


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 18**

9/03/2022



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Immanuel Kant, (born April 22, 1724, Königsberg, Prussia [now Kaliningrad, Russia]—died February 12, 1804, Königsberg), German philosopher whose comprehensive and systematic work in epistemology (the theory of knowledge), ethics, and aesthetics greatly influenced all subsequent philosophy, especially the various schools of Kantianism and idealism.



Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant, print published in London, 1812.

Photos.com/Getty Images

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- Introduction
- Background and early years
- Period of the three *Critiques*
- Last years

Kant was one of the foremost thinkers of the Enlightenment and arguably one of the greatest philosophers of all time. In him were subsumed new trends that had begun with the rationalism (stressing reason) of René Descartes and the empiricism (stressing experience) of Francis Bacon. He thus inaugurated a new era in the development of philosophical thought.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (3)


[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

The Critique of Pure Reason

The *Critique of Pure Reason* was the result of some 10 years of thinking and meditation. Yet, even so, Kant published the first edition only reluctantly after many postponements; although convinced of the truth of its doctrine, he was uncertain and doubtful about its exposition. His misgivings proved well founded, and Kant complained that interpreters and critics of the work were badly misunderstanding it. To correct these wrong interpretations of his thought, he wrote the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783; *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Come Forward as Science*) and brought out a second and revised edition of the first *Critique* in 1787. Controversy still continues regarding the merits of the two editions: readers with a preference for an idealistic interpretation usually prefer the first edition, whereas those with a realistic view adhere to the second. But with regard to difficulty and ease of reading and understanding, it is generally agreed that there is little to choose between them. Anyone on first opening either book finds it overwhelmingly difficult and impenetrably obscure.


A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (4)

[FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]



A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (5)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]



PRIMEIRA SECÇÃO

QUE CONTÉM OS ARTIGOS PRELIMINARES PARA A PAZ PERPÉTUA ENTRE OS ESTADOS

1. «Não deve considerar-se como válido nenhum tratado de paz que se tenha feito com a reserva secreta de elementos para uma guerra futura.»

Seria então, pois, apenas um simples armistício, um adiamento das hostilidades e não a *paz*, que significa o fim de todas as hostilidades, e juntar-lhe o epíteto *eterna* é já um pleonasmo suspeito. As causas existentes para uma guerra futura, embora talvez não conhecidas agora nem sequer pelos negociadores, aniquilam-se no seu conjunto pelo tratado de paz, por muito que se possam extrair dos documentos de arquivo mediante um escrutínio penetrante. – A restrição (*reservatio mentalis*) sobre velhas pretensões a que, no momento, nenhuma das partes faz menção porque ambas estão demasiado esgotadas para prosseguir a guerra, com a perversa vontade de, no futuro, aproveitar para este fim a primeira oportunidade, pertence à casuística jesuítica e não corresponde à dignidade dos governantes, do mesmo modo que também não corresponde à dignidade de um ministro a complacência em tais deduções, se o assunto se julgar tal como é em si mesmo.

Se, pelo contrário, a verdadeira honra do Estado se colocar, segundo os conceitos ilustrados da prudência política, no contínuo incremento do poder seja por que meios for, então aquele juízo afigurar-se-á como escolar e pedante.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (6)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

2. «Nenhum Estado independente (grande ou pequeno, aqui tanto faz) poderá ser adquirido por outro mediante herança, troca, compra ou doação.»

Um Estado não é património (*patrimonium*) (como, por exemplo, o solo em que ele tem a sua sede). É uma sociedade de homens sobre a qual mais ninguém a não ser ele próprio tem de mandar e dispor. Enxertá-lo noutro Estado, a ele que como tronco tem a sua própria raiz, significa eliminar a sua existência como pessoa moral e fazer desta última uma coisa, contradizendo, por conseguinte, a ideia do contrato originário, sem a qual é impossível pensar direito algum sobre um povo¹). Todos sabem a que perigo induziu a Europa até aos tempos mais recentes o preconceito deste modo de aquisição, pois as outras partes do mundo jamais o conheceram, isto é, de os próprios Estados poderem entre si contrair matrimónio; este modo de aquisição é, em parte, um novo género de artifício para se tomar muito poderoso mediante alianças de família sem dispêndio de forças e, em parte também, serve para assim ampliar as possessões territoriais. – Deve também aqui incluir-se o serviço das tropas de um Estado noutro contra um inimigo não comum, pois em tal caso usa-se e abusa-se dos súbditos à vontade, como se fossem coisas de uso.

¹ Um reino hereditário não é um Estado que possa ser herdado por outro Estado; é um Estado cujo direito a governar se pode dar em herança a outra pessoa física. O Estado adquire, pois, um governante, não é o governante como tal (isto é, que já possui outro reino) que adquire o Estado.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (7)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

3. «Os exércitos permanentes (*miles perpetuus*) devem, com o tempo, de todo desaparecer.»

Pois ameaçam incessantemente os outros Estados com a guerra, devido à sua prontidão para aparecerem sempre preparados para ela; os Estados incitam-se reciprocamente a ultrapassar-se na quantidade dos mobilizados que não conhece nenhum limite, e visto que a paz, em virtude dos custos relacionados com o armamento, se torna finalmente mais opressiva do que uma guerra curta, eles próprios são a causa de guerras ofensivas para se libertarem de tal fardo; acrescente-se que pôr-se a soldo para matar ou ser morto parece implicar um uso dos homens como simples máquinas e instrumentos na mão de outrem (do Estado), uso que não se pode harmonizar bem com o direito da humanidade na nossa própria pessoa. Algo de todo diverso é defender-se a si e defender a Pátria dos ataques do exterior com o exercício militar voluntário dos cidadãos empreendido de forma periódica. – O mesmo se passaria com a acumulação de um tesouro; considerado pelos outros Estados como uma ameaça de guerra, forçá-los-ia a um ataque antecipado, se a tal não se opusesse a dificuldade de calcular a sua grandeza (pois dos três poderes, *o militar*, o das *alianças* e o do *dinheiro*, este último poderia decerto ser o mais seguro instrumento de guerra).

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (8)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

6. «Nenhum Estado em guerra com outro deve permitir tais hostilidades que tomem impossível a confiança mútua na paz futura, como, por exemplo, o emprego no outro Estado de *assassinos (percussores)*, *envenenadores (venefici)*, *a ruptura da capitulação*, *a instigação à traição (perduellio)*, etc.»

São estratagemas desonrosos; mesmo em plena guerra deve ainda existir alguma confiança no modo de pensar do inimigo já que, caso contrário, não se poderia negociar paz alguma e as hostilidades resultariam numa guerra de extermínio (*bellum internecinum*); a guerra é apenas o meio necessário e lamentável no estado da natureza (em que não existe nenhum tribunal que possa julgar, com a força do direito), para afirmar pela força o seu direito; na guerra, nenhuma das partes se pode declarar inimigo injusto (porque isso pressupõe já uma sentença judicial). Mas o seu desfecho (tal como nos chamados juízos de Deus) é que decide de que lado se encontra o direito; entre os Estados, porém, não se pode conceber nenhuma guerra de punição (*bellum punitivum*) (pois entre eles não existe nenhuma relação de superior a inferior). – Daqui se segue, pois, que uma guerra de extermínio, na qual se pode produzir o desaparecimento de ambas as partes e, por conseguinte, também de todo o direito, só possibilitaria a paz perpétua sobre o grande cemitério do género humano. Logo, não se deve de modo algum permitir semelhante guerra nem também o uso dos meios que a ela levam. – Que os mencionados meios levam inevitavelmente a ela depreende-se do facto de que essas artes infernais, em si mesmas nunca convenientes, quando se põem em uso não se mantêm por muito tempo dentro dos limites da guerra, mas transferem-se também para a situação de paz como, por exemplo, o uso de espias (*uti exploratoribus*), onde se aproveita a indignidade *de outros* (que não pode erradicar-se de uma só vez); e assim destruir-se-ia por completo o propósito da paz.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (10)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

SEGUNDA SECÇÃO

QUE CONTÉM OS ARTIGOS DEFINITIVOS PARA A PAZ PERPÉTUA ENTRE OS ESTADOS

O estado de paz entre os homens que vivem juntos não é um estado de natureza (*status naturalis*), o qual é antes um estado de guerra, isto é, um estado em que, embora não exista sempre uma explosão das hostilidades, há sempre todavia uma ameaça constante. Deve, pois, *instaurar-se* o estado de paz; a omissão de hostilidades não é ainda a garantia de paz e, se um vizinho não proporcionar segurança a outro (o que só pode acontecer num estado *legal*), cada um pode considerar como inimigo a quem lhe exigiu tal segurança³.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (11)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

/ Primeiro Artigo definitivo para a Paz Perpétua

A Constituição civil em cada Estado deve ser republicana.

A constituição fundada, primeiro, segundo os princípios da *liberdade* dos membros de uma sociedade (enquanto homens); em segundo lugar, em conformidade com os princípios da *dependência* de todos em relação a uma única legislação comum (enquanto súbditos); e, em terceiro lugar, segundo a lei da *igualdade* dos mesmos (enquanto cidadãos), é a única que deriva da ideia do contrato originário, em que se deve fundar toda a legislação jurídica de um povo – é a constituição *republicana*⁴.

constantemente ameaçado por ele; e não posso forçá-lo a entrar comigo num estado social legal ou a afastar-se da minha vizinhança. – Logo, o postulado que subjaz a todos os artigos seguintes é este: Todos os homens que entre si podem exercer influências recíprocas devem pertencer a alguma constituição civil.

Mas toda a constituição jurídica, no tocante às pessoas que nela estão, é

1) Uma constituição segundo o *direito político* (*Staatsbürgerrecht*) dos homens num povo (*ius civitatis*);

2) Segundo o *direito das gentes* (*Völkerrecht*) dos Estados nas suas relações recíprocas (*ius gentium*);

3) Uma constituição segundo o *direito cosmopolita* (*Weltbürgerrecht*), enquanto importa considerar os homens e os Estados, na sua relação externa de influência recíproca, como cidadãos de um estado universal da humanidade (*ius cosmopoliticum*). Esta divisão não é arbitrária, mas necessária em relação à ideia da paz perpétua. Pois, se um destes Estados numa relação de influência física com os outros estivesse em estado da natureza, isso implicaria o estado de guerra, de que é justamente nosso propósito libertar-se.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (12)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

/ Segundo Artigo definitivo para a Paz Perpétua

O direito das gentes deve fundar-se numa *federação* de Estados livres.

Os povos, enquanto Estados, podem considerar-se como homens singulares que, no seu estado de natureza (isto é, na independência de leis externas), se prejudicam uns aos outros já pela sua simples coexistência e cada um, em vista da sua segurança, pode e deve exigir do outro que entre com ele numa constituição semelhante à constituição civil, na qual se possa garantir a cada um o seu direito. Isto seria uma federação de povos que, no entanto, não deveria ser um Estado de povos. Haveria aí uma contradição, porque todo o Estado implica a relação de um superior (legislador) com um inferior (o que obedece, a saber, o povo) e muitos povos num Estado viriam a constituir um só povo, o que contradiz o pressuposto (temos de considerar aqui o direito dos povos nas suas relações recíprocas enquanto formam Estados diferentes, que não se devem fundir num só).

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (13)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

/ Terceiro Artigo definitivo para a Paz Perpétua

«O direito cosmopolita deve limitar-se às condições da *hospitalidade universal*.»

Fala-se aqui, como nos artigos anteriores, não de filantropia, mas de direito, e *hospitalidade* significa aqui o direito de um estrangeiro a não ser tratado com hostilidade em virtude da sua vinda ao território de outro. Este pode rejeitar o estrangeiro, se isso puder ocorrer sem dano seu, mas enquanto o estrangeiro se comportar amistosamente no seu lugar, o outro não o deve confrontar com hostilidade. Não existe nenhum *direito de hóspede* sobre o qual se possa basear esta pretensão (para tal seria preciso um contrato especialmente generoso para dele fazer um hóspede por certo tempo), mas um *direito de visita*, que assiste todos os homens para se apresentarem à sociedade, em virtude do direito da propriedade comum da superfície da Terra, sobre a qual, enquanto superfície esférica, os homens não se podem estender até ao infinito, mas devem finalmente suportar-se uns aos outros, pois originariamente ninguém tem mais direito do que outro a estar num determinado lugar da Terra. – Partes inabitáveis desta superfície, o mar e os desertos dividem esta comunidade, mas o *barco* ou o *camelo* (o barco do deserto) tornam possível uma aproximação por cima destas regiões sem dono e o uso

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (14)

[FONTE: Immanuel Kant, A Paz Perpétua... 1795]

SUPLEMENTO PRIMEIRO

DA GARANTIA DA PAZ PERPÉTUA

O que subministra esta *garantia* é tão-só a grande artista, a *Natureza* (*natura daedala rerum*), de cujo curso mecânico transparece com evidência uma finalidade: através da discórdia dos homens, fazer surgir a harmonia, mesmo contra a sua vontade. Chama-se, por isso, também *destino*, enquanto compulsão de uma causa necessária dos efeitos segundo leis que nos são desconhecidas, e *Providência*¹¹ em referência à

SUPLEMENTO SEGUNDO

ARTIGO SECRETO PARA A PAZ PERPÉTUA

Um artigo secreto nas negociações do direito público é objectivamente, isto é, considerado segundo o seu conteúdo, uma contradição; mas pode muito bem ter em si um segredo, subjectivamente, isto é, avaliado segundo a qualidade da pessoa que o dita, por esta achar inconveniente para a sua dignidade manifestar-se publicamente como seu autor.

O único artigo desta espécie está contido na proposição: «As *máximas dos filósofos sobre as condições de possibilidade da paz pública devem ser tomadas em consideração pelos Estados preparados para a guerra.*»

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (15)

[FONTE: Simon Glendinning – LSE European Institute, 11/07/2012]



European
Institute

A European federation of states is the only form of integration which has the chance to preserve freedom and survive shifting power relations between sovereign nations.

In two texts written in the [1780s](#) and [90s](#) Immanuel Kant predicts the emergence ‘in our continent’ of ‘a great political body of the future without precedent in the past.’ Reading these texts today it is impossible not to be impressed by the uncanny extent to which Kant’s descriptions map on to the developing project of European union. But, as Europe struggles to find a stable form of integration, Kant’s contemporary relevance does not stop at an impressive prediction. In their Introduction to a recent [book](#) on the European project, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Justine Lacroix explore what they call ‘a philosophical triangle’ articulating three currently central conceptions of Europe as a political formation. What is so striking about the three conceptions is that they are *all* discussed by Kant. The three

concern Europe as:

- (i) a region of interconnected but autonomous nation states;
- (ii) a federation of such states; and
- (iii) a single united state.

Kant gives reasons to support all three but, as I will briefly explain, he finally comes down on the side of only one.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (16)

[FONTE: Salikov A., Kant's Perpetual Peace Project... 2015]

КАНТОВСКИЙ СБОРНИК (DEC 2015)

Kant's Perpetual Peace Project and the Project of the European Union

Salikov A.

AFFILIATIONS +

DOI

<https://doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2015-3-ENG-6>

Journal volume & issue

Vol. 34, no. S-1

pp. 70 – 79

Abstract

READ ONLINE

The article examines the following problems: 1) How well-founded is the comparison of the ideas of Kant's essay «Towards Perpetual Peace», written in late XVIII century, with the implementation of nowadays project of European Union 2) If such parallels are possible, to what extent the structure of the EU corresponds to Kant's vision? 3) Which Kantian ideas are of the foremost importance to future development of the EU? Basing on the analysis of Kant's treatise and of the current structure of the EU, the author arrives to the conclusion that the two projects can suitably be compared. However, such comparison requires viewing the EU as an intermediate stage in the establishment of global peace union. The comparative analysis of Kant's theory and the European project, the EU in its current form suits Kant's definition of a federation of sovereign states, united for the purpose of securing peace, and in some respects went even further. The process of European integration has transformed Europe's regional buildup from the arena of regular war conflicts into the society of peace, prosperity, liberty and right. It is obvious that in its development the EU will undergo difficulties and crises. However, the general direction, chosen by the union of European states, aiming at the development of rights and liberties, at good-will and cooperation between individuals, societies and states perfectly corresponds to the spirit of Kant's philosophy and should guarantee of success in establishing global peace in the future.

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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (17)

[FONTE: Oxford Bibliographies]

Democratic Peace Theory

The democratic peace proposition has been lurking in Western thought for millennia, as [Weart 1998](#) shows, but [Kant 1991](#) provides its first modern formulation. The idea that global democracy would provide a solid foundation for global peace was restated in 1917 by Woodrow Wilson as a justification for American entry into World War I and then as part of his vision for a new world order. Modern political science first observed the dyadic democratic peace—that democracies tend not to fight each other—in the 1970s. The observation enjoyed greater attention in the 1980s in particular in two pathbreaking 1983 essays by Michael Doyle, reprinted in [Doyle 2011](#). It received fuller theoretical and empirical attention in the 1990s. [Fukuyama 1992](#), a famous argument that humanity had reached “the end of history,” incorporates the democratic peace proposition. Other scholars sought to develop the theory and push forward more advanced research designs in works such as [Russett 1993](#); [Ray 1995](#); and [Rousseau, et al. 1996](#). In the 2000s, proponents of the democratic peace responded to their critics and embedded the democratic peace in a broader Kantian peace ([Russett and Oneal 2001](#)).

Doyle, Michael W. *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Contains a number of Doyle’s important essays, especially from the 1980s, that lay out the philosophical and theoretical basis of the democratic peace.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (18)

[FONTE: Patrice Ndayisenga, United Nations, Global Governance, and Perpetual Peace / Georgetown University, Global Futures Initiative, 8/12/2015]

United Nations, Global Governance, and Perpetual Peace

December 8, 2015

In *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, German philosopher Immanuel Kant laid down a philosophical presupposition which could help set up a worldwide organization with the mandate to ensure perpetual peace all over the world. Regardless of the critics, the Kantian dream of peace among nations provided a conceptual framework to think and hope in the possibilities of a world society that lives in solidarity and mutual support.

Three centuries latter, a French paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in *The Phenomenon of Man* argued that the evolutionary process of the universe is heading towards one common end, the Omega Point. In his evaluation, he affirmed that the present stage of evolution is heading towards a “planetization” process (globalization) in which humanity is geared towards a common mindset of universal consciousness. Without underrating the visions of Kant and Teilhard, the creation of the United Nations, three centuries after the Kantian conceptualization of the League of Nations, materialized to a certain limit the ideals of a world that humanity deserves in the forecast of the Teilhardian vision of the universe.

A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (19)

[FONTE: Andre Beddow / The National Interest, 28/08/2017]

Immanuel Kant and the Myth of Perpetual Peace

Can the procedures of democratic decisionmaking offer a constitutional solution to the problem of war?



A promessa Kantiana da “paz perpétua” (20)

[FONTE: Andre Beddow / The National Interest, 28/08/2017]

Perhaps more than any other philosopher, Immanuel Kant has suffered the praise of having been labeled an historical optimist. Kant's writings on international affairs have been misconstrued as a defense of the both the desirability and inevitability of a world federation of democracies bound by law. This rendering of Kant has been aided by a selective attention to a few key works and a cultivated ignorance of his more pessimistic remarks on the human condition elsewhere. The truth is that Kant's theory of international affairs is complicated, eluding clean classification as “realist” or “liberal,” but altogether gloomier than is commonly thought. Although the optimist may dream of perpetual peace, no such harmony can be hewn from “the crooked timber of humanity.” Kant's view of history is in fact quite pessimistic, and his prescriptions for politics are in many ways consistent with the realist paradigm. Mankind faces a Sisyphean task: an unending struggle between the universal and particular, harmony and multiplicity, sympathy and antagonism.

What are we to make of Kant's simultaneous enjoinder to establish liberal order and his pessimism about its prospects? At times it seems as though Kant's views, especially in *Perpetual Peace* and the *Doctrine of Right*, entertain the genuine possibility of perpetual peace through democratization. But this is mistaken, resting on a misunderstanding of Kant's notion of republican government, a condition that is, like perpetual peace, an unachievable idea. Where the Kantian optimists have failed is to conflate the regulative and the constitutive.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Carl von Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz, in full **Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz**, (born June 1, 1780, Burg, near Magdeburg, Prussia [Germany]—died Nov. 16, 1831, Breslau, Silesia [now Wrocław, Pol.]), Prussian general and military thinker, whose work *Vom Kriege* (1832; *On War*) has become one of the most respected classics on military strategy.



Carl von Clausewitz
Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, lithograph by Franz Michelis after an oil painting by Wilhelm Wach, 1830. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preussischer Kulturbesitz

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Early military career

Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army in 1792, and in 1793–95 he took part (and was commissioned) in the campaigns of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France. In 1801 he gained admission into the Institute for Young Officers in Berlin, an event that proved to be a turning point in his life.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

This curious development of Clausewitz’s work has had a profound effect on the reception of his ideas. Since later readers have been largely unaware of the reasons for the glaring inconsistency in *On War*, while being impressed by its sophistication, they have tended to concentrate on those ideas that most accorded with the spirit of their own times. For decades after Clausewitz’s death, *On War* remained a respected but little-known work. However, Prussia’s victories in the German Wars of Unification—orchestrated by a self-declared disciple of Clausewitz, Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke—made Clausewitz the most celebrated strategic authority by the late 19th century. It was Clausewitz’s emphasis on morale, concentration of force, the decisive battle, and the complete overthrow of the enemy that were highlighted in the intellectual climate of that time. However, once disillusionment with total war had set in after the two world wars of the 20th century, and with the advent of nuclear weapons, interpretations completely reversed themselves. Strategic thinkers of the nuclear age now picked up the ideas found in the later stage of Clausewitz’s work regarding limited war and the careful political direction of war. A “Clausewitz renaissance” in academia and the armed forces throughout the West ensued. In the communist camp as well—following Vladimir Lenin’s perusal of Clausewitz’s work during World War I—commentators praised Clausewitz’s understanding of the political context of war, while maintaining that his grasp of the social context did not go far enough and while also criticizing his nationalism.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (3) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Helmuth von Moltke

Helmuth von Moltke, in full **Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count (graf) von Moltke**, (born October 26, 1800, Parchim, Mecklenburg [Germany]—died April 24, 1891, Berlin, Germany), chief of the Prussian and German General Staff (1858–88) and the architect of the victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1871).



Helmuth von Moltke, 1871
BBC Hulton Picture Library


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- Personality

Early career

Moltke's father, a man of unstable character, belonged to the nobility of Mecklenburg, his mother to an old family of the free city of Lübeck. The Moltkes were impoverished, and young Helmuth, whose health was not too good, had an unhappy start to life. Since his father had emigrated to Holstein (then a Danish possession) in 1805 and had taken Danish nationality, the boy completed his education with the Royal Cadet Corps in Copenhagen and joined a Danish infantry regiment. After a visit to Berlin in 1821, however, he decided to transfer to the Prussian Army, and in 1822 he obtained a commission as a second lieutenant in the Prussian Life Guards, being posted to Frankfurt an der Oder.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (4) [FONTE: Carl von Clausewitz, Da Guerra, 1832. Wikimedia Commons]



Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (5) [FONTE: Carl von

Clausewitz, Da Guerra, 1832 (trad. ing.) / Project Gutenberg]

On War

by General Carl von Clausewitz

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TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM

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NEW AND REVISED EDITION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY

COLONEL F.N. MAUDE C.B. (LATE R.E.)

EIGHTH IMPRESSION IN THREE VOLUMES

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Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (6) [FONTE: Carl von

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Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (7) [FONTE: Car Von

Clausewitz, On War (trad. Ing.), Princeton University Press, 1976]

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

On War

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24. WAR IS MERELY THE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (8) [FONTE: Jacob W. Kipp, Lenin and Clausewitz...]

Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921

by Jacob W. Kipp
Kansas State University

Carl von Clausewitz. Lithograph by F. Michelis after the painting by W. Wach, 1830. (Original in the possession of Professor Peter Paret, Stanford; used with permission.)



Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (9) [FONTE: Jacob W. Kipp, Lenin and Clausewitz...]

EVEN the most superficial reading of Soviet military writings would lead to the conclusion that a close tie exists between Marxism-Leninism and Clausewitz' studies on war and statecraft. Although labeled an “idealist,” Clausewitz enjoys a place in the Soviet pantheon of military theorists strikingly similar to that assigned to pagan philosophers in Dante's Hell. Colonel General I. E. Shavrov, former commander of the Soviet General Staff Academy, has written that Clausewitz' method marked a radical departure in the study of war:

He, in reality, for the first time in military theory, denied the “eternal” and “unchanging” in military art, strove to examine the phenomenon of war in its interdependence and interconditionality, in its movement and development in order to postulate their laws and principles.¹

Soviet authors point to the fact that Lenin valued Clausewitz' work but refuse to see Lenin's reading of *Vom Kriege* as having any fundamental consequences for Lenin's own views on war or military affairs.² Soviet authors take no note of when or in what context Lenin read Clausewitz, nor do they consider the specific manner in which Lenin applied Clausewitz' concepts on war and statecraft to the formation of the military policy of his party. It is the purpose of this article to examine the intellectual bond between the Prussian officer and the Russian revolutionary in order to understand better the relationship between Soviet military science and Marxism-Leninism.

The ideological baggage which Russian Social Democrats carried with them in 1914 would seem to suggest an undying distrust of any ideas coming from professional soldiers of the

old regime. On the one hand, reformers and revolutionaries shared the strong anti-militarist thrust of European Social Democracy, which viewed the military elite as the sources of a vile and poisonous militarism. The professional soldiers' desire for glory, like the capitalists' search for profits, only brought suffering to the working class. All socialists shared a commitment to a citizens' militia as the preferred means of national defense. In 1917 the Bolsheviks rode this anti-militarist sentiment to power by supporting the process of military disintegration, upholding the chaos of the *komitetshchina*, and promising a government that would bring immediate peace.³

These Social Democrats were also the heirs of the voluminous writings on military affairs of the two founders of scientific socialism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. As Peter Vigor has pointed out, these two life-long collaborators employed a division of labor in their military writings. Engels, who considered himself an amateur soldier, dealt with tactics, strategy, and the impact of technology on military affairs. Marx dealt with international relations, the impact of war on domestic politics, and the revolutionary potential of a given conflict.⁴ After Marx's death Engels continued writing about military affairs, and in 1887 penned a chilling prediction of what a general war would be like in capitalist Europe:

This would be a universal war of unprecedented scope, unprecedented force. From eight to ten million soldiers will destroy one another and in the course of doing so will strip Europe clean in a way that a swarm of locusts could never have done. The devastation caused by the Thirty Year's War telescoped into 3-4 years and spread over the

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (10) [FONTE: Byron Dexter,

Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy, 1950...]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OCTOBER 1950



Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy

Byron Dexter

Volume 29 • Number 1

CLAUSEWITZ AND SOVIET STRATEGY

By Byron Dexter

THERE is in train today a development without parallel in history—a war which has as its frank objective the overthrow of all the parliamentary governments of the world and their replacement by Communist dictatorships centrally controlled in Moscow. The distinguishing characteristic of the campaign is the interchangeability of political and military weapons. A “peace offensive” in Moscow, a cultural conference in Warsaw, a strike in France, an armed insurrection in Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Greece and Korea by fully equipped troops—all are instruments of one war, turned on and turned off from a central tap as a gardener plays a hose up and down a piece of land on which he is nurturing a crop, watering some plants lightly, some heavily.

The theory of a “unified” war directed by a supreme central intelligence, in which political and military instruments are used indifferently to suit a particular object in the pursuit of a gigantic plan, was first and most comprehensively advanced by the German general, Carl von Clausewitz in his book, “On War,” in the early nineteenth century. It is not surprising that in an effort to understand the current Soviet campaign and to find a means of thwarting it, Americans have turned to Clausewitz for such illumination as he may offer, and that references to his aphorisms on the relation of war and politics are everywhere heard.

The concept that underlies the whole of Clausewitz’ discussion of the nature of war is, quite simply, that “war is an act of social life”—that is to say, that it is not an act performed by military men only, but is an expression of the conflict of ideas, objectives and way of life of an entire society with those of some other society. Conflict by high explosives is thus merely one aspect of a war, and is resorted to when and if it helps achieve some particular objective which cannot be achieved in any other way.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (11) [FONTE: John E.

Shepard, On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?, 1990...]

On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?

JOHN E. SHEPHARD, JR.

Carl von Clausewitz occupies a position of well-deserved prominence in the small pantheon of Western military theorists. He bequeathed to us, in his unfinished masterpiece *Vom Kriege*,¹ a trove of provocative ideas, many of which retain remarkable contemporary value. Studying those ideas today is a challenge well rewarded: though we must cull through dusty examples and outdated technical elaborations, we still discover abundant pearls of wisdom that have retained their sheen for more than a century and a half.

But modern soldiers and statesmen cannot redeem the full value of Clausewitz's legacy if they fail to subject his propositions to serious debate. Unfortunately, Clausewitz is more often quoted than read, more venerated than understood. Many of his ideas on the purposes, nature, and conduct of war have been reduced to mere aphorisms to decorate the pages of field manuals. Clausewitz would hardly be pleased by this sort of idolatry. As an empiricist who tried to develop his theory scientifically, he was acutely aware of the need to test his hypotheses against reality. When the realities of warfare change over time, then old, previously accepted hypotheses need retesting and, if necessary, modification.


Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (12) [FONTE: John E.

Shepard, On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?, 1990...]

Clausewitz in the Nuclear Age

How does Clausewitz's elaborate concept accommodate the vast evolution in the ways and means of waging war that has occurred over the past century or so? The answer, I believe, is surprisingly well, considering the immensity of developments in such areas as science, ideology, and organization that affect (or can affect) modern strategy and warfare.

However, one struggles vainly trying to fit some of these changes into the Clausewitzian model. Take, for example, the current and future possession by several nations of nuclear weapons that can be delivered over great distances.



“Nuclear weapons make possible a kind of war that simply obliterates key postulates underlying Clausewitz’s concept of war.”

In deriving his concept of war, Clausewitz assumed that war “never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously,”¹³ and that “the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces.”¹⁴ But these propositions would clearly lose validity in the context of a nuclear war.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (13) [FONTE: Alex Deep,

Putin, Clausewitz and Ukraine / Small Wars Journal 2015...]

Putin, Clausewitz, and Ukraine

Putin, Clausewitz, and Ukraine

Alex Deep

Russia has applied limited war as a means by which to achieve its political goals since the early 1990s. Conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan displayed Russia's willingness to use the defense of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers as a justification to undermine the territorial integrity of neighboring states in order to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Bloc.[i] However, Russia escalated its formula of limited war through indigenous ethnic forces when it annexed the Crimean Peninsula. The separatist struggle that ensued in Eastern Ukraine marked a return to Russia's traditional model, but with increased visibility from the West, and economic sanctions that Russia did not see with its previous endeavors. Going back to Clausewitz, Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to balance the trinity of passion, military means, and political aims in executing a plan that relies on friction and mass to succeed on the ground. However, the real question might not be whether Putin's strategy is Clausewitzian, but whether he is choosing the correct means by which to accomplish the goal of increasing Russian influence along its borders.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (14)

[FONTE: Alex Deep, Putin, Clausewitz and Ukraine / Small Wars Journal 2015...]

Clausewitz would laud Putin's ability to use war as a way of achieving political ends. Russia only chose to initiate hostilities after other forms of political power had failed to maintain its influence over Ukraine such as gas subsidies and support to the regime of Viktor Yanukovych, especially towards joining Russia's burgeoning Eurasian custom house.[ii] However, the removal of Yanukovych and the immediate shift of the new Ukrainian government towards Europe caused Russia to respond with military force through the annexation of Crimea and subsequent support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Russia views these actions as its best chance to maintain its influence over a state that it cannot “lose” to Europe. Russia will continue to view Ukraine as absolutely essential to its national security framework as Russia considers the expansion of NATO and the potential deployment of land- and sea-based missile defense systems near its border as encirclement by the West.[iii]

Russia has used the passion of ethnic nationalism both domestically and within the Russian Diaspora to justify its military intervention in Ukraine. Konstantin Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry official in charge of defending the right of ethnic Russians living abroad, remarked that, “the bacteria of neo-Nazism is spreading across Europe.”[iv] At the same time, Vladimir Putin has publicly vowed to defend “Russian citizens” and “Russian speakers” from this perceived danger of persecution at the hands of fascist radicals including offensive action if necessary.[v] This rhetoric is popular in Russia and amongst ethnic Russians in Ukraine as many see the actions of the new Ukrainian regime as a direct challenge not only to Russian

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (15) [FONTE: Oona A

Hathaway, Scott J Shapir, Making war illegal changed the world... / Guardian, 14/09/2017]



► Bombs away ... a B-52 drops its payload over Nevada. Photograph: Ethan Miller/Getty Images

The long read

**Making war illegal
changed the world. But
it's becoming too easy to
break the law**

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (16) [FONTE: Oona A

Hathaway, Scott J Shapir, Making war illegal changed the world... / Guardian, 14/09/2017]

Last Thursday at 2.42am, four Israeli jets fired a volley of missiles at a Syrian government facility, destroying buildings believed to be associated with the production of chemical weapons, killing two Syrians on the ground in the process. A [statement from Syria](#) issued hours later warned of “dangerous repercussions of such hostile acts on the security and stability of the region”.

This is not the first time Israel has used force to destroy facilities capable of producing unconventional weapons. In 1981, it launched an attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, claiming the reactor had “less than a month go to” before “it might have become critical”. The [United Nations](#) security council quickly condemned the attack as a “clear violation of the charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct”. Other representatives of powerful nations - including Margaret Thatcher - joined in the condemnation. They pointed out that the UN charter prohibits the use of force by one state against another, with only two explicit exceptions: when the security council has approved the use of force (it hadn’t) or when state has a legitimate claim to self-defence (the consensus was that Israel didn’t).

By contrast, Israel’s attack in Syria this month met with deafening silence. One reason is obvious: Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, has launched horrific chemical weapons attacks on civilians, and many world leaders want to see him stopped. But many wanted to keep Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons in 1981 and yet criticised the Israeli attacks as “a grave breach of international law” (as Thatcher put it). What has changed is not the content of the Israeli action - a clear violation of the UN charter in both cases - but its context. Today, perhaps more than at any time since 1945, the prohibition on use of force that has been the backbone of the international order for most of the last century is under attack. Indeed, it is in danger of collapsing - and taking the order it upholds down with it.

Clausewitz e a guerra como “continuação da política por outros meios” (17) [FONTE: Oona A


Hathaway, Scott J Shapir, Making war illegal changed the world... / Guardian, 14/09/2017]

The modern attitude is to regard wars as moral catastrophes to be avoided at almost all costs. We recognise that some wars may be just - even necessary - but they are to be entered into only in a narrow range of cases, such as repelling military aggression. To start a war for any other reason is a breach of international law.

Not that long ago, however, state leaders would have viewed war very differently. A century ago, war wasn't considered a moral catastrophe; it was instead regarded as a legal and legitimate instrument of state action. It wasn't a departure from justice; it *was* justice. In this global system - call it the “old world order” - war wasn't something to be ardently avoided; it was the indispensable means by which states carried out the business of statecraft.

The intellectual architect of the old world order was a Dutch thinker, Hugo Grotius, who wrote about and practised law in the early 17th century. In Grotius's influential telling, war was a legitimate way - indeed, often the only way - in which states could enforce their rights. Since there was no world government to which states could appeal, according to Grotius, they had no choice but to take the law into their own hands. He expressed his idea as follows: “Where judicial settlement ends, war begins.”

Today, war is mainly seen as a means of defending lives and territory. But Grotius saw war as morally valuable and legally viable in every sphere touched by a state's powers, from finance to criminal justice. If loans were not repaid, war was a morally permissible way to collect what was owed. If property was taken without permission, restitution could and should be obtained by force of arms. If some injury had been inflicted, the military was free to collect reparations. And if a crime had been committed, war was useful for punishing criminals who would otherwise escape retribution.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (1) [FONTE: Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, 1/3/2022]

United Nations

A/ES-11/L.1



General Assembly

Distr.: Limited
1 March 2022

Original: English

Eleventh emergency special session

Agenda item 5

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay:
draft resolution

Aggression against Ukraine

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations,

Recalling the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (2) [FONTE: Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, 1/3/2022]

1. *Reaffirms its commitment* to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters;
2. *Deplores in the strongest terms* the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter;
3. *Demands* that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and to refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any Member State;
4. *Also demands* that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;
5. *Deplores* the 21 February 2022 decision by the Russian Federation related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter;
6. *Demands* that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;
7. *Calls upon* the Russian Federation to abide by the principles set forth in the Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Relations;¹
8. *Calls upon* the parties to abide by the Minsk agreements and to work constructively in relevant international frameworks, including in the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group, towards their full implementation;

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (3) [FONTE: Guardian, 2/3/2022]

UN votes to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine and calls for withdrawal

In an emergency session, 141 of the 193 member states voted for the resolution, 35 abstained and five voted against



The United Nations has voted overwhelmingly for [a resolution](#) deploring Russia's invasion of [Ukraine](#) and called for the immediate withdrawal of its forces, in a global expression of outrage that highlighted Russia's increasing isolation.


In an emergency session of the UN's general assembly, 141 of the 193 member states voted for the resolution, 35 abstained, and five voted against. The only countries to vote no in support of Moscow were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea and Syria. Longstanding allies Cuba and Nicaragua joined China in abstaining.

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (4) [FONTE: Axios, 2/3/2022]

How countries voted on UN resolution condemning Russia

March 2, 2022

Yes No Abstain



Data: United Nations; Map: Danielle Alberti/Axios

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (5) [FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Policy, 7/3/2022]

India Has Its Own Ideas About Russia and Ukraine

New Delhi likes the idea of a sphere of influence—but has good reasons to worry about a European conflict.

[C. Raja Mohan](#) February 7, 2022, 5:31 AM



Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, on Sept. 4, 2019. MIKHAIL METZEL/AFP via Getty Images

India's decision to [abstain](#) from the procedural vote on Ukraine at the United Nations Security Council on Jan. 31 reminded many observers of India's presumed instinct to sit on the fence. But India's decision to avoid entangling itself in the standoff between Russia and the West was driven

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (6) [FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Policy, 7/3/2022]

by far more complex reasons than any attachment to its old ideology of nonalignment. India has a much greater interest in the faraway European crisis than appearances suggest. That's because Ukraine raises important questions about power and principle that deeply affect India's security—and highlight the dependence of Asia's security on stability in Europe.

To be sure, India likes the idea of a sphere of influence that Russia is said to be seeking in Eastern Europe. Preserving India's South Asian sphere of influence—a view of the country's role inherited from the British Raj—has been one of more enduring elements of independent India's foreign policy.

Yet, at the same time, New Delhi can't buy into Moscow's promotion by military means of what the latter considers self-determination in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The parallels between how Russia sees Crimea and Donbass on the one hand and how Pakistan views [Indian-administered Kashmir](#) on the other hand can be argued. But Moscow undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity in the name of shared history and culture—and backing militants to achieve its objectives—generates deep discomfort in New Delhi.

On the face of it, India has no dog in the Ukraine fight. It is a proverbial quarrel about a faraway country New Delhi has no capacity to influence. However, India's abstention in the Security Council, backed by a call for ["quiet and constructive diplomacy,"](#) was based on an important recognition: There will be serious consequences for India—both in the near and long term—if it comes to military blows over Ukraine.

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (7) [FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Policy, 7/3/2022]

That the Ukraine question pits India's long-standing partner Russia against its new Western friends is creating further unease. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed New Delhi to hold onto its past relationship with Moscow while expanding its ties with Washington. But growing U.S.-Russian tensions, which could see the United States [imposing sanctions](#) on India for acquiring S-400 air defense missiles from Russia, have begun to constrict India's room for maneuvering between the major powers. Any escalation of the crisis over Ukraine would further squeeze India's position.

As Indian strategic engagement with the United States has grown in recent years, the Modi government has shifted its reaction to developments in Ukraine ever so slightly. In 2014, the government of then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh talked about Russia's "[legitimate interests](#)" in Ukraine; today, the Modi government underlines the "[legitimate security interests](#) of all countries" in Ukraine.

Naturally, some in the [Washington commentariat](#) find India's careful balancing act between the United States and Russia unacceptable. These voices want India to join the Beltway chorus on international issues and demonstrate its fealty to a strategic partnership with the United States. This is utterly unrealistic.

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (8) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 5/3/2022]

Bennett flies to Moscow, meets with Putin about Ukraine war, Iran nuke talks

Orthodox PM makes rare trip on Shabbat to meet with Russian leader, having offered to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv; later speaks with Ukrainian President Zelensky

By [TOI staff](#) Today, 7:46 pm



Prime Minister Naftali Bennett traveled to Moscow on Saturday for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the war in Ukraine.

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (9) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 5/3/2022]



Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he speaks during a press conference in Kyiv, on March 3, 2022 (Sergei Supinsky/AFP)

Israel has sought an elusive middle ground in the conflict: siding with its Western allies while avoiding a rift with Moscow. Russian forces control the airspace in neighboring Syria, where Israeli planes often operate against militias affiliated with Iran; Israel sees Iran as an existential threat.

Israel has offered on several occasions to mediate talks to end the invasion. Ukrainian officials have also said they support the idea, but the initiative has not yet gone any further.

On Tuesday, Bennett said that Israel was seeking to “help quietly” while maintaining its own strategic interests. Israel has expressed its support for the Ukrainian people and has sent a shipment of 100 tons of humanitarian aid. Foreign Minister Yair Lapid condemned the invasion as a “breach of the international order.”

A reacção no mundo à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia (10) [FONTE: Cartoon Horsey /Seattle Times, 30/1/2022]



Bibliografia

