



Política Internacional e Geopolítica a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 11**

26/01/2022



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (2) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Facts

Also Known As	Kingdom of Sweden • Svithiod • Sverige
Head Of Government	Prime Minister: Magdalena Andersson
Capital	Stockholm
Population	(2021 est.) 10,408,000
Currency Exchange Rate	1 USD equals 9.105 Swedish krona
Head Of State	King: Carl XVI Gustaf
Form Of Government	constitutional monarchy with one legislative house (Riksdag, or Parliament [349])
Official Language	Swedish
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Konungariket Sverige (Kingdom of Sweden)
Total Area (Sq Km)	447,425
Total Area (Sq Mi)	172,752
Monetary Unit	Swedish krona (SEK)
Population Rank	(2021) 89
Population Projection 2030	11,261,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2021) 60.2
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2021) 23.3
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2018) 87.4% • Rural: (2018) 12.6%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2020) 80.6 years • Female: (2020) 84.3 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over	Male: 100% • Female: (2008) 100%
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2020) 557,012
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2020) 53,800



A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (3) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Scandinavia

Scandinavia, historically **Scandia**, part of northern Europe, generally held to consist of the two countries of the Scandinavian Peninsula, Norway and Sweden, with the addition of Denmark. Some authorities argue for the inclusion of Finland on geologic and economic grounds and of Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the grounds that their inhabitants speak North Germanic (or Scandinavian) languages related to those of Norway and Sweden.




Scandinavia

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

The term Norden has also come into use to denote Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, a group of countries having affinities with one another and a distinctness from the rest of continental Europe. Among their distinguishing characteristics are thinly populated northern regions, a relative wealth of fish resources, long life expectancies, and high levels of literacy.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (4) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]


Sweden religious affiliation (2016)



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
A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (5) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Sweden major export destinations (2018)



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Sweden major import sources (2018)



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A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (6) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (7) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

The early **Vasa** kings (1523–1611)

After [Gustav I Vasa](#) was elected to the throne in 1523, he began to restore the power of the Swedish king and to organize a central administration under his own direct leadership. On the one hand, this task was [facilitated](#) by the elimination of a great part of the high nobility by the [Stockholm Bloodbath](#). On the other hand, the influence of the king was limited by the economic dependence of [Lübeck](#) and the [Hanseatic League](#). In connection with the war against Denmark and the liberation of [Stockholm](#) in 1523, Gustav Vasa had been forced to make great [concessions](#) to Lübeck, which had given him both economic and military support. In exchange, the merchants of Lübeck and the Hanseatic League were given privileges that created a monopoly of Swedish [foreign trade](#) and even had considerable influence on domestic trade and industry. The concessions also included a large payment and left Sweden heavily in debt to Lübeck. Under the mediation of Lübeck, the war with Denmark was brought to an end by a treaty concluded in [Malmö](#) in 1524.



[J. Binck: portrait of Gustav I Vasa](#)

Gustav I Vasa, portrait after J. Binck, 1542; in the University of Uppsala, Sweden.

Courtesy of the Svenska Porträttarkivet, Stockholm

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (8) [FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]

Second Northern War summary

Second Northern War, or **Great Northern War**, (1700–21) Military conflict to challenge Sweden's supremacy in the Baltic area. Sweden's expansion in the Baltic Sea coastlands antagonized Russia, Denmark-Norway, and Saxony-Poland, which formed an anti-Swedish coalition in 1698. They attacked Swedish-held regions in 1700, but Sweden's [Charles XII](#) successfully countered the attacks and restored the status quo. The Russians eventually succeeded in establishing their power on the eastern Baltic coast, and [Peter I the Great](#) founded his new capital of St. Petersburg there in 1703. Sweden renewed its attack on Russia in 1707, but was defeated at the Battle of Poltava (1709). Despite an alliance with Turkey against Russia (1710–11), Swedish forces suffered defeats in its territories by the revived anti-Swedish coalition, which by then included England and Prussia. Charles opened peace negotiations in 1717, but in 1718 he invaded southeastern Norway, where he was killed. His successor, Frederick I (1676–1751), negotiated peace settlements in 1719–21, including the Treaty of Nystad, which ceded Estonia, Livonia, and other territory to Russia. The war marked the decline of Swedish influence and the emergence of Russia as a major power.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (9) [FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]



Charles XII of Sweden (left) and Peter I of Russia (right)

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (10) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Russo-Swedish Wars

Russo-Swedish history

1610–1617



In Sweden: The reign of Gustav II Adolf

The war with Russia was fought more successfully, however, with Swedish armies even reaching Moscow. Russia was thereby forced to agree to the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, by the terms of which Sweden acquired the provinces of Ingria and Kexholm. The war with Poland continued...

[READ MORE](#)

1741–1743

In Treaty of Åbo

...peace settlement that concluded the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–43 by obliging Sweden to cede a strip of southern Finland to Russia and to become temporarily dependent on Russia. As a result of the Great Northern War (Treaty of Nystad, 1721), Sweden had lost Estonia, Livonia, Ingria, and part of Karelia...

[READ MORE](#)



In Sweden: The Age of Freedom (1718–72)

War with Russia in 1741–43 led to a temporary Russian occupation of Finland and to a further loss of Finnish provinces northwest of St. Petersburg. A war with Prussia in 1757–62 was very expensive. The Hats attempted to make Sweden a great economic power, but...

[READ MORE](#)

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (11) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

1788–1790

Anjala League

In [Anjala League](#)

...Swedish war effort in the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–90. Shortly after the outbreak of war, 113 officers in the Finnish town of Anjala dispatched a letter to Empress Catherine II the Great of Russia calling for peace on the basis of the pre-1743 status quo—one favourable to Sweden. Although this...

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Gustav III



In [Gustav III](#)

...Turkey, he declared war on Russia in 1788, but treasonous activity by the Anjala League, a group of Swedish officers on the Finnish front, along with Denmark's entry into the war on the side of Russia, worsened his situation. In response, Gustav appealed to the three lower estates (clergy, burghers,...

[READ MORE](#)

Sweden



In [Sweden: The era of Gustav III](#)

... in 1787, Gustav went to war against Russia in 1788 to recapture the Finnish provinces. The Swedish attack failed, partly because of a conspiracy by noble Swedish officers—the Anjala League—who, during the war, sent a letter to Catherine II (the Great) of Russia, proposing negotiations. Gustav used the treason of...

[READ MORE](#)

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (12) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

1808–1809

Arakcheyev



In [Aleksey Andreyevich, Graf Arakcheyev](#)

...and in 1809, during the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–09, he personally compelled the reluctant Russian forces to cross the frozen Gulf of Finland and make the attack on the Åland Islands that ultimately resulted in Sweden's

cession of Finland to Russia (September 1809).

[READ MORE](#)

Gustav IV



In [Gustav IV Adolf](#)

...with Russia, and France and Russia attacked Sweden in 1808. The war ended in 1809 with Sweden's surrender of Finland to Russia. . In these circumstances certain groups of liberal officials and officers in Sweden's

western army arranged a coup d'état, and on March 13, 1809, the king was overthrown....

[READ MORE](#)

Sweden



In [Sweden: Royalist reaction](#)

...stubbornly accepted war, even with Russia. Denmark, which had sided with France in October 1807, declared war against Sweden in 1808. England, at the moment busy in Spain, could offer little help. Sweden thus

became politically isolated, with enemies in the east, south, and west. The Swedish army defended Finland...

[READ MORE](#)

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (13)

[FONTE: Ulf Sundberg, Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710 (2014)]



Ulf Sundberg

Swedish defensive fortress warfare in
the Great Northern War
1702-1710



A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (14)

[FONTE: Ulf Sundberg, Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710 (2014)]

4.5 NYENSKANS 1703 – Ingria (in St. Petersburg in today's Russia)

Under siege from April 25/26 to May 1/2, 1703 (7 days). Surrendered.

Introduction

After the fall of Nöteborg in 1702, an attack against the adjacent Nyenskans was expected in the same year. However, it would take until the early spring of 1703 until the Russians struck there.

During the struggles between the Swedes and the Russians in the early fourteenth century, the location was fought over. In the peace of 1323, the Neva River fell outside the Swedish territory. In the Peace of Stolbova 1617, Ingria and the Neva River area became Swedish. In 1632, Gustav II Adolf issued a letter which is seen as the foundation for the city of Nyen. The city, and a star redoubt built there, were destroyed during a war with Russia in 1656, but were soon rebuilt.⁴⁹⁸

In 1700, the rebuilt Nyenskans was a five-bastion fortification, which was protected by a dry moat and a covered way.⁴⁹⁹ The works could have been quite impressive. Specific information on the actual size of them is lacking, but Grigorjev and Bespalov cited a Russian source, saying that the wall was nineteen meters high⁵⁰⁰. This is very high, and subsequent events create the idea that the walls were difficult to storm.


A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (15)

[FONTE: Ulf Sundberg, Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710 (2014)]


Nyenskans was located almost on the point of a peninsula created some twenty kilometers upstream from the Gulf of Finland by the confluence of the Ohta River, then by the Swedes called “Svartbäcken”, and the Neva River.⁵⁰¹ The fortification was located on a navigable river with a connection to open sea. This made it theoretically possible for Swedish ships to reach the fortress. However, the river entrance was army blockable. After their conquest of Nöteborg, the Russians could reach Nyenskans using the Neva River or the road which ran parallel to it. There was no road leading directly from Russian territory to Nyenskans. There was no sail-in function or protected discharge place, as any spot where ships could discharge was within reach of siege artillery. Sited on a peninsula, the fortification was protected by water on two sides, but the fortress could still be stormed with relative ease, as one side offered land access.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (16)

[FONTE: Ulf Sundberg, Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710 (2014)]



Picture 4.7 Two fortifications can be seen in the picture above, the Nyenskans core fortress “A” and the never completed city works to the left of the core fortress. Civilian buildings can be seen along the river. (Source: *Demonstration Du Siege de Nienschantz asiegé par les troupes de sa Majesté Czariene le 24 April 1703 et rendu par accord le premier de mai*, nr 46, Volume 11 *Stora nordiska kriget*, Förteckning 425 *Sveriges krig*, Krigsarkivet.) (Detail.)



Picture 4.8 From the picture above, it can be seen that Nyenskans was located deep in a system of islands and waterways, the latter army blockable. (Source: General Charta öfwer Ingermanland. Ähr af copierat här widh Kongl Landt mäterij contooret, efter höga höga Kongl Senatens orders af d 9 maj 1712, nr 30, 1 Lantmäteristyrelsens leverans 1850, 2 Kartor rörande Finland och Sveriges forna provinser 1623–1805, 420571 Lantmäteristyrelsen 1623–1974, Riksarkivet.) (Detail.)

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (17) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

The siege

The Russian advance party arrived off Nyenskans during the night of the 25th/26th. They drove a Swedish detachment of dragoons into the fortress, and then some of the Russians stormed the core fortress. The attack was beaten back by the Swedes.⁵²⁰

During April 26/27, the Russian main force arrived off Nyenskans, cutting the place off completely. Trenches were dug under the leadership of General Engineer Lambert. In the following days, barges from Nöteborg arrived, bringing siege artillery. The Russian artillery counted at least twenty-four 24-pounders and thirteen mortars.⁵²¹ When the artillery had arrived, Tsar Peter led an expedition down the Neva River with ten companies on sixty boats. His objective was to cut off the mouth of the river to hinder Swedish relief attempts.⁵²²

After the siege

The Russians razed Nyenskans and began the construction of a new fortification on Junisaari [Jänissaari], an islet some five kilometers down the Neva River from Nyenskans, which, for all practical purposes, was the foundation of today's St. Petersburg.⁵²⁴

There had been no Swedish attempts to send a relief army to Nyenskans.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (18) [FONTE: BBC, 4/05/2018]

Rudolf Kjellén

Rudolf Kjellén, in full **Johan Rudolf Kjellén**, (born June 13, 1864, Torsö, Sweden—died Nov. 14, 1922, Uppsala), Swedish political scientist and politician whose conservative theory of the state was influential beyond the borders of Sweden.

Kjellén was educated at the University of Uppsala, and he taught at Gothenburg (1901–16) and Uppsala (from 1916). Kjellén is best known for the systematic works in which he treated modern states as organic systems that flourish and then decay. He coined the terms *geopolitik* (“geopolitics”), the problems and conditions within a state that arise from its geographic features; *oecopolitik*, the economic factors that affect the power of the state; and *demopolitik*, the nation’s racial elements and the problems that they create. Late in his life he analyzed the different kinds of national constitutions. Kjellén served several terms as a conservative member of the Swedish parliament. His influence was particularly strong in Germany, where his *Staten som livsform* (1916; “The State as a Life-Form”) was widely read and where *geopolitik* took on an ideological meaning quite different from his social scientific concept.



RUDOLF KJELLÉN

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (19) [FONTE: Sven Holdar, The life-work of Rudolph Kjellén, 1992]

The ideal state and the power of geography

The life-work of Rudolf Kjellén

SVEN HOLDAR

ABSTRACT. Rudolf Kjellén's *Geopolitik* was part of his attempt to produce a systematic political science, focused on the study of the state. Based on organic analogy, Kjellén wanted to construct an objective way to analyze the evolution of the power of states and to examine how this process affected interstate relations. With his numerous roles—as professor of political science, self-taught geographer, Conservative MP and columnist—Kjellén's stated scientific goal of objectivity never gained followers, especially in his advocacy of Swedish nationalism and the German cause in the First World War. While his ideas got no following in Sweden, his Germanophile *Weltanschauung* was adopted in Germany, most importantly by the *Geopolitik* school associated with Karl Haushofer.

Introduction

The days of small nations have long passed away. The day of Empires has come.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN (1904)

Rudolf Kjellén coined the term *Geopolitik* in an article on the boundaries of Sweden in 1899.¹ This term subsequently became one of the five categories in the system he devised to analyze the state. Inspired by German idealist philosophy, social Darwinism and the *Zeitgeist* of imperialism—illustrated in the quote of Chamberlain above—he broke with the then dominant view of the state as exclusively a legal object. Instead, he viewed the state as a power in foreign affairs, using an organic analogy to describe its existence.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (20)

[FONTE: Hans Brems, From Great Power to Welfare State, Journal of Economic Issues, 1970]

SWEDEN: FROM GREAT POWER TO WELFARE STATE

Hans Brems

There is something fascinating about Sweden's 500-year path from her rise as a national state to her present-day status as the world's most advanced welfare state.¹ For one thing there is the fact that while Gustav Vasa's Sweden was economically backward compared to the European continent, present-day Sweden is Europe's most productive economy. This is just another way of saying that Sweden developed faster than others. For another, there is the dramatic rise and fall of Sweden as a great power on an incredibly narrow population base. But first and foremost, there is the theme of freedom running through it all. In Sweden the individual asserted his freedom *vis-a-vis* nobility and king earlier than anywhere else in Continental Europe with the exception of Switzerland.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (21)

[FONTE: Hans Brems, From Great Power to Welfare State, Journal of Economic Issues, 1970]

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Particularly helpful to Sweden was the Thomas process in steelmaking, adopted in the 1880's. Some of the richest Swedish ore deposits, at Grängesberg in *Bergslagen* and at Kiruna in Norrland, are highly phosphorous, the type to which the Thomas process applies. At the turn of the century a railroad was built to connect Kiruna with the ice-free port of Narvik in Norway.

Brilliant in engineering and efficient as organizers, the Swedes made the most of their natural resources. With capitalist ways they had long been familiar: in the thirteenth century they had founded what must be the world's first corporation, *Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag*, still in business. They now went into international business with corporations such as L. M. Ericsson (1876), ASEA (1883), Separator (1883), Atlas-Diesel (1891), Gasaccumulator (1904), and SKF (1907). In 1910 Sweden became a net capital exporter.

The percentage of the gross national product accounted for by manufacturing and handicraft grew steadily, rising from 15 percent in the decade 1861-1870 to 41 percent in 1941-1950. [6], 221.

As a result, shortly after the turn of the century the gap between a man's earning power in America and in Sweden had narrowed, and emigration never again reached the peaks of the 1880's and 1890's, [5], 134.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (21)

[FONTE: Hans Brems, From Great Power to Welfare State, Journal of Economic Issues, 1970]

With industrialization well under way, Sweden's four-estate Parliament had become an anachronism. In 1865 it abolished itself, and Sweden adopted a modern parliament with an upper house, *första kammaren* (scheduled to disappear in 1970) and a lower house, *andra kammaren* in which all voters had an equal voice. But suffrage was still dependent upon minimum income and property requirements. Rising incomes and the suffrage reforms in 1909 and 1921 eroded these obstacles, and the enfranchised percentage of the population rose sharply from 6 percent in 1870 to 19 percent in 1909 and to 54 percent in 1921 [1], 406, 418, 434.

But with the rise of large-scale enterprise and of the service industries, the white-collar worker became increasingly important. Only by shunning ideology could the labor party appeal to him. Marx and all that had to go, and it was gone around 1930. The labor party came to power, first in coalition with the farmers, later alone.

The Swedish economy has become the second most productive economy in the world – second only to the United States in per capita income. With the vitals of this economy labor governments and labor unions alike have been very reluctant to interfere. No nationalization of industry has been carried out after labor came to power, and strikes have been virtually absent from the Swedish scene. Instead, the world's most advanced social-security system has been built, and Sweden has indeed become *folkhemmet* – a home for all the people.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (22) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica / Nobel Prize]

Alfred Nobel

Alfred Nobel, in full **Alfred Bernhard Nobel**, (born October 21, 1833, Stockholm, Sweden—died December 10, 1896, San Remo, Italy), Swedish chemist, engineer, and industrialist who invented dynamite and other more powerful explosives and who also founded the Nobel Prizes.



Alfred Nobel

Alfred Nobel, portrait by Emil Österman, 1915; in the Nobel Foundation, Stockholm.


© Photos.com/Jupiterimages

Alfred Nobel was the fourth son of Immanuel and Caroline Nobel. Immanuel was an inventor and engineer who had married Caroline Andrietta Ahlsell in 1827. The couple had eight children, of whom only Alfred and three brothers reached adulthood. Alfred was prone to illness as a child, but he enjoyed a close relationship with his mother and displayed a lively intellectual curiosity from an early age. He was interested in explosives, and he learned the fundamentals of engineering from his father. Immanuel, meanwhile, had failed at various

business ventures until moving in 1837 to St. Petersburg in Russia, where he prospered as a manufacturer of explosive mines and machine tools. The Nobel family left Stockholm in 1842 to join the father in St. Petersburg. Alfred's newly prosperous parents were now able to send him to private tutors, and he proved to be an eager pupil. He was a competent chemist by age 16 and was fluent in English, French, German, and Russian as well as Swedish.

The last will and testament

Alfred Nobel signed his last will in Paris on November 27, 1895. He specified that the bulk of his fortune should be divided into five parts and to be used for prizes in physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature and peace to "those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit to humankind."



The will of Alfred Nobel.

© Nobel Media AB 2018. Photo: Alexander Mahmoud

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (23) [FONTE: The Nobel Prize]

THE
NOBEL
PRIZE

Gunnar Myrdal Biographical

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel 1974

Gunnar Myrdal
Friedrich von Hayek



Gunnar Myrdal was born in Gustaf's parish, Sweden, on December 6, 1898. He graduated from the Law School of Stockholm University in 1923 and began practicing law while continuing his studies at the university. He received his *juris doctor* degree in economics in 1927 and was appointed docent in political economy. From 1925 to 1929 he studied for periods in Germany and Britain, followed by his first trip to the United States in 1929-1930 as a Rockefeller Fellow. During this period, he also published his first books, including *The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory*.

Returning to Europe, he first served for one year as Associate Professor in the Post Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. In 1933 he was appointed to the Lars Hierta Chair of Political Economy and Public Finance at the University of Stockholm as the successor of Gustav Cassel. In addition to his teaching activities, Professor Myrdal was active in Swedish politics and was elected to the Senate in 1934 as member of the Social Democratic Party. In 1938, the

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (24)

[FONTE: Steve Valocchi, *The Origins of the Swedish Welfare State: A Class Analysis of the State and Welfare Politics* (1992)]

The Origins of the Swedish Welfare State: A Class Analysis of the State and Welfare Politics*

STEVE VALOCCHI, *Trinity College*

The Swedish welfare system is unique among Western nations. The hallmark of that system is universalism and solidarity, that is, the public provision of income, goods, and services to all Swedish citizens without regard to previous contribution. The Swedish pension system gives pension rights to all citizens regardless of previous employment; child allowances are available for all families, regardless of income level or family structure; and health care is free or heavily subsidized and available to all citizens. Most of these benefits are financed either by progressive taxation or employers' contributions (Einhorn and Logue 1989:170-193). In the area of unemployment, Sweden is unique in that it does not emphasize insurance but prevention. It uses macroeconomic, public works, and worker retraining policies to achieve full employment and adequate wages (Gustafsson and Richardson 1984:166-168).

There is disagreement among social scientists about why the Swedish welfare state took its present form. Some see its origins in the political power of agrarian interests in the first half of the twentieth century (Baldwin 1989, 1990); others attribute its unique features to the political power of the industrial working class beginning in the 1930s (Esping-Andersen 1985; Stephens 1979); still others locate the origins much further back in a "bureaucratically centered monarchical regime" which existed from the seventeenth to early twentieth century and which created investigative and decision-making structures that were analytically thorough and politically consensual (Heclo 1974; Weir and Skocpol 1985:129).

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (25)

[FONTE: Steve Valocchi, The Origins of the Swedish Welfare State: A Class Analysis of the State and Welfare Politics (1992)]

Pre-Social Democratic Welfare Reform

National responsibility for sickness, old age, and unemployment predated the dominance of Social Democratic governments.² The Pension Act of 1913 provided flat rate pension benefits to all citizens at age 67 (Heclo 1974:191; Rosenthal 1967). In 1914, the Swedish government supplemented local poor relief with national funds and, more importantly, established the National Unemployment Commission which undertook public works projects to combat unemployment (Clark 1941:22). In addition, the state contributed money to a variety of voluntary and wage earners' clubs for sickness and industrial accidents (Wilson 1979). In sum, a new national system was established only for old age and, although the state provided substantial supplements, provision for accident, sickness, and unemployment in Sweden remained the responsibility of local governments and voluntary programs (Hovde 1943:632).

As I will argue below, these early reforms emerged from an interaction between politically-mediated class interests and class-mediated state structures. As stressed by the state-centered perspective, a credentialized civil service participating in a decision-making process that relied on investigation, analysis, and close ties between state ministers and the Riksdag created a context in which national solutions to the social problems of Swedish industrialization could develop, percolate, and be implemented with a high degree of consensus. But that is all that this administrative structure created—a context. What is missing are the interests that created this administrative structure in the first place, the class biases embedded in this structure, and the interests that filled this structure with the content of national solutions. Here Baldwin's theory of social interests provides a necessary, if incomplete, answer.

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (26)

[FONTE: Steve Valocchi, The Origins of the Swedish Welfare State: A Class Analysis of the State and Welfare Politics (1992)]

Whither the Social Democrats?

The decade of the 1920s was a crucial period for the Social Democratic party. Their growing electoral strength in the interwar period did not automatically translate into public policy. Unpopular policy programs and rules of proportional representation in the Riksdag prevented the party from exploiting its basis of support (Koblik 1975:254). Beginning in the mid-1920s, however, the Social Democratic leadership took advantage of its experiences in the investigatory commissions of the past several decades to develop and adjust party programs (Steinmo 1988:415). This rethinking of “socialist” practice bore political fruit in the 1930s, when they won forty-one percent of the vote and formed a coalition government with the Agrarian party.

Three outcomes of this process are important for understanding the role of the Social Democratic party in the refashioning of the Swedish welfare state. First, stemming partly from the politics of the 1913 pension law, the Social Democrats recognized the affinity of interests between proletarianized small-scale farmers and industrial workers and developed policy in accordance with this affinity. Party programs in the 1920s came to terms with certain economic and political realities: Sweden was not a highly polarized capitalist society; agricultural elites and small-scale farmers had easy access to a Riksdag based on proportional representation; and farmers’ worsening economic situation and their solidarity in the face of the farm crisis made their interests unavoidable objects of political contention (Söderpalm 1975:265). In response to these factors, Social Democratic programs throughout the 1920s eliminated the demand for nationalization of land and replaced it with policies that protected small farms and encouraged cooperative farms (Stephens 1979:132).

A Suécia: de grande potência ao welfare state (27) [FONTE: A Good Cartoon / Lisa, 2012]



A neutralidade da Suécia (1) [FONTE: BBC, 4/05/2018]

Sweden profile - Timeline

4 May 2018

A chronology of key events:

1905 - Union between Sweden and Norway peacefully dissolved, 90 years after Sweden invaded Norway.

1914 - Outbreak of World War I. Sweden remains neutral.

1920 - Sweden joins League of Nations. During the 1920s Sweden develops from an agricultural into an industrial society. Social democratic governments enact various social reforms.



Getty Images

Sweden carefully guarded its neutrality during World War II

1939 - At the outbreak of World War II, Sweden - along with its Scandinavian neighbours - declares its neutrality. Sweden rejects a request from Germany's enemies to use its territory as a transit route for troops.

A neutralidade da Suécia (2) [FONTE: BBC, 4/05/2018]

1940 - Following the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, Sweden is forced by German military superiority to allow German troops to transit through Sweden to Norway. But the Swedish prime minister rebuffs Germany's offer of membership in the "New Order". Sweden becomes a refuge for Danes and Norwegians trying to flee from the Germans.

1943 - Transit agreement with Germany is cancelled.

1946 - Sweden joins the United Nations.

Social Democrat Tage Erlander becomes prime minister and stays in the post until 1969. Successive governments develop a comprehensive welfare state, introducing a national health service in 1955 and a state pension scheme in 1959.

1952 - Sweden becomes founder member of the Nordic Council, established to further the mutual interests of the Scandinavian countries.

1953 - Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld becomes secretary-general of the United Nations; he stays in the post until 1961. Sweden contributes troops towards UN peace-keeping missions.

A neutralidade da Suécia (3) [FONTE: Nações Unidas]

Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld



Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 10 April 1953 until 18 September 1961 when he met his death in a plane accident while on a peace mission in the Congo. He was born on 29 July 1905 in Jonköping in south-central Sweden. The fourth son of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, Prime Minister of Sweden during the years of World War I, and his wife Agnes, M.C. (b. Almquist), he was brought up in the university town of Uppsala where his father resided as Governor of the county of Uppland.

Although he served with the Social-Democratic cabinet, Mr. Hammarskjöld never joined any political party, regarding himself as an independent, politically.

On 20 December 1954, he became a member of the Swedish Academy. He was elected to take the seat in the Academy previously held by his father. Elected to two terms as Secretary-General Mr. Hammarskjöld was unanimously appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations by the General Assembly on 7 April 1953 on the recommendation of the Security Council. He was reelected unanimously for another term of five years in September 1957.

During his terms as Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld carried out many responsibilities for the United Nations in the course of its efforts to prevent war and serve the other aims of the Charter.

A neutralidade da Suécia (4) [FONTE: BBC, 4/05/2018]

1971 - The two-chamber parliament is replaced by one chamber elected by proportional representation.

1975 - Further constitutional reforms enacted. The last remaining powers of the monarch are removed, so that his duties become purely ceremonial.

1976 - Centre Party leader Thorbjörn Fälldin becomes prime minister, leading Sweden's first non-socialist government for forty years

A decade of uncertainty

Early 1980s - Relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate when Soviet submarines are suspected of infiltrating Swedish territorial waters.

1986 - Social democrat prime minister Olof Palme is assassinated on a Stockholm street by a gunman who fled the scene. Sweden is plunged into shock, and the conduct of the police investigation prompts public criticism. In June 2020, police conclude that the killer was Stig Engstrom, a troubled man who disliked the prime minister and committed suicide in 2000.

1990 - The parliament supports the government's decision to apply for membership of the European Union.

1994 - Swedes narrowly support EU membership in a referendum. Sweden joins the EU on 1st January 1995.



AFP

The 1986 killing of Social Democrat Prime Minister Olof Palme remains unsolved

A neutralidade da Suécia (5) [FONTE: John Pike / Global Security]

Swedish Neutrality

[John Pike](#)

The country has a history of neutrality stretching back to the early part of the 19th century, so Sweden is not traditionally viewed as a military nation. Sweden has not been militarily occupied since 1523 and has not been at war since 1814. During the 17th century, Sweden was a major military power in Europe, and for a time controlled Finland and Norway.

During the 17th century, the Swedish empire consisted of present day Sweden, and parts of Denmark, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and northern Germany. Sweden fought wars against such powers as Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Her role in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) was significant, helping determine the political and religious balance of power in Europe that prevails to this day. Sweden invaded Russia in 1700, and came close to defeating the Russians. However, the forces of Peter the Great overcame the Swedes in 1709, and thereafter Sweden's power declined, as one by one of her external conquests slipped away. In 1809, Sweden was forced to cede Finland to Russia.

Beginning in 1810 King Karl XIV Johan altered the foreign policy stance of Sweden from one of military engagement to a policy of neutrality that exists to this day. Though officially neutral in both World Wars I and II, Sweden's neutrality in World War II was stretched on several occasions.

A neutralidade da Suécia (6) [FONTE: John Pike / Global Security]

When the Soviet Union invaded nearby Finland, many Swedes volunteered to fight for Finland. At thousands of mass meetings all over Sweden, the cry was: "Finland's cause is ours!" Sweden also gave extensive material aid to Finland. However, no Swedish troops were directly involved in the conflict. And when the allies, particularly Britain, wanted to send troops through Sweden to aid Finland in March, 1940, Sweden refused.

Germany's attack on Denmark and Norway placed Sweden in a difficult situation. Germany soon demanded to move military transports over Swedish territory to attack the defenders of Norway. These demands were turned down in April and May of 1940, with only Red Cross transports to northern Norway being permitted transit. However, in June 1940, the Swedes felt constrained to allow the transit of German military equipment and personnel on leave between Norway and Germany, via Sweden. The Government and High Command agreed that a hopeless war with Germany would be unavoidable if the demands were refused. One more major concession was yet to be demanded. In connection with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the transfer of a fully equipped German infantry division under the command of General Engelbrecht from Norway to Finland over Swedish territory was permitted. Other such requests were refused. Sweden continued to trade with Germany during the war, but after the battle of Stalingrad, Sweden cut back exports of iron ore to Germany. During the war some restrictions were placed on the press to placate the Germans.

A neutralidade da Suécia (7) [FONTE: John Pike / Global Security]

The present policy of Swedish neutrality is not laid down in the Constitution or required by any international agreement. Rather, it is a policy which Sweden itself has chosen to pursue, based on the conviction that neutrality is the best possible guarantee of Sweden's being able to avoid involvement in a future war. This policy is backed by a relatively strong national defense designed to deter or prevent the belligerents in any military conflict from trying to occupy or use Swedish territory.

Under the new EU Treaty, member states are expected to assume shared responsibility for Europe's security. The Riksdag [The Swedish Parliament] has ratified the Treaty of Lisbon, including Article 47.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the solidarity clause - Article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Government endorsed the Defence Commission's declaration of solidarity, which includes EU member states, Norway and Iceland.

A neutralidade da Suécia (8) [FONTE: Governo da Suécia / MNE]



Government Offices of Sweden

Foreign and security policy

Foreign policy is about Sweden's relations with and policies towards other countries. Preventing risks and threats is an important part of security policy, which in turn is part of foreign policy. Swedish policy is pursued via direct relations with other countries and also through bodies such as the EU and the UN.

[Foreign and security policy in budget](#)

[Government agencies, etc.](#)

[Contact](#)

News about foreign and security policy

Government communication on the feminist foreign policy

12 February 2020

Five years of Sweden's feminist foreign policy show that it generates results. This is outlined in the Government communication on the policy which was presented by the Government to the Riksdag in September 2019. The feminist foreign policy has, among other things, contributed to support for female members of parliament and entrepreneurs, fewer cases of maternal mortality and unplanned pregnancies, and more resources for gender equality and women's and girl's rights. Sweden has also contributed toward mobilising and financing for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).



Photo: Anders Löwdin/The Riksdag

Responsible for foreign and security policy

Responsible minister



[Ann Linde](#)

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Responsible ministry

[Ministry for Foreign Affairs](#)

Shortcuts

[International sanctions](#)

A neutralidade da Suécia (9) [FONTE: Governo da Suécia / MNE]



Government Offices of Sweden

Statement from [Ministry of Defence](#)

Statement by the Nordic Ministers of Defence regarding the situation in and near Ukraine

Published 21 January 2022

The Nordic Ministers of Defence met virtually on 21 January to discuss the deteriorating situation in and around Ukraine. The ministers monitor the security situation in Ukraine closely, and continue to consult with each other through the NORDEFCO Crisis Consultation Mechanism.

The ministers agree on the gravity of the situation, and the need to seek a diplomatic solution to the current situation. The ministers call on Russia to de-escalate through halting and reversing their ongoing military build-up in the region and engage in dialogue.

The ministers reaffirm their support to Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its right to decide its own foreign and security policy, free from outside interference. The fundamental principles underpinning the European security order remain non-negotiable.

The Nordic countries welcome dialogue on European security issues in relevant fora, including the EU, NATO, OSCE and the UN. The Nordic countries welcome the United States' efforts in engaging Russia in resolving the current crisis.

A neutralidade da Suécia (10) [FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / FP, 7/01/2022]

Swedish Foreign Minister: Joining NATO Is Up to Us

Russian threats to Ukraine have spurred security conversations in northern Europe.

[Amy Mackinnon](#) January 7, 2022, 1:22 PM



Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde attends a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Riga, Latvia, on Dec. 1, 2021. Gints Ivuskans/AFP/Getty Images

Ahead of a series of talks next week between Russian officials and NATO, Sweden's top diplomat underscored that Moscow has no right to dictate which countries can apply to join the trans-Atlantic military alliance.

A neutralidade da Suécia (11) [FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / FP, 7/01/2022]

"It should not be up to Russia if we could join or if we could not join NATO," said Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ann Linde in an interview with *Foreign Policy* on Friday. Linde described Moscow's demands to curtail NATO's activity as "astonishing," noting they would have profound consequences for Sweden's security if they were accepted.

U.S and European officials are set to meet with their Russian counterparts in a variety of high-stakes meetings as the West looks for diplomatic off-ramps amid fears of a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has demanded a sweeping series of security guarantees, including a halt to any eastward expansion of the bloc and limits on its deployments to recent member states.


A [readout](#) of a call between U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his counterparts from the Nordic countries noted "participants reaffirmed the right of each country to choose its alliances."

Linde's comments follow similar remarks made by Finnish President [Sauli Niinisto](#) in his New Year's address: "Finland's room to maneuver and freedom of choice also include the possibility of military alignment and applying for NATO membership, should we ourselves so decide."

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned in late December 2021 that NATO accession for either Finland or Sweden, which maintained policies of neutrality during the Cold War, would entail "serious military and political consequences, which would require an adequate response on Russia's part."

A neutralidade da Suécia (12) [FONTE: Cartoon NATO Association of Canada / David Parkins, 2015]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (1)

[FONTE: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da República Federal da Alemanha, 16/01/2022]




Image information

16.01.2022 - Article

Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is continuing her travels on 17 and 18 January with her first official visits to Ukraine and Russia.

Diplomacy on the basis of shared principles

The first official visits to Ukraine and Russia take place against the backdrop of the military situation close to the Ukrainian border and following the various dialogue formats with Russia at the [NATO-Russia Council](#), in the [OSCE](#) and at bilateral level in the past week. Foreign Minister Baerbock issued the following statement:

”

I will listen very closely to my interlocutors, both in Moscow and Kyiv. But I will also clearly convey the position that we unanimously share within the [EU](#), the G7 and the transatlantic alliance.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (2)

[FONTE: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da República Federal da Alemanha, 16/01/2022]

Thirty years of diplomatic relations with Ukraine

In Kyiv on 17 January, Foreign Minister Baerbock will meet her Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba and President Volodymyr Zelensky. The goal of the meeting will be to make clear that Ukraine is not being sidelined in our diplomatic efforts.

The visit to Kyiv coincides with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Ukraine. Foreign Minister Baerbock intends to use this as an opportunity to update cooperation between the two countries.

“For me, that means, not least, helping to strengthen Ukraine’s potential. I therefore want to talk about initiatives for the sustainable modernisation of the Ukrainian energy sector, about the development of the green hydrogen market and offers of support with cyber defence.”

In Kyiv, Foreign Minister Baerbock will meet German representatives of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and Mikka Kinnunen, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group. The OSCE plays an important role in monitoring the ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine.

Establish our bearings in relations with Russia

Afterwards, Foreign Minister Baerbock will travel on to Moscow, where she will meet her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on Tuesday (18 January). Referring to this meeting, Foreign Minister Baerbock said:

”

My talks in Moscow will also help to establish our bearings. The new German Government wants substantial and stable relations with Russia.



Foreign Minister Baerbock at the press conference with her ukrainian counterpart DmytroKuleba
© Janine Schmitz/photothek.de



Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Oleksandr Riepin, President of the Ukrainian Hydrogen Council
© Janine Schmitz/photothek.de

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (3)

[FONTE: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da República Federal da Alemanha, 20/01/2022]

Close transatlantic coordination: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken our guest in Berlin



Image information

Article

Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock met her American counterpart Antony Blinken today at the Federal Foreign Office. Their talks were preceded by a quadrilateral meeting between Germany, France, the UK and the United States of America

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (4)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict



Foto:

[M]: Alexei Druzhinin / Sputnik / Kremlin Pool Photo via AP; Sergey Pivovarov / REUTERS

To a certain degree, the visit was a conspiratorial one. No photo, no press release – and the first meeting was a small one. William Burns, the head of the CIA, first attended a meeting last week with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his chief of staff Wolfgang Schmidt at the chancellor's behest. Later, they were joined by Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, the BND, and staff members from Scholz's Chancellery. The head of America's foreign intelligence agency told them bluntly that if Russia attacks Ukraine, the pressure on Berlin to take a clear stand against Moscow will increase.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (5)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

Despite the friendly tone among the participants, it was by no means an easy meeting. Germany and the United States have been far apart on the issue of Russia for the past several weeks. Burns brought a trove of intelligence with him on troop movements and sabotage units to convince Berlin of the U.S. view of the Russian threat.

U.S. President Joe Biden also wanted to talk to the Germans – and offered Scholz a personal appointment in Washington at short notice. It would have been Scholz's inaugural visit to the U.S. and, more importantly, an opportunity for the two leaders to closely coordinate joint steps in the acute threat of war.

But Scholz reportedly declined, saying the next few days are already planned with travel and important meetings. Both are now looking for a new date. It's possible the meeting won't take place until the beginning or middle of February.

It's rather difficult to fathom: Russia is building up the biggest threat since the end of the Cold War, deploying around 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, stationing tanks, artillery and rocket launchers, and the German chancellor is unable to clear his schedule to accept an invitation from the American president.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (6)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

It's true that no one knows exactly what Putin's goal is right now – whether he's trying to gain ground diplomatically with the help of military threats or if he is planning a military operation under the pretext of a lack of concessions from the West. Within Chancellor Scholz's SPD, there is a strong tendency to downplay the threat of war. Many within the SPD, but also within the Green Party, share the Kremlin's opinion that Russia had been deceived during the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union.

Still, the Germans' wavering course weakens the strategy of Berlin's Western allies – a strategy aimed at driving the price of a military attack "as high as possible," as one EU official puts it. And the window of opportunity to deter Putin could close soon, one senior NATO diplomat told DER SPIEGEL. Once Putin had made the decision to attack Ukraine internally, he would hardly be able to back down without weakening his

domestic political position, the diplomat says. That's why it is crucial for the EU, the U.S. and NATO to act as united and resolutely as possible. Any hesitation could be interpreted by the Russian president as a signal that he can take the next step.

The message from Washington, meanwhile, is that deterrence only works if you don't take any options off the table. The Americans' view is that those options include arms deliveries to Ukraine and the threat of maximal sanctions. But the German government is tapping the brakes on both fronts.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (7)

[FONTE: Germany (DEU) and Russia (RUS) Trade | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity]



Latest Trends

Russia-Germany In 2019, [Russia](#) exported \$18.9B to [Germany](#). The main products that [Russia](#) exported to [Germany](#) were [Crude Petroleum](#) (\$8.53B), [Refined Petroleum](#) (\$3.07B), and [Coal Briquettes](#) (\$1.87B). During the last 24 years the exports of Russia to Germany have increased at an annualized rate of 4.85%, from \$6.06B in 1995 to \$18.9B in 2019.

Overview In July 2021 Germany exported €2.36B and imported €2.65B from Russia, resulting in a negative trade balance of €281M. Between July 2020 and July 2021 the exports of Germany have increased by €361M (18%) from €2B to €2.36B, while imports increased by €1.16B (78.2%) from €1.48B to €2.65B.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (8)

[FONTE: Germany (DEU) and Russia (RUS) Trade | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity]


Trade In July 2021, the top exports of Germany to Russia were Aircraft (€206M), Pharmaceutical products (€201M), Chassis, bodies, engines etc. for motor... (€183M), Motor cars and motor caravans (€126M), and Other machinery (€120M). In July 2021 the top imports of Germany from Russia were Petroleum oil and petroleum gases (€1.35B), Mineral oil products (€279M), Coal and coal briquettes (€173M), Other semi-finished products (€128M), and Copper and copper alloys, incl. waste,... (€101M).

Origins In July 2021 the exports of Germany were mainly from [North Rhine-Westphalia](#) (€332M), [Baden-Württemberg](#) (€289M), [Bavaria](#) (€262M), [Hamburg](#) (€210M), and [Lower Saxony](#) (€138M), while imports destinations were mainly [Bavaria](#) (€421M), [Brandenburg](#) (€415M), [Hesse](#) (€406M), [North Rhine-Westphalia](#) (€375M), and [Hamburg](#) (€288M).

Growth In July 2021, the increase in Germany's year-by-year exports to Russia was explained primarily by an increase in product exports in Aircraft (€189M or 1.07k%), Pharmaceutical products (€114M or 131%), and Railway or tramway locomotives and rolling... (€35.5M or 458%). In July 2021, the increase in Germany's year-by-year imports from Russia was explained primarily by an increase in product imports in Petroleum oil and petroleum gases (€475M or 54.1%), Coal and coal briquettes (€127M or 276%), and Other semi-finished products (€116M or 912%).

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (9)

[FONTE: Germany (DEU) and Russia (RUS) Trade | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity]



A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (10)

[FONTE: Euractiv / Reuters, 21/01/2022]

Analysis: In Ukraine crisis, Germany faces tough decisions over Nord Stream 2



Germany could find itself in a no-win situation if Russia invades Ukraine, pitting Berlin's main gas supplier against its most important security allies.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz would face pressure from the United States and other Western allies to respond to any invasion by stopping the recently completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany going into operation.

But doing so would risk exacerbating a gas supply crunch in Europe that has been widely blamed on a dearth of gas flows from Russia, and has caused energy prices in Europe to soar.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (11)

[FONTE: Euractiv / Reuters, 21/01/2022]

"Germany is between a rock and a hard place," said Marcel Dirsus, Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University.

"The Scholz government wants to keep the Americans happy because they are Germany's most important allies outside of Europe. But they don't want to annoy the Russians either. That's tough to do."

Russia has massed troops near its border with Ukraine and demanded security guarantees from the West, but denies it plans to invade its former Soviet republic.

Any invasion would be likely to trigger new international sanctions against Russia, with measures against Nord Stream 2 widely seen as one of the strongest ways to put pressure on Moscow.

But Scholz, who replaced Angela Merkel as chancellor late last year, already faces disagreements in his coalition government about how far German sanctions on Nord Stream 2 should go if Russia attacks Ukraine.

The Greens would like to scrap the project, which is still awaiting regulatory approval, as they oppose fossil fuels. They also want to send a clear signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that military aggression abroad and undemocratic practices at home will not be rewarded with gas contracts.

The pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) have also signalled they prefer a tougher approach toward Russia.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (12)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

Crisis on the Ukrainian Border: What Sanctions Could Hurt Russia



A technician prepares a section of pipe for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Foto: Stine Jacobsen / REUTERS

When it comes to word choice, the West is in complete agreement. A Russian attack on Ukraine would carry "political consequences" and a "heavy price," insist both Washington and Brussels. The European Union's chief foreign policy representative, Josep Borrell, said recently that the bloc is preparing a "full set of sanctions" against Moscow.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (13)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022. FOTO: Russia Business Today]



The problem, though, is that the consequences of such punitive measures for the Russian economy aren't always predictable, and the harm to one's own economy can be significant. Should the West stop buying Russian oil and gas? What would be the ramifications of a boycott on Russia's tech sector, or of excluding the country from the SWIFT international bank transfer system? How can the West punish Putin without shooting itself in the foot? Opinions on such questions diverge significantly when Europeans and Americans start considering possible responses to the warmongering of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Power of Semiconductors

It is indisputable that Russia's economy would be hit hard if the West cut deliveries of microchips to the country in response to an invasion. Such a move would be damaging to the aircraft industry and to the arms industry, both of which are key to Russian exports and to the country's prestige. Additional measures under discussion include limitations on deliveries of parts necessary for the construction of warplanes and rockets.

Even simple semiconductors that cost just a few euros each could serve as important leverage. The global chip industry is largely dominated by companies from the U.S. and its allies, with the most state-of-the-art factories located in the U.S., Europe, Taiwan and South Korea.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (14)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

Russia is home to very few, mostly aging factories and they rely heavily on Western patents. The computer producer IRU, for example, which is working on developing a desktop computer made completely in Russia, imports its processors from Taiwan. And the chip producer Angstrom-T went bankrupt in 2019 after it was forced to cut ties with its American partners due to sanctions imposed after Moscow's incursion into Crimea.

Still, it would take several months for a chip boycott to have much of an effect. Cutting Russia off from the SWIFT system, the backbone of the financial world, by contrast, would have an immediate impact. Around 11,000 banks in more than 200 countries use the network to take care of cross-border transactions. "Because of the massive consequences, a credible threat to exclude Russia from SWIFT would be extremely effective," says Gabriel Felbermayr, director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research in Vienna.

The collateral damage of such a move, however, would be significant. Even as companies in Russia would have to find elaborate alternate routes to pay their foreign bills, and the cross-border flow of cash and goods would trickle to a stop, the West would suffer as well. Exports to Russia from companies in Europe could no longer be paid for, and Europe would be unable to pay for natural gas deliveries from Russia. Furthermore, Russian debt held by European banks would be jeopardized. Such considerations led Friedrich Merz, the likely next head of Germany's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), to warn of "an atomic bomb for the financial markets."

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (15)

[FONTE: Der Spiegel online International, 21/01/2022]

"A Sanction that Moscow Would Really Understand"

The problems would be of a similar magnitude if the West were to stop imports of oil and natural gas from Russia. That, too, says Felbermayr, would be "a sanction that Moscow would really understand." But it would also have grave consequences for the West.

Around 55 percent of Germany's natural gas comes from Russia.

At the same time, prices for liquified gas would skyrocket. German storage facilities are emptier than they have been in a long time, and because the markets have been liberalized, the government doesn't have too many levers to counteract such price pressures. German Economics Minister Robert Habeck, for his part, has promised to exert more control over the gas market. "We have to improve our ability to prepare for next winter so that the gas storage facilities are full," he said in an interview with DER SPIEGEL this week. He also said he intended to reform the entire market. But such promises are of little help in the current conflict, which is why a suspension of gas imports seems just as unlikely as shutting Russia out of the SWIFT system.

The situation looks different when it comes to the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Germany and Russia. That delivery route is not urgently needed, assuming that Russia doesn't cut off deliveries through the existing pipelines.

A Alemanha face ao conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (16)

[FONTE: Cartoon Kal / The Economist]



Sugestões de leitura

