that would leave Cyprus in the lurch. Such efforts will continue as Turkey will struggle to get out of the diplomatic corner it is in. However, for the time being, the Greek-Israeli relationship seems to have moved on, if not to a full marriage, at least to a very serious engagement.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (8) [FONTE: Aristotle Tziampiris, The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation, 2015]

The USGS study did not attempt to calculate how much natural gas could be controlled by the various Levantine Basin states, a complicated issue not devoid of political and legal considerations. Still, current estimates are that within Lebanon's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) "there could be as much as 25 trillion cubic feet of gas" (Wood 2013, April 17).<sup>15</sup> The Greek government is convinced that Western Greece holds as much as 4.7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas;<sup>16</sup> and there is also a distinct possibility for the existence of natural gas off the coast of Gaza.<sup>17</sup>

However, in terms of proceeding with efforts to utilize this potential energy-related wealth, it is the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Israel that are ahead of all other regional states. Cyprus divided its EEZ into 13 Blocks (see Fig. 7.1), with the aim to allow the exploration and production (E&P) of what appear to be significant natural gas deposits.

In late December 2011, the President of the ROC Demetres Christofias announced,



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (9) [FONTE:

Aristotle Tziampiris, *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*, 2015]

## **Hellenic–Israeli Energy Cooperation and Turkey’s Intensified Reaction**

The relationship between Cyprus and Israel had been warming up at least since January 2010 when Foreign Minister Lieberman had visited Nicosia.<sup>47</sup> Cyprus was also very helpful to Israel in the aftermath of the *Mavi Marmara* incident. According to a senior Israeli official, “we would have had many more problems’ without the cooperation of Cyprus” (Keinon 2010, June 23).

On 13 March 2011, Cyprus’ President Dimitris Christofias became the first sitting Cypriot President to officially visit the State of Israel. His historic trip signaled the willingness of both countries to increase coordination on a host of issues and especially on natural gas exploration and exploitation.<sup>48</sup> Also, as was the case with Greece, the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey was expected to produce increased numbers of Israeli tourists to Cyprus.<sup>49</sup>

On 24 August, of the same year, Minister Kozakou-Marcoullis flew to Israel. A major focus of her discussions was how to deal bilaterally with the expected Turkish reactions to Cypriot offshore drilling.<sup>50</sup> In effect, Nicosia and Jerusalem had decided to embark upon the closer coordination of their actions vis-à-vis energy and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (10) [FONTE:

Aristotle Tziampiris, *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*, 2015]

Meeting the challenge and further upping the ante, Theodoros Pangalos, vice president of the Greek government clarified in an unambiguous manner that “an attack against Cyprus means an attack against Greece” (Proto Thema 2011, September 16).<sup>52</sup> Somewhat more conciliatory and true to his milder diplomatic style, George Papandreou would call Erdoğan a few days later and suggest “self-restraint” and “calm” over energy developments in Cyprus (Ethnos 2011a, September 26).

Around the same time, the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel, a (full account of which is given in Chapter 4), was continuing at full force. Characteristically, in the first weeks of September 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan decided to expel Israel’s Ambassador from Turkey and several other Israeli diplomats, publicly called Israel “The West’s spoiled child,” (Arsu 2011, September 6) judged that the raid on the *Mavi Marmara* was tantamount to a cause of war, explained that war with Israel “could be done if necessary” (Today’s Zaman 2011, September 22), and announced that Turkish warships would henceforth accompany ships attempting to break the Gaza blockade.<sup>53</sup>

Furthermore, during an interview, Erdoğan unequivocally declared that:

“Turkey will not allow Israel exclusive use of the resources of the Mediterranean Sea” and said that he planned to dispatch three frigates to confront Israeli warships. Israel Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau responded, “Israel can support and secure the rigs that we are going to have in the Mediterranean as cited in Mills 2011, September 15.



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (11) [FONTE:

Al-Monitor / Ben Caspit, 22/01/2020]

## Israel-Greece-Cyprus take on Turkey in the Mediterranean

Ben Caspit | Israel | May 28, 2021 January 22, 2020



The Israel Defense Forces published its [annual intelligence assessment](#) Jan. 15 and for the first time reportedly included the aggressive regional policies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a top danger to watch, but it does not foresee a direct confrontation with Turkey in 2020. Rather, a closer look at the currently chilly relations between Israel and Turkey reveals potential escalation manifested not only in the political realm involving the Palestinians or battling terror, but also in the energy sector.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (12) [FONTE:

Al-Monitor / Ben Caspit, 22/01/2020]

Alongside this diplomatic success, however, the project has also further escalated the crisis between the three signatories and Turkey in the arena of natural gas and in general.

The signing of the pipeline agreement marks the latest development in a decade of steadily increasing trilateral cooperation after Israel discovered gas beneath its territorial waters. Energy cooperation accelerated a year ago, with the creation of the [Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum](#) (EMGF). This unique platform, which aims to promote regional cooperation in the field of energy, now includes the original three countries together with Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Italy. France has [asked to join](#), and the United States wants permanent observer status.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarked at the signing ceremony, "This is a historic day for Israel, because Israel is rapidly [becoming an energy superpower](#), a country that exports energy.... This is also a historic day because the cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel is growing stronger. This is a true alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean that is economic and political, and it adds to the security and stability of the region."

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (13) [FONTE:

Al-Monitor / Ben Caspit, 22/01/2020]

Indeed, Turkey has reacted negatively to the pipeline agreement. It sees the EMGF as an additional instrument by which to contain it geopolitically in the Eastern Mediterranean and to exclude it from the recent gas bonanza. More so, the new project threatens Turkey's strategy of becoming a major East-West energy hub. On Jan. 8, Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin inaugurated the [TurkStream gas pipeline](#), running from Russia to Bulgaria. There also appears to be a genuine desire by Turkey's leadership to assert hegemony in its close environs and [assume the Ottoman-era mantle](#) as a naval power in the Mediterranean littoral. This quest is reflected in Ankara's agenda for expanding Turkey's [naval force](#), with an addition of more than 20 ships expected over the next three years.

Apart from military and diplomatic motivations, Turkey's energy and naval policies also serve domestic purposes. Confrontation with non-Muslim powers, especially Cyprus, is popular with Erdogan's base in the Justice and Development Party as well as with his non-Islamist, nationalist coalition partners.

Ankara has therefore been pushing back against "encirclement" by the Eastern Mediterranean strategic architecture that [Israel and Egypt](#) are trying to jointly develop. It sent drilling ships, with naval escorts, to conduct gas exploration in waters claimed by Cyprus and also by the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkish naval forces threatened Cypriot survey ships in the disputed areas and in late November [forced an Israeli survey ship](#) to leave the area.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (14) [FONTE: DW, 22/10/2020]

## **EastMed Gas Forum fuels energy diplomacy in troubled region**


The Cairo-based EastMed Gas Forum, whose charter was signed by several Mediterranean members on September 22, is the prime instance of regional multilateralism as the US scales down its active engagement in the area.



"The EMGF [EastMed Gas Forum] is the first example to bring Israel together with Arab countries, with the involvement of European member states. The bilateral structures we know are giving way to more complex geopolitical structures," Stefan Wolfrum, a researcher at the Germany Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), told DW. Adding that "the forum creates the framework for the Palestinian Authority to sit at the same table with Israel."




# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (15) [FONTE: DW, 22/10/2020]



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (16) [FONTE: TRT World, 10/12/2019]

## Why did Turkey sign a maritime deal with Libya?

Turkey's deal with Libya's UN-recognised government in Tripoli is a signal to other Mediterranean states that Ankara can block their gas routes.



The map shows the maritime area secured by the deal between Turkey and Libya in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. (TRTWorld)

Turkey's recent moves in the Eastern Mediterranean have made waves after it signed a [maritime deal](#) with Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli. The deal is a clear signal to other coastal states in the region that the gas game will not be played [without Ankara's consent](#).

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (17) [FONTE: TRT World, 10/12/2019]

Turkey does not recognise the agreements because Ankara believes the Greek Cypriot Administration does not represent all the inhabitants of the island.

Since 1974, Cyprus has had two divided administrations - one led by Turkish Cypriots in the north part of the island and another led by Greek Cypriots in the south part of the island.

In Cyprus, located in the middle of the Eastern Mediterranean, the island's Turkish and Greek populations have been unable to come to terms with each other ever since the 1974 Turkish intervention, which aimed to prevent a change in its political status quo following the Greek Cypriot military coup against the internationally-recognised government of the Republic of Cyprus.

The guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus — Turkey, Greece and the UK — initiated a reunification plan in 2002 led by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. Greek Cypriots rejected reunification with Turkish Cypriots on the referendum in 2004. The European Union, which supported Greek Cypriots on the island, accepted their administration as a representative of the entire island and a full member of the bloc following the referendum.

With the relaunched Cyprus talks in 2015, there was hope that the newly discovered gas reserves would inspire Turkish and Greek Cypriots to address the island's political deadlock.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (18) [FONTE: Anadolu Agency,

5/5/2021]

## **Maritime deal with Turkey serves Libyans: Dbeibeh**



### **ANKARA**

Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh asserted that Tripoli will not cancel a maritime agreement signed with Turkey, saying the deal serves the Libyans.

Speaking in an interview with the Doha-based Al Jazeera television due to be aired in full on Wednesday, Dbeibeh said his government disagrees with Greece's evaluation of the agreement.

"We disagree with Greece in evaluating the Libyan-Turkish maritime agreement that serves the Libyans, and [therefore] we will not abandon it," he said.



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (19)

[FONTE: Anadolu Agency, 5/5/2021]

The Libyan premier also commented on the foreign mercenaries in the country, saying that “there are good signs” of getting them out of Libya.

Over the past years, warlord Khalifa Haftar contracted mercenaries from various countries, most notably the Russian Wagner company, to aid him in military operations against the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli, which ended in failure.

Dbeibeh explained that his government has been successful in uniting about 80% of Libya’s state institutions except the military institution.

“The 5+5 military commission is the ‘nucleus’ of the unification process [of the military institution],” he said.

The 5+5 Joint Military Commission is made up of five senior military officers from the Libyan government and five chosen by Haftar.

On Oct. 23 2020, the UN announced a permanent cease-fire agreement between Libya’s warring rivals during a meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Geneva, Switzerland.

Dbeibeh said his government does not coordinate with Haftar. “The government is coordinating with the head of the Benghazi municipality and police apparatus there,” he added.

The Libyan premier attributed the cancellation of a recent cabinet meeting in Benghazi to logistical issues, promising that his government will meet soon in the city, which is still under the control of Haftar's militia.

On April 25, Dbeibeh canceled a visit to Benghazi after militias loyal to Haftar cordoned off Benina Airport.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (20) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (21) [FONTE: Daily Sabah, 17/5/2021.

MAPA: ResearchGate]

## 'Turkey, Palestine should strike maritime deal similar to Libya'

by Nurbanu Kızıl



Turkey should sign a maritime jurisdiction agreement with Palestine, similar to the one it made with Libya to strengthen Palestinians' hand in the international sphere and provide motivation for other countries to sign deals with them, according to one of the main conceivers of Turkey's Blue Homeland doctrine.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (22) [FONTE: Daily Sabah, 17/5/2021]

Gaza has been under a land, sea and air blockade by Israel, while the Palestinian Naval Police's activities are restricted to 11 kilometers (6.84 miles) from the coast.

"By signing such an agreement, the Palestinian people would obtain control over a 10,200 square kilometer maritime zone, which would pave the way for them to utilize all the resources at sea," Yaycı said.


He continued by noting that the deal would also allow Turkey to expand its maritime jurisdiction zone in the Mediterranean, spoiling Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration's plans in the area.

"Countries have interests. Sometimes it is resources, sometimes oil, prestige or to look after the oppressed," Yaycı said, adding that Turkey's sole motivation is to look after the oppressed. He noted that this is a reflection of the aims of the forefathers and is part of the country's historical image.

Such a deal would also mark the first time Palestine signs an agreement with a world power and would significantly contribute to its formal international recognition and motivate the Palestinian Authority (PA) and other states to make deals.



# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (23) [FONTE: Daily Sabah, 17/5/2021]



tr-palestine (1)

Noting that most countries would not oppose such an agreement, the former navy rear admiral said it works for the benefit of most of them with the exception of two: Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration.

"Egypt should not react against it because the agreement does not interfere with the maritime jurisdiction zone it specified in the agreement with the Greek Cypriot administration," Yaycı said, adding that on the contrary, the Turkey-Palestine deal would actually give Egypt more jurisdiction over the area claimed by the Greek Cypriots.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (24) [FONTE: Daily Sabah, 17/5/2021]

## **OIC should take immediate action**

Regarding global silence in the face of Israel's violence against Palestinians, Yaycı said global organizations in general and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in particular, should take concrete action.

"The raison d'être of the OIC is to say stop to such oppression and violence, they should have already reacted against this by now," Yaycı said, adding that the organization has failed to take action. He continued by saying that OIC member states, which hold significant economic power thanks to their resources like oil, should impose serious sanctions against Israel.

"They should say that they will impose trade sanctions on imports and exports if Israel does not stop the bloodshed in Palestine, but they have yet to use this card against Tel Aviv," he said.

Yaycı continued by saying that the U.N. should also come up with a serious resolution to impose sanctions on Israel and help in putting a stop to the aggression.

He suggested that the global body create a peacekeeping force in Gaza, similar to the one it sent to Cyprus during the war, but the U.S. vetoes everything against Israel.

Although a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution does not seem viable in the face of U.S. cooperation with Israel, Yaycı said OIC member-states may force the UNSC to deploy peacekeepers by taking all sorts of economic, political precautions and even volunteer to send troops to act as peacekeepers.

# O gás natural no Mediterrâneo oriental e a recomposição das alianças (25) [FONTE: Daily Sabah, 5/08/2020]







## PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

# O G7 e a governação global (1) [FONTE: The Global Challenges Foundation]

## What is Global Governance?

Global governance brings together diverse actors to coordinate collective action at the level of the planet. The goal of global governance, roughly defined, is to provide global public goods, particularly peace and security, justice and mediation systems for conflict, functioning markets and unified standards for trade and industry. One crucial global public good is catastrophic risk management – putting appropriate mechanisms in place to maximally reduce the likelihood and impact of any event that could cause the death of 1 billion people across the planet, or damage of equivalent magnitude. See here for a [list of global catastrophic risks](#).

The leading institution in charge of global governance today is the United Nations. It was founded in 1945, in the wake of the Second World War, as a way to prevent future conflicts on that scale. The United Nations does not directly bring together the people of the world, but sovereign nation states, and currently counts 193 members who make recommendations through the UN General Assembly. The UN's main mandate is to preserve global security, which it does particularly through the Security Council. In addition the UN can settle international legal issues through the International Court of Justice, and implements its key decisions through the Secretariat, led by the Secretary General.

The United Nations has added a range of areas to its core mandate since 1945. It works through a range of agencies and associated institutions particularly to ensure greater shared prosperity, as a desirable goal in itself, and as an indirect way to increase global stability. As a key initiative in that regard, in 2015, the UN articulated the Sustainable Development Goals, creating common goals for the collective future of the planet.




# O G7 e a governação global (2) [FONTE: The Global Challenges Foundation]

Global governance is more generally effected through a range of organisations acting as intermediary bodies. Those include bodies in charge of regional coordination, such as the EU or ASEAN, which coordinate the policies of their members in a certain geographical zone. Those also include strategic or economic initiatives under the leadership of one country – NATO for the US or China’s Belt and Road Initiative for instance – or more generally coordinating defense or economic integration, such as APEC or ANZUS. Finally, global governance relies on looser norm-setting forums, such as the G20, the G7, the World Economic Forum: those do not set up treaties, but offer spaces for gathering, discussing ideas, aligning policy and setting norms. This last category could be extended to multi-stakeholder institutions that aim to align global standards, for instance the Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).

In summary, global governance is essential but fragmented, complex and little understood. In this context, the key questions raised by the Global Challenges Foundation are, how to reform institutions, how to develop alternative institutions, and how to use the new possibilities of technology to improve governance.

# O G7 e a governação global (3) [FONTE: Federal Ministry of Finance / Germany]



# O G7 e a governação global (4) [FONTE: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2015]

## G7 and G20: Population indicators

	Population	Total fertility rate	Population aged 65 and over	Population projection <sup>1</sup>	Average annual population change
	mn inhabitants	births per woman	%	mn inhabitants	%
G7   G20	2013	2013	2013	2050	2013
II Germany	81	1.4	21	73	0.3
II Canada	35	1.6	15	45	1.2
II France	66	2.0	18	73	0.4
II Italy	60	1.4	21	60	1.2
II Japan	127	1.4	25	108	-0.2
II United Kingdom	64	1.9	17	73	0.6
II United States	316	1.9	14	401	0.7
I Argentina	41	2.2	11	51	0.9
I Australia	23	1.9	14	34	1.7
I Brazil	200	1.8	8	231	0.9
I China	1,357	1.7	9	1,385	0.5
I European Union (EU28)	507	1.6	18	512	0.3
I India	1,252	2.5	5	1,620	1.2
I Indonesia	250	2.3	5	321	1.2
I Mexico	122	2.2	6	156	1.2
I Republic of Korea	50	1.2	12	51	0.4
I Russian Federation	143	1.7	13	121	0.2
I Saudi Arabia	29	2.6	3	40	1.9
I South Africa	53	2.4	6	63	1.5
I Turkey	75	2.0	7	95	1.3
Source	World Bank	World Bank	World Bank	UN DESA	World Bank

Federal Statistical Office, G7 in Figures, 2015

# O G7 e a governação global (5) [FONTE: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2015]









































## G7 and G20: Indicators relating to climate change

	Carbon dioxide emissions				Average annual deforestation (+) / afforestation (–)	Population living in areas where elevation is below 5 metres
	% of global emissions	tonnes per capita	kg per 1,000 int. US\$ GDP	% change on 1990	% of total forest area	% of total population
	2013	2013	2013	2013	2000–2011	2000
<b>G7I G20I</b>						
<b>I Germany</b>	2.4	10.2	277	–17.3	0.00	4.4
<b>I Canada</b>	1.6	15.7	335	23.0	0.00	4.0
<b>I France</b>	1.0	5.7	169	–6.3	–0.39	4.0
<b>I Italy</b>	1.1	6.4	215	–8.4	–0.90	7.5
<b>I Japan</b>	3.9	10.7	279	17.0	–0.05	16.2
<b>I United Kingdom</b>	1.3	7.5	254	–19.2	–0.31	8.6
<b>I United States</b>	15.0	16.6	334	6.2	–0.13	4.1
<b>I Argentina</b>	0.5	4.5	213	74.0	0.81	4.5
<b>I Australia</b>	1.1	16.9	314	43.9	0.37	7.2
<b>I Brazil</b>	1.5	2.6	99	134.2	0.50	4.9
<b>I China</b>	29.1	7.4	229	315.7	–1.57	8.1
<b>I European Union (EU28)</b>	10.5	7.3	222	–14.1	.	7.4
<b>I India</b>	5.9	1.7	139	214.2	–0.46	3.8
<b>I Indonesia</b>	1.4	2.0	100	207.6	0.51	11.2
<b>I Mexico</b>	1.3	3.9	168	52.8	0.30	2.7
<b>I Republic of Korea</b>	1.8	12.7	261	148.2	0.11	5.0
<b>I Russian Federation</b>	5.1	12.6	508	–26.1	0.00	2.9
<b>I Saudi Arabia</b>	1.4	16.6	151	189.3	0.00	1.0
<b>I South Africa</b>	0.9	6.2	464	22.6	0.00	0.5
<b>I Turkey</b>	0.9	4.4	138	121.5	–1.11	2.4
<b>Source</b>	<b>EDGAR/JRC</b>	<b>EDGAR / JRC</b>	<b>EDGAR / JRC</b>	<b>EDGAR / JRC</b>	<b>World Bank</b>	<b>World Bank</b>

# O G7 e a governação global (6) [FONTE: Statista, 2020]

## How the G7 Should Really Look

Largest economies by share of global GDP (in purchasing power parity)

	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020*
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

\* projection

Source: IMF





# O G7 e a governação global (7) [FONTE: Federal Ministry of Finance / Germany]

The Group of Seven (G7)/Group of Eight (G8) is an informal forum of the world's leading economies. The heads of state and government of these countries formulate joint positions on global policy issues when they meet for annual summits. Primary areas of focus include the global economy, foreign and security policy, development and climate.

The first world economic summit, which gave birth to the G7/G8, was initiated by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1975 and held at the Château de Rambouillet, where the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States gathered for fireside chats. The group took on the form of the [G7](#) when Canada joined in 1976 and has convened for annual summits ever since.

The European Union (formerly the European Community) has attended the summits since 1977. The G7 became the G8 in 1998 when Russia – which had held guest status since 1994 – was officially added to the group. However, the G8 process was suspended in 2014 due to Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The G7 leaders determined at the time that it was not possible to conduct productive talks within the G8. For this reason, they decided not to attend the 2014 G8 summit, which had been slated to take place in Sochi on 4–5 June 2014 under Russia's presidency. Instead, the G7 gathered for a summit in Brussels on 4–5 June 2014. Following this meeting, Germany assumed the G7 presidency ahead of time. Since then, the process has been continued under the G7 format. This decision underlined the fact that the G7 is a community of shared values that will not accept the breach of international law.

Like the [G20](#), the G7/G8 is not an international organisation. It does not have its own administrative structure. Due to the G7/G8's informal structures, the rotating annual presidency plays a particularly central role. The country that holds the annual presidency organises that year's summit and sets the agenda.

# O G7 e a governação global (8) [FONTE: Federal Ministry of Finance / Germany]

The summits, which are usually held mid-year, provide the heads of state and government with a key opportunity to exchange views in face-to-face talks. On the occasion of each summit, a communiqué containing the main results is published, together with accompanying reports and action plans.

Each government leader has a personal representative, called a sherpa, who prepares the summit. The Federal Ministry of Finance assists the German Chancellor's sherpa in all questions involving fiscal and monetary policy.

The G7/G8 process has changed significantly over the years. In addition to cooperating at the level of heads of state, the G7 now also holds separate meetings attended by finance ministers and central bank governors. This close cooperation in the area of fiscal and monetary policy is based on the recognition that – given the growing interdependence of the global economy – the economic, monetary and trade policies of major economies tend to affect other countries. Even after the establishment of the G20 as the central forum for international cooperation in the area of economic and fiscal policy, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors still usually meet several times a year to discuss pressing fiscal and monetary policy issues. In addition to their discussions on these issues, which are of particular interest to the G7 countries, the G7 also functions as a catalyst within the G20. Furthermore, thanks to its long-standing tradition of close cooperation, the G7 is able to react swiftly and efficiently in crisis situations.

The meetings of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors are supplemented by regular confidential meetings of their representatives, who are referred to as G7 deputies.

# O G7 e a governação global (9) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## G7

### Papel do G7

O G7, inicialmente G8, foi criado em 1975 como um fórum informal que reúne os líderes das principais nações industrializadas do mundo. As cimeiras anuais do G7 tornaram-se, ao longo dos anos, uma plataforma para determinar a evolução do discurso multilateral e definir respostas políticas a desafios globais. O G7 complementa o G20, geralmente considerado a base da coordenação económica a nível global.

A cimeira reúne líderes da União Europeia e dos seguintes países:

- Canadá
- França
- Alemanha
- Itália
- Japão
- Reino Unido
- Estados Unidos

Atendendo ao facto de que as decisões tomadas por estas potências económicas têm um impacto real, o G7 desempenha um papel importante na definição da agenda global. A orientação política definida por estes líderes para uma dada questão tem repercussões em muitas outras organizações e instituições internacionais.

Por conseguinte, apesar de não serem juridicamente vinculativas, as decisões tomadas no G7 têm uma influência política considerável.

# O G7 e a governação global (10) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## A UE no G7

Em 1977, os representantes da então Comunidade Europeia participaram pela primeira vez na Cimeira de Londres. Com o tempo, a UE foi assumindo um papel mais importante, tendo sido progressivamente incluída em todos os debates políticos da cimeira. Desde a Cimeira de Otava (1981), participa em todas as sessões de trabalho.

### Destaque para a agricultura

O aumento dos preços dos produtos alimentares em 2007-2008 propulsionou a agricultura e a segurança alimentar para o topo da agenda política mundial. Esta crise de preços levou os ministros da Agricultura do então [G8 \(antes da suspensão da Rússia, em 2014\) a reunirem-se em Itália, em 2009](#), para analisarem formas de melhorar a cooperação agrícola com os países em desenvolvimento, especialmente em África.

Na [cimeira seguinte, no Canadá, em 2010](#), os líderes mundiais do G8 afetaram 22 mil milhões de dólares à execução, ao longo de três anos, da Iniciativa de Águia sobre a Segurança Alimentar, de forma a ajudar países vulneráveis a aumentarem a produção alimentar. A [União Europeia assumiu o maior compromisso](#), que cumpriu, tendo contribuído com 3800 milhões de dólares.

Rotação da presidência do G7:

- Japão em 2016
- Itália em 2017
- Canadá em 2018
- França em 2019
- EUA em 2020
- Reino Unido em 2021

# O G7 e a governação global (11) [FONTE: TRT World / Jim O'Neill, 12/06/2018]

## **The G7 is no longer relevant, here's why**

On a range of international issues the G7 can not act without the cooperation of other important nations. This is why it should change.

Though US President Donald Trump's appearance at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Quebec last week was not particularly well received, I find myself sympathizing with his skepticism toward the group. I have long doubted that the annual meeting of leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States serves any useful purpose.

Back in 2001, when I [coined the BRIC acronym](#), I predicted that the growing economic importance of Brazil, Russia, India, and China would eventually require a significant change to global economic governance. At a minimum, I observed, global-governance bodies should include China, if not all of the BRICs.

At the same time, I pointed out that there was little reason for France, Germany, and Italy to be represented individually, given that they share a currency, a monetary policy, and a framework for fiscal policy (at least in principle). And I questioned whether Canada and the UK should still be included among the world's most important economies.

It has now been 17 years, and the G7 is still serving little other purpose than to keep its member states' civil servants busy. Yes, it still comprises the seven Western democracies with the largest economies, but barely so.



# O G7 e a governação global (12) [FONTE: TRT World / Jim O'Neill, 12/06/2018]

The G7 is an artifact of a bygone era. In the 1970s, when the G5 was expanded to include Canada and Italy, the new grouping really did dominate the world economy. Japan was booming, and many expected it to catch up to the US; Italy was growing, and nobody was thinking about China. But this year, China is [projected](#) to overtake the entire eurozone. And at its current rate of growth, it will effectively create a new economy the size of Italy in less than two years. Moreover, India's GDP is already [larger than](#) Italy's, and crisis-ridden Brazil is not far behind.

In other words, the only global legitimacy that the G7 can claim is that it represents a few major democracies. But 85% of the increase in world GDP (in US dollars) since 2010 has come from the US and China, and nearly 50% from China alone. Another 6% has come from India, while the dollar value of the Japanese and EU economies has actually [declined](#).

In light of these realities, the G7 would be much more relevant if Canada, France, Germany, and Italy were replaced by China, India, and a single delegation representing the eurozone. But, of course, there is already a body that represents the current G7 countries as well as the BRICs: the G20, which was formed 1999.

Since its first formal summit in 2008, the G20 has served a clear purpose as a forum for the world's leading economies. For any smaller club to be justified, it must have the same legitimacy as the G20. Representing the democracies that had the largest economies in the 1970s is no longer good enough. After all, India and Brazil also have functioning democracies, and could soon [become](#) more prosperous than France and the UK.

# O G7 e a governação global (13) [FONTE: FT 6/6/2021]

## **G7 tax deal is 'starting point' on road to global reform**

Agreement must now be sought at G20 and among 139 countries involved in OECD talks



The tax deal agreed by the world's leading advanced nations this weekend is the first substantive proof of revived international co-operation since President Joe Biden brought the US back to the negotiating table. Yet there is still a long road ahead before it can be implemented.

"This is a starting point," said French finance minister Bruno Le Maire, pledging that "in the coming months we will fight to ensure that this minimum corporate tax rate is as high as possible".

# O G7 e a governação global (14) [FONTE: FT 6/6/2021]

The accord aims to close loopholes multinationals have exploited to reduce their tax bills, ensuring they pay more in the nations where they operate.

G7 ministers backed a global minimum rate of at least 15 per cent, and agreed that countries should have the right to tax a certain proportion of the largest, most profitable multinationals' profit in the locations where it is generated.

While the OECD [estimates](#) the proposals could generate an additional \$50bn-\$80bn a year in tax revenues, the actual sum raised will vary wildly depending on the technical details of the eventual global agreement.

Two factors will have a particular impact: the rate at which any minimum is set and whether countries that implement the minimum can levy it on revenue generated in countries that do not. The scale of the overall impact is particularly sensitive to this latter point, known as "jurisdictional blending" or "country by country top-ups".


NGOs criticised the 15 per cent minimum as being far too low; UK think-tank IPPR said it "would not be enough to end the race to the bottom".

But Gabriel Zucman, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley known for his work on tax havens, tweeted that the deal was "historic, inadequate and promising" — because while 15 per cent was too low, there was no obstacle to reaching a higher rate.

# O G7 e a governação global (15) [FONTE: FT

6/6/2021]

## Higher profits booked in lower tax jurisdictions



US data refers to 2017; all other data is for 2016 \*For profit-making multinational companies only  
Graphic by: Chelsea Bruce-Lockhart based on work by Garcia-Bernardo, J. and Janský, P. (2021) Profit Shifting of Multinational Corporations Worldwide, ICTD Working Paper 119, Brighton, Institute of Development Studies  
© FT

The minimum rate “slashes incentives for multinational firms to book profits in tax havens”, he said, but added that for the minimum to bite, “it’s essential that it be on a country-by-country basis”, since companies could otherwise use tax havens to offset rates set higher than 15 per cent elsewhere.

# O G7 e a governação global (16) [FONTE: Politico 7/6/2021]

## The main hurdle in getting a global tax deal is Europe

The bloc's countries disagree on what companies should have to pay, and that could scupper efforts to revamp the international system.



U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen (left) and Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe during a meeting of G7 finance ministers in London on June 5, 2021 | WPA pool photo by Alberto Pezzali/Getty Images



# O G7 e a governação global (17) [FONTE: Politico 7/6/2021]

At the center of the upcoming fight is how the potential global tax agreement could undermine decades of work by the likes of Ireland and Cyprus to entice some of the world's biggest companies, including Google and Facebook, to set up shop locally by offering them rock-bottom corporate tax rates.

These EU members' low corporate tax rates have been criticized by others for allowing some of the world's largest companies to avoid paying their fair share. Governments with bargain-basement tax rates say they are necessary to convince companies to invest locally and generate billions in additional tax revenues via payroll and other taxes.

Those deals, which have enticed large multinational companies to set up shop in these low-tax countries, could be thrown out under the G7's plans, which include setting a minimum global corporate tax threshold of 15 percent.

Low corporate tax countries aren't willing to give up without a fight.

Many in Europe's smallest countries — as well as those like Hungary that have [embraced a national corporate tax regime of just 9 percent](#) — are skeptical of the G7's proposals, and caution that nothing has yet been decided under the wider global tax talks being coordinated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

# O G7 e a governação global (18) [FONTE: Politico 7/6/2021]

Despite the potential blow to smaller countries' abilities to offer low tax rates, the EU officials said that skeptical EU governments would likely stay muted because a final global deal was still far off — let alone unanimous support for it among EU countries.

Assuming G20 finance ministers approve the global tax overhaul by the self-imposed deadline of July 9, it's unlikely the OECD will have the signing ceremony ready before the latter stages of next year, due to the need to finalize the technical details of any agreement.

After that deadline, the European Commission will need at least six months to prepare an EU tax bill that officially proposes the minimum corporate tax rate outlined by the G7 countries. Tax officials in Brussels expect to begin legislative negotiations only by mid-2023, and any legislation needs all EU governments' unanimous agreement to pass. That is likely where the battle will be ratcheted up, as national governments with lower tax regimes fight for their survival.

Commission officials are nonetheless optimistic that some form of top-line global tax deal can be struck by the July deadline. The G7's proposals carry weight within the wider negotiations, particularly after the [United States made a new set of proposals](#) — including the 15 percent minimum corporate tax threshold — in April that were almost universally welcomed.

# O G7 e a governação global (19) [FONTE: The Economist, 5/6/2021]

## **The era of small-state privilege in Europe is coming to an end**

Luxembourg and Malta still have vetoes, but power is shifting to big states

Jun 5th 2021

"ONE PERSON, one vote" is a good principle. The ratio in the European Union is a bit more complex: "One Luxembourger, or nine Germans, one vote." Germany has one MEP for every 860,000 citizens. By contrast Luxembourg—a country roughly the size of Düsseldorf—has one per 100,000.



# O G7 e a governação global (20) [FONTE: The Economist, 5/6/2021]


A disproportionate parliamentary weighting is one of many perks enjoyed by the EU's gang of small states. Three-quarters of the bloc's population live in just seven countries; the remainder is spread over the other 20. For them, membership is a sweet deal. Their politicians can wangle top jobs, usually as compromise candidates. A common currency gives smaller European economies a say in monetary matters, rather than being thrown around like a ragdoll by the Bundesbank, as they were before the euro. When it comes to topics such as tax, foreign policy, or changing the EU's treaties, they wield vetoes. This means Malta (population: 500,000) can have as much say as Italy (population: 60m) when shaping a club of 450m. The EU acts as a geopolitical magnifying glass, making small countries appear much larger.

Within the EU, small states can, for once, shape history rather than be victims of it. In times of crisis, leaders used to running a country with a GDP equivalent to the turnover of a middling S&P 500 company sit round the table with Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, ostensibly as equals. It is little wonder that at their first such meeting, some leaders have the giddy demeanour of a weekend footballer meeting Cristiano Ronaldo. For big countries, the EU is about clinging on to the remains of their former clout; for small ones, the EU has made them more powerful than they could ever have dreamed.

Alas, for the EU's army of tiddlers, this golden era of tiny but mighty states is drawing to a close. Take tax, an area where small countries have long enjoyed their own exorbitant privilege. In a bloc where capital can flow freely, imposing lighter taxes than a near neighbour is a lucrative trick. Ireland and Luxembourg transformed themselves from nations of farmers and steelmakers respectively into two of the richest countries on the planet by undercutting larger neighbours on tax. Capital flooded in, along with complaints from next door. Since the EU can legislate on tax only by unanimity, there was little the bloc could do. It asked them nicely to change. They said no.



# O G7 e a governação global (21) [FONTE: Cartoon, IHT / Chapatte 2013]





# Sugestões de leitura

