


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
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SESSÃO N° 29**

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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (1)

[FONTE: Guardian, 26/02/2022]

From partygate to Putin's war: Boris Johnson rides on a rare wave of unity

[Toby Helm](#)



Boris Johnson speaking last week at prime minister's questions in the House of Commons. Photograph: Jessica Taylor/UK Parliament/AFP/Getty Images

It was the silence in the House of Commons – more than the words spoken from the dispatch box – that captured the magnitude of the moment, and the dramatic shift of political mood, on Thursday evening.

Boris Johnson had been woken at 4.10am that morning to be told [Vladimir Putin's troops had crossed the border into Ukraine](#). It was what military intelligence had prepared him to expect.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (2)

[FONTE: Guardian, 26/02/2022]

An aide summed up Johnson's mood as "motivated, anxious, moved and energetic". He addressed the British people at noon before turning again to a reinforced [package of sanctions against Moscow](#). As he did so he seized on a new three-word slogan – "Putin must fail" – which he would use repeatedly at cabinet that evening.

At Westminster, however, by mid-morning, MPs of all parties were wandering around parliament, disorientated and fearful.

It was just weeks since the Tory party had been consumed by talk of Johnson being [subjected to a vote of confidence over the "partygate" affair](#) as opposition MPs and leaders accused him of being a serial rule-breaker and liar unfit to occupy Downing Street.

Every appearance by the prime minister in the Commons for weeks before had turned the chamber into a bear pit. To underline the descent of British politics, a week ago No 10 confirmed the prime minister had [completed and returned a questionnaire](#) he had been sent by Scotland Yard about gatherings in Downing Street that appeared to have taken place in breach of lockdown rules.

Despite it all, Johnson had been determined to soldier on and turn things round on the domestic front. On Monday, he announced [the end of all remaining Covid-19 restrictions in England](#), saying it was time to take the country "back towards normality".

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (3)

[FONTE: BBC, 20/03/2022]

Ukraine war: Boris Johnson sparks fury after comparison to Brexit

20 March

By Mary O'Connor

BBC News

Watch: Boris Johnson compares Ukraine war to Brexit vote

Boris Johnson has been criticised for comparing the struggle of Ukrainians fighting Russia's invasion to people in Britain voting for Brexit.

In a speech he said Britons, like Ukrainians, had the instinct "to choose freedom" and cited the 2016 vote to leave the EU as a "recent example".

The comments have caused anger among politicians both in the UK and Europe.

Donald Tusk, the former president of the European Council, called the comments offensive.

Conservative peer Lord Barwell said voting in a referendum was not "in any way comparable with risking your life" in a war, while Liberal Democrat leader Sir Ed Davey said it was an "insult" to Ukrainians.

The row comes as the prime minister strongly urged China to condemn the Russian invasion in [an interview with the Sunday Times](#). He suggested Beijing was having "second thoughts" about its neutral stance.

Mr Johnson likened the Ukrainians' fight to Brexit in a speech to the Conservative Party's spring conference in Blackpool on Saturday.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (4)

[FONTE: France 24, 13/04/2022]

War in Europe gives the UK new momentum for a role on the world stage



British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walk through Kyiv, Ukraine, on April 9, 2022. © The Ukrainian Presidential Press Service via AFP

On April 9, UK Prime Minister [Boris Johnson](#) travelled to the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Organised in secret, the trip was widely viewed as an exceptional diplomatic success.

Days earlier the city had been under attack from Russian forces, and a video of Johnson and Zelensky walking through the city [posted by the Ukrainian Defence Force](#) on Twitter quickly clocked up millions of views.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (5)

[FONTE: France 24, 13/04/2022]

But the war in Ukraine has united countries in the West against a common enemy in Russian President Vladimir Putin. For the past seven weeks, the UK has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with allies in the EU, NATO and around the world to condemn Russia's actions and support Ukraine's fight.

Doing so seems to have given the UK a burgeoning new profile on the international stage.

"It's a huge opportunity for the UK to find its voice in a very positive way," Dr Melanie Garson, lecturer in international conflict resolution and security in UCL's Department of Political Science, told FRANCE 24.

'Britain should be a great power'

"The UK has taken the opportunity to raise its voice as a defender of democracy and freedoms, and to make sure it is part of the international conversation," Garson says.

This position has echoes in the last large-scale war in Europe.

"It is reaffirming the role of 'great power' the UK has been looking to play since the end of World War II," Tim J. Oliver, Lecturer in British politics and public policy at the University of Manchester, told FRANCE 24. "That means a country that sees itself as a manager of international order, and one of the big players in charge of the system."

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (6)

[FONTE: Somos Tisdall / Guardian, 15/05/2022]

Boris Johnson is using Ukraine crisis to launch a British comeback in Europe | Simon Tisdall | The Guardian

Oh the irony! Boris Johnson, the Brexit ringleader who turned his back on the EU, now boldly leads the defence of Europe in the face of Russian aggression. An exaggeration? Yes, but behind the hype lies an intriguing story. Even as he [risks another major rift with Brussels over Northern Ireland](#), Johnson is using the Ukraine crisis to mend fences with some old European allies. His aim: to re-establish the UK as a continental power.

The signing last week of [bilateral defence pacts with Nato aspirants Sweden and Finland](#) – “our friends in the north” – was the latest manifestation of an apparently concerted British drive to revive political ties with eastern and central European and Nordic countries that were natural UK allies before the Brexit rupture. Johnson and senior ministers have repeatedly visited Poland and the Baltic republics as the Ukraine crisis has unfolded.

Britain’s rapid deployment of extra troops and equipment along Nato’s “front line” with Russia, and this month’s pledge of an [additional \\$1.6bn in sophisticated weaponry](#) and aid to Ukraine itself, has been praised by regional governments [and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy](#), who hosted Johnson last month. In sharp contrast, the EU’s “top two”, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Olaf Scholz, have yet to visit wartime Kyiv.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (7)

[FONTE: EU Observer, 17/05/2022. FOTO: DW]

UK and EU edge closer to trade war over Northern Ireland

[Eszter Zalan](#) Brussels, 17. May, 18:53



The EU said on Tuesday that British plans to ignore parts of the post-Brexit trade rules "raises significant concerns", and warned of counter-measures, as the bloc and the UK edged towards a trade war.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (8)

[FONTE: EU Observer, 17/05/2022]

London said the draft bill was an insurance policy in case it cannot reach agreement with Brussels to end a dispute over the protocol.

The commission made several proposals last October to cut red tape for businesses, but the UK has so far rejected those proposals. The EU has been unwilling to reopen the protocol, which the UK government previously negotiated, agreed and signed.

The protocol was put in place to avoid a border on the island of Ireland, between EU member the Republic of Ireland and non-EU Northern Ireland, and maintain the integrity of the EU's single market at the same time. Essentially a customs border has been moved to the Irish Sea, irking unionists in Northern Ireland.

UK prime minister Boris Johnson has said the UK's plans involve getting rid of "relatively minor barriers to trade".

Foreign secretary Liz Truss told MPs in the House of Commons that the planned legislation would ease the movement of goods, setting out a "green channel" for goods moving from Britain to Northern Ireland, and end the role of the European Court of Justice as the sole arbiter.

She said that the move "is consistent with our obligations in international law."

However, the EU has a different interpretation.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (9)

[FONTE: Guardian, 11/05/2022]

UK goes further than any other Nato country in Sweden and Finland pledge

Boris Johnson's [offer of British written security assurances](#) to Sweden and Finland was more than a piece of symbolism designed to nudge the two countries over the line into making a joint application for Nato next week, Swedish security experts said.

Although Johnson's key guarantee is necessarily a political declaration, as opposed to an international treaty guarantee, the British commitment was of high value at a time of great tension, Anna Wieslander, the Atlantic Council's northern [Europe](#) director said on Wednesday.



Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (10)

[FONTE: Guardian, 11/05/2022]

In a visit to Washington last week Ann Linde, the Swedish foreign minister, was given a broad security assurance by Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state. Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor also promised to back the Nordics' Nato membership when the Swedish prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, and her Finnish counterpart, Sanna Marin, travelled to Berlin last week.

Björn Fägersten, senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, said the British offer "gives an extra layer of assurance in the event of an attack. It is written down and [Boris Johnson](#) was quite specific in terms of talking about increased deployments by the military, air force and naval operations."

Wieslander said "at a time of very high tension in the region, it is of great value, and partly because it builds on what exists already through the agreements made at the time of the setting up of the joint expeditionary force in 2015. It also sends a signal to Russia that a nuclear power is willing to do this. I would expect the US to do something similar."



Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (11)

[FONTE: Reuters, 17/05/2022]

Russia's Lavrov says Finland, Sweden joining NATO makes 'no big difference'

May 17 (Reuters) - Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday that Finland and Sweden joining NATO would probably make "not much difference" as the two countries had long participated in the alliance's military drills.

"Finland and Sweden, as well as other neutral countries, have been participating in NATO military exercises for many years," Lavrov said.

"NATO takes their territory into account when planning military advances to the East. So in this sense there is probably not much difference. Let's see how their territory is used in practice in the North Atlantic alliance."



Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (12)

[FONTE: NATO, 18/05/2022]

Finland and Sweden submit applications to join NATO

Finland and Sweden on Wednesday morning (18 May 2022) simultaneously handed in their official letters of application to join NATO.



The letters were conveyed by the Finnish Ambassador to NATO Klaus Korhonen and respectively, the Swedish Ambassador to NATO Axel Wernhoff, to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Alliance's Brussels headquarters. Mr. Stoltenberg warmly welcomed the requests, saying "this is a good day, at a critical moment for our security."

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (13)

[FONTE: NATO, 18/05/2022]

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with Klaus Korhonen (ambassador of Finland accredited to NATO) and Axel Wernhoff (ambassador of Sweden accredited to NATO)

Ambassadors, dear Klaus, dear Axel, dear friends, good morning!

This is a good day, at a critical moment for our security.

Thank you so much for handing over the applications for Finland's and Sweden's membership in NATO.

Every nation has the right to choose its own path.

You have both made your choice, after thorough democratic processes.

And I warmly welcome the requests by Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

You are our closest partners.

And your membership in NATO would increase our shared security.

The applications you have made today are an historic step.

Allies will now consider the next steps on your path to NATO.

The security interests of all Allies have to be taken into account.

And we are determined to work through all issues and reach rapid conclusions.

Over the past few days, we have seen numerous statements by Allies committing to Finland's and Sweden's security.

NATO is already vigilant in the Baltic Sea region, and NATO and Allies' forces will continue to adapt as necessary.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (14)

[FONTE: Daily Sabah, 18/05/2022]

'Turkey won't approve NATO membership of terrorist supporters'

by Daily Sabah

[Daily Sabah](#)



[President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan speaks at the AK Party's parliamentary group meeting in Ankara, Turkey, May 18, 2022. \(AA Photo\)](#)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Turkey will not say yes to Sweden and Finland's membership as long as the two countries continue to support terrorist groups that pose a direct threat to the country's national security.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (15)

[FONTE: Daily Sabah, 18/05/2022]

"It is controversial for countries to support terrorism and expect our approval," the president said.

His comments came just a few hours after Sweden and Finland officially submitted their applications to become NATO members on Wednesday amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Erdoğan noted that the bloc's enlargement is meaningful Turkey as long as it respects Ankara's sensitivities. He continued by saying that Sweden refuses to extradite terrorists despite Turkey's requests.

"NATO is a security alliance, and Turkey will not agree on jeopardizing this security," he said, adding that delegations from the two Nordic countries should not "bother" coming to Turkey.

Any membership bid in the bloc must be unanimously approved by NATO's 30 members.

Sweden and Finland had also imposed arms export embargoes on Turkey after its military operation seeking to clear northern Syria east of the Euphrates of the YPG/PKK terrorists in 2019.

Turkey said it wanted the Nordic countries to halt their support to terrorist groups present on their territory, and lift bans on sales of some weapons to Turkey.

Sweden and Finland also [rejected Turkey's request for the extradition of people with links to the PKK and Gülenist Terror Group \(FETÖ\)](#).

Both of the Nordic countries rejected the extradition of 19 terrorists and did not respond to Turkey's request for five others.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (16)

[FONTE: Al-Monitor, 15/05/2022]

How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?

Erdogan shakes up otherwise unified Western alliance on Ukraine war.

Sweden's Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson (R) and the Moderate Party's leader Ulf Kristersson address a news conference in Stockholm, Sweden, on May 16, 2022 - HENRIK MONTGOMERY/TT News Agency/AFP via Getty Images
May 17, 2022



Turkish President Recep Erdogan threatened to [veto Finland and Sweden's bid for NATO membership](#) last week. Europe is at one of its most critical junctures in modern history as the West tries to consolidate its defense against Moscow after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (17)

[FONTE: Al-Monitor, 15/05/2022]

Erdogan's chief foreign policy adviser Ibrahim Kalin tried to take the edge off Erdogan's remarks by striking a more conciliatory tone in an interview with Reuters. He commented, "We [are not closing the door](#) [on Finland and Sweden]. But we are basically raising this issue as a matter of national security for Turkey," adding, "If they have a public concerned about their own national security, we have a public that is equally concerned about our own security. We have to see this from a mutual point of view."

Despite the frosty relations between Ankara and Washington due to a host of differences, the Biden administration — which is highly supportive of Finland and Sweden's NATO membership — has chosen a restrained tone in its response to Erdogan. Analysts attribute it to the expectation that Ankara eventually toe the line.

Talking to reporters after the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin over the weekend, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken — who also met with Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu — was circumspect, saying, "I don't want to characterize the specific conversation that we had either with the foreign minister or within the NATO sessions themselves, but I can say this much: I heard almost across the board [very strong support](#) [for Sweden and Finland] joining the alliance."

A Western diplomatic source said the message in Blinken's remarks was clear. The source, who wished to remain anonymous, told Al-Monitor, "If Turkey insists on its threat, then it will find itself isolated in the alliance. This will not be in its short, medium or long-term interests." The source added, however, "Erdogan is known to be single-minded and erratic and may choose to go down the path of his choice despite knowing full well that he is walking into a blind alley."

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (18)

[FONTE: Peter Bloom / The Conversation, 9/03/2022]

Ukraine: the world's defence giants are quietly making billions from the war



Brought to you by lots of very big companies. EPA

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been widely condemned for its unjustified aggression. There are legitimate fears of a revived Russian empire and even a new world war. Less discussed is the almost [half trillion dollar](#) (£381 billion) defence industry supplying the weapons to both sides, and the [substantial profits](#) it will make as a result.

The conflict has already seen massive growth in defence spending. The EU announced it would buy and deliver [€450 million](#) (£375 million) of arms to the Ukraine, while the US has pledged [US\\$350 million](#) in military aid [in addition](#) to the over 90 tons of military supplies and US\$650 million

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (19)

[FONTE: Peter Bloom / The Conversation, 9/03/2022]

Put together, this has seen the [US and Nato sending](#) 17,000 anti-tank weapons and 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, for instance. An international coalition of nations is also willingly arming the Ukrainian resistance, [including](#) the UK, Australia, Turkey and Canada.

This is a major boon for the world's largest defence contractors. To give just a couple of examples, Raytheon makes the Stinger missiles, and jointly with Lockheed Martin makes the Javelin anti-tank missiles being supplied by the likes of the US and Estonia. Both US groups, Lockheed and Raytheon shares are up by around 16% and 3% respectively since the invasion, against a 1% drop in the S&P 500, as you can see in the chart below.

Opportunity knocks

Ahead of the conflict, top western arms companies were briefing investors about a likely boost to their profits. Gregory J. Hayes, the chief executive of US defence giant Raytheon, stated on a January 25 [earnings call](#):

We just have to look to last week where we saw the drone attack in the UAE ... And of course, the tensions in eastern Europe, the tensions in the South China Sea, all of those things are putting pressure on some of the defence spending over there. So I fully expect we're going to see some benefit from it.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (20)

[FONTE: Jacobin Magazine, 4/05/2022. FOTO: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]

For Arms Manufacturers, the War in Ukraine Is a Profits Bonanza



Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Photo: Flickr/Robert Sullivan

Today we see a striking paradox. Western media have echoed all sorts of military pundits and intelligence sources emphasizing how far Russian military might was overrated before the invasion; how much it has proven weaker than expected at every level, including its logistical capabilities and deployment of sophisticated weaponry; and how much damage Vladimir Putin's criminal onslaught on Ukraine has brought upon Russia itself, its economy and its military potential. And yet several NATO governments have seized upon the opportunity of this war, which is obviously enfeebling Russia, in order to engage in a frenzy of increased military expenditure.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (21)

[FONTE: Jacobin Magazine, 4/05/2022]

Military-industrial complexes everywhere are rubbing their hands with glee. NATO armies' top brass is again resorting to the old trick of overestimating the threats, as it periodically used to do with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in order to advocate rearmament. Such a term is utterly inappropriate, given that NATO armies never disarmed to begin with; rather, they were constantly over-armed during the Cold War and have stuck to excessive arms levels ever since. Besides, whatever deliveries of defensive weapons are made to Ukrainian resistance are but a tiny portion of ongoing military expenditure — not even the 1 percent of all NATO spending that Ukraine's president has been begging for.


Not content with the United States' current gigantic military expenditure, which amounted to \$782 billion last year — up from \$778 billion spent in 2020, which itself represented, according to the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](#), 39 percent of global military expenditure, more than three times China's (\$252 billion) and more than twelve times Russia's (\$61.7 billion) — Joe Biden is now [requesting \\$813 billion](#) for the next fiscal year (\$773 billion for the Pentagon and an additional \$40 billion for defense-related programs at the FBI, Department of Energy, and other agencies). According to undersecretary of defense, Comptroller [Michael J. McCord](#): "This budget was finalized before Putin's invasion of Ukraine. So there is nothing in this budget that specifically was changed because it was too late to change it if we wanted to, to reflect the specifics of the invasion."

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (20)

[FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA , 16/03/2022]

EIA expects crude oil prices higher than \$100 per barrel in coming months

March 16, 2022



On February 24, 2022, Russia initiated a further invasion of Ukraine that contributed to the recent sharp increase in the Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices. This sharp rise in crude oil prices reflects increased geopolitical risk and uncertainty regarding how announced and potential future sanctions may affect global energy markets. In our March 2022 [Short-Term Energy Outlook](#) (STEO), which was finalized on March 3, we increased our forecast price of international benchmark Brent crude oil to \$116 per barrel (b) for the second quarter of 2022. We expect gasoline prices to average about \$4.10 per gallon (gal) during the second quarter of 2022 and then decline through the rest of the year.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (23)

[FONTE: Bloomberg, 31/03/2022]

OPEC Wants Russia as an Oil Ally, in Peace and in War

For the oil cartel, wars are business as usual. Whatever happens in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia wants Russia alongside it.



Smoke and flames rise from a Saudi Aramco oil facility in Jeddah.

Source: -/AFP

For the OPEC+ oil cartel, wars are business as usual. In fact, wars among its own members are pretty normal, too.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (24)

[FONTE: Bloomberg, 31/03/2022]

But oil diplomacy thinks long-term. Everyone in Saudi Arabia knows that oil is cyclical. The next economic recession, [which may come as early as this year](#), could push the oil market into oversupply. In Riyadh, no one thinks that Iranian or Venezuelan oil — which remain under American sanctions — will stay outside of the market forever. The very same market that's screaming for extra supply today may eventually need production cuts.

Whenever that happens, Riyadh wants Russia alongside it. Having spent years courting Moscow, the kingdom isn't about to abandon it. And Saudi Arabia is far from alone. Russia still has friends from Brazil to China, and from India to Indonesia.

For OPEC+, it means that the group won't change its plans. As it agreed months ago, with the support of Moscow, the group would add, on paper, another 400,000-plus barrels a day every month until September. In reality, it's adding far less than that, as many OPEC+ countries are unable to raise production and Russian own output is now falling. OPEC has a deal in place with Russia until the end of December. Beyond that, a new one would be need to be negotiated.

For Saudi Arabia and others to break with Russia, they would need a better alternative. But none has been offered yet.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (25)

[FONTE: OPEC, 5/05/2022]



28th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting

Following the conclusion of the 28th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting, held via videoconference on 5th May, it was noted that continuing oil market fundamentals and the consensus on the outlook pointed to a balanced market. It further noted the continuing effects of geopolitical factors and issues related to the ongoing pandemic.

The OPEC and participating non-OPEC oil producing countries therefore decided to:

1. Reaffirm the decision of the 10th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting on 12th April 2020 and further endorsed in subsequent meetings, including the 19th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting on the 18th July 2021.
2. Reconfirm the production adjustment plan and the monthly production adjustment mechanism approved at the 19th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting and the decision to adjust upward the monthly overall production by 0.432 mb/d for the month of June 2022, as per the attached schedule.
3. Reiterate the critical importance of adhering to full conformity and to the compensation mechanism, taking advantage of the extension of the compensation period until the end of June 2022. Compensation plans should be submitted in accordance with the statement of the 15th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting.
4. Hold the 29th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting on 2 June 2022.

	June 2022 Required Production
Algeria	1023
Angola	1480
Congo	315
Eq. Guinea	123
Gabon	181
Iraq	4509
Kuwait	2724
Nigeria	1772
Saudi Arabia	10663
UAE	3075
Azerbaijan	696
Bahrain	199
Brunei	99
Kazakhstan	1655
Malaysia	577
Mexico	1753
Oman	855
Russia	10663
Sudan	73
South Sudan	126
OPEC 10	25864
Non-OPEC	16694
OPEC+	42558

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (26)

[FONTE: CATO Institute, 2/03/2022]

How North Korea Could Exploit Russia's War against Ukraine

North Korea always moves on its own timetable, but it might decide that the Ukraine crisis offers useful cover while it ramps up its testing program.

The [war in Ukraine](#) is absorbing Washington's attention and resources, leaving it able to do little else. However, North Korea is once again attempting to force its way into the national conversation. Or instead, Pyongyang is counting on Ukraine to divert America's attention from its continuing missile and nuclear programs. It's difficult to discern which is true, but much might depend on the answer.

Russia's threats against and subsequent invasion of Ukraine wiped most other international news from the front pages of the newspapers. Although long an apparent publicity hound, Kim Jong-un disappeared into the media black hole. For the first time in many years, nuclear Armageddon seemed to threaten Europe rather than Northeast Asia, courtesy of Moscow's [nuclear alert](#).

Then the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) [launched another](#) ballistic missile. Although only a short-range shot, it followed a [flurry](#) of seven tests of nine missiles in January. The hiatus was likely to avoid embarrassing China during the Olympics.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (27)

[FONTE: CATO Institute, 2/03/2022]

Kim Jong-un might have decided that now is the opportunity. [Observed](#) Evans Revere, formerly of the State Department:

“The North Koreans may think Washington is distracted and stretched by the Russian invasion and will not be able to respond vigorously, or at all, if the DPRK resumes testing of longer-range missiles.” Moreover, even if displeased by such a test, neither Beijing nor Moscow seems currently disposed to support additional sanctions or increase enforcement of existing ones. With Washington at such odds with Russia, the administration will have little leverage against China, especially if Beijing threatens to provide sanctions-busting assistance to Moscow.

Moreover, the Republic of Korea will soon face a [governmental transition](#). If the ruling party triumphs, the new administration will likely oppose a harsh response even to renewed ICBM or nuclear testing. If the opposition wins, little action can be expected before the new government takes over and officials are appointed. Washington might be reluctant to act during that time.

Whatever its plan, the DPRK has the initiative. It always moves on its own timetable, but it might decide that the Ukraine crisis offers useful cover while it ramps up its testing program. The Biden administration might then find itself facing two simultaneous foreign crises and a looming mid-term election.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (28)

[FONTE: CNN, 8/05/2022]

What North Korea learned from Ukraine: Now's the perfect time for a nuclear push



(CNN) — If North Korea was looking for another excuse to forge ahead with its nuclear weapons program, it just found one in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

That one of the very few countries to have voluntarily given up a nuclear arsenal is now under attack from the same country it gave its warheads to will not be lost on Pyongyang.

In fact, analysts say, Moscow's actions have gifted the reclusive Asian nation a "perfect storm" of conditions under which to ramp its program up.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (29)

[FONTE: CNN, 8/05/2022]

Divided over Ukraine, the international community will likely have little appetite for sanctions on the hermit kingdom; indeed, even unified condemnation of a recent North Korean ICBM test remains elusive. What's more, the boycott of Russian oil and gas could even open the door to cut-price energy deals between Pyongyang and Moscow -- ideological allies whose friendship harks back to the Korean war of the 1950s.

In the worst-case scenario, experts even wonder whether this is the start of a once unthinkable chain of events that could end with a return to inter-Korean conflict, perhaps even with the North invading the South -- though most see this as highly unlikely.

As professor Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University puts it, the lesson North Korea has learned from Russia's war in Ukraine, is simple:

"Never, ever surrender your nuclear weapons."



North Korea's intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 lifts off in 2017.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (30)

[FONTE: CNN, 8/05/2022]



Against this background the Russian invasion -- and the international sanctions that followed -- have created a "perfect storm" of conditions for Pyongyang to operate in, analysts say.

"There are some interesting, perhaps unintended consequences for the Western response against Russia in particular, which is that a Russia that has been completely isolated from the global economy and put under tremendous sanctions pressure. I think it has very few incentives to enforce sanctions against North Korea," said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


A clear split among United Nations Security Council permanent members -- Russia and China on one side, the UK, US and France on the other -- means any unified decision to punish North Korea is impossible.


"It's quite clear that China and Russia will block additional sanctions and frankly it's not quite clear, what else can you possibly sanction," Lankov said.

Even a seventh nuclear test may not provoke the usual negative response from Beijing, "China is not going to be happy enough about nuclear tests, but they will swallow it," Lankov said.

Quem ganha com a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia? (31)

[FONTE: cartoon de Heng / NYT, 17/01/2016]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (3)

[FONTE: Andrew Scobell / United States Institute of Peace, 4/03/2022]

China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.

While it's tempting to compare the two, Taiwan and Ukraine are different countries with dissimilar geopolitical circumstances.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine — the most consequential military conflict Europe has witnessed since the Second World War — has riveted the attention of the world. Observers have grappled with the meaning of the act of aggression and scrambled to ponder the wider implications of the war. Almost inevitably people look to draw analogies—both historical and contemporary ones.



Taiwanese helicopters fly the country's flag through the capital Taipei. October 5, 2021. (Lam Yik Fei/The New York Times)

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (4)

[FONTE: Andrew Scobell / United States Institute of Peace, 4/03/2022]

China Is Not Russia

Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a [range of countries](#), including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country's president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others.

Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. China's largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on [U.N. Peacekeeping](#) missions. Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — [in Djibouti](#) (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge.

Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China's borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (5)

[FONTE: Andrew Scobell / United States Institute of Peace, 4/03/2022]

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin's calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia's commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden [stated publicly](#) that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine.

By contrast, Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world's most capable military. The People's Liberation Army — as all branches of China's armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically "unofficial" due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the Biden administration [sent an unofficial delegation](#) of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing's assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (6)

[FONTE: Andrew Scobell / United States Institute of Peace, 4/03/2022]

A Cautionary Tale?

The above differences notwithstanding, Russia's combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia's military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China's political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan.

After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia's Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China's armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island).

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (7)

[FONTE: Oriana Skylar Mastro / FP, 18/04/2022. FOTO: USNI]

Beijing Is Used to Learning From Russian Failures



Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a double disaster for President Vladimir Putin, as he faces a poorly performing military combined with an inability to shield his country from economic punishment. Both of these possibilities historically have also been sources of apprehension for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But China's leadership turned its anxiety into action about 10 years ago, deliberately working to fix many of the problems and minimize the risks currently plaguing Russia in Ukraine.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (8)

[FONTE: Oriana Skylar Mastro / FP, 18/04/2022]

One result is that the Chinese military is more likely to perform well even though it has not fought a war since 1979, when it lost thousands of troops in a punitive but brief invasion of Vietnam. Adding to that, China's economy is both far larger and deliberately more diversified than Russia's. A sanctions effort like the one presently aimed at Russia would be much harder to sustain against China. These two observations do not mean deterrence won't hold, only that the unfolding events in Ukraine will likely do little to make Beijing more cautious.

Nearly everyone overestimated Russia's military capabilities—including probably Putin himself. During its invasion of Ukraine, Russia's [air-ground coordination](#) has been ineffective, and Russian forces have shown [risk-adverse tendencies](#) in the air. Russia has also struggled with [logistics](#) and keeping its military [supplied](#). Notably, it appears that Russia acted on [bad intelligence](#) and therefore did not believe initial strikes that maxed out its firepower were necessary. Furthermore, many Russian weapons platforms are outdated (for example, its Cold War-era tanks), and modern Su-57 fighter jets and T-14 Armata tanks only exist in [comparatively small numbers](#).


The Chinese military used to clearly exhibit the same deficiencies. But over the past decade, it has embraced significant reforms, creating a much more capable fighting force that should give even the United States pause.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (9)

[FONTE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 25/04/2022]

World military expenditure passes \$2 trillion for first time

25 April 2022



World military expenditure, by region, 1988-2021

(Stockholm, 25 April 2022) Total global military expenditure increased by 0.7 per cent in real terms in 2021, to reach \$2113 billion. The five largest spenders in 2021 were the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom and Russia, together accounting for 62 per cent of expenditure, according to new data on global military spending published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (10)

[FONTE: Oriana Skylar Mastro / FP, 18/04/2022]

First, while Russia allowed its conventional capabilities to atrophy, Chinese military spending has [exploded](#) over the past three decades, increasing by 740 percent (in comparison to Russia's 69 percent) from 1992 to 2017.

According to [data](#) from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spent almost four times on its military in 2020 than Russia


(\$244.9 billion to \$66.8 billion). In [1999](#), less than 2 percent of its fighter jets were fourth-generation, 4 percent of its attack submarines were modern, and none of its surface ships were. Twenty years later, not only did China have much more of everything, but the majority was the most advanced, modern versions available—with China exhibiting advantages over Russia, even in [combat aircraft](#), a traditional area of weakness for China.

Indeed, People's Liberation Army (PLA) commentators often refer to China's economic might as one of the reasons their military would outperform Russia's—Russia has been "[stingy](#)" with its military modernization and production of precision-guided munitions primarily because of a lack of resources. By contrast, China has [more than 2,200](#) conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, making the PLA Rocket Force the world's largest ground-based missile force. Estimates place the number of missiles positioned against Taiwan alone at [around 1,000](#).

Russia's poor performance does remind us that it takes more than just a lot of fancy systems to win a war (though having more advanced systems and more of them surely would have helped). The [human element](#) of Russia's failures is front and center. Putin probably did not have an open and honest communication channel with the military, which was fearful of providing unfavorable information to the erratic leader. Russian troops were largely considered incompetent, but Putin thought superior technology could overcome human deficiencies.


O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (11)

[FONTE: Global Fire Power, 2022]



O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (12)

[FONTE: Global Fire Power, 2022]



O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (13)

[FONTE: Oriana Skylar Mastro / FP, 18/04/2022]

Chinese President Xi Jinping identified similar training and competency issues in the PLA 10 years ago. But under his command, the PLA has been proactively implementing significant reforms to avoid similar pitfalls. And unlike Putin, who apparently believed technology could overcome deficiencies in personnel, Xi came to the opposite conclusion. When he came to power, he took one look at the military and recognized that with all its fancy equipment, the PLA probably could not fight and win wars and perform the missions it had been assigned. Of particular importance, according to China's national military strategy, was to fight local wars under informationalized conditions. This meant that the network between platforms and people—the ease of connectivity—was the main feature of modern warfare. China needed the best equipment; an advanced command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; and tons of precision-guided munitions. But perhaps most importantly, it needed troops that could leverage these systems to conduct seamless operations across services and top-down through the chain of command.

What followed was a series of slogans—the two incompatibles, two inabilities, two big gaps, the five incapables—all designed to point out the organizational and personnel issues of the military and focus leadership attention and resources on fixing the issue. A massive military reorganization followed with moves such as [reorganizing](#) effective combat units to be smaller so that they can mobilize more quickly and can remain self-sufficient for long periods of time. This means, [in contrast with the Russian military](#), the PLA will likely have less reliance on generals at the front lines. China also established theater commands to facilitate joint operations and prioritized realism in its military exercises to help it prepare for real combat. Part of all of this was Xi's demand that the military communicate its failures and weaknesses so that they could be addressed. Moreover, to improve command and control, China has moved toward engaging in multidomain joint operations all while standing up a new joint operations center that will ensure that, unlike with the Russian

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (14)

[FONTE: SCMP, 20/03/2022]

Ukraine showing Taiwan the way on fighting much bigger army

Invasion of Ukraine has sparked speculation that the PLA might be inspired to attack Taiwan. Ukrainians' dogged defence against far mightier Russian army seen to offer lessons on asymmetric warfare and the power of reservists.

Ukraine's fightback against the Russian invasion offers [Taiwan](#) lessons on building up effective asymmetric capabilities to defend against an attack from mainland China, Taiwanese officials and analysts said.

They also urged Taiwan to [learn from the way](#) Ukraine has mobilised its people to join the military in an all-out resistance effort.

When Russian troops invaded [Ukraine](#) on February 24, many thought it would be a matter of days before the much mightier army prevailed over Ukrainian forces. However, the war is well into its fourth week and Ukrainians are still fighting back hard.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (15)

[FONTE: SCMP, 28/04/2022]

Taiwan aims to use lessons from Russia-Ukraine conflict in annual Han Kuang war game

The island's military has been studying how Ukraine used asymmetric warfare and hopes to employ similar tactics in the event of an attack from mainland China. The annual exercise will also practise using reserve civilian forces to form an all-out defence against the PLA



[Taiwan](#) will test the combat capability and the readiness of its forces to fight off an attack from mainland China in its [annual Han Kuang war game](#), which starts next month.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (16)

[FONTE: Elliott Abrams / CFR, 3/05/2022]

The Ukraine War, China, and Taiwan

What lessons will Xi Jinping learn from the war in Ukraine?

What lessons is Xi Jinping learning from the war in Ukraine?

The optimistic answer is that the lessons he is learning make an invasion of Taiwan less likely. First, Xi may be wondering how well his untested military would perform if told to invade. Surely the abysmal performance of Russian troops must make Xi, and every other high official in China, wonder what happens if stiff resistance is met. Like the Russian army, but unlike the U.S. military and our allies who fought in Iraq or Afghanistan, the People's Liberation Army or PLA is simply untried. And Xi must fear that a military defeat could threaten his own hold on power.

Second, Xi must wonder about the impact on his economy (suffering already from Covid lockdowns that may cause low growth for all of this year) that harsh sanctions would cause. Of course the unity in the West around Ukraine—the United States, Canada, EU, NATO plus Australia, Japan, and many other states—might not be replicated. But it needn't be replicated exactly for there to be considerable damage to China.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (17)

[FONTE: Elliott Abrams / CFR, 3/05/2022]

Yet there are other lessons Xi might take from Putin's war and that make invasion no less or perhaps even more likely. First, he may learn that he must go all in for a "blitzkrieg" if he invades. That is presumably what Putin intended, and he presumably assumed (as many in the West did) that after just a few days he would have conquered Kyiv and could install a puppet government there. Resistance would collapse quickly and

Zelensky would be in exile or dead, that line of thinking went. So the lesson for Xi could be that he must completely overwhelm Taiwan and take Taipei very fast, using whatever vast number of troops, ships, and planes is required.

Second, along the same lines, he may have learned that it's crucial to avoid resupply of the other side. That has been critical to Ukraine, and it has been possible because of its land borders with NATO countries. Taiwan is an island and the Chinese navy, the PLAN, can be used to police the shipping lanes to Taiwan. This is another argument for China to put massive forces to work, so that they achieve capitulation before resupply can begin.

So Xi might conclude that if he moves fast with overwhelming force, the United States will back off rather than confront his forces directly or even in an effort to resupply the Taiwanese forces. And he might conclude that if that happens, the conflict will be over fast and countries around the world will avoid heavy sanctions on China because the cause is lost.

It would be a huge gamble for Xi, of course. An excellent deterrent would be the fall of Vladimir Putin, showing that an unsuccessful military effort will risk Xi's own political demise. And a Russian defeat, meaning a continuing conflict that saps Russia's military strength even more and damages its economy deeply, will be another deterrent.

O conflito de Taiwan: lições da guerra da Ucrânia (18)

[FONTE: Cartoon Mark Knight, 24/02/2022]



Bibliografia

