


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 1**

6/10/2021



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (1)


[FONTE: Maps of the World]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (2)

[FONTE: Statista]


Total population in the Asia Pacific region in 2019, by country or region
(in millions)



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (3)

[FONTE: Statista]

Gross domestic product (GDP) in the Asia Pacific region in 2019, by country or region
(in billion U.S. dollars)



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (4)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Felix Heiduk, Gudrun Wacker

From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific

 Deutsch

Significance, Implementation and Challenges

SWP Research Paper 2020/RP 09, 01.07.2020, 43 Seiten

doi:10.18449/2020RP09

- More and more states and regional organisations employ the term “Indo-Pacific”. It is increasingly supplanting the previously common term, “Asia-Pacific”. In Europe, only France has so far presented its own “Indo-Pacific” concept.
- The term “Indo-Pacific” is used to refer to various, sometimes divergent, concepts. These in turn are based on very different ideas on regional order. What they all have in common is the reference to the importance of a rules-based international order.



SWP

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (5)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

- “Indo-Pacific” is a political term and therefore neither purely descriptive nor value-neutral. In particular, the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept aims to contain China and is thus an expression of the growing strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In Beijing, “Indo-Pacific” is primarily understood as a U.S.-led containment strategy directed against China.
- Other actors, for example ASEAN or India, emphasise aspects such as economic prosperity, connectivity and multilateral cooperation in their Indo-Pacific concepts.
- The EU and its member states are under increasing pressure from Washington to commit themselves directly or indirectly to the “Indo-Pacific” – and thus, from a U.S. perspective, for Washington and against Beijing. In their deliberations, Europeans should not succumb to this zero-sum logic.
- The EU and its member states have at their disposal three (ideal type) approaches: “equidistance”, “alignment” and “autonomy”. In order to be able to choose one option, Europeans must define their economic, security and normative interests in the region and provide the necessary resources for their advancement.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (6)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

“Indo-Pacific”: The Construction of a Region


The “Indo-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific region” has enjoyed growing popularity for over ten years as a geographical and strategic construct in the foreign and security policy discourse in Japan, the United States, Australia, India, France and some Southeast Asian states. Many see “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographical and strategic frame of reference that has at least partially come to replace the previously dominant “Asia-Pacific” construct.

The term has found its way into official documents such as national security strategies or defence white papers as well as into the rhetoric of the elites. It is also increasingly being discussed in think tanks and academic institutions. As a result, it has become a kind of “geopolitical nomenclature”.¹

Although each country has its own understanding of the concept, in terms of both the geographical extent of the Indo-Pacific region and its strategic orientation and essential attributes, there is a common denominator: The two oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, are imagined as *one* contiguous area. This understanding is based on the fact that the vast majority of the world’s flows of goods, but also energy supplies, are transported via sea routes that traverse these two oceans. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is currently *the* arena in which growing rivalry between the United States and China in Asia is being played out. Accordingly, it has gained in importance geopolitically and geo-economically over the last two decades. Moreover, many Asian actors see it not only as a “purely” geographical construct but also as an alternative to the Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) (see blue box on page 8). Geopolitical and geo-economic aspects are thus closely intertwined in the Indo-Pacific.


O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (7)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (8)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (9)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

The Indo-Pacific: Emergence, Objectives, Key Issues and Ideas on Regional Order

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States

President Donald Trump first presented his “vision” of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in November 2017 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hanoi.⁶ President Barack Obama had already strategically connected the Indian and Pacific Oceans to form an “Indo-Pacific” region and outlined plans for an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) in addition to the political and military “pivot to Asia”.⁷ In contrast to the Obama administration, however, the Trump administration sees the “Indo-Pacific region” as a central foreign and economic policy arena for dealing with China. In 2018 Vice President Mike Pence drew considerable attention when he delivered a speech denouncing China’s behaviour and condemning its repeated interference in the internal affairs of other states (including the United States) and its aggressive policy in the South China Sea.⁸ Soon afterwards then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson defined the “less responsible” approach of an increasingly powerful China to international standards and Beijing’s deliberate undermining of the “international rules-based order” as Washington’s main challenge.⁹

Donald Trump seeks to implement a reorientation of U.S. policy towards China through the FOIP. This approach is based on his criticism of the previous administration’s Asia policy, which in his view initially announced an “Asia pivot” and later a rebalancing to the region but never fully implemented it.¹⁰ At the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called on “friends” of the United States to “choose” between the systems of the United States and China when considering whom to cooperate with.¹¹

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (10)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Japan's “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: From strategy to vision

The term “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” was not coined by U.S. President Donald Trump but has its origins in a speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (see timeline on page 12). In 2007, during his first term in office, Abe delivered a speech entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas” to the Indian Congress. In it, he presented his vision of closer political and economic connectivity between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It was a vision based on intensive cooperation among the democratic states of the region, which was to serve as the centre of a network spanning the entire Indian Ocean and the Pacific and make way for a “free flow of persons, goods, capital and knowledge” that would guarantee “freedom and prosperity”. According to Abe, the security of the shipping routes is of central strategic importance in this respect. Abe's connectivity concept also emphasises “universal” norms, which are intended to closely link the democracies in the region politically and economically and to regulate the behaviour of non-democratic states, above all China.³⁸

Abe's connectivity concept emphasises “universal” norms that closely link the democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this context, Abe also proposed in 2007 to establish the Quad, consisting of Japan, Australia, India and the United States. However, Abe's first term in office lasted only one year, so that the corresponding concepts were only brought to life in his second term of office, which began in 2012.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (11)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Australia and the Indo-Pacific as a solid regional reference framework

For Australia, the Indo-Pacific has become *the* regional frame of reference for its own geographical and strategic positioning since 2013; the term “Indo-Pacific” is firmly anchored in official documents. It was used as early as 2012 in a government *White Paper*, but only twice, to denote a geographical arc spanning the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.⁶⁰ The Australian Defence White Paper of 2013,⁶¹ in contrast, devotes an entire chapter to the concept (with a total of 56 mentions). Its use continues in the Defence White Paper of 2016⁶² and the Foreign Policy White Paper of 2017.⁶³ Since then, the concept has been a central theme in speeches by politicians⁶⁴ and is also discussed in academic circles.

In 2012, Rory Medcalf, one of Australia’s best-known security policy experts, presented a groundbreaking article on the term “Indo-Pacific”.⁶⁵ In recent years, academic texts on Australia’s strategic positioning have focused on the Sino-American conflict, power shifts in the region and the rules-based international order – all of which are discussed within the framework of the Indo-Pacific.⁶⁶ Two predominant traditions in Australia’s foreign policy are highlighted in these texts, both of which employ the concept of “Indo-Pacific”: Australia as a middle power on the one hand; and as a “dependent ally” of the United States on the other.⁶⁷

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (12)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

India's "Act East" policy and the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific experienced one of its constitutive moments in India in August 2007, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his speech to parliament on the "confluence of the two seas".⁸³ Nevertheless, very few official Indian documents on the Indo-Pacific have been issued to date, although it should be noted that the Indian government does not publish white papers on foreign or defence policy. A more specific document, the *Indian Maritime Security Strategy* of 2015, refers in its introduction to a shift in global focus from the "Euro-Atlantic" to the "Indo-Pacific" and links the latter concept to India's "Act East" policy.⁸⁴ The *National Security Strategy*, commissioned by the Indian opposition party Congress and published in March 2019, also mentions "Indo-Pacific" seven times. Among other things, it calls for priority to be given to harmonizing the various views of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework.⁸⁵

Representatives of Indian think tanks regularly discuss both the term "Indo-Pacific" and India's handling of it; they have also identified contradictions and ambiguities in India's strategy.⁸⁶ India's "Look East" policy (since 1991) and later "Act East" policy (since 2014), with its focus on Southeast Asia, fits into the wider Indo-Pacific framework, with priority given to strategic and security aspects over economic issues.⁸⁷

Traditional pillars of Indian foreign policy play a central role in the interpretation of the Indo-Pacific concept.

Traditional pillars of Indian foreign policy, i.e. non-alignment and strategic autonomy, play a decisive role in India's interpretation of the Indo-Pacific concept.⁸⁸

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (13)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

The “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”

Until June 2019, the term “Indo-Pacific” was not used in official ASEAN statements and documents. However, it must be mentioned in this context that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry presented concrete ideas for an “Indo-Pacific Friendship and Cooperation Treaty” as early as May 2013. This treaty was presented by then Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa as a possible new foreign policy “paradigm”. It was designed to address the changing geopolitical and geo-economic framework of the region and to contain the resultant interstate rivalries. Security in Asia was to be understood as a jointly administered public good to be safeguarded by the Indo-Pacific Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.¹⁰⁴ However, the initiative was met with little enthusiasm outside Indonesia at the time.

Thus, even though ideas on the Indo-Pacific have been circulating within ASEAN for years, at least internally, the “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP), which appeared in June 2019, can primarily be seen as a reply to the Trump administration’s FOIP strategy and to the responses of other states in the region such as Australia, Japan and India.

The ASEAN states felt compelled to launch their own vision of the Indo-Pacific in order to be able to intervene in regional debates on the Indo-Pacific. Behind this lie, on the one hand, historical factors, such as the fear that ASEAN states could become the playground of great powers or the desire to establish ASEAN as a central anchor of regional security cooperation (ASEAN centrality);¹⁰⁵ but current factors also play a role, including concerns about the negative political and economic effects an escalation of the Sino-American rivalry could have on ASEAN.¹⁰⁶ The states of Southeast Asia, partly because of their geographical location between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, felt impelled to challenge the competing ideas of order of the two great powers, China (BRI) and the United States (FOIP), by formulating their own response.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (14)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

ASEAN Member States



Brunei Darussalam
Commencement Date:
7 January 1984



Cambodia
Commencement Date:
30 April 1999



Indonesia
Commencement Date:
8 August 1967



Lao PDR
Commencement Date:
23 July 1997



Malaysia
Commencement Date:
8 August 1967



Myanmar
Commencement Date:
23 July 1997



Philippines
Commencement Date:
8 August 1967



Singapore
Commencement Date:
8 August 1967



Thailand
Commencement Date:
8 August 1967



Viet Nam
Commencement Date:
28 July 1995

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (15)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Different concepts of the Indo-Pacific in comparison

☐ Excluding China ☒ Including China

Actor	Term/Label	Key elements	Main initiatives	Ideas on regional order
ASEAN	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ASEAN at the heart of regional cooperation ("ASEAN centrality") - Maintaining a rules-based order - Strengthening multilateral cooperation 	none	multilateral
Australia	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) - Opening up new markets for trade and investment - Improving connectivity through infrastructure development - Providing alternatives to the "Belt and Road" Initiative (BRI) - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in Papua New Guinea and in the South Pacific) - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, Japan, India - "2+2" dialogues with India, Japan, USA - Revival of the Quad - Strategic dialogues ASEAN countries - Arms exports to partners in Asia - Bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements 	<p>Trade policy: multilateral</p> <p>Security policy: bilateral, minilateral</p>
India	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - ASEAN at the heart of regional cooperation ("ASEAN centrality") - Improvement of connectivity through infrastructure expansion - Providing alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in South Asia) - Asia – Africa Growth Corridor - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, Japan and Australia - "2+2" dialogues with Australia, Japan and USA 	<p>Trade policy: bilateral</p> <p>Security policy: multilateral</p>
Japan	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (until 2018: <i>Strategy</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quad - Opening up new markets for trade and investment - Improvement of connectivity through infrastructure expansion - Providing alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in East Africa and South and Southeast Asia) - Asia – Africa Growth Corridor - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, India and Australia - "2+2" dialogues with USA, India and Australia - Revival of the Quad - Bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements 	<p>Trade policy: multilateral</p> <p>Security policy: bilateral, minilateral</p>
United States	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Containment of China - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quad - Free, fair and reciprocal trade - Improving connectivity through infrastructure development, alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in the Western Pacific) - Expansion of security cooperation with Japan and Australia and India - "2+2" dialogues with Japan, Australia and India - Revival of the Quad - Modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces - Arms exports to partners in Asia - Bilateral trade agreements 	bilateral

Sources: Official documents issued by the respective countries.

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O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (16)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

China's Response to the Indo-Pacific

Officially the term “Indo-Pacific” is not (yet) used in China and therefore does not appear in key documents, such as the Defence White Paper of July 2019.¹²⁰ The term has been used occasionally in Chinese Foreign Ministry press conferences, but always exclusively by foreign journalists. Chinese officials consistently adhere to the expression “Asia-Pacific” in their answers. As late as March 2018, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that the concept of the Indo-Pacific was as short-lived as the foam on the two seas.¹²¹

As far as academic publications are concerned, until 2017 the “Indo-Pacific” was mentioned in relatively few articles (2016: 126; 2017: 202). From 2018 onwards, however, its appearance has increased rapidly (2018: 793; 2019 to October: 612).¹²² It has apparently been accepted that this concept is not going to disappear anytime soon – at least not from the foreign and security policy vocabulary of the United States – and that it is important to gain a better grasp of the new construct. The majority of academic papers published by think tanks and universities refer to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy; the roles of Japan, Australia and India are also regularly analysed. A number of texts compare the Indo-Pacific strategy with China's own BRI. In Chinese media, articles by international policy experts also address or comment on the Indo-Pacific concept.¹²³ A distancing from the term is already evident from the fact that it is placed in quotation marks in most Chinese publications.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (17)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

The perception of the Indo-Pacific in China

Following Donald Trump's announcement of the new geopolitical construct as an American strategy during his first trip to Asia in November 2017 in Vietnam (APEC summit), the reaction not only of the Chinese leadership but also of Chinese academics was initially reserved.¹²⁴ Indeed, Chinese experts and scientists see the concept as still in flux even two years after Trump's announcement.¹²⁵ Almost without exception, they interpret the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as a reaction to global and regional power shifts and to China's rise with its growing economic, political and military influence.

From the Chinese perspective, Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy has replaced the Obama administration's policy of "rebalancing" towards Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, Trump's strategy has replaced the Obama administration's policy of "rebalancing" or reorientation towards Asia ("pivot to Asia").¹²⁶ For Chinese analysts, its goal is obvious: the United States is concerned with maintaining its supremacy in the region (and globally) and with slowing down or containing China's further rise.¹²⁷

Only a single article, albeit one that was published as early as 2013, manages to give the Indo-Pacific concept a positive spin by highlighting common interests in the Indian Ocean, for example in the fight against piracy, and thus identifying an opportunity for cooperation for China as well.¹²⁸

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (17)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

The Indo-Pacific as a containment strategy

China has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific” but has adhered to the term “Asia-Pacific”. The various arguments cited by the Indo-Pacific advocates – the shifting of global economic focus to the region, the merging of the two seas, the increased strategic importance of India and the Indian Ocean, the regional community of values and norms – are all rejected as unconvincing in Chinese academic publications.

Nevertheless, China recognizes in the Indo-Pacific strategy a trend towards increasing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. The U.S. policy mix of cooperation and containment, which from the Chinese perspective has existed for decades, is clearly shifting in favour of the latter.

For China, the main goal is to avert the potential danger of a full-scale confrontation with the United States.

For China, therefore, the main goal is to avert the potential danger of full-scale economic and/or military confrontation. The starting point for this is above all China’s policy towards its neighbouring states and the region, which must be carefully calibrated to prevent the emergence of a united front with the United States against China. China assumes that peaceful coexistence is – or must be – possible between the United States as an established power and China as an emerging power, because the costs and collateral damage of a confrontation are not acceptable to either side (or the other states of the region).

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (1) [FONTE: National Museum of Australia]



From left: Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell, Australian Chief of General Staff, Major-General William Gentry, New Zealand Chief of General Staff and Admiral Arthur Radford, US Commander in Chief Pacific, gather in Honolulu for the first meeting of ANZUS military representatives

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica; logo do Pacto ANZUS]

ANZUS Pact

ANZUS Pact, formally **Pacific Security**

Treaty, security **treaty** between **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and the **United States** that was signed

in San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 1, 1951, for the purpose of providing mutual aid in the event of

aggression and for settling disputes by peaceful means. It came into force in 1952. The three countries' initials provided the acronyms for the treaty and the organization that grew out of it. The United States offered the pact to Australia as compensation for the prospect of Japanese rearmament. Under the terms of the treaty, the three nations maintained a consultative relationship with each other and strove to ensure their **collective security** in the Pacific region.

In the mid-1980s New Zealand instituted an antinuclear policy, one of whose provisions was the banning of nuclear-armed vessels from its ports, including those of the U.S. Navy. In response, the United States formally suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand in 1986 and reduced the two countries' military ties. The three nations remained formal parties to the treaty, but in practical terms ANZUS was inoperative from then on.

Date: September 1, 1951

Participants: **Australia** • **New Zealand** • **United States**

Key People: **Sir Robert Menzies**



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (3) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]


Briefing

Sep 25th 2021 edition >

The new geopolitics of Asia

AUKUS reshapes the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific

A major submarine deal underscores how the new theatre for great-power competition is maritime



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (4) [FONTE: Governos dos EUA / White House, 15/09/2021]



BRIEFING ROOM

Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS

SEPTEMBER 15, 2021 • STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

As leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, guided by our enduring ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order, we resolve to deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. As part of this effort, we are announcing the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called “AUKUS” — Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Through AUKUS, our governments will strengthen the ability of each to support our security and defense interests, building on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties. We will promote deeper information and technology sharing. We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (5) [FONTE: Governos dos EUA / White House, 15/09/2021]

As the first initiative under AUKUS, recognizing our common tradition as maritime democracies, we commit to a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability. We will leverage expertise from the United States and the United Kingdom, building on the two countries' submarine programs to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.

The development of Australia's nuclear-powered submarines would be a joint endeavor between the three nations, with a focus on interoperability, commonality, and mutual benefit. Australia is committed to adhering to the highest standards for safeguards, transparency, verification, and accountancy measures to ensure the non-proliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology. Australia remains committed to fulfilling all of its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state, including with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our three nations are deeply committed to upholding our leadership on global non-proliferation.

Recognizing our deep defense ties, built over decades, today we also embark on further trilateral collaboration under AUKUS to enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability. These initial efforts will focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (6) [FONTE: World Nuclear Association, 2021]



Nuclear-Powered Ships

(Updated June 2021)

- **Nuclear power is particularly suitable for vessels which need to be at sea for long periods without refuelling, or for powerful submarine propulsion.**
- **Over 160 ships are powered by more than 200 small nuclear reactors.**
- **Most are submarines, but they range from icebreakers to aircraft carriers.**
- **In future, constraints on fossil fuel use in transport may bring marine nuclear propulsion into more widespread use. So far, exaggerated fears about safety have caused political restriction on port access.**

Work on nuclear marine propulsion started in the 1940s, and the first test reactor started up in USA in 1953. The first nuclear-powered submarine, *USS Nautilus*, put to sea in 1955.

This marked the transition of submarines from slow underwater vessels to warships capable of sustaining 20-25 knots submerged for weeks on end. The submarine had come into its own.

Nautilus led to the parallel development of further (*Skate*-class) submarines, powered by single pressurised water reactors, and an aircraft carrier, *USS Enterprise*, powered by eight Westinghouse reactor units in 1960. A cruiser, *USS Long Beach*, followed in 1961 and was powered by two of these early units. Remarkably, the *Enterprise* remained in service to the end of 2012.

By 1962 the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines operational and 30 under construction. Nuclear power had revolutionised the Navy.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (7) [FONTE: World Nuclear Association, 2021]

Nuclear Naval Fleets

Russia built 248 nuclear submarines and five naval surface vessels (plus nine icebreakers) powered by 468 reactors between 1950 and 2003, and was then operating about 60 nuclear naval vessels. (Bellona gives 247 subs with 456 reactors 1958-95.) For operational vessels in 1997, Bellona lists 109 Russian submarines (plus four naval surface ships) and 108 attack submarines (SSN) and 25 ballistic missile ones apart from Russia.

At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, there were over 400 nuclear-powered submarines operational or being built. At least 300 of these submarines have now been scrapped and some on order cancelled, due to weapons reduction programmes*. Russia and the USA had over 100 each in service, with the UK and France less than 20 each and China six. The total today is understood to be about 150, including new ones commissioned**. Most or all are fuelled by high-enriched uranium (HEU).


* In 2007 Russia had about 40 retired submarines from its Pacific fleet alone awaiting scrapping. In November 2008 it was reported that Russia intended to scrap all decommissioned nuclear submarines by 2012, the total being more than 200 of the 250 built to date. Most Northern Fleet submarines had been dismantled at Severodvinsk, and most remaining to be scrapped were with the Pacific Fleet.

** Late in 2019: USA 70, Russia 40, China 19, UK 10, France 9, India 3.

India launched its first nuclear submarine in 2009, the 6000 dwt *Arihant* SSBN, with a single 85 MW PWR fuelled by HEU (critical in August 2013) driving a 70 MW steam turbine. It is reported to have cost \$2.9 billion and was to be commissioned in 2016. The second and slightly larger Arihant-class SSBN, the *INS Aridaman* is being built at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam, and was due to be launched in 2018 and commissioned by 2022. It will have a more powerful reactor. Another three Arihant-class vessels launched by 2023 and then six SSBN twice the size of Arihant-class and six nuclear SSNs are planned, the latter being approved by the government in February 2015. The SSNs will be a similar size to Arihant-class SSBN and powered by a new reactor being developed by BARC. India is also leasing an almost-new 7900 dwt (12,770 tonne submerged) Russian *Akula II*-class nuclear attack submarine for ten years from 2010, at a cost of \$650 million: the *INS Chakra*, formerly *Nerpa*. It has a single 190 MWt VM-5/OK-659B (or OK-650B) PWR driving a 32 MW steam turbine and two 2 MWe turbogenerators.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (8) [FONTE: Statista, 2016]

Number of nuclear-powered submarines in June 2016, by country



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (9) [FONTE: The Times, 18/09/2021]



Scott Morrison discussed the defence deal with Boris Johnson at the G7 summit while the French focused on sausages
PETER NICHOLLS/REUTERS/AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE/GETTY


O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (10) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]

HMAS Perfidious Albion

The importance of nuclear submarines lies in the projection of force. Diesel-electric submarines like the Shortfin Barracuda can be very quiet indeed when in electric mode. As such they would be well suited to protecting Australia's coastal waters—better in some ways than nuclear-powered boats, which can never completely silence the hum of their reactors' plumbing. In deeper seas and when travelling greater distances, though, nuclear subs can hide between sound-muffling layers of warm and cold water and make use of their far greater range and sustained speed.

A conventional sub dispatched to patrol the contested waters of the South China Sea from HMAS Stirling, the naval base in Perth which is home to Australia's submarine fleet, would be able to stay on station for just two weeks before returning for refuelling and upkeep, according to calculations by the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an American think-tank. A nuclear sub could lurk for as long as its crew could be fed (see map). Its missions there could include intelligence-gathering and disgorging special forces as well as holding Chinese surface ships and submarines at risk.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (11) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]



The Economist

The Economist

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (12) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]

To go from a diesel-electric fleet to a nuclear fleet is thus a change of strategy, not just of propulsion. It provides a way to project power from the shipping lanes which feed the all-important Malacca Strait to the waters off Taiwan. Add on the capacity to launch much longer-range missiles—a submarine could deliver missiles to China's mainland while sitting to the east of the Philippines—and the country has a greatly expanded offensive

The new boats' specifications and exact provenance are to be defined during an 18-month scoping period. If, over the years that it takes for them to arrive, Australia does in fact lease one or two American Virginia-class subs to train crews and fill the gap, that would further strengthen its ties with America's navy. It would also spur the development of relevant infrastructure at HMAS Stirling and possibly also at Darwin on the north coast and Brisbane on the east, infrastructure visiting American boats could use too. A day after the AUKUS news came the announcement of a substantial increase in America's military presence in and around Australia.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (13) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]

Responding to the AUKUS announcement on September 16th, China's "wolf-warrior" government spokesman, Zhao Lijian, said the submarine co-operation "seriously undermined regional peace and stability, intensified an arms race and undermined international non-proliferation efforts". While the source needs to be taken into account, the deal does raise potential proliferation issues.

The fact that a submarine is nuclear-powered does not mean that it must carry nuclear missiles (and Mr Biden stressed that Australia's would not). There are currently no American nuclear warheads capable of sitting on the sort of missiles that can be fired from the Virginia or Astute boats and thus, probably, the new Australian class. But if the new submarines use reactors like America's and Britain's, Australia will need the fuel those reactors use: highly enriched uranium (HEU) of the sort that is used to make bombs. Australia would not necessarily need to develop enrichment technology itself. Its possession of HEU provided by others would still make it unique among the non-nuclear-weapons states signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (14) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]

Unique, but not in breach: the NPT allows such uses. If Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which polices the NPT, found a way for the HEU to be used on submarines and still kept under IAEA safeguards, they would be setting a precedent which might strengthen the treaty a bit. If they do not, the precedent could point the other way: if safeguards are not the norm, exploiting HEU for submarine propulsion might become cover for making bombs. South Korea recently showed it can launch a ballistic missile from a submarine—a capability most of the nuclear-weapons states have, but which no other non-nuclear-weapon state has ever seen a need for. Were it to start developing nuclear power for its submarines without IAEA safeguards, its motives would come under very close scrutiny.

If Australia's strategic stance is changed by the deal, so is America's. Since the second world war it has projected power across the region via what Bruce Cumings, a historian, calls an "archipelago of empire"—island bases from Hawaii in the east to Guam, Okinawa in Japan and, in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, leased from Britain without the consent of its natives. In Australia, America has now, in effect, a beefed-up continent-sized base for its own operations as well as a reinvigorated ally.


O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (15)

[FONTE: FT, 16/09/2021 e The Economist, 25/09/2021]

China seeks to join transpacific trade pact

Beijing sends application hours after US, UK, and Australia outlined defence deal

September 16 2021



China's request to join the trade pact underlines the increasingly complex relations between Beijing and its neighbours © Getty Images/iStockphoto

China has made a bid to enter a transpacific trade pact originally designed by Washington to limit Beijing's growing economic and political influence in the region.



The Economist

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (16) [FONTE: FT, 16/09/2021]


The predecessor of the CPTPP was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement signed in 2016 by the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and seven other countries. It was originally negotiated by then US president Barack Obama to ensure that Washington, rather than Beijing, kept a hand over regional trade and investment rules.


His successor Donald Trump pulled out of the deal in 2017, leaving Japan to spearhead its reformation into the CPTPP, which came into force the following year.

Beijing's application [comes](#) as Australia, the UK and US struck a security pact allowing Canberra to purchase nuclear-powered submarines to offset an increasingly assertive China. Beijing [condemned the move](#), accusing the three countries of having an "outdated cold war zero-sum mentality".

China's request to join the trade pact underlines the increasingly complex relations between Beijing and its neighbours. Despite rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific, economies are highly dependent on one another. Beijing views deepening trade and investment ties as key to counter growing hostility in capitals including Washington, Canberra, London and Tokyo.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (17) [FONTE: Japan Times, 21/09/2021]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (1) [FONTE: Politico, 15/09/2021]

Von der Leyen finds EU's soul — and its weakness — in State of Union address

In a speech that lacked many applause lines, the Commission president sought to inspire while also highlighting the EU's shortcomings.



European Commission President delivers a speech during a debate on "The State of the European Union" in Strasbourg | Yves Herman/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen riffed on the strength of Europe's soul in her annual State of the Union speech, but there was another theme running through her address on Wednesday: the EU's weakness on the world stage, and its dissension at home.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (2) [FONTE: Politico, 15/09/2021]

She urged greater military independence from the U.S. and less reliance on Asia for computer chips. She conceded that the fight against climate change will depend on the entire world, especially China.

In many ways, her speech was an hour-long discourse about how Brussels struggles to achieve its goals and project its values — at times unable even to compel its own member countries to reach decisions or abide by the rules of the club.

Von der Leyen lamented the inability of the 27 capitals to come together on a single migration and asylum policy — a gap she said the EU's rivals and human traffickers are now exploiting. And she touched on a number of other issues, most notably the rule of law and media freedom, that hinted at other nagging, disagreements within the EU over its basic principles.

Von der Leyen delivered her address to the European Parliament at a moment of acute political delicacy — just 11 days before a hotly-contested German federal election, amid a continuing coronavirus pandemic that has tested government leaders and citizens, and under a persistent cloud of unease and uncertainty.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (3) [FONTE: Euractiv, 16/09/2021]

EU aims for bigger diplomatic weight on Indo-Pacific matters



The European Union outlined on Thursday (16 September) a new strategy for raising its presence in the Indo-Pacific and counter China's increasing influence in the region, which has become the latest arena of the international geopolitical race.

The new strategy coincided with an agreement between the United States, Australia, and Britain to establish a security partnership for the Indo-Pacific, but also to scrap a French-designed nuclear-powered submarine agreement that left Paris fuming about being cut out of the deal.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told *France Info* he felt "stabbed in the back" over the "unacceptable" deal that will hurt French business and shuts the French military out of a key initiative against China.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (4) [FONTE: Euractiv, 16/09/2021]

Speaking to reporters in Brussels later, the chief EU diplomat, Josep Borrell, said the move “does not weaken our relations with Australia, it is a partner we have in the region”, but still made clear that the EU needs to step up its efforts.

“We must survive on our own, as others do,” Borrell said as he presented the new EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, which he called “maybe one of the most important geopolitical documents” of the EU thus far.

“I understand the extent to which French government will be disappointed,” Borrell said and added: “We, Europeans, must look at the autonomy we must strive to have... it’s one way of waking up Europeans and saying ‘look, you need to take the initiative’”.

When, however, pressed by repeated questions about the new US-Australia-UK power alliance, Borrell did say he “regretted” the American move.

The strategy, drawn up around seven priority areas, covers issues such as reducing economic dependence on China through completing EU trade negotiations with Australia, Indonesia and New Zealand, resuming trade negotiations, and starting investment negotiations with India, as well as reevaluating stalled talks with other partners.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (5) [FONTE: FT, 27/09/2021]

European defence: the quest for 'strategic autonomy'

The Aukus deal shows the need for more military collaboration between EU states but the US remains the indispensable partner

September 27 2021



© FT montage; Reuters; Getty Images | Emmanuel Macron was incensed by the Aukus deal but he recognises the need for a strong Nato and strong EU military presence

On the same evening French president Emmanuel Macron found out that the US had secretly struck a defence deal with Australia that [cut France out of a submarine contract](#), he announced a military triumph of his own. Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, leader of the terrorist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, had been [killed "by French forces"](#).

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (6) [FONTE: FT, 27/09/2021]



Some 3,500 French troops are deployed for Operation Barkhane, a seven-year campaign in north Africa's Sahel region © Benoit Tessier/Reuters

Although they are conscious of the need to take on more responsibility for protecting their continent, European defence officials acknowledge that more robust and effective collaboration between member states cannot replace partnership with the US.

Instead, the question is not about making Europe militarily independent from the US, but about how it can be a [more reliable and muscular ally](#).

"This transatlantic alliance is paramount for security in the world. We have never put it into question in Europe," says Charles Michel, president of the European Council. "A more robust Europe makes our alliance more robust."

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (7) [FONTE: FT, 27/09/2021]

The EU's biggest member states are acutely aware of the extent to which the US has reoriented its foreign policy towards competition with China, leaving European security matters as a far less pressing priority than during the cold war. Some see it as only a matter of time before the US withdraws more military assets from Europe as it continues its Indo-Pacific pivot.



During a telephone call last week, US president Joe Biden sought to mollify French president Emmanuel Macron's anger over the Aukus deal © Brendan Smialowski/AP

The Aukus deal has hardened the EU's resolve to forge what its leaders have dubbed "strategic autonomy", a concept that would allow it to deploy its military assets independently from other powers.

But an EU shorn of Britain, previously one of its most important defence players alongside France, is well short of consensus on this topic.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (8) [FONTE: FT, 27/09/2021]

Piecemeal co-ordination

American military support has been essential to the European project ever since the failure to ratify the Treaty of Paris of 1952, which would have united six nations. It was the US that enabled the notion of pooled European security in the face of a potential threat from the Soviet Union through Nato — an alliance that today accounts for all but six of the EU's member states.

But defence analysts see that US security pledge as a double-edged sword, given that it has led to a dependence that means very few European armies could effectively operate without Washington.

The EU's combined capacities are not small. The EU's Nato states have a [combined strength of 1.26m serving troops](#), not far off the US's 1.37m. But that headline figure disguises critical holes in their military capabilities that have always been filled in by the Americans.

EU member states lack strategic airlift capabilities: in essence enough large transport planes to rapidly move thousands of troops, arms and equipment into combat. They lack ground and mobile air defence systems. And the equipment that some states do possess often lacks the ability to communicate with other states' equipment.

"It is all about what we call enablers — the big, behind-the-scenes capabilities, mainly transport and communications," says Brooks Tigner, a Brussels-based analyst at Janes, the defence intelligence company.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (9) [FONTE: Groupe d'études géopolitiques, 22/06/2021]



22/06/2021

Ce que l'Union peut faire en Indo-Pacifique

Il est temps pour l'Union d'intensifier son engagement stratégique dans l'Indo-Pacifique, et sa coopération avec les acteurs de la région. Sur le plan conceptuel, l'Indo-Pacifique est actuellement très en vogue. Les décideurs politiques, diplomates, stratèges et les experts des think tanks débattent tous de l'avenir de cette région dynamique. Je me réjouis de ce débat, tout comme je suis convaincu que cette région constitue à la fois un enjeu majeur pour l'Union européenne, et que cette dernière peut apporter une contribution importante à son développement.

L'Indo-Pacifique est autant un espace stratégique qu'une réalité géographique. L'Union européenne définit la région comme une zone qui s'étend de l'Afrique de l'Est aux États insulaires du Pacifique. Cette zone est en train de devenir le centre de gravité du monde, tant en termes géoéconomiques que géopolitiques.

Je voudrais donner quelques chiffres pour étayer cette affirmation : l'Indo-Pacifique génère 60 % du PIB mondial, et deux tiers de la croissance mondiale. Il s'agit de la deuxième destination la plus importante pour les exportations européennes, et quatre des dix principaux partenaires commerciaux de l'Union s'y trouvent. En d'autres termes, nous sommes un acteur important de son développement.

À l'avenir, l'importance de la région ne fera que se renforcer. D'ici 2030, l'écrasante majorité (90 %) des 2,4 milliards d'individus qui rejoindront la classe moyenne seront originaires de cette région.

Malgré ce dynamisme, la stabilité de la région est de plus en plus remise en question : différends maritimes et terrestres, crises et conflits internes, intensification de la rivalité géopolitique entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Si les conséquences de ces bouleversements se font sentir dans le monde entier, elles sont particulièrement marquées dans cette région. Le renforcement considérable des capacités militaires des pays de l'Indo-Pacifique en témoigne.

Signe de cette dégradation du paysage sécuritaire régional, une autre statistique est particulièrement édifiante : la part de l'Indo-Pacifique dans les dépenses militaires mondiales, en constante augmentation, est passée de 20 % en 2009 à 28 % en 2019. Cela signifie que les pays de cette région investissent massivement dans leurs armées face aux incertitudes qui pèsent sur l'avenir. La démocratie et les libertés fondamentales sont également mises à mal, comme nous l'avons observé récemment au Myanmar.

Il y a un véritable risque que la politique et le nationalisme l'emportent sur le développement économique et la coopération, qui ont pourtant été le ciment des pays de la région, et qui ont permis à des millions de personnes de sortir de la pauvreté.



A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (10) [FONTE: Groupe d'études géopolitiques, 22/06/2021]

La stratégie Indo-Pacifique de l'Union européenne

Pour toutes ces raisons, l'Union souhaite étendre son engagement vis-à-vis de cette région et de ses acteurs. C'est pourquoi les 27 ministres des Affaires étrangères ont récemment adopté une nouvelle stratégie pour la coopération dans l'Indo-Pacifique, après que plusieurs États membres l'ont déjà fait au niveau national (France, Allemagne et Pays-Bas).

Le message est le suivant : l'Union a l'intention de renforcer son engagement avec ses partenaires dans la région Indo-Pacifique afin de répondre aux dynamiques émergentes qui affectent la stabilité régionale.

Concrètement, cela signifie que nous intensifierons les travaux conjoints visant à stimuler le commerce et l'investissement, l'ouverture économique et la connectivité dans une approche durable.

Nous encouragerons la coopération multilatérale en travaillant sur les défis de portée planétaire : de la pandémie au changement climatique, de la biodiversité à la gouvernance des océans en passant par les enjeux liés à l'économie numérique. Enfin, nous approfondirons notre engagement en matière de sécurité, en cherchant à rendre ce volet de la coopération aussi concret que possible.

Notre nouvelle stratégie vise à approfondir le degré d'intégration régionale. Elle est inclusive pour tous les partenaires de la région qui souhaitent coopérer avec l'Union européenne lorsque nos intérêts coïncident. Elle inclut notamment la Chine, car nous savons que dans des domaines importants comme le climat, la pratique durable de pêche, et le respect de la biodiversité, sa coopération est essentielle.

Notre objectif n'est pas d'encourager l'émergence de blocs rivaux ou de forcer les pays à prendre parti. En revanche, nous sommes déterminés à approfondir notre coopération avec des partenaires démocratiques qui partagent les mêmes idées. Il est important de bien comprendre que l'engagement de l'Union européenne en faveur des droits démocratiques et des libertés fondamentales est très fort, non pas parce que nous les considérons comme des constructions européennes ou occidentales, mais parce que ces valeurs et principes sont universels.

Ce point de vue est partagé par de nombreux pays et habitants de cette région qui veulent être maîtres de leur destin politique, et voir leurs droits protégés.

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A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (11) [FONTE: Groupe d'études géopolitiques, 22/06/2021]

Malgré la pandémie et les nombreuses crises sécuritaires dans notre voisinage, l'Union doit être prête à s'engager davantage dans l'Indo-Pacifique, et avec les acteurs de la région.

Josep Borrell

L'étude des investissements et du financement en la matière montre qu'il y a un fort décalage entre les idées reçues et la réalité. Il convient ici de rappeler quelques chiffres.

L'Union est toujours le premier investisseur mondial avec 11 600 milliards d'euros, contre 6 800 milliards d'euros pour les États-Unis, 1 900 milliards d'euros pour la Chine, et 1 500 milliards d'euros pour le Japon.

Nous sommes également le plus grand donateur : notre aide au développement s'est élevée à 414 milliards d'euros entre 2013 et 2018. Ce chiffre est largement comparable à celui des investissements effectués par la Chine dans le cadre des projets des Nouvelles routes de la soie, soit 434 milliards d'euros, mais sous forme de prêts.


Comparaison n'est pas raison, et il serait inopportun de tirer des conclusions trop hâtives avec ce type de chiffres, car il y a souvent un manque de transparence : chacun essaie de faire correspondre les chiffres à ses objectifs.

Mais l'essentiel est là : l'Union est une superpuissance économique. Nous sommes connus pour notre ouverture économique ainsi que notre aide au développement, et nous sommes prêts à continuer sur cette voie avec nos partenaires de la région Indo-Pacifique, afin de bâtir une reprise qui profite aux populations des deux régions.

Malgré l'impact de la pandémie, les économies de l'ASEAN comptent parmi celles qui connaissent la croissance la plus rapide au monde. Le PIB global de l'ASEAN s'élève à 3 000 milliards de dollars et devrait croître de 6 % cette année. L'Indonésie devrait connaître une croissance de 5 % en 2021 et en 2022. Les dernières prévisions de croissance de la Commission européenne prévoient une croissance de 4,2 % en 2021, et de 4,4 % en 2022 dans l'Union.

Nous dépendons de la réussite économique des uns et des autres. À ce titre, la prochaine présidence indonésienne du G20 sera décisive pour travailler ensemble, afin d'ancrer la reprise mondiale sur une base durable et inclusive, de réduire les inégalités mondiales, et de lutter contre la crise climatique.

A vontade de autonomia estratégica da União Europeia (12) [FONTE: cartoon de Ben Jennings, 2021]



Sugestões de leitura

