


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

SESSÃO Nº8

24/11/2021




PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]




Facts

| | |
|---|---|
| Also Known As | Formosa • Republic of China • Chung-hua Min-kuo • T'ai-wan |
| Head Of Government | Premier: Su Tseng-chang |
| Population | (2021 est.) 23,487,000 |
| Currency Exchange Rate | 1 USD equals 27.775 Taiwan new dollar |
| Seat Of Government | Taipei |
| Head Of State | President: Tsai Ing-wen |
| Form Of Government | multiparty republic with one legislative house (Legislative Yuan [113 ¹]) |
| Official Language | Mandarin Chinese |
| Official Religion | none |
| Official Name | Chung-hua Min-kuo (Republic of China) |
| Total Area (Sq Km) | 36,197 |
| Total Area (Sq Mi) | 13,976 |
| Monetary Unit | New Taiwan dollar (NT\$) |
| Population Rank | (2021) 57 |
| Population Projection 2030 | 23,557,000 |
| Density: Persons Per Sq Mi | (2021) 1,680.5 |
| Density: Persons Per Sq Km | (2021) 648.9 |
| Urban-Rural Population | Urban: (2018) 78.2% • Rural: (2018) 21.8% |
| Life Expectancy At Birth | Male: (2018) 77.6 years • Female: (2018) 84.1 years |
| Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate | Male: not available • Female: not available |
| Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000) | (2019) 610,872 |
| Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$) | (2019) 25,881 |

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (3) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]


Ethnic composition (2003)



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
A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (4) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Taiwan religious affiliation (2005)




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A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (5) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (6) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]


Taiwan major export destinations (2018)



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A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (7) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Taiwan major import sources (2018)



© Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (8)

[FONTE: Chiang Kai-Shek (imagem à esquerda) Encyclopædia Britannica]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (9)

[FONTE: Proclamação da República Popular da China a 1/10/1949 por Mao Tsé-Tung (Mao Zedong) / Wikimedia Coommons]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (10) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]

Taiwan in Time: The great retreat

The KMT's massive transportation of people, goods, artifacts, military and government institutions to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War was mostly complete by the time the central government started operating in Taipei

By Han Cheung / Staff reporter

Taiwan in Time: Dec. 5 to Dec. 11

Shortly after noon on Dec. 10, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) finished their last meal in China. The elder Chiang's mood was solemn as they headed to Chengdu's military airport. Without saying a word, he boarded the plane to Taiwan.

By that time, the transfer of people, public property and military and governmental institutions to Taiwan was mostly complete. A day earlier, the Republic of China's Executive Yuan held its 102nd meeting — its first in Taipei.

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (11) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]



Members of the Republic of China Army board a ship bound for Taiwan in 1949.

Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

The Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) retreat to Taiwan in 1949 after losing the Chinese Civil War was a lengthier and more monumental, taking place over the course of more than a year with countless freight and air trips.

Before deciding on Taiwan, the KMT entertained the idea of retreating to western China. Many officials opposed the move, as it was too close to the rapidly advancing People's Liberation Army, which knew the terrain well.

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (12) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]



Chiang Kai-shek, center, visits Taiwan in 1946. Three years later, it would become his permanent home.


Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Chang argued that Taiwan's subtropical climate, abundant resources and advanced infrastructure left behind by the Japanese would be able to support a massive population influx. The Taiwan Strait would make it difficult for the People's Liberation Army to mount an immediate attack, and the US would be more likely to protect such a strategic location.

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (13) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]

Chang also believed that the people of Taiwan would welcome the “motherland” government after years of Japanese rule, and that it was relatively free of communist influence. The suppression of the 228 Incident a year previously would further deter people from causing unrest, making it a “stable” base for the KMT to prepare their counterattack.

THE BIG MOVE



By the time People's Liberation Army soldiers took over Nanjing's Presidential Palace in April 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party's retreat to Taiwan was already under way.

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (14) [FONTE: FT, 27/05/2021]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (15)

[FONTE: Atlantic, 8/10/2015 - imagem das ilhas Quemói (Kinmen)]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (16)

[FONTE: Atlantic, 8/10/2015 - imagem das ilhas Quemói (Kinmen)]



A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (17) [FONTE: The Straits Times, 4/11/2020]



Tank traps on the beaches of Taiwan's Kinmen Island on Oct 20, 2020. PHOTO: AFP

A questão de Taiwan: enquadramento geopolítico (18) [FONTE: Reuters /SCMP, 27/10/2021]



A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (1) [FONTE: Governo de Taiwan]

● Diplomatic Allies



country with whom we currently have
diplomatic relations

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (2) [FONTE: Governo de Taiwan]

East Asia and Pacific



Marshall Islands Republic of Nauru Palau



Tuvalu

Africa



Eswatini

Europe



Holy See

Latin America and Caribbean



Belize Republic of Guatemala Haiti



Republic of Honduras Nicaragua Republic of Paraguay



St. Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia St. Vincent & the Grenadines

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (3) [FONTE: World Population Review, 2021]

GDP Ranked by Country 2021

| Rank ▲ | Name | GDP (IMF '19) | GDP (UN '16) | GDP Per Capita | Population |
|--------|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| 1 | United States | 22.20 Tn | 18.62 Tn | \$66,678 | 332,915,073 |
| 2 | China | 15.47 Tn | 11.22 Tn | \$10,710 | 1,444,216,107 |
| 3 | Japan | 5.50 Tn | 4.94 Tn | \$43,597 | 126,050,804 |
| 4 | Germany | 4.16 Tn | 3.48 Tn | \$49,548 | 83,900,473 |
| 5 | India | 3.26 Tn | 2.26 Tn | \$2,338 | 1,393,409,038 |
| 6 | United Kingdom | 2.93 Tn | 2.65 Tn | \$42,915 | 68,207,116 |
| 7 | France | 2.88 Tn | 2.47 Tn | \$43,959 | 65,426,179 |
| 8 | Italy | 2.09 Tn | 1.86 Tn | \$34,629 | 60,367,477 |
| 9 | Brazil | 2.06 Tn | 1.80 Tn | \$9,638 | 213,993,437 |
| 10 | Canada | 1.83 Tn | 1.53 Tn | \$48,137 | 38,067,903 |
| 11 | South Korea | 1.74 Tn | 1.41 Tn | \$34,000 | 51,305,186 |
| 12 | Russia | 1.67 Tn | 1.25 Tn | \$11,428 | 145,912,025 |
| 13 | Spain | 1.50 Tn | 1.24 Tn | \$32,026 | 46,745,216 |
| 14 | Australia | 1.48 Tn | 1.30 Tn | \$57,447 | 25,788,215 |
| 15 | Mexico | 1.30 Tn | 1.08 Tn | \$9,963 | 130,262,216 |
| 16 | Indonesia | 1.21 Tn | 932.26 Bn | \$4,374 | 276,361,783 |
| 17 | Netherlands | 954.93 Bn | 777.23 Bn | \$55,606 | 17,173,099 |
| 18 | Turkey | 809.55 Bn | 863.71 Bn | \$9,519 | 85,042,738 |
| 19 | Saudi Arabia | 790.06 Bn | 639.62 Bn | \$22,356 | 35,340,683 |
| 20 | Switzerland | 740.70 Bn | 668.85 Bn | \$84,987 | 8,715,494 |
| 21 | Poland | 643.27 Bn | 471.40 Bn | \$17,019 | 37,797,005 |
| 22 | Taiwan | 633.70 Bn | | \$26,564 | 23,855,010 |
| 23 | Sweden | 576.72 Bn | 514.48 Bn | \$56,763 | 10,160,169 |
| 24 | Belgium | 553.78 Bn | 467.96 Bn | \$47,607 | 11,632,326 |
| 25 | Thailand | 547.43 Bn | 407.03 Bn | \$7,826 | 69,950,850 |

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (4) [FONTE: The Economist, 19/11/2020]

Why commercial ties between Taiwan and China are beginning to fray

The relationship that helped build China's economy faces new challenges

Nov 19th 2020

HUNDREDS OF JOBSEEKERS lined up outside a factory gate on a recent autumn morning. Uni-Royal, a Taiwanese maker of electronic components for such brands as Samsung and Toshiba, was looking for extra help at its plant in Kunshan, an hour's drive west of Shanghai. New factory hands could earn 4,000 yuan (\$610) a month, double the local minimum wage. Kunshan is dotted with hundreds of Taiwanese manufacturers like Uni-Royal. More than 100,000 Taiwanese call Kunshan home.

"Little Taipei", as Kunshan is known, illustrates a broader phenomenon. Exact estimates vary, but as many as 1.2m Taiwanese, or 5% of Taiwan's population, are reckoned to live in China—many of them business folk. Taiwan Inc has not let fraught political relations with China, which views the island as part of its territory, get in the way of business. Taiwanese companies have invested \$190bn in Chinese operations over the past three decades. Foxconn, a giant Taiwanese contract manufacturer of electronics for Apple and other gadget-makers, employs 1m workers in China, more than any other private enterprise in the country.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (5) [FONTE: The Economist, 19/11/2020]

When China opened up to foreign investment in the 1980s, entrepreneurs from Taiwan were the first foreigners to open their wallets. Enticed by cheap labour and land across the strait, they quickly set up shop in the coastal provinces closest to Taiwan. To this day Jiangsu (which includes Kunshan), Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong attract most Taiwanese money (see map). A common language and shared culture helped reduce transaction costs. Foxconn built its first Chinese factory in Shenzhen in 1988. By 2008 around a sixth of China's stock of inward investment came from Taiwan, making it the biggest foreign investor in China.



The Economist

Today three of China's 12 most popular consumer-goods brands by revenue are Taiwanese. Chinese gobble up Master Kong instant noodles, Want Want rice crackers and Uni-President juices. Apple's three biggest China-based suppliers—Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron—are all Taiwanese.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (6) [FONTE: The Economist, 19/11/2020]

Now China is going out of its way to recruit more businesses from Taiwan. Between 2018 and 2019 the government unveiled no fewer than 25 policies aimed at luring them. Measures include tax credits and, more striking, a special right to bid on lucrative government contracts, from railway construction to “Made in China 2025”, an innovation scheme centred on advanced manufacturing. In May the Chinese authorities released an official directive, signed by five ministries, permitting Taiwanese-owned firms in China to “receive the same treatment as mainland enterprises”. It applies even to sensitive areas like 5G mobile networks, artificial intelligence and the hyperconnected “Internet of Things”. No other foreign firms enjoy similar treatment.

These efforts by Beijing have so far had limited success. Annual investment flows from Taiwan have fallen by more than half since 2015 (see chart). This growing reticence on the part of corporate Taiwan can be explained by three considerations. The first is geopolitical.

China’s goal of discouraging formal independence by strengthening business ties is increasingly transparent to many Taiwanese. Beijing’s special treatment of Taiwanese firms, which are designated as domestic ones in its drive for “indigenous innovation”, only stokes more suspicions. It may have helped Taiwan’s independence-leaning president win re-election in January. Chinese firms, which have been able to invest in Taiwan since 2009, are coming under fire from the island’s regulators, which suspect them of being a fifth column for the Chinese Communist Party. Last month Taobao Taiwan, the local version of Alibaba’s Chinese e-commerce platform, said that it would cease operations.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (7) [FONTE: FT, 21/1/2021]

Taiwan manufacturers quit China over trade tensions and rising costs

Shift out of mainland reverses decades of investment and could rattle supply chains

January 11 2021



A semiconductor facility in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Businesses are bidding farewell to China and moving production back to Taiwan © Bloomberg

Human resources executives at Hwa Meei Optical are working overtime. The Taiwanese sunglasses and goggles maker is looking to hire 30 workers, many of them urgently, for a new factory.

Having based most of its production in China for more than two decades, Hwa Meei is now expanding at home. A new plant in Taiwan, opened earlier this year, will create 180 jobs and is part of a plan to expand the group's footprint in higher margin products.


A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (8) [FONTE: FT, 21/1/2021]

Hwa Meei is not an outlier. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese enterprises are bidding farewell to China because of rising costs and trade tensions between Washington and Beijing, marking a dramatic shift for Taiwan's corporate landscape with significant implications for global manufacturing.

"I see a structural collapse among the ranks of Taiwanese-owned businesses in China," said Liu Jen, editor in chief at CRIF China Credit Information Service in Taipei.

According to its survey, revenues grew at less than half of the 1,000 largest Taiwanese-owned enterprises in China last year and their total net profits before taxes dropped by more than one-fifth to the lowest in nine years. "The era of cross-strait industrial co-prosperity is over," Mr Liu said.

Performance of top 1,000 Taiwanese-owned companies in China



Source: CRIF China Credit Information Service
© FT

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (9) [FONTE: BBC, 5/10/2021]

Record number of China planes enter Taiwan air defence zone

5 October



Getty Images

This is not the first time Chinese planes have flown into Taiwan's air defence zone

Taiwan has urged Beijing to stop "irresponsible provocative actions" after a record number of Chinese warplanes entered its air defence zone.

Monday's incursion marks the fourth straight day of incursions by Chinese aircraft, with almost 150 aircraft sent into Taiwan's defence zone in total.

Some analysts say the flights could be seen as a warning to Taiwan's president ahead of the island's national day.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway province.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (10) [FONTE: BBC, 5/10/2021]

In an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine on Tuesday, Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen warned there would be "catastrophic" consequences for peace and democracy in Asia if the island were to fall to China.


"It would signal that in today's global contest of values, authoritarianism has the upper hand over democracy," she wrote.

Ms Tsai added that while Taiwan did not seek confrontation, Taiwan would "do whatever it takes to defend itself".

Taiwan has been reporting for more than a year that China's air force has been repeatedly flying nearby.

Incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone are on the rise

Chinese military aircraft sorties reported this year



Source: Taiwan Ministry of National Defence


BBC

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (11) [FONTE: Statista, 2021]

The Military Imbalance In The Taiwan Strait

Military forces of China and Taiwan in comparison (2021)

🇨🇳 Mainland China 🇹🇼 Taiwan



Source: U.S. Department Of Defense



A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (12) [FONTE: Armed Forces]

🌐 Military power of China & Taiwan




Map of the world.


| | | |
|---------------------|---|--|
| Country: | China (CN) | Taiwan (TW) |
| Capital: | Beijing | Taipei |
| Population: | 1,444,390,177 | 23,568,378 |
| Area: | 9,596,961 km ² | 36,193 km ² |
| More: | China military forces description | Taiwan military forces description |
| Economy Comparison: | China - Taiwan | |

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (13) [FONTE: Armed Forces]

\$ Military expenditures

| |  CN |  TW |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Military budget: | 252 billion \$ | 13 billion \$ |
| Percent of GDP: | 1.7% | 2.3% |

Military budget 
\$




%





A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (14) [FONTE: Armed Forces]

Manpower

| |  CN |  TW |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Active personnel: | 2,185,000 | 290,000 |
| Reserve personnel: | 8,000,000 | 2,800,000 |
| Available for military: | 385,821,101 | 5,883,828 |

Active 




%






A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (15) [FONTE: Armed Forces, 2021]

✈ Air Forces

| |  CN |  TW | |
|----------------------|--|--|---|
| Total aircraft: | 4,630 | 814 | |
| Fighter aircraft: | 1,049 | 129 | + |
| Multirole aircraft: | 1,130 | 189 | + |
| Attack aircraft: | 120 | 0 | + |
| Helicopters: | 1,355 | 237 | + |
| UCAV (combat drone): | 151 | 0 | + |

Total aircraft 



%



Bar chart icon

Pie chart icon

More ▾

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (16) [FONTE: Armed Forces, 2021]

Navy

| |  CN |  TW | |
|-------------------|--|--|---|
| Total naval: | 742 | 96 | |
| Aircraftcarriers: | 4 | 0 | + |
| Destroyers: | 38 | 4 | + |
| Frigates: | 54 | 22 | + |
| Corvettes: | 73 | 1 | + |
| Submarines: | 74 | 4 | + |

Total naval 



A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (17) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

China's National Defense in the New Era

The State Council Information Office of
the People's Republic of China

July 2019

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A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (18)

[FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

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A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (19) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

I. International Security Situation

China's Security Risks and Challenges Should Not Be Overlooked

China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China's overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development. Nevertheless, it also faces diverse and complex security threats and challenges.

The fight against separatists is becoming more acute. The Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), stubbornly stick to "Taiwan independence" and refuse to recognize the 1992 *Consensus*, which embodies the one-China principle. They have gone further down the path of separatism by stepping up efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for *de jure* independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence. The "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the peaceful reunification of the country. External separatist forces for "Tibet independence" and the creation of "East Turkistan" launch frequent actions, posing threats to China's national security and social stability.

China's homeland security still faces threats. Land territorial disputes are yet to be completely resolved. Disputes still exist over the territorial sovereignty of some islands and reefs, as well as maritime demarcation. Countries from outside the region conduct frequent close-in reconnaissance on China by air and sea, and illegally enter China's territorial waters and the waters and airspace near China's islands and reefs, undermining China's national security.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (20) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

II. China's Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era

The socialist system of China, the strategic decision to follow the path of peaceful development, the independent foreign policy of peace, and the best of cultural traditions – considering peace and harmony as fundamentals – determine that China will pursue a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.


Resolutely Safeguarding China's Sovereignty, Security and Development Interests

To solve the Taiwan question and achieve complete reunification of the country is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and essential to realizing national rejuvenation. China adheres to the principles of “peaceful reunification”, and “one country, two systems”, promotes peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and advances peaceful reunification of the country. Meanwhile, China resolutely opposes any attempts or actions to split the country and any foreign interference to this end. China must be and will be reunited. China has the firm resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession of any part of its territory by anyone, any organization or any political party by any means at any time. We make no promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and the very small number of “Taiwan independence” separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.

A pressão da China para recuperar / anexar Taiwan (21)

[FONTE: Paresh / Japan Times, 30/05/2016]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (1) [FONTE: Global Network Against Food Crisis, 2021]



A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (2)

[FONTE: Global Network Against Food Crisis, 2021]

GRFC 2021 in brief

The magnitude and severity of food crises worsened in 2020 as protracted conflict, the economic fallout of COVID-19 and weather extremes exacerbated pre-existing fragilities. Forecasts point to a grim outlook for 2021, with the threat of Famine persisting in some of the world's worst food crises.

In 2020



155M people

in 55 countries/territories were in **Crisis or worse** (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent – an increase of around 20 million people from 2019.



133 000 people

in Burkina Faso, South Sudan and Yemen were in **Catastrophe** (IPC/CH Phase 5) and needed urgent action to prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.



28M people

in 38 of the 43 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses were in **Emergency** (IPC/CH Phase 4) and needed urgent action to save lives and livelihoods.

66%

of the 155 million people in **Crisis or worse** (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent were in 10 countries/territories – Democratic Republic of the Congo (21.8M), Yemen (13.5M), Afghanistan (13.2M), Syrian Arab Republic (12.4M), Sudan (9.6M), northern Nigeria (9.2M), Ethiopia (8.6M), South Sudan (6.5M), Zimbabwe (4.3M) and Haiti (4.1M).

In three countries, more than half of the population analysed was in **Crisis or worse** (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.



SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC



SOUTH SUDAN



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Children living in food-crisis countries/territories are especially vulnerable to malnutrition.



15.8M children under 5 years in the 55 food-crisis countries/territories were wasted.



75.2M children under 5 years in the 55 food-crisis countries/territories were stunted.

The primary **drivers** of acute food insecurity in 2020 were **conflict/insecurity, economic shocks** – including those resulting from COVID-19 – and **weather extremes**. Drivers often co-exist and reinforce one another.



CONFLICT/INSECURITY
99.1M people
in **23** countries/
territories



ECONOMIC SHOCKS
40.5M people
in **17** countries



WEATHER EXTREMES
15.7M people
in **15** countries

Forecast 2021



While conflict will remain the major driver of food crises in 2021, the economic repercussions of COVID-19 will exacerbate acute food insecurity in fragile economies.



142M people

are projected to be in **Crisis or worse** (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in **40** countries/territories for which forecasts are available.



155 000 people

will likely face **Catastrophe** (IPC/CH Phase 5) in two of these countries through mid-2021, with **108 000** in South Sudan and **47 000** in Yemen.

In **South Sudan**, four payams of Pibor county will continue to face Famine Likely (IPC Phase 5).

In northern **Nigeria**, although no population/area is projected to be in Catastrophe/Famine (CH Phase 5), some indicators suggest that a proportion of the population (<10%) may face such conditions.

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (3) [FONTE: Global Network Against Food Crisis, 2021]

CHAPTER 1 A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES

Global food crises overview, 2020

Around 155 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 55 countries/territories in 2020.

The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 2020 was nearly 20 million higher than in 2019 (134.7 million in 55 countries/territories). The additional people were mainly in 12 food crises: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Syrian Arab Republic, with around 6 million more each; Nigeria (15 states and the FCT) and the Sudan, with around 4 million more each; Afghanistan, Burkina Faso and Honduras, all with around 2 million more each and Burundi, Cameroon, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda, all with about 1 million more each.

Around 21 percent of the analysed population was in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 2020, up from 16.5 percent in 2019.

Out of the 47 million children suffering from wasting globally, 15.8 million were in these 55 food crises. Out of the 144 million children affected by stunting globally, 75.2 million were in the 55 food crises (JME, March 2020).



15.8M children under 5 years old are wasted and 75.2M children under 5 years old are stunted in the 55 food-crisis countries/territories.

Source: JME, March 2020.

Populations in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

In South Sudan, the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) increased from zero in May–July 2020 to 92 000 in October–November 2020, and increased further to 105 000 in six counties by December (IPC and external reviews, December 2020). The IPC Famine Review Committee determined that four payams in Pibor county faced Famine Likely (IPC Phase 5) in October–December 2020.

In Yemen, around 16 500 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the last quarter of 2020 in five districts in the governorates of Al Jawf and Hajjah, driven by conflict, displacement and limited humanitarian access, and Amran, where highly vulnerable marginalized groups lack access to public services. This marks a decrease since January 2019 when 63 500 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 25 districts in eight governorates, including Amran and Hajjah but not Al Jawf.

Burkina Faso's crisis worsened by mid-2020 when around 11 400 people – partially or completely cut off from humanitarian assistance – were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)

An additional 208 million people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 43 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses in 2020 and required action for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.



Some 155.3 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 55 countries/territories in 2020.



Nearly 133 000 people were in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in Burkina Faso, South Sudan and Yemen in 2020.

SOUTH SUDAN



105 000

YEMEN



16 500

BURKINA FASO



11 400

Source: FSIN, using IPC and CILSS-CH data.



Some 208 million people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 43 countries/territories in 2020.

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (4) [FONTE: Global Network Against Food Crisis. 2021]

The regional perspective

In 2020, Africa remained the continent most affected by food crises, accounting for 63 percent of the global total number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent, up from 54 percent in 2019. See map 1.2.


The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in Central and Southern Africa was the highest on the continent at 40.2 million, up from 32.2 million in 2019. This increase is partly explained by the economic impact of COVID-19 and protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well increased analysis coverage. In East Africa, 32.9 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), 75 percent of them in the Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan. In West Africa and the Sahel, 24.8 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent – almost double the number of 2019 largely due to intensifying conflict, mass displacement and the economic impact of COVID-19.

Eurasia accounted for 29 percent of the global total number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent. In the Middle East, 29.4 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in four conflict-affected countries/territories (Iraq, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen) as well as refugee populations (mainly Syrian) in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. In South Asia, (Afghanistan, Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan), 15.6 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.

In Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and Haiti, over 11.8 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), a dramatic increase since 2019 due to increasing analysis coverage as well as deteriorating food crises linked to repeated weather extremes and the economic fallout from COVID-19 on fragile economies. See figure 1.6.

Map 1.2

Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (or equivalent) by region, 2020



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2021.

Figure 1.6


Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above (or equivalent), by region, 2016–2020

Data from 39 countries common to all editions of the GRFC 2017–2021

| | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| Eurasia | 31.3 | 36.5 | 36.8 | 36.9 | 45.6 |
| East Africa | 25.9 | 29.3 | 28.4 | 27.7 | 32.9 |
| Central America and Haiti | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 7.8 | 11.8 |
| Central and Southern Africa | 22.3 | 23.4 | 25.2 | 30.2 | 40.2 |
| West Africa and the Sahel, Cameroon and Libya | 11.5 | 18.1 | 11.4 | 12.6 | 24.8 |

Source: FSIN, GRFC 2017–2021.

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (5) [FONTE: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2013]



A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (6) [FONTE: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2013]

Growing demand and limited supply

First, the world population is set to reach over 9 billion by 2050.¹⁰ The greatest share of this increase will take place in developing countries, in a setting of urbanization and robust income growth from economic development.¹¹

Population growth and urbanization are expected to result in 3 billion more urban dwellers by 2050. For most people living in cities, food will have to be brought in from remote food-production centers. Higher incomes will change diets and consumption patterns. As more and more people enter the middle class, demand for meat and dairy products will increase. However, animal products such as meat and dairy require more resources to be produced and cause higher emissions than plant-based alternatives.¹² Growing demand for meat diverts cereal stocks toward meat production; 7 to 10kg of cereals are required to produce 1kg of meat.¹³ Globally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-FAO Outlook of 2012 estimates that the world will have 2.3 billion additional mouths to feed by 2050. This rise in demand will require 60% more animal feed, 1 billion more tonnes of cereals, and 200 million more tonnes of meat.¹⁴

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (7)

[FONTE: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2013]

Second, food availability has come under increasing pressure due to competing demands from the non-food sector, mainly for the production of biofuel and animal feed. For instance, global demand for vegetable oils for non-food industrial purposes has tripled within 20 years. Demand from China and the European Union (EU) accounted for 40% of this increase.¹⁵ The pressure from the biofuel sector is lessening somewhat as the continuation of mandatory blending of fossil fuels with biofuels is being debated in the EU and United States (US).¹⁶ The discovery of shale gas and increased production from difficult-to-access oil deposits in the US may also temper the demand for biofuel. Although cereal availability is not a pressing issue yet, it is significant that between 2008 and 2011 cereal production for non-food purposes grew by 5.8% whereas cereal production for food purposes grew by only 2.5%. In 2010–2011 as much as 54% of total cereal production was used for purposes other than food.¹⁷

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (8) [FONTE: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2013]

Security implications

Against this backdrop, food security is an issue which is increasingly dealt with in the realm of geopolitics. Indicative of this development is the recent discourse surrounding the spikes of food prices, which emphasizes the security risks of food scarcity. The security implications of food insecurity became fully apparent during the 2008 food crisis and more recently during the Arab Spring. In January 2011, record high food prices resulted in protests in Tunisia, in which over 100 people died and which subsequently led to the spread of revolutions in other North African and Middle Eastern countries. Commentators have since depicted food scarcity as the “hidden driver of world politics”.²⁸

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (9)

[FONTE: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2013]

Another phenomenon causing international tensions is land grabbing, which is the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign investors. High food prices have triggered an increase of large scale acquisitions of farmland, especially in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Governments of emerging and developed economies have started to proactively purchase or lease thousands of hectares of farmland in foreign countries as an alternative to buying food on the international food market. Target countries usually welcome this interest, as it brings foreign investment, technology, know-how, and infrastructure. Land deals, however, can also create instability and other security risks when compromising the local population's access to resources, alienating local people who depend on those resources for livelihood and food security, and putting local farmers out of business.³²

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (10) [FONTE: The Geopolitics of Food (Interview with Tim Lang) / Renewable Matter 14/10/20]

The Geopolitics of Food. Interview with Tim Lang

Tim Lang favours the long view. You can't look at the food system without using a complex, holistic approach. No one has a better outlook than the internationally renowned professor of Food Policy at London's City University. His latest book Feeding Britain, focuses on his home country but his analysis span across the world. His take is that some countries like UK are, de facto, facing a wartime scale of food challenge. Geopolitics and consumer culture are the two main drivers that are slowing down the circular and climate-proof transition of the food system. We sat down for a hour long interview on Skype to discuss: what's coming next?



A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (11) [FONTE: The Geopolitics of Food (Interview with Tim Lang) / Renewable Matter 14/10/20]

Professor Lang, what are today's main challenges in the global food system?

"The trends are the same as ten years ago. **Climate change** becomes more urgent, **biodiversity loss** even more. But there is also a new important dynamic: **geopolitical uncertainties**. I speak from **Brexitland**, which used to be known as Britain, a nation that has chosen to destabilise the European Union, which is on a steady decline. There are tensions between the United States, China, India, Russia, Europe. Those big macro political economic issues affect what happens in the food system just as much as they shape the car, the packaging or the tourist industry. So, geopolitics is becoming very important. Leaving Europe my country, Britain, is having to think about food security again. And last: there is an **urgent need to tackle consumer culture**. Driving down the price of goods in order to make them more available has now become a crisis of our own making. It's absolutely clear that **the food system in Europe overeats**, over consumes, wastes more and more. Even the Mediterranean diet has worsened, transitioned into a rising avalanche of ultra-processed foods, all of which send signals back onto land use, jobs and so on. I have called it the **permanent eating economy**."

You have repeatedly said that there is a broad problem of "food defense".

"When we buy cheap oranges from West Africa, saying we don't need Spain. Or rely on our relations with US and believe we can get endless oranges from Florida; we are basically exposing ourselves to food security issues. Brexit showed us our fragility. Great Britain was an industrial nation in the 18th century and then became the dominant imperial power in the 19th century and pursued that as a way of feeding ourselves."

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (12) [FONTE: The Geopolitics of Food (Interview with Tim Lang) / Renewable Matter 14/10/20]

In your book, you stress the relevance of local production.

“We have focused on mass distribution of companies like **Tesco**. The prioritization of price has weakened the UK agriculture, so that primary producers get the smallest slice of the cake. They get about 5% of the value of the food we buy. We need a market where local producers get a fair share. In our country, the 50% self-sufficiency should be nearer to 80% in order to contribute globally.

Everywhere in Europe, the small farms and the small business sector is really in a very great difficulty. They are outmaneuvered and outcompeted by giant companies. There is a fundamental tension between small-food economy and big-food economy, and I don't think Europe is dealing with that. Again: we need policies. The tendency instead is still to internationalize, to haul food across the globe. **The motorways are full of food.** One in five trucking kilometers is done to transport food. The embedded carbon-intensive infrastructure is ridiculous.”

Can using waste to produce new biomaterial or biogas be an opportunity for farmers?

“In UK there's a lot of talk, some action, but not enough on this issue. I was in the government commission on food and natural resources for the Sustainable Development Commission, which was abolished by the conservative government in 2011. It was an attempt to really invest in food waste reduction, – the program was called Waste Resources Action Program, WRAP – but the only initiative that could have had political leverage over the food industry was closed down. Without governance we wasted nine years. We see some good examples, with the SDGs. But still there is a massive reliance on plastic, and little reflection on agricultural waste. Maybe plastic milk bottles have got a bit thinner. But in Britain there is no national harmonised scheme. Everyone has different recycling systems. **We need a systemic change of approach for food**, and we need it urgently. We can't waste time now.”

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (13) [FONTE: Politico 3/11/2021]

Mexico: Front line of the global food war

Mexico is battling to revitalize indigenous corn, while the US seeks to stop the spread of a movement against GM food and agrichemicals.



Illustration by Jaya Nicely for POLITICO

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (14) [FONTE: Politico 3/11/2021]

It was, after all, in Mexico that people first cultivated maize from the [teosinte plant](#) 10,000 years ago. The country now boasts [64 different strains](#), which are mashed, fried and kneaded into [at least 600](#) traditional dishes, from tortilla flatbreads — which most Mexicans eat on a daily basis — to spicy pozole soup.

In an astonishing twist of fate, however, the country that first farmed the crop now vies with Japan to be the world's biggest importer, and buys mainly genetically modified maize from the giant farms of the United States, with which it finds it hard to compete.

It is the left-leaning populist president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who is now seeking to turn back that tide of U.S. products, as part of a broader push to revive national industries and support rural indigenous communities. In a shock declaration of war against Big Agri, he pledged last New Year's Eve to phase out GM corn by 2024, along with the ubiquitous pesticide glyphosate that is often sprayed on maize. The chemical is widely attacked by activists who argue that it [damages soil](#) and is a carcinogen. "Corn, this sacred plant, is from Mexico — yet we are the nation that imports the most corn around the world," he proclaimed back in his [inaugural speech](#) in 2018.

Mexico's maize mobilization exposes the [most active fault line in global food policy](#). The United States is increasingly worried that a European-led movement against GM products and pesticides will spread, throwing up barriers to trade. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is warning that if the European Union triumphs in the contest to set global norms in reducing agrichemicals and going organic, the world will suffer a double hammer blow of reduced output and soaring food prices.

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (15) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 2/9/2021]

Your Food Prices Are at Risk as the World Runs Short of Workers

Whether it's fruit pickers, slaughterhouse workers, truckers or waiters, the world's food ecosystem is buckling due to a shortage of staff.

Across the world, a dearth of workers is shaking up food supply chains.


In Vietnam, the army is assisting with the rice harvest. In the U.K., farmers are dumping milk because there are no truckers to collect it. Brazil's robusta coffee beans took 120 days to reap this year, rather than the usual 90. And American meatpackers are trying to lure new employees with Apple Watches while fast-food chains raise the prices of burgers and burritos.

Whether it's fruit pickers, slaughterhouse workers, truckers, warehouse operators, chefs or waiters, the global food ecosystem is buckling due to a shortage of staff. Supplies are getting hit and some employers are forced to raise wages at a double-digit pace. That's threatening to push food prices – already heated by soaring commodities and freight costs – even higher. Prices in August were up 33% from the same month last year, according to an index compiled by the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (16) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 2/9/2021]

“Almost certainly there is disruption,” said Decker Walker, BCG’s agribusiness expert in Chicago. Effects vary among locations and products, he said, but “the general theme seems to be: The roles with the least desirable working conditions are actually the ones that we have the most pain with.”

Global Food Prices Rise During the Pandemic



Data: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Note: Indices track changes in international prices of a basket of food commodities.

There are signs the labor shortfall is curbing supplies. In the U.S., wholesale distributors like Sysco Corp. and United Natural Foods Inc. are reporting production delays and slowdowns for items ranging from bacon and cheese to coconut water and spices. In the U.K., some stores are running low on staples like bread and chicken, while McDonald's Corp. ran out of milkshakes in August.

“We have family-wage, great jobs that have been open, that we’ve been recruiting really hard for and have had trouble filling,” said Patrick Criteser, chief executive officer of Tillamook County Creamery Association. The Oregon-based dairy co-operative recently ran so short of workers that a board member had to skip an operational meeting to help out in the fields. “With the inflation we’re seeing in the business and the inflation that we’re seeing at the farm level, it’s going to translate to the shelf.”

A geopolítica das cadeias de abastecimento alimentar (17)

[FONTE: Signe Wilkinson / Philadelphia Inquirer, 31/03/2021]



Sugestões de leitura

FULL PLANET, EMPTY PLATES

The New Geopolitics of Food Scarcity



Lester R. Brown

