


Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a reconfiguração do mundo no século XXI

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 34
29/06/2022**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Facts

Also Known As	Republic of Turkey • Türkiye Cumhuriyeti
Head Of State And Government	President: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Capital	Ankara
Population	(2022 est.) 85,217,000
Currency Exchange Rate	1 USD equals 17.326 Turkish lira
Form Of Government	multiparty republic with one legislative house (Grand National Assembly of Turkey [600 ¹])
Official Language	Turkish
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Republic of Turkey)
Total Area (Sq Km)	769,604
Total Area (Sq Mi)	297,146
Monetary Unit	Turkish lira (TL)
Population Rank	(2021) 18
Population Projection 2030	89,080,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2022) 286.8
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2022) 110.7
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2018) 75.1% • Rural: (2018) 24.9%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2016–2018) 75.6 years • Female: (2016–2018) 81 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate	Male: (2019) 99% • Female: (2019) 94%
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2020) 763,333
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2020) 9,050
¹ Amendments to the constitution passed in April 2017 and implemented in July 2018 expanded the Grand National Assembly from 550 to 600 seats, eliminated the post of prime minister, and expanded the role of the president.	



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (3) [FONTE: MNE da Turquia]



Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit In Helsinki On Turkey's Candidacy To The EU December 11, 1999

The official recognition of Turkey's candidate status for full-membership to the European Union is a landmark event not only for Europe, but for the world as well. This candidacy, and in due time, full-membership to the European Union is Turkey's birthright by virtue of Turkey's historical development, its geography, and its present day attributes as well as the provisions of the 1963 Association Agreement.

Moreover, for the last four years, Turkey has been the only country to have effected a customs union with the European Union without becoming a full member.

The declaration of Turkey as a candidate country on an equal-footing with other candidate countries in an unequivocal manner and with clarity is a positive development.

Thereby, the road to full-membership for Turkey is opened.

Turkey, through NATO has contributed to the security of Europe and the West as a whole throughout the decades of Cold War. It carried the heavy economic burden of this responsible role with a great sense of duty. Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bi-polar world, the geo-strategic importance of Turkey has further expanded and grown. And, Turkey became a pivotal country in the Eurasian process.

The Bosphorus bridges do not only straddle the two sides of Istanbul but they also unite the continents of Europe and Asia. And this, not only in geographic terms, but in the political and cultural senses of the word as well.

The Turks have been Europeans for 600 years. But the Turks are not only Europeans. They are also Asian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern at once. Turkey is a power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea basins and the Balkans. It is becoming the energy terminal where the gas and oil riches of the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus will be transported to world markets.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (4) [FONTE: MNE da Turquia]

As such, it is living testimony to the interaction between Europe and Asia and the confluence of Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Turkey, is the leader country in democracy and secularism among the countries having a majority of Muslim population. It epitomizes vividly the fallacy of the thoughts that underline the thesis of Rudyard Kipling, who said that the East and the West would never meet; and those who think like Mr. Samuel Huntington that the clash of civilizations is inevitable.

These are precisely why, Turkey's membership to the European Union is not just to the benefit of Turkey, but to the Union as well.

I am well aware that we have some ground to cover in further raising the standards in the fields of human rights and democracy, as well as remedying a number of shortcomings in our economy. Separatist terrorism which has continued for a long time bears the prime responsibility in this regard. The high and heavy cost we incurred during the long decades of the Cold War in ensuring the security and prosperity of the West, the Balkans, and the Caucasus also played a part.

Yet, whatever the negative effects of such external factors may be, surmounting our deficiencies is primarily our own task and responsibility.

Indeed, during the six and a half months that elapsed after our three-party coalition government took office, we took far-reaching strides in expanding human rights and democracy in Turkey and in improving our economic performance. By way of examples, I wish to cite the following:

- Through a constitutional amendment, the members of the State Security Courts are to be chosen solely from amongst civilian judges and prosecutors.
- Again by amending the Constitution we have recognized international arbitration and facilitated privatization. By the end of the year we will complete the necessary legislation that these amendments entail.
- We have taken necessary measures to prevent every kind of mistreatment.
- We have adopted the legislation rendering the civil servants accountable before courts for any of their offences.
- We have taken effective measures to combat organized crime.
- We have freed on parole convicted writers and journalists.
- We have passed a repentance law for those involved in separatist terrorism.
- Through a new legislative arrangement we have rendered more difficult the closure of political parties.
- We have enacted a comprehensive tax reform.
- We have adopted a new legislation reforming our social security system.
- We have introduced an extensive reform through a new customs law.
- We have taken legislative action to strengthen and streamline our response to natural disasters.
- We have prepared a new civil code that will further enhance gender equality.

These are only a few examples of what our government has achieved in the way of extensive reforms during the past six and a half months.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (5) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Bülent Ecevit

Bülent Ecevit, (born May 28, 1925, Constantinople [now Istanbul], Turkey—died November 5, 2006, Ankara), Turkish poet, journalist, and politician who served as prime minister of Turkey in 1974, 1977, 1978–79, and 1999–2002.



Ecevit remained active in politics and was deputy premier in 1998 when Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz was forced to resign following a corruption scandal. Ecevit formed a new government, and in April 1999 his Democratic Left Party won a plurality of votes. A coalition government was created, with Ecevit as prime minister. Months after he took office, Turkey suffered a devastating earthquake, and Ecevit drew criticism for the government's slow initial response to the crisis and its refusal to allow Muslim groups to participate in relief efforts. A staunch secularist, Ecevit had pledged to curb the growing influence of Islam in Turkish politics.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (6)

[FONTE: 2019 Republic of Türkiye

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs]

16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions

16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (7)

[FONTE: Conselho da União Europeia / Cimeira de 16-17 de Dezembro de 2004]



Brussels, 1 February 2005

16238/1/04
REV 1

CONCL 4

COVER NOTE

from : Presidency
to : Delegations
Subject : **BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL
16/17 DECEMBER 2004**

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

I. ENLARGEMENT

General

4. The European Council welcomed the findings and recommendations presented by the Commission on 6 October 2004 to the Council and the European Parliament in its Regular Reports on Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, the Strategy Paper on Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, its Recommendation on Turkey and the document on Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (8)

[FONTE: Conselho da União Europeia / Cimeira de 16-17 de Dezembro de 2004]

Turkey

17. The European Council recalled its previous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, at Helsinki, it agreed that Turkey was *a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States* and, subsequently, concluded that, if it were to decide at its December 2004 meeting, *on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.*

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (9) [FONTE: Conselho da União Europeia / Cimeira de 3 de Outubro de 2005]



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**



12514/1/05 REV 1 (en,nl,da,fi)
(Presse 241)

PRESS RELEASE

2678th Council Meeting

General Affairs and External Relations

General Affairs

Luxembourg, 3 October 2005

President

Mr Jack STRAW
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom

* The 2679th meeting on External Relations is the subject of a separate press release (12515/05).

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (10)

[FONTE: Conselho da União Europeia / Cimeira de 3 de Outubro de 2005]

Main Results of the Council

*The Council approved a framework for negotiations with **Turkey** on its accession to the EU, as mandated by the European Council last December, thus enabling the negotiations to begin immediately after the meeting.*

*It also gave the go-ahead to accession negotiations with **Croatia**, on the basis of a positive assessment of Croatia's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, enabling the negotiations to begin immediately after the meeting.*

ITEMS DEBATED

ENLARGEMENT

- *Turkey: negotiating framework and opening of discussions*

The Council approved a framework for negotiations with Turkey on its accession to the EU, as mandated by the European Council last December, thus enabling the negotiations to begin immediately after the meeting.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (11)

[FONTE: União Europeia, Turkey Negotiation Framework 3/10/2005]

NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK

(Luxembourg, 3 October 2005)

Principles governing the negotiations

1. The negotiations will be based on Turkey's own merits and the pace will depend on Turkey's progress in meeting the requirements for membership. The Presidency or the Commission as appropriate will keep the Council fully informed so that the Council can keep the situation under regular review. The Union side, for its part, will decide in due course whether the conditions for the conclusion of negotiations have been met; this will be done on the basis of a report from the Commission confirming the fulfilment by Turkey of the requirements listed in point 6.
2. As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, these negotiations are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (12)

[FONTE: União Europeia, Turkey Negotiation Framework 3/10/2005]

3. Enlargement should strengthen the process of continuous creation and integration in which the Union and its Member States are engaged. Every effort should be made to protect the cohesion and effectiveness of the Union. In accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union's capacity to absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Turkey. The Commission shall monitor this capacity during the negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this condition of membership has been met.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (13)

[FONTE: União Europeia, Turkey Negotiation Framework 3/10/2005]

4. Negotiations are opened on the basis that Turkey sufficiently meets the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, for the most part later enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union and proclaimed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Union expects Turkey to sustain the process of reform and to work towards further improvement in the respect of the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including relevant European case law; to consolidate and broaden legislation and implementation measures specifically in relation to the zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill-treatment and the implementation of provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, ILO standards including trade union rights, and minority rights. The Union and Turkey will continue their intensive political dialogue. To ensure the irreversibility of progress in these areas and its full and effective implementation, notably with regard to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights, progress will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission, which is invited to continue to report regularly on it to the Council, addressing all points of concern identified in the Commission's 2004 report and recommendation as well as its annual regular report.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (14)

[FONTE: Delegation of the European Union to Turkey]

TURKEY

State of Play: 1 November 2016		
	Negotiations Opened	Negotiations Closed
1 – Free Movement of Goods		
2 – Freedom of Movement of Workers		
3 – Right of Est. & Freedom to Provide Services		
4 – Free Movement of Capital	19 December 2008	
5 – Public Procurement		
6 – Company Law	17 June 2008	
7 – Intellectual Property Rights	17 June 2008	
8 – Competition Policy		
9 – Financial Services		
10 – Information Society And Media	19 December 2008	
11 – Agriculture And Rural Development		
12 – Food Safety, Vet. & Phytosanitary Policy	30 June 2010	
13 – Fisheries		
14 – Transport Policy		
15 – Energy		
16 – Taxation	30 June 2009	
17 – Economic And Monetary Policy	14 December 2015	
18 – Statistics	26 June 2007	
19 – Social Policy And Employment		
20 – Enterprise And Industrial Policy	29 March 2007	
21 – Trans-European Networks	19 December 2007	
22 – Regional Pol. & Coord. of Structural Instr.	05 November 2013	
23 – Judiciary And Fundamental Rights		
24 – Justice, Freedom And Security		
25 – Science And Research	12 June 2006	38880
26 – Education And Culture		
27 – Environment	21 December 2009	
28 – Consumer And Health Protection	19 December 2007	
29 – Customs Union		
30 – External Relations		
31 – Foreign, Security And Defence Policy		
32 – Financial Control	26 June 2007	
33 – Financial And Budgetary Provisions	30 June 2016	
34 – Institutions		
35 – Other Issues		

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (15) [FONTE: William Chislett / Real Instituto Elcano, 5/10/2015]

Working Paper 14/2015
5 October 2015



Turkey's 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight
Working Paper 14/2015 - 5/10/2015

Turkey's 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight

William Chislett | Associate Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute | @ WilliamChislett3

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Turkey's 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight

William Chislett

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (16) [FONTE: Al Arabia News, 1/03/2022]

Erdogan to EU over bloc membership: Show same 'sensitivity' for Ukraine to Turkey

01 March ,2022: 08:58 PM GST



Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on the European Union to show the "same sensitivity" it showed for Ukraine's membership bid for Turkey's application, state news agency Anadolu reported on Tuesday.

"We appreciate the efforts to get Ukraine into the EU. But I say to these EU members, why are you still worried about taking Turkey into the EU. Show the same sensitivity for Turkey as you do about Ukraine," he said.

"Will you put Turkey on your agenda when someone attacks [us] too?" he added.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (17) [FONTE: Euractiv 8/04/2022]

If Turkey was an EU member, Ukraine war might have been prevented, says minister



Turkey's leaders have recently increased talk about their will to return to the negotiating table with Brussels. But what has prompted this new momentum? EURACTIV Slovakia spoke to Faruk Kaymakcı, Turkey's deputy minister of foreign affairs and director for EU affairs.

Negotiations on Turkey's EU accession were halted in 2019, following the Turkish government's crackdown on civil society, media, academia, and others, who have expressed opposition to the regime. President Recep Erdoğan is now asking the EU to relaunch membership negotiations.

Erdoğan's director for EU Affairs and deputy minister of foreign affairs, Faruk Kaymakcı, told EURACTIV that there is momentum for a return to the negotiating table.

"In the face of the Russian aggression, we have seen the need for a strong Europe and Turkey," he said.

"A wrong message of a weak and divided Europe, and of a divided Transatlantic world was given," he explained, adding that if Turkey had been part of the bloc, "treated fairly in the negotiation process", or had much better relations with the bloc, the war in Ukraine could have been avoided.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (18) [FONTE: Euractiv 8/04/2022]

"Imagine that we had a solution to the Cyprus issue in 2004. We might have become an EU member by now. Turkey's EU membership might have prevented the war in Syria, the war in Iraq, and even the war in Ukraine," Kaymakcı said.

Some analysts suggest that Turkey's decision to rewind negotiations with the EU is strongly related to the country's huge trade deficit. Turkey's annual inflation, as of March, rose to a 20-year high. Ankara can therefore either increase rates, weaken the lira, or secure major external financing.

Kaymakcı argued that improving relations with the EU would also increase confidence in the Turkish economy. He said an update of the EU-Turkey Customs Union might double trade volumes. Within the post-pandemic recovery, "it will be beneficial to both sides."

Accession perspective 'had helped a lot'

In his opinion, the best time for Turkey in terms of meeting the Copenhagen political criteria was at the beginning of the negotiation procedure, "up until 2006 or even 2009". Turkey "believed in the process" and made "tremendous reforms", he said.

"Many colleagues in the EU called it a silent revolution."


However, Kaymakcı insisted that the status of Cyprus has seriously damaged Turkey's accession perspective. "Turkey, marginalised and

discriminated as a candidate country, was pushed away from the EU for the interests of one or two member states," he said.

The EU, however, links the stalled negotiations to the deterioration of democracy in Turkey, including crackdowns on civil society, the lack of rule of law, judicial interference, and human rights abuses, referred to in the latest report by the European Commission on Turkey.


O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (19)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/02/2022]



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (20)

[FONTE: The Economist, 9/02/2022]



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (21)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (22) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Facts

Also Known As	Ukrayina
Head Of Government	Prime Minister: Denys Shmyhal
Capital	Kyiv (Kiev)
Population	(2021 est.) 43,879,000
Head Of State	President: Volodymyr Zelensky
Form Of Government	unitary multiparty republic with a single legislative house (Verkhovna Rada ¹ [450])
Official Language	Ukrainian
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Ukrayina (Ukraine)
Total Area (Sq Km)	603,549
Total Area (Sq Mi)	233,032
Monetary Unit	hryvnya (UAH)
Population Rank	(2021) 34
Population Projection 2030	42,628,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2021) 188.3
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2021) 72.7
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2020) 69.5% • Rural: (2020) 30.5%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2019) 66.9 years • Female: (2019) 77 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate	Male: not available • Female: not available
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2020) 147,691
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2020) 3,540
¹ Translated as Supreme Council.	



O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (23) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia, 17/06/2022]



Opinion on the EU membership application by Ukraine

Brussels, 17 June 2022

INTRODUCTION

The aspiration to belong to the European Union has for many years been an important priority for Ukraine, its governments and citizens. It has been an underlying motive for democratic changes over the past decade and a driver of a number of key reforms founded on European values. The decision in late 2013, of the then-President not to sign, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which symbolised for many Ukrainians a path towards the European Union, led to large-scale protests against the authorities. Subsequently, the Russian Federation moved against Ukraine, not accepting the independent choice of the Ukrainian people. While losing control over part of its territory and suffering human and economic losses because of the conflict in the eastern part of the country, Ukraine continued throughout the years as a resilient democracy moving closer to the European Union and gradually aligning with the *acquis*.

Application for membership

In this Opinion, the Commission assesses Ukraine's application on the basis of its capacity to meet the criteria set by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, as well as in Madrid in 1995, notably regarding the country's administrative capacity. The Opinion also takes into account Ukraine's efforts in implementing its obligations under the Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which entered into force on 1 September 2017. The Commission will assess the impact of Ukraine's accession on the EU policy areas at a later stage.

This Opinion has been prepared following a methodology similar to that used in previous Commission Opinions. Ukraine received questionnaires on 8 April 2022 on the political and economic criteria and on 13 April on the EU *acquis* chapters and provided its replies on 17 April and on 9 May respectively. This Opinion is a structural assessment against established criteria and builds on knowledge and experience gained through many years of close cooperation of the EU with Ukraine.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (24) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia, 17/06/2022]

Overall, as regards the political criteria, Ukraine is well advanced in reaching the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

Concerning the economic criteria, Ukraine has continued its strong macro-economic record, demonstrating a noteworthy resilience with macroeconomic and financial stability ensured also after Russia's invasion in February 2022. This reflects not only a very strong political determination, but also relatively well-functioning institutions. At the same time, ambitious structural reforms to remove corruption, reduce the State footprint and the persistent influence of oligarchs, strengthen private property rights and enhance labour market flexibility need to continue in Ukraine to improve the functioning of its market economy. The capacity of the country to cope with the competitive pressure in the EU will depend crucially on how post-war investments in Ukraine are designed and sequenced in order to upgrade its physical capital, improve educational outcomes and spur innovation.

As regards the capacity to fulfil the obligations of membership, Ukraine has worked since 2016 on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DFCTA). These agreements already capture an unprecedented amount of the EU acquis. Ukraine has gradually approximated to substantial elements of the EU acquis across many chapters. It has an overall satisfactory track record of implementation, while in some sectors the country is more advanced than in others.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Commission recommends to the Council that Ukraine is given the perspective to become a member of the European Union.

The Commission, recommends that Ukraine be granted candidate status, on the understanding that the following steps are taken:

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (25) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia, 17/06/2022]

- enact and implement legislation on a selection procedure for judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, including a pre-selection process based on evaluation of their integrity and professional skills, in line with Venice Commission recommendations;
- finalise the integrity vetting of the candidates for the High Council of Justice members by the Ethics Council and the selection of candidate to establish the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine;
- further strengthen the fight against corruption, in particular at high level, through proactive and efficient investigations, and a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions; complete the appointment of a new head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office through certifying the identified winner of the competition and launch and complete the selection process and appointment for a new Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
- ensure that anti-money laundering legislation is in compliance with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); adopt an overarching strategic plan for the reform of the entire law enforcement sector as part of Ukraine's security environment;
- implement the Anti-Oligarch law to limit the excessive influence of oligarchs in economic, political, and public life; this should be done in a legally sound manner, taking into account the forthcoming opinion of the Venice Commission on the relevant legislation;
- tackle the influence of vested interests by adopting a media law that aligns Ukraine's legislation with the EU audio-visual media services directive and empowers the independent media regulator;
- finalise the reform of the legal framework for national minorities currently under preparation as recommended by the Venice Commission, and adopt immediate and effective implementation mechanisms

The Commission will monitor Ukraine's progress in fulfilling these steps and report on them, together with a detailed assessment of the country, by the end of 2022.

The accession process remains based on established criteria and conditions. This allows any country in the process to progress based on own merits but also means that steps towards the EU can be reversed if the underlying conditions are not met anymore.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (26) [FONTE: Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 23/06/2022]

Conclusões do Conselho Europeu sobre a Ucrânia, os pedidos de adesão da Ucrânia, da República da Moldávia e da Geórgia, os Balcãs Ocidentais e as relações externas, 23 de junho de 2022

II. UCRÂNIA

4. O Conselho Europeu debateu a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, nas suas diferentes dimensões. O Conselho Europeu reitera que se mantém firmemente ao lado da Ucrânia e que a União Europeia continuará a prestar um forte apoio à resiliência global da Ucrânia a nível económico, militar, social e financeiro, incluindo a ajuda humanitária.

5. O Conselho Europeu condena resolutamente os ataques indiscriminados da Rússia contra civis e infraestruturas civis, e insta este país a retirar, imediata e incondicionalmente, todas as suas tropas e equipamento militar de todo o território da Ucrânia dentro das fronteiras que lhe são internacionalmente reconhecidas. O direito internacional humanitário, nomeadamente no que diz respeito ao tratamento dos prisioneiros de guerra, tem de ser respeitado. Há que permitir de imediato aos ucranianos, em especial às crianças, que foram levados à força para a Rússia o regresso em segurança. A Rússia, a Bielorrússia e todos os responsáveis por crimes de guerra e outros crimes da maior gravidade serão chamados a prestar contas pelos seus atos, em conformidade com o direito internacional.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (27) [FONTE: Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 23/06/2022]

III. PEDIDOS DE ADESÃO DA UCRÂNIA, DA REPÚBLICA DA MOLDÁVIA E DA GEÓRGIA

10. O Conselho Europeu reconhece a perspetiva europeia da Ucrânia, da República da Moldávia e da Geórgia. O futuro destes países e dos seus cidadãos está na União Europeia.

11. O Conselho Europeu decidiu conceder o estatuto de país candidato à Ucrânia e à República da Moldávia.

12. Convida-se a Comissão a informar o Conselho sobre o cumprimento das condições especificadas nos pareceres da Comissão relativos aos respetivos pedidos de adesão, no âmbito do seu pacote de alargamento regular. O Conselho decidirá sobre novas medidas assim que todas estas condições estiverem plenamente preenchidas.

13. O Conselho Europeu está pronto a conceder o estatuto de país candidato à Geórgia assim que tiverem sido tratadas as prioridades especificadas no parecer da Comissão relativo ao pedido de adesão da Geórgia.

14. O progresso de cada país rumo à União Europeia dependerá do seu próprio mérito no cumprimento dos critérios de Copenhaga, tendo em conta a capacidade da UE para absorver novos membros.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (28) [FONTE: Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 23/06/2022]

IV. BALCÃS OCIDENTAIS

15. A União Europeia manifesta o seu pleno e inequívoco empenho na perspetiva de adesão dos Balcãs Ocidentais à UE e apela à aceleração do processo de adesão.

16. O Conselho Europeu convida a Comissão, o alto representante e o Conselho a continuarem a impulsionar, com base na metodologia revista, a integração gradual entre a União Europeia e a região já durante o próprio processo de alargamento, de uma forma reversível e baseada no mérito.

17. O Conselho Europeu recorda a importância das reformas, nomeadamente no domínio do Estado de direito e, em especial, das reformas relacionadas com a independência e o funcionamento do sistema judicial e a luta contra a corrupção. Apela igualmente aos parceiros para que garantam os direitos e a igualdade de tratamento das pessoas pertencentes a minorias.

18. O Conselho Europeu foi informado sobre a evolução mais recente dos debates entre a Bulgária e a Macedónia do Norte. Apela a uma resolução rápida das últimas questões pendentes, a fim de que as negociações de adesão possam ser encetadas sem demora.

19. O Conselho Europeu reafirma a urgência de realizar progressos tangíveis na resolução dos diferendos bilaterais e regionais pendentes, particularmente no Diálogo Belgrado-Pristina sobre a normalização das relações entre a Sérvia e o Kosovo*.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (29) [FONTE: Luuk van Middelaar e Hans Kribbe / The Economist, 16/06/2022]

Allowing Ukraine into the EU is not the right move for now, say Luuk van Middelaar and Hans Kribbe

SHOULD UKRAINE join the European Union? It is a big question, not just for Ukraine but for the EU too. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine's president, has made a strong case for his country, and several EU governments are convinced. We are part of the family, he argues: fighting and dying for Europe and its values.

Mr Zelensky's plea is hard to ignore. Pouring cold water over the European aspirations of a country under attack in a vicious war seems callous and myopic. And he is right to remind Europeans that enlarging their club carries geopolitical significance. Concerns about stability in Europe drove the post-cold-war accessions of Poland, Hungary and others to the EU almost two decades ago.

Yet many European leaders prefer to play the procedural card, hiding behind time and process. Olaf Scholz, Germany's chancellor, says fast-tracking Ukraine would be unfair to aspirant members in the Balkans who have been stuck in the queue for years. Mark Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, insists there can be "no short-cut" to membership. Emmanuel Macron, France's president, says accession will take "years, and in truth, no doubt decades".

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (30)

[FONTE: Luuk van Middelaar e Hans Kribbe / The Economist, 16/06/2022]

Such “rules are rules” arguments may be cogent in peacetime. But during a war they risk looking clueless and cynical. At stake is Ukraine’s survival as a state, not its adoption of EU food-safety standards. There is a risk of losing sight of the strategic choices at stake. At their summit on June 23rd and 24th EU leaders may be tempted to fudge the issue, hinting at accession prospects without giving a clear date or firm commitment. By creating expectations that cannot be met, this risks breeding resentment. Just ask Turkey, which has been on a phantom road towards EU membership for almost 20 years.

Still, Ukraine deserves straight answers, not false promises. And the truth that EU leaders leave unspoken is that, although anchoring Ukraine in European structures is strategically important, there are equally strategic reasons why the EU should not be one of them.

It does not make sense for Ukraine to join the union before it secures NATO membership, which even Mr Zelensky agrees is unattainable today. Security comes first, and the EU cannot provide it against Russia. EU member governments have a treaty obligation to assist each other in the case of armed aggression “with all means in their power”, but this form of solidarity, designed with terrorism or cyber-warfare in mind, does not deter a nuclear power. It is why Poland and other ex-Warsaw Pact members entered NATO before joining the EU. It is also why Finland and Sweden are now seeking protection under NATO’s Article 5, its mutual-defence clause. If Ukraine were to join the EU without this NATO deterrent in place, the risk of a future war between Russia and the EU as a whole would grow significantly.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (31)

[FONTE: Luuk van Middelaar e Hans Kribbe / The Economist, 19/06/2022]

Hungary, which has tilted towards authoritarianism over the past decade and recently diluted the EU's sanctions on Russia, provides a cautionary tale.) Centralising EU decision-making on foreign policy and the rule of law, which currently require unanimity among 27 governments, would undermine the ability of new members to throw grit into the oyster. But few existing members are ready to contemplate handing such powers to Brussels.

None of this means Mr Zelensky should be given the brush-off. There is an evident need to anchor Ukraine, and several other Balkan and Black Sea states, more firmly in Europe. But neither NATO nor the EU can be that anchor. It is this that makes Mr Macron's recent proposal for a pan-European political community a more realistic proposition than some of his critics suggest—as long as it is conceived in the right way.

Above all, such a league of European states—call it the E40, after the long motorway that connects Calais to Ukraine—should exist outside EU structures and be intergovernmental, a bit like the G20. What Europe does not need is another waiting room for aspiring EU members, or a revived version of the old “two-speed Europe” idea (in which one group of states moved towards greater integration with more speed than others less keen to do so). Nor should such a concert of states be imagined as an outer circle orbiting a Brussels core, as the European Commission is likely to conceive of it. The EU already has countless partnerships and association agreements with European non-member governments, including Ukraine. And any hint of an “EU-lite” would instantly deter Britain, which must also be involved.

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (32) [FONTE: Werner Kirsch, The distribution of power within the EU: perspectives on a Ukrainian accession and a Turkish accession, 2022]

International Economics and Economic Policy
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-022-00541-w>

ORIGINAL PAPER



The distribution of power within the EU: perspectives on a Ukrainian accession and a Turkish accession

Werner Kirsch¹

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Abstract

On February 28th, 2022, Ukraine submitted an application concerning accession to the European Union. As Ukraine is already linked to the European Union through an Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement—signed in 2014—there might be a chance for the Ukraine to join the EU within the next decade. With about 41 million inhabitants, Ukraine is a rather large country and the 65% majority requirement under the EU's Qualified Majority Voting rules would give Ukraine some significant power in a future EU28. Herein, it is shown how relative political power indices—as measured by the Banzhaf index—would change in the case of an EU enlargement to allow accession by Ukraine: The large economies would lose power and, surprisingly, many small countries would gain political power. Such perspectives might lead one to reconsider the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union at the EU level in the course of future negotiations on amendments to the Lisbon Treaty. The case of Turkey's accession is also considered as is the case of Montenegro joining the European Union.

Keywords EU enlargement · Ukraine · Banzhaf index · Power · Majority voting

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (33) [FONTE: Werner Kirsch, The distribution of power within the EU: perspectives on a Ukrainian accession and a Turkish accession, 2022]

2 Voting in the Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union is one of the legislative bodies of the European Union. Each member state is represented by one government official. The voting procedure in the Council is regulated by the Treaty of Lisbon.

In most fields of politics, the Council reaches policy decisions by means of “double majority”. A double majority is achieved if the supporters of a proposal represent both 65% of the population of the European Union as a whole and 55% of the member states. This voting procedure was introduced as a compromise between a qualified majority of the citizens (i.e., the population criterion) and a qualified majority of the member countries (i.e., the states criterion). The second criterion makes sure that the votes of smaller member states, for example Malta or Luxembourg, do not become completely irrelevant.

There is also an additional rule: If only three member states vote against a proposal, then the proposal is accepted even if the double majority is not reached. This rule prevents three large countries, e.g., Germany, Italy, and Poland, from joining forces to block a decision. There are very few combinations of three countries which together represent more than 35% of the population of the EU: In the current EU27, there are only 22 such combinations possible.

This system is what is known as qualified majority voting (QMV).

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (34)

[FONTE: Werner Kirsch, The distribution of power within the EU: perspectives on a Ukrainian accession and a Turkish accession, 2022]

Table 1 Population statistics on a potential EU enlargement by the Ukraine and the changes in the Banzhaf power index

Country	Pop. (mio.)	BI: EU27	BI: EU27 + UA	Rel. diff
Germany	83.2	12.09%	10.83%	− 10.41%
France	67.7	10.08%	8.89%	− 11.80%
Italy	59.2	8.88%	7.83%	− 11.86%
Spain	47.4	7.66%	6.65%	− 13.29%
Ukraine	41.4		5.96%	
Poland	37.8	6.41%	5.54%	− 13.55%
Romania	19.2	3.95%	3.73%	− 5.49%
Netherlands	17.5	3.75%	3.56%	− 5.11%
Belgium	11.6	3.05%	2.95%	− 3.35%
Czechia	10.70	2.95%	2.86%	− 3.01%
Greece	10.68	2.95%	2.86%	− 3.00%
Sweden	10.4	2.91%	2.83%	− 2.88%
Portugal	10.3	2.90%	2.82%	− 2.84%
Hungary	9.7	2.83%	2.76%	− 2.59%
Austria	8.9	2.74%	2.68%	− 2.23%
Bulgaria	6.9	2.50%	2.47%	− 1.12%
Denmark	5.8	2.37%	2.36%	− 0.43%
Finland	5.53	2.33%	2.33%	− 0.24%
Slovakia	5.46	2.32%	2.32%	− 0.18%
Ireland	5.0	2.27%	2.27%	0.13%
Croatia	4.0	2.15%	2.17%	0.86%
Lithuania	2.8	2.00%	2.04%	1.98%
Slovenia	2.1	1.92%	1.97%	2.69%
Latvia	1.9	1.90%	1.95%	2.92%
Estonia	1.3	1.83%	1.89%	3.54%
Cyprus	0.90	1.77%	1.85%	4.06%
Luxembourg	0.63	1.74%	1.82%	4.39%
Malta	0.53	1.73%	1.81%	4.55%
Decision probability		13.2%	11.36%	

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (35)


[FONTE: Werner Kirsch, The distribution of power within the EU: perspectives on a Ukrainian accession and a Turkish accession, 2022]

Table 2 Future potential EU enlargement by Turkey and changes in the Banzhaf power index

Country	Pop. (mio.)	BI: EU27	BI: EU27 + TR	Rel. diff
Turkey	84.7		9.92%	
Germany	83.2	12.09%	9.75%	– 19.39%
France	67.7	10.08%	8.03%	– 20.37%
Italy	59.2	8.88%	7.34%	– 17.33%
Spain	47.4	7.66%	6.09%	– 20.51%
Poland	37.8	6.41%	4.94%	– 22.89%
Romania	19.2	3.95%	3.57%	– 9.57%
Netherlands	17.5	3.75%	3.41%	– 8.88%
Belgium	11.6	3.05%	2.88%	– 5.69%
Czechia	10.70	2.95%	2.80%	– 5.08%
Greece	10.68	2.95%	2.80%	– 5.06%
Sweden	10.4	2.91%	2.77%	– 4.83%
Portugal	10.3	2.90%	2.76%	– 4.77%
Hungary	9.7	2.83%	2.71%	– 4.33%
Austria	8.9	2.74%	2.64%	– 3.67%
Bulgaria	6.9	2.50%	2.45%	– 1.79%
Denmark	5.8	2.37%	2.36%	– 0.59%
Finland	5.53	2.33%	2.33%	– 0.23%
Slovakia	5.46	2.32%	2.32%	– 0.14%
Ireland	5.0	2.27%	2.28%	0.41%
Croatia	4.0	2.15%	2.19%	1.69%
Lithuania	2.8	2.00%	2.08%	3.54%
Slovenia	2.1	1.92%	2.01%	4.75%
Latvia	1.9	1.90%	1.99%	5.14%
Estonia	1.3	1.83%	1.94%	6.20%
Cyprus	0.90	1.77%	1.90%	7.10%
Luxembourg	0.63	1.74%	1.88%	7.66%
Malta	0.53	1.73%	1.87%	7.93%
Decision probability		13.2%	11.40%	

O exemplo da Turquia para a adesão da Ucrânia à União Europeia (36) [FONTE: Cartoon de Paresh, 2017]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (2) [FONTE:

Richard N. Haass, The post-American Middle East | The Strategist, 19/12/2019]

The post-American Middle East | The Strategist

[Richard N. Haass](#)

The post-American Middle East



It was 5 August 1990, just days after Saddam Hussein's Iraq had invaded and conquered all of Kuwait, and US President George H.W. Bush could not have been clearer as he [spoke](#) from the South Lawn at the White House: 'This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.' Over the next six months, Bush proved to be a man of his word, as the United States sent half a million soldiers to the Middle East and led an international coalition that liberated Kuwait.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (3) [FONTE:

Richard N. Haass, The post-American Middle East | The Strategist, 19/12/2019]

Welcome to the post-American Middle East. To be fair, the phrase is something of an exaggeration, as the US hasn't withdrawn from the region. In fact, it has recently sent additional troops to deter and, if necessary, help defend Saudi Arabia from future Iranian attacks and possibly respond directly to them. But there's no getting around the fundamental truth that the US has reduced both its presence and role in a region that it has dominated for nearly half a century.

The roots of this trend date back to President George W. Bush, whose decision to launch an ill-advised and poorly designed war of choice against Iraq proved to be a turning point in US foreign policy. The high costs and poor results of that war turned the American public against military involvement in the region, which influenced President Barack Obama as he chose not to follow through on his warnings to Syria's government that use of chemical weapons would cross a 'red line' and trigger grave consequences. Obama also decided not to follow up the NATO-led intervention in Libya that removed Muammar Gaddafi's regime but left behind a divided country and a failed state.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (4) [FONTE: Erik Freymann, 25/02/2021]

Influence Without Entanglement in the Middle East

How China is outflanking the United States—and staying under the radar.

[Eyck Freymann](#) February 25, 2021



A close-up view of Dubai Knowledge Park's Huawei building in Jumeirah, Dubai, on Feb. 22.

A close-up view of Dubai Knowledge Park's Huawei building in Jumeirah, Dubai, on Feb. 22.

Karim Sahib/AFP/Getty Images

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (5) [FONTE: Erik Freymann, 25/02/2021]

For 12 years, the United States has been trying to disengage from the Middle East. Regional powers, including Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, have responded by seeking new allies and competing more fiercely with one another. But beyond the headlines, China has been the biggest winner in the post-U.S. Middle East. Beijing was already the [largest buyer](#) of the region's oil. Now, without fanfare, it has become the only outside power that has strong political and trading ties with every major country there.

For Washington, this means the Middle East is reemerging as an arena of great-power competition. China's growing influence in the Middle East does not yet directly threaten any vital U.S. interests. Yet China's deepening alignment with Iran and friendly links to anti-American Shiite militia groups is concerning and poses long-term risks to U.S. forces, partnerships, and commercial access. The Biden administration should impose costs on China and Iran to keep their budding strategic partnership from growing unchecked. It should also recognize that most of its Middle Eastern allies and partners—including Israel and the Gulf states—are determined not to take sides in a U.S.-Chinese geopolitical rivalry.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (6) [FONTE: Erik Freymann, 25/02/2021]

If China's goal is to achieve influence without entanglement in the Middle East, the BRI is succeeding brilliantly. The list of countries that have endorsed the BRI and committed in one form or another to partnering with it includes Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. That alone should be a wake-up call to Washington. These countries agree on almost nothing—but they all want closer ties with China.

Most problematic for U.S. national interests is the strategic partnership between China and Iran. Iranian domestic politics is divided between a moderately pro-China reformist faction and an ultra-pro-China hard-liner faction that has enthusiastically embraced the BRI. The Trump administration's "maximum pressure" Iran policy has empowered the hard-liners. China-Iran relations have been friendly for decades, but they improved rapidly during Donald Trump's presidency. China has made large purchases of Iranian crude oil and sold telecom supplies to Iran, in violation of sanctions, and it is currently negotiating an agreement for Jask, a port outside the Strait of Hormuz. The two countries were supposed to conduct joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean last week. (China pulled out at the last minute, citing its New Years' holiday.)

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (7) [FONTE: FT, 20/09/2021]



‘More of China, less of America’: how superpower fight is squeezing the Gulf

Caught between Washington and Beijing, Middle
East states struggle to balance relations

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (8) [FONTE: BP


Energy Outlook, 2018]

Regions


Growth in energy demand is driven by increasing prosperity...



Primary energy consumption
by region



Primary energy growth and
regional contributions



Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (9) [FONTE: FT, 11/05/2021]

Saudi Aramco overtakes Apple as world's most valuable company

Rallying oil prices lift state-backed energy group while tech stock sell-off hits iPhone maker

May 11 2022




Saudi Aramco is expected to announce bumper profits when it reports first-quarter earnings on Sunday © Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

Saudi Aramco has overtaken Apple as the world's most valuable company after higher oil prices pushed shares of the world's biggest crude exporter to record levels while a broader tech stock sell-off weighed on the iPhone maker.


Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (10) [FONTE:

The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) / Saudi Arabia exports 2020]



Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (11) [FONTE:

The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) / United Arab Emirates exports 2020




Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (12) [FONTE: FT, 20/09/2021]

Oil drives Gulf states' trade shift to China

Share of countries' overall imports and exports

2000 → 2020




Sources: IMF; FT calculations
© FT

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (13) [FONTE: FT, 20/09/2021]

The Huawei factor

"This is one of those issues that make the current relationship with Abu Dhabi and other Gulf states scratchy," the diplomat says. "There's an effort to make them choose in a pretty binary fashion and the Emiratis have been equally firm in saying 'don't make us choose'."



Riyadh decided to use Huawei's 5G technology in Neom, the flagship development project in Tabuk province that will include a futuristic city © Mark Schiefelbein/AP

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (14) [FONTE: FT, 20/09/2021]

The appeal of Beijing

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both taken formal steps to deepen their relations with China in recent years.

In January 2016 Beijing issued its first “Arab policy paper”, which looked at everything from security to commerce and counter-terrorism. The same month Saudi Arabia and China agreed to establish a “comprehensive strategic partnership” to enhance political, cultural, security and military ties during a visit to the kingdom by Xi. Gulf states are seeking to benefit from Beijing’s [Belt and Road Initiative](#), and Prince Mohammed, the kingdom’s day-to-day ruler who co-chairs the “China-Saudi Arabia High-Level Joint Committee”, has linked it to his own “Vision 2030” plan.

The UAE and China agreed to establish their own “comprehensive strategic partnership” with a focus on economic ties, technology transfers, IT and energy when the Chinese president visited Abu Dhabi in 2018. But there were also political and military aspects to their agreements, including a desire to “enhance practical co-operation between the two armies” in “various forces and weapons, joint training and training of personnel and other domains”.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (15) [FONTE:

Amos Yadlin e Assaf Orion, Foreign Affairs, 18/02/2022]



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Israel's New Strategy

Why a Post-American Middle East Means a Greater
Role in Regional Security

BY AMOS YADLIN AND ASSAF ORION February 18, 2022

As Washington increasingly shifts its attention to Asia, the Middle East has slid down its priority list. The Ukraine crisis has exacerbated the slide, drawing urgent attention to Europe. Accordingly, there have been growing questions about what this means for Middle Eastern security, particularly for Washington's longtime ally Israel. Noting decade-long statements about pivoting to Asia, and observing the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, many commentators have suggested that the United States was leaving the region. Indeed, some fighter jets and missile defense batteries have been removed from Middle Eastern bases.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (16) [FONTE:

Amos Yadlin e Assaf Orion, Foreign Affairs, 18/02/2022]

JERUSALEM'S NEW FRIENDS

Amid shrinking U.S. involvement, Israel has taken significant steps to forge a new approach in the region. And in contrast to its military image, Israeli security is increasingly being driven by diplomacy. Although the 2020 Abraham Accords—establishing formal relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan —were brokered by the United States, the agreement amounts to an important breakthrough in Israel's regional posture, allowing it greater room to act both independently as well as in concert with the United States. Not only did the accords establish direct government-to-government relations between Jerusalem and these new partners; they also paved the way for people-to-people relations, as seen in the new air travel links between Israel and the UAE, for example. Cooperation between the partners is also expanding on economic and technological issues, as well as on policies relating to energy, water, and the environment.

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (17) [FONTE:

Amos Yadlin e Assaf Orion, Foreign Affairs, 18/02/2022]

Nor have Israel's diplomatic efforts been confined to the signatories of the Abraham Accords. Leveraging its newfound maritime gas reserves, Israel has recently reached agreements to sell gas to Egypt and Jordan, some of it transiting to Lebanon through Syria. Israel has also joined the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority among its members. In addition to building Israel's energy footprint, such initiatives have also helped expand other economic opportunities, such as the energy-for-water partnership between Israel, Jordan, and the UAE that was announced in November 2021.

At the same time, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has signaled a new willingness to improve Turkish-Israeli relations, which had deteriorated over the previous decade. Erdogan has raised the possibility of new gas arrangements with Israel, and Israeli President Isaac Herzog is scheduled to soon meet with Erdogan in Turkey. Even with Saudi Arabia, the Israeli government continues to pursue discrete backchannel contacts, principally to address mutual security concerns such as Houthi

Um Médio Oriente pós-americano? (18) [FONTE:

Cartoon the Yasser Ahmed / Arab Weekly, 29/06/2021]



Sugestões de leitura

