

Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a crise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

**2020-2021
SESSÃO Nº 37**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O regresso da questão de Chipre (1) [FONTE:

Encyclopædia Britannica]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (2) [FONTE:

Encyclopædia Britannica]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (3) [MAPAS:

As bases soberanas britânicas na ilha de Chipre - Wikimedia Commons]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (4) [IMAGENS:

O Arcebispo e 1º Presidente de Chipre, Makarios III e o Vice-Presidente Fazıl Küçük - Wikimedia Commons]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (5)

[IMAGENS: o actual Presidente da República de Chipre, Nicos Anastasiades e Ersin Tatar - Anadolu Agency e Wikimedia Commons]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (6) [FONTE: Evening Standard, 20/07/1974]

Details—Page 3. 46,657 London: Saturday July 20 1974 6 5p

TURKEY INVADERS

Sea and air landings—tanks head for capital

Following report is compiled from eye-witness accounts by news agencies and from Evening Standard reporters on the spot.

TURKEY invaded Cyprus by sea and air at first light today and seven and a half hours later claimed her paratroops controlled the northern part of the capital, Nicosia.

A column of Turkish tanks was reported to be 16 miles from the city on the road from the invasion beach at Kyrenia in the north where the main assault force landed.

The Turks claimed the Greek-Cypriot forces trying to hold Nicosia had suffered heavy casualties. They said the Greek-Cypriot troops and tank reinforcements sent from Pafos and Larnaca to relieve the capital were routed by Turkish soldiers.

The Turkish invasion began at dawn and was breaking when the main assault force landed at Kyrenia, a Turkish Cypriot town on the north coast. United States international also reported that Turkish forces had landed by sea near Limassol in the south.

Paratroops were dropped near Kyrenia, Nicosia, and one report said they also landed in the east at Mila.

Shelling

The Kyrenia landings were preceded by heavy naval shelling and when the invasion came the jets which bombed the National Guard camps at Kyrenia and the airport and key installations in the capital.

The Turks claimed that "underwater commando teams" came ashore and "cleared up" resistance from any Greek forces and a helicopter commando force flew inland to seize the mountain pass dominating the Kyrenia-Nicosia road.

Neutral military sources have estimated Turkey had so far landed about 6000 men by air and sea and up to 40 tanks since the invasion began.

There were no specific reports on casualties. But both sides put out calls for doctors and nurses and blood donors.

The fighting gradually spread with reports of shelling and mortar fire from towns as far apart as Pafos and Limassol near the main British bases, although some of the clashes may have been between opposing local forces.

The British Forces Broadcasting Station announced that a three-and-a-half hour ceasefire had been arranged in the Limassol area to permit the evacuation of foreign citizens.

Nicosia Radio claimed six Turkish aeroplanes were shot down over Cyprus.

But General Suat Akalga, commander of Turkish forces along the Turkish southern coast, announced that all his aeroplanes had returned to base safely.

In a pooled dispatch, foreign correspondents quoted an Australian tourist who drove down the Nicosia-Kyrenia road with his wife and three children as saying the Turkish forces were giving "for victory signs to support aeroplanes" swooping over them.

Other reports said that when Turkish paratroops entered

NICOSIA, Saturday.

THE FOREIGN Press corps got caught up in the battle for Nicosia today as 2000 Turkish paratroops tried to dislodge the Greek-led National Guardsmen from the capital.

Late in the day British Forces Radio announced that the United Nations had managed to arrange ceasefire on the "green line" separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Nicosia.

Reporters and photographers were trapped in the Ledra Palace Hotel as Nicosia shook with the sounds of bombing and the screams of jets overhead which were being fired at by anti-aircraft guns.

Newsmen, believed to include Evening Standard reporter Peter Steele, took cover behind sofas in the hotel lobby as the gun battle raged outside.

Two Greek Cypriots manning an observation post on the roof of the hotel were hit by a shell. One was killed and the other was driven to hospital by the Daily Mirror's Donald Wise.

Associated Press photographer Paul Roque reported that three Turkish Phantom jets had hit a psychiatric hospital in a bombing attack near a national guard headquarters.

Roque, who witnessed the bombing, said: "I arrived at the hospital only 10 minutes after it was hit. I saw at least 20 dead and 60 others badly wounded."

Anti-aircraft fire downed one of the aircraft, which crashed behind the hospital, he added. The three Phantoms rolled in one after the other over the hospital and hysterical inmates

reported "big heavy stuff," either tanks or artillery brought up by Greek Cypriots, firing down Shakespeare Avenue towards Turkish Cypriot positions.

"Oh, my God," said one veteran newsmen. "I never thought it could come to this."

Reuter correspondent Peter Heller kept a telex line open to the outside world, punching

Continued on Page 3

2000 paras in battle for Nicosia



FABULOUS SALES

THE SUEDE & 568 KINGS ROAD, CHELSEA

THE SUEDE, LEATH, 535 OXFORD STREET

HUGE REDUC OUR FUR COATS

Minks, Foxes, Rabbits

EXAMPLES

PONY COATS, TRIMMED RE

PEARL MINK COATS

WOLF JACKETS

RED FOX JACKETS

RACCOON JACKETS

GREY MINK COATS

RABBIT COATS

WILD MINK COATS

WEATHER : Sunny spells. Lighting-up time : 9.24 p.m. to 4.39 a.m.

● We send 1300 more troops to protect Britons

● The Greeks mobilise

O regresso da questão de Chipre (7) [FONTE: Imperial War Museums]



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PHOTOGRAPHS

HMS HERMES DURING THE CYPRUS EMERGENCY

Wessex helicopters and commandos on board HMS HERMES during the Cyprus emergency, 1974.

[See object record >](#)

In August 1960 Cyprus became a republic but, in the following decades, it was plagued with violence between the Greek and Turkish communities. In 1974 a Greek military coup, which aimed to unite the island with mainland Greece, led to a Turkish invasion and the division of the island between Turkish Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus remains divided to this day.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (8) [IMAGENS:

A invasão turca do Norte de Chipre em 1974 - Associated Press]



Turkish troops, on July 20, 1974, pull ashore a Greek Cypriot torpedo boat damaged during fighting in Kyrenia on the day Turkey invaded and occupied the northern third of Cyprus. (Associated Press)

O regresso da questão de Chipre (9) [IMAGEM:

A invasão turca do Norte de Chipre em 1974 - “Cyprus: Why One of the World’s Most Intractable Conflicts Continues” in NYT, 7/11/2016]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (10) [FONTE:

“Abandoned Nicosia Airport Has Been Trapped in a DMZ for 40 Years” in Slate, 19/12/2014]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (11) [FONTE:

“Abandoned Nicosia Airport Has Been Trapped in a DMZ for 40 Years” in Slate, 19/12/2014]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (12) [FONTE:

“Abandoned Nicosia Airport Has Been Trapped in a DMZ for 40 Years” in Slate, 19/12/2014]



O regresso da questão de Chipre (13)

[FONTE: UNFICYP]



UNFICYP

UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN
CYPRUS



ABOUT THE BUFFER ZONE

After 1974, most of Cyprus's Greek and Turkish Cypriots have lived separately in northern and southern regions of the island that are currently divided by a UN-controlled buffer zone.

The buffer zone - also called 'the Green Line' - extends approximately 180 km across the island. In some parts of old Nicosia it is only a few meters wide, while in other areas it is a few kilometres wide. Its northern and southern limits are the lines where the belligerents stood following the ceasefire of 16 August 1974, as recorded by UNFICYP.

In the eastern part of the island, the buffer zone is interrupted by the British Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia, where the UN does not operate. Another area the UN does not control is Varosha, the former resort town near Famagusta, now under the control of the Turkish military.

In line with UNFICYP's mandate to work toward a return to normal conditions, many parts of the buffer zone are farmed and/or inhabited. There are several villages or special areas (called Civil Use Areas) within the Buffer Zone, where more than 10,000 people live and/or work. Civilians may enter these areas freely. Elsewhere in the buffer zone, civilian movement or activity requires specific authorization from UNFICYP. Located in the eastern region of the buffer zone, Pyla is the only village where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live side-by-side.

Other areas are largely untouched by human activity. Remnants of old villages, shops and other reminders of lives once lived are scattered throughout the buffer zone.

The buffer zone has remained a haven for flora and fauna, thriving on the near absence of hunters and most other human interference. UNFICYP pays careful attention to preservation of the natural environment, and in particular to the prevention of unlawful dumping of rubbish in the buffer zone.

UNFICYP keeps permanent watch over the buffer zone with patrols in vehicles, on foot, on bicycles and by helicopter. Additionally, a highly mobile unit stands ready to respond to emergencies within the buffer zone.

Approximately 1,000 incidents occur within the buffer zone each year, ranging from name-calling to unauthorized use of firearms. Civilian construction is another regular issue; UNFICYP always has to consider security, ownership and operational requirements in its efforts to encourage a return to normal conditions in the buffer zone.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (14)

[FONTE: AFP]

Cyprus Divided since 1974



O regresso da questão de Chipre (15)

[FONTE: ECHR, 12/05/2014]



EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Press Release

issued by the Registrar of the Court

ECHR 131 (2014)

12.05.2014

Grand Chamber judgment on the question of just satisfaction in the Cyprus v. Turkey case

In today's Grand Chamber judgment in the case of [Cyprus v. Turkey](#) (application no. 25781/94), which is final¹, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the question of the application of Article 41 (just satisfaction).

The Court held, *by a majority*, that the passage of time since the delivery of the principal judgment on 10 May 2001 did not preclude it from examining the Cypriot Government's just satisfaction claims.

The Court held, *by a majority*, that Turkey was to pay Cyprus 30,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the relatives of the missing persons, and EUR 60,000,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the enclaved Greek-Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula. These amounts are to be distributed by the Cypriot Government to the individual victims under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (16)

[FONTE: ECHR, 12/05/2014]

Press Release

The Court pointed out that it had found in the principal judgment a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus were being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights. It was for the Committee of Ministers to ensure that the findings of the principal judgment, which were binding and which had not yet been complied with, were given full effect by the Turkish Government. Such compliance was not consistent with any complicity in the unlawful sale or exploitation of Greek Cypriot homes and property in the northern part of Cyprus.

The Court's decision in the case of [Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey](#), to the effect that cases presented by individuals concerning violation of property complaints were to be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in no sense disposed of the question of Turkey's compliance with the principal judgment in the present inter-State case.

Separate opinions

Judges Zupančič, Gyulumyan, David Thór Björgvinsson, Nicolaou, Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska, Power-Forde, Vučinić and Pinto de Albuquerque expressed a joint concurring opinion. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque expressed a concurring opinion, joined by Judge Vučinić. Judges Tulkens, Vajić, Raimondi and Bianku expressed a partly concurring opinion, joined by Judge Karakaş. Judge Casadevall expressed a partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion. Judge Karakaş expressed a dissenting opinion. These opinions are annexed to the judgment.

The judgment is available in English and French.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (17)

[FONTE: BBC, 13/05/2014]

Cyprus invasion: Turkey rejects court order for damages

13 May 2014



Reuters

Greek and Turkish Cypriots have lived estranged for decades

Turkey does not intend to pay compensation to Greek Cypriots for its invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said.

He was responding after the European Court of Human Rights ordered Turkey to pay 90m euros (£73m; \$123m) in damages.

The court said this was for losses endured during the invasion and subsequent partition of the island.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (18)

[FONTE: BBC, 13/05/2014]

'Not necessary'

Foreign Minister Davutoglu said Turkey did not "consider the decision to be binding because of the grounds it is based on, its method and the fact that it takes into consideration a country that Turkey does not recognise.

"We don't consider it necessary to make this payment."

The Cypriot government has welcomed Monday's ruling by Europe's top human rights court.

The court found that despite the passage of time, Turkey was still liable for damages and should:

- Pay 30m euros for the suffering endured by relatives of the nearly 1,500 people who had gone missing during the invasion
- Pay 60m euros to the Greek-Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula, an enclave within northern Cyprus.

UN peacekeeping forces estimate that 165,000 Greek Cypriots fled or were expelled from the north, and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south, although the parties to the conflict say the figures are higher.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (19)

[FONTE: Hürriyet Daily News, 17/09/2018]

Turkey to increase troops in Turkish Cyprus

BAKU- Hande Firat



[Turkey](#) does not have plans to establish a [military](#) base in Turkish [Cyprus](#) but the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) will increase its [deployment](#) of troops there, President Recep Tayyip [Erdoğan](#) said on Sept. 16.

"We will not decrease the number of our soldiers there but on the contrary, we will increase them," Erdoğan said, speaking to journalists on his route from Azerbaijan to Turkey.

The president elaborated on recent media reports proposed by the TSK to the Foreign Ministry to establish a military base in Turkish Cyprus.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (20)

[FONTE: Hürriyet Daily News, 17/09/2018]

"It will take only minutes to reach the Mediterranean. But it does not apply to Greece. We do not need to establish a base there," he said.

The issue is about physiology and Turkey will take such a step if needed in psychological terms, he said.

Erdoğan recalled previous attempts for a resolution in divided Cyprus and blamed Greek Cyprus for rejecting the Annan plan.

"From now on, we will implement the prescription of our own," the president said.

The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders, along with the representatives of the guarantor countries, had talks aimed at reunifying the country's 43-year-long dispute at the United Nations-sponsored discussions, but the latest round of a peace attempt failed in the Swiss Alps in June of last year.

At the meeting, Greek Cypriot negotiators reportedly rejected the presence of Turkish troops on the island—troops deployed there to protect Turkish Cypriots from ethnic violence—and also rejected Turkey's role under the treaty as a guarantor country for Cyprus.

The island has been divided since 1974 when Turkey intervened into the north after a coup that aimed at unification (enosis) with Greece.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared on Nov. 15, 1983.

Currently, only Turkey recognizes it as an independent state.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (21)

[FONTE: Público, 21/07/2021]

Plano turco para reabrir estância cipriota de Varosha merece condenação internacional

Governo de Nicósia pede reunião extraordinária do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, enquanto União Europeia e Estados Unidos consideram decisão patrocinada por Ancara como “inaceitável” e “provocatória”.



A estância balnear de Varosha encontra-se abandonada desde a invasão turca de Chipre, em 1974 Harun Ucar/Reuters

O regresso da questão de Chipre (22)

[FONTE: Público, 21/07/2021]

Chipre apelou ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU para convocar uma reunião extraordinária destinada a abordar o plano das autoridades cipriotas turcas para a reabertura parcial de Varosha, uma estância balnear do distrito de Famagusta que se encontra abandonada desde 1974, quando a Turquia invadiu a ilha mediterrânica e estabeleceu um estado, no Norte, que ainda hoje só é reconhecido por Ancara.

Os cipriotas turcos, [apoiados](#) pelo Governo de Recep Tayyip Erdogan, anunciaram na terça-feira que Varosha, uma zona militarizada e desde há vários anos destinada a ser devolvida aos cipriotas gregos, ficaria agora sob controlo civil e seria parcialmente reaberta. O anúncio de Ersin Tatar, o líder cipriota turco, foi feito na presença do Presidente da Turquia, que se deslocou à ilha para as celebrações do 47.º aniversário da autoproclamada [República Turca de Chipre do Norte](#) e, ao mesmo tempo, para reforçar a solução de dois povos, dois Estados defendida por Ancara.

"A vida vai recomeçar em Varosha", afirmou Erdoğan, para quem "a soberania e a situação de igualdade entre cipriotas turcos e cipriotas gregos devem ser confirmadas".

O levantamento do estatuto militar de parte da zona de Varosha, que se encontra vedada com arame farpado desde a intervenção militar turca de 1974, mereceu não só a condenação do internacionalmente reconhecido Governo de Nicósia como também da União Europeia e dos Estados Unidos.

"Estamos perante uma violação clara das resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, que terá um impacto negativo nos esforços em andamento para reiniciar as negociações entre as duas partes", disse o ministro cipriota dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Nikos Christodoulides.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (23)


[FONTE: BBC, 14/11/2014]

Varosha: The abandoned tourist resort

14 January 2014

By Richard Hooper and Vibeke Venema

BBC World Service



AP

Welcome to Varosha, the Mediterranean's best kept secret.

Miles of sand where it's just you and nature. Dozens of grand hotels where you'll have the pick of the rooms.

Just remember to pack your bolt cutters to make a hole in the fence - and watch out for the army patrols with orders to shoot on sight.

Before the division of Cyprus in 1974, Varosha - a resort in Famagusta - was booming. The rich and famous were drawn by some of the best beaches on the island. Richard Burton and Brigitte Bardot all dropped by - the Argo Hotel on JFK Avenue was said to be Elizabeth Taylor's favourite.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (24)

[FONTE: BBC, 14/11/2014]

"Anyone who comes from Varosha has a romanticised notion of it," says Vasia Markides, 34, an American Greek-Cypriot whose mother grew up there. "They talk about it being the hub of art and intellectual activity. They describe it as the French Riviera of Cyprus."



Other

But 40 years ago, after years of inter-ethnic violence culminating in a coup inspired by Greece's ruling military junta, Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern third of the island.

As its troops approached Varosha, a Greek-Cypriot community, the inhabitants fled, intending to return when the situation calmed down. However, the resort was fenced off by the Turkish military and has been a ghost town ever since. A UN resolution of 1984 calls for the handover of Varosha to UN control and prohibits any attempt to resettle it by anyone other than those who were forced out.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (25)

[FONTE: UN News, 23/07/2021]



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Security Council calls for 'immediate reversal' of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision on Varosha



UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe | The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) controls the buffer zone between the opposing sides. (file)

O regresso da questão de Chipre (26)

[FONTE: UN News, 23/07/2021]

'Deep regret'

"The Security Council expresses its deep regret regarding these unilateral actions that run contrary to its previous resolutions and statements."

The statement calls for "the immediate reversal of this course of action and the reversal of all steps taken on Varosha since October 2020."

The statement followed a closed-door briefing earlier in the day by the outgoing UN Special Representative, [Elizabeth Spehar](#).

The Mediterranean island has been divided between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities for 47 years, and a Security Council resolution of 1964 recommended the establishment of a peacekeeping force to maintain law and order and help end inter-communal strife.

According to news reports, on Wednesday, Greek Cypriot leaders appealed to the Council over plans by Turkish Cypriot authorities to revert a 1.35 square-mile section of Varosha, from military to civilian control, and open it for potential resettlement.

The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is backed by Turkey, made the initial announcement a day earlier, that part of the suburb would come under civilian control.

Guterres statement

On Wednesday, the UN [Secretary-General António Guterres](#) expressed his deep concern over Wednesday's announcements by Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot leaders, on re-opening Varosha, and said that the UN's position "remains unchanged and is guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions".

In a [statement](#) issued by his Deputy Spokesperson, Farhan Haq, Mr. Guterres called on all sides "to refrain from any unhelpful actions and to engage in dialogue to bring peace and prosperity to the island through a comprehensive settlement".

"The Secretary-General has repeatedly called on all parties to refrain from unilateral actions that provoke tensions and may compromise the ongoing efforts to seek common ground between the parties towards a lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue".

'Just settlement'

The Security Council statement concluded with a reaffirmation of its commitment "to an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement, in accordance with the wishes of the Cypriot people, and based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation, with political equality".



O regresso da questão de Chipre (27)

[FONTE: UN News, 23/07/2021]



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Secretary-General



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Elizabeth Spehar

Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced on 30 March 2016 the appointment of Elizabeth Spehar of Canada as his new Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Ms. Spehar will also perform the function of Deputy to the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus. She is expected to take up her new appointment later in the year.

She will succeed Lisa M. Buttenheim of the United States, who will take up the position of Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support at United Nations Headquarters. The Secretary-General is grateful for Ms. Buttenheim's dedication and exemplary leadership of UNFICYP over the past six years. She also provided invaluable support to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices as the Deputy to his Special Adviser on Cyprus. During her tenure, significant progress has been achieved in the negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement.

Ms. Spehar has extensive political experience in several senior positions with the Department of Political Affairs since 2007. Currently Director of the Policy and Mediation Division, she has previously served as Director for the Americas and Europe Division and Director of the Europe Division, engaging extensively on key political issues facing the region. She also served briefly as Interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNFICYP in 2008.

Prior to joining the United Nations, Ms. Spehar was a senior official with the Organization of American States for more than 12 years, working to promote democracy and develop that Organization's dialogue and conflict-resolution instruments.

Ms. Spehar holds a Bachelor of Arts with honours from Queen's University in Canada; a master's degree in international affairs from Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, also in Canada; and a Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures from the University of Pau in France.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (28)

[FONTE: Castas Iordanidis / ekathimerini, 22/07/2021]

Erdogan's motives



Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had two goals when he announced on Tuesday the plan to partially open Varosha, in the occupied city of Famagusta in the north of Cyprus, "with respect for property rights."

The first – but not the most important – was to entice some Greek Cypriots with significant property in the area to act unilaterally and seek compensation for their assets, by transacting with and thus recognizing the authority of the occupation forces.

Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades saw through him and directly accused Erdogan of attempting to cause division among the Greek Cypriot community. He went on to express the belief that no Cypriot from Famagusta will become an accomplice.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (29)

[FONTE: Castas Iordanidis / ekathimerini, 22/07/2021]

The Turkish president certainly expected that his announcement would provoke an immediate reaction from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, as had already happened before the extraordinary convening of the Council, under the presidency of France. However, he did not hesitate to go through with his announcement because, it has been estimated, Erdogan's intention is to increase the "risk" associated with the 47-year-old Cyprus issue, thus triggering the immediate involvement of the major powers to ensure "stability" in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As a starting point for negotiations, Erdogan is promoting the recognition of a two-state solution for Cyprus, seeking to achieve the "sovereign equality" of the two communities, within the framework of a bi-communal confederation.


The Turkish president believes that he has consolidated his country's position in the region so as to lead developments in the direction that he wants. Apparently, Erdogan bases his assessment on the fact that since the Turkish invasion in 1974, and after the end of the 1967-1974 dictatorship in Greece, the direct or indirect intervention of foreign powers has often worked in Ankara's favor.

The big difference today is the personal dislike that American President Joe Biden and his administration have for Erdogan, though not for Turkey, whose strategic importance to Washington and the EU remains very high.

Athens and Nicosia remain committed to the path of legality; Ankara has introduced the illegal projection of power in Cyprus; and the great powers are dealing with the issue according to their wider interests: We are entering a new phase.

O regresso da questão de Chipre (30)

[FONTE: Cartoon Ilias Makris / ekathimerini 20/07/2021]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (1) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 29/03/2018]

Why we need to measure military cyber power



Image: REUTERS/Larry Downing

Brought to you in collaboration with the
**International Institute for
Strategic Studies**

29 Mar 2018

This article is part of the World Economic Forum's [Geostrategy platform](#)

Anyone who has been on a management training course will have been confronted with the proposition that 'if you can't measure it, you can't manage it'.

For empires and nation-states alike, having the best possible understanding of the capabilities of potential adversaries to project power, especially in the military realm, has always been seen as a vital tool of statecraft.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (2) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 29/03/2018]

There is a general acceptance that a war fought solely within the cyber domain is unlikely to be the shape of things to come – although some states, notably China and Russia, have developed a concept whereby cyber tools can be in some circumstances used for compellence or deterrence in ways designed to obviate the need for kinetic force.

However, activities within the cyber domain are far more likely to be a precursor to, or adjunct of, kinetic activities.

Thereafter, however, consensus quickly breaks down.

A succession of senior US policy-makers, including Richard Clarke and Leon Panetta, have spoken of the potentially devastating effects of concerted cyber attacks, leading to loss of life and irreversible damage.

Overwhelming an adversary


With such an outlook comes a belief in the pre-eminent importance of attack, overwhelming the adversary's networks to pre-empt the disabling of one's own.

At the other end of the spectrum, many scholars argue that to date no lives have been lost as a direct result of actions undertaken in the cyber domain; that most cyber attacks are reversible, and of limited impact; and that a combination of robust defence and resilience are the key to success.

In practice, the cyber components of most armed forces devote most of their capabilities to protecting military networks, though a growing number of states have declared a capability and intent to undertake offensive cyber operations.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (3) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 29/03/2018]

Countries best prepared against cyberattacks



Source: ABI Research, ITU, Global Cybersecurity Index

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (4) [FONTE: The Economist, 17/09/2020]

A new global ranking of cyber-power throws up some surprises

America rules digital national security, China is not far behind

Sep 17th 2020

CHINA HAS the world's largest army. Russia wields the most tanks. America owns the fanciest satellites. But who has the most cyber-power? A new National Cyber Power Index by the Belfer Centre at Harvard University ranks 30 countries on their level of ambition and capability. Offensive cyber-power—the ability to do harm in or through computer networks—is one measure. But so too are the strength of a country's defences, the sophistication of its cyber-security industry and its ability to spread and counter propaganda (see chart).



As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (5)

[FONTE: Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment / IISS, 28/06/2021]

Tiers of cyber power: A qualitative assessment

Tier One

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

World-leading strengths in all the categories:

UNITED STATES

Tier Two

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

World-leading strengths in some categories:

**AUSTRALIA, CANADA, CHINA, FRANCE,
ISRAEL, RUSSIA, UNITED KINGDOM**

Tier Three

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strengths or potential strengths in some categories but significant weaknesses in others:

**INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, JAPAN,
MALAYSIA, NORTH KOREA, VIETNAM**

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (6)

[FONTE: Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment / IISS, 28/06/2021]

Executive Summary

This report sets out a new methodology for assessing cyber power, and then applies it to 15 states:

- Four members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia
- Three cyber-capable allies of the Five Eyes states – France, Israel and Japan
- Four countries viewed by the Five Eyes and their allies as cyber threats – China, Russia, Iran and North Korea
- Four states at earlier stages in their cyber-power development – India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam

The methodology differs from the index-based approaches developed by other organisations because it is broader and principally qualitative, analysing the cyber ecosystem of each state and how it intersects with international security, economic competition and military affairs. The states are assessed in seven categories:

- Strategy and doctrine
- Governance, command and control
- Core cyber-intelligence capability
- Cyber empowerment and dependence
- Cyber security and resilience
- Global leadership in cyberspace affairs
- Offensive cyber capability

THREE TIERS OF CYBER POWER

We have divided the 15 states into three tiers of cyber power.

Our first tier is for states with world-leading strengths across all the categories in the methodology. We conclude that only the **United States** merits inclusion.

Our second tier is for states that have world-leading strengths in some of the categories. The states we place at that level are, in alphabetical order, **Australia, Canada, China, France, Israel, Russia** and the **United Kingdom**.

Our third tier is for states that have strengths or potential strengths in some of the categories but significant weaknesses in others. We conclude that **India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea** and **Vietnam** are at that level.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (7)

[FONTE: Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment / IISS, 28/06/2021]

1. United States

Dominance in cyberspace has been a strategic goal of the United States since the mid-1990s. It is the only country with a heavy global footprint in both civil and military uses of cyberspace, although it now perceives itself as seriously threatened by China and Russia in that domain. In response, it is taking a robust and urgent approach to extending its capabilities for cyber operations, both for systems security at home and for its ambitions abroad in the diplomatic, political, economic and military spheres. The US retains a clear superiority over all other countries in terms of its ICT empowerment, but this is not a monopoly position. At least six European or Asian countries command leadership

positions in certain aspects of the ICT sector, though all but one (China) are close US allies or strategic partners. The US has moved more effectively than any other country to defend its critical national infrastructure in cyberspace but recognises that the task is extremely difficult and that major weaknesses remain. This is one reason why the country has for more than two decades taken a leading role in mobilising the global community to develop common security principles in cyberspace. The US capability for offensive cyber operations is probably more developed than that of any other country, although its full potential remains largely undemonstrated.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (8)

[FONTE: Cyber Capabilities and National Power:
A Net Assessment / IISS, 28/06/2021]

In terms of space connectivity, the US operates at least three times as many satellites as China (see Table 1.2, which includes only the countries that feature in this report). US military cyber activity is heavily dependent on its space assets, since the vast majority of military cyber activity is executed via outer space – especially intelligence collection, damage assessment and targeting.

Table 1.2. Numbers of satellites (January 2021)⁴³

US	1,897
China	410
Russia	176
UK	167
Japan	84
India	63
Canada	43
France	22
Israel	16
Australia	13

Table 1.3. National semiconductor industries' share of global market (%), 2020⁴⁴

Country	Type of semiconductor			
	Logic	Analogue	Memory	Discrete
US	61	63	23	23
South Korea	6		65	5
Europe	9	22		42
Japan	6	9	9	25
China	9			5
Taiwan	9		3	

However, for all its digital economic power, the US relies on a globalised market and supply chain. This played out in private-sector complaints against the Trump administration regarding its efforts to ban companies around the world from relying on computer chips manufactured wholly or even partly in China, as part of a multinational supply chain.⁴⁵ Many tech and telecoms companies, including giants such as Intel and Motorola, have long relied on manufacturing in China to sustain their business model.

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8. China

China's leaders have moved decisively to embrace the information revolution. They started from a position of relative backwardness in electronics in the 1990s, but with the advantages of a rapidly growing economy and technology transfer from abroad. The country has since established the world's most extensive cyber-enabled domestic surveillance and censorship system, which is tightly controlled by the leadership. China's intention of becoming a cyber power was reflected in its military strategy released in 2015 and its first formal cyber-security strategy in 2016. The country has ambitious goals for the indigenous manufacture of the core internet technologies it relies on, aiming to become a world leader in such technologies by 2030. Its core cyber defences remain weak compared with

those of the United States, and cyber-resilience policies for its critical national infrastructure are only in the early stages of development. China has been locked in a battle with the United States and its allies over global cyber governance since the early 2000s, a contest aggravated by US determination to sanction Chinese tech firms in response to China's malicious behaviour in cyberspace. Since the early 2000s China has conducted large-scale cyber operations abroad, aiming to acquire intellectual property, achieve political influence, carry out state-on-state espionage and position capabilities for disruptive effect in case of future conflict. China is a second-tier cyber power but, given its growing industrial base in digital technology, it is the state best placed to join the US in the first tier.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (10)

[FONTE: Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment / IISS, 28/06/2021]

9. Russia

Russia's cyber strategy is dictated by its confrontation with the West, in which it sees cyber operations as an essential component of a wider information war. Its cyber governance is centralised, hierarchical and under the president's personal control. The country is highly dependent on foreign ICT corporations and has a less impressive digital economy than, for example, the United Kingdom or France. It is seeking to redress key weaknesses in its cyber security through government regulation and the creation of a sovereign internet, and by encouraging the development of an indigenous digital industry. Given its economic circumstances, these ambitions may prove unrealistic. For two decades Russia has led, with some successes, diplomatic efforts to curtail what it sees as the dominance of cyberspace by

the West, and particularly the United States. It has credible offensive cyber capabilities and has used them extensively as part of a much broader strategy aimed at disrupting the policies and politics of perceived adversaries, especially the US. It has run extensive cyber-intelligence operations, some of which reveal increasing levels of technical sophistication. However, Russia appears not to have given priority to developing the top-end surgical cyber capabilities needed for high-intensity warfare. Overall, Russia is a second-tier cyber power. To join the US in the first tier it would need to substantially improve its cyber security, increase its share of the global digital market and probably make further progress in developing the most sophisticated offensive military cyber tools.

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Balance-of-power considerations

There is a broad consensus in international relations, among both states and political elites, that gains in cyber power, and the application of that power in grey-zone operations, have the potential to upset the broader balance of power between the US and its allies on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other. Beyond that broad consensus, there is not much agreement on how this technological competition can be assessed or measured in power terms, a situation compounded by the frequent emergence of new technologies (such as nano chips, carbon-based chips, cloud architectures, quantum computing, AI, autonomous weapons systems and military robots).

Leading states agree that cyber capability underpins military power and can radically affect decision-making and the control of most military systems and force formations. This report confirms that the traditional notion of balance of power based on geopolitical arrangements is being superseded by the idea of an informational balance of power. The US and China both pursue doctrines of information dominance, which includes attempting to dominate the global production of information technology. The US believes it still has the edge, and indeed

China concedes that is the case. Moreover, the old geopolitical realities remain in play, especially given the United States' international alliances (through NATO, and with Australia, Israel, the Gulf Arab states, Japan and South Korea). These alliances retain their geographical importance but now carry a new overlay of cyber partnership.

This report takes the view that US digital-industrial superiority, including through alliance relations, is likely to endure for at least the next ten years. There are two strands to this judgement. The first is that in advanced cyber technologies and their exploitation for economic and military power, the US is still ahead of China. The second is that since 2018, the US and several of its leading allies have agreed to restrict, with differing degrees of severity, China's access to some Western technologies. By doing so, they have endorsed a partial decoupling of the West and China that could potentially impede the latter's ability to develop its own advanced technology. How robustly the US continues this strategy, and how China responds, will dictate the future balance of cyber power.

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[FONTE: Lyu Jinghua / IPI Global Observatory, 22/03/2019]



What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?

March 22, 2019

by Lyu Jinghua

News stories on the [cyber threat](#) that China poses appear on a regular basis. Most underscore a view that China is using cyber power to rise and ultimately win global dominance, and that the Chinese government is behind the scenes in many malicious cyber activities. Though many of the allegations focus on the tension between China and the United States on cyber espionage, these actions are unlikely to cause armed conflict since [almost all capable actors](#) conduct cyber espionage.

Suspensions of intentions and capabilities of cyber warfare, however, could drag the US and China into arms races, and even hot wars, due to the role cyber tools can play in military operations. Given the risks, it is necessary to examine China's views on cyber warfare from a narrative that is different from what most readers are familiar with.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (13) [FONTE: Lyu Jinghua / IPI Global Observatory, 22/03/2019]

Core Aims of China's Cyber Warfare

Though there is no commonly accepted conception of cyber warfare, one made by a RAND Corporation [study](#) is frequently quoted by Chinese military analysts: cyber warfare is strategic warfare in the information age, just as it was nuclear warfare in the 20th century. This definition serves as the foundation to argue that cyber warfare has much broader significance to national security and involves competition in areas beyond the military, such as the economy, diplomacy, and social development.

Again, [China's Military Strategy](#) describes the primary objectives of cyber capabilities to include: "cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support for the country's endeavors in cyberspace, and participation in international cyber cooperation." The strategy frames these objectives within the aims of "stemming major cyber crises, ensuring national network and information security, and maintaining national security and social stability."

Of these objectives, an essential one is national security and social stability. As shown by several incidents, such as the [protests](#) after Iran's 2009 presidential election, the [Arab Spring](#), as well as Occupy Wall Street and the [London Riots](#) of 2011, social media plays a vital role in helping to plan and carry out such protests and movements. The Chinese government's monitoring of the internet and social media is based on its potential use as a platform to disseminate information that could cause similar social unrest to spread, which could lead to large-scale social and political instability.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (14) [FONTE: Lyu Jinghua / IPI Global Observatory, 22/03/2019]

Another essential objective, in common with all states, is defending critical information infrastructure. China is more and more dependent on information networks in all aspects, including in defense. Although it has a large-scale technology industry and possesses the potential to compete with the US in some, most of its core network technologies and key software and hardware are provided by US companies.

China uses the term “eight King Kongs” to describe the top internet companies in its domestic supply chain: Apple, Cisco, Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Qualcomm. Heavy dependence on these companies’ products makes it necessary to work towards developing the domestic technology industry and its capabilities, and to thereby make the country’s internal internet infrastructure more secure. It also makes China believe that its primary mission in cyberspace is to ensure information security of critical areas, which is inherently defensive and non-destructive.

Many, including the US government, have accused the Chinese government and military of cyberattacks in which intellectual property has been stolen. In this regard, there are several distinctions to make clear. The first is between those cyberattacks that aim to destroy, and cyber espionage for intelligence collection. The second is to make clear those forms of cyber espionage that are related to national security concerns and those for economic interests. And the last is between malicious cyber activities that one government or military should take responsibility for, and those that are attributed to a government or military based on less-than-reliable [key indicators](#) of where activities originate.

As ciber-capacidades militares na competição mundial (15) [FONTE: Lyu Jinghua / IPI Global Observatory, 22/03/2019]

Is China's Cyber Capability as Formidable as Imagined?


As mentioned, cyber warfare encompasses far more areas than the military and intelligence gathering. It is therefore logical to measure one country's cyber capability by a more comprehensive evaluation, which at least [includes](#): technological research and development (R&D) and innovation capabilities; information technology industry companies; internet infrastructure scale; influences of internet websites; internet diplomacy and foreign policy capabilities; cyber military strength; and comprehensiveness of cyberspace strategy. If evaluated along all these criteria, China's cyber power largely lags behind that of the US.

Aside from China's disadvantages in critical technological self-sufficiency as mentioned above, it is not as advanced in other aspects as well. According to the [ICT Development Index \(IDI\)](#), which is based on 11 indicators to monitor and compare developments in information and communication technology across countries, China respectively ranked 80th, 81st, and 82nd among 176 states in 2017, 2016, and 2015.

Part of China's low influence on the global internet is due to the fact that its primary languages are not widely used on the internet outside the country. Though there are a massive number of Chinese speakers throughout the world, Chinese languages are only used by [1.7 percent of all websites](#), while 53.9 percent use English.

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[FONTE: ASPI The Strategist - The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 25/09/2018]



Sugestões de leitura

