


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (1) [FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]



History | IAEA

The U.S. Ratification of the Statute by President Eisenhower, 29 July 1957, marks the official birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the press conference following the signing ceremony in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C., President Eisenhower evoked his address to the UN General Assembly in December 1953, at which he had proposed to establish the IAEA.

"In fact, we did no more than crystallize a hope that was developing in many minds in many places ... the splitting of the atom may lead to the unifying of the entire divided world."

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (2)

[FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atómica]

The IAEA is strongly linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas President Eisenhower expressed in his speech in 1953 helped shape the IAEA's [Statute](#), which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956.

The Agency was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate to work with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA's dual mission – to promote and control the Atom – are defined in Article II of the IAEA Statute.

"The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (3) [FONTE: Eisenhower Presidential Library]



Atoms for Peace

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was determined to solve “the fearful atomic dilemma” by finding some way by which “the miraculous inventiveness of man” would not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. In his Atoms for Peace speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower sought to solve this terrible problem by suggesting a means to transform the atom from a scourge into a benefit for mankind. Although not as well known as his warning about the “military industrial complex,” voiced later in his farewell radio and television address to the American people, President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech embodied his most important nuclear initiative as President. From it sprang a panoply of peaceful atomic programs. With it President Eisenhower placed the debate over the control of nuclear science and technology, which had largely been the province of government officials and contractors, squarely before the public. Indeed, the present public controversy over nuclear technology and its role in American society can be traced back to President Eisenhower’s determination that control of nuclear science was an issue for all Americans.

The Atoms for Peace speech reflected the President’s deep concern about “Atoms for War.” The escalating nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, which included the development of thermonuclear bombs, brought President Eisenhower to the United Nations. Since Hiroshima the destructive power of nuclear weapons had increased dramatically. Nuclear weapons technology, thus far a product of American expertise, would also eventually enter the arsenals of the Soviet Union through the normal processes of technological development. President Eisenhower felt a moral imperative to warn the American people and the world of this new reality.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (4) [FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]



In October 1957, the delegates to the First General Conference decided to establish the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Until the opening of the Vienna International Centre in August 1979, the old Grand Hotel next to the Vienna Opera House served as the Agency's temporary headquarters.

The IAEA has also two regional offices located in Toronto, Canada (since 1979) and Tokyo, Japan (since 1984), as well as two liaison offices in New York City, United States of America (since 1957) and Geneva, Switzerland (since 1965). The Agency runs laboratories specialized in nuclear technology in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria, opened in 1961, and, since 1961, in Monaco.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (5) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart (third from right) signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, London, 1968.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (6) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also called **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, agreement of July 1, 1968, signed by the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 59 other states, under which the three major signatories, which possessed nuclear weapons, agreed not to assist other states in obtaining or producing them. The treaty became effective in March 1970 and was to remain so for a 25-year period. Additional countries later ratified the treaty; as of 2007 only three countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have refused to sign the treaty, and one country (North Korea) has signed and then withdrawn from the treaty. The treaty was extended indefinitely and without conditions in 1995 by a consensus vote of 174 countries at the United Nations headquarters in New York City.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (7) [FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]

The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty



The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and [entered into force on 5 March 1970](#). On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. With 191 States parties, it is the most widely adhered to treaty in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon States parties have committed themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices while nuclear-weapon States parties have committed not to in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State party to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear-weapon States parties under the Treaty are defined as those that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. There are five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (8) [FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]

While the IAEA is not a party to the NPT, it is entrusted with key verification responsibilities under the Treaty. Each non-nuclear-weapon State party is required under Article III of the NPT to conclude a [comprehensive safeguards agreement](#) (CSA) with the IAEA to enable the IAEA to verify the fulfilment of their obligation under the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The IAEA therefore has a specific verification role as the international safeguards inspectorate, namely to verify the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States parties. By September 2021, 178 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have brought into force CSAs required by the Treaty and 8 of them have yet to do so.

The IAEA also has an important role to play in achieving the objectives under Article IV to foster international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Through its activities relevant to energy security, human health, food security and safety, water resource management and industrial applications, the IAEA supports its Member States in attaining their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (9)

[FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]




The vast majority of safeguards agreements are comprehensive safeguards agreements that have been concluded by the IAEA with [non-nuclear-weapon States parties](#) to the [NPT](#) and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The IAEA has to date concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with 178 States. Some 100 of these States have also concluded small quantities protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in the territory, jurisdiction or control of the State for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have concluded voluntary offer safeguards agreements under which the IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear material in facilities that the State has voluntarily offered and the IAEA has selected for the application of safeguards. The IAEA applies safeguards under a voluntary offer agreement to verify that nuclear material remains in peaceful activities and is not withdrawn from safeguards except as provided for in the agreement.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (10) [FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]



Safeguards are implemented in three States that are not party to the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – on the basis of item-specific agreements they have concluded with the IAEA. Under these agreements, the IAEA applies safeguards to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

Article III of the IAEA Statute provides the Agency with the authority, among others, to establish and administer safeguards. When the [Board of Governors](#) approves a safeguards agreement, it authorizes the [Director General](#) to conclude and subsequently implement the agreement. [Read more →](#)

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (11)

[FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]

Board Members for 2021-2022

The Board of Governors is one of the two policy-making bodies of the IAEA, along with the annual General Conference of IAEA Member States.

The Board examines and makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA's financial statements, programme and budget. It considers applications for membership, approves safeguards agreements and the publication of the IAEA's safety standards. It also appoints the Director General of the IAEA, with the approval of the General Conference.

The Board generally meets five times per year: in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in November.

The 35 Board Members for 2021-2022 are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Viet Nam.



O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (12)

[FONTE: Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica]

Rafael Mariano Grossi

Director General

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi assumed office on 3 December 2019.

Mr Grossi is a diplomat with over 35 years of experience in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2013, he was appointed Ambassador of Argentina to Austria and Argentine Representative to the IAEA and other Vienna-based International Organizations.



In 2019, Mr Grossi acted as President Designate of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and from 2014 to 2016 he served as president of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where he was the first president to serve two successive terms. In 2015, he presided over the Diplomatic Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, securing unanimous approval for the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety – a milestone in international efforts in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

From 2010 to 2013, he served as Assistant Director General for Policy and Chief of Cabinet at the IAEA. Previously, he held several senior positions in the Argentine Foreign Service, including as Political Affairs Director General from 2007 to 2009.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (13) [FONTE: Reuters, 10/06/2022]



IAEA warns of 'fatal blow' to nuclear deal as Iran removes cameras

[Francois Murphy](#) June 10, 2022 2:46 AM GMT+1 Last Updated 12 hours ago

VIENNA, June 9 (Reuters) - Iran on Thursday dealt a near-fatal blow to chances of reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal as it began removing essentially all the International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring equipment installed under the deal, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said.

Iran had warned of retaliation if the IAEA's 35-nation Board of Governors passed a resolution drafted by the United States, France, Britain and Germany criticising Tehran for its continued failure to explain uranium traces found at undeclared sites. The resolution was passed by a crushing majority late on Wednesday. [read more](#)

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (14) [FONTE: Reuters, 10/06/2022]



Indirect talks between Iran and the United States on reviving the 2015 deal have been stalled since March.

"You think we would retreat from our positions if you pass a resolution at the (IAEA) Board of Governors? In the name of God and the great nation of Iran, we will not back off a single step from our positions," Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in a speech.

Since then-President Donald Trump pulled Washington out of the deal and re-imposed sanctions against Tehran in 2018, Iran has breached many of the deal's limits on its nuclear activities. It is enriching uranium to close to weapons-grade.

Western powers warn it is getting closer to being able to sprint towards making a nuclear bomb. Iran denies wanting to. [read more](#)

France, Britain and Germany, the so-called E3, condemned Iran's actions on Thursday and urged it fully resume its cooperation with the watchdog and end its nuclear escalation.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (15) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Guardian, 8/06/2022]

West to rebuke Iran over lack of cooperation with nuclear watchdog

Move at IAEA board meeting may deepen impasse over talks to bring US back into 2015 nuclear deal

[Patrick Wintour](#)



Equipment at the Natanz nuclear research centre in Iran. Photograph: Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran/AFP/Getty Images

Europe and the US will rebuke [Iran](#) this week for failing to cooperate with the UN nuclear inspectorate, a move that has angered Iran's leadership and may deepen the impasse over talks to bring the US back into the 2015 nuclear agreement, and the lifting of sanctions on Tehran.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (16) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Guardian, 8/06/2022]

In a joint statement to the board, the three European signatories to the nuclear deal – the UK, France and Germany – also condemn Iran's broader attitude to non-proliferation, saying: "Iran's nuclear programme is now more advanced than at any point in the past," and adding that Iran's accumulation of enriched uranium has no "credible civilian justification".

The three countries say: "Iran's nuclear advances are not only dangerous and illegal, they risk unravelling the deal that we have so carefully crafted together to restore the nuclear deal. The more Iran is advancing and accumulating knowledge with irreversible consequences, the more difficult it is to come back to the deal."

They add: "Neither the IAEA nor the international community know how many centrifuges Iran has in its inventory, how many were built where they are located precisely at the point it is expanding its programme and component manufacturing and centrifuge assembling capabilities."

On Wednesday, Iran disconnected some of the UN watchdog's cameras monitoring its nuclear sites, its atomic energy agency said.

The motion to the board, separate from the joint statement, is seen by the west as the minimum necessary to maintain the credibility of the nuclear inspectorate after its director general, Rafael Grossi, reported that his inspectorate had not been receiving the required cooperation from Iran.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (17) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Guardian, 8/06/2022]

The new motion does not set a deadline for Iranian cooperation, and is relatively mildly worded, partly to ensure it secures the required two-thirds majority of the 35-member board.

But Russian diplomats have joined Iran in criticising the motion, and said they will not be associated with it. China is likely to express opposition as well. Iran has not been specific about how it will respond.

With the separate talks in Vienna about the US rejoining the 2015 nuclear agreement on life support, a motion at the IAEA board criticising Iran's bona fides may make an agreement even more elusive. Negotiations on a new nuclear agreement began in April 2021 and the last round finished in March.

Throughout the talks in Vienna the US delegation has been negotiating indirectly with Iran, but the talks have stalled over the US refusal to lift its designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organisation. In Washington, opposition to the Biden administration rejoining the agreement has been growing. Iran is also dubious about guarantees that US sanctions will be lifted.

Iran claims Grossi, an experienced diplomat, is dancing to Israel's tune by criticising the level of Iranian disclosures at the three sites, saying the information on which he is acting has been provided by Israel. Grossi visited Israel and not Iran before the board of governors meeting, as he did on the eve of the last two meetings, which some viewed as a sign that the agency was preparing to escalate its position towards Iran.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (18) [FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 13/05/2022]

How US blacklisting of IRGC is stalling Iran nuclear deal revival

Iran wants its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps removed from US 'terror' list, a demand Biden is reluctant to grant.



Washington, DC – After [weeks of optimism](#) around the prospect of restoring the Iran nuclear deal earlier this year, the fate of the agreement appears to be in limbo again with no further talks on the calendar and Washington's attention focused on Ukraine.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (19) [FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 13/05/2022]

Then, why is Iran insisting on de-listing the IRGC?

Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, another think-tank in the US capital, detailed several elements that make the "terrorist" label a critical issue for the IRGC itself:

- **Prestige:** "They don't want to be called terrorists. Internationally, it's not a good thing to have hanging around their necks."
- **Iranian politics:** "It could also undermine them within the Iranian cutthroat politics. You could see a situation where other factions within the regime will go after IRGC – 'You are the ones that result in us being isolated'."
- **Fear of assassinations:** "They believe that it gives the United States a green light or blank cheque to assassinate anybody in the IRGC senior command; if they're on the terrorism list, then there might be more assassinations in the way the US carried out against [Quds Force commander] [Qassem Soleimani](#) back in 2020."
- **Economic interests:** "There are literally hundreds of companies in Iran that have ties to the IRGC. So getting off the terrorism list will help just a little bit in terms of their business operations and ability to make money."

For her part, Slavin said de-listing the IRGC is also crucial for Iran's hardline [President Ebrahim Raisi](#), who she says has not been able to secure any major achievements since coming into office last year.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (20)

[FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Foreign Policy, 5/04/2022]

The Little Iran Nuclear Deal That Couldn't

A revived nuclear pact could benefit Washington and Tehran but is proving a hard sell.

[Colum Lynch](#) April 5, 2022, 3:03 PM



An Iranian flag flies next to a ground-to-ground Sejil missile at an undisclosed location in Iran.

An Iranian flag flies next to a ground-to-ground Sejil missile at an undisclosed location in Iran on Nov. 12, 2008. AFP via Getty Images

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (21) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Foreign Policy, 5/04/2022]

The ongoing Iran nuclear talks are aimed at resurrecting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark 2015 pact that offered Iran relief from nuclear-related sanctions in exchange for a verifiable commitment to accept constraints on its nuclear program, ensuring it could not pursue a nuclear weapon in the near term. Former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal in May 2018 and imposed additional sanctions on Tehran. A year later, Iran—which had until then complied with the pact—began ramping up its own nuclear activities, violating the terms of the original agreement and reducing the so-called breakout time required to produce enough fissile material to make a single bomb from a year to a matter of weeks.

The Biden administration committed to rejoining the JCPOA on the condition that Iran return to compliance with the pact and reopened indirect negotiations with Iran in April 2021. Those talks—which have included representatives from successive Iranian administrations—were nearing completion last month. But they have since stalled, most recently over a Russian demand that it be granted a broad exemption from sanctions imposed on Moscow in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Russia is important to the Iran deal because, for now, it is the one country willing and able to offload Iran's uranium.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (22) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Foreign Policy, 5/04/2022]

A new deal

The announcement of a nuclear deal would provide some clear benefits to U.S. policymakers. It would require Iran to stop operating its most advanced centrifuges, which progressively enrich uranium from the levels needed for energy generation to the levels needed for warheads. Iran would also have to store those centrifuges in a warehouse under international monitoring and either degrade its stockpile of highly enriched uranium—the stuff that is approaching weapons-grade purity—or ship it abroad. But a deal is a hard political sell. The new pact is certain to be weaker than the original, with a significantly shorter breakout time. It would leave Iran in possession of a new generation of advanced centrifuges that it began operating only after the Trump administration pulled out of the deal.

Critics in Washington and in the Middle East have already been marshaling opposition to another nuclear deal, saying it merely postpones, rather than halts, Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. Under the terms of the original 2015 deal, Iran can legally resume some of its enrichment activities in

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (23) [FONTE: Patrick Wintour / Foreign Policy, 5/04/2022]

2026 and 2031. Iran secured the right to expand the size of its uranium stockpile, currently capped at about 660 pounds, in January 2031 and to then enrich uranium at higher levels than currently allowed under the 2015 nuclear pact. Those provisions would shorten the estimated breakout time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. It remains unclear whether a new deal would extend those provisions. But Iran has, in the wake of the U.S. abrogation of the pact, already enriched more uranium, and to greater purities, than it could have done under the deal it previously adhered to.

But Iran would still be subject to expanded international monitoring of its nuclear program for up to an additional 10 years. The original pact also required Iran to sign an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—known as the Additional Protocol—that involves more intrusive scrutiny of its nuclear program than required by signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (24) [FONTE: Michael Hirsh / Foreign Policy, 9/04/2022]

America's Iran Follies

How two decades of misjudgments by Washington helped lead Tehran to the nuclear brink.

[Michael Hirsh](#) June 9, 2022, 2:23 PM



American and Iranian flags, with a man removing the Iranian one

A staff member removes the Iranian flag from the stage during the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna on July 14, 2015. CARLOS BARRIA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

After more than two decades of failed policies—fluctuating wildly between confrontation and cooperation—Washington and the West still find themselves facing down a hostile Iran. And today, though it is in dire shape economically, Tehran may be close to delivering the final rebuff, with experts saying it is just weeks away from achieving nuclear bomb capability.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (25) [FONTE: Michael Hirsh / Foreign Policy, 9/04/2022]

"The tragic irony is that both sides have a deal—all the brackets in the text [raising additional issues] have been closed," said Ali Vaez, a former deputy to Malley at the International Crisis Group, where he serves as Iran Project director. He said that of more than 1,500 sanctions—either those that "snapped back" under Trump's renunciation of the deal or that were newly imposed by the former president—the Biden administration has said it will lift about 1,100 of them. Meanwhile the Iranians, while resuming uranium enrichment, haven't accelerated it by much, the IAEA says.

But hard-line politics on both sides may continue to stymie a deal. In particular the Biden administration is reluctant to remove Iran's IRGC from the terrorist list. "This was the trap the Trump administration laid for their successor, and unfortunately the Biden administration has fallen into it," Vaez said. "Because they are not willing to pay the political price."

Hopes for regime change in Tehran, meanwhile, continue to dominate much of the discussion in Washington. Yet they may prove just as unrealistic as in the past. Today's protests are still small compared to the height of the Green Movement, when reformers aligned with former President Mohammad Khatami thronged the streets in 2009. And dissenters to the regime still lack an institutional presence such as vibrant labor unions.

"The Green Movement and reformists always seem to have their backs against the wall, and they don't appear to have real leverage the way they did briefly under Khatami," Tirman said. "I don't see anything changing near-term. The regime has always been able to crack down on that stuff."

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (26) [FONTE: Michael Hirsh / Foreign Policy, 9/04/2022]

"The lackluster approach toward the JCPOA, in turn, empowered the hardline conservatives in Tehran to adopt a narrative on the deal that was all about American bad faith and European complicity in only pressuring Iran on concessions," said Banai, an international relations scholar at Indiana University. "After the election [in mid-2021] of the new conservative president, Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian narrative went into overdrive.

Most Iran observers agree that even in the best of all possible worlds—if then-U.S. President Donald Trump hadn't reneged on the 2015 nuclear deal and imposed his so-called maximum pressure campaign starting in 2018—U.S.-Iran relations would still be deeply strained.

"Look at Obama's statement after the signing of the JCPOA. He was very clear that we don't have any illusions about a better relationship or about Iran being a good actor in the region. And this was the most amenable president we've had toward Iran in 45 years," said John Tirman, executive director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies and another co-author of *Republics of Myth*, which is based on years of high-level conferences on Iran-U.S. relations. (In his July 14, 2015, remarks announcing the pact, Obama called Iran a "sworn adversary.")

Indeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran was virtually founded on anti-U.S. sentiment—the preamble to its constitution [states](#) that the "motive force" behind the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was the "American plot" to back then-Shah Reza Pahlavi's "despotic regime" and consolidate "Iran's political, cultural and economic links with World Imperialism."

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (27) [FONTE: GRID, 1/06/2022]

Will more countries want nuclear weapons after the war in Ukraine?

From the Middle East to East Asia, nuclear crises loom.



On a certain level, many of today's most pressing U.S. national security problems are really just variations of one problem: how to manage the risk of armed conflict in a world with nuclear weapons.

The question haunts American foreign policy on multiple fronts. In Ukraine, the key question the U.S. and its allies are facing is how much military support they can provide without risking an all-out NATO-Russia war that could end civilization as we know it. President Joe Biden's trip to Asia last week was interrupted by [multiple missile tests](#) from nuclear-armed North Korea and overshadowed by his [vow to defend Taiwan](#) with military force if it were attacked by China, a scenario many analysts have [projected could easily go nuclear](#). Then there are the ongoing talks over the Iran nuclear agreement: Then-President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the deal in 2018, and Biden has pledged to return to it, but negotiations have stalled. That has in turn raised the risks of armed conflict or a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (28) [FONTE: GRID, 1/06/2022]

Almost eight decades after Hiroshima, only nine countries possess their own nuclear weapons, far fewer than many predicted at the [dawn of the nuclear age](#). (South Africa [gave up its arsenal in 1989](#).) The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since 1945 and that so few countries have acquired them is a testament both to how frightening these weapons are, and the robust norms and penalties in place to prevent their spread.

It's still very difficult to build a nuclear bomb. While the technology itself is older than color television, acquiring the necessary fissile materials is an expensive and tricky process that, if publicly disclosed, exposes a country to international sanctions, isolation or military strike. While it is true that these factors didn't prevent North Korea from acquiring a nuclear weapon, most countries don't want to wind up as isolated and poor as North Korea. There's a reason most of the roughly 30 countries that have pursued a nuclear weapon never got there.

But recent events have raised troubling signs that the norms against nuclear weapons proliferation are breaking down and that more countries may see it in their interest to acquire them. Governments looking at Ukraine and Russia may well conclude that a nuclear arsenal can help a powerful state impose its will on its neighbor. And they may look at North Korea and see how even the most erratic and isolated rogue regime can acquire a degree of international clout by building a nuclear arsenal.

And as these norms break down, the bigger concern is that the norms against the use of nuclear weapons could follow.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (29) [FONTE: GRID, 1/06/2022]

Iran and the Middle East

The negotiations over a revival of the Iran nuclear deal have been on life support for so long, it sometimes seems like they will never actually die. But at the moment, it's hard to see a path forward toward an agreement. The current sticking point is Iran's demand that the Biden administration remove the country's Revolutionary Guard Corps from the U.S. terrorist blacklist, where Trump placed it in 2019.


Biden has reportedly [made a final decision](#) not to delist the group, which is accused of repressing dissent within Iran and fomenting violence throughout the Middle East. While the two sides appeared to be on the verge of an agreement as recently as March, talks are now deadlocked, and the other parties to the landmark nuclear pact are getting nervous. "Every day which passes without achieving agreement, the risk to lose everything increases considerably," one European diplomat [told the journalist Laura Rozen](#). Even the chief U.S. negotiator, Rob Malley, [conceded in congressional testimony](#) last week that "the odds of a successful negotiation are lower than the odds of failure."

The stakes are high. Since the U.S. quit the pact, Iran has been ramping up the enrichment activities that the agreement prohibited. A report from the International Atomic Energy Agency this week [reportedly concludes](#) that Iran now likely has enough enriched uranium to allow it to build a weapon and could convert that uranium to weapons-grade material in just a few weeks. Does this mean that failure at the negotiating table will lead inevitably to a nuclear-armed Iran? Not necessarily. Some experts believe Iran, which still denies it has any intention of building a bomb, is also pursuing a hedging strategy, stopping just short of doing so. In this scenario, Iran would avoid the additional sanctions and isolation that would result from actually going nuclear, while preserving the option to do so quickly were conditions to change.

O regresso da ameaça nuclear: o caso do Irão (30)

[FONTE: Cartoon, Roar Hagen / Verdens Gang, 2021]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (1)

[FONTE: MDN, 2/03/2022]



Bússola Estratégica aprovada: "um marco para a União Europeia"

O Conselho de Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Defesa da União Europeia aprovou esta segunda-feira a [Bússola Estratégica](#), um documento de orientações políticas e estratégicas para a política de segurança e de defesa da União Europeia.

O Ministro da Defesa Nacional, João Gomes Cravinho, afirmou que "a aprovação da Bússola Estratégica é um marco para a União Europeia e foi recebida com uma salva de palmas para assinalar o significado histórico do momento".

João Gomes Cravinho lembrou que a presidência portuguesa do Conselho da União Europeia teve um papel muito importante na elaboração do documento e o que foi defendido durante o [primeiro semestre de 2021](#): "insistimos que não haveria que escolher entre realismo e ambição. Nós dissemos sempre que para ser realista [a Bússola Estratégica] devia ser ambiciosa, na medida em que o mundo exige isso da União Europeia", afirmou.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (2)

[FONTE: MDN, 2/03/2022]

O Ministro de Estado e dos Negócios Estrangeiros afirmou que este "é um documento muito importante de orientação estratégica da política de segurança e defesa da União Europeia. O seu conteúdo representa a avaliação da situação de segurança e do ambiente estratégico que rodeia a União, define a visão estratégica comum, estabelece os novos meios que poremos ao nosso dispor para defender a nossa segurança e define objetivos e metas a prosseguir até 2030 para reforçar a capacidade de defesa da União Europeia".

O Ministro da Defesa acrescentou que «da parte portuguesa, ficámos satisfeitos porque os nossos contributos foram incorporados no documento, reforçando significativamente a importância do estabelecimento de parcerias com países e entidades africanas e reforçando a centralidade de África para a segurança da Europa» e reforçando «a referência à relevância da segurança marítima para a Europa».

Portugal também fica satisfeito por ver que os seus contributos foram incorporados no documento face à primeira versão, nomeadamente "reforçando significativamente a linguagem sobre África, a importância do estabelecimento de parcerias com países e entidades no continente africano e reforçando também aquilo que é a centralidade de África para a segurança e defesa da Europa".

"A finalização deste processo inaugura uma nova etapa para a Europa da Segurança e Defesa", concluiu João Gomes Cravinho.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (3)

[FONTE: EUEA - The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2022]

A Strategic Compass for the EU

The European Union has formally **approved the Strategic Compass**, at a time when we witness the return of war in Europe.



The Compass gives the European Union an **ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy** by 2030.

The more hostile security environment requires us to **make a quantum leap forward** and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our defence capabilities.

The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity and determination. The objective of the Strategic Compass is to make the **EU a stronger and more capable security provider**. The EU needs to be able to protect its citizens and to contribute to international peace and security. This is all the more important at a time when war has returned to Europe, following the unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as of major geopolitical shifts. This Strategic Compass will enhance the EU's strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (4)

[FONTE: EUEA - The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2022]



A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will

contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. It will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core.

The Strategic Compass provides a shared assessment of the **strategic environment** in which the EU is operating and of the **threats and challenges** the Union faces. The document makes concrete and actionable proposals, with a very precise timetable for implementation, in order to **improve the EU's ability to act decisively** in crises and to defend its security and its citizens.

The Compass covers all the aspects of the security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: **act, invest, partner** and **secure**.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (5)

[FONTE: EUEA - The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2022]

Act

In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary, the EU will:

- establish a strong **EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops** for different types of crises
- be ready to deploy **200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts** within 30 days, including in complex environments
- conduct regular **live exercises on land and at sea**
- enhance **military mobility**
- reinforce the EU's **civilian and military CSDP** (Common Defence and Security Policy) **missions and operations** by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process , acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity



A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (6)

[FONTE: EUEA - The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2022]

Secure

In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will:

- boost its **intelligence** analysis capacities
- develop **Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams** bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats
- further develop the **Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox** and **set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy** to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks
- develop a **Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference** Toolbox
- develop an **EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence**
- strengthen the EU's role as a **maritime security actor**



A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (7)

[FONTE: EUEA - The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2022]

Partner

In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will:

- strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as **NATO**, the **UN** and **regional partners**, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN
- develop more tailored **bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries** and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others
- develop **tailored partnerships** in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting **participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building**.



A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (8)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / UK in a Changing Europe, 3/03/2022]

The EU's geopolitical awakening? - UK in a changing Europe

Commentary

The EU's geopolitical awakening?

The EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine took many observers by surprise. For once, the Union exceeded expectations, and by a large margin. Divisions between member states melted away quickly in the face of Russian aggression, and the Union adopted a set of sweeping sanctions on Moscow. The EU's High Representative for foreign and security policy, Josep Borrell, hailed the EU's response to the conflict as a 'geopolitical awakening.'

The EU has banned transactions with Russia's central bank, cut off several Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system, banned Russian flights from EU airspace, taken the Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik offline, and sanctioned Vladimir Putin himself.

Member states also agreed to provide Ukraine with €450 million to acquire weapons – a move labelled by Commission president Ursula von der Leyen as a 'watershed moment'. The Union is also preparing to welcome large numbers of Ukrainian refugees and seriously looking into how to overcome its reliance on Russian energy.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (9)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / UK in a Changing Europe, 3/03/2022]

The most consequential integration step in EU foreign policy would be removing the need for unanimity between member states – but changing that rule requires unanimous agreement, which seems far from certain to materialise.

So long as each state has a veto, the crucial factor in shaping the EU's strength as a geopolitical actor will remain its ability to reach consensus on a case-by-case basis. And we should not underestimate just how favourable the circumstances of Russia's aggression were to generating EU unity – and how unique.

First, there was no ambiguity about who was responsible for starting the conflict. Putin's completely unprovoked invasion of Ukraine united member states in a manner that would have been much harder to achieve had Putin launched more limited or covert military operations.

The EU already had a very poor relationship with Russia, which was under a significant regime of sanctions after its 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Ukraine, which has been drawing closer to the EU since 2014, could hardly have appeared more restrained and worthy of European support.

Second, Russia's attack on Ukraine posed a real danger to the EU's security, as it directly threatened EU member states which border Russia and Ukraine. This put extensive pressure onto the other member states to respond resolutely.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (10)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / UK in a Changing Europe, 3/03/2022]

The EU's reaction to the invasion was not only about defending Ukraine or principles of international law, but also about reducing the concrete risk of future Russian aggression towards the EU itself.

Third, the EU was, to a considerable extent, following Washington's lead in responding to Russia's actions. The US provided the broader diplomatic and military policy framework within which the EU could develop a strong response. Washington also helped generate EU unity, pushing sceptical EU states to respond robustly to Russia's aggression. Vetoing sanctions was unthinkable.

In coming years, the EU may be faced with conflicts very different in form from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. They may be civil wars, without such a clear aggressor and worthy partner to support; they might not directly threaten and mobilise such a broad group of member states; and the US might decline to become involved, instead of providing a comfortable blanket of leadership for the EU. Divisions between member states may be much harder to overcome.

None of this is to downplay the significance of the EU's response to [Putin](#)'s attack on Ukraine. Just two weeks ago it was difficult to imagine the EU responding in such a robust manner, and it may well be that the conflict will spark further integration in security and defence. But it is simply too early to be sure about that.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (11)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / CER, 25/03/2022]



Does the Strategic Compass herald a stronger EU in security and defence?

by Luigi Scazzieri, 25 March 2022

The EU Strategic Compass sets out a realistic vision for EU security policy. It is now up to member-states to live up to their promises.

Vladimir Putin's attack on Ukraine marks the start of a more dangerous era in European security. The more threatening international environment created by Russia's invasion gives the newly-released [EU Strategic Compass](#) extra significance, as it sets out the EU's ambitions in security and defence over the next decade.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (12)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / CER, 25/03/2022]

The starting point of the Compass is a threat analysis. The Union faces a range of “multifaceted and often interconnected” threats and challenges. The Compass rightly paints a gloomy picture: the EU is “surrounded by instability and conflicts”. To its east, it faces a revanchist Russia which threatens the EU’s neighbours and the Union itself. Russia also poses a threat in the south, through its interventions in Syria and Libya and its influence in the Sahel. The challenge from China is briefly sketched out, with Beijing seen as a partner in some areas, an economic competitor and a systemic rival – a characterisation that may be overtaken by events if China aligns more closely with Russia. The focus of the Compass is the EU’s neighbourhood: it carries out a *tour d’horizon*, from tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and instability in the MENA region to the “dangerous mix” of terrorism, weak states and poverty in the Sahel and Central Africa. More broadly, the Compass argues that geopolitical competition has affected fields like trade and data flows, and that the EU faces a multitude of broader threats like terrorism, climate change and pandemics.

The Compass is not a detailed strategy for how the EU should deal with each of these threats and challenges. It is not a grand strategy like the 2016 [Global Strategy](#) or even a regional strategy. Instead, the Compass acknowledges that the EU is currently “collectively underequipped to counter the whole range of threats and challenges it faces” and focuses on the tools the Union needs to deal with these. In practical terms, the Compass sets out steps that the EU will take in four areas: 1) military capability development; 2) strengthening EU military and civilian operations; 3) fostering resilience; and 4) strengthening partnerships.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (13)

[FONTE: Luigi Scazzieri / CER, 25/03/2022]

The Compass and European security

The Strategic Compass is unlikely to end transatlantic and European debates about the EU's role in European security. The EU has a role in defending member-states under the framework of its 'mutual assistance clause', and the Compass says that member-states will continue to carry out advance scenario planning and exercises such as cyber-exercises. But the Compass does not in any way pitch the EU as an alternative to NATO, repeatedly emphasising the complementarity between the two. Nevertheless, the EU's ambitions to be a military player endure and could create friction between EU member-states and the US, and within Europe, if they lead to competition for resources and personnel with NATO. There may also be disagreements if the EU expands its investments in defence capabilities, as funds would almost certainly be tied to strengthening the EU defence industry and therefore buying European rather than US equipment. None of these issues will be major sources of friction under the Biden administration, which supports a larger EU role in defence, but they could become more controversial if a Trump-like president comes to power in 2024 and demands that Europeans 'buy American', or accuses them of wasting money on duplicating NATO activities.

Nevertheless, even if the Compass does not put an end to divisions about Europe's security role, several factors should dampen tensions in the near term. First, even though formal EU-NATO co-operation will be limited by the Turkish and Cypriot vetoes, an implicit division of labour is likely to develop. A reinvigorated NATO will deal with deterrence and defence, while the EU will leverage its financial muscle for capability development, take the lead in strengthening Europe against non-military threats, and project stability across its neighbourhood through financial and military assistance. Second, even though some duplication between the EU and NATO will probably occur, its political impact will probably be diminished as growing defence budgets should ease resource constraints.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (14)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021]



A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (15)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, p. v]

Table 0.1. Factors directly influencing European strategic autonomy in defence

- | | |
|--|--|
| • Level of conflict in the world | • Aggregate military strength of European forces |
| • Threat perception across European nations | • Degree of complementarity with NATO |
| • Extent to which Europeans perceive the U.S. as a reliable ally | • Level of interoperability |
| • Credibility of NATO | • Involvement of the UK in initiatives relating to European strategic autonomy post-Brexit |
| • Level of ambition of European strategic autonomy | • Level of third party access to the European defence market |
| • Development of a common strategic culture in Europe | • National defence spending of European nations |
| • European leadership | • EU common funding |

Source: RAND analysis using hierarchical cluster analysis scenario methodology.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (16)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, p. v]

Table 0.2. Overview of scenarios


	SCENARIO 1	SCENARIO 2	SCENARIO 3
	'A true European pillar of NATO'	'European defence integration falters; transatlantic fragmentation'	'A strong Europe goes its own way'
Level of conflict in the world	Increases	Decreases	Increases
European decision making	Led by France, Germany, UK Cohesive	Fragmented No UK involvement post Brexit	European Security Council set up with permanent and rotating seats
NATO-EU complementarity	Increases	Decreases	Decreases
Perception of the U.S.	U.S. perceived as a reliable ally	Mixed	Perception that U.S. cannot be relied upon
National defence spending of European nations	≥2% GDP	Decreases	Increases but most countries do not meet 2% GDP target
Integration and interoperability of European capabilities	Increases	Decreases	Increases
Third party access to EU defence market	Increases	No change	Decreases

Source: RAND analysis of scenario software outputs.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (17)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, p. 3]

Figure 1.1. Steps and initiatives towards European strategic autonomy




Source: Adapted from European Defence Agency (EDA) (2018a).

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (18)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, p. 3]

Figure 2.1. The plurality of European defence frameworks and their participating nations



* While it is a member of the EU, Denmark has an opt-out from participation in the EU CSDP

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (19)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, pp. 24 e 26]

Figure 3.1. Scenario 1: A true European pillar of NATO

A true European pillar of NATO



Figure 3.3. Scenario 3: A strong Europe goes its own way

A strong Europe goes its own way



A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (20)

[FONTE: RAND Europe, 2021, p. 46]

Box 6. Summary of Chapter 5

Broad policy options that have the potential to contribute to a positive realisation of European strategic autonomy in defence include:

1. Fostering a constructive dialogue on defence matters at all levels among the EU, EU member states, the U.S. as well as with the UK, including discussions bilaterally, via regional defence groupings or via working level discussions at EU-US level (e.g. between defence R&D sponsor organisations, via PESCO or other technical/institutional means of collaboration) to enhance mutual understanding of the meaning and ambition behind European strategic autonomy in defence – and beyond.
2. Encouraging a proactive and unambiguously supportive US stance towards European strategic autonomy in defence, providing concrete backing to EU defence integration and dampening divergent preferences of individual EU member states to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of relevant initiatives.
3. Fostering deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO as already envisaged in the Joint Declaration, using the Strategic Compass as a practical avenue in the short term.
4. Restoring a constructive relationship with the UK on defence issues after Brexit, recognising its significant contribution to European security and defence and advantages through its valuable capabilities and global relationships such as through the Five Eyes partnership or United Nations Security Council.

A bússola estratégica: um novo rumo para a política de segurança e defesa europeia? (21)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Rodrigo no Expresso, 2/07/2019]



Sugestões de leitura

NUCLEAR WEAPONS



and

AMERICAN
GRAND STRATEGY

FRANCIS J. GAVIN

