


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI


**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 9
15/12/2021**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (1)


[FONTE: Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, ed. original 1889]



A geopolítica do poder marítimo (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Alfred Thayer Mahan, (born September 27, 1840, West Point, New York, U.S. —died December 1, 1914, Quogue, New York), American naval officer and historian who was a highly influential exponent of sea power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.



Alfred Thayer Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan, c. 1904.
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
(cph 3a11341)

Mahan was the son of a professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1859 and went on to serve nearly 40 years of active duty in the United States Navy. He fought in the American Civil War, later served on the staff of Adm. J.A.B.

Dahlgren, and was steadily promoted, reaching the rank of captain in 1885. In 1884 he was invited by Stephen Luce, president of the newly established Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, to lecture on naval history and tactics there. Mahan became the college's president in 1886 and held that post until 1889.


In 1890 Mahan published his college lectures as *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. In this book he argued for the paramount importance of sea power in national historical supremacy. The book, which came at a time of great technological improvement in warships, won immediate recognition

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (3) [FONTE: US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Milestones: 1866–1898 - Office of the Historian

Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s

In 1890, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a lecturer in naval history and the president of the United States Naval War College, published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, a revolutionary analysis of the importance of naval power as a factor in the rise of the British Empire. Two years later, he completed a supplementary volume, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*.



Book Cover of the 12th Edition of Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (4) [FONTE:

US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain's emergence as the world's dominant military, political, and economic power. Mahan and some leading American politicians believed that these lessons could be applied to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the quest to expand U.S. markets overseas.

The 1890s were marked by social and economic unrest throughout the United States, which culminated in the onset of an economic depression between 1893 and 1894. The publication of Mahan's books preceded much of the disorder associated with the 1890s, but his work resonated with many leading intellectuals and politicians concerned by the political and economic challenges of the period and the declining lack of economic opportunity on the American continent.

Mahan's books complemented the work of one of his contemporaries, Professor Frederick Jackson Turner, who is best known for his seminal essay of 1893, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." An American history professor at the University of Wisconsin, Turner postulated that westward migration across the North American continent and the country's population growth had finally led to the "closing" of the American frontier, with profound social and economic consequences. While Turner did not explicitly argue for a shift towards commercial expansion overseas, he did note that calls for a "vigorous foreign policy" were signs that Americans were increasingly looking outside the continental United States in order to satiate their desire for new economic opportunities and markets.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (5) [FONTE: US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Mahan was one of the foremost proponents of the “vigorous foreign policy” referred to by Turner. Mahan believed that the U.S. economy would soon be unable to absorb the massive amounts of industrial and commercial goods being produced domestically, and he argued that the United States should seek new markets abroad. What concerned Mahan most was ensuring that the U.S. Government could guarantee access to these new international markets. Securing such access would require three things: a merchant navy, which could carry American products to new markets across the “great highway” of the high seas; an American battleship navy to deter or destroy rival fleets; and a network of naval bases capable of providing fuel and supplies for the enlarged navy, and maintaining open lines of communications between the United States and its new markets.

Mahan’s emphasis upon the acquisition of naval bases was not completely new. Following the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward had attempted to expand the U.S. commercial presence in Asia by [purchasing Alaska in 1867](#), and increasing American influence over Hawaii by concluding a reciprocity treaty that would bind the islands’ economy to that of the United States. Seward also attempted to purchase suitable Caribbean naval bases. Finally, he attempted to ratify a treaty with the Colombian Government that would allow the United States to build an isthmian canal through the province of Panama. In the wake of the Civil War, however, Congress became preoccupied with Reconstruction in the South, and the Senate rejected all of Seward’s efforts to create a network of American naval bases.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (6) [FONTE: Nicholas J. Danby / U.S. Naval Institute, Fevereiro de 2021]



The Roots of Roosevelt's Navalism

Historians long have credited Alfred Thayer Mahan with shaping Theodore Roosevelt's ideas about sea power. In fact, the future President's fascination with ships dated back to his childhood and his opinions on naval expansion to his college years.

On 3 September 1901, before a strenuous day of shaking a thousand hands and reviewing Minnesota National Guard troops, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt formally opened the annual Minnesota State Fair in Minneapolis with his rousing "National Duties" speech. While "laughter and applause mingled throughout his address in equal proportions," both the public and the press seemed to miss its significance.¹

Toward the middle of his speech, Roosevelt famously stated, "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far."² But neither national newspapers nor the local press deemed the remark insightful enough to include in their highlights of Roosevelt's speech. It would be insightful soon enough. Just four days later in Buffalo, New York, an assassin shot President William McKinley. Nine days after that, Vice President Roosevelt would become President Roosevelt. And his epigrammatic aphorism would shape U.S. foreign policy for the next century.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (7) [FONTE: US Naval History and Heritage Command]



Naval History and Heritage Command

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[Spanish-American War](#) » [Mobilization](#) » **Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3/14/1898**

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Spanish-American War

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[Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3/14/1898](#)

[Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Senator William Eaton Chandler \(New Hampshire\), 9/29/1897](#)

[Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont to Commodore George Dewey, 10/16/1897](#)

[More Documents \(119\)](#)

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Naval Intelligence

Coastal Defense

Naval Operations in the Caribbean

Naval Militia

Battle of Manila Bay

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Telegraphy and Cable Cutting

Battle at Punta de la Colorados

Rescue of the Winslow

Bombardment of San Juan

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

March 14, 1898.

My dear Captain Mahan:

I entirely agree with you. A year ago, when we had seven armored ships against the Spanish fleet, I thought a flying squadron might be of use; at present we have six against eight, and I don't think so. We are taking the *OREGON* around, and I hope that she will be at Cuba by the time the *PELAYO* may be gotten out of Toulon and sent across. ¹ You know my opinion pretty well. We should have struck a year and a half ago, when our superiority of forces was great, and when we could have saved Cuba before it was ruined. Every month since the situation has changed slightly to our disadvantage, and it will continue so to change. It is the case of the sibylline books again. ² We should fight this minute in my opinion, before the torpedo-boats get over here. But we won't. We'll let them get over here and run the risk of serious damage from them, and very possibly we won't fight until the beginning of the rainy season, when to send an expeditionary force to Cuba means to see the men die like sheep.

I send you a copy of a letter I submitted to the Secretary ³ two months ago. Will you please send it back to me? I agree with you that we should not try to do anything much with Porto Rico at present.

I think much better of the *BROOKLYN* than you do, but quite as badly of the *MINNEAPOLIS* and *COLUMBIA*. I further agree with you with all my heart about local coast defense. I shall urge, and have urged, the President ⁴ and the Secretary to pay absolutely no heed to the outcries for protection from Spanish raids. Take the worst--a bombardment of New York. It would amount to absolutely nothing, as affecting the course of a war, or damaging permanently the prosperity of the country. I should not myself divert a ship from Cuban waters for any threat against our coast, bar always that I should protect the battleship building at Newport News. ⁵ However, I am afraid we shall have to make up our minds that a monitor will be sent to Boston, another to New York, and another to Newport News--of which last I should entirely approve.

I am going to show your letter to Captain Goodrich ⁶ and also to the Secretary. I have Captain Goodrich at work on a plan of attack for we haven't a plan of any kind excepting that prepared last June. ⁷

Faithfully yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

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American Ships and Commanders

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A geopolítica do poder marítimo (8) [FONTE:

Ronald B. St. John, European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1889-1906]

EUROPEAN

NAVAL EXPANSION

AND MAHAN, 1889-1906

Much has been written about the influence that Alfred Thayer Mahan had upon naval policy and ship construction of major maritime powers. The author postulates that Mahan's writings largely substantiated policies and strategies already conceived, especially in England and Germany. He reasons that Mahan's greatest influence was with Germany who, at the turn of the century, was in the throes of building an overseas empire.

An article prepared

by

Captain Ronald B. St. John, U.S. Army

Beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, there occurred in Europe an unprecedented expansion in naval forces. The new European naval expansion took the form of an uncritical demand for seapower and sparked the greatest warship building boom in history. A comparison of Europe's fleets in

1900 and 1914 graphically illustrates the expansion which took place.¹

The impetus for this phenomenal expansion was closely rooted in the tenor of the time—Social Darwinism, imperialism, and militarism. To be great, a state had to have a colonial empire; and to have a colonial empire, it had to

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1900

	Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
Battleships	45	33	17	12
Cruisers	126	38	14	20
Torpedo-Gunboats	<u>34</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>4</u>
	205	92	40	36

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1914

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Russia	Austria-Hungary
Battleships	68	21	37	8	11
Cruisers	110	30	48	14	7
Destroyers	218	83	142	105	19
Torpedo-Boats	70	153	47	25	58
Submarines	<u>76</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>10</u>
	542	357	301	177	105

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (9) [FONTE:

Ronald B. St. John, *European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1889-1906*]

At any rate, it is impossible to conclude other than that Mahan influenced German naval expansion much more than he affected the growth of the Royal Navy after 1888. The publication in 1890 of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* stirred Wilhelm's lifelong interest in navies and added strength to the efforts begun in 1888 to increase and modernize the German Navy. Throughout the decade from 1890 to 1900, Mahan's principles were cited again and again in support of German naval expansion, especially by the German Navy League. Mahan's clear, concise presentation had a definite influence on the shipbuilding programs of both England and Germany; but it had a greater influence on German naval expansion, probably because Germany lacked the strong naval tradition which England had cultivated for over 300 years.

However, to hold Mahan's writings responsible for European naval expansion after 1888 would be to overlook other forces which would have resulted in naval expansion even in the absence of Admiral Mahan. European naval expansion at the turn of the last century had its roots in the wave of imperialism which swept over the Continent in the 1880's. To remain a great power, a state had to secure colonial possessions; and to take and hold colonies, it had to have a strong navy. In such an age the principles of Mahan were predestined to receive a warm welcome; but the age and its ideas did not originate with the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Admiral Mahan did not bring new ideas to England, Germany, and some of the other European countries; but the theories set forth in his writings crystallized and clarified old ideas. Moreover, his writings appeared at precisely the time the Europeans needed them to justify their naval increases.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (10)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Kaiser William I, Alfred von Tirpitz e Helmuth Moltke em 1912

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (11) [FONTE: The British Library]




What is this?

The start of the First World War saw the publication of large amounts of supportive, patriotic ephemera designed to appeal to the market of war supporters. This postcard uses powerful British colonial tropes – sea-power, imperial songs and the Union Jack – and overlays them onto something peculiarly Canadian – a birch bark scene. Birch bark scenes are still common in Canadian arts and crafts, harking back to Wiigwaasabak (birch scrolls) used by First Nations people to illustrate geometrical patterns and shapes. In this postcard then we can see the birch effect as a Canadian base over which British colonial messages are overlaid.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (12)

[FONTE: Wikimedia Commons / Casa da Música]



3.
Still more majestic shalt thou rise,
More dreadful from each foreign stroke;
As the loud blast, that tears the skies,
Serves but to root thy native oak.
Rule Britannia! &c.

4.
Thee, haughty tyrants ne'er shall tame;
All their attempts to bend thee down,
Will but arouse thy generous flame,
To work thy woe, and thy renown.
Rule Britannia! &c.

5.
To thee belongs the rural reign,
Thy cities shall with commerce shine;
All thine, shall be the subject main,
And ev'ry shore it circles, thine.
Rule Britannia! &c.

6.
The muses, still with freedom found,
Shall to thy happy coast repair;
Blest Isle! with matchless beauty crown'd,
And manly hearts to guard the fair.
Rule Britannia! &c.

Rule, Britannia!

Quando a Grã-Bretanha, por ordem dos Céus

Primeiro do grande azul se ergueu;

Este era o mapa da terra então,

E os anjos da guarda cantaram este refrão:

"Reina, Grã-Bretanha! Reina sobre os oceanos:


"Os Britânicos nunca serão escravos."

Eis a primeira estrofe da canção *Rule, Britannia!*, composta em 1740 por Thomas Arne, sobre um texto de James Thomson. Originalmente, a canção fazia parte de uma peça maior, intitulada *Alfredo* – uma mascarada (género de entretenimento cortês da época, com música, teatro e dança) baseada na vida de Alfredo, o Grande, Rei de Wessex (um dos reinos anglo-saxões que precederam a Inglaterra). Era uma das inúmeras composições músico-teatrais de Thomas Arne, que, nesse domínio, foi o compositor britânico mais importante do século XVIII: a ele se deve, por exemplo, o reavivar da ópera em inglês a partir da década de 1730.

Rapidamente a canção *Rule, Britannia!* começou a adquirir vida própria, independente da mascarada original, graças à enorme popularidade que granjeou logo à data da estreia, em 1745. Gradualmente, tornar-se-ia uma espécie de hino da Marinha Real Britânica – mas é também cantada, ainda nos nossos dias, noutros contextos de exortação patriótica, como em jogos de futebol da selecção britânica. O sucesso da canção ao longo dos séculos deve-se, sem dúvida, ao texto (glorificando a Grã-Bretanha como líder dos mares, terra de liberdade e nação protegida pelos Céus), mas nunca teria sido possível sem a eficácia da música – uma música directa e acessível, e, ao mesmo tempo, carregada de heroísmo e dignidade.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo (13)

[FONTE: Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 2013]



A geopolítica do poder marítimo (14)

[FONTE: Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 2013]

CHAPTER TWO

MAHAN'S INFLUENCE ON JAPANESE SEA POWER

Nature of Influence

Japanese leaders, civil and military, were quick to note the contemporary relevance of Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History*. The navy found in this book both a uniquely American doctrine (a national policy of greatness through overseas expansion) and universally applicable naval theories (strategic principles). As to the former, Japanese leaders said Mahan's works must be carefully studied for what they revealed about the direction of American national policy. In particular, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (1897) was an "ideal weathervane for the secret of America's national power and its future projections abroad."¹ This may be called an "American studies" approach to Mahan.

Naval leaders saw in Mahan's works more than guidebooks to American expansionism. They were keenly aware that his works formulated universally applicable strategic doctrines. They believed they could extract "certain immutable principles." Kaneko Kentarō had this in mind when he introduced *Influence of Sea Power* to Japan. He urged readers of the Japanese translation "to study it

carefully and strive so that the Japanese Empire can secure sea power in the Pacific." Concerning the universality of Mahan's strategic teachings, Fleet Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō of Tsushima fame later paid this homage: "Naval strategists of all nations are of one opinion that Admiral Mahan's works will forever occupy the highest position as a world-wide authority in the study of military science. I express my deep and cordial reverence for his far-reaching knowledge and keen judgment."² Moreover, as we will see later, Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power* in Japanese translation provided a weighty and sophisticated theory that Japan's navalists could use to assert their primacy in budgetary appropriations in competition with the army. The sea power doctrine provided navy leaders such as Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei with a bureaucratic rationale for planning a naval buildup.

Mahan's writings became canon in the navy, but did its officers really read them? Mahan's convoluted prose must have seemed formidable. Even Admiral Suzuki Kantarō, one of the three most illustrious naval theorists (the other two being Akiyama Saneyuki and Satō Tetsutarō, discussed shortly) who taught in the Naval Staff College in the early twentieth century, confessed that the English original of *Influence* was beyond him and that he waited for a Japanese translation. But even the Japanese version, written in florid and long-winded prose, was hardly readable. Lieutenant Commander Ogasawara Naganari found it necessary to write a simplified version, *Teikoku kaigun shiron* (On the History of the Imperial Navy), using examples from Japanese naval history. In its preface he wrote, "Mahan's book [*Influence*] is not only too technical but its argumentations too profound and erudite to be understood by our youth."³

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (1) [FONTE:

Encyclopædia Britannica]



O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (3) [FONTE: DN, 20/07/2018]

Quando juncos chineses competiam com naus portuguesas


A China é hoje o grande parceiro económico de África e presidente Xi Jinping, de visita ao continente, pode reivindicar relação com 600 anos, graças ao almirante Zheng He




Almirante Zheng He

O almirante chinês Zheng He fez sete viagens de exploração marítima no início do século XV ao serviço da dinastia Ming, chegando tão longe como Java, no sentido sul, ou a atual Tanzânia, para Sudoeste. Das viagens a África ficou a memória de uma girafa trazida de Melinde, hoje Quênia, e oferecida ao imperador Yongle, que patrocinava a aventura marítima.

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (4) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (5) [FONTE: DN, 20/07/2018]



Girafa levada para a China

A última das viagens ocorreu em 1433. Os sucessores de Yongle não eram tão entusiastas das explorações oceânicas. Além disso, o próprio almirante Zheng He terá morrido no regresso da sétima viagem, segundo uma das versões históricas (a outra, data a sua morte de 1435, a defender Nanquim, a antiga capital, pois foi Yongle quem escolheu Pequim para governar e mandou erguer a Cidade Proibida).

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (6) [FONTE: DN, 20/07/2018]

Estas viagens chinesas coincidiram como o início da expansão portuguesa. Em 1434, ano depois da sétima viagem de Zheng He, Gil Eanes passava o cabo Bojador. E essa Melinde de onde foi levada a girafa para Pequim é a mesma onde em 1498 Vasco da Gama aportou e encontrou um piloto que o ajudou na travessia final até Calicute, na Índia.

Pode especular-se que se não fosse a mudança de liderança imperial na China, os juncos de Zheng He e sucessores poderiam ter contornado África, talvez até cruzando-se umas décadas depois com as naus portuguesas ao largo de Angola ou da Guiné, mas historiadores como João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, professor na Universidade Nova de Lisboa, discordam totalmente. "Como todos os navios dos mares da Ásia os juncos estavam preparados apenas para navegar com ventos favoráveis, devido às monções. Exploraram a costa africana até à atual Tanzânia, mas dificilmente passariam a sul de Moçambique, pois aí já sopram ventos alísios. Ou seja, os juncos chineses não tinham condições sequer para se aproximarem do cabo das Tormentas", afirma um dos autores de *História da Expansão e do Império Português* e biógrafo de D. Manuel I, o rei que enviou Vasco da Gama à Índia.

Zheng He, nascido muçulmano e feito eunuco depois de capturado criança numa guerra, não deixa de ser uma das grandes figuras da história marítima. Em Hamburgo, o museu dedicado à navegação, considera-o um dos sete grandes marinheiros de sempre, num grupo onde estão os portugueses Bartolomeu Dias (que foi o pioneiro a passar as Tormentas, depois cabo da Boa Esperança), Vasco da Gama e Fernão de Magalhães. Para os chineses é um herói, pelo menos desde que em 1905 um intelectual progressista dos tempos finais do Império publicou a biografia *O grande navegador da nossa pátria*.

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (7) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Navios britânicos atacam uma bateria chinesa no Rio das Pérolas durante a primeira Guerra do Ópio, 1841.

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (8) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]




Pintura que representa a assinatura Tratado de Nanjing entre a China e o Reino Unido (1842)

O Tratado de Nanjing (29 de Agosto de 1842), que pôs fim à primeira Guerra do Ópio, foi o primeiro dos “tratados desiguais” entre a China e potências estrangeiras.

A China pagou aos britânicos uma indemnização e cedeu o território de Hong Kong.

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (9) [FONTE:

US Naval Institute Archives / Naval History Blog]



May, 31 1900

Sailors and Marines from USS Newark and USS Oregon arrive at Peking (Beijing), China with other Sailors and Marines from Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy and Japan to protect U.S. and foreign diplomatic legations from the Boxers. The Boxers, or Righteous Harmony Society, was a proto-nationalist movement that rose up in China between 1898 and 1901, opposing Western imperialism and Christianity.

O trauma da China: uma grande potência terrestre que foi dominada pelo mar (10) [FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]



Parada militar das Oito Potências na Cidade Proibida após o esmagamento da rebelião do Boxers e a captura Pequim, em 28 de Novembro de 1900.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (1) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 27/04/2021]

China: The rise of a trade titan

27 April 2021

By Alessandro Nicita and Carlos Razo, UNCTAD




Terracotta sculptures of Chinese warriors. / © Lukas Hlavac

China is perhaps one of the most unprecedented stories of economic development in recent history. In the last 25 years, the country's economy rapidly expanded, lifting more people out of poverty than anywhere else in the world.

But all this wouldn't have been possible without another outstanding story: the emergence of China from the periphery of world trade to becoming a global trade titan.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (2) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 27/04/2021]



A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (3) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 2021]



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Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade and the global economy. Over 80% of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea, and the percentage is even higher for most developing countries.

The Review of Maritime Transport is an UNCTAD flagship report, published annually since 1968. It provides an analysis of structural and cyclical changes affecting seaborne trade, ports and shipping, as well as an extensive collection of statistics from maritime trade and transport.


This year's edition of the report has a special focus on the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the industry and includes a special chapter on the challenges seafarers face in view of the crewing crisis.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (4)

[FONTE: China's Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing's Strategy in VOA, 13/09/2021]



A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (5) [FONTE: World Shipping Council]




Port	Volume 2020 (Million TEU)	Volume 2019 (Million TEU)	Volume 2018 (Million TEU)	Volume 2017 (Million TEU)	Volume 2016 (Million TEU)	Website
1 Shanghai, China	43.5	43.30	42.01	40.23	37.13	English
2 Singapore	36.6	37.20	36.6	33.67	30.9	English
3 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China	28.72	27.49	26.35	24.61	21.6	Chinese
4 Shenzhen, China	26.55	25.77	27.74	25.21	23.97	Chinese
5 Guangzhou Harbor, China	23.19	23.23	21.87	20.37	18.85	English Chinese
6 Busan, South Korea	21.59	21.99	21.66	20.49	19.85	English Korean
7 Qingdao, China	22.00	21.01	18.26	18.3	18.01	English Chinese
8 Hong Kong, S.A.R, China	20.07	18.30	19.6	20.76	19.81	Chinese
9 Tianjin, China	18.35	17.30	16	15.07	14.49	English Chinese
10 Rotterdam, The Netherlands	14.35	14.82	14.51	13.73	12.38	English Dutch Deutsch Chinese

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (6) [FONTE: Vista área do Porto de águas profundas de Xangai / Diário do Povo online, 29/05/2019]



A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (7) [FONTE: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2020]

Map 5.3 | Liner shipping connectivity, 2020



^a As indicated by the LSBCI 2019.

^b As indicated by the LSCI.

^c Change of less than 5 per cent compared to the value in the previous year.

Concepts and definitions

The liner shipping connectivity index (LSCI) indicates a country's position within global liner shipping networks. It is calculated from the number of ship calls, their container carrying capacity, the number of services and companies, the size of the largest ship, and the number of other countries connected through direct liner shipping services.

Liner shipping connectivity throughout the world

In the third quarter of 2020, the economy best connected to the global liner shipping network, as measured by the LSCI, was China. Singapore, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America and Malaysia followed next in the rankings. Sub-regional leaders included: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium in Europe; Panama, Colombia and Mexico in Latin America and the Caribbean; Egypt, Morocco and South Africa in Africa; and Sri Lanka and India in South Asia. In 2019, all top-20 bilateral connections were intra-regional, namely within Europe and within Eastern and South-Eastern Asia.

Over the last ten years, the rank order among the most connected economies remained almost unchanged, with China far ahead of the others. During the last year, the United States of America showed a fast increase in its connectivity, allowing the country to move one rank up, before Malaysia.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (8) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 13/08/2019]

UNCTAD: Shanghai is the world's best-connected port

August 13, 2019

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has ranked the port of Shanghai as the world's best-connected port. The Chinese port has earned a score of 134 points in UNCTAD's port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index.

According to the index, the port of Singapore was ranked second as it garnered 124.63 points followed by Pusan in Korea with 114.45 points. Apart from Shanghai Port, another Chinese port, Ningbo was ranked fourth with a score of 114.35 points. While the Top 20 comprises other Asian and European ports, none featured in the Top 20 are from Africa, North and South America as well as Australia.

According to Shamika N. Sirimanne, UNCTAD's director of technology and logistics, a container port's performance is a critical factor that can determine transport costs and, by extension, trade competitiveness. Container ports that are well connected and have frequent and direct shipping services are key to minimising trade cost and fostering sustainable development.

The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index released by UNCTAD is significant for traders as it helps them to determine maritime transport trends and the ports' positions compared to others. It provides data for more than 900 ports.


A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (9) [FONTE: Porto de Ningbo-Zhoushan / FOTO: SCMP]



A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (10) [FONTE: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2020]

5.2 Merchant fleet

Map 5.2 | Building, ownership, registration and recycling of ships, 2019
(Percentage of world total)



Sources: UNCTADstat (UNCTAD, 2020a); Clarksons Research.


Note: Top three countries in each segment are shown. Building and recycling are estimated deliveries and demolitions during 2019. Registration and ownership figures refer to the beginning of the year 2020.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (11) [FONTE: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2020]

Shipbuilding and recycling

In 2019, 93 per cent of global shipbuilding, in terms of tonnage, was located in China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. Of ship recycling, Bangladesh and India accounted for 83 per cent and Turkey accounted for an additional 9 per cent.

Figure 5.2.1 | **World fleet by principal vessel type**
(Millions of dead-weight tons)



Sources: UNCTADstat (UNCTAD, 2020a); Clarksons Research.

Note: Commercial ships of 100 gt and above. Beginning-of-year figures.

A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (12) [FONTE: Marine Insight, 19/01/2021]

China Regains Title Of World's No.1 Shipbuilding Nation, As It Surpasses South Korea

Tags: [China Shipbuilding](#) January 19, 2021

China has made headlines all over the world last year because of the coronavirus outbreak but there is good news emanating from the country as well. The maritime industry witnessed one such good news today as China took over South Korea in terms of global shipbuilding orders.

China regained its previous title as the No.1 shipbuilder country in the world after a span of 2 years.

China Improves on All 3 Indicators

The Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, MIIT issued a statement on Friday which showed these new statistics. As per the statement, "China's three major indicators in the shipbuilding industry – completed ships, new orders, and orders on hand – were all in leading positions worldwide in 2020 with 43.1%, 48.8% and 44.7% of the global market share respectively"


A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (13) [FONTE: Imagem do estaleiro de construção naval da China State Shipbuilding Co (CSSC) / Wikimedia Commons]



A transformação da China em grande potência comercial marítima (14)

[FONTE: China's Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing's Strategy in VOA, 13/09/2021]






PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (1)

[FONTE: Capa de Livro de dedicado ao Almirante Liu Huaqing (Imprensa da Longa Marcha / edição chinesa, 2013)]



A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (2)


[FONTE: Jamestown Foundation / James Holmes e Toshi Yoshihara, A Chinese Turn to Mahan? Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13, 24/06/2019]

A Chinese Turn to Mahan?

Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13

By: James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara

June 24, 2009 08:54 PM Age: 12 years



Admiral Liu Huaqing

Robert Kaplan proclaims that “the Chinese are the Mahanians now,” enamored with the fin de siècle American sea captain who exhorted seafaring nations to amass international commerce, merchant and naval fleets, and forward bases (The Atlantic, November 2007). By those measures, China is progressing swiftly toward sea power. It depends on a steady flow of seaborne cargoes of oil, natural gas, and other raw materials from Africa and the Persian Gulf region, and it relies on the oceans as a thoroughfare by which Chinese export wares reach foreign consumers. Chinese shipyards are bolting together merchantmen at a helter-skelter pace. In April 2009, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) held a naval review to mark the sixtieth anniversary of its founding and—after years of studied denials—the PLA leadership has more or less openly stated that it wants to acquire aircraft carriers. The PLAN has built a base on Hainan Island capable of berthing nuclear submarines, thereby

extending its reach toward the Strait of Malacca, and Chinese diplomats have negotiated basing rights throughout the Indian Ocean.

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (3)

[FONTE: Jamestown Foundation / James Holmes e Toshi Yoshihara, A Chinese Turn to Mahan? Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13, 24/06/2019]

Like Mahan, Chinese thinkers connect thriving commerce with naval primacy. In the respected Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Major (Ret.) General Jiang Shiliang, then chief of the PLA General Logistics Department, invokes him to justify Chinese control of “strategic passages” traversed by vital goods. For Jiang, the contest for “absolute command” is a fact of life in international politics [3]. In a similar vein, Beijing’s 2004 Defense White Paper instructs the armed forces to “strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air” [4]. This remains the clearest statement of China’s Mahanian outlook.

Numerous Chinese analysts cite Mahanian-sounding principles when appraising the value of Taiwan, the midpoint of the first island chain, and occasionally Guam, America’s naval stronghold in the second island chain [5]. They view Taiwan as the single geographic asset, once returned to Beijing’s possession, which would grant China direct access to the Pacific. On the other hand, if Taiwan maintained de facto independence, the mainland would remain hemmed behind the inner island chain, which runs southward from the Japanese home islands to the Indonesian archipelago. The authoritative Science of Military Strategy declares, “If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland ... China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.” If so, “the essential strategic space for China’s rejuvenation will be lost” [6].

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (4)

[FONTE: McDevitt, Becoming a Great “Maritime Power:” A Chinese Dream Michael (2016)]

Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (retired)


June 2016



Abstract

In November 2012, then president Hu Jintao declared that China’s objective was to become a strong or great maritime power. This report, based on papers written by China experts for this CNA project, explores that decision and the implications it has for the United States. It analyzes Chinese thinking on what a maritime power is, why Beijing wants to become a maritime power, what shortfalls it believes it must address in order to become a maritime power, and when it believes it will become a maritime power (as it defines the term). The report then explores the component pieces of China’s maritime power—its navy, coast guard, maritime militia, merchant marine, and shipbuilding and fishing industries. It also addresses some policy options available to the U.S. government to prepare for—and, if deemed necessary, mitigate—the impact that China’s becoming a maritime power would have for U.S. interests.

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (5) [FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]



A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (6) [FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]

Drummed into military service

The Gwadar template, where Beijing used its commercial know-how and financial muscle to secure ownership over a strategic trading base, only to enlist it later into military service, has been replicated in other key locations.

In Sri Lanka, Greece and [Djibouti](#) in the Horn of Africa, Chinese investment in civilian ports has been followed by deployments or visits of People's Liberation Army Navy vessels and in some cases announcements of longer term [military contingencies](#).

China's 'dual use' commercial and naval ports

● Confirmed ○ Possible ● High-profile naval visits to ports owned by China



'Dual use' is defined as Chinese owned or invested ports confirmed, or proposed, as engaging in both commerce and military use

**China has not invested in a port, but its navy uses Seychelles' facilities in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean*

***The US has expressed concern over the possible use of Chinese-owned Darwin port for military purposes*

Source: FT research

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (7) [FONTE: RT, 1/08/2017]

China's 1st foreign naval base officially opens in Djibouti

1 Aug, 2017 14:00



China has formally launched its first overseas naval facility in Djibouti, an East African nation that is already hosting America's only expeditionary Marine base in Africa.

Five Chinese formations and Djibouti's Three Services Honor Guard took part in the launch ceremony on Tuesday, the People's Daily [reported](#), referring to the base as *"the logistics facility."* The event marked the 90th anniversary of the Chinese military.


A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (8) [FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]

“There is an inherent duality in the facilities that China is establishing in foreign ports, which are ostensibly commercial but quickly upgradeable to carry out essential military missions,” says Abhijit Singh, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. “They are great for the soft projection of hard power.”

Data compiled or commissioned by the Financial Times from third-party sources show the extent of China’s dominance in most maritime domains.

China’s port operators take up strong positions


2015, twenty-foot equivalent units (million)



Definition of Chinese port operators includes Hong Kong companies. Figures include total annual throughput for all terminals in which shareholdings held as of Dec 31 2015, adjusted according to the extent of equity held in each terminal

Source: Drewry

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (9) [FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]




A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (10)

[FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]

Two-thirds of container traffic passes through Chinese owned or invested ports

Twenty-foot equivalent units (million) and percentage of total for world's top 50 container ports



Includes estimates of container traffic through ports in which Chinese and Hong Kong companies have investments, even minority stakes

Sources: Lloyd's List Intelligence; FT research

It is not only the world's biggest ports that have attracted Chinese investments. Dozens of smaller harbours — including some in key strategic locations such as Djibouti, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Darwin in Australia, Madaya Island in Myanmar and proposed ports on the Atlantic Ocean islands of São Tomé and Príncipe and in Walvis Bay in Namibia — have also drawn investments or promises of Chinese port construction.

The total size of these investments is difficult to calculate because of sketchy disclosure. But since 2010, Chinese and Hong Kong companies have completed or announced deals involving at least 40 port projects worth a total of about \$45.6bn, according to a study by Sam Beatson and Jim Coke at the Lau China Institute, King's College London, in co-operation with the Financial Times. A dozen other deals — from Carey Island, Malaysia, to Chongjin in North Korea — have been reported without any financial details.

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (11)

[FONTE: How China rules the waves / FT, 12/1/2017]

Journey from land to sea

For thousands of years, Chinese emperors focused on defending the middle kingdom against land-based invasions, usually from the north and west. But in 2015 an official white paper on military strategy decreed a big shift that offers a glimpse of the country's changing maritime objectives.

“The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests,” the document said. It added that the Chinese navy should protect “the security of sea lanes of communication and overseas interests”.

China has the world's fastest-growing navy among major powers

Number of submarines and naval surface vessels



Source: IISS

Analysts say that China's naval strategy is aimed primarily at denying US aircraft carrier battle groups access to a string of archipelagos from Russia's peninsula of Kamchatka to the Malay Peninsula in the south, a natural maritime barrier called the “first island chain” within which China identifies its strategic sphere of influence.

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (12) [FONTE: USNI News, 3/11/2021]

China Has World's Largest Navy With 355 Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon

[Mallory Shelbourne](#) November 3, 2021 6:22 PM



Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning underway. PLAN Photo

China has the biggest maritime force on the globe with an inventory of about 355 vessels, according to a Defense Department report released Wednesday.

With 355 ships in its fleet, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is slated to expand its inventory to 420 ships within the next four years, the Pentagon's annual China military report estimates. By 2030, the PLAN is expected to have 460 ships.



Northern Theater Navy

- 1 Aircraft Carrier
- 4 Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines
- 14 Diesel-powered Attack Submarines
- 2 Cruisers
- 11 Destroyers
- 12 Frigates
- 12 Corvettes
- 2 Tank Landing Ships
- 3 Medium Landing Ships
- 15 Missile Patrol Craft

Eastern Theater Navy

- 18 Diesel-powered Attack Submarines
- 13 Destroyers
- 23 Frigates
- 24 Corvettes
- 3 Amphibious Transport Docks
- 16 Tank Landing Ships
- 5 Medium Landing Ships
- 38 Missile Patrol Craft

Southern Theater Navy

- 1 Aircraft Carrier
- 6 Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines
- 2 Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines
- 14 Diesel-powered Attack Submarines
- 10 Destroyers
- 14 Frigates
- 20 Corvettes
- 5 Amphibious Transport Docks
- 10 Tank Landing Ships
- 8 Medium Landing Ships
- 14 Missile Patrol Craft

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (13) [FONTE: WSJ, 5/12/201]



China Seeks First Military Base on Africa's Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds

Alarmed officials at the White House and Pentagon urge Equatorial Guinea to rebuff Beijing's overtures

Malabo, on the island of Bioko in the Gulf of Guinea, is Equatorial Guinea's capital. MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (14) [FONTE: CNN Portugal, 6/12/201]

China planeia primeira base militar em África, num país-membro da CPLP

A Guiné Equatorial pode receber a primeira base militar permanente da China no continente africano. Uma base no Atlântico, que é vista pelos EUA como uma ameaça à sua Costa Leste

[CNN](#)

A China estará a preparar a sua primeira base militar no continente africano, e o destino será a Guiné Equatorial, um país-membro da CPLP. A revelação foi feita pelo [Wall Street Journal](#), citando informações classificadas dos serviços secretos norte-americanos. De acordo com a notícia, "os relatórios [das secretas] levantam a perspectiva de que os


navios de guerra chineses seriam capazes de se rearmar e reabastecer no lado oposto da Costa Leste dos EUA - uma ameaça que fez disparar os alarmes na Casa Branca e no Pentágono".

Em outubro, o vice-conselheiro de segurança nacional dos EUA, Jon Finer, visitou a Guiné Equatorial para tentar convencer o ditador Teodoro Obiang a rejeitar as propostas da China. Os esforços do responsável norte-americano foram dirigidos também ao vice-presidente "Teodorin" Obiang, filho e herdeiro designado pelo homem que chefia o país desde 1979.

"Como parte da nossa atividade diplomática em relação a questões de segurança marítima, deixámos claro para a Guiné Equatorial que certos passos potenciais envolvendo atividades [chinesas] naquele país levantariam preocupações de segurança nacional [nos EUA]", disse um alto funcionário da administração Biden, citado pelo WSJ.

A China como nova potência marítima (militar) global? (15)

[FONTE: Chapatte / NYT, 20/05/2015]



Sugestões de leitura

