


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 21**

23/03/2022



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (1)

[FONTE: Joshua Greenberg / International Churchill Society, 24/09/2019]



THE INTERNATIONAL
CHURCHILL SOCIETY

Finest Hour Extras

"COMRADES AND BROTHERS" CHURCHILL, STALIN AND THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF 1942

Reading Time: 39 minutes



Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill sit in the Kremlin in Moscow.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2019

By Joshua Greenberg

EVENTS +

Columbia University
Department of History

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (2)

[FONTE: Joshua Greenberg / International Churchill Society, 24/09/2019]



**THE INTERNATIONAL
CHURCHILL SOCIETY**

Had Churchill not travelled to Moscow to meet Stalin in August 1942, it is highly doubtful that the Soviet Union would have been as committed as it was to the allied cause throughout the Second World War. Churchill arrived in Moscow with no specific policy goals, but to establish a rapport with Stalin which could be used to lay the building blocks of the Grand Alliance for the future. Anglo-Soviet cooperation was a course of action which Churchill had explored and advocated for since the 1930's, and the summit of August 1942 provided Churchill with the opportunity to materialize his desire for such a desperately needed alliance. Through skillful diplomacy, Churchill was able to persuade the Russians that it was improbable to open a second front in Europe in 1942, but also to convince them of the need to drive the Germans out of North Africa in order to hold a winning streak in the war. It was therefore imperative that Churchill meet with Stalin to close the gap in the still nascent Big Three relationship and lay the groundwork for future conferences at which more material issues could be discussed. Furthermore, following the meeting, any suspicion that Stalin had of the Western Allies had been significantly diminished, at least in the short term, in favor of the war effort. Churchill's journey to

Moscow led to a plan of action for the course of the war, increased confidence in the allied relationship, and convinced Stalin as to the importance of Operation Torch. The allies agreed on intensifying the bombing of Germany, increasing military aid to Russia, but also left Stalin with the understanding that the timing for an invasion of France would be up to Great Britain and the United States. Churchill left Moscow proud of an alliance growing in confidence and strength. It is highly likely that this trip was vital in securing the allied victory in 1945 and shaping the outcome of the Second World War as we know it today.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (3) [FONTE: BBC, 23/05/2013]

Churchill and Stalin made 'merry' until early hours

23 May 2013



Russia and Britain had signed a pact to fight Germany in 1941

Wartime talks between Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin were proving awkward until a drinking session lasting until 3am, newly released files show.

In a [Foreign Office account of the 1942 Moscow visit](#), an official recalls finding the men enjoying "food of all kinds... and innumerable bottles".

The mood was "merry as a marriage-bell" although Churchill was "complaining of a slight headache" by 1am.

The letter adds: "The two great men really made contact and got on terms."

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (4) [FONTE: BBC, 23/05/2013]

The first meeting with Stalin on the trip "delighted" the British prime minister, before a second meeting at which the Russian leader presented a matter "as sticky and unhelpful as could be".

Sir Alexander writes: "Exactly the same technique as last December when, at first meeting, all was honey and at the second everything went wrong.

"A very odd technique, and I don't see the point of it."

He continues: "This threw rather a cloud on the party, which was not dispelled by the banquet the following night. Nothing can be imagined more awful than a Kremlin banquet, though it has to be endured.

"Unfortunately, Winston didn't suffer it gladly."

'Impressed'

The breakthrough between the leaders came the following evening at further talks with Stalin, alone, that had been requested by Churchill, who is described as "determined to fire his last bolt".

After the meeting began at 7pm, it was 1am when Sir Alexander was "summoned to come at once to Stalin's rooms at the Kremlin".

There I found Winston and Stalin, and Molotov who had joined them, sitting with a heavily laden board between them: food of all kinds crowned by a sucking pig, and innumerable bottles. What Stalin made me drink seemed pretty savage: Winston, who by that time was complaining of a slight headache, seemed wisely to be confining himself to a comparatively innocuous effervescent Caucasian red wine.

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (5)

[FONTE: History Matters / University of Sheffield, 31/08/2020]


'I Don't Think I'm Wrong About Stalin': Churchill's Strategic And Diplomatic Assumptions At Yalta

August 31, 2020



On 23 February 1945 Churchill invited all ministers outside the War Cabinet to his room at the House of Commons to hear his account of the Yalta conference and the one at Malta that had preceded it. The Labour minister Hugh Dalton recorded in his diary that "The PM spoke very warmly of Stalin. He was sure [...] that as long as Stalin lasted, Anglo-Russian friendship could be maintained." Churchill added: "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust with Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin." [1]

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (6) [FONTE: NATO / Fundação a 4/04/1949]



Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (7) [FONTE: History Today]


WHY DID PORTUGAL JOIN NATO?

Portugal had had a centuries-long relationship with the United Kingdom – another seafaring power with interests scattered across the globe. They had helped each other protect their territorial possessions, and there were many of them. They also maintained privileged trade agreements. In the lead-up to the Second World War, Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar decided, however, to broaden his country's alliances to protect Portugal from being dragged inadvertently into one of the biggest human catastrophes of the twentieth century. However, this status of neutrality did not last and by 1943 and 1944, Salazar signed the Azores Agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States respectively. This marked the beginning of Portugal's *rapprochement* with countries involved in the future North Atlantic Alliance.

When Portugal was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance, it had reservations about the use and possible exploitation of its territory for naval and air bases in times of peace; it was assured that they would not be used without the government's full consent. Portugal then tried to make a case for the inclusion of its many overseas territories and colonies and sought to have Spain invited. The reply was negative in both cases. Portugal accepted the invitation to join NATO nonetheless.

The accession to NATO constituted a diplomatic victory for the regime in terms of its participation on the international stage. Joining the Alliance meant added prestige and the strengthening of Portugal's status as a whole; it also injected a degree of stability on the domestic front. More fundamentally, membership of the Alliance, albeit turned principally toward Central and Eastern Europe, increased the country's security. And over time, it would also mean the development of Portugal's armed forces, which would benefit from changes in infrastructure, training and the professional upgrading of its military personnel.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (8) [FONTE: NATO]



LISBON AT THE HEART OF EVENTS FROM DAY ONE

From very early on, Portugal featured in the Alliance milestones when the young international organisation held a defining meeting in Lisbon 20-25 February 1952. Decisions were taken that would shape the Organization and provide it with structures that still exist today. It was also at this meeting that Greece and Turkey were formally welcomed as NATO's new members, having officially joined on 18 February 1952.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (9) [FONTE: NATO]

LISBON AT THE HEART OF EVENTS FROM DAY ONE

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The NATO meeting in Lisbon was held at the Instituto Superior Técnico

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (10) [FONTE: US Department of State]



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY, VOLUME V, PART 1

Acheson–Salazar Meeting, Sao Bento Palace, Lisbon, February 22, 1952, Morning

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador MacVeagh
Special Assistant Xanthaky

PORTUGAL

Prime Minister Salazar

[80] *Editorial Note*

[81] *Memorandum of Conversation, by Special Assistant Xanthaky*

[LISBON, undated.]

740.5/3–452

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY, VOLUME V, PART 1

740.5/3–452

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Special Assistant Xanthaky*¹

TOP SECRET

[LISBON , undated.]

The Secretary of State called on Dr. Salazar on February 22nd at the Sao Bento Palace. He was accompanied by Ambassador MacVeagh and Theo. A. Xanthaky who acted as interpreter. Mr. Acheson expressed to Dr. Salazar the warm appreciation of President Truman, as well as his own, for the friendly cooperation and understanding which the Portuguese Government had shown in the recent Azores negotiations. The Secretary also thanked and congratulated the Prime Minister for the hospitality and splendid facilities which the Portuguese Government had made available to the NATO conference and which were contributing so much to the success of the meeting. Dr. Salazar replied that Portugal was anxious to do her full share in all matters pertaining to NATO and that the Azores represented an important link in our mutual defense system. He then inquired whether the Secretary thought that an attack on the West by Russia was imminent. The Secretary said he did not believe that the Soviets would precipitate an all-out assault as their governmental set-up was not conducive to such action. The Secretary added, however, he believed that such peripheral disturbances, always at the expense of others, as in Korea and Indo-China, would continue to be fostered by the U.S.S.R. The Secretary mentioned that as our strength increased we had to contend with certain sectors of American public opinion which are [Page 130] taking the line that if the Russians are going to attack us eventually, why not attack them first: the so-called preventive war philosophy. On the other hand, as far as the Government is concerned, for obvious reasons, it is important that the danger of a Russian attack should not be minimized. Concerning the possibility of eventually coming to an understanding with the U.S.S.R., Dr. Salazar stated that in his opinion difficulty lay, in negotiating even from strength, in our complete lack of confidence in them. He believed, for example, that the Soviets would give anything to make an arrangement at this juncture with the Germans, the only people in Europe they really fear, but that this is not possible because of complete lack of faith which all concerned have toward them.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (11) [FONTE: South China Morning Post, 22/02/1972]

South China Morning Post

Vol XXVIII No 43

HONGKONG, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1972

Price 40 cents

Nixon and Mao hold surprise hour-long talk

Peking, Feb. 21.

Almost unnoticed by the masses, President Nixon drove through Peking's wide and deserted streets today to a surprise meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Their one-hour talk took place in Mr Mao's home. It was a "frank discussion," the White House Press Secretary, Mr Ronald Ziegler, said.

It came as a shock to the big American press corps which accompanied Mr Nixon here, and which had wondered why Mr Nixon was 90 minutes late for the opening of formal talks with the Premier, Mr Chou En-lai.

Dr Henry Kissinger, the President's national security adviser whose secret trip here on July 9 arranged Mr Nixon's Chinese summit, also participated. So did Mr Chou. The only other person present was a New York-born interpreter, Miss Tan Wensheng, daughter of a Chinese journalist.

Not specified

Mr Ziegler refused to specify what Mr Nixon discussed with Mr Mao and Mr Chou in the first attempt to overcome 20 years of hostility and isolation that spring out of Mr Mao's communist victory over the Nationalist army of General

Mr Nixon said his purpose was "to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war."

The Mao meeting and a huge banquet tonight in Peking's vast "Great Hall of the People" were the high point in Mr Nixon's first day in this chilly, ancient capital.

Earlier, at their buff brick guest house, an American flag flapping from the front porch roof, Mr Nixon held his first diplomatic talk - 20 minutes with Mr Chou and Dr Kissinger, described as an amiable session about "generalities."

Next was to have come the formal meeting with Mr Chou at the Great Hall, but instead Mr Nixon, Dr Kissinger and Mr Chou travelled to their secret four-way meeting with Mr Mao, 78.

White House officials brushed aside reporters' speculation that the 90-minute delay in beginning the record meeting with Mr Chou was

When the session with Mr Mao ended, Mr Nixon and Mr Chou held the day's third formal meeting at the Great Hall. They posed at the door, smiling at each other, then entered the red-carpeted, chandelied salon.

Mr Chou, who knows English but refuses to speak it, spoke in Chinese. His words were interpreted for Mr Nixon.

Mr Chou explained that the second Vice-Chairman, Mme Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen), widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic, was not at the airport because she was in "rather poor health" and that the first Vice-Chairman, Mr Tung Pi-wu, had to be in Canton receiving ambassadors.

Elderly

He said Madame Sun Yat-sen was elderly. "We have too many elderly people in our Government," he said.



President Nixon and Mr Chou pose together for photographs just before the first plenary session of their formal meetings. — (Radiopicture).



President Nixon, the first American President to set foot on Chinese soil, steps forward from his personal Boeing 707 to shake hands with Mr Chou En-lai, watched by Mrs Pat Nixon, at the start of the historic visit to China.

Russia offers sweeping aid to Hanoi

London, Feb. 21.

The Soviet bloc, in a secret high pressure diplomatic initiative coinciding with President Nixon's Peking trip, has offered Hanoi sweeping military and political support against any Sino-American understanding, diplomats sources said today.

The Soviet bloc, with the intention of winning over the North Vietnamese to the Russian side, was said to have offered "all necessary assistance of the entire Soviet bloc" to enable Hanoi to hold out against any peace or military pressures from Peking or Washington.

The sources said Moscow had aligned its East European allies behind its new effort to counter any significant moves in Peking, assuring Hanoi it would not be left friendless.

The sources said the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr Jeno Fock, returned from a special mission to Hanoi last week and his findings were immediately taken to Moscow by the Hungarian Party chief, Mr Janos Kadar.

Hungary has in the past had important contacts with Hanoi and the latest move was related to the current high-pressure Kremlin diplomatic campaign to win closer alignment with North Vietnam at the expense of China and the United States, the sources indicated.

These developments were seen as part of the motive for the Peking summit and the

'Overthrow Mao' call by Poland

Warsaw, Feb. 21.

In what amounted to a call for the overthrow of Peking's leadership, the Polish Communist Party chief, Mr Edward Gierek, today appealed to the Chinese people to reject Chairman Mao's policies and restore "socialist principles" in China.

The attack was the strongest yet to be levelled by Poland, the biggest and strongest ally of the Soviet Union.


Mr Gierek told a mass rally: "Our position towards China is clear. It results from the principles of Marxism-Leninism."

"We hope that the Chinese people and the Chinese communists will find enough strength in themselves to reject the dangerous Maoist line and restore socialist principles in the policy of their State."

— AP.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (12) [FONTE: Newsweek, 20/02/2022]

'The Week That Changed The World': 50 Years Since Richard Nixon Visited Mao in China



President Richard Nixon meets with Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in Beijing, during his 1972 visit to China.
CORBIS/GETTY IMAGES

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (13) [FONTE: University of South California / US-China Institute]

Mao Zedong Meets Richard Nixon, February 21, 1972



For other documents on Mao Zedong, click [here](#).

Meeting attendees: Richard Nixon; Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung in the transcript); Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai); Wang Hairong (Wang Hai-jung); Tang Wensheng (Tang Wen-sheng); Henry Kissinger; and Winston Lord as the notetaker.

February 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman Mao Tsetung
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol
of the Foreign Ministry
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 21, 1972- 2:50-3:55 p.m.

PLACE: Chairman Mao's Residence, Peking

(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)

President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said that you read more than he does.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very difficult problem for us. You said that what it is required to talk about are philosophic problems.

President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman's poems and speeches, and I know he was a professional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)

Chairman Mao: (looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of philosophy?

President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?

President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the Chairman's collective writings to my classes at Harvard.

Chairman Mao: Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (14) [FONTE: Newsweek, 20/02/2022]

Fifty years ago this coming week, President [Richard Nixon](#) ventured where no U.S. president had gone before him and carried out a state visit to China. A trip that, he humbly claimed, "changed the world."

The announcement of Nixon's trip was a bombshell. It came at the height of the Cold War when an amicable visit to one of the country's fiercest and most direct ideological rivals at the time seemed inconceivable, especially from a staunch anti-Communist like Nixon.

Such was the surprise, that the *Washington Post* wrote: "If Mr. Nixon had revealed he was going to the moon, he could not have flabbergasted his world audience more."

In his televised address to the nation on July 15, 1971, Nixon revealed his plans to visit communist China. "I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China," Nixon said.

On February 21, 1972, Nixon and his entourage touched down on the tarmac of a country they did not diplomatically recognize, and had had virtually no contact with for over two decades.

Como as democracias venceram guerras no passado (15) [FONTE: Newsweek, 20/02/2022]



A picture depicting the unscheduled meeting between Mao Tse-Tung (third from left) and US President Richard Nixon (fourth from right) and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger (third from right) in Beijing on February 21, 1972. Then-Special Assistant to Kissinger, Winston Lord (second from right) secretly attended the meeting, and his presence was omitted from any official photos or communiques at the time. Courtesy of Winston Lord

Geopolitical Aims Of The Trip

Nixon had long standing diplomatic ambitions in Asia, and with China in particular. He had written an [article in Foreign Affairs](#) in 1967, where he argued: "Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China

forever outside the family of nations. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation."

Nonetheless, the President's ambitions were not as selfless and globalist as he made them seem. He was not merely trying to help China onto the global stage and allow it to shake off the shackles of Communism, he had other political aims.

The Cold War was in full swing and the U.S. was keeping a close eye on their public enemy number one: the Soviet Union. At the time, friction had started to emerge between the two Communist colossi, and Nixon saw the possibility of establishing ties with China as a way of simultaneously weakening the USSR. The Nixon administration opted to follow the old adage 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.'

A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (1)

[IMAGENS: Artigo e Livro de Francis Fukuyama sobre o “fim da história”]

The End of History? _____

____Francis Fukuyama_____


IN WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that “peace” seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict.

And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a

process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world’s two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants’ markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

Francis Fukuyama is deputy director of the State Department’s policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation. This article is based on a lecture presented at the University of Chicago’s John M. Olin Center for Inquiry Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy. The author would like to pay special thanks to the Olin Center and to Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom for their support in this and many earlier endeavors. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect those of the RAND Corporation or of any agency of the U.S. government.



A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (2)

[FONTE: Alan Wolfe / The New Republic, 16/01/2019]


Francis Fukuyama's Shrinking Idea

He famously hailed the triumph of liberal democracy. Now he struggles to see a future for it.



A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (3)

[FONTE: US Department of State, 9-10 /12/2021 / Cimeira das Democracias]



“

Democracy doesn't happen by accident.
We have to defend it, fight for it, strengthen it, renew it.

PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
FEBRUARY 2021

Since day one, the Biden-Harris Administration has made clear that renewing democracy in the United States and around the world is essential to meeting the unprecedented challenges of our time.

On December 9-10, 2021, President Biden held the first of two Summits for Democracy, which brought together leaders from government, civil society, and the private sector in our shared effort to set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies today through collective action.

A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (4)

[FONTE: US Department of State, 9-10 /12/2021]

Participant List

Albania	Finland	Moldova	Slovenia
Angola	France	Mongolia	Solomon Islands
Antigua and Barbuda	Georgia	Montenegro	South Africa
Argentina	Germany	Namibia	Spain
Armenia	Ghana	Nauru	Suriname
Australia	Greece	Nepal	Sweden
Austria	Grenada	Netherlands	Switzerland
Bahamas	Guyana	New Zealand	Taiwan
Barbados	Iceland	Niger	Timor-Leste
Belgium	India	Nigeria	Tonga
Belize	Indonesia	North Macedonia	Trinidad and Tobago
Botswana	Iraq	Norway	Tuvalu
Brazil	Ireland	Pakistan	Ukraine
Bulgaria	Israel	Palau	United Kingdom
Cabo Verde	Italy	Panama	Uruguay
Canada	Jamaica	Papua New Guinea	Vanuatu
Chile	Japan	Paraguay	Zambia
Colombia	Kenya	Peru	
Costa Rica	Kiribati	Philippines	
Croatia	Kosovo	Poland	
Cyprus	Latvia	Portugal	
Czech Republic	Liberia	Republic of Korea	
Democratic Republic of Congo	Lithuania	Romania	
Denmark	Luxembourg	Saint Kitts and Nevis	
Dominica	Malawi	Saint Lucia	
Dominican Republic	Malaysia	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	
Ecuador	Maldives	Samoa	
Estonia	Malta	Sao Tome and Principe	
European Union	Marshall Islands	Senegal	
Fiji	Mauritius	Serbia	
	Mexico	Seychelles	
	Micronesia	Slovakia	

A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (5)

[FONTE: The Economist / Democracy Index, 10/02/2022]

Democracy Index 2021, by regime type

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	21	12.6	6.4
Flawed democracies	53	31.7	39.3
Hybrid regimes	34	20.4	17.2
Authoritarian regimes	59	35.3	37.1

Note: “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the Index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire estimated world population.

Source: EIU.

According to EIU’s [measure of democracy](#), less than half (45.7%) of the world’s population now live in a democracy of some sort, which is a significant decline from 2020 (49.4%). Even fewer (6.4%) reside in a “full democracy”; this level is slightly down from 8.4% in 2020, after two countries (Chile and Spain) were downgraded to “flawed democracies”. Substantially more than a third of the world’s population (37.1%) live under authoritarian rule, a large share of which are in China.

There were 13 changes of regime type in 2021—nine negative and four positive. Chile and Spain were downgraded from “full democracies” to “flawed democracies”. Three east European countries—Moldova, Montenegro and North Macedonia—improved their status from “hybrid regimes” to “flawed democracies”. Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Tunisia were all relegated from “flawed democracies” to “hybrid regimes”. Mauritania was promoted from the “authoritarian” classification to that of “hybrid regime”. The Kyrgyz Republic slipped eight places and was demoted from a “hybrid regime” to an “authoritarian regime”. Haiti followed the same path, as did Lebanon.

A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (6)

[FONTE: Freedom House]




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A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (7)

[FONTE: Rachel Sharp / The Independent, 15/03/2021]

Francis Fukuyama says Russian defeat in Ukraine will ‘make possible a new birth of freedom’

Author and Stanford University fellow says Vladimir Putin is headed for an ‘outright defeat’

Rachel Sharp • 4 days ago • [3](#) Comments



Francis Fukuyama writes that Putin is headed for an ‘outright defeat’

A ilusão do “fim da história” e da universalização da democracia liberal (8)

[FONTE: Francis Fukuyama / American Purpose, 10/03/2021]

Preparing for Defeat



Bohdan Khmelnytsky Monument, Kyiv

I'm writing this from Skopje, North Macedonia, where I've been for the last week teaching one of our [Leadership Academy for Development](#) courses. Following the Ukraine war is no different here in terms of available information, except that I'm in an adjacent time zone, and the fact that there is more support for Putin in the Balkans than in other parts of Europe. A lot of the latter is due to Serbia, and Serbia's hosting of Sputnik.

I'll stick my neck out and make several prognostications:

1. Russia is heading for an outright defeat in Ukraine. Russian planning was incompetent, based on a flawed assumption that Ukrainians were favorable to Russia and that their military would collapse
12. A Russian defeat will make possible a “new birth of freedom,” and get us out of our funk about the declining state of global democracy. The spirit of 1989 will live on, thanks to a bunch of brave Ukrainians.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (1)

[FONTE: Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers

Azar Gat

THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY

TODAY'S GLOBAL liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam—and it is the lesser of the two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the societies from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction—particularly by nonstate actors—that makes militant Islam a menace.

The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (2)

[FONTE: Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

Liberal democracy’s supposedly inherent economic advantage is also far less clear than is often assumed. All of the belligerents in the twentieth century’s great struggles proved highly effective in producing for war. During World War I, semiautocratic Germany committed its resources as effectively as its democratic rivals did. After early victories in World War II, Nazi Germany’s economic mobilization and military production proved lax during the critical years 1940–42. Well positioned at the time to fundamentally alter the global balance of power by destroying the Soviet Union and straddling all of continental Europe, Germany failed because its armed forces were meagerly

supplied for the task. The reasons for this deficiency remain a matter of historical debate, but one of the problems was the existence of competing centers of authority in the Nazi system, in which Hitler’s

Contingency was responsible for the United States’ emergence in the New World—and its ability to save the Old World.

“divide and rule” tactics and party functionaries’ jealous guarding of their assigned domains had a chaotic effect. Furthermore, from the fall of France in June 1940 to the German setback before Moscow in December 1941, there was a widespread feeling in Germany that the war had practically been won. All the same, from 1942 onward (by which time it was too late), Germany greatly intensified its economic mobilization and caught up with and even surpassed the liberal

democracies in terms of the share of GDP devoted to the war (although its production volume remained much lower than that of the massive U.S. economy). Likewise, levels of economic mobilization in imperial Japan and the Soviet Union exceeded those of the United States and the United Kingdom thanks to ruthless efforts.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégia das democracias liberais (3)

[FONTE: Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

Because the totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war, and these countries were subsequently threatened by Soviet power, they lent themselves to a sweeping restructuring and democratization. Consequently, smaller countries that chose capitalism over communism had no rival political and economic model to emulate and no powerful international players to turn to other than the liberal democratic camp. These small and medium-sized countries' eventual democratization probably had as much to do with the overwhelming influence of the Western liberal hegemony as with internal processes. Presently, Singapore is the only example of a country with a truly developed economy that still maintains a semiauthoritarian regime, and even it is likely to change under the influence of the liberal order within which it operates. But are Singapore-like great powers that prove resistant to the influence of this order possible?

The question is made relevant by the recent emergence of nondemocratic giants, above all formerly communist and booming authoritarian capitalist China. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character as its economic clout grows. Some believe that these countries could ultimately become liberal democracies through a combination of internal development, increasing affluence, and outside influence.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégia das democracias liberais (4)

[FONTE: Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers / Foreign Affairs, 2007]

That future has arrived, and it is nothing less than a new cold war: The constant, interminable Chinese computer hacks of American warships' maintenance records, Pentagon personnel records, and so forth constitute war by other means. This situation will last decades and will only get worse, whatever this or that trade deal is struck between smiling Chinese and American presidents in a photo-op that sends financial markets momentarily skyward. The new cold war is permanent because of a host of factors that generals and strategists understand but that many, especially those in the business and financial community who populate Davos, still prefer to deny. And because the U.S.-China relationship is the world's most crucial—with many second- and third-order effects—a cold war between the two is becoming the negative organizing principle of geopolitics that markets will just have to price in.

This is because the differences between the United States and China are stark and fundamental. They can barely be managed by negotiations and can never really be assuaged.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (5) [FONTE: NYT, 18/03/2021]

Russia Erupts in Fury Over Biden's Calling Putin a Killer

The Kremlin described the U.S. president's response to an interview question as “very bad,” and recalled its ambassador to “analyze what needs to be done” about the countries' relations.



Joseph R. Biden Jr., then vice president, meeting with Vladimir V. Putin, then Russia's prime minister, in 2011. Maxim Shipenkov/EPA, via Shutterstock

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (6) [FONTE: NYT, 18/03/2021]

The previous evening, [Russia](#) took the rare step of recalling its ambassador to Washington after Mr. Biden's comments in a television interview, warning of the possibility of an “irreversible deterioration of relations.” On Thursday, seated in a gilded chair on the seventh anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea, Mr. Putin all but called Mr. Biden a killer himself.

“When I was a child, when we argued in the courtyard, we said the following: ‘If you call someone names, that's really your name,’” Mr. Putin said, quoting a Russian schoolyard rhyme. “When we characterize other people, or even when we characterize other states, other people, it is always as though we are looking in the mirror.”

Despite Mr. Biden's long-running criticism of Mr. Putin, some Russian analysts had voiced hope that the Kremlin could forge a productive working relationship with the new administration in Washington on areas of common interest. But Mr. Biden's combative stance in an interview with ABC News that was broadcast on Wednesday seemed to puncture those hopes, even as many of Mr. Putin's critics praised the American president's comments.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (7) [FONTE: CNN, 19/03/2021]

US and China trade barbs after Blinken warns of need to respect global order or face a 'more violent world'

(CNN) — A first face-to-face meeting between US and Chinese officials [got off to a heated start](#) in Anchorage, Alaska, on Thursday as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's statement that the Biden administration would bring up "deep concerns" about some of China's actions around the world was met with immediate pushback from Chinese counterparts, sparking an unusually public exchange of diplomatic barbs.



A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (8) [FONTE: Real Clear Politics, 20/03/2021]

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP) — Top U.S. and Chinese officials wrapped up two days of contentious talks in Alaska on Friday after trading sharp and unusually public barbs over vastly different views of each other and the world in their first face-to-face meeting since President Joe Biden took office.

The two sides finished the meetings after an opening session in which they attacked each other in an unusually public way. The U.S. accused the Chinese delegation of “grandstanding” and Beijing fired back, saying there was a “strong smell of gunpowder and drama” that was entirely the fault of the Americans.

The meetings in Anchorage were a new test in increasingly troubled relations between the two countries, which are at odds over a range of issues from trade to human rights in Tibet, Hong Kong and China’s western Xinjiang region, as well as over Taiwan, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and the coronavirus pandemic.

“We got a defensive response,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said after the meetings concluded.

“We wanted to share with them the significant concerns that we have about a number of the actions that China has taken, and behaviors exhibiting concerns, shared by our allies and partners,” he said. “And we did that. We also wanted to lay out very clearly, our own policies, priorities, and worldview. And we did that too.”

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (9)

[FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

China and Russia Turn Deeper Ties into a Military Challenge for Biden

“You face a two-front war where we don’t have a two-front military,” said one former Trump official.

[Amy Mackinnon](#) April 20, 2021, 12:35 PM



Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) and Russian President Vladimir Putin smile during the welcoming ceremony on the final day of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, on April 27, 2019. VALERY SHARIFULIN/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images

Deepening military and diplomatic cooperation between Russia and China is worrying U.S. defense planners, who fear the two frenemies that share military technology and many foreign-policy goals will complicate the Biden administration’s plan to reassert U.S. leadership.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (10)

[FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

“Our sense is that [China] is paying very close attention to what’s going on as they did initially with things in the Ukraine,” the senior defense official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “I think it’s fair to say that they are looking closely to determine how they might leverage lessons learned into their own national interests.”

There’s no evidence so far to suggest Beijing and Moscow are actually coordinating their parallel pressure campaigns, according to 11 current and former officials and experts who spoke to *Foreign Policy*. But the buildups are stretching the U.S. President Joe Biden’s attention at a particularly bad time. As the Pentagon has broken with the 1990s-era concept of planning for two major wars at the same time, the split screen of Chinese fighter jets over Taiwan and Russian troops massing near Ukraine is giving the Pentagon’s strategic planners a particularly uncomfortable preview of what the future could hold.

“You face a two-front war where we don’t have a two-front military,” said Elbridge Colby, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration. “If NATO is expecting U.S. forces to bail it out simultaneously with a fight over Taiwan, we can’t do them both. We don’t have the assets. That can create huge problems for us.”

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (11)

[FONTE: Amy Mackinnon / Foreign Policy, 20/04/2021]

Russia's recent military buildup near Ukraine's border has also served as a reminder that although China may be the strategic priority for years to come, Moscow still has the capacity to wreak havoc in Europe.


“I want the pivot to Asia, but I don't want it to come at the expense of focusing on the threat of Putin today,” said Michael McFaul, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia under former U.S. President Barack Obama.

For years, China and Russia have engaged in a tactical alliance in the United Nations Security Council, banding together to counter the influence of the United States and its European allies—Britain and France—who have liberally pursued economic sanctions and military intervention. That cooperation has only increased in recent years, including on votes regarding Syria. Outside of U.N. headquarters, Russia and China have intensified their once-chilly relationship in recent years by redoubling bilateral trade in key areas like energy and arms. Both are interested in circumventing the U.S.-dictated financial order that helps undermine Washington's global dominance. They have also united over their deep skepticism about U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (12)

[FONTE: Frederick Kempe / Atlantic Council, 20/04/2021]

Why growing Chinese-Russian common cause poses Biden's nightmare



Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's Xi Jinping walk down the stairs as they arrive for a BRICS summit in Brasilia, Brazil November 14, 2019. REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino/File Photo

President Joe Biden faces a nightmare scenario of global consequence: increasing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation aimed at undermining US influence and at upending Biden's efforts to rally democratic allies.

It is the most significant and underrecognized test of Biden's leadership yet: It could be the defining challenge of his presidency.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (13)

[FONTE: Frederick Kempe / Atlantic Council, 20/04/2021]

How the great-power drama complicates Biden's agenda

The Biden administration this week responded to Putin with the carrot of a summit meeting and the stick of new sanctions. On Tuesday, Biden [called](#) Putin, signaling he is not looking to escalate tensions with the leader he only a month ago [agreed](#) was a “killer.”

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken [stood](#) beside NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg as they condemned Russia's military buildup. The Biden administration's strongest rebuke came Thursday when it [announced](#) new economic sanctions against thirty-eight Russian entities accused of election interference and cyberattacks, expelled ten diplomats, and introduced measures banning US financial institutions from trading newly issued Russian state debt and bonds.

China's incursions over Taiwan came shortly after the US State Department [issued](#) guidelines loosening the rules for US government officials engaging with Taiwan. Blinken has [said](#) the administration is concerned by China's “increasingly aggressive actions” and is committed to ensuring that Taiwan “has the ability to defend itself.” The United States further demonstrated its support on Wednesday by [sending](#) an unofficial delegation consisting of a former US senator and two former US deputy secretaries of state to Taiwan.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (14)

[FONTE: Debasish Roy Chowdhury / Time, 10/12/2021]

Joe Biden’s Democracy Summit Is the Height of Hypocrisy



Nicholas Kamm / AFP

Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte and Jair Bolsonaro walk into a democracy summit. But this isn't a joke.

Having [recently abandoned Afghanistan](#) to an Islamist autocracy and [famine](#), and now finalizing a [\\$650 million arms sale](#) to Saudi Arabia, President Joe Biden thought it would be a fine idea to hold a two-day virtual gathering on democracy, where some of its worst offenders could pose as responsible upholders of freedom and dispense homilies on how to save the world from those like themselves.


A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (15) [FONTE: Debasish Roy Chowdhury / Time, 10/12/2021]

But there is no explanation as why some countries that are far from democratic have been invited. More than [30 percent](#) of the 110 invited countries are classified by U.S.-based non-profit [Freedom House](#) as only “partly free.” Three are “not free” at all—Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Iraq. More than a dozen are classified by Sweden’s V-Dem Institute as “electoral autocracies” including the Philippines, India and Kenya.

Some of the omissions from the [participant list](#) are as puzzling as the inclusions. It’s not clear, for example, why strongmen like India’s [Modi](#), the Philippines’ [Duterte](#) and Brazil’s [Bolsonaro](#) made the cut, but Turkey’s [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](#) didn’t, when all of them have been wrecking democratic institutions in their respective countries with equal vigor. There is no logic as to why an invitation was extended to Pakistan (which spared the Biden administration any further embarrassment by declining it). It is one of the most [dangerous countries](#) in the world, with a military-backed government that came to power through a heavily rigged election, and is notorious for rights violations. Nor does it make sense that an invitation was denied to Singapore, which may be a de facto one-party state, but it holds clean elections and offers a quality of life and security to its people that many invitees at the summit would kill for. (That is why [public trust](#) in politicians in Singapore is far higher than in the countries participating in the summit—higher, even, than in the host country itself.)

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (16) [FONTE: Chad de Guzman / Time, 16/12/2022]

How the U.S. Boycott of the Beijing Olympics Is Splitting the World



Hou Yu—China News Service/Getty Images

The last time the U.S. boycotted an Olympic Games, China joined in— withdrawing from the 1980 Moscow Games along with at least 44 other nations, ostensibly to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Chinese leaders even sent [18 athletes](#) to the Liberty Bell Classic in Philadelphia, which was billed as the “[alternative](#)” to the main event in Moscow. In a Cold War tit-for-tat, the Soviet Union and its allies withheld their athletes from the next Summer Olympics, the 1984 Games in Los Angeles.

A “insustentável leveza” estratégica das democracias liberais (17) [FONTE: SupChina, 3/2/2022]

The ‘Winter Olympics Pact’ between Moscow and Beijing


[Joe Webster](#) Published February 3, 2022



Xi Jinping 习近平 and Vladimir Putin. 习近平 Reuters / Kremlin/dp

The People's Daily [heralded](#) the upcoming get-together between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping 习近平 at the Winter Olympics, saying that the visit will mark the 38th meeting between the two figures since 2013, when [Xi chose Russia for his first foreign trip](#).

“The China-Russia relationship has grown into a big ship featuring the highest degree of mutual trust, the highest level of coordination and the highest strategic value,” says the People's Daily. “At the helm of the ship are the two heads of state.”



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (1)

[FONTE: “The Eurasian Nightmare” Hal Brands / Foreign Affairs, 25/02/2022]



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Eurasian Nightmare

Chinese-Russian Convergence and the Future of
American Order

BY HAL BRANDS February 25, 2022

HAL BRANDS is Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of *The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today*.

The greatest strategic problem the United States faces is the convergence of its two main rivals, China and Russia—countries that don’t always like or trust each other but nonetheless derive great benefits from their simultaneous assaults on the existing international order. And as Moscow and Beijing contest the balance of power at both ends of Eurasia, they are drawing together in ominous ways.

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (2)

[FONTE: Hal Brands, “The Eurasian Nightmare” / Foreign Affairs, 25/02/2022]

The Sino-Russian convergence gives both powers more room for maneuver by magnifying Washington’s two-front problem: the United States now faces increasingly aggressive near-peer rivals in two separate theaters—eastern Europe and the western Pacific—that are thousands of miles apart. Sino-Russian cooperation, while fraught and ambivalent, raises the prospect that America’s two great-power rivalries could merge into a single contest against an autocratic axis. Even short of that, the current situation has revived the great geopolitical nightmare of the modern era: an authoritarian power or entente that strives for dominance in Eurasia, the central strategic theater of the world.

That nightmare traces back to the writings of the political geographer Halford Mackinder, who warned in 1904 that the coming era would feature high-stakes struggles to rule Eurasia and its surrounding oceans. That prophesy played out in the two cataclysmic hot wars and one global cold war that followed. Mackinder’s vision has become newly relevant in the twenty-first century: the United States’ rivals are working to create a radically revised global order with an autocratic Eurasia at its core.

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (3)

[FONTE: Hal Brands, “The Eurasian Nightmare” / Foreign Affairs, 25/02/2022]


THE HEART OF THE WORLD

Mackinder is considered by many to be the father of geopolitics, and argued in his famous “heartland” theory of political geography (as well as subsequent publications) that three revolutions were putting Eurasia at center stage in global affairs. First, the colonization of Africa and much of Asia meant that possibilities for easy imperial expansion were fading, presaging fiercer fights between great powers in Eurasia, the world’s geopolitical core. Second, the proliferation of railroads was making it possible to project power across vast territories and creating new opportunities for conquest on the Eurasian landmass. Third, illiberal states were harnessing rapidly industrializing economies to underwrite horrific repression at home and dramatic expansion abroad. If such states were able to dominate Eurasia, global supremacy would be within their reach.

Eurasia, Mackinder pointed out, controlled most of the world’s population and industrial potential. A power or coalition that gained control of Eurasia’s resources could then build unrivaled navies and expand its empire across the seas. The coming geopolitical dramas would thus play out on and around this vital landmass. Autocratic bids for expansion would trigger fights with coalitions linking offshore powers—the United Kingdom and later the United States—to onshore allies whose existence would be threatened by a Eurasian hegemon.

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (4)

[FONTE: Halford Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, 1904]



THE GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT OF HISTORY.

Fig. 5

435

THE NATURAL SEATS OF POWER.

Pivot area—wholly continental. Outer crescent—wholly oceanic. Inner crescent—partly continental, partly oceanic.

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (5)

[FONTE: Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 1919]

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY

A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF
RECONSTRUCTION

BY

H. J. MACKINDER, M.P.



NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1919

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“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (6)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Halford Mackinder

Halford Mackinder, in full **Sir Halford John Mackinder**, (born February 15, 1861, Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, England—died March 6, 1947, Parkstone, Dorset), British political geographer noted for his work as an educator and for his geopolitical conception of the globe as divided into two camps, the ascendant Eurasian “heartland” and the subordinate “maritime lands,” including the other continents. He was knighted in 1920.



Halford Mackinder

Halford Mackinder, detail of a drawing by Sir William Rothenstein, 1933; in the collection of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Courtesy of the London School of Economics and Political Science; photograph, J.R. Freeman & Co. Ltd.

Mackinder was the son of a physician of Scottish descent. In 1880 he entered Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied natural sciences with a preference for biology; he obtained first-class honours in 1883 and, one year later, a second-class in modern history. He was president of the Oxford Union, the principal debating society at the university. After leaving Oxford he read for the bar at the Inner Temple, one of the law “colleges” in London, and qualified as a barrister in 1886. As a lecturer for the Oxford extension movement—formed to give educational opportunities to people unable to attend

a university—he traveled widely through the country, particularly among the workingmen of the north of England, expounding what he called the “new geography.”

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (7)

[FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Studying the prerequisites for a stable peace settlement during World War I, he developed a thesis in political geography that he had first outlined in a paper read to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904, “The Geographical Pivot of History.” In it he argued that interior Asia and eastern Europe (the heartland) had become the strategic centre of the “World Island” as a result of the relative decline of sea power as against land power and of the economic and industrial development of southern Siberia. His extended views were set out in a short book, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, published early in 1919 while the Paris Peace Conference was in session. The role of Britain and the United States, he considered, was to preserve a balance between the powers contending for control of the heartland. As a further stabilizing factor, he urged the creation of a tier of independent states to separate Germany and Russia, much along the lines finally imposed by the peace treaty. The book included, apart from the main theme, many farsighted observations—*e.g.*, his insistence on the “one world” concept, the need for regional organizations of minor powers, and the warning that chaos in a defeated Germany would inevitably lead to dictatorship. The book attracted little attention in Britain but rather more in the United States. There was an unexpected sequel, however,

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (8)

[FONTE: Julian Borger/ Guardian, 18/03/2022]

China's decisive turning point: will it side with Russia and divide the world?



While China has abstained on United Nations security council resolutions on the invasion, it has sided with Moscow rhetorically, echoing Russian talking points blaming Nato, and recycling conspiracy theories, and the Biden administration believes it has [already decided](#) to bail Russia out economically.

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (9)

[FONTE: Julian Borger/ Guardian, 18/03/2022]

‘There is still a window before China loses its wiggle room’

Since the Rome meeting on Monday, there have been a few signs of China continuing to hedge its bets, enough to give some hope in Washington that all is not lost. Chinese state-run television channels began to show footage of the devastation wreaked on Ukrainian cities, though they have yet to call it a war or an invasion. The [Chinese ambassador to Ukraine](#) assured his hosts: “We will always respect your state.”

The [German paper Bild](#) reported that Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, had been on his way to Beijing on Thursday but had turned his plane around and returned to Moscow for unknown reasons. A US official confirmed the incident but cautioned it was too early to tell its significance, speculating that China was “perhaps wanting to downplay public displays” of amity.

On 12 March, Prof Hu Wei, the vice-chairman of the policy research centre attached to the State Council, [wrote an article on China’s Ukraine dilemma](#), noting that Putin’s military effort was faltering.

“China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible,” he argued. “At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before [China](#) loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.”

“Ideais democráticos e realidade” (10)

[FONTE: Cartoon Stephen / South China Morning Post, 26/05/2022]



Bibliografia

