


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 27**

4/05/2022



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (3) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Facts

Also Known As	Islas de Solomón
Head Of Government	Prime Minister: Manasseh Sogavare
Capital	Honiara
Population	(2021 est.) 753,200
Head Of State	British Monarch: Queen Elizabeth II , represented by Governor-General: David Vunagi
Form Of Government	constitutional monarchy with one legislative house (National Parliament [50])
Official Language	English
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Solomon Islands
Total Area (Sq Km)	30,407
Total Area (Sq Mi)	11,740
Monetary Unit	Solomon Islands dollar (SI\$)
Population Rank	(2021) 167
Population Projection 2030	825,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2021) 64.2
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2021) 24.8
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2018) 23.7% • Rural: (2018) 76.3%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2019) 73.3 years • Female: (2019) 78.6 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate	Male: (2009) 88.9% • Female: (2009) 79.2%
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2020) 1,582
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2020) 2,300



As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (4) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

History of the Solomon Islands

Establishment of colonial rule

By the late 19th century the islands were being [exploited](#) for [labour](#) to work the plantations of [Fiji](#) and other islands and of [Queensland](#), [Australia](#). About 30,000 labourers were recruited between 1870 and 1910. To protect their own interests, [Germany](#) and [Britain](#) divided the Solomons between them in 1886, but in 1899 Germany transferred the northern islands, except for [Buka](#) and [Bougainville](#), to Britain (which had already claimed the southern islands) in return for recognition of German claims in Western Samoa (now [Samoa](#)) and parts of Africa. The British Solomon Islands Protectorate was declared in 1893, partly in response to abuses associated with labour recruitment and partly to regulate contacts between islanders and [European](#) settlers but mainly to forestall a threat of annexation by [France](#). [Colonial](#) rule began in 1896. Although generally humane, administrators were more concerned with promoting the interests of European traders and planters than those of the islanders, and islanders were punished harshly for offenses against colonial law and order. The murder of government tax collectors by members of the Kwaio [ethnic group](#) on [Malaita](#) in 1927 was answered with a savage [punitive](#) expedition, backed by an Australian warship, that burned and looted villages and killed many of the Kwaio. Together with some of his associates, Basiana, the leader of the tax collectors' killers, was hanged, and his young sons were forced to witness the execution.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (5) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Battle of Guadalcanal

Battle of Guadalcanal, (August 1942–February 1943), series of World War II land and sea clashes between Allied and Japanese forces on and around Guadalcanal, one of the southern Solomon Islands, in the South Pacific. Along with the naval Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942), the fighting on Guadalcanal marked a turning point in favour of the Allies in the Pacific War.



As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (6) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

World War II


With the outbreak of [World War II](#) in the Pacific, the Japanese began occupying the protectorate early in 1942, but their advance farther southward was stopped by U.S. forces, which invaded on August 7. Fighting in the Solomons over the next 15 months was some of the most bitter in the Pacific; the long [Battle of Guadalcanal](#) was one of the crucial conflicts of the [Pacific War](#). Throughout the campaign the U.S. forces and their allies were strongly supported by the islanders. After the war, because of the proximity of an airfield and the availability of flat land and of the military's buildings, [Honiara](#) on Guadalcanal became the new capital, replacing [Tulagi](#).

Independence

Another result of the war was to stimulate political [consciousness](#) among the islanders and so inspire a nationalist movement known as Maasina Rule, which lasted from 1944 to 1952. Subsequently, in response to the worldwide movement for [decolonization](#), the Solomons set out on the path of [constitutional](#) development. The country was formally renamed Solomon Islands in 1975, and independence was attained on July 7, 1978. Peter Kenilorea, who had helped lead Solomon Islands to independence, became its first [prime minister](#) (1978–81) and served a second term from 1984 to 1986. Solomon Mamaloni, another pre-independence leader, served as prime minister several times in the 1980s and '90s; resigning from his final term in August 1997 amid allegations of corruption, he was replaced by Bartholomew Ulufa'alu.


As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (7) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Ethnic composition (2009)



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
Religious affiliation (2009)



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
As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (8) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Solomon Islands major export destinations (2018)




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Solomon Islands major import sources (2018)



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As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (9) [FONTE: South China Morning Post]



As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (10) [FONTE: Patricia O' Brian / The Diplomat, 30/04/2022]

Australia's Monroe Doctrine in the Age of the China-Solomon Islands Security Deal

Old anxieties about Australia's vulnerabilities remain relatively unchanged, but the new geopolitical order is fundamentally different.

All the attention on China's recent security pact with the [Solomon Islands](#) has shone a light on the concept of Australia's regional sphere of influence. Why does Australia feel alarmed that an independent neighboring nation has brokered an agreement with China?

Australia's prime minister, fighting what he thought would be an advantageous "khaki" election campaign (although it is not [unfolding](#) as he hoped), talked this week about a "[red line in the Pacific](#)" being drawn that Australia, and the [U.S.](#), will enforce in as yet unspecified ways. Australia's defense minister escalated the rhetoric by telling Australia's voters that they should "[prepare for war](#)." The rhetoric from the Australian government is hot – red hot – and a dangerous election tactic that has been met with fiery responses from China and the Solomon Islands' [prime minister](#), Manasseh Sogavare. It paints a menacing scenario for Australia's voters that taps into deep wells of anxiety about the country's vulnerabilities that stretch back into the 19th century, when Australia was a collection of British colonies with national unity (realized in 1901) then a distant ambition.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (11) [FONTE: Patricia O' Brian / The Diplomat, 30/04/2022]

Taking the lead from the United States' 1823 declaration by President James Monroe that deemed any European nation asserting imperial power in the Americas as an act of hostility toward the United States, Australian politicians began deploying the term Australia's "Monroe Doctrine" in the 1870s. For Australian politicians, the expression articulated the fundamental security imperative of keeping Australia and the islands adjacent to it out of the "[grasp of competing powers](#)." "Competing powers" in the late 19th century referred specifically to France and Germany. The Dutch had long held present-day Indonesia and were not considered a comparable threat to Australia's security. France began a bold foray into the western Pacific in 1853 when it annexed New Caledonia and then commenced creating a settler society there much like the British had done in Australia from 1788. From the 1870s, anxieties intensified when a newly unified Germany rapidly began entering into the imperial game.

The Pacific Islands – at first in New Guinea and Samoa – were bringing Germany too close to Australia for the comfort of many politicians. Fears of great power footholds in Australia's near region were repeatedly used to [drive British imperial](#) claims to assuage anxious colonials. [These fears](#) propelled Britain to annex the Solomon Islands in 1893, but left France and Germany to take other islands in the archipelagoes arcing the continent's northeast, with present-day Vanuatu jointly run by both Britain and France. These developments led one Australian newspaper article in 1897 to presciently predict that in the future "[we will have to spend millions ... because of the nearness of bases of possible hostile operations](#)."

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (12) [FONTE: Patricia O' Brian / The Diplomat, 30/04/2022]

The islands arcing Australia are now sovereign nations with the exception of [New Caledonia](#), which recently rejected independence from France. Adding more regional complexity, the Autonomous Region of Bougainville is on course to become independent from Papua New Guinea in the near future. Furthermore, China is now the rising great power in question. Its size, regional location, approach to the islands, and historical ties to the region put China on a very different footing in the current strategic game playing out in the Pacific islands.

Australia's demographic landscape is also a critical factor. Paradoxically, with all the talk about "Australia's Pacific family," very few people from Australia's nearest neighbors are represented in Australia's migrant community ([0.88 percent in 2016](#)). This is the result of consistent policies of racial and, after 1975 when the "White Australia" immigration policy was abandoned, economic barriers that have kept Pacific populations at bay. (The Pacific communities resident in Australia have come via the "New Zealand pathway," mainly from Samoa and Tonga). In all the "us and them" rhetoric about Australia and China it needs to be remembered that [5 percent](#) of Australia's population is of Chinese descent, and the number of China-born Australians rose almost [59 percent](#) between the 2011 and 2016 census. How these [demographics](#) will impact the upcoming election will be interesting in seats with large Chinese populations.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (13) [FONTE: Richard Herr /ASPI, 6/04/2022]

In signing deal with China, Solomon Islands has broken the trust of its Pacific neighbours | The Strategist

[Richard Herr](#)

In signing deal with China, Solomon Islands has broken the trust of its Pacific neighbours



In his statement to the Solomon Islands parliament on the [draft security agreement](#) between his country and Beijing, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare stridently but disingenuously denied '[pitching into any geopolitical power struggle](#)'.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (14) [FONTE: Richard Herr /ASPI, 6/04/2022]

It's not clear if the signed version is different in any important aspect from the leaked version, but even a significant sanitising of the language wouldn't undo the damage this event has done to both signatory countries.

In a [three-page letter](#) to Sogavare, the president of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, set out very clearly the reasons why Solomons security ties with China would pitch the region into the broader geopolitical power struggle.

The letter is particularly significant because it was written from the perspective of the only one of the three Micronesian entities in a freely associated relationship with the US to recognise the People's Republic of China. (The other two are Marshall Islands and Palau.)

Panuelo argues that, while the Solomons enjoys agency as an independent state to pursue its national interest, it has an obligation to its people, to the region and even to global security to use its agency with prudence. Sogavare has an obligation to recognise that his decisions have consequences for others in the region.

The language and substance of the draft agreement betray its origins in Beijing and thus serve to identify China's ambitions in the Solomons and by extension the region more generally.

The implied preferential extraterritoriality in the draft allowing China to use its military 'to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects' raises concerns beyond Solomons Islands.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (15) [FONTE: Richard Herr /ASPI, 6/04/2022]

On 31 March, the Australian Defence Force's joint operations chief, Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, [spoke publicly](#) of the consequences of a Chinese military presence on ADF operations. While Bilton was careful to use the language of conditionality, the security agreement has already thrown an enormous rock into the Pacific pond and the ripples will affect all members of the free and open Indo-Pacific project.

The references in the draft agreement to military personnel, armed forces and ship visits with stopover and transition arrangements give rise to justifiable concerns that it will legitimise prepositioning of Chinese military stores as a precursor to a secure naval precinct on its way to a full-blown military base under the pretext of protecting Chinese interests.

The immediate-term objective for Beijing, apparently shared and supported by Sogavare, has been to achieve some parity with Canberra's security treaty with Honiara signed after the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands ended. A long-term objective in light of last year's AUKUS announcement may be to focus Australia's security concerns closer to home and away from the South China Sea.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (16) [FONTE: Guardian, 29/04/2022]

Solomon Islands PM suggests Australia's reaction to China security deal is hysterical and hypocritical



Manasseh Sogavare says he wasn't told about Aukus pact until it was public while Scott Morrison accuses counterpart of parroting China's lines

The prime minister of Solomon Islands has accused the Australian government of hypocrisy over his country's security deal with [China](#), saying the Aukus pact was far from transparent but he "did not become theatrical and hysterical".

Manasseh Sogavare said Solomon Islands and other countries in the region "should have been consulted to ensure that this Aukus treaty is transparent since it will affect the Pacific family by allowing nuclear submarines in Pacific waters".

The Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, hit back on Friday afternoon, suggesting that Sogavare had changed his view based on "other influences" and that there was a "remarkable similarity between those statements and those of the Chinese government".

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (17) [FONTE: Guardian, 29/04/2022]

The Australian foreign minister, Marise Payne, used a speech on Thursday to [criticise the secrecy surrounding the Solomons](#) security agreement while insisting “no document signed and kept away from public view” would change Australia’s commitment to answering Pacific island countries’ needs.

In an at-times defensive address to parliament in Honiara on Friday, Sogavare said the “western media” had accused Solomon Islands and China of showing a lack of transparency about the agreement. But Sogavare said he had first “learned of the Aukus treaty in the media”.

“One would expect that as a member of the Pacific family, Solomon Islands and members of the Pacific should have been consulted to ensure that this Aukus treaty is transparent, since it will affect the Pacific family by allowing nuclear submarines in Pacific waters,” Sogavare said.

“Oh, but I realise ... that Australia is a sovereign country, and that it can enter into any treaty that it wants to, transparently or not – which is exactly what they did with [the] Aukus treaty.”

Sogavare added: “When Australia signed up to Aukus we did not become theatrical and hysterical on the implications this would have for us. We respected Australia’s decision. And I’m glad to say that Australia, United States of America and Japan respected our sovereignty to enter into this security agreement with China as well, based on trust and mutual respect.”

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (18) [FONTE: Global Times, 28/04/2022]

Australia violates other countries' sovereignty by drawing 'red line' on China-Solomons cooperation: Chinese Vice FM

By Global Times



China's Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng Photo: website of China's Foreign Ministry

What right does Australia have to draw a "red line" between China and the Solomon Islands? If this is not violation of other countries' sovereignty, what is? China's Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng asked during a video conference at the launch ceremony of the China-Pacific Island Countries Cooperation Center on Climate Change.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (19) [FONTE: Global Times, 28/04/2022]

Xie said that China and the Solomon Islands independently negotiated and signed the pact, which is the sacred right of two sovereign states. "The bilateral security cooperation is open and transparent and not targeted at any third party. It does not conflict with our cooperation with other partners or existing mechanisms in the region, and serves the common interests of both countries and the South Pacific region." Xie said.

Responding to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison's remarks that China is building a military base in the Solomon Islands and that this would be the "red line" for Australia and the US, Xie said that this is fundamentally different from the fact that some countries have formed a clique, stimulated arms races, increased the risk of nuclear proliferation, and incited confrontation between factions.

"What right do these countries have to tell China what to do? What right does Australia have to draw a 'red line' between the Solomon Islands, which is 2,000 kilometers away from it, and China, which is 5,000 kilometers away? If this is not violation of other countries' sovereignty, interference in other countries' internal affairs and violation of international rules, what is?" Xie questioned.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (20) [FONTE: Global Times, 28/04/2022]





An Australian soldier stands on the tarmac at Honiara Airport, Solomon Islands, Tuesday, November 30, 2021. Photo: VCG

Those who slander, smear and intimidate other countries expose their mentality of colonialism, Xie stressed. They are brazenly pursuing coercive diplomacy, and desperately trying to control Pacific Island countries and maintain their so-called sphere of influence.

"The Pacific Ocean is the common home of countries in the region, rather than anyone's backyard. It should be a big stage for international cooperation, rather than an arena for geopolitical games," Xie noted.

As ilhas Salomão e a crescente influência da China na Ásia-Pacífico (21) [FONTE: Cartoons e Guardian e Global Times]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (1) [FONTE: FT, 26/04/2022]

'At war with the whole world': why Putin might be planning a long conflict in Ukraine

Stalling peace talks and new offensive suggest Kremlin could escalate its 'special operation' into a 'war' against the west

April 26 2022



Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (2) [FONTE: FT, 26/04/2022]

Moscow saw the conflict as part of a greater geopolitical clash.

"All things considered, we are now at war with the whole world, like we were in the Great Patriotic War, [when] all of Europe, the whole world was against us. And it's the same now, they never liked Russia," Minnikayev said.

While Minnikayev's analogy makes little sense — the US and its European allies fought the Nazis alongside the Soviet Union — it indicates a belief the Ukraine conflict is "just an episode of a greater confrontation with the west", said Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of political analysis project R. Politik.

"Until Putin manages to seal a new Yalta" — the summit that divided Europe into US and Russian spheres of influence after the second world war — "Russia will dig in, and it won't be limited to Ukraine," she said.

"That doesn't mean they're going to conquer Moldova or the Baltics — it means they could escalate in any way through sabre-rattling, testing weapons or maybe even using them."

When Rustam Minnikayev, a top Russian general, outlined plans to seize south-eastern Ukraine last week, he also suggested an attack on neighbouring Moldova was planned, indicated Russia was preparing for a longer war of attrition against what would remain of Ukraine, and that

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (3) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Transdniestria

Transdniestria, also spelled **Transnistria**, also called **Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Republic** and **Pridnestrovie**, separatist enclave in Moldova, located on the east bank of the Dniester River.



Transdniestria

The separatist enclave of
Transdniestria in Moldova.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Loosely occupying some 1,350 square miles (3,500 square km), the self-proclaimed (1990)

Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Republic is not recognized by any state. It has a national bank, national currency (the ruble), and customs house, as well as its own flag and national anthem.

Historically, Transdniestria was ruled at various times by the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union. The main city is Tiraspol. Much

of Moldovan industry is located in Transdniestria, and in 2005 the Transdniestrian authorities severed power to Moldova. A substantial Russian military presence in Transdniestria strained Moldovan relations with Russia in the early 21st century.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (4) [FONTE: ISW, 29/04/2022]



Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (5) [FONTE: BBC, 26/04/2022]

Ukraine war: US wants to see a weakened Russia

4 days ago

By Matt Murphy
BBC News



Mr Austin (L) and Mr Blinken (R) became the highest level US officials to travel to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin has said he hopes Russian losses in Ukraine will deter its leadership from repeating its actions elsewhere.

Ukraine can still win the war if given the right support, he added.

He also announced the US would allocate an extra \$713m (£559m) of military aid to Ukraine and other European nations.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (6) [FONTE: Público, 29/04/2022]

Washington aposta na vitória da Ucrânia, mas o objectivo é a derrota da Rússia

A invasão russa da Ucrânia transformou-se numa “guerra por procuração” entre a NATO e Moscovo. A parada nunca esteve tão alta e, por isso, as negociações de paz terão de esperar.

29 de Abril de 2022, 21:30



Soldado ucraniano dispara um míssil Javelin durante um exercício Reuters/UKRAINIAN JOINT FORCES OPERATION

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (7) [FONTE: Público, 29/04/2022]

Na última semana acumularam-se os sinais de que os parceiros ocidentais da Ucrânia estão a redobrar os esforços no apoio militar, económico e político às autoridades de Kiev, numa altura em que a invasão russa voltou a subir de intensidade no Donbass, uma região mais propícia a avanços das forças ao serviço do Kremlin. A convicção de que a guerra será longa e de que a Ucrânia pode realmente ganhar alicerça uma estratégia arriscada e que põe, em definitivo, a NATO e a Rússia na rota do confronto.

As visitas do chefe do Pentágono, Lloyd Austin, e do secretário de Estado norte-americano, Antony Blinken, a Kiev no fim-de-semana passado representam uma espécie de linha divisória na forma como o Ocidente passou a encarar o conflito na Ucrânia. [De regresso à Polónia, Austin fez uma declaração calculada](#), mas com enorme ressonância. "Queremos ver a Ucrânia manter-se como um país soberano, democrático e capaz de proteger o seu território soberano. Queremos ver a Rússia enfraquecida ao ponto de deixar de conseguir fazer coisas como invadir a Ucrânia."

Em duas frases, o secretário da Defesa dos EUA delineou aqueles que passaram a ser os objectivos estratégicos da NATO para a guerra que decorre em território ucraniano. A inclusão do enfraquecimento de Moscovo, sobretudo, representa uma alteração profunda da posição mantida por Washington e pelos seus parceiros não há muito tempo. Inicialmente, o apoio ocidental à Ucrânia destinava-se a assegurar a sobrevivência do país perante a agressão russa e a alcançar um desfecho não demasiado punitivo para o país.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (8) [FONTE: Michael Hirsch / Foreign Policy, 29/04/2022]

Biden's Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame

With his strategy to “weaken” Russia, the U.S. president may be turning the Ukraine war into a global one.

[Michael Hirsh](#) April 29, 2022, 2:45 PM



U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders at the White House in Washington on April 20.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (9) [FONTE: Michael Hirsch / Foreign Policy, 29/04/2022]

On Thursday, Biden urged Congress to provide \$33 billion in additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine—more than double the previous amount—and said he was sending a clear message to Putin: “You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.” Beyond that, Biden said in remarks at the White House, the new policy was intended “to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts.”

That followed an equally clear declaration this week from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who after a meeting in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the U.S. objective is now to curtail Russia’s power over the long term so it does not have the “capability to reproduce” its military assault on Ukraine. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin said in a stopover in Poland.

The shift may have been what prompted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to declare afterward that Washington and the West had entered a “proxy” war with Russia, risking another world war that, Lavrov warned, could go nuclear. “The danger is serious, real. And we must not underestimate it,” Lavrov said. Putin also again suggested this week, as he has since the beginning of his invasion on Feb. 24, that he still had the option of using nuclear weapons against NATO, saying, “We have all the instruments for this [to respond to a direct threat to Russia]—ones nobody else can boast of. And we will use them, if we have to.”

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (10) [FONTE: Michael Hirsch / Foreign Policy, 29/04/2022]

The newly aggressive U.S. approach won plaudits from many quarters—in particular from current and former NATO officials who insist the Russian nuclear counterthreats are only empty rhetoric.

Yet other Russia experts expressed worry that the United States and its Western allies are, in effect, crossing the very redlines they have avoided until now. For most of the two-month conflict, Biden has refused to authorize any military support, such as major offensive weapons or a no-fly zone, that might be perceived as putting U.S. or NATO forces in direct conflict with Russia. Now, some observers worry that with the additional aid and tougher economic sanctions, the U.S. president is forcing Putin into a corner in which he can only fight on or surrender. The latter course would mean relinquishing Putin's career-long aim of strengthening Russia against the West. Yet Putin, who has long said the West's goal was to weaken or contain Russia, has never been known to surrender during his decade and a half of aggressive moves against neighboring countries, mainly Ukraine and Georgia.

"In the Kremlin's eyes the West is out to get Russia. It was unspoken before. Now it's spoken," said Sean Monaghan, an expert on Europe at the

Center for Strategic and International Studies. "If you combine this with Biden's comments, at his summit in Poland last month, that 'this man [Putin] cannot remain in power,' all that turns this a territorial war into a wider confrontation and might make negotiating a settlement to end the war in Ukraine far more difficult or even impossible at the present." (Biden officials later said that the president was not seeking regime change in Russia.)

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (11) [FONTE: Angus Roxburgh / Guardian, 27/04/2022]

Further arming Ukraine will only destroy it. The west must act to end this war now | Angus Roxburgh

Few people in the west doubt that Ukraine is [fighting a just war](#). Russia's invasion was entirely unprovoked. Whatever complaints it may have had about Nato expansion or Ukraine's mistreatment of Russians [in Donbas](#), nobody had attacked Russia, and nobody was planning to. Vladimir Putin launched a straightforward war of aggression and territorial conquest.

It follows that supporting [Ukraine](#) is the right thing to do. But it is not at all clear that the kind of support we are giving (and not giving) is the right way to go about preserving the Ukrainian nation.

The longer this war rages on, the more Ukrainians will flee their homeland, and the more devastation will be wrought upon their homes, cities, industry and economy. Yet the west's current approach of supporting Ukraine's war aim of defeating the aggressor, and [providing arms](#) for that purpose while pointedly avoiding direct military intervention, is guaranteed to prolong the war. Russia's progress may be slowed, but it's highly unlikely to be stopped, far less pushed out of Ukraine, and in the meantime the grinding destruction and hideous war crimes will continue.

No day goes past without some senior western politician proclaiming that Ukraine will be "successful" and that [Russia](#) is "failing". This is certainly morale-boosting. But it is clearly nonsense.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (12) [FONTE: Angus Roxburgh / Guardian, 27/04/2022]

The fact is, as time goes on, more towns and cities are destroyed and then fall to the Russians. In two months, the area under Russian control – originally just the breakaway parts of Donbas – has grown to perhaps five times the size. If Russia continues to suffer “defeats” at this pace, then in another two months the entire south of Ukraine will be in ruins, cities such as Odesa will [resemble Mariupol](#), and thousands upon thousands more Ukrainians will have died.

Worse, as the war goes on, and more towns are destroyed, it becomes less likely that Ukrainians who have fled to other countries will ever return, because they will have no homes or workplaces to come back to. How many citizens of Mariupol will ever return? If Russia’s aim was to exterminate the Ukrainian nation, then the west’s approach is helping to do just that.

Surely, if the lives of Ukrainian people are our concern then the west has to do something to stop the war – now. Encouraging the Ukrainians to continue, however just their cause, is merely making their country uninhabitable.

The trouble is, there are only two ways to stop the war quickly, and neither is palatable to most western leaders.

One would be for Nato to enter the war and make a quick, massive and decisive strike to cripple Russia’s invasion forces. Unlike with Russia’s actions, it would have every right under international law to do so. When [Putin intervened in Syria](#), he very carefully framed this as a response to a request from Syria’s legitimate and internationally recognised government. The west could do the same in Ukraine. Putin himself has no such justification for his invasion.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (13) [FONTE: Scott Sagan / Foreign Affairs, 16/03/2022]

The World's Most Dangerous Man

Putin's Unconstrained Power Over Russia's Nuclear Arsenal

BY SCOTT D. SAGAN March 16, 2022

SCOTT D. SAGAN is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

On the third day of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin called a meeting with Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Sergei Shoigu, the minister of defense. Seated at the opposite end of an extraordinarily long table, Putin ordered them to “transfer the deterrence forces of the Russian army”—which include its nuclear weapons—“to a special mode of combat duty.” The directive was aired on Russian national television. As Putin made his announcement, both Gerasimov and Shoigu looked surprised and uneasy.



Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (14) [FONTE: Scott Sagan (entrevista) / Stanford News, Abril 2022]

The U.S. must do what it can to prevent Russian military from crossing the nuclear threshold, Stanford scholar says

CIA director William Burns recently [said](#), "None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential [Russian] resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons." Are you worried about the Russians using nuclear weapons against the Ukrainians if the war continues to go badly for Moscow?

Yes. I recently [argued](#) in *Foreign Affairs* that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world. Putin could order the Russian military to drop a single nuclear bomb on a Ukrainian city to try to coerce the Zelensky government into immediately surrendering. This frightening scenario is not fanciful. It is, after all, effectively what the United States did to Japan in 1945.

We can only hope that in this situation, senior Russian officers would tell Putin that such a strike would be [illegal](#), a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and refuse to comply. Some national security officials are Putin's cronies, like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but the military leadership is more independent. The United States must do what it can to reinforce any reluctance by the Russian military to cross the nuclear threshold.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (15) [FONTE: Tarek Megerisi / Foreign Policy, 27/04/2022]

Don't Turn Ukraine Into the Next Syria or Libya

By flooding the country with arms and foreign fighters, Western leaders could be paving the way for future conflicts.



Employees unload a plane carrying new U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine, at Kyiv's Boryspil airport on Jan. 25.

Employees unload a plane carrying new U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine, at Kyiv's Boryspil airport on Jan. 25. SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images

When Russia invaded Ukraine, it was a watershed moment for the Western world—a moment that evoked a sense of history, urgency, and existential struggle. After all, this was a return of the 20th century's bogeyman attempting to redive Europe and redraw the Iron Curtain. All these emotional triggers lent a romantic quality to Ukraine's struggle against Russia that the Western world indulged in.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (16) [FONTE: Tarek Megerisi / Foreign Policy, 27/04/2022]

The policy response was parsed through these lenses of urgency and romanticism. Weapons were sent, young men traveled from afar to Ukraine's front, and the militarization of a population of 41 million people was cheered as plans to fast-track the country into the European Union were made. And this only keeps dialing up. This month, the United States is [sending](#) drones, helicopters, and howitzers to shore up the defense of the Donbas while other allies prepare [anti-aircraft missile launchers](#), artillery, and potentially even fighter jets to support Ukraine's war effort.

It is an eerily similar throwback to the days when popular revolutions against former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad turned violent and policies to support the well-meaning revolutionaries were dictated by hopefulness, righteousness, and an urgency that lacked due care and planning. The effects of this, like in the Middle East and North Africa, could be that the West is sowing the seeds of the next 10 years of crisis due to its failure to plan carefully today.

Even before Russia had crossed the Rubicon, the Western world was sending Ukraine what it required to have any hope of resisting the impending cataclysm. Advanced weaponry, such as fabled [anti-tank Javelin missiles](#) and anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, were sent in troves, and stacked pallets of small arms and ammunition arrived by the plane load, along with armored cars, advanced radios, and everything needed to excel at [modern warfare](#). The scale and speed of the airlift of weaponry to Ukraine is likely to be the largest in contemporary history.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (17) [FONTE: Tarek Megerisi / Foreign Policy, 27/04/2022]

By March 6, some [20,000 foreign fighters](#) were making their way to Ukraine. This is a considerable number of fighters considering the over 10-year conflict in Syria attracted an estimated [40,000 people](#). And as Syria and Libya have shown, this could create significant legal- and security-related headaches in the future. Many of these fighters are inspired by [nationalist narratives](#); some are even right-wing extremists, though Russian propaganda has exaggerated their numbers.

Ideologically inspired fighters of all stripes have a tendency to radicalize, and war is an experience that pollutes the sanity and morality of those who experience it. It will be hard to track the spread of these ex-combatants returning across Europe and the United States as well as their ability to bring small arms back with them. The return of [right-wing extremists](#) exacerbates this and could cause a compounding crisis as they use their conflict experience to train, recruit, and plan fresh violence. This will burden already strained state health and security services that will need to react to the phenomenon.


Moreover, it is a problem that will worsen exponentially the longer the war continues and Ukrainian society becomes more heavily armed and militarized. Europe should therefore be planning alongside Ukraine to help the Zelensky administration manage the politics of war and prevent the enduring militarization of its social and political life in a way that ensures that even if Russian President Vladimir Putin can't win on the battlefield, he could succeed in killing any hope of a liberal, democratic Ukraine.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (18) [FONTE: Elizabeth Gibney / Nature, 17/03/2022]

Where is Russia's cyberwar? Researchers decipher its strategy

Many analysts expected an unprecedented level of cyberattacks when Russia invaded Ukraine — which so far haven't materialized.

17 March 2022



So why hasn't Russia used cyberwarfare, as expected?

One theory is that the decision to invade Ukraine was held at the highest level and didn't trickle down the chain of command until it became too late to deploy significant cyberattacks, which can take months to organize, says Herr.

Cyberattacks might also be more suitable to skirmishes that fall short of physical war. Cyberweapons are cheaper than boots on the ground, but are still costly, says Mariarosaria Taddeo, a philosopher on the ethics of digital technologies at the Oxford Internet Institute, UK. Cyberattacks are a show of power, inflict damage without engaging in a conventional war and are difficult to attribute with certainty — but these advantages lose relevance once all-out war begins, she says.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (19) [FONTE: Elizabeth Gibney / Nature, 17/03/2022]

Could the cyberwar escalate?

Russia might be keeping its more aggressive cyberweapons in reserve, says Malekos Smith. If the ground war stalls and financial sanctions bite, Russia could increase cyberattacks, she says. It could ramp up its assault on Ukraine and target Western nations to inflict on them the same kind of chaos wrought by sanctions, for example by targeting companies and financial markets, she says.

Health-care systems and power networks could be vulnerable. In 2021, non-state hackers, possibly in Russia, used ransomware to shut down the US Colonial oil pipeline for days. "This is the kind of thing we can expect — an attack that's enough to cripple infrastructure for a while and create disruption," says Taddeo. On 12 February, before the invasion, the US Cyber Security and Infrastructure Agency warned organizations to prepare for cyber-attack.

If physical damage occurred, countries such as the United States have declared that they could respond with every means possible. The National Cyber Power Index by the Belfer Center, where Zabierek works, ranks Russia's cybercapabilities below those of the United States, China and the United Kingdom. A cyberoperation could trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Trade Organization treaty, which states that an attack on one member nation is considered an attack on them all. If that happened, Russia would be outmatched on all fronts, says Zabierek.

Os riscos de uma guerra prolongada na Ucrânia (20)

[FONTE: cartoon Kal / The Economist, 5/02/2022]



Bibliografia

