

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (2) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (3) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



4. Russian Empress Catherine II ('the Great') (1729–96), aided by Potemkin, expanded her empire to the shores of the Black Sea at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. She inspected the newly founded city of Sevastopol in May 1787. (Photo by Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (4) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



3. Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin (1739–91), confidant of Catherine the Great and governor of *Novorossiia* (New Russia), urged his Empress to annex Crimea and to establish a major naval base at the fine harbour of Akhtiar – renamed Sevastopol. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (5) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]




51. 'The Defence of Sevastopol', by Alexander Deyneka (1899–1969). The painting of 1942, which became a famous wartime propaganda poster, portrayed Sevastopol's defiant role in the Great Patriotic War, subsequently honoured in its designation as a 'Hero City' in 1945. (World History Archive/TopFoto)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (6) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



63. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894–1971), First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953–64) and Premier (1958–64), directed the transfer of Crimea in 1954 from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. (Bettmann/Getty Images)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (7) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



76. 'Welcome home to the native harbour', Sevastopol street art in February 2014, indicating the popular support in the city for President Vladimir Putin and reunification with Russia. (Vladimir Zizak)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (8) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



80. The Russian Navy armed auxiliary, the guided missile tender *General Ryabikov*, together with a tug, blocking the entrance and exit to Sevastopol Bay on 4 March 2014, which prevented the movement of Ukrainian Navy vessels. (Sergey Gorbachev)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (9) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



81. A provocative, pro-Russian, billboard concerning the disputed referendum held in Crimea, including Sevastopol, on 16 March 2014. The main caption reads: '16 March we choose' and the word below is 'or'. (Viktor Drachev/AFP/Getty Images)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (10) [FONTE: Mungo Melvin, Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin, 2017]



86. President Vladimir Putin speaking at Victory Day in Sevastopol on 9 May 2014 told a cheering crowd that ‘the Fatherland is embracing you once again as family, as daughters and sons’ – reflecting the internationally disputed re-annexation of Crimea into Russia. (Photo by Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images)

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (11) [FONTE: The Economist, 23/06/2021]

Russian and British forces square off in the Black Sea

Russia claims to have fired warning shots at a British destroyer in disputed waters off Crimea

THE LAST time that Russia fired on a British warship was in 1919, when a Bolshevik submarine torpedoed a destroyer in the Gulf of Finland. The last time it happened in the Black Sea was during the Crimean war over 165 years ago. So it was a surprise when Russia declared that it had not only fired warning shots at HMS *Defender*, a British destroyer passing through Crimean waters on June 23rd, but had also dropped bombs in its path.

The precise sequence of events is contested. Russia says that the British warship crossed 3km (two miles) into its territorial waters off Crimea, near Cape Fiolent (see map). When the Soviet Union broke up, Crimea became part of Ukraine. Russia occupied and annexed it in 2014. It thus claims the patch of sea in question, even though most countries, including Britain, regard the annexation as illegal. Russia said it "halted the violation" with warning fire and, 11 minutes later, with 250kg bombs dropped from Su-24 bombers.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (12) [FONTE: BBC, 24/6/2021]



Source: Marine Traffic

BBC

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (13) [FONTE: BBC, 24/6/2021]

On board HMS Defender

Jonathan Beale, Defence Correspondent

I am on board the warship in the Black Sea.

The crew were already at action stations as they approached the southern tip of Russian-occupied Crimea. Weapons systems on board the Royal Navy destroyer had already been loaded.

This would be a deliberate move to make a point to Russia. HMS Defender was going to sail within the 12 mile (19km) limit of Crimea's territorial waters. The captain insisted he was only seeking safe passage through an internationally recognised shipping lane.

Two Russian coastguard ships that were shadowing the Royal Navy warship, tried to force it to alter its course. At one stage, one of the Russian vessels closed in to about 100m.

Increasingly hostile warnings were issued over the radio - including one that said "if you don't change course I'll fire". We did hear some firing in the distance but they were believed to be well out of range.

As HMS Defender sailed through the shipping lane it was buzzed by Russian jets. The Captain, Vincent Owen, said the ship detected more than 20 military aircraft nearby. Commander Owen said his mission was confident but non-confrontational.

Russia said the incident happened just after midday local time (09:00 GMT) in the Black Sea near Cape Fiolent in the south of Crimea.

According to the Russian military, HMS Defender was told to change course, and when it failed to do so, a Russian border patrol ship sent several warning shots. About ten minutes later, a military jet dropped warning bombs in the path of the destroyer.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (14) [FONTE: Royal Navy]



ROYAL NAVY

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Surface Fleet > HMS Daring | HMS Dauntless | HMS Diamond | HMS Dragon | HMS Defender | HMS Duncan

HMS DEFENDER (D36)

Launched in December 2009, HMS Defender is the fifth of the Royal Navy's six Type 45 destroyers. Together with her sister vessels, Defender is one of the most advanced warships ever constructed.

Get help understanding deployment
This unit is currently on deployment, find out how that might affect you.

Unit official communications
For the latest updates about this unit visit the Royal Navy forum.

Facts & figures

8,500 tonnes

Total displacement


152 metres

Total length

30+ knots

Top speed

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (15) [FONTE: Royal Navy]




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HMS Defender heads on Black Sea mission after Mediterranean workout

10 June 2021 Topic: Fighting arms Surface Fleet

Storyline: [HMS Defender](#)



HMS Defender has completed NATO security operations in the Mediterranean and will be heading to the Black Sea after a stop in Istanbul.

The Type 45 destroyer is part of the UK's Carrier Strike Group but has peeled away from the task group temporarily to carry out her own set of missions in the Black Sea.

Over the past few weeks Portsmouth-based Defender completed intensive training and worked on Operation Sea Guardian, NATO's mission in the Mediterranean to deter and counter terrorism.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (16) [FONTE: The Economist, 23/06/2021]

Whatever happened, it was out of the ordinary. Western countries routinely decry Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea—most recently at a NATO summit on June 14th. On June 23rd the European Union extended economic sanctions on Russia stemming from the annexation for an eighth successive year. But neither America nor any other member of NATO is thought to have gone as far as sailing a warship with a journalist aboard through Crimea's waters to flout Russia's claims (though Russia accused HMS *Dragon*, another British destroyer, of doing so last October; there were fewer public fireworks on that occasion). "As far as I know," says Dmitry Gorenburg, an expert on the Black Sea at CNA, a think-tank in Washington, "this is the first time a NATO warship has entered Crimean waters since 2014."

Britain's move was bold, but risky. Russia has built up a large military presence in Crimea, including advanced missile, air-defence and jamming systems. HMS *Defender* was a considerable distance from HMS *Queen Elizabeth*, the aircraft-carrier that she escorts, currently on the other side of the Bosphorus in the Mediterranean. It helps that an American intelligence-gathering plane was watching from above. But Britain's willingness to run the risk reflects, in part, its torrid relationship with Russia, which has not recovered from Russia's attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer, in England three years ago.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (17) [FONTE: The Economist, 23/06/2021]

It also points to a wider shift in Britain's defence posture. In a series of documents published over the past year Britain has set out a new strategy involving the more active use of military forces around the world. They called for "continuous operating on our terms and in places of our choosing", including actions "that may test the traditional limits of statecraft".

Britain's support for Ukraine, which has also lost territory in its east to Russian-backed separatist militias and continues to skirmish with them, is a good example of this. Britain's armed forces are already training Ukrainian troops and providing military assistance. In September, 250 British paratroopers conducted one of their largest air drops in decades in the country. Then on June 22nd, just a day before HMS *Defender's* Crimean foray, British and Ukrainian government ministers met on the ship's deck and agreed to jointly build patrol boats and naval bases for Ukraine. Britain may also transfer two old minesweeping ships to Ukraine's navy.

But Anglo-Russian antagonism is not the only source of tension in the Black Sea. In the spring Russia massed troops close to eastern Ukraine and in Crimea itself, provoking fears of an invasion. Though the build-up was halted in late April, some troops have stayed behind. Now Ukraine is preparing to host "Sea Breeze", an annual NATO-led naval exercise which will run from June 28th to July 10th, involving 32 navies, including America's. Russia has complained that the exercise will "increase risks of unintended incidents" and "inspire militaristic ambitions in Kiev".

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (18) [FONTE: NYT, 24/06/2021]

British Warship Deliberately Sailed Close to Crimea, U.K. Officials Say

The action, meant to demonstrate support for Ukraine, incited an international incident after Russia scrambled warplanes and Coast Guard vessels.

June 24, 2021



The British destroyer H.M.S. Defender arriving at the port of Odessa, Ukraine, this month. Sergey Smolentsev/Reuters

In an interview with the BBC, the Defender's captain, Cmdr. Vince Owen, made it clear that the ship deliberately sailed close to the Crimean coast to assert the position that Crimea and the waters around it legally belong to Ukraine.

"With the U.K. and the Royal Navy, our deployment is here to maintain international order, and uphold that for the global peace and security," Commander Owen [told the BBC](#).

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (19) [FONTE: The

Conversation / Andrew Serdy, 24/06/2021]

HMS Defender incident: what the law of the sea says

[Andrew Serdy](#) June 24, 2021 5.53pm BST

There are conflicting accounts from the UK and Russia about an incident off Cape Fiolent on the Crimean peninsula on June 23 when Russia's defence ministry said its [aircraft had fired](#) warning shots at the British destroyer HMS Defender to expel it from Russia's claimed territorial sea.

The geopolitics that might lie behind the episode are for others to debate, but having credible legal arguments is always important. The UK's Ministry of Defence said [on Twitter](#):

The Royal Navy ship is conducting innocent passage through Ukrainian territorial waters in accordance with international law.

"Innocent passage" for foreign ships is the main qualification on a coastal state's otherwise untrammelled sovereignty over its territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. Several provisions are devoted to it in Part II of the 1982 [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea](#) (UNCLOS), to which both the UK and Russia (as well as Ukraine) are party.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (20) [FONTE: The

Conversation / Andrew Serdy, 24/06/2021]

Under Article 17 of UNCLOS, innocent passage is the right to proceed through another country's territorial waters without interference. Article 18 defines "passage" as navigation through the territorial sea of a coastal state without calling into one of its ports – as HMS Defender was doing – or to or from the internal waters of a state. It must be "continuous and expeditious", without stopping and anchoring, except in so far as is incidental to ordinary navigation, or because of *force majeure* or distress, or in order to render assistance to another vessel in distress.

Nothing suggests that HMS Defender's passage was anything but continuous and expeditious. As for what is "innocent", UNCLOS Article 19 equates this with not being prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state, and contains an exhaustive list of prejudicial acts, including use or threat of force, weapons exercises, defence- or security-related information-gathering, propaganda, smuggling of goods or people, launching, landing or taking on board aircraft or military

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (21) [FONTE: The

Conversation / Andrew Serdy, 24/06/2021]

UK within its rights

All of this points to the UK being within its rights to send its ship through the territorial waters off the Crimean peninsula. Notably, there is no requirement that innocent passage must be done for a particular purpose, nor does it need justification in terms of the directness of the route from port of origin to destination (although a glance at the map shows that passing close to Crimea is indeed the shortest way from Odessa to any Georgian port).



Black Sea: the waters off Crimea are part of the route from Odessa to any Georgian ports. Wikimedia Commons, [CC BY-SA](#)

So far there has been no accusation from Russia that HMS Defender was engaged in any of the acts that by UNCLOS Article 19 render passage non-innocent, which would have triggered Article 25 permitting the coastal state to take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent. It seems to have been its mere presence that Russia found objectionable, possibly because HMS Defender was too close for comfort to the sensitive naval port of Sevastopol.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (22) [FONTE: The Conversation / Andrew Serdy, 24/06/2021]

The UK maintains that the ship was in a recognised sea lane. This appears to be an indirect reference to UNCLOS Article 22, which permits the coastal state to “require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes ... as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships”.

Sea lanes off southwestern Crimea were already included in the 2013 edition of the [Ships' Routeing](#) publication of the [International Maritime Organization](#) (the UN specialised agency for shipping), the last that predates the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea. The current (2019) edition is behind a paywall, but it would not have been in Russia's interest to alter the lanes since then, as that would invite the question of whether it has lawfully acquired territorial title to Crimea, answered resoundingly in the negative by [UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262](#).

A different rule for warships?

One possible counterargument would be to say that warships do not in fact have the right of innocent passage, only merchant ships. But this is a minority view and unconvincing, as it would make nonsense of much of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Many of the acts identified as prejudicial under Article 19 can in practice only be done by warships, yet there is no point including them in this list if warships do not benefit from the right in the first place.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (23) [FONTE: The Conversation / Andrew Serdy, 24/06/2021]

But if the aim of the passage was to underline the UK view that the Crimea belongs to Ukraine and not Russia, given the reference in the Ministry of Defence statement to HMS Defender being in Ukrainian territorial waters, this is misconceived, as it cannot possibly advance Ukraine's claim. It might even be counterproductive, by giving an opening to an argument that the passage, if undertaken predominantly for propaganda purposes, becomes non-innocent under Article 19.

The China question

For the whole point of innocent passage is that, as a right, permission does not have to be sought for it, which makes it irrelevant to which state the territory in question belongs. The same, incidentally, goes for the South China Sea, where – even now – the Royal Navy is [sending a carrier group](#). Innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of any feature clear of the water at high tide is a right irrespective of which of the claimants has the better case for territorial title.

The only difference is that one of them, China, is the leading proponent of the view confining innocent passage to merchant ships. So – bearing in mind the qualification about propaganda – making a demonstration of passing through without seeking any claimant's permission does actually serve a purpose there.

As contínuas tensões entre a Rússia e a Europa / Ocidente: a Crimeia (24) [FONTE: The Times /

Peter Brooks, 24/06/2021]



Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (1) [FONTE: IISS / David Gordon, 18/06/2021]

US–Russia summit: quick wins for Putin, delayed gratification for Biden

Expectations for the US–Russia summit in Geneva were low, and the outcomes did not exceed them. Putin’s success is immediate. The payoff for Biden will take longer to assess – and will depend on Russia’s behaviour, argue David Gordon and Nigel Gould-Davies.

Summits almost never make decisions – they merely ratify them. The work of agreeing ‘deliverables’ is done by officials in advance and signalled to the media. Only rarely are unresolved issues brought to leaders to hammer out face-to-face. The London terrorist bombings that took place during the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005 produced a rare moment of real-time [summit decision-making](#).

Nor do these carefully planned events throw up surprises. When they do, it is because leaders have gone off script, and it is always controversial. There are two stand-out examples in the US–Russia relationship, one positive and one negative: the discussions between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev about the possibility of a nuclear-free world at the 1986 Reykjavik summit that initiated the endgame of the Cold War; and Donald Trump’s public endorsement at the Helsinki summit in 2018 of Vladimir Putin’s assurances – over the assessments of his own intelligence community – about Russia’s interference in the US political process in the 2016 presidential election.

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (2) [FONTE: IISS / David Gordon, 18/06/2021]

By these standards, the Biden–Putin summit on 16 June ran to type. With US–Russian relations at their lowest point since the early 1980s, a long agenda of contentious issues, and two highly experienced leaders, there were few expectations of surprise or breakthrough. The main deliverables were modest. The return of ambassadors remedies an extraordinary situation that symbolised the parlous bilateral relationship. A new ‘strategic dialogue’ means the two sides will talk more regularly. Neither side raised any expectations in advance, and the outcomes did not exceed them. Indeed, they could have been agreed with a phone call. Those few analysts who expected more from the summit did so because they thought that both leaders would want to avoid such a meagre outcome. They were wrong.

If summit agendas and outcomes are fixed, what are the variables? Summits are mostly about language and choreography. First, they are an opportunity for leaders to engage directly. As Biden noted, ‘foreign policy is a logical extension of personal relations.’ This matters most when the relationship is new, as when John Kennedy met Nikita Khrushchev at a tense summit in Vienna in June 1961. Khrushchev’s conclusion that Kennedy lacked resolve emboldened him to send nuclear missiles to Cuba. But Biden and Putin are veterans who know one another. There was no chemistry to establish and little psychology to test. Second, it is through summits that leaders communicate image and messages with their own people and with the world.

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (3) [FONTE: IISS / David Gordon, 18/06/2021]

Summit the result of Russian pressure, not US strategy

Three points of choreography and language stand out from this summit. Firstly, the expanded session with senior officials lasted barely an hour. Since the US had expected it to last longer, this was almost certainly due to a conscious Russian decision not to engage. It signals that, for Putin, the important thing was to meet Biden rather than deal with the wider substantive agenda of issues that divide the countries.

Secondly, the decision to hold separate press conferences for the two leaders – itself a marker of low expectations – gave Putin an hour alone to set out his narratives unchallenged, including the claim that the US had supported a ‘coup d’état’ in Ukraine; that the woman killed during the 6 January insurrection of the Capitol Building had been ‘murdered’; and that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had consciously chosen to travel to Berlin for treatment, when in reality he was in a coma following his poisoning with Novichok. While it is unlikely that Putin’s performance gave any of his explanations more credibility, it will make Biden’s task of defending the summit when he returns to Washington a bit more challenging.

Thirdly, the fact that the summit was staged at all is significant. Biden proposed it to Putin at the height of Russia’s build-up of military forces on Ukraine’s border in April. It was a decision prompted by Russian pressure, rather than part of a prior strategy, and went ahead despite a number of cyber attacks originating from Russia that followed. The Biden administration did not do an effective job in explaining the purpose of the summit to the American public, but it will be spared full scrutiny given that it was wedged in among a series of more effective summits with the G7, NATO and the EU.


Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (4) [FONTE: IISS / David Gordon, 18/06/2021]

Delayed gratification for Biden

Putin placed a high value on the summit. It was his first overseas trip since the pandemic began, and a rare foray from his highly COVID-secure personal protocols and facilities. Much about it will satisfy him: that his coercive diplomacy helped produce it; that he limited the discussion of substantive issues; that Biden – in a pointed departure from the rhetoric of the Obama administration in which he served – acknowledged Russia as a ‘great power’; and that he was afforded extended time in the glare of global media attention setting out his sometimes invidious framing of major issues. All of this sends a message to Russian domestic audiences – elites and populace alike – that he can still secure a meeting with the US president as an equal, and play a confident role.

As for Biden, who invested some domestic political capital in the summit, his most important and specific policy message to Putin was that he would not tolerate further cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. As he noted later, ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating.’ The key question now is whether Putin will heed this warning and if he does not – as he did not heed similar messages when Biden was vice president – what consequences will follow. For the United States, the success of the summit may be best be judged by how effective this deterrence proves to be.

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (5) [FONTE: Cartoon de Chappatte / Boston Globe]



Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (6) [FONTE: Politico 24/06/2021]

German-French overture to Putin splits EU

Initiative proposes a summit with Russian leader but also threatens new economic sanctions.



French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel floated the possibility of an EU-Russia summit | Pool photo by Axel Schmidt/EPA-EFE

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (7) [FONTE: Politico 24/06/2021]

The proposals, put forward by German Chancellor Angela Merkel after consultation with French President Emmanuel Macron, came on the eve of a European Council summit at which heads of state and government were scheduled to discuss EU-Russia relations over dinner — a time reserved for their most sensitive conversations.

The initiatives seemed intended to create a new carrot-and-stick approach toward Russia by the EU, which has worked hard to stay unified in pressuring Moscow since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea. Officials failed to explain why making such a move at this particular time might yield different results than previous attempts to engage with Putin.

But there were quick signs the plan could backfire, potentially dividing the EU by being too soft on Putin by offering a summit, while simultaneously angering Moscow by raising the threat of new sanctions. Such threats could risk undermining an effort by U.S. President Joe Biden to shift the dynamic between the West and the Kremlin, just a week after he met Putin at a [high-stakes summit](#) in Geneva.

The German-French plan, unveiled during a meeting of EU diplomats, blindsided leaders of the European institutions, including Council President Charles Michel, who controls the summit agenda.

Many EU diplomats expressed fury at the last-minute proposal, with some of the strongest outrage coming from the three Baltic countries and Poland. Those countries have long advocated a tough response to Russia's military aggression in Ukraine, to malign activities by Russian operatives on European soil, including assassinations, and to the poisoning and subsequent jailing of Russian opposition figure [Alexei Navalny](#).

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (8) [FONTE: Politico 24/06/2021]

Russian sphere of influence

While the threat of new sanctions might be sufficient to infuriate Putin, the German-French proposal also provocatively emphasized the EU's efforts to exert greater sway in the so-called Eastern Partnership countries, including Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as in Central Asia — regions that Russia has long viewed as within its own sphere of influence.

The conclusions also specifically cite the Western Balkans, where Moscow has sought to compete for influence.

"The European Council stresses the need to [strengthen] relations with the Western Balkans and consolidate their European perspective," according to the German-French proposal. "It also stresses the need for strengthening and intensifying economic and political relations and cooperation with those Eastern Partners and other neighbors in particular in Central Asia, who are willing to seek closer cooperation with the European Union."

Supporters of the French-German proposal complained that it was "strange" Biden could meet Putin, but EU leaders don't, despite the fact there is much more to talk about given the geographic proximity and stronger economic ties.

Several senior EU officials said Biden had succeeded in laying the ground for reversing years of deteriorating relations with Russia, and they praised the U.S. for sending a senior State Department official, Victoria Nuland, to Brussels directly from the Geneva summit to brief her EU counterparts.

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (9) [FONTE: Politico 24/06/2021]

EU leaders take hard line on Russia, rebuking Merkel and Macron

Poland and the Baltics lead effort to thwart German-French initiative.

Rather than endorsing the language proposed by Germany and France that would have floated the idea of “meetings at leaders level,” [akin to the one held by U.S. President Joe Biden with Putin](#) in Geneva last week, the Council approved a statement focused on setting expectations and demands for the Kremlin, which would be a prerequisite for new diplomatic engagement. The Council also threatened new economic sanctions should Moscow persist in “malign, illegal and disruptive activity.”

“The European Council expects the Russian leadership to demonstrate a more constructive engagement and political commitment and stop actions against the EU and its Member States, as well as against third countries,” the leaders wrote in their conclusions.

The Council demanded that Russia “fully assume its responsibility” in ensuring the implementation of the Minsk 2 peace agreement to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the leaders reiterated their support for pursuing “accountability” in the destruction of a [Malaysian passenger jet](#) that was shot down in 2014 with a Russian missile.

Rather than floating the idea of a high-level summit meeting, the leaders called on the European Commission and the EU’s foreign policy chief to develop “concrete options including conditionalities and leverages” for further cooperation with Russia in various policy areas. “The European Council will explore formats and conditionalities of dialogue with Russia,” they wrote.

Como lidar com a Rússia? As divisões europeias e no Ocidente (10) [FONTE: Politico 24/06/2021]

Several critics of the German-French plan said they did not understand why Merkel and Macron had rushed ahead rather than waiting to see if Putin responds positively to Biden's suggestions of cooperation in some policy areas.

The reference in the leaders' conclusions to "third countries" and another reference to "ensuring coordination with partners" seemed to be nods to the U.S. and Biden's efforts to shift the dynamic between Russia and the West.

In response to a query from POLITICO, a U.S. State Department spokesperson on Thursday night suggested it would make sense to give Putin some time to respond to areas of potential cooperation that Biden identified during their conversation in Geneva.

"The United States has been clear that we and our partners must be prepared to continue to impose costs when Russia's behavior crosses boundaries that are respected by responsible nations. Our goal is to have a relationship with Russia that is predictable and stable," the spokesperson said. "There was a lot of ground covered at the June 16 Summit with Putin, but it is going to take some time to see if the areas of potential cooperation actually produce results."

The debate among EU leaders was difficult and at times impassioned.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (1) [FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]

The Quad: An emerging multilateral security framework of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region

SUMMARY

The Indo-Pacific region houses the largest share of global GDP, the world's busiest trade routes, largest population and most powerful militaries.

After having successfully worked side by side in coordinating the 2004 tsunami relief, in 2007 Australia, India, Japan and the US (the Quad, short for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) held meetings with each other to discuss security-related issues, and their navies held a military exercise. Although the grouping ended its activities prematurely in 2008, China's growing assertiveness in the region prompted it to remain active in bilateral and trilateral cooperation on security issues. Meetings among senior officials resumed in November 2017 in Manila. In November 2020, the Quad navies held a major military exercise. The first Quad summit took place in March 2021.


The grouping has emphasised that its goal is to maintain the liberal rules-based international order, which China seeks to undermine through a revisionist challenge of the status quo. Its efforts are not focused on creating institutions or military alliances, but rather, on generating gradual convergence of cooperation on multiple issues, including Covid-19, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and disaster recovery. Establishing further cooperation with other like-minded countries in the region and co-existing with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are among the Quad's future challenges.

The EU is not a traditional security player in the Indo-Pacific; however, as the region is particularly relevant to its trade, it has a strong interest in avoiding disruption of the sea lanes. The Indo-Pacific could be an area of cooperation with the new US administration. France, Germany and the Netherlands have published strategies or guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, which has stepped up expectations about the forthcoming strategy for the region by the EU as a whole.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (2)

[FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]

Map 1 – The Indo-Pacific, as defined in strategies from France, Germany and the Netherlands



Source: EPRS. Population, GDP and defence budget: 2019. Armed forces: 2020. NB: Representation of boundaries does not imply recognition.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (3)

[FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]

Indo-Pacific: An emerging geopolitical concept

The term 'Indo-Pacific' [emerged](#) in the diplomatic and security arena and became widely recognised as a [geopolitical concept](#) only in the past decade. However, the [geographical borders](#) of the combination between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are not clearly set. According to Indian Navy Captain, Gurpreet Khurana, who was among the first to use it in an [academic paper](#) in 2007, the term has entered into common usage as being more adequate than 'Asia-Pacific', because it includes both the growing comprehensive power of China and the need to incorporate India into the region-wide security architecture.

Australia was the first country to use the 'Indo-Pacific' as a keyword in its 2012 strategic white paper on '[Australia in the Asian Century](#)', and then again in its 2013 [defence white paper](#). In February 2013, in his speech '[Japan is Back](#)' at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, Abe Shinzō used 'Indo-Pacific' together with 'Asia-Pacific' in his speech. A few months later the same venue hosted Jakarta's Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, who gave the speech '[An Indonesian perspective of the Indo-Pacific](#)': a triangular strategic arrangement spanning two oceans, with Indonesia at its centre. In August 2016, in his speech at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), held in Kenya, Abe revealed Japan's vision of the '[confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans](#)' into peaceful seas governed by freedom and the rule of law. He did not use the term Indo-Pacific; however, the 2017 [Diplomatic Bluebook](#) noted that the prime minister had announced Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy ([FOIP](#)) on that occasion.

The term appeared several times in the 2015 [Indian maritime security strategy](#). Prime Minister Narendra Modi's speech at the Shangri-La dialogue on June 2018 is considered Delhi's official endorsement of the concept. An 'open, stable, secure and prosperous [Indo-Pacific Region](#)' was at the heart of Modi's speech. In 2019, an [Indo-Pacific division](#) was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (4)

[FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]

Introduction

After a break of several years, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, Japan, India and Australia (the [Quad](#)), has recently been revived and is gradually gaining prominence as the coordinated response effort of democracies to the increasing assertiveness of authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2017, senior foreign ministry officials from the four countries met on the margins of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit in Manila. The key points discussed with regard to the Indo-Pacific included making it free and open, taking joint action against terrorism, and promoting a rules-based system. Since then, they have held bimonthly meetings with an incrementally [widening scope](#). As Firstpost senior editor, Sreemoy Talukdar, noted, 'a framework that began with enhancing maritime security has now expanded to include cyber and critical technology, infrastructure, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, connectivity, health security, Mekong regional cooperation, ASEAN-led regional architecture, among other areas'. In November 2020, the navies of the renewed Quad, together with Singapore, held the [Malabar](#) naval exercise. The first historic Quad [summit](#) took place in March 2021.

The origins: Quad 1.0

In the aftermath of the 2004 [Boxing Day tsunami](#), the 21st century's deadliest natural disaster, the US, together with Australia, India and Japan, led the [international aid](#) effort, coordinating their military forces to provide relief and paving the way for their further multilateral cooperation. Japan started work on developing the concept. In November 2006, its Foreign Minister, Asō Tarō, launched the idea of a sweeping [arc of freedom and prosperity](#),¹ stretching from north-east Asia to central Asia and the Caucasus, and then to Turkey, central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states, to encompass a host of countries embracing the principles of freedom, democracy, a market economy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. In a speech before the Indian parliament in August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō, spoke about the [confluence of the two seas](#), a concept meant to serve as the basis for a broader Asia evolving into an open and transparent network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, including the US and Australia, and allowing people, goods, capital, and knowledge to circulate freely.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (5)

[FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]

Quad 2.0

China's aggressive assertiveness in the past decade has increased the Quad countries' awareness of the threat it poses: [Beijing spends on its military](#) more than all of its Indo-Pacific neighbours combined. In 2012, right before coming back as Japan's prime minister, Abe called for a [democratic security diamond](#), a sort of a Quad remake.


The way towards Quad 2.0 passed through its breakup. The Quad countries were active in bilateral and trilateral cooperation (analysts use the term [minilateralism](#)) on security-related issues. [Japan](#) and [Australia](#) have both had a military alliance with the US for a long time. Since 2006, the US, Japan and Australia have held a [trilateral strategic dialogue](#) (TSD); in 2014 they had their first [trilateral summit](#); in July 2018 they announced a [trilateral partnership in infrastructure projects](#) in the Indo-Pacific. In December 2018, the US, Japan and India held their first [trilateral summit](#). In 2015, Australia, India and Japan held their first [trilateral dialogue](#).

An early example of a military exercise carried out by the grouping is the annual US-India [Malabar](#) naval exercise, first held in 1992, which Japan joined permanently in 2015. India and Australia, strategic partners since 2009, have significantly improved their [security cooperation](#), also thanks to their 2014 [framework for security cooperation](#), with maritime cooperation developing through the biennial [AUSINDEX](#) exercise. Since 2017, they have held [2+2 foreign and defence](#) secretaries dialogues, which they decided to upgrade to the level of ministers in 2020.

[Japan](#) has also joined the Australia-US military exercises, such as the biennial [Talisman Saber](#) (since 2015) and the annual [Southern Jackaroo](#) (since 2013). In recent years, Japan and India (alongside [France](#)) have joined [Pitch Black](#), the biennial Australia-hosted multinational air power exercise, in which the US was the first foreign participant back in 1983.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (6)

[FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]



Source: EPRS

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (7) [FONTE: Parlamento Europeu / Briefing, Março de 2021]


China's reaction and the framing of the Quad as an 'Asian NATO'

In March 2018, China's Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, mocked the idea of reviving the Quad as '[foam in the ocean](#)', destined to dissipate soon'. However, articles published in the Chinese communist party newspaper Global Times, lambasting the Quad as a new '[Asian NATO](#)' and Quad meetings as '[ruthless and toothless photo-ops](#)', only revealed Beijing's anxiety. This anxiety has found expression in attacks against former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo; at the same time, in an attitude that The Diplomat has defined as [two-pronged](#), the remaining Quad partners have been spared, in an attempt to [dissociate](#) them from Washington.

[Russia is quite critical](#) of the Quad as well: in December 2020, Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, said that 'India is currently an object of the Western countries' persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies', a statement that prompted [Delhi's answer](#), reflecting the independence pursued in respect of its foreign policy.

Contrary to Chinese rhetoric, experts suggest that the Quad is unlikely to become a formal military alliance. They argue that it has gradually developed through cooperation among like-minded partners, rather than through a rapid process of [institutionalisation](#) (one that political leaders and citizens would not be likely to support, especially in the name of containing China). There are no joint statements after the Quad ministerial meetings: the four countries issue their own read-outs separately; this even happened when they held their second ministerial meeting – their first stand-alone – in October 2020 in Tokyo. Meanwhile, the Quad's prospects could be more promising than those of other groupings (e.g. [BRICS](#): Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), as its members are closer to being natural partners sharing the same values and geopolitical challenges. In the meantime, all four Quad members being democracies, the grouping may occasionally need to adjust to the changes in political leadership that its members undergo. [Cooperation across a range of sectors](#) not limited to security may guarantee the Quad a long life as a policy coordination mechanism.

Figure 2 – China's share of total trade in selected countries in 2019



Source: [DG Trade](#), European Commission.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (8)

[FONTE: Sumitha Narayanan Kutty e Rajesh Basrur / The Diplomat, 24/03/2021]

The Quad: What It Is – And What It Is Not

The Quad is no Asian NATO. And that may be its greatest strength.



Credit: The Diplomat

The March 12 summit meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad, comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, has not been fully grasped by most analysts. The Quad's recent resurgence – after an abortive start in 2007 – has been driven by uneasiness about the rise of China and the security threat it poses to the international order. Yet there is no direct reference to China, or even military security, in the Quad's first-ever [joint statement](#) or the Washington Post [op-ed](#) penned by its four leaders. On the contrary, the most significant outcomes of the summit are related to COVID-19 vaccine production, facilitating cooperation over emerging technologies, and mitigating climate change.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (9)

[FONTE: Sumitha Narayanan Kutty e Rajesh Basrur / The Diplomat, 24/03/2021]

The threat posed by China is at one level military, as evidenced by its proactive pursuit of territorial claims in South Asia, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. At another, it is economic and technological. China is a pivotal player in global supply chains, most visible today in [its major role as a vaccine supplier](#), a major investor of surplus capital globally through the Belt and Road Initiative, and a [rapidly rising technological power](#). It is this broader aspect of global order that the Quad aims to address, as is clear from two of the joint statement's specifics, which focus on the establishment of working groups on vaccine development and critical technologies. Both these efforts seek to constrain China's central position in the global system, but also to develop a world order that is broad-based and inclusive. The third working group being set up is on climate change, an area in which China is a cooperative player and not a competitor, and thus downplays the notion that the Quad is simply an instrument of containment. Together, the three initiatives are designed to create an environment that encourages China to be a positive player and persuades other states to shed their hesitancy toward the Quad.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (10)

[FONTE: Sumitha Narayanan Kutty e Rajesh Basrur / The Diplomat, 24/03/2021]

Though the summit focused on non-military initiatives, the Quad by no means downplays the military dimension. Its members have established the basis for regular defense cooperation through naval exercises, and the sharing of intelligence and military logistics. Adding further heft to previous bilateral efforts, the trilateral India-U.S.-Japan Malabar naval exercises expanded to include Australia last year. The four states have consolidated their military responses by building a [set of nested strategic partnerships](#): linking their bilateral relationships with the India-Japan-U.S., India-Australia-Japan, and U.S.-Japan-Australia trilaterals. The Quad is a logical extension of this network and has the potential to build a “Quad Plus” arrangement involving Canada, France (scheduled to join in a five-nation military exercise in April), and perhaps New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

With these arrangements doing the heavy lifting on the security front, the Quad has the bandwidth to focus on countering the challenging non-security frontiers of Beijing’s influence. Addressing the latter, the group has promoted Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure – rechristened the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure – and introduced the multi-stakeholder [Blue Dot Network process](#), both intended to create a globally recognized evaluation and certification system for investments in sustainable developmental projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (11) [FONTE: Jeff Smith / Foreign Policy, 25/06/2021]

How to Keep India All-In on the Quad

A once-reluctant partner has become a new driver of a critical coalition.



From left, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison listen during a virtual meeting of the "Quad," hosted from the White House in Washington on March 12. Olivier Douliery/AFP via Getty Images

This may well be the golden age of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), the strategic grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Since its revival in 2017 amid rising shared concerns about China, the group has consistently defied its critics and originally modest expectations. This year, the Quad has not only survived the first major change of government among its members but has thrived—not least because India, originally the most reluctant member, is now all-in on the grouping.

O Indo-Pacífico e o Diálogo de Segurança Quadrilateral (QUAD) (12) [FONTE: Jeff Smith / Foreign Policy, 25/06/2021]

In a stark reversal from the past, Indian officials are now some of the most vocal champions of the Quad and its conceptual cousin, the Indo-Pacific. They have also begun facing down criticism from Beijing and Moscow head-on. For the Quad to maintain this momentum, India's partners must recognize the drivers of its recent enthusiasm as well as its concerns and sensitivities about the group's future trajectory.

The pace of multilateral groups is often set by the most skeptical member, and India, by its own admission, has traditionally been the Quad's most cautious constituent. After the unceremonious disbanding of the first attempt at a Quad in 2008—when a new government in Australia, intent on engagement with Beijing, signaled its disinterest in the format—New Delhi approached the reconstitution of the group [with some trepidation](#).

A great deal [changed](#) in the decade between the Quad's collapse and rebirth, however, as the push of China and the pull of India's democratic partners simultaneously grew stronger. On one hand, India experienced [growing trust and comfort](#) cooperating with the United States and the other Quad democracies, [diminished ideological attachment](#) to its previous Cold War philosophy of nonalignment, and outspoken advocacy for the Quad and Indo-Pacific by the influential [Indian minister of external affairs](#), S. Jaishankar.

At the same time, new rifts opened with China that tipped the scales toward more open rivalry. Arguably the most consequential of these fissures was a series of escalating crises at or near their disputed border, including clashes on the [Doklam plateau in 2017](#) and in [Ladakh in 2020](#). The latter produced the first casualties from border hostilities in more than 40 years.

Sugestões de leitura

