


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (1)

[FONTE: Donald J. Trump, “The Art of the Deal”, 1987]

The Art of the Deal is a commonsense guide to personal finance. In practical-advice books, as in life, there are no guarantees, and readers are cautioned to rely on their own judgment about their individual circumstances and to act accordingly.

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
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Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (2)

[FONTE: AP News, 8/05/2018]

Trump declares US leaving ‘horrible’ Iran nuclear accord



WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the landmark nuclear accord with Iran on Tuesday, abruptly restoring harsh sanctions in the most consequential foreign policy action of his presidency. He declared he was making the world safer, but he also deepened his isolation on the world stage and revived doubts about American credibility.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (3)

[FONTE: AP News, 8/05/2018]

But Trump, a severe critic of the deal dating back to his presidential campaign, said in a televised address from the White House that it was “defective at its core.”

U.S. allies in Europe had tried to keep him in and lamented his move to abandon it. Iran’s leader ominously warned his country might “start enriching uranium more than before.”

The sanctions seek to punish Iran for its nuclear program by limiting its ability to sell oil or do business overseas, affecting a wide range of Iranian economic sectors and individuals.

Major companies in the U.S. and Europe could be hurt, too. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that licenses held by Boeing and its European competitor Airbus to sell billions of dollars in commercial jetliners to Iran will be revoked. Certain exemptions are to be negotiated, but Mnuchin refused to discuss what products might qualify.

He said the sanctions will sharply curtail sales of oil by Iran, which is currently the world’s fifth largest oil producer. Mnuchin said he didn’t expect oil prices to rise sharply, forecasting that other producers will step up production.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (4)

[FONTE: The White House, 4/02/2025]

↶ FACT SHEETS

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restores Maximum Pressure on Iran

The White House

February 4, 2025

RESTORING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad.

- The NSPM establishes that:
 - Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles;
 - Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and
 - Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (5) [FONTE:

The White House, 4/02/2025]

TAKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OFF THE TABLE: President Trump will not tolerate Iran possessing a nuclear weapons capability, nor will he stand for their sustained sponsorship of terrorism, especially against U.S. interests.

- In 2020, President Trump declared that “as long as [he is] President of the United States, Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.”
- Today’s NSPM fulfills the President’s 2020 vow to contend with Iran’s pernicious influence across the globe:
 - “For far too long — all the way back to 1979, to be exact — nations have tolerated Iran’s destructive and destabilizing behavior in the Middle East and beyond. Those days are over. Iran has been the leading sponsor of terrorism, and their pursuit of nuclear weapons threatens the civilized world. We will never let that happen.”

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (6) [FONTE: Público, 1/03/2025]



Ataque ao Irão Trump e Netanyahu visam derrubar regime de Teerão • Conflito ameaça acesso da China a energia • Portugal evita comentar uso da Base das Lajes • Luís Amado: “Ter uma guerra civil no Irão será um pesadelo” • Opiniões de Teixeira Fernandes e Teresa de Sousa Destaque, 2 a 9, P2 e Editorial

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (7)

[FONTE: Herb Scribner / AXIOS. 1/03/2026]

How Trump's Iran gamble breaks from past regime overthrows



Photo illustration: Sarah Grillo/Axios. Photos: Majid Saeedi and Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg via Getty Images

President Trump's bid to [topple Iran's regime](#) marks a sharp break from two decades of U.S. intervention playbooks across multiple presidencies.

The big picture: Trump's weekend strikes on Iran — and his explicit call for an uprising — diverge from how the U.S. approached regime pressure in [Iraq](#) and [Venezuela](#), historians tell Axios. The gamble signals a more unpredictable stretch of his foreign policy ahead as he openly threatens force elsewhere.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (8)

[FONTE: Herb Scribner / AXIOS, 1/03/2026]

State of play: Trump announced military strikes against Iran on Saturday and vaguely called for Iranian people to overtake their government following months of their demanding a [regime change](#) amid worsening economic conditions.

- The attacks [were a result](#) of failed diplomacy over Iran's nuclear weapon supply as tensions mounted between the countries through Trump's second term.

After announcing the operation Saturday, Trump addressed Iranians in a video: "When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations."

- Trump exclusively [told Axios](#) the "off ramps" he envisions: "I can go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days and tell the Iranians: 'See you again in a few years if you start rebuilding [your nuclear and missile programs].'"

Reality check: Trump's Iran play is different than the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 under former President George W. Bush and the seizure of Venezuela's leader Nicolás Maduro in January — two instances where the U.S. took a more direct hand in dismantling a government's power structure.

- "Iran is different from both of those conflicts," retired U.S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor, professor of military history at The Ohio State University, tells Axios.



Both regime overthrows, the historians said, were done with future government infrastructure in mind — which is less clear in the Iran crisis so far.

- "As General David Petraeus remarked at the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, 'Tell me how this ends,'" Mansoor said.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (9)

[FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 14/06/2026]



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump · 1d



This Great Deal will bring Peace and Security to the whole Region. Many presidents have tried to make Peace with Iran, and all have failed before me. The Leaders of the Region have, for the first time, found a President who can help them achieve real Peace. With the opening of the Strait upon the signing of the Deal on Friday, for purposes of mine removal, oil will flow on both ends again for the Region, and the World! President DONALD J. TRUMP

 6.66k

 8.36k

 35.8k



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump · 1d

The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete. Congratulations to all! I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and, simultaneously herewith, authorize the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade. Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow! President DONALD J. TRUMP

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (10)

[FONTE: Michael Birnbaum / Washington Post, 15/06/2026. Mapa: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Trump sought to break Iran’s regime. He settled for reopening Hormuz.

The emerging agreement ends a costly war but leaves Iran’s leadership intact and its nuclear future still subject to negotiation.



Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (11)

[FONTE: Michael Birnbaum / Washington Post, 15/06/2026]

President Donald Trump declared an end to his campaign against Iran’s leaders with an exhortation on Sunday: “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!”

With the Iranian regime still in place, he was celebrating a resumption of the way the world was on Feb. 27, the day before the United States and Israel attacked Iran.

A return to a version of the status quo was a far cry from the original aims of a war effort that kicked off with a vow to come to the aid of the Iranian protesters who had taken to their nation’s streets to denounce their regime. Once strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in the opening hours of the war, Trump told Iranians that the moment to seize back their nation had come.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (12)

[FONTE: Michael Birnbaum / Washington Post, 15/06/2026]

In promoting a deal that halted the fighting, Trump and his top lieutenants said Iran had agreed not to pursue a nuclear weapon. But Iranian leaders, who have made similar pledges repeatedly for decades, suggested Sunday that the difficult conversations about their nuclear program were still ahead and would come only after the U.S. naval blockade on their ports was lifted.

With the details of Sunday's agreement still not public and nuclear issues a question mark, experts said it was too early to assess the full legacy of a conflict that spanned five-and-a-half weeks of intense fighting followed by more than two additional months of an uneasy truce as global oil stocks drained.

But Trump's approach has shifted. Rather than exhort Iranians to overthrow their repressive leaders, the focus is now on bargaining with the regime. The president has pushed back on military action that might jeopardize the peace, as he did Sunday with Netanyahu.

“As far as regime change, I never cared about regime change,” Trump told the Wall Street Journal on Sunday. Iran's current leadership is “the third group we've dealt with, and this is the most rational group yet.”

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (13)

[FONTE: Michael Birnbaum / Washington Post, 15/06/2026]

Some Middle East experts question that, even as many said a deal that ended the fighting and reopened the strait was likely superior to the alternative of continued war.

“If this agreement goes forward as reported, it will leave a brutal regime in control of Iran and in control of most of the tools it uses to threaten the region: ballistic missiles, drones and a weaker but still-dangerous regional proxy network in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen,” said Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

“Trump backed down here in a real sense,” Katulis said. “He knew that there were no good military options, so he had to get to some sort of a deal. Both sides are going to claim victory. That’s what the next four or five days will be about.”

As Trump sold his deal, some of his staunchest backers from the tough-on-Iran flank of his coalition questioned whether an end to the fighting now left the world in a better place.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (14)

[FONTE: ISW, 17/06/2026]

Key Takeaways

1. Multiple sources published what appears to be the text of the US-Iran agreement. Neither the United States nor Iran has officially published the text of the agreement at this time. The leaked text of the agreement, if accurate, indicates that Iran has emerged from the conflict in a stronger strategic position, however.
2. The MoU reportedly grants Iran significant economic relief, which Iran would likely use to try to reconstitute its missile, drone, and nuclear programs, as well as the Axis of Resistance. The MoU states that Iran could receive further economic relief by fulfilling its commitments in the MoU and reaching a final agreement that addresses key nuclear issues. ISW-CTP has not observed any indications that Iranian decision-makers are willing to make concessions on the nuclear issues that would be included in a final agreement, however.
3. Iran will likely try to exploit the agreement's seemingly ambiguous language about the Strait of Hormuz to try to enforce its control over shipping through the strait. The reported text of the agreement does not explicitly bar Iran from “managing” the strait, and Iran could therefore continue to insist on vessels using its illegal traffic separation scheme in Iranian territorial waters and paying “fees” to the IRGC Navy.
4. The Iranian regime is interpreting the clause in the agreement about a ceasefire “on all fronts” as a requirement for Israel to cease operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon. This interpretation is part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah by trying to secure Israel's capitulation in Lebanon.
5. The reported MoU terms indicate that Iran structured the agreement in a way to try to limit the United States' ability to impose renewed pressure on Iran during the 60-day negotiations period and thereby make it more challenging for the United States to extract concessions from Iran during the negotiations.
6. Iranian officials and media are largely framing the US-Iran MoU as an Iranian victory that codifies Iran's military achievements. The Iranian regime's English-language media outlet, Press TV, argued on June 16 that the MoU is not simply a ceasefire, but rather represents the “political codification of a battlefield reality.”

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (15)

[FONTE: ISW, 17/06/2026]

The MoU states that Iran could receive further economic relief by fulfilling its commitments in the MoU and reaching a final agreement that addresses key nuclear issues. ISW-CTP has not observed any indications that Iranian decision-makers are willing to make concessions on the nuclear issues that would be included in a final agreement, however. Block and Saudi media reported that the United States will release “frozen or restricted” funds and assets “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement.”[8] US Vice President JD Vance clarified to ABC News on June 15 that the release of frozen assets is contingent upon Iran taking “verified steps” to eliminate its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.[9] The United States, “together with its regional partners,” will also commit to forming a “rehabilitation and economic development” plan worth at least \$300 billion USD, according to the text published by Block, Saudi media, and several Western outlets.[10] An Iranian outlet affiliated with Supreme Leader Military Adviser Mohsen Rezaei similarly reported that the MoU requires the United States and its allies to present a reconstruction plan worth at least \$300 billion USD to Iran.[11] US President Donald Trump denied that the United States would give Iran \$300 million USD.[12] The economic development plan is contingent upon the United States and Iran reaching a final nuclear agreement that addresses Iran’s HEU stockpile and ability to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, but key Iranian decision-makers, such as Vahidi, have not signaled any willingness to concede on these issues. The current MoU reiterates Iran’s commitment not to produce a nuclear weapon. Iranian officials have historically insisted that Iran does not seek to produce a nuclear weapon, but the regime has nevertheless developed in recent years the latent capability to develop a nuclear weapon if it decides to do so.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (16)

[FONTE: Alarabiya English, 16/06/2026]

Memorando de Entendimento

Fonte: Alarabiya English, <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/06/16/al-arabiya-obtains-14point-draft-usiran-deal>

1. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos, juntamente com os seus aliados na guerra atual, declaram, no momento da assinatura deste Memorando de Entendimento, **o fim imediato e permanente da guerra em todas as frentes, incluindo o Líbano**, e comprometem-se a não lançar, a partir de agora, qualquer ação hostil um contra o outro, bem como a abster-se da ameaça ou do uso da força mútua. O acordo final confirmará as disposições deste Artigo e dos restantes Artigos. **Concessão importante ao Irão — O Líbano / Hezbollah não era objectivo da guerra**
2. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a respeitar a soberania e a integridade territorial mútua, e a abster-se de interferir nos assuntos internos um do outro. **Neutra**
3. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a **negociar e a alcançar um acordo final num prazo máximo de 60 dias**, prorrogável por consentimento mútuo. **Adiamento do problema**
4. Imediatamente após a assinatura deste Memorando de Entendimento, os Estados Unidos levantarão o bloqueio naval e impedirão qualquer interferência ou obstrução contra a República Islâmica do Irão, restaurando o tráfego à sua capacidade total num prazo máximo de 30 dias; o tráfego de navios por parte da República Islâmica do Irão deverá ser proporcional ao volume de tráfego anterior à guerra. Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se também a retirar as suas forças das áreas circundantes no prazo de 30 dias após o acordo final. **Abertura do Estreito de Ormuz**

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (17)

[FONTE: Alarabiya English, 16/06/2026]

5. Aquando da assinatura deste Memorando de Entendimento, a República Islâmica do Irão tomará imediatamente medidas para garantir que a circulação de navios mercantes desde o Golfo Pérsico até ao Mar de Omã, e vice-versa, seja retomada no prazo de 30 dias para o volume anterior à guerra, tendo em conta a necessidade de remoção de obstáculos técnicos e de neutralização de minas por parte do Irão. **Abertura do Estreito de Ormuz**

6. Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se, juntamente com os seus parceiros regionais, a criar um **plano abrangente e acordado por ambas as partes para a reabilitação e o desenvolvimento económico da República Islâmica do Irão, garantindo um financiamento de, pelo menos, 300 mil milhões de dólares**. O mecanismo de execução deste plano, como parte do acordo final, será formulado no prazo de 60 dias. **Concessão financeira futura maior ao Irão se concretizada — terá sido uma ideia do Qatar**

7. Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a pôr fim, de acordo com um calendário a ser acordado como parte do acordo final, **a todos os tipos de sanções que a República Islâmica do Irão atualmente enfrenta**, incluindo as resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e da Junta de Governadores da Agência Internacional da Energia Atómica (AIEA), bem como **todas as sanções unilaterais dos EUA, tanto primárias como secundárias**. **Concessão futura maior ao Irão**

8. **A República Islâmica do Irão reitera que nunca produzirá armas nucleares. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos acordaram que o destino do material enriquecido e o destino de todas as outras questões relacionadas com o nuclear mutuamente acordadas**, incluindo as necessidades nucleares do Irão, serão adequadamente tratados num acordo final; o acordo final confirmará as disposições deste Artigo. **Promessas vagas aos EUA. Não contém nada de novo. O Irão já dizia isso antes**

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (18)

[FONTE: Alarabiya English, 16/06/2026]

9. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos acordam que, pendente um acordo final, manterão o *status quo*: o Irão manterá o *status quo* no seu programa nuclear e os Estados Unidos não imporão novas sanções ao Irão nem reforçarão as suas forças na região. **Neutra**
10. Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a que, imediatamente após a assinatura deste Memorando de Entendimento e até à data do levantamento das sanções, o Departamento do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos **emitirá isenções para as exportações de petróleo bruto iraniano, produtos petroquímicos e seus derivados**, e todos os serviços relacionados, incluindo serviços bancários, de seguros, de transporte e similares. **Concessão imediata maior ao Irão**
11. Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a que, face ao progresso das negociações rumo a um acordo final, **os fundos e ativos congelados ou restritos da República Islâmica do Irão serão libertados e colocados totalmente à disposição. Estes fundos, quer sejam mantidos na conta principal ou transferidos, serão utilizados para qualquer pagamento ao beneficiário final determinado pelo Banco Central da República Islâmica do Irão e estarão totalmente disponíveis para utilização.** Os Estados Unidos comprometem-se a emitir todas as autorizações e licenças necessárias com base nisto.

Concessão maior ao Irão, superior ainda à do Acordo de 2015 de Obama

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (19)

[FONTE: Alarabiya English, 16/06/2026]

12. A República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos acordam que será estabelecido um mecanismo de execução para supervisionar a aplicação bem-sucedida e o compromisso futuro com o Acordo Final. **Neutra**
13. Após a assinatura deste Memorando de Entendimento, e mediante a receção de garantias relativas ao início da execução dos Artigos 4, 5, 10 e 11 deste Memorando de Entendimento, bem como à continuidade da execução destas medidas, a República Islâmica do Irão e os Estados Unidos iniciarão negociações para um Acordo Final exclusivamente no que diz respeito aos restantes Artigos. **Promessas vagas aos EUA. Adiamento do problema**
14. O acordo final será aprovado através de uma resolução vinculativa do Conselho de Segurança da ONU. **Neutra**

Balanco global

2 Cláusulas sobre o Estreito de Ormuz com efeitos imediatos após o acordo [aparentemente de troca por troca – desmantelamento do bloqueio e do contra-bloqueio]

5 Cláusulas com importantes concessões imediatas ou futuras ao Irão ao nível da retirada das sanções, acesso a fundos no exterior, etc.

3 Cláusulas com promessas vagas aos EUA de negociações e/ou adiamento do problema nuclear

4 Neutras

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (20)

[FONTE: Barak Ravid/ AXIOS, 16/06/2026]

Scoop: CIA director doubts Iran's intentions on deal, sources say

Barak Ravid



CIA Director John Ratcliffe at a Cabinet meeting in May. Photo: Kent Nishimura/AFP via Getty

CIA Director John Ratcliffe told President Trump and other senior officials that evidence gathered by U.S. intelligence agencies raises serious doubts about Iran's willingness to make the nuclear concessions the U.S. is seeking in any final deal, according to three sources familiar with those discussions.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (21)

[FONTE: Barak Ravid/ AXIOS, 16/06/2026]

Behind the scenes: There were a series of high-level meetings about the deal between Trump and his advisers in the lead-up to Sunday's announcement.

- During those meetings, Trump and his team discussed intel gathered by several U.S. intelligence agencies that showed that the way Iranian officials were discussing the deal among themselves was inconsistent with what they were telling the mediators and the U.S., two sources said.
- Ratcliffe and Rubio said that based on that intel, they doubted the Iranians would agree to take the **nuclear** steps the U.S. was seeking, according to two sources.
- "The intelligence reflects that the Iranian intentions are not in line with their commitments under the deal," a source said.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (22)

[FONTE: Barak Ravid/ AXIOS, 16/06/2026]

Between the lines: The full text of the 14-point initial deal has yet to be published, but a source familiar with the text contended that the Iranians will get more than they give under the MOU — unless they agree to sign a nuclear deal that meets the U.S. objectives.

The big picture: The deal is designed to [extend the ceasefire](#) and launch 60 days of negotiations, which can be extended by mutual consent.

- In the context of those talks, Iran reiterates its past commitment to never acquire or procure a nuclear weapon.
- The source said the MOU says the U.S. and Iran commit to "resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material" and "discuss the issue of future enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to Iran's nuclear needs based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal."
- The text says Iran will maintain the status quo of its nuclear program so long as negotiations continue. For its part, the U.S. won't impose new sanctions or deploy additional forces to the region.
- If a final nuclear deal is reached, within 30 days the U.S. will remove the forces it mobilized for the war and will terminate all sanctions against Iran under an agreed-upon schedule, according to the source's description of the text.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (23)

[FONTE: CNN, 16/06/2026]

US intel assesses Iran can shut down the Strait of Hormuz at will from now on



US intelligence agencies have recently assessed that Iran can effectively shut down access to the [Strait of Hormuz](#) at will from now on, meaning the country's regime has acquired a powerful new ability to hurt the global economy as a result of the war, according to three sources familiar with the findings.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (24)

[FONTE: CNN, 16/06/2026]

Regardless of the framework agreement that is due to be formally signed on Friday to open the key waterway as a prelude to nuclear talks, Iran proved it can shut off access to the strait during the current conflict and US intelligence assessments suggest that could happen again.

“We have now handed Iran de facto control over the strait – a weapon more powerful than any nuke,” one of the sources familiar with the US intelligence assessments told CNN, emphasizing how the war has fundamentally altered Tehran’s thinking about leveraging similar tactics in the future.

Iran has similarly learned it can leverage targeted strikes against the energy infrastructure of Gulf countries as an asymmetric capability after doing so to great effect during the war, another tool it can use to its advantage going forward, a second source familiar with the assessments said.

The US has had to negotiate with Iran intensively to fully re-open the strait, underscoring the Iranians’ continued leverage.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (25)

[FONTE: CNN, 16/06/2026]

And even as the two sides appear to have signed an agreement that would reopen the strait and end the current conflict, multiple sources said Iran has been plotting an economic “nuclear option” if negotiations with the US fall apart: getting the Houthis, the Iranians’ chief proxy force in Yemen, to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean — another global trade chokepoint that has served as a shipping lifeline amid Iran’s months-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz.



Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irã? (26)

[FONTE: CNN, 16/06/2026]

Miscalculation that emboldened Iran

Iran had long threatened to shut down the strait in response to an attack by foreign adversaries, including the US and Israel, but had not demonstrated the ability to successfully do so prior to Trump’s decision to launch combat operations along with Israel earlier this year.

One reason the Trump administration underestimated Iran’s willingness to close the strait earlier this year, multiple sources previously said, was officials believed doing so would hurt Iran more than the US — a view that was bolstered by Iran’s empty threats to act in the strait after US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities last summer.



Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (27)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

The Middle East Power Paradox

How the Iran War Will Transform America's Military Role

DANA STROUL

July/August 2026 *Published on June 16, 2026*



A U.S. fighter jet landing on an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea, March 2026

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (28)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

Throughout the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, Washington has relished the display of its conventional military superiority. President Donald Trump’s administration has boasted of its quantitative achievements: before the April 8 cease-fire, the United States alone flew more than 10,000 air sorties, hit over 130,000 targets, and intercepted 1,700 Iranian missiles and drones. According to U.S. Central Command, the campaign demolished more than 85 percent of the facilities that Tehran used to produce missiles and drones, sank the majority of Iran’s naval vessels, and eliminated 70 percent of its missile launch infrastructure.

But degrading Iran’s military capabilities was not the broad strategic goal Trump laid out in the early days of Operation Epic Fury. He variously promised to achieve the complete surrender of the regime, to protect the Iranian people from their leaders’ brutality, to rid the region of Iran’s malign influence entirely, and to wrest a better nuclear deal from Tehran than the one U.S. President Barack Obama reached in 2015. All these aims remain elusive. The regime in Tehran survived. And it has cleverly adapted toward an attrition strategy that has badly strained the U.S. arsenal, threatened civilian infrastructure across the Middle East, and added a new dimension of power projection by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and pressuring the global economy.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (29)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

In a bitter paradox, the Iran war revealed opportunities for U.S. Central Command to work much more effectively with regional militaries. But the trust deficit that has opened between the United States and its Gulf partners will make it far harder to take advantage of those opportunities. The Gulf states need clearer security commitments now more than ever. These countries, however, are losing faith that Washington is committed to ensuring their security, and both the American public and U.S. political leaders have lost what appetite they had for the costly, sustained work of countering Iran’s threats.

The Middle East after Epic Fury is not safer, more stable, or more prosperous. And if the United States fails to achieve the grand goals Trump set out before the war, its ability to rally partners in other theaters will be undermined, and its adversaries will be emboldened. To properly learn the war’s lessons, the United States has to change how it fights. The U.S. defense industrial base will need to innovate faster and pair with trusted partners in developing and coproducing an arsenal that can meet the demands of future wars. In the Middle East, the Pentagon will need to accelerate changes to its force posture and basing, and update the way it works with allies. Gulf countries are already looking for supplemental defense partners, and Washington must redouble its efforts to transition from being the region’s sole security guarantor to its security integrator. If it fails to do so, it could entrench the idea that the United States will be an impediment, not an asset, to allies as they seek to ensure their security.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (30)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

Epic Fury also put a stark spotlight on the immense material demands of modern warfare—and the United States’ unreadiness to fight for a sustained period. That the economics of war is changing had already been illuminated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent protracted war. High-end air defense systems and cutting-edge munitions are financially and operationally unsustainable against low-cost, long-term drone attacks. The Pentagon’s current inventories enabled it to overmatch Iran during Epic Fury. But it did so at a cost to other theaters and priorities. Washington expended an extraordinary amount of munitions striking targets within Iran itself: as the defense strategist Mackenzie Eaglen has pointed out, the U.S. military fired more than 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles in a few weeks—but it can produce only 90 to 100 per year. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to counter Iranian missile fire, the United States expended at least 190 THAAD interceptors and 1,060 Patriot interceptors between February 28 and April 8 alone. Those figures represented around 53 percent and 46 percent of the United States’ prewar inventories, respectively. At the rates that it can replenish these interceptors, the United States could not counter air threats in multiple theaters if it needed to.

Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (31)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

America fired more than 1,000 Tomahawks but can produce only 90 to 100 per year.

Unlike during the 12-day war, when an Iranian attack on Qatari territory did not disrupt the country’s close relationship with the U.S. military, within 24 hours Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had closed their airspace to U.S. military aircraft and placed other restrictions on how the Pentagon used

their bases. These Gulf states feared that Trump’s lack of response to the attack on the UAE’s oil terminal, in particular, would continue to embolden Tehran. Without military cooperation from geographically close countries, Project Freedom could not continue, and for the first time during the war, Iran forced open a temporary fissure between the United States and key Gulf partners.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia quickly restored the U.S. military’s access. But such episodes of distrust and rupture are likely to recur. And even before the war, Middle Eastern leaders were looking for more diversity in their military acquisitions and defense partnerships. This search is now accelerating. At the height of Iran’s retaliation, the UAE requested that Israel deploy troops and additional air defense systems to its territory. Ukraine sent teams of counterdrone experts across the Middle East and, in late March, signed long-term security agreements



Um bom “memorando de entendimento” para terminar com a guerra no Irão? (33)

[FONTE: Dana Stroul / Foreign Affairs, 16/06/2026]

ADAPT OR DIE

The U.S. military demonstrated that, together with Israel, it was able to significantly degrade the capabilities of an adversary in a short time. But the recent war made it clear that Iran can project power in new ways—and even more important, that its ability to adapt in the midst of an ongoing conflict is much greater than the United States had planned for. So instead of diminishing the broader Iranian threat, the war generated new perils for the Gulf states and the global economy.

The greatest problem for the United States in the Middle East now is its inability to turn military achievements into strategic wins. Tehran’s newfound willingness to directly threaten its Gulf neighbors, and its eagerness to use global economic coercion, means the United States must retain a military presence in the Middle East and keep backing its longtime partners’ efforts to defend themselves. But Americans are not sold on deepening these military partnerships. Over the past few years, polling has consistently shown that Americans want to fight fewer foreign wars and retrench from the Middle East specifically. A March Reuters/Ipsos survey showed that most Americans wanted a quick exit from Iran, even if a strategic victory had not been achieved. U.S. political leaders will likely balk at reinforcing security commitments in the Middle East precisely when the region will seek them.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES


A crise da diplomacia europeia (1)

[FONTE: União Europeia / Serviço de Publicações Oficiais]



A crise da diplomacia europeia (2)

[FONTE: União Europeia / EU As a Global Actor, 2022]



A crise da diplomacia europeia (3)

[FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

TÍTULO V

DISPOSIÇÕES GERAIS RELATIVAS À AÇÃO EXTERNA DA UNIÃO E DISPOSIÇÕES ESPECÍFICAS RELATIVAS À POLÍTICA EXTERNA E DE SEGURANÇA COMUM

CAPÍTULO 1

DISPOSIÇÕES GERAIS RELATIVAS À AÇÃO EXTERNA DA UNIÃO

Artigo 21.º

1. A ação da União na cena internacional assenta nos princípios que presidiram à sua criação, desenvolvimento e alargamento, e que é seu objetivo promover em todo o mundo: democracia, Estado de direito, universalidade e indivisibilidade dos direitos do Homem e das liberdades fundamentais, respeito pela dignidade humana, princípios da igualdade e solidariedade e respeito pelos princípios da Carta das Nações Unidas e do direito internacional.

A União procura desenvolver relações e constituir parcerias com os países terceiros e com as organizações internacionais, regionais ou mundiais que partilhem dos princípios enunciados no primeiro parágrafo. Promove soluções multilaterais para os problemas comuns, particularmente no âmbito das Nações Unidas.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (4)

[FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

Artigo 22.º

1. Com base nos princípios e objetivos enunciados no artigo 21.º, o Conselho Europeu identifica os interesses e objetivos estratégicos da União.

As decisões do Conselho Europeu sobre os interesses e objetivos estratégicos da União incidem nos domínios da política externa e de segurança comum e noutros domínios que se insiram no âmbito da ação externa da União. Essas decisões podem dizer respeito às relações da União com um país ou uma região ou seguir uma abordagem temática. Definem a sua duração e os meios a facultar pela União e pelos Estados-Membros.

O Conselho Europeu delibera por unanimidade, por recomendação do Conselho por este adotada de acordo com as regras previstas para cada domínio. As decisões do Conselho Europeu são executadas nos termos dos Tratados.

2. O Alto Representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança, no domínio da política externa e de segurança comum, e a Comissão, nos restantes domínios da ação externa, podem apresentar propostas conjuntas ao Conselho.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (5)

[FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

CAPÍTULO 2

DISPOSIÇÕES ESPECÍFICAS RELATIVAS À POLÍTICA EXTERNA E DE SEGURANÇA COMUM

SECÇÃO 1

DISPOSIÇÕES COMUNS

Artigo 23.º

A ação da União na cena internacional ao abrigo do presente capítulo assenta nos princípios, prossegue os objetivos e é conduzida em conformidade com as disposições gerais enunciadas no Capítulo 1.

Artigo 24.º

(ex-artigo 11.º TUE)

1. A competência da União em matéria de política externa e de segurança comum abrange todos os domínios da política externa, bem como todas as questões relativas à segurança da União, incluindo a definição gradual de uma política comum de defesa que poderá conduzir a uma defesa comum.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (6)

[FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

A política externa e de segurança comum está sujeita a regras e procedimentos específicos. É definida e executada pelo Conselho Europeu e pelo Conselho, que deliberam por unanimidade, salvo disposição em contrário dos Tratados. Fica excluída a adoção de atos legislativos. Esta política é executada pelo Alto Representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança e pelos Estados-Membros, nos termos dos Tratados. Os papéis específicos que cabem ao Parlamento Europeu e à Comissão neste domínio são definidos pelos Tratados. O Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia não dispõe de competência no que diz respeito a estas disposições, com exceção da competência para verificar a observância do artigo 40.º do presente Tratado e fiscalizar a legalidade de determinadas decisões a que se refere o segundo parágrafo do artigo 275.º do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.

2. No quadro dos princípios e objetivos da sua ação externa, a União conduz, define e executa uma política externa e de segurança comum baseada no desenvolvimento da solidariedade política mútua entre os Estados-Membros, na identificação das questões de interesse geral e na realização de um grau de convergência crescente das ações dos Estados-Membros.

3. Os Estados-Membros apoiarão ativamente e sem reservas a política externa e de segurança da União, num espírito de lealdade e de solidariedade mútua, e respeitam a ação da União neste domínio.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (7)

[FONTE: Tratado da União Europeia]

Artigo 31.º

(ex-artigo 23.º TUE)

1. As decisões ao abrigo do presente capítulo são tomadas pelo Conselho Europeu e pelo Conselho, deliberando por unanimidade, salvo disposição em contrário do presente capítulo. Fica excluída a adoção de atos legislativos.

Qualquer membro do Conselho que se abstenha numa votação pode fazer acompanhar a sua abstenção de uma declaração formal nos termos do presente parágrafo. Nesse caso, não é obrigado a aplicar a decisão, mas deve reconhecer que ela vincula a União. Num espírito de solidariedade mútua, esse Estado-Membro deve abster-se de qualquer atuação suscetível de colidir com a ação da União baseada na referida decisão ou de a dificultar; os demais Estados-Membros respeitarão a posição daquele. Se os membros do Conselho que façam acompanhar a sua abstenção da citada declaração representarem, no mínimo, um terço dos Estados-Membros que reúna, no mínimo, um terço da população da União, a decisão não é adotada.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (8)

[FONTE: União Europeia]

Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa (SEAE)

Panorâmica

- **Função:** gere as relações diplomáticas da UE com os países não pertencentes à UE e conduz a política externa e de segurança europeia
- **Alta representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança:** Kaja Kallas
- **Instituído em:** 2011
- **Sede:** Bruxelas (Bélgica)
- **Sítio Internet:** [Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa](#)

O Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa (SEAE) é o **serviço diplomático** da UE. O seu objetivo é garantir uma maior coerência e eficácia da política externa da UE, reforçando, assim, a influência da Europa a nível mundial.

O que faz o SEAE?

- Apoia o/a [alto/a representante da UE](#) na condução da [política externa e de segurança da UE](#)
- Gere as **relações diplomáticas e as parcerias estratégicas** com países terceiros
- Colabora com os serviços diplomáticos nacionais dos **países da UE, as Nações Unidas e outras potências mundiais**

A crise da diplomacia europeia (9)

[FONTE: União Europeia]

Composição

O Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa é dirigido pelo/a responsável pela política externa da UE ou **alto/a representante da União para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança**. É composto:

- **em Bruxelas**, por pessoal especializado transferido do [Conselho da UE](#), da [Comissão Europeia](#) e dos serviços diplomáticos dos países da UE
- **em todo o mundo**, por uma rede de [delegações, que funcionam como uma espécie de embaixada da UE](#)

Como funciona o SEAE?

O/a alto/a representante é também Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia. Representa a política externa e de segurança da UE em todo o mundo, coordena o trabalho da Comissão Europeia no domínio das relações externas da UE e preside às reuniões dos ministros dos negócios estrangeiros, da defesa e do desenvolvimento. O/a alto/a representante / Vice-Presidente é responsável pela execução da **política externa e de segurança da UE**, em colaboração com os países da UE e utilizando recursos nacionais e europeus, contribuindo para garantir a coerência da política externa da UE.



No exterior das suas fronteiras, a UE é representada por **gabinetes nos diferentes países** – as [delegações da UE](#) – que têm um papel semelhante ao de uma embaixada.


A crise da diplomacia europeia (10)

[FONTE: Serviço Europeu para a Acção Externa]



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HIGHLIGHTS
EEAS Open Day 2025
10 MAY 2025








HIGHLIGHTS: #StandWithUkraine

HIGHLIGHTS: EEAS Open Day 2025

HIGHLIGHTS: Looking back: key moments over 25 years of AU-EU Partnership



High Representative / Vice President
KAJA KALLAS

-  HR/VP on Instagram 
-  HR/VP on Blue Sky 
-  Kaja Kallas HR/VP on X 
-  HR/VP Responsibilities & agenda

A crise da diplomacia europeia (11)

[FONTE: União Europeia / EU As a Global Actor, 2022]

THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE EU's Diplomatic Service

MISSION

The EEAS is the European Union's diplomatic service. It carries out the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy to promote peace, development, security, and the interests of European citizens around the world. It is led by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

IN FIGURES

6000+ Staff in EEAS headquarters + EU Diplomatic Representations

145 EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS AROUND THE WORLD



nearly
400
national diplomats
are seconded from
Member State
ministries to the
EEAS.

18

The EU is a **security provider**, with 5000+ soldiers, police and special advisers deployed across 3 continents in **18 civilian missions and military operations** to prevent conflicts and build peace.

49% of all staff are
Women

9

EU Special Representatives promoting the EU's policies and interests in certain regions and countries as well as issues of particular concern or interest for the EU like Human Rights.

Since 2000
160 EU Election Observation Missions have been deployed around the world to strengthen and support democracy.

WHAT

A crise da diplomacia europeia (12)

[FONTE: Comissão Europeia. QFP 2021-2027]

Single Market, Innovation and Digital

149.5 (+ 11.5 from NGEU)

Cohesion, Resilience and Values

426.7 (+ 776.5 from NGEU)

Natural Resources and Environment

401 (+ 18.9 from NGEU)

Migration and Border Management

25.7

Security and Defence

14.9


Neighbourhood and the World

110.6

European Public Administration

82.5

Total: €2.018 trillion




A crise da diplomacia europeia (13)

[FONTE: Euractiv, 18/05/2026]

EEAS in crisis: Who speaks for Europe?

'It's a bit of a duck-billed platypus,' said former EU Ambassador James Moran about the EU's diplomatic arm

Euractiv • Last updated: May 18, 2026 - 10:27



A crise da diplomacia europeia (14)

[FONTE: Euractiv, 18/05/2026]

The EU's diplomatic service under the leadership of Kaja Kallas is facing an unprecedented bout of internal turmoil – exposing existential questions about whether the bloc's foreign policy machinery is fit for purpose.

Created under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was designed as a compromise between Brussels and national capitals: strong enough to coordinate diplomacy on behalf of the EU's governments collectively, independently of the European Commission, but weak enough not to threaten national foreign ministries.

Caught between capitals and Commission

Over 15 years later, officials across the EU institutions say that compromise is increasingly under strain.

"There should be fewer intrigues between and inside the European Commission and the External Action Service," former Estonian foreign minister and current MEP Urmas Paet told *Euractiv*. "It looks really ridiculous with burning issues around the world."

A crise da diplomacia europeia (15)

[FONTE: Euractiv, 18/05/2026]

The EEAS occupies an awkward place in the EU's institutional architecture: formally independent, yet politically tethered to both the Commission and the member states. The tension is embodied in the "double hatted" office held by Kallas as simultaneously both the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, or HRVP for short.

"It's always been difficult because it's a bit of a duck-billed platypus," said James Moran, a former EU Ambassador and now associate senior research fellow at CEPS, a Brussels think tank.

Officials inside the EEAS complain privately that the Berlaymont has increasingly encroached on its territory, while Commission officials reject suggestions of a deliberate power grab.

One EU diplomat argued that the growing overlap between geopolitics and economic policy has inevitably shifted power toward the Commission.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (16)

[FONTE: Euractiv, 18/05/2026]

Whose mandate? Who speaks for EU?

“Where they have a mandate, they deliver. The problem is that it is a very enigmatic institution with a rather weak mandate,” said Juraj Majcin, a policy analyst at the European Policy Centre, an EU affairs think tank in Brussels.

Majcin pointed to recent security partnerships with countries such as India and Australia as examples of areas where the EEAS has functioned effectively. But he argued that the institution still struggles to define its place inside the EU system.

“As long as the treaty applies, there will be a European External Action Service,” Moran said, adding that its efficacy depends on leadership and member states’ willingness to act collectively.

Earlier this week, Kallas [put herself forward](#) to play the leading role in potential future negotiations with Russia, prompting a debate that highlights the EEAS’s wider political problems.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (17)

[FONTE: FT, 10/06/2026]

EU foreign policy

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EU countries weigh 'tearing apart' bloc's diplomatic service

Chief diplomat Kaja Kallas and her EEAS are in capitals' crosshairs over leadership and co-ordination issues



A crise da diplomacia europeia (18)

[FONTE: FT, 10/06/2026]

France and Germany are discussing proposals for a radical overhaul of the EU's 15-year-old diplomatic service in an attempt to improve the bloc's response to geopolitical crises.

Paris, Berlin and other capitals are weighing options that include stripping powers from the bloc's chief diplomat Kaja Kallas and her €1bn-a-year External Action Service (EEAS) and returning them to the [European Commission](#) and member states, according to five senior officials briefed on the discussions.

“It is clear that [the EEAS] doesn't work the way it should in today's world. It is dysfunctional,” said one of the officials.

“The problem is structural and so the structure needs to be rebuilt.”

A crise da diplomacia europeia (19)

[FONTE: FT, 10/06/2026]

In recent years, the EU has been roiled by the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the whims of US President Donald Trump and the rising use of tariffs, economic coercion and energy supplies as foreign policy tools, with many questioning whether the EEAS is up to the task of coordinating effective responses.

The proposal, which would reverse the aims of a [16-year-old decision](#) to create the EEAS as an autonomous service, is one of several options detailed in a French government assessment shared with other member states.

One idea proposed by Paris is to limit the autonomy of the top diplomat — currently a double-hatted role answering to member states and the Commission — and loosen her control over the network of more than 140 delegations that the EEAS operates in countries around the world.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (20)

[FONTE: FT, 10/06/2026]

“Capitals are annoyed and want an effective way for us to act in unison externally,” said another of the officials. “There’s a real risk that the [EEAS] gets torn apart.”

Proponents of restructuring the diplomatic service believe it is feasible without changing the EU treaty, which states that the EEAS should “assist” the top diplomat under terms agreed by member states and dating back to 2010. Any changes to those terms would require unanimous support from the EU’s 27 member states.

Several countries have argued in private that there is too much overlap and a lack of co-ordination between the EEAS, national foreign ministries and the external relations directorates of the Commission and Council, the officials said.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (21)

[FONTE: FT, 10/06/2026]

Moving EEAS powers to directorates inside the Commission and Council could save money by slashing posts, the officials said. Drafting sanctions lists and proposals for military missions, for instance, could be shifted to the Council, while day-to-day diplomacy would be overseen by the Commission.

Ideas about how to reshape the EU foreign service are also being factored into the drafting of a new security strategy set to be published by the Commission this summer, two of the officials said.

The French assessment of potential remedies, which is preliminary, is being discussed bilaterally at senior levels between EU governments and is one of multiple options floated about the future of the EEAS, the officials said. Paris has been clear that all the options have pros and cons.

The Élysée Palace declined to comment.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (22)

IFONTE: Euronews. 13/06/20261

Backlash against Kallas reveals hard truths of EU foreign policy

The growing criticism of Kaja Kallas as High Representative has laid bare structural shortcomings and tensions in the European Union's foreign policy.

9:49



A crise da diplomacia europeia (23)

[FONTE: Euronews, 13/06/2026]

"Could the EEAS function better? Probably yes. Could the High Representative do things differently in her cabinet? Probably yes. But let's face it, the biggest issue here is a divided Council," where member states sit.

"It's important that the EU has a strong High Representative. That's in our interest."

A third diplomat noted that the inherent limitations of the role — assigned by leaders at the start of each five-year mandate — make it a mission impossible, regardless of the strengths of the chosen person.

"Structurally, the High Representative cannot succeed, regardless of who it is. She/he doesn't have tools. All previous High Representatives failed, and so will those in the future. So it is not about the name," the diplomat said.

The fact that Kallas comes from Eastern Europe is also fuelling the political backlash, this diplomat said, as the former premier takes a hard line on Russia that some nations in Western and Southern Europe believe goes too far.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (24)

[FONTE: Euronews, 13/06/2026]

Mission impossible

The real problems, diplomats say, go beyond Kallas.

They stem from a complex and outdated institutional setting that places the High Representative between the European Commission, the independent executive, where she serves as one of the vice presidents, and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the bloc's diplomatic arm, which she leads on her own.


On top of that, foreign policy at the EU level is bound by unanimity, which means the decision-making is strictly within the remit of capitals. One single "no" is enough to derail an entire course of action, even a mundane statement.

In practice, this leaves Kallas in charge of steering a foreign policy whose direction ultimately escapes her control.


"The EEAS and the position of High Representative were created in a different time and age, when the world looked completely different. If you were to create the system from scratch, you wouldn't do it now the way it was done then," another senior diplomat said.

A crise da diplomacia europeia (24)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Rodrigo / Expresso, 12/05/2023]



Bibliografia



IRAN'S RISE AND RIVALRY WITH THE US IN THE MIDDLE EAST



MOHSEN M. MILANI