


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a era da imprevisibilidade

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO N° 25**


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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (1)

[FONTE: Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, ed. original 1889]



A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Alfred Thayer Mahan, (born September 27, 1840, West Point, New York, U.S. —died December 1, 1914, Quogue, New York), American naval officer and historian who was a highly influential exponent of sea power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.



Alfred Thayer Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan, c. 1904.
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
(cph 3a11341)

Mahan was the son of a professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1859 and went on to serve nearly 40 years of active duty in the United States Navy. He fought in the American Civil War, later served on the staff of Adm. J.A.B.

Dahlgren, and was steadily promoted, reaching the rank of captain in 1885. In 1884 he was invited by Stephen Luce, president of the newly established Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, to lecture on naval history and tactics there. Mahan became the college's president in 1886 and held that post until 1889.

In 1890 Mahan published his college lectures as *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. In this book he argued for the paramount importance of sea power in national historical supremacy. The book, which came at a time of great technological improvement in warships, won immediate recognition


A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (3)

[FONTE: US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Milestones: 1866–1898 - Office of the Historian

Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s

In 1890, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a lecturer in naval history and the president of the United States Naval War College, published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, a revolutionary analysis of the importance of naval power as a factor in the rise of the British Empire. Two years later, he completed a supplementary volume, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*.



Book Cover of the 12th Edition of Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (4)

[FONTE: US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain's emergence as the world's dominant military, political, and economic power. Mahan and some leading American politicians believed that these lessons could be applied to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the quest to expand U.S. markets overseas.

The 1890s were marked by social and economic unrest throughout the United States, which culminated in the onset of an economic depression between 1893 and 1894. The publication of Mahan's books preceded much of the disorder associated with the 1890s, but his work resonated with many leading intellectuals and politicians concerned by the political and economic challenges of the period and the declining lack of economic opportunity on the American continent.

Mahan's books complemented the work of one of his contemporaries, Professor Frederick Jackson Turner, who is best known for his seminal essay of 1893, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." An American history professor at the University of Wisconsin, Turner postulated that westward migration across the North American continent and the country's population growth had finally led to the "closing" of the American frontier, with profound social and economic consequences. While Turner did not explicitly argue for a shift towards commercial expansion overseas, he did note that calls for a "vigorous foreign policy" were signs that Americans were increasingly looking outside the continental United States in order to satiate their desire for new economic opportunities and markets.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (5)

[FONTE: US Department of State / Office of the Historian]

Mahan was one of the foremost proponents of the “vigorous foreign policy” referred to by Turner. Mahan believed that the U.S. economy would soon be unable to absorb the massive amounts of industrial and commercial goods being produced domestically, and he argued that the United States should seek new markets abroad. What concerned Mahan most was ensuring that the U.S. Government could guarantee access to these new international markets. Securing such access would require three things: a merchant navy, which could carry American products to new markets across the “great highway” of the high seas; an American battleship navy to deter or destroy rival fleets; and a network of naval bases capable of providing fuel and supplies for the enlarged navy, and maintaining open lines of communications between the United States and its new markets.

Mahan’s emphasis upon the acquisition of naval bases was not completely new. Following the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward had attempted to expand the U.S. commercial presence in Asia by [purchasing Alaska in 1867](#), and increasing American influence over Hawaii by concluding a reciprocity treaty that would bind the islands’ economy to that of the United States. Seward also attempted to purchase suitable Caribbean naval bases. Finally, he attempted to ratify a treaty with the Colombian Government that would allow the United States to build an isthmian canal through the province of Panama. In the wake of the Civil War, however, Congress became preoccupied with Reconstruction in the South, and the Senate rejected all of Seward’s efforts to create a network of American naval bases.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (6)

[FONTE: Nicholas J. Danby / U.S. Naval Institute, Fevereiro de 2021]



The Roots of Roosevelt's Navalism

Historians long have credited Alfred Thayer Mahan with shaping Theodore Roosevelt's ideas about sea power. In fact, the future President's fascination with ships dated back to his childhood and his opinions on naval expansion to his college years.

On 3 September 1901, before a strenuous day of shaking a thousand hands and reviewing Minnesota National Guard troops, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt formally opened the annual Minnesota State Fair in Minneapolis with his rousing "National Duties" speech. While "laughter and applause mingled throughout his address in equal proportions," both the public and the press seemed to miss its significance.¹


Toward the middle of his speech, Roosevelt famously stated, "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far."² But neither national newspapers nor the local press deemed the remark insightful enough to include in their highlights of Roosevelt's speech. It would be insightful soon enough. Just four days later in Buffalo, New York, an assassin shot President William McKinley. Nine days after that, Vice President Roosevelt would become President Roosevelt. And his epigrammatic aphorism would shape U.S. foreign policy for the next century.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (7)

[FONTE: US Naval History and Heritage Command]

Spanish-American War

Battleship *Maine* passes Morro Castle as it enters the Havana harbor, Cuba, 25 January 1898. It was destroyed the following month by an explosion that killed 266 American Sailors. The incident was a catalyst for the Spanish-American War. Naval History and Heritage Command photograph, NH 48619.



A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (8)

[FONTE: Nicholas J. Danby / U.S. Naval Institute, Fevereiro de 2021]

The Spanish-American War was preceded by three years of intense fighting by Cuban revolutionaries who sought to gain independence from Spanish colonial rule. From 1895–98, the conflict in Cuba captured the attention of the American public mostly because of the economic and political instability within close geographical proximity to the United States. The U.S. press and political establishment also had a role in stirring up American sentiment. By early 1898, tensions between the United States and Spain were mounting. After [battleship Maine](#) exploded and was sunk in the Havana harbor on 15 February 1898, U.S. military intervention in Cuba became likely. On 20 April, Congress passed a joint resolution that acknowledged Cuba's independence, demanding that Spain give up control of the island and authorizing President William McKinley to use whatever military measures he deemed necessary to guarantee the independence of Cuba. The Spanish government saw no alternative but to rejecting U.S. demands and severing all diplomatic relations. McKinley responded by ordering a naval blockade of Cuba and issued an order for the call-up and deployment of 125,000 military personnel, termed "volunteers" at the time.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (9)

[FONTE: Nicholas J. Danby / U.S. Naval Institute, Fevereiro de 2021]

At this point, the war was all but over due to the sheer dominance of the U.S. military's superior naval and ground forces and because Spain was not prepared for a war with an up and coming world power. On 26 July, at the request of the Spanish government, the French ambassador in Washington, Jules Cambon, approached the McKinley administration to discuss peace terms. As a result of the talks, a cease-fire was signed on 12 August. The war officially ended four months later when the U.S. and Spanish governments signed a Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898.

The war ended Spain's colonial empire in the western hemisphere and also secured the position of the United States as a Pacific power. The U.S. victory compelled Spain to relinquish claims on Cuba, and to cede sovereignty over Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (the United States agreed to pay \$20 million for the latter). The United States also annexed the territory of Hawaii as a result of the conflict. Consequently, the war enabled the United States to establish its predominance in the Caribbean region and to pursue strategic and economic interests in Asia. It also forged the way toward the construction of the Panama Canal, linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (10)

[FONTE: Ronald B. St. John, European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1889-1906]

EUROPEAN

NAVAL EXPANSION

AND MAHAN, 1889-1906

Much has been written about the influence that Alfred Thayer Mahan had upon naval policy and ship construction of major maritime powers. The author postulates that Mahan's writings largely substantiated policies and strategies already conceived, especially in England and Germany. He reasons that Mahan's greatest influence was with Germany who, at the turn of the century, was in the throes of building an overseas empire.

An article prepared

by

Captain Ronald B. St. John, U.S. Army

Beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, there occurred in Europe an unprecedented expansion in naval forces. The new European naval expansion took the form of an uncritical demand for seapower and sparked the greatest warship building boom in history. A comparison of Europe's fleets in

1900 and 1914 graphically illustrates the expansion which took place.¹

The impetus for this phenomenal expansion was closely rooted in the tenor of the time—Social Darwinism, imperialism, and militarism. To be great, a state had to have a colonial empire; and to have a colonial empire, it had to

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1900

	Great Britain	France	Russia	Germany
Battleships	45	33	17	12
Cruisers	126	38	14	20
Torpedo-Gunboats	<u>34</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>4</u>
	205	92	40	36

EFFECTIVE FIGHTING SHIPS, COMPLETED—1914

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Russia	Austria-Hungary
Battleships	68	21	37	8	11
Cruisers	110	30	48	14	7
Destroyers	218	83	142	105	19
Torpedo-Boats	70	153	47	25	58
Submarines	<u>76</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>10</u>
	542	357	301	177	105

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (11)

[FONTE: Ronald B. St. John, *European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1889-1906*]

At any rate, it is impossible to conclude other than that Mahan influenced German naval expansion much more than he affected the growth of the Royal Navy after 1888. The publication in 1890 of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* stirred Wilhelm's lifelong interest in navies and added strength to the efforts begun in 1888 to increase and modernize the German Navy. Throughout the decade from 1890 to 1900, Mahan's principles were cited again and again in support of German naval expansion, especially by the German Navy League. Mahan's clear, concise presentation had a definite influence on the shipbuilding programs of both England and Germany; but it had a greater influence on German naval expansion, probably because Germany lacked the strong naval tradition which England had cultivated for over 300 years.

However, to hold Mahan's writings responsible for European naval expansion after 1888 would be to overlook other forces which would have resulted in naval expansion even in the absence of Admiral Mahan. European naval expansion at the turn of the last century had its roots in the wave of imperialism which swept over the Continent in the 1880's. To remain a great power, a state had to secure colonial possessions; and to take and hold colonies, it had to have a strong navy. In such an age the principles of Mahan were predestined to receive a warm welcome; but the age and its ideas did not originate with the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Admiral Mahan did not bring new ideas to England, Germany, and some of the other European countries; but the theories set forth in his writings crystallized and clarified old ideas. Moreover, his writings appeared at precisely the time the Europeans needed them to justify their naval increases.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (12)


[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



Kaiser William I, Alfred von Tirpitz e Helmuth Moltke em 1912

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (13)

[FONTE: Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 2013]



A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (14)

[FONTE: Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 2013]

CHAPTER TWO

MAHAN'S INFLUENCE ON JAPANESE SEA POWER

Nature of Influence

Japanese leaders, civil and military, were quick to note the contemporary relevance of Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History*. The navy found in this book both a uniquely American doctrine (a national policy of greatness through overseas expansion) and universally applicable naval theories (strategic principles). As to the former, Japanese leaders said Mahan's works must be carefully studied for what they revealed about the direction of American national policy. In particular, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (1897) was an "ideal weathervane for the secret of America's national power and its future projections abroad."¹ This may be called an "American studies" approach to Mahan.

Naval leaders saw in Mahan's works more than guidebooks to American expansionism. They were keenly aware that his works formulated universally applicable strategic doctrines. They believed they could extract "certain immutable principles." Kaneko Kentarō had this in mind when he introduced *Influence of Sea Power* to Japan. He urged readers of the Japanese translation "to study it

carefully and strive so that the Japanese Empire can secure sea power in the Pacific." Concerning the universality of Mahan's strategic teachings, Fleet Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō of Tsushima fame later paid this homage: "Naval strategists of all nations are of one opinion that Admiral Mahan's works will forever occupy the highest position as a world-wide authority in the study of military science. I express my deep and cordial reverence for his far-reaching knowledge and keen judgment."² Moreover, as we will see later, Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power* in Japanese translation provided a weighty and sophisticated theory that Japan's navalists could use to assert their primacy in budgetary appropriations in competition with the army. The sea power doctrine provided navy leaders such as Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei with a bureaucratic rationale for planning a naval buildup.

Mahan's writings became canon in the navy, but did its officers really read them? Mahan's convoluted prose must have seemed formidable. Even Admiral Suzuki Kantarō, one of the three most illustrious naval theorists (the other two being Akiyama Saneyuki and Satō Tetsutarō, discussed shortly) who taught in the Naval Staff College in the early twentieth century, confessed that the English original of *Influence* was beyond him and that he waited for a Japanese translation. But even the Japanese version, written in florid and long-winded prose, was hardly readable. Lieutenant Commander Ogasawara Naganari found it necessary to write a simplified version, *Teikoku kaigun shiron* (On the History of the Imperial Navy), using examples from Japanese naval history. In its preface he wrote, "Mahan's book [*Influence*] is not only too technical but its argumentations too profound and erudite to be understood by our youth."³

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (15)

[FONTE: USNI News, 5/03/2025]

Trump's 'Make Shipbuilding Great Again' Order Calls for Wholesale Overhaul of U.S. Maritime Industry



The Trump administration wants a sweeping government-wide overhaul of the U.S. commercial and military maritime sectors in an effort to catch up to China's unrivaled shipbuilding capacity, according to draft documents obtained by USNI News.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (16)

[FONTE: USNI News, 5/03/2025]

The draft of an executive order, dated Feb. 27, calls on administration officials to create a maritime action plan over the next six months to revamp the American maritime industry.

"The United States has always been a maritime nation, but today China's shipbuilding sector has established a position of dominance in the global market through unfair non-market practices, creating over 200 times the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry," reads a draft White House fact sheet accompanying the draft order.

The order will create a new maritime industrial base office within the White House's National Security Council to lead the effort. Trump announced the new office on Tuesday night during a joint address to Congress.

"To boost our defense industrial base, we are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry, including commercial shipbuilding and military shipbuilding. And for that purpose, I am announcing tonight that we will create a new office of shipbuilding in the White House and offer special tax incentives to bring this industry home to America, where it belongs," Trump said.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (17)

[FONTE: USNI News, 5/03/2025]

The maritime action plan must include a wide range of items, including a probe into China's "unfair targeting of maritime logistics, and shipbuilding sectors," the creation of a maritime security trust fund that could put money toward a shipbuilding financial incentives program for the next nine years and the creation of maritime opportunity zones to promote shipbuilding investment.

"As the leading economic and geopolitical power in the world, the United States needs a flexible funding source – akin to but distinct from a sovereign wealth fund – that is capable of underwriting our affirmative vision," reads a section in the EO about the trust fund. The proposal wants to use tariff and tax money to build up the fund.

The plan also calls on the Department of Homeland Security to impose the Harbor Maintenance Tax on foreign cargo and certify that carriers offloading foreign cargo in Mexico or Canada pay the relevant charges and another 10 percent fee, according to the executive order language.

"The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take immediate action to require all foreign origin cargo to clear the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) process at a U.S. port of entry for security and collection of all applicable customs, taxes, tariffs, fees, interest, and other charges," reads the draft EO.

A geopolítica do poder marítimo: a ascensão dos EUA a potência global (18)

[FONTE: Le Monde, 10/1/2025. FOTO: CNN]



Trump revives imperialism à la Teddy Roosevelt

Donald Trump's positioning on Greenland and the Panama Canal echoes the Monroe Doctrine, which established the 'Western Hemisphere' as an area of US hegemony.

There's a sense of déjà vu in the air. Donald Trump shocked his allies on Tuesday, January 7, by not ruling out the use of force to retake the Panama Canal or purchase Greenland. With this bluff, the president-elect is reviving the old tradition of US imperialism at the turn of the 20th century. The "golden age," which began after the Civil War, is one Trump dreams of: it was marked by the amassing of colossal fortunes, widespread corruption and inward-looking tariffs that protected US industry and meant there was no income tax. Above all, it was defined by imperialism to ensure US hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. During this period, the US bought Alaska from the Russians (1867), invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines – "liberated" in 1898 from Spanish colonialism, and dug the Panama Canal, completed in 1914.

A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (1) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 27/04/2021]

China: The rise of a trade titan

27 April 2021

By Alessandro Nicita and Carlos Razo, UNCTAD




Terracotta sculptures of Chinese warriors. / © Lukas Hlavac

China is perhaps one of the most unprecedented stories of economic development in recent history. In the last 25 years, the country's economy rapidly expanded, lifting more people out of poverty than anywhere else in the world.


But all this wouldn't have been possible without another outstanding story: the emergence of China from the periphery of world trade to becoming a global trade titan.

A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (2)

[FONTE: UNCTAD, 27/04/2021]



A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (3) [FONTE: World Shipping Council, 2023]



Port	Volume 2020 (Million TEU)	Volume 2019 (Million TEU)	Volume 2018 (Million TEU)	Volume 2017 (Million TEU)	Volume 2016 (Million TEU)	Website
1 Shanghai, China	43.5	43.30	42.01	40.23	37.13	English
2 Singapore	36.6	37.20	36.6	33.67	30.9	English
3 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China	28.72	27.49	26.35	24.61	21.6	Chinese
4 Shenzhen, China	26.55	25.77	27.74	25.21	23.97	Chinese
5 Guangzhou Harbor, China	23.19	23.23	21.87	20.37	18.85	English Chinese
6 Busan, South Korea	21.59	21.99	21.66	20.49	19.85	English Korean
7 Qingdao, China	22.00	21.01	18.26	18.3	18.01	English Chinese
8 Hong Kong, S.A.R, China	20.07	18.30	19.6	20.76	19.81	Chinese
9 Tianjin, China	18.35	17.30	16	15.07	14.49	English Chinese
10 Rotterdam, The Netherlands	14.35	14.82	14.51	13.73	12.38	English Dutch Deutsch Chinese


A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (4) [FONTE: China's

Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing's Strategy in VOA, 13/09/2021]



potência marítima: o comércio (5) [FONTE: China's

Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing's Strategy in VOA, 13/09/2021]




A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (6) [FONTE: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2024]



Figure 13

Top 10 world shipowners, dead weight tons, share of world total, as at 1 January 2024
(Percentage)



Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on data provided by Clarksons Research Services.


A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (7) [FONTE: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2024]




Figure 15

Top 10 economies in the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index

Top 5 economies



Top 6–10 economies



Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on data provided by MDS Transmodal.
Note: Index is set at 100 for the average value of country connectivity in the first quarter of 2023.

A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (8) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 13/08/2019]

UNCTAD: Shanghai is the world's best-connected port

August 13, 2019

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has ranked the port of Shanghai as the world's best-connected port. The Chinese port has earned a score of 134 points in UNCTAD's port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index.

According to the index, the port of Singapore was ranked second as it garnered 124.63 points followed by Pusan in Korea with 114.45 points. Apart from Shanghai Port, another Chinese port, Ningbo was ranked fourth with a score of 114.35 points. While the Top 20 comprises other Asian and European ports, none featured in the Top 20 are from Africa, North and South America as well as Australia.


According to Shamika N. Sirimanne, UNCTAD's director of technology and logistics, a container port's performance is a critical factor that can determine transport costs and, by extension, trade competitiveness. Container ports that are well connected and have frequent and direct shipping services are key to minimising trade cost and fostering sustainable development.

The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index released by UNCTAD is significant for traders as it helps them to determine maritime transport trends and the ports' positions compared to others. It provides data for more than 900 ports.

A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (9) [FONTE: Matthew P.

Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, 25/03/2025]

China Dominates the Shipbuilding Industry



Source: Authors' calculations; and S&P Global Sea-web.

A transformação da China em grande potência marítima: o comércio (10) [FONTE: Matthew P.

Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, 25/03/2025]

China has rapidly established itself as the world's dominant shipbuilding power, marginalizing the United States and its allies in a strategically important industry.

- 1** China's lead in the global commercial shipbuilding market is huge and growing. The country's largest state-owned shipbuilder built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II.
- 2** Foreign companies, including firms based in many U.S.-allied countries, purchase 75 percent of ships built at China's dual-use shipyards, funneling billions of dollars in revenue and transferring key technologies into the country's naval industrial base.
- 3** Through its "military-civil fusion" strategy, China has integrated commercial and military production at many of its shipyards, giving its People's Liberation Army Navy access to infrastructure, investment, and intellectual property acquired from commercial contracts.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (1) [FONTE: McDevitt, Becoming a Great “Maritime Power:” A Chinese Dream Michael (2016)]

Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (retired)

June 2016



Abstract

In November 2012, then president Hu Jintao declared that China’s objective was to become a strong or great maritime power. This report, based on papers written by China experts for this CNA project, explores that decision and the implications it has for the United States. It analyzes Chinese thinking on what a maritime power is, why Beijing wants to become a maritime power, what shortfalls it believes it must address in order to become a maritime power, and when it believes it will become a maritime power (as it defines the term). The report then explores the component pieces of China’s maritime power—its navy, coast guard, maritime militia, merchant marine, and shipbuilding and fishing industries. It also addresses some policy options available to the U.S. government to prepare for—and, if deemed necessary, mitigate—the impact that China’s becoming a maritime power would have for U.S. interests.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (2)

[FONTE: Jamestown Foundation / James Holmes e Toshi Yoshihara, A Chinese Turn to Mahan? Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13, 24/06/2019]

A Chinese Turn to Mahan?

Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13

By: James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara

June 24, 2009 08:54 PM Age: 12 years



Admiral Liu Huaqing

Robert Kaplan proclaims that “the Chinese are the Mahanians now,” enamored with the fin de siècle American sea captain who exhorted seafaring nations to amass international commerce, merchant and naval fleets, and forward bases (The Atlantic, November 2007). By those measures, China is progressing swiftly toward sea power. It depends on a steady flow of seaborne cargoes of oil, natural gas, and other raw materials from Africa and the Persian Gulf region, and it relies on the oceans as a thoroughfare by which Chinese export wares reach foreign consumers. Chinese shipyards are bolting together merchantmen at a helter-skelter pace. In April 2009, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) held a naval review to mark the sixtieth anniversary of its founding and—after years of studied denials—the PLA leadership has more or less openly stated that it wants to acquire aircraft carriers. The PLAN has built a base on Hainan Island capable of berthing nuclear submarines, thereby

extending its reach toward the Strait of Malacca, and Chinese diplomats have negotiated basing rights throughout the Indian Ocean.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (3)

[FONTE: Jamestown Foundation / James Holmes e Toshi Yoshihara, A Chinese Turn to Mahan? Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 13, 24/06/2019]

Like Mahan, Chinese thinkers connect thriving commerce with naval primacy. In the respected Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Major (Ret.) General Jiang Shiliang, then chief of the PLA General Logistics Department, invokes him to justify Chinese control of “strategic passages” traversed by vital goods. For Jiang, the contest for “absolute command” is a fact of life in international politics [3]. In a similar vein, Beijing’s 2004 Defense White Paper instructs the armed forces to “strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air” [4]. This remains the clearest statement of China’s Mahanian outlook.

Numerous Chinese analysts cite Mahanian-sounding principles when appraising the value of Taiwan, the midpoint of the first island chain, and occasionally Guam, America’s naval stronghold in the second island chain [5]. They view Taiwan as the single geographic asset, once returned to Beijing’s possession, which would grant China direct access to the Pacific. On the other hand, if Taiwan maintained de facto independence, the mainland would remain hemmed behind the inner island chain, which runs southward from the Japanese home islands to the Indonesian archipelago. The authoritative Science of Military Strategy declares, “If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland ... China will forever be locked to the west side of the first chain of islands in the West Pacific.” If so, “the essential strategic space for China’s rejuvenation will be lost” [6].

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (4) [FONTE: USNI News, 3/11/2021]



China Has World's Largest Navy With 355 Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon

China has the biggest maritime force on the globe with an inventory of about 355 vessels, according to a Defense Department report released Wednesday.

With 355 ships in its fleet, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is slated to expand its inventory to 420 ships within the next four years, the Pentagon's annual China military report estimates. By 2030, the PLAN is expected to have 460 ships.

The 355 estimation accounts for "major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, and fleet auxiliaries," according to the report, which covers events in 2020.

"This figure does not include 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). ... Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants," the report reads.

The report, which is mandated by Congress each year, describes China's navy as having growing ambitions to operate with more versatile platforms beyond the Indo-Pacific region.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (5) [FONTE: The Economist, 4/11/2024]

In some areas of military strength, China has surpassed America

The modernisation of the PLA is proceeding at an extraordinary pace

Nov 4th 2024



A very modern marinerPhotograph: Reuters

As he prepares for a second term, Donald Trump will receive the same simple message from all 18 of America's intelligence agencies: Russia may be causing mayhem in Europe, but only China has the wherewithal to mount a global challenge. "Beijing is accelerating the development of key capabilities," said the co-ordinating body for American spooks last year. Those capabilities, it added, are ones that China "believes the People's Liberation Army (PLA) needs to confront the United States in a large-scale, sustained conflict".

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (6) [FONTE: Girish Linganna/Modern Diplomacy, 4/1/2025]

China's Big but Weak Navy: The illusion of Maritime Power

China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has grown rapidly in recent decades, becoming the world's largest navy by sheer number of vessels. However, size alone does not equate to capability, and the PLAN's deficiencies in combat experience, technological reliability, and global trustworthiness underscore its vulnerabilities. Despite its ambitions, China's naval power projection remains a paper tiger, faltering under scrutiny.

Lack of Naval Combat Experience

The PLAN's biggest Achilles' heel is its lack of real-world combat experience. Unlike the United States Navy and other QUAD navies, which have been engaged in multiple conflicts and joint operations worldwide, China's navy has not faced significant combat since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Modern naval warfare demands operational expertise in complex scenarios, including high-intensity conflicts, amphibious assaults, and carrier strike group coordination—areas where PLAN personnel remain largely untested.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (7) [FONTE: Girish Linganna/ Modern Diplomacy, 4/1/2025]

Case in point: China's frequent naval drills in the South China Sea (SCS) often showcase choreographed exercises rather than realistic combat simulations. For example, during the 2021 joint exercise with Russia, the PLAN struggled to synchronise operations with its ally, revealing interoperability and command efficiency gaps. Similarly, its attempts to emulate carrier-based operations have been hampered by inexperience. The Liaoning and Shandong, China's two aircraft carriers, are still in the nascent stages of developing effective carrier strike capabilities.

Recent reports amplify these issues. In August 2023, unconfirmed accounts suggested that a Type 093 nuclear-powered submarine experienced a catastrophic failure in the Yellow Sea, allegedly entangling in underwater defences and leading to fatal outcomes for its crew. While Beijing denied these claims, the incident highlighted potential deficiencies in operational readiness and safety protocols.

The lack of international experience further compounds these problems. PLAN vessels involved in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden have been criticised for excessive reliance on allied forces for logistical and operational support. In comparison, Indian and U.S. vessels operate independently with greater coordination and effectiveness.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (8) [FONTE: Girish Linganna/ Modern Diplomacy, 4/1/2025]

Unreliable Weapon Technology

China's indigenous weapons systems often fall short of their advertised performance. For example, the much-touted Type 055 destroyers are equipped with advanced radar and missile systems, but reports suggest frequent malfunctions during testing. In 2020, a Type 055 destroyer experienced propulsion issues during its maiden deployment, forcing it to return to port prematurely.

Further underlining these concerns is the recent mishap involving China's newest nuclear submarine during construction in Wuhan, as reported in mid-2024. The vessel's sinking at the shipyard revealed critical gaps in quality control and project oversight, delaying China's attempts to modernise its underwater fleet.

Chinese anti-ship missiles, such as the DF-21D "carrier killer," have yet to be proven in real-world scenarios. The missile's ability to target moving vessels in contested environments remains theoretical, and experts have raised doubts about its reliability against advanced countermeasures deployed by adversaries.

Additionally, reports from export partners indicate systemic issues. For instance, Algeria's purchase of Chinese corvettes in 2019 revealed that onboard sensors and weapons systems frequently malfunctioned in harsh maritime conditions. This has forced the Algerian Navy to seek upgrades and maintenance from third-party suppliers, significantly increasing operational costs.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (9) [FONTE: Girish Linganna/ Modern Diplomacy, 4/1/2025]

Historical Context and Strategic Shortcomings

Historically, a defensive posture has shaped China's naval strategy, prioritising coastal security over blue-water capabilities. The "Century of Humiliation," during which China was subjugated by Western and Japanese naval forces, continues to influence its focus on regional dominance. However, this historical baggage limits China's ability to project power globally, as evidenced by its limited presence in the Arctic and Atlantic regions compared to the US and European navies.

Another major drawback is China's overreliance on numerical superiority rather than qualitative advancement. Despite building a vast fleet, the PLAN lacks the support infrastructure necessary for sustained global operations, such as replenishment ships and overseas bases. This shortfall became evident during the 2021 evacuation mission in Yemen, where Chinese vessels struggled to coordinate with allied forces due to logistical constraints.

The PLAN's rapid expansion masks underlying vulnerabilities that undermine its credibility as a global naval power. Its lack of combat experience, unreliable technology, and exploitative defence exports have exposed the limitations of its maritime ambitions. As nations in the IOR and beyond reassess their strategic partnerships, China's naval might be more facade than force—a sobering reality for Beijing's aspirations of global, let alone regional dominance.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (10)

[FONTE: Sam J. Tangredi / US Naval Institute, Vol. 149/1/1.439 (2023)]



Bigger Fleets Win

In naval warfare, a smaller fleet of superior quality ships is not a way to victory. The side with the most ships almost always wins.

I've heard a lot of people saying recently, 'Quantity has a quality all its own.' And I just want to be clear: No, it doesn't. That's one of the dumbest damn things I've ever heard."¹ With respect to the quoted speaker, not only does quantity have a quality all its own, but it also almost always proves decisive in naval warfare when professional competence is equal.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (11)

[FONTE: Sam J. Tangredi / US Naval Institute, Vol. 149/1/1.439 (2023)]

Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day.² Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology.³

When professional naval competence and strategic acumen were equal, the larger fleet usually won, even when the smaller fleet possessed technological advantages at the start of the conflict. A primary reason is that technological advantages were inevitably short-lived.⁴ In a war between equally competent technological near peers—absent a series of amazing strokes of luck—the larger fleet always won.⁵ (See Table 1.)

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (12)

[FONTE: Sam J. Tangredi / US Naval Institute, Vol. 149/1/1.439 (2023)]

TABLE 1: WARS WITH CLASHES OF FLEETS OR SIGNIFICANT OPPOSED NAVAL OPERATIONS

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Greeks vs Persians ▪ Peloponnesian wars (Greek vs Greek) ▪ Punic Wars (Rome vs Carthage) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Struggle for Sicily; First Punic War; Second Punic War ▪ Roman civil wars (Pompey, Antony, etc. vs Caesars) ▪ Turks/Arabs vs Byzantine Empire (initially Byzantines had superior technology, but they eventually lost)* ▪ Genoa vs Venice ▪ Hundred Years' War (France vs England) ▪ Holy Roman Empire/Spain/Venice vs Ottomans ▪ Portuguese vs Ottomans/Gujerati in the Indian Ocean* ▪ Korean-Japanese wars ▪ England vs Spain (Armada, etc. 1560-1600) ▪ Anglo-Dutch-French wars <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eighty Years' War (Dutch vs England, etc.); • First Anglo-Dutch War; • Second Anglo-Dutch War; • Third Anglo-Dutch War; • French-Dutch War; • War of the League of Augsburg ▪ Baltic/Great Northern wars (Sweden vs Dutch, Danes, Russians) ▪ Russo-Swedish War ▪ Seven Years' War (Britain vs France – “first world war”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ American Revolutionary War (United States [and France] vs. Britain) ▪ French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (Britain vs France, Spain) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • War of 1812 ▪ Wars of Independence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South Americans vs Spain • Greeks vs Ottomans ▪ Austro-Italian War (wooden rams beat ironclads) ▪ Opium Wars and gunboat imperialism (British East India Company, Britain, France vs China, others) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First and Second Opium wars* • Individual battles throughout Asia ▪ American Civil War ▪ Spanish-American War ▪ Sino-Japanese War ▪ Russo-Japanese War ▪ World War I ▪ World War II in Atlantic, Mediterranean ▪ World War II in Pacific, Indian Ocean ▪ Cold War (proxy wars, interventions) <p>* Superior technology defeated numbers</p>
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A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (13) [FONTE: Sam J. Tangredi / US Naval Institute, Vol. 149/1/1.439 (2023)]

A Smaller Fleet, A Bigger Risk

The United States can fund a significant fleet that matches the growth of the PLA Navy—or not. Whether the fleet is 250 or 500 ships is for elected officials and the Navy to decide, but those leaders must identify, acknowledge, and *own* that risk. There is risk in all choices. But there is particularly higher risk in making choices based on unproven assumptions.

Based on historical research, claims such as “numbers don’t matter” and “our ships are more capable and therefore we need fewer” have no basis in evidence. Such claims are assumptions that ignore historical evidence, but as Hemingway wrote in *A Sun Also Rises*, “Isn't it pretty to think so.”

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (14) [FONTE: Sam J. Tangredi / US Naval Institute, Vol. 149/1/1.439 (2023)]

In expressing the reality of mass and operational competence in the Royal Navy, Admiral Lord St. Vincent stated in 1801, "I do not say the Frenchman [Napoleon] will not come. I only say he will not come by sea."³² Applying St. Vincent's logic to the findings of my research: I do not say that a smaller, technologically superior fleet could *never* defeat a much larger fleet, I only say that—with the possible exception of three cases in the past 1,200 years—*none has*. Historical evidence shows that smaller fleets lose. In the "ends, ways, and means" formulation of strategy, mass (or numbers) is one of the most important "ways."

A naval war against China in the western Pacific in this decade would pit a smaller U.S. naval force against a larger PLAN, on China's home turf, within range of the PLA's air and rocket forces. U.S. leaders must ask themselves to what extent they are willing to bet on technological—without numerical—superiority in that fight.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (15)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]



A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (16) [FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]

Military-Civil Fusion

The meteoric rise of China's commercial shipbuilding industry is closely tied to the relentless pace of its military modernization. Rather than establishing firewalls between civilian and military production, China has actively sought to integrate these activities. This aligns with China's military-civil fusion (MCF, 军民融合) strategy, a national strategy elevated and spearheaded by Xi Jinping to fuse together the country's national security and economic development policies to simultaneously level up the defense industry and broader economy.⁴

Maximizing the overlap between commercial and military production through MCF provides a key channel for the exchange of resources, technology, and personnel between sectors. China's 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries highlights "military-civilian common standardization projects [that] promote two-way transfer of military-civilian technology."⁵ The prominent role of sprawling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in strategic industries further facilitates this process, as it consolidates commercial operations, research and development, and military production under direct government control.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (17) [FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]

Figure 3: Integrated Civilian and Military Production Visible at Changxing Island Shipbuilding Base and Longxue Island Shipbuilding Base



A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (18)


[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]

At the heart of Beijing's MCF ambitions in shipbuilding lies the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), an expansive conglomerate of shipyards, factories, and research institutes overseen by China's top political and military leadership. CSSC is the world's largest shipbuilding group, and in 2024 alone, it produced more commercial vessels by tonnage than the United States has since World War II. Yet, the company is also responsible for building warships for the ever-expanding People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which is rapidly amassing the world's largest fleet.

China State Shipbuilding Corporation is the world's largest shipbuilding conglomerate by both revenue and market share. It boasts 84 subsidiaries and employs over 200,000 people across shipbuilding, marine engineering, research and development, and various other portfolios. The firm calls itself the “main force” in developing China's naval forces, and “undertakes the scientific research and production tasks of all the main combat equipment of the Chinese Navy.”⁸ Similar to U.S. firms like Boeing or Lockheed Martin, it is a major defense contractor with significant commercial operations. However, CSSC has fewer lines separating its commercial and military operations, creating inherent risks for companies seeking to do business without inadvertently contributing to China's military development. In 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce placed 25 CSSC subsidiaries on its Entity List, restricting the transfer U.S. technology to those entities.⁹ In 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added the company to its Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, restricting certain financial transactions with the firm.¹⁰

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (19) [FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]

Figure 16: U.S. Navy and PLA Navy Warship Annual Tonnage Launched



A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (20) [FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]

Countering China's Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empire

1. **Actively counter China's MCF strategy by severing the flow of foreign capital and technology into Chinese shipyards.** Given measures already in place to limit U.S. ties with China's defense industrial base, the focus needs to be on reducing the flow of capital and technology from other countries into Chinese shipyards.
2. **Reduce China's dominance in the global shipbuilding industry.** Past experiences in industries like solar panels and electric vehicle batteries, where U.S. and allied firms were nearly completely pushed out of the market by low-cost Chinese manufacturing, offer sober warnings of what can happen without intervention. Taking action to limit China's outsized influence will promote the economic security of not just the United States but also key U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan. Eroding China's market dominance will also indirectly support the first objective of limiting Beijing's ability to leverage its commercial shipbuilding industry to support its naval modernization through its MCF strategy.
3. **Encourage friendshoring to key U.S. allies—namely South Korea and Japan—as a counterweight to China.** It will be impossible to completely shift commercial order books away from Chinese shipyards. There is too much global demand and not enough capacity outside of China (Chinese shipyards currently claim 62 percent of the global orderbook

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (21)


[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole et. Al. / CSIS, March 2025]


through 2033). It is similarly unrealistic to expect the United States to become a major player in the global shipbuilding market in the short-to-medium term. Achieving even a 5 percent market share would require a nearly 50-fold increase in domestic production. While the United States can take steps to scale up its industrial capacity, it should also prioritize enhancing the competitiveness of South Korea and Japan against their Chinese counterparts. This represents the most efficient and viable strategy for expanding alternative market options outside of China.

4. **Nurture U.S. domestic shipbuilding capacity in key areas.** Washington should set realistic goals for enhancing its domestic shipbuilding capacity. As noted above, even capturing a small share of the global market in the near-to-medium term would be a significant challenge. Rather than striving to become a global shipbuilding power, the United States should prioritize developing a commercial shipbuilding industry that meets critical national security needs. Investments should focus on these priorities rather than direct competition with China. This could also include developing specialized capabilities, such as icebreaker construction, and fostering technological innovation to strengthen the broader maritime industry.
5. **Limit costs to the United States and its key international partners.** There are implicit tensions in the goals outlined above. The optimal set of policies will achieve important strategic and national security objectives while not overly burdening consumers and firms in the United States and allied countries.

A competição China vs EUA pela supremacia marítima global (22)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Paresh, 2017]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (1)

[FONTE: Matt Spetalnick /Reuters, 1/04/2008]

Bush vows to press for Ukraine, Georgia in NATO

[Matt Spetalnick](#)

KIEV (Reuters) - U.S. President George W. Bush vowed on Tuesday to press for Ukraine and Georgia to be allowed to start the process of joining NATO despite resistance from Russia and skepticism from the alliance's European members.

Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko and President Bush walks during an official welcoming ceremony in Kiev April 1, 2008. REUTERS/Mykhailo Markiv/Pool



A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (2)

[FONTE: NYT, 3/04/2008]

NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine

April 3, 2008

BUCHAREST, Romania President Bush threw the NATO summit meeting here off-script on Wednesday by lobbying hard to extend membership to Ukraine and Georgia, but he failed to rally support for the move among key allies.

Mr. Bush's position that Ukraine and Georgia should be welcomed into a Membership Action Plan, or MAP, that prepares nations for NATO membership directly contradicted German and French government positions stated earlier this week. It also risked upsetting efforts to get Russia to soften its opposition to positioning a missile defense array in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Bush failed to win over a consensus of NATO members in a debate at a dinner of NATO leaders, a senior German official said Wednesday night, with at least seven countries lined up against him.

Normally, summit meetings like this are prescribed, but Mr. Bush's comments added some extra interest while annoying Germany and France, which had said they would block the invitation to Ukraine and Georgia.

At the dinner on Wednesday, the German and French position was supported by Italy, Hungary and the Benelux countries, a senior German official said. Mr. Bush was said to have accepted that his position was not going to prevail, and officials were asked to find some construction overnight that would encourage Ukraine and Georgia without asking them to enter a membership plan now.

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (3)

[FONTE: NATO / Cimeira de Bucareste, 3/04/2008]



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION | TOPICS | NEWSROOM | E-LIBRARY

🏠 > e-Library > Official texts (Chronological)

Bucharest Summit Declaration

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008

03 Apr. 2008 - | Press Release (2008) 049 | Issued on 03 Apr. 2008 |



Last updated: 08 May. 2014 11:10

23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (4)

[FONTE: NATO, 11/01/2022]



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Relations with Ukraine

Last updated: 11 Jan. 2022 10:18

A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantial of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas.



A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (5)

[FONTE: NATO, 11/01/2022]

- Dialogue and cooperation started when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994).
- Relations were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take cooperation forward.
- The 2009 Declaration to Complement the NATO-Ukraine Charter mandated the NUC, through Ukraine's Annual National Programme, to underpin Ukraine's efforts to take forward reforms aimed at implementing Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, in line with the decisions of the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
- Cooperation has deepened over time and is mutually beneficial, with Ukraine actively contributing to NATO-led operations and missions.
- Priority is given to support for comprehensive reform in the security and defence sector, which is vital for Ukraine's democratic development and for strengthening its ability to defend itself.
- In response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has reinforced its support for capability development and capacity-building in Ukraine. The Allies condemn and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, and its destabilising and aggressive activities in eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea region. NATO has increased its presence in the Black Sea and stepped up maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.
- Since the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO's practical support for Ukraine is set out in the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine.
- In June 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation reinstating membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective. In 2019, a corresponding amendment to Ukraine's Constitution entered into force.
- In September 2020, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved Ukraine's new National Security Strategy, which provides for the development of the distinctive partnership with NATO with the aim of membership in NATO.

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (6)

[FONTE: Doug Bandow / CATO Institute, 6/03/2025]

Ukraine Is Never Joining NATO

It is time for Washington to issue an official no to any kind of US security guarantee. Moscow has demonstrated that it is ready to go to war over Ukraine. Washington should make clear that it is not.

Ukraine Is Desperate for NATO Membership: It Won't Ever Happen

"An invitation for Ukraine to join Nato is a necessary thing for our survival," he said in December.

Last month he offered to yield his office if doing so would win alliance approval. After his clash with President Donald Trump in the Oval Office, Zelensky declared: "If we cannot be accepted to NATO, we need some clear structure of security guarantees from our allies in the U.S."

Trump said no. Nor is he alone. President Joe Biden said no. President Barack Obama said no. The only president who advocated bringing Ukraine into NATO was George W. Bush, whose reckless foreign policy caused thousands of American military and hundreds of thousands of foreign civilian deaths in the Middle East and South Asia. The transatlantic alliance's resulting promise to include Kyiv, made at Bush's behest at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, was an essential factor in Moscow's decision for war nearly 14 years later.

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (7)

[FONTE: Doug Bandow / CATO Institute, 6/03/2025]

No Means No

After three years of combat in which Washington has slowly escalated its proxy war-plus against Moscow, Trump should confirm that no means no. The US should, if possible, end the conflict, and if not, exit the battle. He also should begin bringing American forces home from Europe, working with member governments to enable them to take over responsibility for their own defense.

The United States created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 76 years ago. The purpose of NATO was to ensure American security by providing a shield behind which war-ravaged European states could recover, unmolested by the Red Army, then entrenching communist regimes across the continent's east.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, the alliance's first supreme commander and later US president, emphasized that America's garrison was temporary: "We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is to assist these people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet." Yet the Europeans saw a sucker and almost eight decades later Washington's legions remain on station across the Atlantic, with another nation, Ukraine, demanding US protection as well.

A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (8)

[FONTE: War on the Rocks, 18/02/2025]

ARMED NEUTRALITY FOR UKRAINE IS NATO'S LEAST POOR OPTION

JENNIFER KAVANAGH AND CHRISTOPHER MCCALLION

COMMENTARY

FEBRUARY 18, 2025



A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (9)

[FONTE: War on the Rocks, 18/02/2025]

When it comes to securing Ukraine's future, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, armed neutrality is the worst option for the United States and NATO, except for all the others.

As the Russo-Ukrainian war approaches its third anniversary, the conflict may be nearing a turning point. Ukraine's military is dangerously exhausted, facing worsening manpower shortages and the prospect of diminishing Western aid. Russia, despite steady gains, hasn't scored a decisive breakthrough and is suffering high losses amid tightening economic constraints. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has promised to end the war and has already held discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin to get negotiations started.

Whenever peace talks begin, they will be difficult and complex. While questions about territory will most likely be settled on the battlefield, arrangements for Ukraine's long-term security will be a stubborn sticking point. Several alternatives have been proposed, including NATO membership with its Article 5 guarantee, a bi- or multilateral security guarantee from the United States or a group of European states, or "armed neutrality" — which would leave Ukraine with no security guarantee but with substantial military assistance. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky argues NATO membership is the only way to ensure a lasting peace, many current alliance members, including the United States, are opposed, unwilling to take on the additional security burden.


A Ucrânia e a (im)possível adesão à NATO (10)

[FONTE: War on the Rocks, 18/02/2025]

Article 5 commitment is not quite the guarantee Kyiv might hope for. Article 5 does not require members to respond with military force against an aggressor, and its deliberately vague wording gives allies the freedom to decide how and when to react. As a result, past Western refusal to send military forces to defend Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 would weaken the credibility of any formal security guarantee offered to Kyiv by NATO countries. Words alone would not prevent a deterrence failure, and an American tripwire force — which might address this risk — has already been ruled out by successive presidential administrations. Worse, by extending an unreliable commitment to Ukraine, NATO would also undermine the credibility of Article 5 guarantees to existing members.

Of proposed alternatives, only armed neutrality avoids these consequences while offering the most promising chance for long-term peace. Ukraine's armed neutrality would, however, come with responsibilities for NATO members, especially in Europe, to help Kyiv build its arsenal and fortify the continent's own defenses.

Sugestões de leitura



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