



Política Internacional e Geopolítica a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 15
9/02/2022**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



AN ESSAY
ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION;
OR, A
VIEW OF ITS PAST AND PRESENT EFFECTS
ON
HUMAN HAPPINESS;
WITH
AN INQUIRY INTO OUR PROSPECTS RESPECTING
THE FUTURE REMOVAL OR MITIGATION OF
THE EVILS WHICH IT OCCASIONS.

By T. R. MALTHUS, A. M.
LATE FELLOW OF JESUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

THE THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, IN ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

BY T. BENSLEY, BOLT COURT, FLEET STREET.


1806.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (2) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Thomas Malthus, in full **Thomas Robert Malthus**, (born February 13/14, 1766, Rookery, near Dorking, Surrey, England—died December 29, 1834, St. Catherine, near Bath, Somerset), English economist and demographer who is best known for his theory that [population](#) growth will always tend to outrun the food supply and that betterment of humankind is impossible without stern limits on reproduction. This thinking is commonly referred to as Malthusianism.

Malthus was an [economic](#) pessimist, viewing poverty as humanity's inescapable lot. The argument in the first edition of his work on population is essentially abstract and analytic. After further reading and travels in Europe, Malthus produced a subsequent edition (1803), expanding the long pamphlet of 1798 into a longer book and adding much factual material and illustration to his thesis. At no point, even up to the final and massive sixth edition of 1826, did he ever adequately set out his premises or examine their logical status. Nor did he handle his factual and statistical materials with much critical or statistical rigour, even though statisticians in Europe and Great Britain had developed increasingly sophisticated techniques during Malthus's lifetime. The 20th-century American sociologist and demographer [Kingsley Davis](#) remarked that, while Malthus's theories were based on a strong empirical foundation, they tended to be weakest in their empiricism and strongest in their theoretical formulation. For better or worse, the Malthusian theory of population was, nevertheless, incorporated into theoretical systems of economics. It acted as a brake on economic optimism, helped to justify a [theory of wages](#) based on the wage earner's minimum cost of subsistence, and discouraged traditional forms of charity.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (3) [FONTE: by Robert J. Mayhew Malthus The Life and Legacies of an Untimely Prophet, 2014, p. 127]



Of course, to summarize Malthus’s core beliefs by styling him an “environmental economist” is misleading, but it also captures an important truth. Malthus did not cognize the airs, waters, and ecosystems of our earth as limited; he was no more an environmental economist than Wordsworth was a Friend of the Earth. It is more historically accurate to say that Malthus was the individual in the canon of so-called “classical economists” who cleaved most strongly to the argument that emanated from the seventeenth-century French *economistes* that the land—taken in a wide sense—was the origin of all value, even in a society he recognized as rapidly moving toward having a preponderance of its population and wealth in the manufacturing and commercial sectors. This is not, of course, environmental economics per se, but it is a form of economics more insistently attuned to the environment, to the limits and opportunities the physical world presents to human societies, than any other that was forged in his own era or for many decades thereafter.

A finitude dos recursos naturais “espectro de Malthus” (4) [FONTE: The Economist, 15/05/2008]

**The
Economist**



Malthus, the false prophet


The pessimistic parson and early political economist remains as wrong as ever

May 15th 2008

AMID an astonishing surge in food prices, which has sparked riots and unrest in many countries and is making even the relatively affluent citizens of America and Europe feel the pinch, faith in the ability of global markets to fill nearly 7 billion bellies is dwindling. Given the fear that a new era of chronic shortages may have begun, it is perhaps understandable that the name of Thomas Malthus is in the air. Yet if his views were indeed now correct, that would defy the experience of the past two centuries.

Malthus first set out his ideas in 1798 in “An Essay on the Principle of Population”. This expounded a tragic twin trajectory for the growth of human populations and the increase of food supply. Whereas the natural tendency was for populations to grow without end, food supply would run up against the limit of finite land. As a result, the “positive checks” of higher mortality caused by famine, disease and war were necessary to bring the number of people back in line with the capacity to feed them.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (5) [FONTE: The Economist, 15/05/2008]



Political folly increases in a geometrical ratio

As so often, governments are making matters worse. Food-export bans are proliferating. Although these may produce temporary relief for any one country, the more they spread the tighter global markets become. Another wrongheaded policy has been America's subsidy to domestic ethanol production in a bid to reduce dependence on imported oil. This misconceived attempt to grow more fuel rather than to curb demand is expected to gobble up a third of this year's maize (corn) crop.

Although neo-Malthusianism naturally has much to say about food scarcity, the doctrine emerges more generally as the idea of absolute limits on resources and energy, such as the notion of “peak oil”. Following the earlier scares of the 1970s, oil companies defied the pessimists by finding extra fields, not least since higher prices had spurred new exploration. But even if oil wells were to run dry, economies can still adapt by finding and exploiting other energy sources.

A new form of Malthusian limit has more recently emerged through the need to constrain greenhouse-gas emissions in order to tackle global

warming. But this too can be overcome by shifting to a low-carbon economy. As with agriculture, the main difficulty in making the necessary adjustment comes from poor policies, such as governments' reluctance to impose a carbon tax. There may be curbs on traditional forms of growth, but there is no limit to human ingenuity. That is why Malthus remains as wrong today as he was two centuries ago.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (6) [FONTE: L. Bretschger / European Economic Review 127 (2020) 103477]

Malthus in the light of climate change

Lucas Bretschger

CER-ETH Centre of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE F7, Zurich CH-8092, Switzerland

A B S T R A C T

To reconsider the Malthusian predictions of natural limits to economic development, the paper develops a multi-sector growth model with exhaustible resource extraction, investments in physical and knowledge capital, climate change, and endogenous fertility. Economic growth is driven by endogenous innovations which increase in the availability and productivity of research labour. Poor substitution of natural resources triggers sectoral change. Climate change is the result of polluting resource use which is, like consumption and investments, based on the intertemporal optimization of the households. Highlighting the importance of bounded resource supply and of rational extraction decisions I show that climate change is independent of population growth in steady state and there is no causal relationship between climate and population during transition to steady state. The consumption per capita growth rate rises in the innovation rate and the output elasticities of labour and capital in the different sectors. Unlike climate policy, population policy is not warranted; it may be counterproductive because labour is crucial for the research sector.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (7) [FONTE: L. Bretschger / European Economic Review 127 (2020) 103477]

6. Conclusions

The paper has addressed the Malthusian concerns that population growth may significantly add to global problems in the context of climate change. Notably, it has dealt with the question whether population growth harms the economy in the future by accentuating the pollution of the atmosphere and whether population growth is bounded by climate change, taking into account the consequences of global warming. As a main result I have found that, also in the context of climate change, specific concerns about population growth are not warranted. The model shows that, in steady state, climate change remains independent of population growth and, during transition, climate change and population growth may move in the same direction for a certain period of time but there is no causal relationship between the two variables. The economy is driven by innovations which emerge at high rate when labour is productive (in research and child rearing), congestion effects of a dense population are low, knowledge diffusion is efficient, and the elasticity of substitution between labour and resources is high. The long-run consumption per capita growth rate increases in the innovation rate, in the output elasticities of labour and capital in final goods production and of labour in research. A low discount rate supports consumption growth and lowers resource price growth. Population policy is not warranted to mitigate climate change, it can even be counterproductive because labour is the crucial input in the research sector.

There are related global problems which are not included in the present model because they go beyond the scope of the used framework. In fact, the model is already very rich and further issues may primarily be raised because the task to address one “big” problem induces thinking about the other global issues as well. Specifically, income inequality, poverty, unemployment, North South division, ageing, environmental migration, uncertainty, and scarcity of local public goods are all clearly relevant in general and potentially also in a Malthusian context but they all would deserve a more specific analysis which goes beyond the scope of the present contribution.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (8) [FONTE: Petter Gleditsch, This time is different! Or is it? ... Nils, 2021]

Journal of
Peace Research

This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and environmental optimists in the age of climate change

Nils Petter Gleditsch 

Peace Research Institute Oslo & Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(1) 177–185
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Abstract

Warning about dire effects of climate change on armed conflict is a recent variation of a scenario that has been promoted by environmental pessimists for over two centuries. The essence is that human activities lead to resource scarcities that in turn will generate famine, pestilence, and war. This essay reviews three stages of the argument: first, the original Malthusian thesis that focused on food production. Second, the broader neoMalthusian concern from the 1970s about limits to growth and developing scarcities in a range of necessities. And recently, the specter of climate change. In each phase, the Malthusians have met firm opposition from environmental optimists, who argue that emerging scarcities can be countered by human ingenuity, technological progress, and national and international economic and political institutions and that environmental change is not in itself a major driver of human violence. In the third phase, the Malthusian case appears to be stronger because human activities have reached a level where they have a truly global impact. Environmental optimists still insist that these problems can be overcome by human ingenuity and that the long-term trend towards less violence in human affairs is unlikely to be reversed by climate change. The stakes seem higher, but the structure of the debate remains largely the same.

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (9) [FONTE: Petter Gleditsch, This time is different! Or is it? ... Nils, 2021]

Climate change – a game changer?

Climate change is often framed as an unprecedented problem emerging in a mature stage of the Anthropocene. As Wagner & Weitzman (2015: 8–10) argue, it is ‘uniquely global’, ‘uniquely long-term’, and ‘uniquely irreversible’. Yet, concern about the social effects of irregular weather patterns and changing climate is not a new phenomenon. Severe winters and cool and rainy summers have frequently led to starvation, such as the Great Famine of 1315–17. Many such phenomena were caused by relatively short-term variations in weather, but a period of several centuries with lower temperatures followed, frequently called the ‘Little Ice Age’. The collapse of the Nordic settlements in Greenland in the 15th century was certainly climate-related, at least in part (Kintisch, 2016). Long-term historical studies (such as Zhang et al., 2010) suggest that wars and regime changes are more common in cold periods. More drastically, the ice ages, including the most recent one that ended some 10,000 years ago, completely changed the topography of North Europe and North America and eliminated not only whatever habitation existed before but also any discernable traces of it. In the early 1970s, fear of another impending ice age briefly emerged and on this basis a CIA (1974) report predicted ‘famine and starvation’ in many areas of the world, as well as ‘mass movement of people across borders’.

IPCC reports as leaning excessively towards pessimism, driven by an alliance of activists and scholars funded by politically driven research programs, while neoMalthusians see them as overly cautious because the IPCC has to watch its step in order not to offend governments that are, at the end of the day, its owners. Thus, uncertainty itself is a major negative externality of global warming and a major contributor to human insecurity as shown by many public opinion polls.


Compared to previous rounds of the environmental debate between pessimists and optimists, the stakes seem higher this time because of the global nature of the problem and the temptation to engage in free-riding in the efforts to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Yet, the debate continues along the same dividing-lines. The pessimists are often charged with alarmism and misanthropy; the optimists are accused of complacency. Both indictments have some plausibility. Further polarization of the debate will lead us nowhere. But perhaps we can hope for a fusion of the neoMalthusian concern and passion with the optimists’ emphasis on finding constructive solutions?

A finitude dos recursos naturais e o “espectro de Malthus” (10)

[FONTE: Cartoon Movement / Marian Kamensky, 10/05/2021]



Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (1) [FONTE: John Waterbury, *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley*, 1979 (recensão do Livro)]



JOHN WATERBURY, *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979). Pp. xiv + 301.

At a time of international attention to the agricultural potential of the Sudan and to the critical condition of the Sudanese and Egyptian economies, it is useful to have this sober account of the record and prospects of water resource development in the Nile Valley. Professor Waterbury questions how "hydraulics and policy intersect and with what results for the use of the resource." He attempts an answer by concentrating on the cases of Egypt, the "classic downstream state," and the Sudan; Uganda, Ethiopia, and the other riparian states figure much less. An overcommitment of the Nile's waters to ambitious projects is predicted as the inevitable result of national policies "for dealing with a transnational asset."

Chapter one, on the "Development of the River System", and chapters four and five, on the history of the Aswan High Dam project and its effects, are valuable surveys. Complicated statistical data are rendered intelligible, and the technical arguments against the construction of the Dam are deftly handled. Several excellent tables and figures illustrate the text. Because "the policy errors that have studded the High Dam's history are rooted in the highly political atmosphere in which the project has been appraised" (p. 152), the author argues that it has been possible only recently for Egyptians and others dispassionately to judge the success of the Dam. Professor Waterbury concludes that on the whole the Dam has been an asset, that alternative schemes would have engendered similar problems, and that, in any case, for political reasons the positive results expected of the Dam were from its inception exaggerated. Chapter six, on the development of the Egyptian economy after 1952, helps in understanding that exaggeration, but seems misplaced in a discussion of "hydropolitics," a term which, incidentally, is not satisfactorily defined.

Professor Waterbury's analysis of the Sudan's agricultural potential is a bracing antidote to the feverishly optimistic speculation which is currently in vogue on the subject. While the amount of cultivable land is enormous, its exploitation will have practical limits beyond the purely financial. Still, the author reaches the interesting conclusion that Arab investors in Sudanese agriculture "will probably use their weight to assure the Sudan all the water it needs to make its project work" (p. 245).

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (2) [FONTE: Universidade de Genebra, 29/03/2021]

“What is hydropolitics? Examining the meaning of an evolving field”



29 March 2021

Introduction

The study of *hydropolitics* is relatively young and ‘borrows’ concepts from other well-established disciplines such as political science, geography, or sociology. The roots of this nascent but blossoming research arena date back only to the late 1970s. As with any new field of study, there is much conceptual fuzziness surrounding *hydropolitics*. For instance, to this day, no single, universal definition of *hydropolitics* exists and is unlikely to be established any time soon.

Following is a selection of major peer-reviewed contributions that deal with the definition of *hydropolitics*. The selected contributions are ordered chronologically and give a specific insight into the evolution of this definition. Furthermore, for each contribution, a brief comment is provided to facilitate users’ reading.

Waterbury, J. 1979. *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley*. Syracuse University Press.

The term *hydropolitics* was first coined by Waterbury (1979) in his book *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley*¹. In questioning “how can sovereign states, pursuing national self-interest [...], cope with the challenge of bi- or multinational coordination in the use of a common resource?”, Waterbury implicitly defined *hydropolitics* as the study of inter-state politics regarding the management of shared water resources.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (3) [FONTE: Hydropolitics | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Environmental Science]

Hydropolitics

The lack of a settled definition for hydropolitics—a prismatic concept that acquires specific meanings according to both the disciplinary boundaries within which it is used and the theoretical perspectives of those employing it—is consistent with the disagreement over its nomenclature (hydro-politics vs. hydropolitics). The term has had many meanings and idiosyncratic usages over time, and there has been hardly any attempt to advance a clear definition for it. The strength of the concept of hydropolitics, its inter-disciplinary conceptual heterogeneity, is also its weakness. While the crystallization of some of the core features of hydropolitics in the literature—especially with regard to scale (namely, the focus on the inter-state level and the range of issues covered, that is, the politics of international water basins)—has anchored hydropolitics to “standard cases” of the concept, its theoretical underpinnings are still blurred. The study of hydropolitics has substantially delved into trans-boundary, not just any, waters. Yet, both the ontology and epistemology of the concept are debatable, so few eclectic definitions for hydropolitics have emerged. Hence, by addressing the relationships between knowledge, theory, and action of hydropolitics, the scientific community, in particular scholars of international relations, political geography, and critical geopolitics, has struggled for theoretical coherence as well as for conceptual clarity over the use of the term. This is not an easy task, though, because the fluid essence of hydropolitics escapes not only definition but also easy classification.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (4) [FONTE: Water Scarcity Atlas]

Hydro-political Interactions

Transboundary waters are of critical importance in global politics, with 286 shared watercourses between 146 countries. Climate change and population growth are expected to heighten hydro-political tensions, leading to increased water related interactions in these transboundary river basins.


Definition of a hydro-political interaction

- Interactions can involve either **tensions or cooperation**; either way, they indicate a water allocation or management issue
- Although the index doesn't give information about the degree of cooperation or conflict associated with the specific interaction, it identifies areas of possible hydro-political risk that would be best addressed through cooperative action.

Main takeaways

- The index highlights the areas where issues related to water resources are most likely. Some of the areas highlighted are **well known hotspots** that are already stressed, such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin, the Nile basin, the Indus basin and the Euphrates-Tigris basin.
- The **likelihood of hydro-political interactions is expected to rise** on average between 74.9 % (2050 RCP 4.5) to 95.3 % (2100 RCP 8.5) especially in sub-Saharan Africa, South-America, Southern North-America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Central and Southern Asia.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (5) [FONTE: Water Scarcity Atlas]




[Show figures from article](#)

Main takeaways


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Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (6) [FONTE: Water Scarcity Atlas]



Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (7) [FONTE: BBC, 16/06/2017]

FUTURE

What is BBC Future? Future Planet Follow the Food Change Agents Immune Response More 

BEST OF BBC FUTURE | GRAND CHALLENGES

Why 'hydro-politics' will shape the 21st Century



(Image credit: Getty Images)



Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (8) [FONTE: BBC, 16/06/2017]

It's been called the 'next oil'. In the coming decades, the supply of water has the potential to influence geopolitics, diplomacy and even conflict.

GRAND CHALLENGES

In this **special series**, Future Now takes a close look at the biggest, most important issues we face in the 21st Century.

For two months, we'll bring you insight from leading scientists, technologists, entrepreneurs and influencers to help you make sense of the challenges we face in today's rapidly evolving world.

The 2008 James Bond film *Quantum of Solace* pits 007 against an evil criminal syndicate bent on global domination. Sounds par for the course... but this particular network of baddies isn't using lasers or missiles to cause havoc.

No, the Quantum organisation has a uniquely dastardly plan: seizing control of Bolivia's water supply.

While the evil syndicate's role in the film might not be entirely realistic, this piece of fiction does raise a scenario that is worth considering seriously: what *would* happen if a country's water supply was cut off? What would be the global fallout?

Think about it: sure, we need water to survive. But it also fuels a country's commerce, trade, innovation and economic success. This has been the case for time immemorial, from the Nile in Ancient Egypt to the

Amazon in the Brazilian rainforest.

While bodies of water typically help form natural borders of countries, several nations tend to share access to rivers or lakes – the Nile runs through nearly a dozen countries alone, for example. Given how conflict-prone humankind is, it's surprising there haven't been more dust-ups of a “hydro-political” nature.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (9) [FONTE: BBC, 16/06/2017]

Experts agree: if there was no access to water, there would be no world peace. That's why one of the grand challenges of the next few decades could be maintaining this ultra-sensitive stasis of water management. In the 21st Century, freshwater supplies are drying up, **climate change is raising sea levels and altering borders**, explosive population growth is straining world resources, and global hyper-nationalism is testing diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, **water demand is expected to go up 55% between 2000 and 2050**. In the coming century, in terms of its value as a global resource, it's been described as "**the next oil**."

So what can we do to guarantee global access to water – and thus global peace?

World peace hinges on hydro-politics

Water's role in shaping politics goes back centuries. "In the ancient world, large bodies of water formed natural boundaries for people and nations," says Zenia Tata, executive director of global development and international expansion at XPrize, an organisation that's holding **a worldwide competition for innovative water management solutions**. "But today's geopolitical landscape looks very different," and access to water remains paramount.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (10) [FONTE: BBC, 16/06/2017]

Experts agree: if there was no access to water, there would be no world peace

In many areas of the world, bodies of water run through several countries or brush up against many countries' borders. That's where something called "riparian water rights" come into play.

In the case of a river, upstream countries – where the river originates – enjoy inherent power and leverage over the downstream countries. These kinds of riparian hotspots abound. And they're often in places that are already fraught.

In the Middle East, the Jordan River basin is the primary water source for many regions, including Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, regions of long-standing political tensions. In Syria, meanwhile, the worst drought in close to a millennium has been partly **blamed for the country's generation-defining civil war and radicalisation** that led to the formation of so-called Islamic State.

Egypt and Ethiopia **have sparred over development of water from the River Nile** for centuries: the iconic river originates in Ethiopia but ends in Egypt, which sets up an inherently combative relationship. In 2015, Egypt and Ethiopia put enough differences aside to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the river, which is Africa's largest dam and is due to open in July. The countries also **signed a deal that strives to ensure** fair river access.


Tata points to many developed or emerging markets that have had similar challenges: "Take the example of **Malaysia's 99-year deal with Singapore**, giving them paid access to fresh water from the Johor River," Tata says. "Singapore is arguably one of the most progressive nations on our planet, but without sufficient fresh water resources within its boundaries, all industry, trade, commerce and culture would all stand still."

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (11) [FONTE: Pacific Institute, 5/11/2019]

Violence over Water Increases: New Data from the Water Conflict Chronology

November 5, 2019, Oakland, California — The Pacific Institute has just released a major update to its **Water Conflict Chronology**, adding over 300 new instances of armed conflicts associated with water resources and water systems, identified from news reports, eyewitness accounts, and other conflict databases. The [Water Conflict Chronology](#) is the world's most comprehensive open-source database on water-related violence. Created by the [Pacific Institute](#) in the 1980s, it includes all known verified instances where water and water systems (1) **trigger** conflicts; (2) are used as **weapons** in conflicts; or (3) are **targets or casualties** of violence. The large number of new cases are the result of improved data collection from other global databases on violence, war, and conflict, and especially, a major increase in recent attacks on civilian water systems in the ongoing violence in the Middle East, especially in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Also notable is the continuing violence in parts of the Sahel, Africa where traditional herders and farmers are competing for scarce water resources as populations grow, extreme weather events worsen, and land and water become political flashpoints. As with all previous entries, each event is identified with the date, location, category (trigger, weapon, or casualty), a short description, and a verifying citation or source. The Chronology now includes over 900 cases of violence associated with water resources and systems and shows a clear acceleration in recent decades. Figure 1 shows the overall increase in the number of events in the Chronology between 1980 and 2018.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (12) [FONTE: Pacific Institute, 5/11/2019]



Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (13) [FONTE: Pacific Institute]

Date	Parties Involved	Basis of Conflict	Violent or In the Context of Violence?	Description	Sources
2011–2012	Syria	Development dispute; Military goal	Yes	Severe political conflict in Syria has been aggravated by the multi-year drought gripping the region. More than 1.5 million people – mostly farmers and their families– have moved to cities and their outskirts. In 2008, US diplomats in Syria warned that the influx of rural people to cities “could act as a multiplier on social and economic pressures already at play and undermine stability in Syria.” Political unrest began in March 2011 in Dara’a, and soon escalated into civil war as ousters seek to overturn the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the ruling Ba’ath Party.	Mohtadi 2012; Worth 2010; Femia and Werrell 2012; Gleick 2014
2011	Tanzania	Development dispute	Yes	Conflicts over water are increasing in the Pangani River Basin in northeastern Tanzania between farmers and herders over dwindling water resources. In 2011 in Mbuguni village, four farmers are hacked to death by angry Maasai morans (warriors) as they tried to stop a group of cattle from trampling on maize seedlings.	Makoye 2013
2011	NATO and Libya	Military target; Military goal	Yes	NATO forces attack on a factory that produces pipes for the “Great Man-Made River” water supply pipeline near Brega, reporting that it was used as a base for military operations and the launching of missiles.	CRG 2013; HRI 2011; Water Technology n.d.
2011	United States, Texas	Cyber terrorism	No	A hacker targets a water plant in South Houston following earlier news (later discounted) of an electronic attack on an Illinois water plant, reportedly to raise awareness of concerns over lax security for critical infrastructure. The breach occurs after the attackers hacked into supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) software used by the utility, and used IP addresses that originated in Russia.	Mills 2011
2012	Libya	Military tool	Yes	During the 2011 Libyan Civil War, forces loyal to dictator Muammar Gaddafi gain control of a water operations center and cut off water supply to the capital. The system controls Libya’s Great Manmade River—a system of pumps, pipes, and canals that brings water from distant aquifers to Tripoli and other cities. Half the country is left without running water, prompting the UN and neighboring countries to mobilize tanker ships to deliver water to coastal cities.	Walton 2012; UPI 2011

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (14) [FONTE: Pacific Institute]

Date	Parties Involved	Basis of Conflict	Violent or In the Context of Violence?	Description	Sources
2017	Yemen	Military target	Yes	Fighting in Yemen has damaged water infrastructure in several cities. Airstrikes, shelling, and sniper attacks in and around the town of Al Mokha have killed and injured scores of civilians and halted most services, including the main market and the water supply system.	ReliefWeb 2017a
2017	Bangladesh	Development dispute	Yes	Protesters take to the streets in the center of Dhaka and more than 50 are injured in clashes over the potential ecological impacts of a proposed coal plant on aquatic ecosystems and fisheries. These actions follow on protests from 2016.	Schneider 2016a, Paul 2017
2017	Darfur	Development dispute	Yes	At least 70 people have been killed in the past few months in clashes between farmers and herders over access to water resources and land in the southern part of Darfur.	UN News Centre 2017
2017	Syria	Military tool	Yes	In response to the advance of the Syrian Arab Army, The Islamic State (ISIS) floods villages they control in the Deir Hafer Plain of east Aleppo by pumping water from Lake Assad into the Al-Jar channel.	Fadel 2017
2017	Ukraine	Military target, military tool	Yes	A long series of attacks on energy and water systems in the Ukraine has intermittently left nearly three million people without access to reliable water supplies. This has included repeated damage to the Donetsk Filtration Plant, the South Donbas water pipeline, energy plants that supply power to water treatment and distribution systems, and the Carbonit Water Pumping Station.	ReliefWeb 2017b
2017	Syria	Military Target	Yes	A combined U.S. and Syrian force launches an attack on Islamic State forces controlling the Tabqa Dam — a choke point on the Euphrates River and source of hydroelectric power for the region, which has been under ISIS control. There are conflicting reports on whether the dam itself was the target of an attack.	Gibbons-Neff 2017, BBC 2017

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (15) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 23/10/2018]

Where will the 'water wars' of the future be fought?



A new paper paints a disturbing picture of a nearby future where people are fighting over access to water. These post-apocalyptic-sounding **"water wars"** could rise as a result of climate change and population growth and could become real soon enough if we don't take steps to prevent them.

The paper pointed to several hotspots in the world where **"hydro-political issues"** are more likely to flare up. Not surprisingly, these are areas having problems with accessing fresh water and where a **"transboundary"** to water exists. That means the people in that area share some body of water, like a lake or a river. So in times of scarcity due to environmental factors and growing population, the water resources become thin and tensions result.

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (16) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 23/10/2018]

In particular, the five most vulnerable hotspots highlighted by the paper include the **Nile, Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indus, Tigris-Euphrates, and Colorado rivers**.




Fig. 2. Likelihood of hydro-political issues among the main transboundary basins (transboundary basin borders in black, non-transboundary areas shaded).


Image: JRC

Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (17)

[FONTE: F. Farinosi et al. Global Environmental Change 52 (2018), pp. 286–313]

F. Farinosi et al.

Global Environmental Change 52 (2018) 286–313



Hidropolítica: quando a água adquire uma dimensão geopolítica (18) [FONTE: World Economic Forum, 23/10/2018] [FONTE: F. Farinosi et al. Global Environmental Change 52 (2018), pp. 286–313]




Fig. A6. Comparison between water events reported in the WARICC database between 1997 and 2009 (Bernauer et al., 2012a) and the likelihood of hydro-political interactions presented in this study (shaded areas are not considered in the WARICC database).

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (1) [FONTE: Lobsang Yangtso, China's River Politics on the Tibetan Plateau, 2017]

China's River Politics on the Tibetan Plateau: Comparative Study of Brahmaputra and Mekong

Lobsang Yangtso

Introduction

China has water problem both in quality and quantity. Seventy-five percent of urban water in China is inappropriate for drinking and 30 percent unfit for use in agriculture and industry. Northern China has 45 percent of the population with only 13.8 percent of the freshwater resources where as South has abundant with water. However, China has an advantageous geographical position, and has the largest freshwater reserves in the world. Most of the major trans-boundary rivers originate in the Tibetan Plateau such as the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Indus, the Yangtze River, and the Sutlej. China lies in 19 international river basins and represents their upstream country. This trans-boundary nature of China's rivers has favoured China in dam construction.

China has dammed almost all the rivers of the Tibetan Plateau. It has dammed the Brahmaputra, the Mekong, the Yellow River, the Yangtze, the Indus and the Sutlej- the major rivers of Asia but has not signed a single water-sharing agreement with its downstream nations. It has different policies with the Mekong and the Brahmaputra Rivers and pursues upstream strategy by rejecting multilateral framework for managing its trans-boundary waters.

Chinese Policy for Trans-boundary

Rivers China shares trans-boundary rivers with thirteen directly bordering countries. China is located in the upper reach of rivers in most cases. It has set up multiple trans-boundary rivers cooperation mechanisms with twelve neighbouring countries concerning "hydrological data provision in flood season, flood control, emergency response, boundary rivers improvement, utilization and protection of water resources etc" (Ministry of Water Resources, PRC, April 2015) (See table 1). The Ministry of Water Resources of PRC further states that it "sticks to principle of putting people first, emphasizing equality and rationality, balancing development and protection, and enhancing good-neighbourly friendship and cooperation" (ibid).

JOURNAL ARTICLE

China's River Politics on the Tibetan Plateau

Lobsang Yangtso


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Issue: Third
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Published By: Library
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Archives



<https://www.jstor.org/stable/90024493>

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (2)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Peter Engelke e David Michel, 2019]




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A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (3)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Peter Engelke e David Michel, 2019]




A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (4) [FONTE: Atlantic Council / Peter Engelke e David Michel, 2019]

Himalayan Asia is a shorthand term referring to the Asian countries that depend on river water from the high mountain ranges of the Tibetan Plateau. As the rivers produced by the Himalayas and other mountain ranges on the Plateau are under increasingly serious pressure, water insecurity threatens much of the continent's peace and security. Himalayan Asia's transboundary water dynamics threaten to erode interstate cooperation, including among the continent's major powers, risk worsening geopolitical competition, and heighten the odds of domestic and interstate conflict. Yet there are viable pathways for avoiding such an outcome, the most important of which treat water as a shared resource to be managed cooperatively among a variety of actors, public and private, national and subnational. Without such leadership and engagement, there is significant risk of water insecurity becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, wherein states securitize water and therefore define it in zero-sum geopolitical terms. That scenario has few, if any, positive outcomes.

Himalayan Asia's water tower is the most important source of fresh water in Asia, with its major and minor rivers providing water to billions of people north to south and east to west. The tower refers to the high-altitude regions that sit at the center of the continent and collectively act as a kind of water-generating engine for Asia. Because the tower's high mountain ranges contain vast quantities of ice and snow, they produce a long list of rivers, including the Mekong, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Indus, Salween, Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Ili, Irrawaddy, Yellow, and Yangtze rivers. Collectively, those rivers flow into every region of the continent except for West Asia (the region extending from Iran westward) and the Caucasus. Moreover, because these mountain ranges straddle China, India, Pakistan, and other countries with contested borders and regions, the water tower is itself a key part of Asia's geopolitical competition.

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (5)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Peter Engelke e David Michel, 2019]



A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (6) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Brahmaputra River

Brahmaputra River, Bengali **Jamuna**, Tibetan **Tsangpo**, Chinese (Pinyin) **Yarlung Zangbo Jiang** or (Wade-Giles romanization) **Ya-lu-tsang-pu Chiang**, major river of Central and South Asia. It flows some 1,800 miles (2,900 km) from its source in the Himalayas to its confluence with the Ganges (Ganga) River, after which the mingled waters of the two rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal.



Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River
Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River flowing
through the Himalayas in the Tibet
Autonomous Region of China.


© Dmitriy Sarbash/Fotolia

Along its course the Brahmaputra passes through the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, and Bangladesh. For most of its length, the river serves as an important inland waterway. It is not, however, navigable between the mountains of Tibet and the plains of India. In its lower course the river is both a creator and a destroyer—depositing huge

quantities of fertile alluvial soil but also causing disastrous and frequent floods.

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (7)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Peter Engelke e David Michel, 2019]



A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (8) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (9) [FONTE: Project Performance International, 3/03/2021]

China To Build The World's Largest Hydroelectric Dam On The Yarlung Tsangpo River - PPI

The project

China recently announced its plan to build the world's biggest hydroelectric dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). China's commitment is to reduce the use of fossil fuels and become carbon-neutral by 2060.

The plan is to build eleven hydropower stations on the river. These will generate 60 gigawatts of power, producing three times more hydroelectric power than China's current largest dam, the Three Gorges. That project forced the relocation of more than 1.4 million people, one of the downsides of very large dam projects.



A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (10) [FONTE: Project Performance International, 3/03/2021]

The Yarlung Tsangpo originates from melting glaciers and mountain springs. The river flows down the Himalayan watershed and supplies drinking water to an estimated 1.8 billion people in China, India and Bhutan. At one point, the river descends approximately 2,700 meters through the Yarlung Tsangpo, creating a huge gorge more than twice as deep as the Grand Canyon in the United States.

This new mega-dam project is receiving criticism from environmentalists as well as from Tibetan rights groups. Some residents in Medog County face the risk of relocation. In addition, experts hold fear on the impact of the changed river flow.

While this project in the Yarlung Tsangpo is the largest, it is not the only dam project along the river. Various small and medium-sized dams have already been built. It is noted that China's 11 Mekong dams have disrupted fish life and the flow sediment has contributed directly to the collapse of river banks and the destruction of communities – a downside to be weighed against the benefits of a dam.

The Yarlung Tsangpo River flows from Tibet into India's Arunachal Pradesh state and down through to Assam to Bangladesh. Indian authorities are concerned that the Chinese project could trigger flash floods and create water scarcity. Now India is considering building a 10 gigawatt dam in Arunachal Pradesh to mitigate the adverse impact of the Chinese Yarlung Tsangpo dam project.

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (11) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Mekong River

Mekong River, Cambodian **Mékôngk**, Laotian **Mènam Khong**, Thai **Mae Nam Khong**, Vietnamese **Sông Tiền Giang**, Chinese (Pinyin) **Lancang Jiang** or (Wade-Giles) **Lan-ts'ang Chiang**, river that is the longest river in Southeast Asia, the 7th longest in Asia, and the 12th longest in the world. It has a length of about 2,700 miles (4,350 km). Rising in southeastern Qinghai province, China, it flows through the eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Yunnan province, after which it forms part of the international border between Myanmar (Burma) and Laos, as well as between Laos and Thailand. The river then flows through Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam before draining into the South China Sea south of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Vientiane (Viangchan), the capital of Laos, and Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, both stand on its banks. About three-fourths of the drainage area of the Mekong lies within the four countries the river traverses on its lower course—Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (12) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (13) [FONTE: Brian Eyster / FP, 22/04/2020]

Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong

New data demonstrates a devastating effect on downstream water supplies that feed millions of people.


[Brian Eyster](#) April 22, 2020, 12:56 PM



A fisherman floats on the Mekong River in Pak Chom district in the northeastern Thai province of Loei on Oct. 31, 2019. The once mighty river has been reduced to a thin, grubby neck of water in northern Thailand, record lows blamed on drought and a recently opened dam hundreds of miles upstream. LILLIAN SUWANRUMPHA/AFP via Getty Images

A geopolítica da água na Ásia: o caso do Tibete (14) [FONTE: Cartoon de Rebel Pepper, 2020]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (2) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



Facts

Head Of Government	Prime Minister: Justin Trudeau
Capital	Ottawa
Population	(2021 est.) 38,148,000
Currency Exchange Rate	1 USD equals 1.276 Canadian dollar
Head Of State	Queen of Canada (British Monarch): Elizabeth II , represented by Governor-General: Mary May Simon
Form Of Government	federal multiparty parliamentary state with two legislative houses (Senate [105 ¹ , 2]; House of Commons [338])
Official Languages	English; French
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Canada
Total Area (Sq Km)	9,984,670
Total Area (Sq Mi)	3,855,103
Monetary Unit	Canadian dollar (Can\$)
Population Rank	(2021) 38
Population Projection 2030	41,364,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2021) 9.9
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2021) 3.8
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2018) 81.4% • Rural: (2018) 18.6%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2020) 81.1 years • Female: (2020) 85.9 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate	Male: (2006) 100% • Female: (2006) 100%
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2020) 1,651,022
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2020) 43,440

¹ Statutory number.

² All seats are nonelected.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (3) [FONTE: Boston Globe, 2/02/2022]

What's going on across the border? The Canadian trucker protests, explained.

By [Shannon Larson](#) Globe Staff, Updated February 2, 2022, 10:38 a.m.



Truck drivers hung a Canadian flag on the front grill of a truck parked in downtown Ottawa, Ontario, near Parliament Hill on Wednesday. Thousands of protesters railing against vaccine mandates and other COVID-19 restrictions descended on the capital, deliberately blocking traffic around Parliament Hill. Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press via AP

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (4) [FONTE: Boston Globe, 2/02/2022]

The protests began as a convoy of truckers rallying against a new vaccine mandate for truck drivers crossing the United States-Canada border, and those taking part were [generally peaceful as they traveled across the country](#). But the loosely organized convoy [garnered additional support and picked up speed](#) along the way, morphing into a [broader challenge of public health restrictions](#) designed to combat the pandemic and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada before it eventually congregated in Ottawa on Saturday. Trudeau has [strongly condemned](#) their actions.

Here is what we know about the unfolding situation.

Who is involved and what are they saying?

Dubbed the “Freedom Convoy,” the [movement](#) began with a coalition of truckers aiming to challenge a regulation implemented this month by the Canadian government that requires truckers returning from the United States to show proof of vaccination. [If not fully vaccinated](#), those traveling across the border will face testing and quarantine requirements. [The United States](#) has imposed the same mandate on foreign nationals.

But the driving purpose of the convoy eventually shifted to adopt a wider focus: a total repudiation and denouncement of restrictions and lockdown measures. Much of the frustration felt by pandemic-weary citizens who joined in on the protests was directed specifically at Trudeau.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (5) [FONTE: Globe and Mail, 30/01/2022]

Updates: Officials condemn 'desecration' of monuments, hateful signs on display at trucker convoy protest

Truckers and supporters demonstrate against COVID-19 vaccine mandates in Ottawa Saturday. Find the latest updates [here](#)

Globe Staff and Wire Services



Supporters of a cross-country truck convoy protesting measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 such as vaccine mandates walk near Parliament Hill in Ottawa on Jan. 29, 2022. Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press


A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (6) [FONTE: CBC,6/02/2022]

Ottawa declares state of emergency as police boost enforcement, target protest's fuel supply

Protest is 'most serious emergency our city has ever faced,' mayor says

[Christian Paas-Lang](#) · CBC News · Posted: Feb 06, 2022 12:29 PM ET |

Last Updated: 6 hours ago



Police line up at the Coventry Road staging area in east Ottawa as they move in to confiscate fuel, vehicles and make arrests Sunday evening. (Joanne Chianello/CBC)

The City of Ottawa declared a state of emergency Sunday afternoon in response to ongoing protests in the downtown core, while Mayor Jim Watson described the situation in the nation's capital as the "the most serious emergency our city has ever faced."

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (7) [FONTE: CBC,6/02/2022]

City yet to ask for military aid

The state of emergency and increased police action represent significant changes in the response to the chaotic situation in Ottawa — where demonstrators have become entrenched in the city's downtown core.

Amid increasing resident anger, police said on Saturday that they lack the resources to end the protest, now in its 10th day.

Politicians have also increasingly denounced the protest over COVID-19 public health restrictions, with Ontario Premier Doug Ford and others calling it an "occupation" and the head of the Ottawa Police Services Board referring to it as an "insurrection."

Ford said on Sunday that his government was supporting Ottawa in whatever way it could. His office told CBC News the city had not asked the province to request military aid from the federal government.

In a statement, Ontario's solicitor general, Sylvia Jones, emphasized that politicians cannot direct the police but that discussions were ongoing "to ensure [Ottawa police] have every necessary resource they need to keep their community safe."

Local, provincial and federal politicians have condemned the protesters' actions and called for a solution. But what that solution might be remains unclear.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (8) [FONTE: Le Devoir, 7/02/2022]

«Un Woodstock de la liberté» promis à Québec

[Sébastien Tanguay](#)



Photo: Jacques Boissinot La Presse canadienne L'occupation de Québec a été de plus courte durée que celle d'Ottawa.

Les opposants aux mesures sanitaires rassemblés devant le parlement, à Québec, ont quitté la capitale sans désordre, dimanche soir, pour mieux se donner rendez-vous dans deux semaines.

Plus grand, mieux organisé et tout aussi revendicateur : le deuxième rassemblement annoncé par les organisateurs Bernard « Rambo » Gauthier et Kevin « Big » Grenier entend réunir deux fois plus de participants.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (9) [FONTE: Shachi Kurl / NBC, 5/02/2022]

Truckers in Canada protesting Covid vaccine mandates show Canada's Trumpists are growing

Those caught off guard by the intensity of the protests haven't been paying attention to the creeping extremism in the country's political discourse.

True to type, Canadians such as myself are humble enough to know that when the rest of the world thinks of us — which, admittedly, is almost never — it is as a kinder, gentler and less ideological version of our raucous American neighbors to the south. O Canada! We put the real in realpolitik.

While Canadians have been consuming news from down south since the dawn of broadcasting, the American right appears to be speaking directly to them now. On Friday, Trump endorsed the convoy.

When you belong to a country mercifully untroubled by civil war, catastrophic political upheaval or alarming geopolitics, you are used to being looked upon as a shining beacon of all that is good. Whether that's entirely accurate, it is usually where the narrative ends.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (10) [FONTE: Shachi Kurl / NBC, 5/02/2022]

The prime minister is also playing to his base. Having [lost the popular vote two elections in a row](#), his power depends on a coalition of center-left parties no longer motivated by “sunny ways” but fear of the right. Trudeau repeatedly dismisses those protesting as a [“small fringe minority”](#) who don’t follow “the science,” but he ignores a broader frustration with perceived government overreach after two years of collective sacrifice.

Indeed, while strong majorities support requiring health care workers, first responders, teachers and public-facing employees to be vaccinated, the same [cannot be said](#) for other workers. And [more than half](#) of the [largely vaccinated Canadian population](#) is now calling for all pandemic- related restrictions to be lifted.

We have a moment to live up to the standard the international community generally expects of us. That warm familiar feeling of Canadian moral superiority depends on it.

But Trudeau has yet to acknowledge that the country is showing signs of wanting a new approach, because he knows his core voters are energized by othering the “fringe.”

The result? [Nearly 40 percent of Canadians](#) believe there is no room for political compromise in Canada, which is a staggering number of people in a country that prides itself on peace, order and good government.

A radicalização da contestação social e política no Canadá (11) [FONTE: Cartoon de Kestutis, 1/2/2022]



Bibliografia

