


# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes  
SESSÃO Nº 10  
22/12/2021**



## **PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL**

# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



<b>Also Known As</b>	Ukrayina
<b>Head Of Government</b>	Prime Minister: Denys Shmyhal
<b>Capital</b>	<a href="#">Kyiv</a> (Kiev)
<b>Population</b>	(2021 est.) 43,879,000
<b>Head Of State</b>	President: Volodymyr Zelensky
<b>Form Of Government</b>	unitary multiparty republic with a single legislative house (Verkhovna Rada <sup>1</sup> [450])
<b>Official Language</b>	Ukrainian
<b>Official Religion</b>	none
<b>Official Name</b>	Ukrayina (Ukraine)
<b>Total Area (Sq Km)</b>	603,549
<b>Total Area (Sq Mi)</b>	233,032
<b>Monetary Unit</b>	hryvnya (UAH)
<b>Population Rank</b>	(2021) 34
<b>Population Projection 2030</b>	42,628,000
<b>Density: Persons Per Sq Mi</b>	(2021) 188.3
<b>Density: Persons Per Sq Km</b>	(2021) 72.7
<b>Urban-Rural Population</b>	Urban: (2020) 69.5% • Rural: (2020) 30.5%
<b>Life Expectancy At Birth</b>	Male: (2019) 66.9 years • Female: (2019) 77 years
<b>Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate</b>	Male: not available • Female: not available
<b>Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)</b>	(2020) 147,691
<b>Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)</b>	(2020) 3,540

<sup>1</sup> Translated as Supreme Council.

# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (3)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Volodymyr Zelensky

**president of Ukraine**

*Alternate titles: Volodymyr Zelenskiy*

**Volodymyr Zelensky**, (born January 25, 1978, Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, [U.S.S.R.](#) [now in Ukraine]), Ukrainian actor and comedian who was elected [president](#) of [Ukraine](#) in 2019. Although he was a political novice, Zelensky's [anticorruption](#) platform won him widespread support, and his significant online following translated into a solid electoral base. He won a landslide victory over incumbent [Petro Poroshenko](#) in the second round of the 2019 presidential election.



Volodymyr Zelensky

[See all media](#)


[See all related content →](#)

## Early life and career as an entertainer

Zelensky was born to Jewish parents in the industrial metropolis of [Kryvyi Rih](#) in southern Ukraine. When he was a small child, his family relocated to [Erdenet](#), [Mongolia](#), for four years before returning to Kryvyi Rih, where Zelensky entered school. Like many people from Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk region, he grew up as a native [Russian](#) speaker, but he also acquired fluency in both [Ukrainian](#) and [English](#). In 1995 he entered Kryvyi Rih Economic Institute, the local campus of the Kiev National Economic University, and in 2000 he graduated with a law degree.

# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (4)

[FONTE: Governo da Ucrânia]



[Home](#) / [Government and authorities](#) / [Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine](#)

## Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine



Shmyhal Denys

Prime Minister of Ukraine



Svrydenko Yulia

First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine - Minister of Economy of Ukraine



Vereshchuk Iryna

Deputy Prime Minister - Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine



Stefanishyna Olha

Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine



Fedorov Mykhailo

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine



Nemchinov Oleh

Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine



Galushchenko German

Minister of Energy of Ukraine



Huttsait Vadym

Minister of Youth and Sports of Ukraine



Kuleba Dmytro

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine



Kubrakov Olexandr

Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine



Lazebna Maryna

Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine




Laputina Yulia

Minister for Veterans' Affairs of Ukraine

# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (5)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Ethnic composition (2001)




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# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (6)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Religious affiliation (2004)



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\*Includes "Kiev patriarchy," "Moscow patriarchy," "no particular patriarchy," and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox.


# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (7)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (8)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (9)

[FONTE: Political Geography Now, 2014]



# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (10)

[FONTE: Political Geography Now, 2014]



# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (11)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council, UkraineAlert, 21/10/2019]

## **Kyiv not Kiev: Why spelling matters in Ukraine's quest for an independent identity**



This rush to Ukrainianize spellings is not only a response to Kyiv's sudden newsworthiness. It represents the latest chapter in a long-running campaign to secure recognition for the Ukrainian-language versions of Ukrainian place names, and is part of a much broader post-Soviet drive to assert an independent Ukrainian identity. These efforts have not always met with success. For example, the Ukrainian authorities first endorsed "Kyiv" as the official English-language spelling back in the mid-1990s, but beyond the rarefied world of diplomatic protocol, most members of the international community paid no attention and continued with the more familiar "Kiev" instead.

# A Ucrânia: alguns dados geopolíticos (12)


[FONTE: Atlantic Council, UkraineAlert, 21/10/2019]

All this changed when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. It is no coincidence that international attitudes toward the “Kyiv vs. Kiev” debate have undergone a radical transformation since 2014. Like so many other aspects of Ukrainian identity politics, Russia’s attack has electrified the issue, infusing it with entirely new meaning among domestic audiences and encouraging the outside world to think again. With Russian tanks parked in the Donbas and Moscow propagandists denouncing Ukraine as an accident of history, the continued use of Russian-language transliterations for Ukrainian towns and cities became not only absurd but also grotesque.

As a result, the pre-2014 trickle of institutions and media outlets embracing the “Kyiv” spelling became a flood. In addition to the international press, the list of post-2014 converts includes dozens of airlines and airports, numerous academic dictionaries and textbooks, and the hugely influential United States Board of Geographic Names. Ukraine’s #KyivNotKiev campaign will necessarily continue, but we may finally have reached the tipping point. “Kyiv” has now become the standard spelling in much of the English-language world, while those still clinging to “Kiev” risk accusations of outmoded thinking.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (1)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past, 2008]



# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (2)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past, 2008, Introduction, p. 3]

Where does Russian history end and Ukrainian history begin? This question, which the dissolution of the Soviet Union placed on the scholarly agenda in the West, has not yet received a satisfactory answer. Should the study of the Russian past begin with the Scythians of the Northern Black Sea region, the Varangian princes who took control of the Dnipro (Dnieper) trade route in the closing centuries of the first millennium, or with the rule of the Kyivan (Kievan) princes who established a major polity, known today as Kyivan Rus', in the first centuries of the second millennium? Generations of historians referred to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, as the starting point of the Muscovite dynasty, the Russian state, and, ultimately, the Russian nation. But the historical developments just mentioned have also been claimed by Ukrainian historiography since its inception and are now regarded as integral parts of the history of Ukraine, on whose territory they took place. If these are actually the beginnings of Ukrainian history, when does Russian history start? These questions are fundamental to the formation of modern Russian and Ukrainian national identity and to future relations between these two largest Slavic states and peoples.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (3)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past*, 2008]



2. Ukrainian Lands in the Nineteenth Century. Zenon E. Kohut, Bohdan Y. Nebesio, and Myroslav Yurkevich, *Historical Dictionary of Ukraine* (Lanham, MD, Toronto, and Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005), map 5.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (4)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past, 2008]



3. Ukraine at the Time of the Revolution of 1917. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk, vol. 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 409.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (5)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past, 2008]



4. Soviet Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk, vol. 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 441.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (6)

[FONTE: Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past*, 2008]



5. Present-Day Ukraine. Zenon E. Kohut, Bohdan Y. Nebesio, and Myroslav Yurkevich, *Historical Dictionary of Ukraine* (Lanham, MD, Toronto, and Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005), map 9.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (7) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



**Bohdan Khmelnytsky**

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, statue in Kyiv, Ukraine.

## Cossack

**Cossack**, Russian **Kazak**, (from Turkic *kazak*, “adventurer” or “free man”), member of a people dwelling in the northern hinterlands of the Black and Caspian seas. They had a tradition of independence and finally received privileges from the Russian government in return for military services. Originally (in the 15th century) the term referred to semi-independent Tatar groups, which formed in the Dnieper region. The term was also applied (by the end of the 15th century) to peasants who had fled from serfdom in Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy to the Dnieper and Don regions, where they established free self-governing military communities. In the 16th century there were six major Cossack hosts: the Don, the Greben (in Caucasia), the Yaik (on the middle Ural River), the Volga, the Dnieper, and the Zaporozhian (mainly west of the Dnieper).

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (8) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Bohdan Khmelnytsky

**Bohdan Khmelnytsky**, Ukrainian in full **Bohdan Zinoviy Mykhaylovych Khmelnytsky**, Polish **Bohdan Chmielnicki**, Russian **Bogdan Khmelnitsky**, (born c. 1595, Chigirin, Ukraine—died Aug. 6 [Aug. 16, New Style], 1657, Chigirin), leader (1648–57) of the [Zaporozhian Cossacks](#) who organized a rebellion against Polish rule in [Ukraine](#) that ultimately led to the transfer of the Ukrainian lands east of the [Dnieper River](#) from Polish to Russian control.

Although he had been educated in [Poland](#) and had served with Polish military forces against the Turks, Khmelnytsky, who had become chief of the Cossacks at Czyhryn, quarreled with the Polish governor of that region and was forced to flee (December 1647) to the fortress of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, a semimilitary [community](#) that had developed from runaway serfs, bandits, and traders who had settled along the Dnieper River. He then organized a rebellion among the Zaporozhian Cossacks and, with the support of the Crimean Tatars, marched against the Poles in April 1648. His victorious advance won him additional support from the dissatisfied peasants, townspeople, and clergy of Ukraine, who joined him in a mass uprising that enabled him to enter Poland proper and seize Lwów (now Lviv) in October 1648.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (9) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## **treaties of Brest-Litovsk**

**treaties of Brest-Litovsk**, peace treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk (now in Belarus) by the Central Powers with the Ukrainian Republic (Feb. 9, 1918) and with Soviet Russia (March 3, 1918), which concluded hostilities between those countries during World War I. Peace negotiations, which the Soviet government had requested on Nov. 8, 1917, began on December 22. They were divided into several sessions, during which the Soviet delegation tried to prolong the proceedings and took full advantage of its opportunity to issue propaganda statements, while the Germans grew increasingly impatient.




**treaties of Brest-Litovsk**

Delegates at negotiations for the treaties of Brest-Litovsk, 1918.  
*George Grantham Bain Collection/Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (digital file no. 26094)*

When no substantial progress had been made by January 18, the German general Max Hoffmann firmly presented the German demands, which included the establishment of independent states in the Polish and Baltic territories formerly belonging to the Russian Empire and in Ukraine. Leon Trotsky, head of the Soviet delegation since January 9, called for a recess (January 18–30). He returned to Petrograd where he persuaded the reluctant Bolsheviks (including Lenin) to adopt a policy under which Russia would leave the war but sign no peace treaty (“neither war nor peace”).

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (10) [FONTE: Embaixada da Ucrânia nos EUA]



→ [News](#) → The 140th anniversary of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky

## The 140th anniversary of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky

15 May 2013 15:58



In the XX century the history of Ukraine gave its people a lot of strong leaders and politicians. One of them is Pavlo P. Skoropadsky, Ukrainian public and political figure, the representative of famous cossack family. He participated in the Russian Japanese War (1904-1905), World War I (1914-1918), and was the Hetman of Ukrainian States (April 29 - December 14 1918).

Scholarly and educational literature published over the last two decades paid great attention to the statehood of Ukraine during the age of the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1921 and, especially, to the role of the Ukrainian State led by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. Despite the unfavorable circumstances triggered by the war and revolution, and the difficulties of the Ukrainian liberation movement caused by external political and especially military factors, the government of Hetman Skoropadsky had considerable achievements in foreign and domestic policy.

**Ukrainian State of P.Skoropadsky was recognized by 30 countries and it had its own representatives in 23 countries.**

Hetman had success in ordering finances, establishing Ukrainian monetary system and banks. Judicial reforms by P.Skoropadsky were also of extraordinary importance. He set the legal proceedings based on new principles, established a Senate, introduced many new laws.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (11) [FONTE: 100 years of the proclamation of hetmanship in Ukraine | The Day newspaper]



GERMAN KAISER WILHELM II AND HETMAN PAVLO SKOROPADSKY.  
WILHELMSHOEHE NEAR KASSEL, SEPTEMBER 6, 1918

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (12) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

## Holodomor

**Holodomor**, man-made famine that convulsed the Soviet republic of Ukraine from 1932 to 1933, peaking in the late spring of 1933. It was part of a broader Soviet famine (1931–34) that also caused mass starvation in the grain-growing regions of Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan. The Ukrainian famine, however, was made deadlier by a series of political decrees and decisions that were aimed mostly or only at Ukraine. In acknowledgement of its scale, the famine of 1932–33 is often called the Holodomor, a term derived from the Ukrainian words for hunger (*holod*) and extermination (*mor*).




A young child, showing obvious signs of starvation, during the Holodomor, Kharkiv, Ukraine, photo by Alexander Wienerberger, 1933.

Diocesan Archive of Vienna (Diözesanarchiv Wien)/BA Innitzer

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (13)

[FONTE: Juliëtte Dekker, The politics of memory: the ambivalent status of a Ukrainian Nationalist; Encyclopædia Britannica]



Stepan Bandera Monument

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (14) [FONTE: Juliëtte Dekker, The politics of memory: the ambivalent status of a Ukrainian Nationalist]

## The politics of memory: the ambivalent status of a Ukrainian Nationalist

*By Juliëtte Dekker*


Over the course of the twentieth century, the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv has been the home base of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its former leader Stepan Bandera. The OUN has promoted a strong and autonomous Ukrainian identity, independent of the power of past “occupational regimes”, such as the Austrian-Hungarian, Polish and Soviets (Bechtel 2015: 190). Both presently and in the past, this nationalist viewpoint is characterized by a markedly anti-Polish and anti-Russian political sentiment. The former OUN leader Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) has become a controversial symbol of this Ukrainian nationalism. In the more Europe-oriented, Western half of Ukraine, Bandera is perceived as a hero and a national liberator, a status witnessed by a variety of monuments and commemorative practices (Liebich & Myshlovska 2014). In the East of Ukraine, in Poland and in Russia, on the other hand, Bandera is seen in a much more negative light, being labeled a terrorist, a villain and a Nazi collaborator (Marples 2006: 555). As such, the controversy surrounding Bandera’s figure mediates a variety of conflicts that shape present-day Ukrainian society.

Bandera’s status in Ukrainian national memory continues to play a controversial role today. During our fieldtrip to the Ukrainian city of Lviv I approached this conflicts through a two-level site analysis of an (in)famous symbol to the memory of Stepan Bandera, the Stepan Bandera monument located at Kropyvnyts’koho Square. In the first level, which is mainly represented in the podcast below, I have attended to the material aspects of the monument: its controversial location, its aesthetics, the symbolism it uses. Here I have tried to embed this analysis in a second level, consisting of the socio-political articulations of Bandera’s status in public debate.

# A Ucrânia e a Rússia: um passado comum e conflitual (15)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Martin Sutovec (Shooty) / 2013]





## **PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES**

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (1) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]



## UKRAINE AT A GLANCE

**Area**  
603,550 square kilometers  
(largest country in Europe,  
excluding Russia)

**Population**  
44 million

**Religions**  
Orthodox Christianity,  
Catholicism, Protestantism

**Primary Languages**  
Ukrainian (official), Russian

**Form of Government**  
Semipresidential republic

**GDP**  
\$155.6 billion


**GDP Per Capita**  
\$3,727

Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank

COUNCIL ON  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (2) [FONTE: Council on Foreign Relations]

## NATO's Expanding Membership



### ● Founding members

1949 Belgium  
Canada  
Denmark  
France  
Iceland  
Italy  
Luxembourg  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Portugal  
United Kingdom  
United States

### ● Cold War expansion

1952 Greece  
Turkey  
  
1955 Germany  
  
1982 Spain

### ● Post-Cold War expansion

1999 Czech Republic  
Hungary  
Poland  
  
2004 Bulgaria  
Estonia  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Romania  
Slovakia  
Slovenia  
  
2009 Albania  
Croatia  
  
2017 Montenegro  
  
2020 North Macedonia

Source: NATO.

COUNCIL on  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (3) [FONTE: CNN, 9/04/2021]

**Russian forces are massing on Ukraine's border. Bluff or not, Putin is playing with fire**



A satellite view of the Pogonovo training area in Russia's Voronezh region, close to the Ukrainian border.

*London (CNN)* — For an army given to masking its moves, surely the worst way to disguise a potential imminent invasion of a country is by overtly preparing for it.

This is the paradox around [Russia's](#) visible buildup in its west, not far from the [Ukrainian border](#). Were Moscow trying to reverse the military stalemate around the Donbas separatist region -- that it truncated from Ukraine in 2014 -- would it want to telegraph its moves so blatantly?

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (4) [FONTE: CNN, 9/04/2021]

The key as-yet-unanswered question is what Russia's objective would be in a military intervention. Some analysts have speculated it might flood the separatist areas and adjacent conflict zones with a huge Russian "peacekeeping" force, designed to impose its will and rules on the area -- effectively annexing the Donbas in earnest.

Yet this would almost guarantee a Western response, likely at first in the form of sanctions. It would also achieve for Moscow essentially the same control it has now on these areas, albeit with lot of expensive Russian skin and hardware in the game. It is all the squeeze, with none of the juice, and so probably not that favorable to the Kremlin.



A Ukrainian serviceman uses a periscope in a trench on the frontline with Russia-backed separatists near the town of Zolote, in the Lugansk region on April 8.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (5) [FONTE: FT, 16/11/2021]

## Troop build-up shows Putin views Ukraine as 'unfinished business'

Russia's leader is worried Kyiv might try to retake Donbass region, say analysts

November 16 2021



Last spring, US officials thought they had helped prevent a major geopolitical flare-up when Russia's President Vladimir Putin ordered tens of thousands of troops he had massed near the Ukrainian border from as far as Siberia to stand down.

In recent weeks, however, it has become clear that much of the Russian forces had remained within striking distance of the Ukrainian border and had resumed their build-up, amid undisclosed additional intelligence that would support the assumption Moscow is planning an invasion, western officials say.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (6) [FONTE: FT, 16/11/2021]

US intelligence assessments suggest a “high probability” that Russia may be planning further military aggression against the country, [according to Ukraine’s deputy defence minister](#). While Ukraine and other western allies have yet to reach a definitive conclusion, Washington’s warning has raised the level of alert to its highest since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula from Kyiv.

The resurgent risk of military invasion in the heart of Europe underlines the failure of diplomatic Franco-German efforts under the so-called Normandy format to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that has been raging in eastern Ukraine over the past seven years.

“It’s become clear in the last half-year that there won’t be any more negotiations according to the old models,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian foreign policy analyst and adviser to the Kremlin. “If those formats disappear, then a legal vacuum appears amid a serious, unresolved conflict which carries high risks that direct clashes might resume.”

Ukraine says Russia is massing as many as 114,000 troops to the north, east, and south of the Donbass, a mostly Russian-speaking region where Russian-backed separatists have fought government forces since a pro-western revolution in Kyiv in 2014.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (7) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Dnieper River in Kyiv

# ogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (8) [FONTE: Público, 16/12/2021]

## **Kiev mantém a calma perante a ameaça russa mas já começou a preparar-se para o pior**

Autoridades da capital da Ucrânia estão a reparar os cerca de cinco mil abrigos da cidade e cada bairro terá em breve o seu próprio batalhão civil de defesa territorial.

Isabelle Khurshudyan e David L. Stern 16 de Dezembro de 2021, 22:00



Estação de metro de Pecherska, uma das estruturas que as autoridades de Kiev designaram como abrigo de emergência Serhiy Morgunov/Washington Post

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (9) [FONTE: Público, 16/12/2021]

No entanto, nem todos estes locais serão capazes de fornecer um local seguro contra um ataque aéreo.

Roman Tkachuk, chefe do departamento de segurança municipal de Kiev, disse que cerca de 19% dos locais estão inutilizáveis, muitos devido ao abandono. As autoridades estão, actualmente, a vistoriar local a local e a efectuar as melhorias necessárias.

Outros locais estão agora ocupados pelo comércio e outras actividades. Os *bunkers* de Kiev listados no Google Maps incluem um estúdio de dança, um teatro de improvisação e uma variedade de cafés e salões de beleza. Estes estabelecimentos não estão obrigados a fornecer abrigo, mesmo que o local já o tenha sido anteriormente.

Mas alguns negócios estão dispostos a oferecer o seu espaço como abrigo caso seja necessário. No Black Pig - um restaurante no centro histórico de Kiev - a designação do estabelecimento como potencial abrigo gerou alguma confusão. Depois de os funcionários começarem a conversar entre si, o contabilista do restaurante informou que esse era realmente o caso.

“Estamos prontos”, disse Neli Kalyuzhna, gerente do Black Pig.

Alguns civis ofereceram-se para pegar em armas. Em 2014, logo após o início do conflito no leste da Ucrânia, as autoridades criaram forças de defesa territorial em todo o país, destinadas a fornecer uma linha adicional de defesa em caso de um ataque em grande escala.

Em breve, cada bairro de Kiev terá o seu próprio batalhão, com “pelo menos 5 mil” combatentes em toda a cidade, revela Andriy Kryshchenko, vice-chefe da administração da cidade de Kiev. Segundo uma lei aprovada durante o Verão, estas forças ficarão sob contrato do exército ucraniano.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (10)

[FONTE: John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs, Setembro/Outubro 2014]

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## Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault

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The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

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*John J. Mearsheimer*

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin's decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU's expansion eastward and the West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine's democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (11)

[FONTE: John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs, Setembro/Outubro 2014]

Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin's determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided—and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.

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*U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia's border.*

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The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country's interests. This past February, before Yanukovich was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a "sphere of influence" in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion.

The West's final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (12)

[FONTE: John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs, Setembro/Outubro 2014]

and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than \$5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovich won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.

When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in *The Washington Post*, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (13)

[FONTE: John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs, Setembro/Outubro 2014]

## **CREATING A CRISIS**

The West's triple package of policies—NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion—added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a \$15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists.

Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations,

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (14)

[FONTE: John J. Mearsheimer in Foreign Affairs, Setembro/Outubro 2014]




and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych's toppling that it was "a day for the history books." As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych's ouster.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (15) [FONTE: Daniel W. Drezner in Washington Post, 10/02/2015]

## Why Ukraine cannot be a buffer state

Arming Ukraine might not be a good idea, but making Ukraine a buffer state between Russia and the West is an impossible idea.



Source: The Guardian, AFP, et al.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (16)

[FONTE: Daniel W. Drezner in Washington Post, 10/02/2015]

The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily. Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.

She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia's orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.

To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine's economy, a goal that is clearly in everyone's interest.

I'm dubious about the utility of arming the Ukrainian government, so Mearsheimer's proposal has some appeal as an alternative. The only thing getting in its way are Ukrainian and Russian policy preferences. In other words, I'm even more dubious about the likelihood of Mearsheimer's solution actually working.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (17) [FONTE: Daniel W. Drezner in Washington Post, 10/02/2015]

Indeed, in his widely discussed [Valdai speech](#) from last fall, Russian President Vladimir Putin was quite explicit about his economic objections to the Eastern Partnership:

We have told our American and European partners that hasty backstage decisions, for example, on Ukraine's association with the EU, are fraught with serious risks to the economy. **We didn't even say anything about politics; we spoke only about the economy**, saying that such steps, made without any prior arrangements, touch on the interests of many other nations, including Russia as Ukraine's main trade partner, and that a wide discussion of the issues is necessary (emphasis added).

Nothing in the past year's worth of conflict has shifted these policy preferences towards a possible compromise. With Crimea now pried away from Ukraine, the policy preferences of the rest of the country are even more pro-European economic integration. And while the sunk cost fallacy might be an economic truism, in politics it means that the costs of conceding now are greater than they were last year.

The Ukrainians will not accept anything that looks like "economic neutrality," and the Russians will not accept a Ukraine with closer economic ties to Europe. Other than that, Mearsheimer's proposed compromise looks peachy.

Indeed, for Putin and Russia, the phrase "nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia" is an oxymoron. A coherent, independent Ukraine, regardless of alliance ties, would threaten Russia, as [Anne Applebaum has pointed out](#):

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (18) [FONTE: Kyiv Post, 10/02/2015]

## **Op-Ed: The Conflict Around Ukraine: a Tragedy of Mistranslation**

Published Dec. 15. Updated Dec. 15 at 6:30 pm



**Those unfamiliar with the former Soviet states have struggled to understand why Russian President Vladimir Putin would decide to launch a war against his Slavic neighbors in Ukraine. U.S. and European foreign policy, grounded more in realism, where practical and economic factors drive foreign policy, are perhaps easier to understand to the outsider.**

However, Russia's foreign policy objectives are more opaque and driven by factors that are harder to comprehend unless one looks at it through the lens of Russian history and sees that it is the basis for today's constructivist foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (19) [FONTE: Kyiv Post, 10/02/2015]

Russia has a foreign policy that is relatively linear – once you understand the “logic” that the Kremlin uses. The reasoning that Putin uses when discussing how he will “defend” Russia is based on an interpretation of the West that differs entirely from how a western-educated person would understand the modern world – and modernity. The scars of battles from centuries ago taught the Tsars and Putin the importance of having “buffer zones” that act as battle lands, thwarting a western incursion before it could reach Moscow.

Ukraine – which means the rough equivalent of “borderland” – is a country that Russia has historically considered to be part of its territories. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, the three eastern Slavic countries and most important Republics of the Soviet Union, are viewed by Putin as being part of Russia’s historic lands and identity. The Russian’s historic memory is that Slavic peoples were converted to Eastern Orthodoxy in 988 when Kyivan Rus (a medieval state with its center in Kyiv), was baptized. Putin’s June 2021 missive on the subject succinctly lays out his view that the historic closeness between Ukraine and Russia is so immediate that Ukraine’s future is inherently tied to Russia.

Putin’s lack of faith in the West is grounded in the 2004 accession of the former Soviet Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) into NATO. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin had stated that U.S. President Bill Clinton had promised that this would not happen, and it is seen as a betrayal by the West that took advantage of the weak state of post-Soviet Russia.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (20) [FONTE: Kyiv Post, 10/02/2015]

Thus, when Putin saw that Ukraine was hoping to go the same direction as the Baltic states, he interpreted it as being a window of opportunity for the West (namely the United States) to gobble up its ally. The alarm bells set off in Moscow triggered a classic move in the Russian playbook.

As happened with Transnistria in Moldova (early 1990s), and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia (2008), Russia acted in 2014 to destabilize Ukraine by striking-up a conflict. Moscow hoped that a clash in largely Russian-speaking Donbas and Crimea would later be converted into a "frozen conflict" (i.e. a formerly "hot conflict" that has largely cooled-down, but remains legally unresolved).

This strategy attempts to bar the occupied country with a frozen conflict from being able to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and close the door to the European Union. Ultimately, this is Putin's desire: to keep the west at bay and from encroaching closer to Moscow.

The West, despite having dealt with Russia's strategy of frozen conflicts before, has not improved how it handles such situations. As history has shown, US sanctions do not necessarily achieve their intended result (case study: US' sanctions against Cuba since 1960). Likewise, making general promises of NATO membership, without any clear timelines, perhaps operates against the national security of the countries who wrongly translate the promise as a real guarantee of quasi-NATO support for them, whereas it would be wiser to interpret these promises as rather being statements of general support and that the NATO countries (namely the USA) will not oppose that country's future membership in the Organization.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (21) [FONTE: Kyiv Post, 10/02/2015]

Russia, historically, like the Soviet Union before it, often used brinkmanship as a preferred strategy to gain what it wanted from the West. Increasing the stakes to the point that the West blinks could be what is on Putin's mind now.

Given Russian elections in two years, and the declining popularity of Putin due to the state of the Russian economy, Covid, and recent pension reforms, it would seem to be against the interests of the twenty-one year-long leader of Russia to risk a military conflict with Ukraine today that could lead to the greater domestic destabilization of his own country should the war turn out to not be the stunning victory for which he would hope. Russian citizens could well lose their taste for their President's push to conquer Ukraine once the bodies of their sons are returned from a war with a "brotherly nation" for which the average Russian does not understand the need.

Though it is uncertain what Putin may plan next, it would seem that he may have already achieved his objective: All eyes are on Russia – giving it the status of being "a player." Biden has publicly stated that the United States would not send its troops to back Ukraine if Russia were to invade. In the coming weeks we will see what Putin desires, but as of now, it would seem there is little he could gain from further attacks against Ukraine, only further risks to his own claim to power, should he toss the dice on an invasion into Ukraine.

# Jogos de guerra: a Rússia quer invadir a Ucrânia? (22)

[FONTE: The Cartoon Movement, 10/04/2021]



# Sugestões de leitura

