


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 11

2/02/2022



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (1) [MAPA: União Europeia]



A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (2) [FONTE: União Europeia]

Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates

Candidate Countries

Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate countries.

Negotiations are held with each candidate country to determine their ability to apply EU legislation (*acquis*) and examine their possible request for transition periods. In order to conduct the accession negotiations, EU legislation and standards are divided into 35 chapters which are negotiated one by one. DG Environment is assisting the countries particularly in preparing to comply with the environmental component of chapter 27.

An underlying principle of the negotiations is that countries have to fully transpose and implement the EU legislation by the time of accession. Transitional measures can be granted essentially for investment-heavy directives, provided that the measures are limited in time and scope and do not create distortion of competition for the EU single market. These are mainly in the field of waste, water, industrial pollution and air quality. No transitional periods are granted to horizontal legislation (Environmental Impact Assessment, Access to information etc.) and nature legislation. Transition periods are only granted on the basis of detailed justification of the needs, and on realistic implementation plans specifying the steps that will be taken to ensure full compliance with the target legislation by the end of the transition period.

Albania applied for the EU membership in April 2009 and received the candidate status in June 2014. In April 2018, the Commission issued an unconditional recommendation to open accession negotiations. The Council set out the path towards opening accession negotiations in June 2019, depending on progress made in key areas such as the judiciary, fight against corruption and organised crime, intelligence services and public administration. In March 2020 the members of the European Council endorsed the General Affairs Council's decision to open accession negotiations with Albania and in July 2020 the draft negotiating framework were presented to the Member States.

The **Republic of North Macedonia** was declared a candidate country in December 2005. Since October 2009, the Commission has continuously recommended to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. In 2015 and 2016, the recommendation was made conditional on the continued implementation of the Pržino agreement and substantial progress in the implementation of the 'Urgent Reform Priorities'. In March 2020, the General Affairs Council decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. The decision was endorsed by members of the European Council. In July 2020 the draft negotiating framework was presented to the Member States.

Montenegro submitted the application for EU membership in December 2008. The candidate status was granted on 17 December 2010. The opening of accession negotiations took place in June 2012. The accession negotiations for Chapter 27 - Environment were opened on 10 December 2018.

Serbia applied for the candidate country status in December 2009. The candidate country status was granted in March 2012. On 21 January 2014, the first Intergovernmental Conference took place, signalling the formal start of Serbia's accession negotiations. The screening exercise for Chapter 27 – Environment took place in 2014 and the screening report has been adopted by the Council in December 2016 without an opening benchmark. The Presidency invited Serbia in December 2016 to submit its negotiating position for Chapter 27, which Serbia did in February 2020.

Turkey was declared a candidate country in December 1999. Negotiation talks were opened on 3 October 2005 and Chapter 27 was open for negotiations on 21 December 2009. Technical discussions are on-going in areas such as water, waste, nature protection or horizontal legislation.

Potential Candidates

These are countries/entities which have a clear prospect of joining the EU in the future but have not yet been granted candidate country status.

Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations with **Bosnia and Herzegovina** were opened in September 2005 and on 16 June 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the European Union signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The SAA entered into force in June 2015. The country has submitted in February 2016 its application to join the EU. In September 2016, the Council invited the Commission to present an Opinion on BiH application. The Commission adopted its Opinion (Avis) on the EU membership application of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 29 May 2019.

In 2008 the EU repeated its willingness to assist the economic and political development of **Kosovo** through a clear European perspective. The Stabilization and Association Agreement between EU and Kosovo has been initiated in July 2014 and entered into force in April 2016.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (3) [FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

7.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

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Artigo 2.º

A União funda-se nos valores do respeito pela dignidade humana, da liberdade, da democracia, da igualdade, do Estado de direito e do respeito pelos direitos do Homem, incluindo os direitos das pessoas pertencentes a minorias. Estes valores são comuns aos Estados-Membros, numa sociedade caracterizada pelo pluralismo, a não discriminação, a tolerância, a justiça, a solidariedade e a igualdade entre homens e mulheres.

Artigo 3.º

(ex-artigo 2.º TUE)

1. A União tem por objetivo promover a paz, os seus valores e o bem-estar dos seus povos.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (4) [FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

Artigo 49.º

(ex-artigo 49.º TUE)

Qualquer Estado europeu que respeite os valores referidos no artigo 2.º e esteja empenhado em promovê-los pode pedir para se tornar membro da União. O Parlamento Europeu e os Parlamentos nacionais são informados desse pedido. O Estado requerente dirige o seu pedido ao Conselho, que se pronuncia por unanimidade, após ter consultado a Comissão e após aprovação do Parlamento Europeu, que se pronunciará por maioria dos membros que o compõem. São tidos em conta os critérios de elegibilidade aprovados pelo Conselho Europeu.

As condições de admissão e as adaptações dos Tratados em que se funda a União, decorrentes dessa admissão, serão objeto de acordo entre os Estados-Membros e o Estado peticionário. Esse acordo será submetido à ratificação de todos os Estados Contratantes, de acordo com as respetivas normas constitucionais.

Artigo 50.º

1. Qualquer Estado-Membro pode decidir, em conformidade com as respetivas normas constitucionais, retirar-se da União.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (5)

[FONTE: Ahto Lobjakas / RFERI, 30/05/2008

FOTO: AP]

EU: New Initiative Suggests East Is Edging Out South In 'Neighborhood' Tussle

**Poland Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski is all smiles after tabling
his Eastern Partnership initiative in Brussels on May 26 (AFP)**

**BRUSSELS -- The so-called Eastern Partnership initiative may well
come to mark the point when the European Union's center of gravity
shifted decisively to the east.**

Initial reactions to the Polish-Swedish proposal, unveiled on May 26 at an EU foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, suggests the East is edging out the South in the struggle for recognition among the bloc's neighbors. The initiative has effectively short-circuited what has come to be known as the "borders of Europe" debate within the EU. Stockholm and Warsaw have forced the major players in the bloc to admit, at least tacitly, that their eastern neighbors -- Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan -- are all located in Europe.



Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski (left) and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (right).
(AP)

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (6) [FONTE: Ahto Lobjakas / RFERI, 30/05/2008]

Many observers agree that Poland and Sweden are forcing the EU to admit the obvious -- that the bloc's eastern neighbors cannot forever be denied a shot at EU membership. Even Germany and France, both skeptical of further enlargement, are coming around to the view that it may serve the EU's interests to acknowledge eastern ambitions sooner rather than later.

European Identity, Aspirations

Michael Emerson, a senior analyst with the Brussels-based Center for European Policy Studies, says Sikorski is essentially stating the obvious.

"Fundamentally, it is uncontroversial that the eastern neighbors -- which are all members of the Council of Europe -- have a certain European identity and aspirations and perspectives, possibly, for some of them," Emerson says. "Whereas that is not the case for the Mediterranean Arab states."

Obvious it may be, but so far, the continental "old" member states -- afflicted as they are by enlargement fatigue -- have been loath to admit this.

Still, this is changing. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, foreign minister of the EU's largest member state, Germany, spoke of the Eastern Partnership with approval on May 26. He said the EU has "every interest" in stabilizing Eastern Europe. He added, however, that that does not necessarily mean preparing its countries for accession.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (7) [FONTE: Ahto Lobjakas / RFERI, 30/05/2008]

Major Gesture Toward Ukraine

There are suggestions that France is trying to placate eastern member states in order to win support for its own Mediterranean Union for the southern neighbors, endorsed by EU leaders in March. But there are signs Paris may have more noble motives. Diplomats in Brussels say France is preparing a major gesture during its presidency toward Ukraine, which has long claimed it is more than a mere neighbor.

"During the French presidency, we will be very open, especially for Ukraine, because we would like to get out of this negative position [the EU] had in the past," says Michel Foucher, a former senior French diplomat and currently a member of the Robert Schuman Foundation, a French think tank. "And we think it's important to have a kind of open-door policy toward Ukraine, which is not to make decisions, not prescribe [solutions], but not to exclude [anything], if I may say so."

Ukraine, which is presently negotiating a new partnership accord with the EU, wants an Association Agreement. All new Eastern European member states had Association Agreements with the EU before they were given candidate status.

Foucher said an Association Agreement is one option, adding that Paris at this stage is leaning toward the formulation "privileged partnership." This would evoke uneasy echoes of Turkey's travails, which is being offered just such a designation as an alternative to full EU membership.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (8) [FONTE: União Europeia]



Environment in the Eastern Partnership


Introduction



Map source: europarl.europ.eu

The **Eastern Partnership (EaP)** is a joint policy initiative which aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union (EU), its Member States and its six Eastern neighbours: **Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.**

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (9) [FONTE: União Europeia]



A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (10) [FONTE: União Europeia]

FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS



Ukraine is a priority partner for the European Union. The EU supports Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous and democratic future for its citizens and is unwavering in its support for Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Association Agreement (AA), including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together, promoting deeper political ties, stronger economic links and respect for common values.

Since spring 2014, Ukraine has embarked on an ambitious reform programme, aiming to stabilise its economy and improve the livelihoods of its citizens. Priority reforms include the fight against corruption, reform of the judiciary, constitutional and electoral reforms, improvement of the business climate and energy efficiency, as well as reform of public administration, including decentralisation. The EU has pledged a package of €12.8 billion for the next few years to support the reform process, with strong conditionality on continued progress.

IN FIGURES

5,200

Ukrainian students and education staff benefitting from the Erasmus+ exchange programme in the period up to summer 2018

27%

In 2017, exports from Ukraine to the EU increased by 27% and Ukrainian imports from the EU by about 22%, while overall trade increased by 24%

500,000

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) supported directly with EU funding and over 1500 IDP entrepreneurs supported with grants to establish new businesses

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (11) [FONTE: União Europeia]

STRONGER GOVERNANCE

- ✓ A nationwide decentralisation programme (€90 million) providing advice and support to **improve the transparency and accountability of local and regional authorities** and enhancing local administrative centres. 27 administrative centres have opened in all Ukrainian oblasts.
- ✓ A **public administration programme** (€104 million) aims to embed a new generation of civil servants, reorganising government structures to mirror EU standards and developing best practice in policy making and advancing key sector reforms.
- ✓ An **anti-corruption programme** (€15 million) is supporting the newly established anti-corruption institutions, strengthening parliamentary oversight and capacities of civil society and independent media to contribute to the fight against corruption.
- ✓ A programme **developing the private sector** (€110 million) and fostering Ukraine's economic recovery through technical assistance to improve the legislative framework for SMEs and supporting the set-up of business advice centres in the regions that facilitate access to finance.

STRONGER ECONOMY

- ✓ The Association Agreement including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), entered into force on 1 September 2017, although parts of the agreement have been provisionally applied since 1 November 2014 and the DCFTA since 1 January 2016. The DCFTA is a **major milestone in bilateral trade relations** offering new economic opportunities to both sides.
- ✓ The agreement triggers reform of Ukraine's legal framework, aiming to align it with that of the EU. **Ukrainian businesses receive stable and predictable preferential access** to the largest single market in the world, with over 500 million consumers. And EU businesses are able to benefit from easier access to the Ukrainian market, building new relationships with suppliers and partners.
- ✓ In 2017, **exports from Ukraine to the EU increased by 27%** and Ukrainian imports from the EU by about 22%, while overall trade increased by 24%.
- ✓ The reforms that are anchored in the AA/DCFTA will improve the overall business climate in Ukraine, including curbing corruption and **eliminating protectionist measures**, which will in turn increase investor confidence.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (12) [FONTE: União Europeia]

STRONGER CONNECTIVITY


- ✓ The EU has provided support for the government of Ukraine in establishing **an independent energy regulatory authority** and new gas and electricity laws to improve efficiency in the energy sector.
- ✓ In close cooperation with partners and financial institutions such as EIB, EBRD and the World Bank, the EU continues to support the **modernisation of Ukraine's gas transport system**, reconstructing parts of the east-west transit pipelines.
- ✓ The European Union is the largest donor to the new **Safe Confinement** above the destroyed Unit 4 of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, which was erected in November 2016.
- ✓ The EU has provided support for an **ambitious transport agenda**, contributing significantly to the AA and the DCFTA. Transport is the backbone of increased movement of people and goods between Ukraine and the EU and will foster trade and economic growth.

- ✓ Temporary 'Autonomous Trade Measures' for Ukraine were introduced in October 2017, topping up the quantities of agricultural products **Ukraine can export to the EU** without paying customs duties and accelerating the elimination of customs tariffs for several industrial products.
- ✓ The EU has supported Ukrainian authorities in establishing an independent regulatory authority for **electronic communications**, as well as in improving Ukraine's cyber resilience

STRONGER SOCIETY

- ✓ **Visa-free travel** for Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports entered into force on 11 June 2017. In one year, over half a million Ukrainians travelled to the EU without needing a visa.
- ✓ Ukraine is one of the largest beneficiaries in the Eastern Partnership region of the Erasmus+ programme, with **more than 5,200 Ukrainian students and education staff** benefitting from the Erasmus exchange programme in the period up to summer 2018.
- ✓ The EU supports a **€10 million civil society programme** that aims to reinforce its capacity to support and monitor the reform programme that is underway.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (13) [FONTE: Governo da Ucrânia]



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Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine

[Bilateral institutions of the
Association Agreement between
Ukraine and the EU](#)

[Support Group for Ukraine](#)

In March 2007 negotiations on a new enhanced agreement which would replace the previous Partnership and Cooperation agreement began between the EU and Ukraine under the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.

During the EU-Ukraine Summit held in Paris in September 2008, the parties reached an understanding and accorded that the new enhanced agreement would be known as the Association Agreement.

Twenty one rounds of negotiations on the Association Agreement were held between 2007 and 2012. Eighteen of negotiation rounds were focused on the chapter of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

The conclusion of the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement had been announced at the EU-Ukraine Summit on December 19, 2011. This Agreement is more extensive in comparison with similar agreements concluded between the EU and other Central or Eastern European countries.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (14) [FONTE: Governo da Ucrânia]

The political part of the Association Agreement as well as the Final Act of the Summit was signed by the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk during the extraordinary EU – Ukraine Summit held on March 21, 2014.

In particular, the Preamble, Title I "General Principles" Title II "Political dialogue and reform, political association, cooperation and convergence in foreign and security policy" and Title VII "Institutional, general and final provisions" of the Agreement.

At the Summit, Ukraine expressed commitment to comply with Ukraine's obligations under Article 8 of the Association Agreement concerning the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 after amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.

The economic part of the Association Agreement was signed during the meeting of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko with the European Council, leaders of the European Union, the Heads of State and Heads of Government of the 28 EU Member States on June 27, 2014. In particular Title III "Justice, Freedom and Security", Title IV "Trade and trade-related matters", Title V "Economic and sector cooperation" and Title VI "Financial cooperation and anti-fraud provisions". This economic part of the Agreement together with the previously signed political part constitutes one single document.

Parliament of Ukraine and the European Parliament ratified the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU simultaneously on September 16, 2014. Ukrainian side handed over the certificates of ratification to the depositary completing thus all internal procedures.

The Association Agreement in its scope and thematic coverage is the biggest international legal document in the history of Ukraine and the biggest international agreement with a third country ever concluded by the European Union.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (15) [FONTE: Presidente da Ucrânia, 13/10/2020]



PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE

Ukraine does everything to be an equal member of the EU - President

13 October 2020 - 22:42



President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is convinced that Ukraine should not just become a member of the European Union, but be an equal participant in the unification of European states. He stated this in a joint interview with Polish President Andrzej Duda to Ukrainian and Polish journalists during a trip to Odesa.

"For me, the most important thing is that Ukraine is not just a member of the EU, but an equal member. I want Ukraine to be invited to the EU. We want to be at this table of negotiations and values at the same level and with the same status," the Ukrainian President stressed.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (16) [FONTE: Presidente da Ucrânia, 13/10/2020]

The Head of State reminded that in order to become a member of the European Union, the countries aspiring to join must meet many conditions.

"Politicians - both Ukrainian and European - say that the path to the EU is a path with two-way movement, towards each other. But no one says that there are many lanes on this road: the country has a lot to do to become a member of the EU. The independent anti-corruption policy, attractive investment climate, and, by the way, the infrastructure that we are actively building," he said.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized that mentally Ukrainians are Europeans. He reminded that there were many disputes over the accession to the European Union of countries such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and now they are members of the EU.

"We now see the result," the President of Ukraine said.

When asked by a journalist whether it is possible for Ukraine and Poland to sit on one side of the "table" of the European Union, the President replied: "There will definitely be such a moment".

Andrzej Duda, for his part, noted that Poland has always supported Ukraine's European aspirations.

"Ukraine has always been in Europe, and the issue of EU membership is a political issue, and it requires changes and many reforms that need to be carried out in Ukraine," he said.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (17) [FONTE: Presidente da Ucrânia, 13/10/2020]

"Ukraine is moving towards the EU, and we support it on this path, and my visit is proof of that," Andrzej Duda stressed.

Regarding the historical aspect of the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland, Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed content that during the conversation with Andrzej Duda they were very open in discussing the issues of historical memory.

"We have to be realistic, without sentiment. At our level, we have agreed to go through all these issues, because we live side by side, we are neighbors and will be neighbors forever," the President of Ukraine said.


He stressed that the issue of historical memory should be resolved by historians, professionals, not politicians.

"That is why it is important that today, as a political issue, the issue of historical memory is completely removed. It is important. There should be no disputes between our countries in the future," Volodymyr Zelenskyy summed up.

The President of Ukraine also noted that the Ukrainian-Polish economic forum held in Odesa today was opened by the presidents of the two countries and heads of relevant ministries. About 50 Ukrainian and 30 Polish companies took part in the meeting. Much attention has been paid to infrastructure development.

"I have not seen any moment, any fundamental tension that could divide our countries," the President of Ukraine emphasized.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (18) [FONTE: Rada / Parlamento da Ucrânia, 23/09/2021]



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Adopted the Law of Ukraine on the Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to the Excessive Influence of Persons who have Significant Economic or Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs)

Information Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat
Published on 23 September 2021, at 14:45

Adopted the Law of Ukraine No. 5599 on the Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to the Excessive Influence of Persons who have Significant Economic or Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs).


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24 January 2022 18:02

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (19)

[FONTE: Kira Rudik / Atlantic
Council, 15/11/2021]

Ukraine's Anti-Oligarch Law: President Zelenskyy's populist power grab?



The anti-oligarch law recently signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is being trumpeted by his supporters as a landmark step in the struggle to reduce the political influence of Ukraine's oligarch elite. However, this legislation looks more like an attempt to conceal the strengthening of presidential powers behind a facade of populist rhetoric.

In order to appreciate the reality of Zelenskyy's anti-oligarch legislation, it is important to understand the roots of the oligarchic system as it exists in today's Ukraine. In 1991, Ukraine gained independence with a 70-year legacy of state ownership. Those with ties to the former Communist regime emerged as the first generation of post-independence oligarchs.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (20) [FONTE: Kira Rudik / Atlantic Council, 15/11/2021]

The second generation of oligarchs took shape as the 1990s progressed and key economic assets became concentrated in the hands of several dozen people, many of whom remain active players in Ukrainian politics and the economy. A number of oligarch clans with regional ties to Kyiv, Dnipro, and Donetsk grew to dominate many aspects of Ukraine's national life and compete for access to state resources.

Every oligarch clan had its own ensemble of loyal MPs, ministers, and officials in various positions throughout the state apparatus. By the time President Yanukovich fled to Russia in February 2014, virtually all key sectors of the Ukrainian economy were under the control of the oligarchs. Crucially, this control also extended to the Ukrainian media.

Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity and the subsequent undeclared war with Russia have created a new set of challenges for the oligarchic system. Since 2014, Ukraine has witnessed the emergence of a genuinely independent National Bank along with independent management at state energy giant Naftogaz. Decentralization reforms have deprived central government of its monopoly on control of state budgets. At the same time, the state has been empowered by security considerations in response to ongoing Russian aggression.

While these developments placed some limitations on oligarch influence, they did not succeed in derailing the oligarchic system as a whole. Frustration over the continued power of the oligarch clans was a key factor behind Zelenskyy's presidential election victory in 2019, when he came to power amid campaign trail commitments to combat the old elite and usher in a new era of greater equality.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (21) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

Reasons for Big “Blunders”—EU Policy towards Ukraine

Introduction

EU policy towards Ukraine and Russia remains unchanged, regardless of critical voices pleading for changing EU’s policy towards Russia, especially in Germany. The EU emphasizes European togetherness, maintaining the sanction regime against Russia by upholding diplomatic channels at the same time and supporting the Ukrainian policy of territorial integrity, and its far-reaching association agreement with Ukraine has become operative.¹ In the eyes of the EU, Putin’s Russia alone represents the guilty party of the bloody conflict.

Against this stance, I will argue that, from a strategic point of view, EU policy towards Ukraine had at least three flaws:

- It is both alarming and possibly revealing that the EU disregarded the warnings of a possibly harsh reaction by Russia if Ukraine turned westward and becomes part of EU’s sphere of influence.
- It is also quite evident that the EU had a rather romantic understanding of Ukraine’s domestic situation.
- Finally, the EU was—and still is—rather insensitive towards the question of what negative consequences the association agreement might have on the EU itself.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (22) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

The Ukraine Conflict as a Catalyst of a Major Change

Thesis 1: The conflict over Ukraine has induced a major change for the worse in world politics and has left Ukraine in shambles. On the one hand, Russia has destabilized the European political order; on the other hand, the EU has evidently committed significant foreign policy blunders with its policy towards Ukraine.² In the context of the Ukraine crisis, the dominant narrative in world politics has changed. In addition, the conflict raised significant questions about the nature and future of the EU’s role in world politics.

The Ukraine conflict induced a remarkable change in the discussions on the state of the world order. Prior to the conflict, analysts and policy makers talked about and practised “humanitarian interventions,” discussed “democratic peace,” and developed the “Responsibility to Protect Doctrine” (R2P)—that is, the international community should support a state unable to guarantee human rights and in extreme cases even intervene militarily. A clear final goal dominated the discourse on world security: Global Governance. The struggle has significantly contributed to this change. Nowadays, the dominating headlines read geopolitics and even Cold War II. One important reason behind this change is Russia’s and the West’s response to the domestic upheavals and political transformation in Ukraine.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (23) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

The EU’s Eastern Policy and the Evolution of Events—Integration Rivalry

Thesis 2: Ukraine was the object of a power rivalry between the EU and Russia in which each side wanted to extend its influence on Ukraine. The EU was well aware of this rivalry. That is why those in charge rushed towards the signing of the association agreement with Ukraine and disregarded Russia’s interests. The problem: this policy assumed that Putin would apply only methods used in the past. Possible countermeasures by Russia based on a different set of instruments were not taken into consideration.

Until 2013, Ukraine struggled primarily with Russia. The issues were Ukraine’s debts to Russia, subsequent reactions by Moscow, and the reproach by Russia that Ukraine sold Russian gas illegally to the West. Crimea, where Russia maintained a major naval base, was an additional major thorn in Ukraine’s relations with Russia. Sevastopol has always been an important hub to project Russia’s naval power globally. Regardless the two parties were able to sign an agreement, which allows Russia to maintain the base,¹⁰ Crimea remained a potential zone of conflict. The Duma, e.g., issued resolutions that Crimea belongs to Russia and authorities distributed Russian passports to citizens on the Crimea.¹¹

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (24) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

Ukraine’s Domestic Situation

Thesis 3: In its policy to force Ukraine to take sides, the EU has not analyzed carefully enough the societal, economic, and political divisions in Ukraine and their likely consequences.

From the outset, Ukraine was a big country fraught with problems and, even more important, set up rather separate identities about the basic orientation of its policy.

Before the crisis occurred, roughly three “identities” were discernable¹⁸—Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Western Ukraine:¹⁹

- In Crimea, separatist ideas were widespread from the beginning. Alignment with Russia was always a subject of discussion. In a 2001 poll, 60 percent declared themselves as Russians, 24 percent as Ukrainians, and 11 percent as Tartars.
- Russia always supported Russian-minded groups on the peninsula: the DUMA had declared already in 1991 that the handing over of Crimea to Ukraine was “illegal,” and DUMA members openly advertised the unification of Crimea with Russia.
- In 2010, President Yanukovich gained more than 70 percent of the votes in the South and East. His promise was to repair the relationship with Russia.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (25) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

No Sense of “Realpolitik”

Thesis 4: The EU designed its policy towards Ukraine in competition with Russia. However, it did not take possible counter-measure by Moscow of a different kind into account. These counter-measure did not come as a surprise.

There were warnings about possible military actions already in 2008 after Russia’s attack on Georgia. For example, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said, “Russia might try to make advances in Crimea after the success of its military operations in Georgia in August.” In Poland, there was “the belief that Ukraine is next.”²⁷ In addition, a number of analysts emphasized before the harsh conflict surfaced that the potential membership of states participating in the Eastern partnership program of the EU “will alter the tectonics of the post-Soviet area—massive reactions by Russia will follow.”²⁸

Indeed, Russia’s interest was clear. Official strategy documents emphasized, for example, the predominant status of Russia within the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with a growing emphasis on Ukraine. Already in “Russia’s Medium-Term Strategy (2000–2010) for the development of relations with the EU”, one could read that Russia aimed at “consolidating and developing integration processes in the CIS” and that the EU’s enlargement has an “ambivalent impact” on EU–Russia cooperation. The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept of February 2013 indicated Ukraine “as a priority partner within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)” and “the protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad.” Finally, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on December 23, 2013, that the final pieces are in place for the 2015 launch of the economic union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and that he hoped that it would be joined by Ukraine.²⁹


A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (26) [FONTE: Peter Schmidt, “Reasons for Big ‘Blunders’—EU Policy towards Ukraine”, 2016]

A (Too?) Heavy Burden

Thesis 5: EU’s policy to sign an association agreement with the Ukraine and provide the country a clear perspective of membership, adds a staggeringly heavy burden on the EU’s already overloaded economic and political agenda. It will probably hurt both the EU and Ukraine.

The EU’s old approach, at least on paper, was that there is no relationship between the EU’s Eastern Policy and membership. However, the goals and methods equalled the preparation for membership. The EU parliament always held a positive view and the Commission followed later. The European Commissioner for Enlargement stated in Kiev already on February 7, 2013, that there was now a link between EU’s Eastern Policy and membership.³⁶ Today, EU’s policy almost unconditionally supports the government in Kiev. The EU and Kyiv share now something like a community of fate, and it looks as if the EU is inextricably linked with the future of Ukraine. This is the case regardless the restrictive interpretation of the association agreement, agreed on by the European Council last December, the far-reaching character of the agreement brings the Ukraine very close to the EU.³⁷

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a UE (27) [FONTE: Cartoon de Rodrigo / Expresso, 2013]



A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (1) [FONTE: Matt Spetalnick / Reuters, 1/04/2008]

Bush vows to press for Ukraine, Georgia in NATO

[Matt Spetalnick](#)

KIEV (Reuters) - U.S. President George W. Bush vowed on Tuesday to press for Ukraine and Georgia to be allowed to start the process of joining NATO despite resistance from Russia and skepticism from the alliance's European members.

Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko and President Bush walks during an official welcoming ceremony in Kiev
April 1, 2008. REUTERS/Mykhailo Markiv/Pool



A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (2) [FONTE: NYT, 3/04/2008]

NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine

April 3, 2008

BUCHAREST, Romania President Bush threw the NATO summit meeting here off-script on Wednesday by lobbying hard to extend membership to Ukraine and Georgia, but he failed to rally support for the move among key allies.

Mr. Bush's position that Ukraine and Georgia should be welcomed into a Membership Action Plan, or MAP, that prepares nations for NATO membership directly contradicted German and French government positions stated earlier this week. It also risked upsetting efforts to get Russia to soften its opposition to positioning a missile defense array in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Bush failed to win over a consensus of NATO members in a debate at a dinner of NATO leaders, a senior German official said Wednesday night, with at least seven countries lined up against him.

Normally, summit meetings like this are prescribed, but Mr. Bush's comments added some extra interest while annoying Germany and France, which had said they would block the invitation to Ukraine and Georgia.

At the dinner on Wednesday, the German and French position was supported by Italy, Hungary and the Benelux countries, a senior German official said. Mr. Bush was said to have accepted that his position was not going to prevail, and officials were asked to find some construction overnight that would encourage Ukraine and Georgia without asking them to enter a membership plan now.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (3) [FONTE: NATO / Cimeira de Bucareste, 3/04/2008]



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION | TOPICS | NEWSROOM | E-LIBRARY

Home > e-Library > Official texts (Chronological)

Bucharest Summit Declaration

**Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008**


03 Apr. 2008 - | Press Release (2008) 049 | Issued on 03 Apr. 2008 |



Last updated: 08 May. 2014 11:10

23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (4) [FONTE: Governo da Ucrânia, 30/10/2019]



[Home](#) / [News](#) / Dmytro Kuleba: Ukraine believes the decision of 2008 Bucharest Summit to grant NATO membership to our...

Dmytro Kuleba: Ukraine believes the decision of 2008 Bucharest Summit to grant NATO membership to our country will be fulfilled

Service of the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, posted 30 October 2019 15:45

[DEFENSE](#) [DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER](#) [INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY](#)

At a joint briefing in Odessa Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Dmytro Kuleba and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told about plans and priorities for further cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance.

Dmytro Kuleba welcomed NATO Secretary General in Ukraine and stated that among the urgent issues were strengthening the Ukrainian economy, democracy and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. "Today, in Odessa, in the new capital of our Navy, we place particular emphasis on the development of the Navy and the enhancement of security in the Black Sea," he said.

The Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration stressed that the current Government was the first Government to clearly set out in its Action Program a task to achieve harmonization of standards, requirements and principles with the Alliance's membership criteria within five years. "Public opinion surveys show a steady pattern that the support for Euro-Atlantic integration in the public is steadily growing. We are not talking about the spontaneous reaction of Ukrainian citizens to Russia's aggression, but about a conscious decision," Dmytro Kuleba stressed.

He stressed that Ukraine had made its choice - NATO membership. Similarly, the Alliance made its choice in 2008 when it decided at the Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would become a NATO member. "We assume that this decision will be fulfilled. An application for Membership Action Plan (MAP) having submitted by Ukraine in 2008 is valid. We believe that there is no need to resubmit the application. Instead, we need to pursue reforms, deepen our cooperation with the Alliance, and achieve harmonization of standards of our Armed Forces with those of the NATO.

BY THEMES «DEFENSE», «DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER», «INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY»

18:12, 28 January

[INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY](#)
[INVESTMENTS](#) [PRIME MINISTER](#)
[REFORMS](#)

Denys Shmyhal: Ukraine works on creating a comfortable environment for foreign investors and businesses

13:57, 28 January

[ENERGY SECURITY](#)
[INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY](#)
[PRIME MINISTER](#)

Transformation of Ukrainian energy sector is one of the main objectives facing Ukraine in the coming years, says Denys Shmyhal

23:21, 27 January

[INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY](#) [POLICY](#)

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (5) [FONTE: NATO, 11/01/2022]



Relations with Ukraine

Last updated: 11 Jan. 2022 10:18

A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantial of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas.



A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (6) [FONTE: NATO,

11/01/2022]

- Dialogue and cooperation started when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994).
- Relations were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take cooperation forward.
- The 2009 Declaration to Complement the NATO-Ukraine Charter mandated the NUC, through Ukraine's Annual National Programme, to underpin Ukraine's efforts to take forward reforms aimed at implementing Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, in line with the decisions of the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
- Cooperation has deepened over time and is mutually beneficial, with Ukraine actively contributing to NATO-led operations and missions.
- Priority is given to support for comprehensive reform in the security and defence sector, which is vital for Ukraine's democratic development and for strengthening its ability to defend itself.
- In response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has reinforced its support for capability development and capacity-building in Ukraine. The Allies condemn and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, and its destabilising and aggressive activities in eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea region. NATO has increased its presence in the Black Sea and stepped up maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.
- Since the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO's practical support for Ukraine is set out in the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine.
- In June 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation reinstating membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective. In 2019, a corresponding amendment to Ukraine's Constitution entered into force.
- In September 2020, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved Ukraine's new National Security Strategy, which provides for the development of the distinctive partnership with NATO with the aim of membership in NATO.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (7) [FONTE: Ukrinform, 11/11/2021]

Poll: 58% back Ukraine's accession to NATO, 62% want Ukraine to join EU



The poll revealed that if a respective referendum were held today, 62% of respondents would support Ukraine's accession to the EU, and 32% would oppose it.

At the same time, 58% of respondents would be in favor of Ukraine's joining NATO, and 35% would oppose it.

At the same time, those most skeptical about Ukraine's joining the EU and NATO are the voters of the Opposition Platform – For Life party and the parties of Andriy Shariy and Yevhen Muraiev.

The survey was conducted among residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older in all regions, except for the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions. A total of 5,000 respondents were interviewed.

According to the poll, residents of the country's western and central regions are the most loyal to European integration, unlike residents of the eastern regions, where less than half support Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (8) [FONTE: NATO / Tratado do Atlântico Norte]



Tratado do Atlântico Norte

Washington D.C., 4 de Abril de 1949 ¹

04 Apr. 1949 - | Last updated 19-Jun-2017 13:09

*Os Estados Partes no presente Tratado,
Reafirmando a sua fé nos intuitos e princípios da Carta das Nações Unidas e o desejo de viver em
paz com todos os povos e com todos os Governos;
Decididos a salvaguardar a liberdade, herança comum e civilização dos seus povos, fundadas nos
princípios da democracia, das liberdades individuais e do respeito pelo direito;
Desejosos de favorecer a estabilidade e o bem-estar na área do Atlântico Norte;
Resolvidos a congregar os seus esforços para a defesa colectiva e para a preservação da paz e da
segurança:
cordam no presente Tratado do Atlântico Norte:*

Artigo 5.º

As Partes concordam em que um ataque armado contra uma ou várias delas na Europa ou na América do Norte será considerado um ataque a todas, e, consequentemente, concordam em que, se um tal ataque armado se verificar, cada uma, no exercício do direito de legítima defesa, individual ou colectiva, reconhecido pelo artigo 51.º da Carta das Nações Unidas, prestará assistência à Parte ou Partes assim atacadas, praticando sem demora, individualmente e de acordo com as restantes Partes, a acção que considerar necessária, inclusive o emprego da força armada, para restaurar e garantir a segurança na região do Atlântico Norte.

Qualquer ataque armado desta natureza e todas as providências tomadas em consequência desse ataque serão imediatamente comunicados ao Conselho de Segurança. Essas providências terminarão logo que o Conselho de Segurança tiver tomado as medidas necessárias para restaurar e manter a paz e a segurança internacionais.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (9) [FONTE: NYT, 13/01/2022]

NATO Won't Let Ukraine Join Soon. Here's Why.

Ukraine, with Russian troops on its borders, is pressing for membership. But President Biden and European leaders are not ready for that step.

Jan. 13, 2022



Ukrainian troops took part in an exercise near Kyiv in December. If Ukraine were a NATO member, the alliance would be obligated to defend it against Russia and other adversaries. Sergei Supinsky/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

WASHINGTON — The tense talks this week among the United States, Russia and European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have made one thing clear: While the Biden administration insists it will not allow Moscow to quash Ukraine's ambitions to join NATO, it has [no immediate plans](#) to help bring the former Soviet republic into the alliance.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (10) [FONTE: NYT, 13/01/2022]

If Ukraine were a NATO member, the alliance would be obligated to defend it against Russia and other adversaries. U.S. officials say they will not appease President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia by undermining a policy enshrined in NATO's original 1949 treaty that grants any European nation the right to ask to join.

"Together, the United States and our NATO allies made clear we will not slam the door shut on NATO's open door policy — a policy that has always been central to the NATO alliance," Wendy R. Sherman, the deputy secretary of state, said on Wednesday.

But France and Germany have [in the past opposed Ukraine's inclusion](#), and other European members are wary — a deal breaker for an alliance that [grants membership only by unanimous consent](#). American and Russian leaders know this. With Russian troops amassed on Ukraine's eastern border, some current and former American and European officials say Mr. Putin might just be raising the NATO issue as a pretext for an invasion.

Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, has suggested that Mr. Putin is trying to distract from more urgent matters. "Everybody's talking about NATO expansion," Mr. McFaul [said on a podcast](#) by the Center for a New American Security that was released on Tuesday. "Suddenly, we're debating this issue that wasn't even an issue. That's a great advantage to him."

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (11) [FONTE: NYT, 13/01/2022]

Biden has grown skeptical of expanding U.S. military commitments.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mr. Biden successfully urged NATO to accept Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as member states in the late 1990s. The top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, Mr. Biden [said that turning the former Cold War adversaries into allies](#) would mark the “beginning of another 50 years of peace” for Europe. He added that the move would right a “historical injustice” perpetrated by Stalin.

But over the course of two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, experts said, Mr. Biden’s fervor for expanding NATO cooled considerably. In 2004, seven Eastern European countries joined the alliance, and in 2008, President George W. Bush pushed NATO to [issue a declaration](#) that Ukraine and Georgia would become members in the future despite [reservations](#) from U.S. intelligence agencies. However, the alliance has never offered either country a formal action plan to join, a necessary step for them to do so.

As recently as June, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken [told senators](#) that “we support Ukraine membership in NATO.” Mr. Biden, however, has been far more circumspect in his public comments and “has soft-pedaled talk of extending NATO membership to Ukraine,” two foreign policy scholars, Joshua Shiffrin and Stephen Wertheim, [wrote in September](#) in Foreign Affairs.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (12) [FONTE: NYT, 13/01/2022]

Biden wants Ukraine to improve its political and legal systems.

To meet one of the three main criteria for entry into NATO, a European nation must demonstrate a commitment to democracy, individual liberty and support for the rule of law. While Ukrainian leaders say they have met that threshold, some American and European officials argue otherwise.

In a 2020 analysis, Transparency International, an anticorruption watchdog, ranked Ukraine 117th out of 180 countries on its corruption index, lower than any NATO nation.

Officials in European nations with stronger liberal governance — notably in [Sweden](#) and [Finland](#) — have also floated the possibility of joining NATO, despite years of determined nonalignment. That is a discussion “we are ready to do,” Victoria J. Nuland, the State Department’s under secretary for political affairs, told journalists on Tuesday. “Obviously, they are longtime, established, stable democracies.”

She signaled that might not be the case with Ukraine. “That conversation would be slightly different than it is with countries that are making the transition to democratic systems and dealing with intensive problems of corruption and economic reform and democratic stability, etc.,” Ms. Nuland said.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (13) [FONTE: Julian Pecquet / Foreign Lobby, 8/08/2021]

Ukraine dominates new US lobbying for second month in a row

New Lobbying Contracts – August 2021					
	Country	Foreign Principal	Registrant	Date/ Length of contract	Amount
1	Ukraine	Civil Movement For a Just Ukraine	Yorktown Solutions	Aug. 17 / 1 year	\$960,000
2	United Arab Emirates	Embassy of the UAE	FGH Holdings	July 1 / 5 months	\$375,000
3	Malaysia	Malaysian Palm Oil Council	DCI Group	Aug. 17 / 1 year	\$300,000

Ukrainian interests dominated new Washington lobbying for a second month in a row as the **Joe Biden** administration rethinks US policy towards the eastern European nation, according to a *Foreign Lobby Report* review of filings disclosed with the Department of Justice in August.

The **Civil Movement for a Just Ukraine**, a Kyiv nonprofit founded by Ukrainian veterans with ties to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, hired **Yorktown Solutions** on a 12-month, \$960,000 [contract](#) to help advance the group's anti-kleptocracy agenda. The firm founded by **Daniel Vajdich**, a former adviser to Sen. **Ted Cruz** (R-Texas), has had a \$960,000

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (14) [FONTE: Câmara dos Representantes dos EUA]



<input checked="" type="radio"/> Lobbying Disclosures <input type="radio"/> Lobbying Contributions		IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	SENATE ID	REGISTRANT NAME	CLIENT NAME	LOBBYISTS	REPORT TYPE	FILING YEAR
Filing Year ^		422480015	400604838	Blue Star Strategies LLC	QPartners, LLC	Painter, Sally	Registration	2021
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2021 <input type="checkbox"/> 2020 <input type="checkbox"/> 2019 <input type="checkbox"/> 2017 <input type="checkbox"/> 2016 <input type="checkbox"/> 2015 <input type="checkbox"/> 2013		449580001	401105861-12	WEST CAPITAL INC.	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	Kolesnikova, Yana Kolesnikova, Yana	Registration Amendment	2021
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Report Type ^		449580001	401105861-12	WEST CAPITAL INC.	Volodymyr Petrovich Zelensky	Kolesnikova, Yana	Registration Amendment	2021
<input type="checkbox"/> Registration <input type="checkbox"/> Registration Amendment		449580001	401105861-12	WEST CAPITAL INC.	Volodymyr Petrovich Zelensky	Kolesnikova, Yana	Registration Amendment	2021
Issue Areas ^		449580001	401105861-12	WEST CAPITAL INC.	Volodymyr Petrovich Zelensky	Kolesnikova, Yana	Registration Amendment	2021
<input type="checkbox"/> EDUCATION (EDU) <input type="checkbox"/> GOVERNMENT ISSUES (GOV)		449580001	401105861-12	WEST CAPITAL INC.	Volodymyr Petrovich Zelensky	Kolesnikova, Yana	Registration Amendment	2021

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (15)

[FONTE: Roman
Woronowicz / Kyiv Post, 28/01/2022]

Zelensky Insists in Biden Call Russian Attack Not Imminent



US President Joe Biden and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke via telephone on Jan. 27, in discussions that at least one unnamed Ukrainian official characterized as heated.

While the White House released a readout of the call that made no mention of any disagreement, the Ukrainian government official said that Zelensky vehemently disagreed with Biden's characterization that a Russian attack was imminent, according to CNN.

*CNN reporter, Alex Marquardt, wrote on Twitter:
'A Russian invasion is now virtually certain once
the ground freezes, Biden said to Zelensky.'*

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (16) [FONTE: Roman Woronowicz / Kyiv Post, 28/01/2022]

Kyiv could be “sacked,” Russian forces may attempt to occupy it, “prepare for impact”, Biden said, according to this official.

Biden also told Zelensky not to expect that U.S. or NATO troops would be sent into Ukraine should Russia invade or that Ukraine might obtain the latest and most lethal hi-tech military hardware.

Zelensky is said to have responded that while the situation on Ukraine’s borders was tense, it remained stable with no indication that Russian troops were preparing to move into Ukraine.


National Security Council spokeswoman, Emily Horne, disagreed with the CNN reporting:

“This is not true. President Biden said that there is a distinct possibility that the Russians could invade Ukraine in February. He has previously said this publicly & we have been warning about this for months. Reports of anything more or different than that are completely false,” Horne noted in response to Marquardt’s assertions.


She added that a spokesperson for Zelensky had subsequently stated that “some reports regarding today’s conversation of President Zelenskyy and President Biden are completely false.”

The White House readout noted that, “President Biden reaffirmed the readiness of the United States along with its allies and partners to respond decisively if Russia further invades Ukraine. He also underscored the commitment of the United States to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A Ucrânia e as instituições euro-atlânticas: a relação com a NATO / EUA (17) [FONTE: Politico / World's cartoonists on this week's events, 29/01/2022]



▲ First published on Caglecartoons.com, U.S., January 25, 2022 | By Jeff Koterba



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (1)

[FONTE: Comité Olímpico Internacional]



Latest Beijing 2022 news [All news](#)



Beijing 2022

29 Jan 2022

Five ways in which Beijing 2022 will become carbon neutral



Beijing 2022

29 Jan 2022

UN Secretary-General António Guterres calls for the Olympic Truce to be observed



Beijing 2022

28 Jan 2022

Access to a new fan base - IOC President emphasises opportunities when meeting the Chefs de Mission



Beijing 2022

28 Jan 2022

IOC publishes Beijing 2022 Competition Contingency Regulations

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (2)

[FONTE: Global Times, 29/01/2022]

Dignitaries, envoys extend wishes for Chinese New Year overlapping Winter Games

By Zhang Han



Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, said the tiger's strength, vitality, courage, tenacity and boldness are qualities we need as we face unprecedented challenges, in a video address released by the UN on January 28, 2022. Photo: VCG

World leaders, chiefs of international organizations and ambassadors to China sent their best wishes for the Year of the Tiger, and the festive atmosphere for the Chinese New Year is further heated by high anticipation for the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, which will start in six days.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (3)

[FONTE: CNN, 26/01/2022]

US suggests Winter Olympics could influence Russia's military planning in Ukraine



By [Jennifer Hansler](#) and [Jeremy Herb](#), CNN

Updated 1652 GMT (0052 HKT) January 26, 2022



NATO chief still believes there's a diplomatic solution with Russia 02:06

(CNN) — A senior US official suggested Wednesday that the [Winter Olympics](#) beginning next week in China could affect Russian President Vladimir Putin's calculations over a possible invasion of Ukraine.

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said that the Winter Olympics in Beijing could impact Putin's thinking about potential military action, noting at a virtual European think tank event Wednesday that she thinks Chinese President Xi Jinping "would not be ecstatic if Putin chose that moment to invade Ukraine."

The Beijing Olympics kick off at the beginning of February and Putin plans to be there, Sherman added.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (4)

[FONTE: Japan Times, 24/01/2022. FOTO: BBC]

Putin could burst Xi's Olympic dream with a war in Ukraine

Jan 24, 2022



As the U.S. and Europe mount increasingly frantic efforts to deter Russia from any invasion of Ukraine, it's Chinese President Xi Jinping who may have the biggest influence on Vladimir Putin's timetable.

The Russian president has said he will join Xi at the opening ceremony Feb. 4 of the Beijing Winter Olympics, where the Chinese leader has lavished billions of dollars to showcase his nation's superpower status to the world.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (5)

[FONTE: Japan Times, 24/01/2022]

The last thing Xi would need is for Putin to overshadow China's big moment by triggering a global security crisis with the U.S. and Europe, analysts say. That's especially the case given Xi is looking to bolster his prestige at home as he seeks endorsement for an unprecedented third term later this year.

The two nations have often had each other's backs on the global stage.

They've worked in concert to block United Nations Security Council resolutions critical of either, and aligned on collective issues like North Korea. They reveled in the messy U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. And they've largely stayed neutral on actions declared to be in the other's national interest — such as Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Xi called Putin an "old friend" when they chatted in mid December, while the Russian leader hailed what he said was a "responsible joint approach to solving urgent global issues."

But kicking off an invasion of Ukraine in the middle of Xi's Olympic moment could throw a wrench into such warmth, and risk drawing China into the diplomatic fray. It's possible Xi asked Putin in their recent call not to invade Ukraine during the Games, according to one diplomat in Beijing who asked not to be identified talking about such scenarios. China's embassy in Russia on Saturday dismissed that prospect, adding that Beijing has advocated for a solution to the issues via the framework of the Minsk peace accords.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (6)

[FONTE: SCMP, 29/01/2022]

China renews call for direct talks as UN Security Council turns attention to Ukraine crisis

Chinese diplomatic observers said Beijing would maintain a flexible but ambiguous position and was unlikely to weigh in China has close cooperation with both countries and will not take sides, analyst says



The US has called on Beijing to use its influence with Moscow to push for a diplomatic solution to the crisis but observers said China was not likely to take on a bigger role.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (7)

[FONTE: SCMP, 24/01/2022]

Taiwan scrambles jets after Beijing sends 39 aircraft to island's air defence zone

Sunday's fly-by came a day after the US and Japan wrapped up a six-day joint maritime drill south of Okinawa. In biggest PLA sortie to island since October, planes flew northeast of Pratas Island, according to Taiwan defence ministry.



A chart provided by the ministry showed that the PLA aircraft flew in an area northeast of the Taiwan-controlled [Pratas Island](#).

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (8)

[FONTE: Japan Times, 24/01/2022]

China sends warplanes close to Taiwan amid report of new naval presence near Japan

[Jesse Johnson](#) Jan 24, 2022



A Chinese H-6 bomber flies over the East China Sea in a photo released in July 2019. On Sunday, China sent its largest number of warplanes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone since October. | JOINT STAFF OFFICE OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE MINISTRY / VIA REUTERS

China sent its largest number of warplanes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone since October on Sunday, Taipei's Defense Ministry announced, as a report said that Beijing had recently established a constant naval presence between southern Japan and eastern Taiwan — an area viewed as a potential future battleground.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (9)

[FONTE: Japan Times, 24/01/2022]

Sunday's incursion of 39 warplanes, mostly advanced fighter jets, was the most in a single day since China sent 56 bombers, fighters and spy planes into the ADIZ on Oct. 4. The sortie included 24 J-16 fighters, 10 J-10 fighters and one nuclear-capable H-6 heavy bomber as well as reconnaissance aircraft.

The Taiwanese Defense Ministry said in a statement late Sunday that it scrambled its own aircraft to broadcast warnings and deployed missiles to track the Chinese warplanes, which flew in the southwestern part of its ADIZ, close to the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands, according to a map provided by the ministry.

Sending the warplanes allows Beijing to probe and stress the Taiwanese military while at the same time providing invaluable training opportunities for the Chinese side, according to experts.

Some observers said Sunday's ADIZ flight may have been a response to joint training by the U.S. Navy and Maritime Self-Defense Forces in the Philippine Sea, which includes waters to the east of Taiwan.

The MSDF [said Monday](#) that its Hyuga helicopter carrier had conducted joint exercises for five days through Saturday with two U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups south of Okinawa Prefecture to strengthen the two navies' deterrence and response capabilities.

The move also came just days after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden held a [virtual summit](#), with the two leaders agreeing to ["push back"](#) against China's assertive actions in the region.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (9)

[FONTE: FT, 30/01/2022]

Ukraine conflict shines light on deepening ties between Beijing and Moscow

US and others worry a war in Europe could embolden an already assertive China



© Greg Baker/AFP/Getty Images

US and European warnings that Russia is about to invade Ukraine may spur fear in the west but in China the spectre of war has triggered a different reaction.

The Ukraine crisis “will be a historic opportunity for us to solve the Taiwan problem”, said a Chinese nationalist blogger known as Huashan Qiong Jian last week. The events were a huge drain on the energy of the US and had diverted Washington’s attention away from China, the commentator wrote. “War in Ukraine will be a historical window for the unification of the motherland which we must not miss.”

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (10)

[FONTE: FT, 30/01/2022]



Chinese, Russian and Iranian naval forces in joint drills in the Indian Ocean this month, an example of growing military co-operation between Beijing and Moscow © Iranian Army office/AFP/Getty


Although the two countries insist that they are not in an alliance, military collaboration in some areas has reached a level that rivals that between traditional allies.

"There is no ceiling on the development of our relationship, no limit," said Zhao Mingwen, a former Chinese diplomat and Russia expert now at the China Institute of International Studies, the think-tank of the foreign ministry. "This gives our western friends a lot of room for imagination. You could say we are even more allies than allies."

Zhao added that Russia and China would support each other in conflicts that they viewed as provoked by external powers. "If China were forced to unify Taiwan by force and the US intervened, I believe Russia would not sit by idly," he said.

A China e a crise Rússia-Ucrânia: uma oportunidade para pressionar Taiwan? (11)

[FONTE: Politico / World's cartoonists on this week's events, 29/01/2022]



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Sugestões de leitura

