


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a era da imprevisibilidade

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

SESSÃO N° 26


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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (1)

[FONTE: Jean-François Revel (Plon, 2002)]



O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (2)

[FONTE: Philippe Boulanger / Revue Des Deux Mondes, 24/04/2024]



Réflexion

Jean-François Revel, l'engagé

Jean-François Revel occupe une position singulière dans le champ intellectuel français de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle.

Jean-François Revel occupe une position singulière dans le champ intellectuel français de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Homme de gauche déclaré, il se démarque de ses contemporains intellectuels communistes ou compagnons de route par la défense résolue de la démocratie libérale et du capitalisme. Ancien résistant au nazisme, auteur d'essais polémiques d'histoire de l'art, de poésie, de gastronomie, journaliste et ancien directeur de L'Express (1978-1981), Revel s'efforce de promouvoir les idées libérales contre le marxisme-léninisme et le gaullisme, à la façon des écrivains du XIXe siècle engagés contre le bonapartisme ou le socialisme. Revel aurait eu cent ans en 2024. Son libéralisme intégral a-t-il été entendu ?

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (3)

[FONTE: Philippe Boulanger / Revue Des Deux Mondes, 24/04/2024]

Comme Frédéric Bastiat, Revel plaide en faveur du libéralisme et du capitalisme (industriel). Comme Alexis de Tocqueville, il compare souvent, dans ses écrits, la situation politique, économique et constitutionnelle respective des États-Unis et de la France. Néanmoins, le rapprochement le plus saisissant est celui avec Benjamin Constant. Comme Constant, homme imprégné des Lumières européennes, Revel a été formé dans un moule exigeant : l'enseignement des jésuites. Comme Constant, qui a beaucoup voyagé dès son enfance (Suisse, France, Allemagne, Angleterre), il manifeste assez tôt, du fait de son parcours personnel et professionnel qui le conduit en Algérie, au Mexique et en Italie, une ouverture d'esprit peu commune à son époque.

« À la différence d'autres intellectuels, il s'engage en effet dans la politique pratique : dans les Hauts-de-Seine. »

Comme son lointain aîné polyglotte, il parle plusieurs langues (anglais, italien, espagnol, portugais), ce qui lui facilite l'accès à des littératures étrangères et des sources d'information variées. Constant est profondément européen, Revel est résolument cosmopolite. Mais les deux hommes se séparent au point de vue de leur engagement politique :

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (4)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Date de la note : 26 février 2021

Jean-François REVEL, « L'obsession anti-américaine: Son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences », Éd. Plon, août 2002

En 1970, alors que la gauche n'avait d'yeux que pour le communisme le maoïsme ou le castrisme, Jean-François Revel publia un livre choc « Ni Marx, ni Jésus », où il expliquait que la révolution des idées nouvelles ou des nouveaux modes de vie se passait en Amérique, notamment en Californie, devenue le laboratoire de la mondialisation libérale, et qu'elle ne venait plus, ni des religieux, ni des marxistes. Très critiqué par les intellectuels de gauche de l'époque, pour lesquels rien de bon ne pouvait venir de l'Amérique, le livre obtint pourtant un succès de librairie, touchant un large public.

Plus de 30 ans plus tard, Jean-François Revel constatait que l'anti-américanisme persistait et qu'il était même devenu une obsession amenant à reprocher aux États-Unis une chose et son contraire.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (5)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

On trouvera ci-dessous un résumé de ses principaux arguments dans son livre paru en 2002.

Pour les intellectuels proches des communistes, l'antiaméricanisme va de soi puisque l'Amérique est le phare du libéralisme et du capitalisme. C'est oublier qu'il existe aussi un antiaméricanisme de droite pour des intellectuels européens qui n'admettent pas de ne plus être au centre du monde et même un antiaméricanisme d'extrême droite pour des intellectuels hostiles à la démocratie et au libéralisme.

Or, poursuit Jean-François Revel, souvent, la critique de l'Amérique occulte une bonne partie des réalités. Lorsque Picasso peint un tableau montrant des Américains tirant sur des Coréens du Nord, il oublie l'aide apportée par les Américains aux Coréens du Sud lorsqu'ils furent attaqués par les Coréens du Nord. La guerre des Américains au Vietnam est par ailleurs vivement condamnée, mais on oublie de rappeler que cette guerre est d'abord la conséquence des erreurs françaises, celles de 1945 où la France a refusé de reconnaître la légitimité des aspirations vietnamiennes à l'indépendance et celles des années 50 où elle a cherché à réprimer la rébellion dans une guerre perdue à Dien Bien Phu.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (6)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Dans le conflit entre Israël et les Palestiniens, si l'Amérique intervient, on lui reproche son impérialisme et son unilatéralisme et, si elle n'intervient pas on lui reproche son isolationnisme.

Depuis l'effondrement de l'URSS, on lui reproche aussi d'être devenue l'« hyperpuissance » qui domine le monde. C'est omettre le fait que la domination de l'Amérique résulte d'abord des erreurs de l'Europe qui a précipité sa propre chute en déclenchant deux guerres mondiales et en inventant deux régimes particulièrement néfastes, le nazisme et le stalinisme.

Si l'Europe ne se prive pas de critiquer les États-Unis, elle réclame nonobstant leur aide pour régler les problèmes de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Elle est en effet bien incapable de les régler elle-même tant l'Union européenne, encore loin d'être une puissance reconnue, reste « un chœur où chaque membre se prend pour un soliste ».

En 2000, remarque l'auteur, il a été de bon ton de se moquer des incertitudes qui ont duré plus d'un mois pour déterminer le vainqueur de l'élection entre George Bush et Al Gore. Pourtant, recompter des bulletins de vote est le signe du bon fonctionnement d'une démocratie.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (7)

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En 2001, les Européens ont reproché à George Bush son refus de ratifier le protocole de Kyoto. C'était oublier que le Sénat américain l'avait refusé à l'unanimité et que Bill Clinton ne l'avait approuvé par décret juste avant de quitter la Maison-Blanche que pour piéger son successeur. Le reproche des Européens était d'autant plus injustifié qu'aucun pays européen ne l'avait alors ratifié.

Au début des années 2000, les mouvements antimondialistes organisent de grandes manifestations pour empêcher les réunions internationales, notamment celles de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), alors que ces réunions avaient pour objectif de fixer des règles à la mondialisation. En fait, les antimondialistes s'opposent essentiellement au libéralisme incarné par l'Amérique. Des responsables politiques comme Lionel Jospin ou Jacques Chirac leur ont emboîté le pas jusqu'à exprimer leur soutien à ces manifestations de rue qui empêchent des gouvernements élus de se réunir.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (8)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Pour juger objectivement des avantages ou des dangers de l'actuelle mondialisation, pour Jean-François Revel, il convient de répondre aux trois questions suivantes relatives à la mondialisation par le marché :

1. Est-elle un mal en tant que telle ?

2. Est-elle un mal parce qu'elle offre un champ d'expansion à la superpuissance américaine ?

3. Est-elle un mal parce que les riches deviennent toujours plus riches et les pauvres toujours plus pauvres ?

Sur la première question, ce que la gauche refuse, ce n'est pas la mondialisation en elle-même, mais le marché. La gauche a toujours eu une ambition planétaire marquée par la création de plusieurs internationales. La seule mondialisation qui l'intéresse est celle des idées de gauche, une mondialisation planifiée et dirigée. On peut aussi rappeler que le refus de la mondialisation et le repli sur les nationalismes ont été la cause de bien des guerres.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (9)


[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Sur la deuxième question, s'il est exact que les États-Unis se considèrent comme une nation élue chargée d'éclairer le monde, on ne peut pas s'empêcher de faire le rapprochement avec la France, *patrie des lumières et des droits de l'homme*, qui s'estime fondée à donner des leçons au reste du monde. Si la mondialisation ressemble à une américanisation, si les produits culturels américains se diffusent aisément dans le monde entier, c'est dû en grande partie à la faiblesse des Européens. Rien n'empêche les Européens de faire œuvre d'imagination pour concurrencer les Américains.

Enfin sur la troisième question, si la mondialisation a peut-être favorisé les riches, elle a aussi diminué le nombre de pauvres. En Asie et en Amérique du Sud, la pauvreté a reculé. L'exception que représente l'Afrique, n'est pas dû à la mondialisation, mais aux choix politiques des gouvernements et aux guerres incessantes qui ont affaibli ce continent.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (10)

[FONTE: Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs McWorld*, Random House, 1996]



O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (11)

[FONTE: Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs McWorld*, Random House, 1996 / Recensão feita por David P. Fidler]

**Reflections on the McRevolution: A Review of
*Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet Is Both Falling
Apart and Coming Together and What This Means
for Democracy*, by Benjamin R. Barber
Times Books, 1995, 381 pp.**

REVIEWED BY DAVID P. FIDLER*

In 1790, Edmund Burke published a book warning Britain and Europe of the great threat posed by the violent upheaval of the French Revolution.¹ Burke went to great lengths to demonstrate that the real threat posed by the French Revolution was its ideology, which could cross borders and corrupt the hearts and minds of people in every country in Europe. Burke feared that the Jacobin ideology would undermine and eventually destroy the British constitution and European civilization unless Britain and its allies crushed the evil before it could work its wicked ways. Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* was read and debated at the highest levels of British political society.

In 1995, Benjamin R. Barber published a book warning the United States and other liberal democracies of the threat posed by the processes of globalization--the universal dominance of a capitalist inspired, consumer-monopolizing ideology (McWorld) and the often violent ethnic, racial, and religious backlashes against the rapid homogenizing of society and soul produced by capitalism's global expansion (Jihad).² Barber goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the real threat posed by McWorld is its "videology," which crosses borders and corrupts the hearts and minds of people in every country in the world. Barber fears that the videology of

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McWorld is undermining democracy and the nation-state through its strangulation of culture and civil society and through its twisted conspiracy with Jihad, which violently convulses against McWorld's onslaught while embracing McWorld's methods. Barber's reflections on the McRevolution⁴ in the world are being read and discussed at the highest levels of American politics. President Clinton, for example, has publicly praised and recommended *Jihad vs. McWorld*.⁵

Burke's *Reflections* and Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* are both conservative works seeking to protect traditional society and politics against radical innovations that threaten to undermine fundamental values and belief systems. Burke's warnings about the French Revolution proved prophetic as the Revolution descended into terror and militaristic despotism. Whether Barber's warnings about the McRevolution prove equally prophetic remains to be seen, but Barber's fears and prognostications about the demise of democracy and the nation-state under the impact of the McRevolution are difficult to accept because they are not supported by a persuasive historical analysis or normative argument.

I. THE McREVOLUTION

A. *The Dynamics of the McRevolution*

The McRevolution in international affairs that Barber fears has two key forces: McWorld and Jihad. "McWorld" is Barber's metaphor for the product of the process by which globally-expansionist capitalism presses "nations into one homogenous global theme park . . . tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce."⁶ McWorld is a reality in which everything is contrived, artificial, and "imagineered"⁷--everything, that is, except profit. Culture, individual responsibility, political accountability,

* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (12)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Quand, en 1983, Reagan a considéré l'URSS, comme « l'empire du mal » ou quand en 1987, à Berlin, il a demandé à Gorbatchev de faire tomber le mur, beaucoup d'Européens se sont émus du « simplisme » américain. Il n'empêche que, deux ans après, le mur s'effondrait et que l'URSS disparaissait.

Les Européens ont préféré attribuer les nombreux attentats qui ont frappé les Occidentaux depuis vingt ans, à des dérives d'individuels extrémistes. Même l'attentat du World Trade Center ce serait qu'une anomalie ou une parenthèse que l'on pourrait refermer.

C'est refuser de voir qu'un terrorisme nouveau de nature islamiste, dirigé par des groupes organisés et soutenu par des Etats, progresse depuis les années 80. Pour les islamistes, l'Occident est le mal. Ils voudraient se moderniser sans s'occidentaliser, refusant de convenir que c'est, par l'action de l'Occident depuis plusieurs siècles, que la modernisation économique, politique et culturelle a pu s'opérer.

Quand George Bush prend conscience de la nature de ce nouveau terrorisme et décide de l'attaquer à sa base en Afghanistan, des intellectuels européens dénoncent une agression dont ils ne voient pas la cause. L'Occident ne combat pas l'Islam, mais les islamistes combattent les Occidentaux.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (13)

[FONTE: Fondation Prospective & Innovation, 26/02/2021]

Depuis le XIXe siècle, les élites françaises ont dénigré l'Amérique. Il a fallu que Baudelaire traduise Edgar Poe pour que les intellectuels français admettent l'existence d'une littérature américaine. Les intellectuels français du XIXe siècle, souvent proches des royalistes, ne pouvaient admettre le bon fonctionnement de la démocratie américaine. Pourtant, l'Amérique a institué la scolarisation gratuite et obligatoire dès 1832, 50 ans avant la France et, pour beaucoup, cela explique son essor industriel au XXe siècle. Dès 1820, le suffrage universel y existait pour les hommes et a été institué progressivement pour les femmes de 1869 à 1920, bien longtemps avant la France. D'où le fait que certains expliquent que le socialisme n'a jamais pris aux États-Unis par le fait que les ouvriers ont eu tout de suite le droit de vote et ont pu participer aux débats politiques.

Malgré tous ces exemples, les intellectuels français continuaient en 2002 à considérer que l'Amérique n'était pas une vraie démocratie. Après l'arrivée de Le Pen au deuxième tour de l'élection présidentielle, un intellectuel français n'a pas hésité à dire que la France devenait une démocratie aussi « dégénérée » que l'Amérique, ignorant que la politique de Reagan, d'après des études objectives, a diminué le nombre de pauvres aux États-Unis, à l'inverse de ce que ressassent nos médias français pour qui il n'a fait qu'enrichir les riches et appauvrir les pauvres.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (14)

[FONTE: Serge Halimi / Le Monde Diplomatique, 1/11/2002]



A obsessão “filo-americana”

Jean-François Revel é um abnegado. Membro da Academia Francesa, escritor e jornalista, com presença constante e contínua nos meios de comunicação, não baixa a guarda: é o paladino da defesa dos valores humanitários e generosos do capitalismo. Serge Halimi

Serge Halimi

1 de novembro de 2002

Jean-François Revel não é um dissidente comum. Seus panfletos são publicados pela Editora Plon, adulados pela “crítica” e vendidos às dezenas de milhares de exemplares. Se o perseguem, é para oferecer-lhe prêmios literários. Sua fama pesa – ele o confessou em duas edições de *Commentaires* –, mas lhe permite ver cada um de seus novos textos, idêntico ao anterior, tornar-se o centro de todos os “debates”. *Le Monde des Livres* acaba de consagrá-lo como “a honra dos intelectuais¹”: tem uma cadeira na Academia Francesa, participa do júri do prêmio Interallié, escreve crônicas para a revista *Point* e para a RTL e a *France Culture* não existe sem ele.

Tamanha influência permite certas ousadias. Tais como a de fustigar a “obsessão antiamericana” de um país, a França, que, durante os últimos dez anos, jamais deixou de guerrear ao lado dos Estados Unidos – em 1991, no Golfo, em 1999, no Kosovo, e em 2001-2002, no Afeganistão. Outra ousadia é a de trespassar, com a espada e a caneta desembainhadas, os flancos de uma desinformação que ele afirma ser generalizada². É o que faz em relação à violência escolar na França, por exemplo: “Logicamente, é um assunto tabu” (p. 156³). Ou à história contemporânea: “A crônica dos crimes do comunismo continua sendo objeto de uma censura vigilante” (p. 270). Ou sobre a realidade nos Estados Unidos: “Difamar os Estados Unidos ocupa nove décimos do pensamento francês” (p. 237).

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (15)

[FONTE: Serge Halimi / Le Monde Diplomatique, 1/11/2002]

A “honra dos intelectuais franceses”

Ainda cercado por imaginários adversários totalitários, JFR adota algumas técnicas retóricas que merecem ser classificadas como stalino-reaganianas

Os neoconservadores estão viúvos há dez anos. Seu inimigo preferido, o comunismo, deixou de ser uma ameaça, esgotou-se a grande discussão que alimentava suas vidas (que chegam ao fim). Porém, ao invés de celebrarem sua vitória e de se darem um pouco de paz (e a nós, também), conservaram o registro apocalíptico que estrutura sua identidade. E fingem, então, acreditar que o inimigo – destruído, recuperado, em debandada – ainda paira sobre o presente. O comunismo não morreu, trata-se de uma artimanha; o lobo disfarçou-se em vovozinha, mas para melhor nos comer. O terrorismo, o islamismo, o movimento antiglobalização e o multiculturalismo constituiriam, portanto, os mais recentes avatares do eterno Império do Mal.

Com o aval que lhe permite a certeza de ser incluído entre os ensaístas franceses que mais se equivocaram sobre tudo (tema no qual Alain Minc é seu único rival), Jean-François Revel vai à luta, obstinado, correndo o risco de se repetir. Em 1981, previu que a eleição de François Mitterrand transformaria a França numa democracia popular⁵. Defendeu, com absoluta convicção, que Mikhail Gorbatchev pretendia, com sua Perestroika, adormecer o Ocidente para melhor o destruir. É lógico que atualmente todo mundo bajula e faz citações do nosso acadêmico do Point, chegando mesmo a cantarolar o refrão de que ele mais gosta, o do “Somos todos norte-americanos”. Apesar disso, “a honra dos intelectuais franceses” continua desconfiado, convencido de que ainda vem sendo desejada a morte da hiper-potenciazinha tão generosa que ele defende de todas as difamações.

O anti-americanismo antes da era Trump (16)

[FONTE: Serge Halimi / Le Monde Diplomatique, 1/11/2002]

Conclusões e afirmações extraordinárias

O livro resume-se a um princípio: “a falsidade não impede que prospere uma teoria, se esta for sustentada por uma ideologia e protegida pela ignorância

Numa comparação entre “a União dos Estados americanos” e a “União Européia”, nosso acadêmico avalia que o caráter menos democrático desta última é patente, pois “o peso proporcional de cada um dos países europeus no Parlamento e na Comissão está longe de ter qualquer relação com seu peso demográfico real” (p. 50). Revel “esquece” de ressaltar que a representatividade demográfica do Senado norte-americano é ainda mais imperfeita (o Estado de Wyoming, com uma população de 494.423 pessoas, elege dois senadores como a Califórnia, com 34,5 milhões de habitantes).

O autor revela que “nas últimas cinco décadas, toda a América Latina teve um progresso de cerca de 5% ao ano”. Para sustentar conclusão tão extraordinária, infelizmente, Revel se baseia num estudo... de 1985. Teria sido realmente essa a última fonte que pesquisou sobre o assunto? Na verdade, pouco importa: quando os dados observáveis contradizem as virtudes de um capitalismo que Revel defende cegamente, ele os atribui ao comunismo de antigamente. A África, por exemplo, “único continente do mundo onde se constata uma pauperização absoluta concreta” (p. 91), deveria sua desgraça ao fato de ter “adotado os sistemas soviético e chinês”. Ora, vejam só... E a Nigéria dos militares? E a África do Sul do apartheid? E o Zaire de Mobutu? E a Costa do Marfim da África francesa?

No fundo, Jean-François Revel só tem razão em relação a uma única coisa: “A boa fé nada pode contra a má fé” (p. 94).

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (1)

[FONTE: Richard Wike / Foreign Affairs, 8/01/2020]

The New Anti-Americanism

How Worries About U.S. Dominance Gave Way to
Worries About U.S. Decline

BY RICHARD WIKE

January 8, 2020

RICHARD WIKE is Director of Global Attitudes Research at the Pew Research Center.

Anti-Americanism has surged in much of the world since U.S. President Donald Trump took office. New polling from the Pew Research Center shows that global ratings for Trump are similar to those President George W. Bush received near the end of his second term (and considerably lower than the high marks President Barack Obama enjoyed throughout his tenure). And as in the Bush years, the president's unpopularity has led to a sharp decline in overall favorability ratings for the United States.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (2)

[FONTE: Richard Wike / Foreign Affairs, 8/01/2020]

The worries driving negative global attitudes toward the United States are different now than they were during Bush's presidency. When anti-Americanism reached its high point during the Bush administration, the United States was seen as an unchecked superpower, unilaterally pursuing its interests, and unconstrained by the international norms and institutions it had played the lead role in constructing. In the Trump era, by contrast, critics are less concerned about the exercise of unrivaled U.S. power than they are about a U.S. retreat—from both global leadership and liberal democracy.

Rattled by the lingering effects of the 2007-08 financial crisis, exhausted by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and challenged by the “rise of the rest,” the United States is now widely seen as a fading former hegemon, disinterested in global challenges and in danger of being eclipsed by China. In an era of anxiety about the creaking liberal world order, much of the rest of the world wants American engagement and leadership—but sees the United States turning inward instead.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (3)

[FONTE: Richard Wike / Foreign Affairs, 8/01/2020]

Gone are the days when critics assailed the United States for trying to be the world's policeman. Now they worry about a disengaged superpower thinking only of “America first.”

LIBERAL LEVIATHAN?

Since World War II, views of the United States—both positive and negative—have been shaped by perceptions of U.S. power and the ways it has been exercised. In 1947, the British scholar and politician Harold Laski observed that the United States “bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive.” In the decades since, the United States has employed that influence—and especially its tremendous military power—in different ways, eliciting very different reactions from policymakers and people in the rest of the world.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (4)

[FONTE: Richard Wike / Foreign Affairs, 8/01/2020]

COLOSSUS DOWN

The polls also show that the United States is no longer seen as a colossus bestriding the globe. China and other emerging powers increasingly challenge U.S. leadership in various domains—a shift recognized by ordinary citizens as well as policymakers and analysts. In a 2018 Pew survey, a median of 70 percent across 25 nations said they believed China was playing a more important role in world affairs compared to 10 years ago; only 31 percent felt this way about the United States. In 2015, a median of 48 percent across 40 nations said China will someday replace—or already has replaced—the United States as the leading superpower, while just 35 percent believed the United States would remain on top. In the minds of many, the hyperpower has become a declining power.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (5)

[FONTE: Richard Wike / Foreign Affairs, 8/01/2020]

THE COMPLICATED SUPERPOWER

Whether it's the shifting balance of power, challenges to multilateralism, the closing of borders or declining confidence in the health of democracy, scholars and average citizens seem to agree that key elements of the liberal world order are under strain. And they see in Washington a leader less committed than his predecessors to strengthening and maintaining that order.

Yet it is worth remembering that the United States' image has bounced back before. It's clear today that people haven't given up on the United States. In 2018, Pew asked respondents in 25 nations whether they would rather live in a world with the United States or China as the top superpower. A median of 63 percent preferred the United States, while just 19 percent preferred China. People recognize that the world is changing, but they still want the United States to have a prominent place in it. Even if the international system is reeling, many elements of it remain quite popular—and people are still looking for leadership from the increasingly complicated superpower that built it.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (6)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

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
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**European favourability of the USA
falls following the return of
Donald Trump**

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (7)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

Attitudes in Denmark in particular have become more negative

With Donald Trump re-elected to the White House, the US president has been causing concern across Europe with his threats to put tariffs on a number of countries, suggestions that he could seize Greenland, and his willingness to negotiate with Russia over the conflict in Ukraine.

YouGov's latest EuroTrack survey shows that favourable attitudes towards the United States in several Western European countries have slumped since President Trump's election.


Comparing our latest quarterly data with the last poll prior to Donald Trump's re-election, favourable attitudes towards the United States have fallen by between six and 28 percentage points.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (8)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

Favourability towards the USA has fallen across Western Europe following the re-election of Donald Trump

Overall, do you have a favourable or unfavourable view of the following countries? [The United States]
% with a favourable view



YouGov®

Latest data: 5-18 February 2025

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (9)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

Favourable opinion of the US appears to have fallen both as a fact of Trump's re-election (dropping 3-11 points between the last poll prior to the election and our November poll, by which point Trump had been elected but not yet taken office), and again subsequently as a result of his first actions as president.

This particularly appears to be the case in Denmark, which saw a 20pt drop in positive sentiment towards the US in the most recent poll, almost certainly in connection with Trump's suggestions in January that he may seize the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.


More than half of people in Britain (53%), Germany (56%), Sweden (63%) and Denmark (74%) now have an unfavourable opinion of the USA. Italy proves to be the only country in which the number of people with a negative view of the US do not outnumber those with a positive view – but even here Italians are divided 42%-42%.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (10)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

EuroTrack: most people in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Denmark have a negative opinion of the USA

Overall, do you have a favourable or unfavourable view of the following countries? [The United States] %



YouGov


Latest data: 5-18 February 2025

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (11)

[FONTE: YouGov UK, 1/03/2025]

EuroTrack: Favourability towards the USA has fallen in Western Europe since Donald Trump was re-elected

Overall, do you have a favourable or unfavourable view of the following countries? [The United States]
% with a favourable view




YouGov

Latest data: 5-18 February 2025

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (12)

[FONTE: Anna Fleck / Statista, 15/04/2025]



O anti-americanismo na era Trump (13)

[FONTE: Anna Fleck / Statista, 15/04/2025]

U.S. Reputation Worsens Amid Tariffs Announcements

Anna Fleck Apr 15, 2025

The world is seeing a resurgence in anti-Americanism, exacerbated by U.S. President Donald Trump's recent tariff announcements. [Data](#) from Morning Consult shows that America's reputation has worsened in 38 out of 42 nations polled around the world since the start of the year.

Particularly severe drops were seen among some of America's longest-standing allies, such as Canada (-44 percentage points) and South Korea (-38 percentage points), as well as European nations such as Sweden (-47 percentage points), France (-33 percentage points), Norway (-36 percentage points) and the United Kingdom (-31 percentage points).

Meanwhile, consumers in Malaysia registered no difference in net favorability between January and March of this year, while Israel (+4 percent), China (+6 percent) and Russia (+24 percent) all saw increases in consumers' favorability of the U.S. According to Morning Consult, the increase in Russia was likely due to Trump's involvement in discussions on the [war in Ukraine](#) and his spat with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a bilateral meeting. With regards to China, it is important to note that even with the increase at the time, Chinese views of the U.S. remained highly negative overall. Additionally, this survey was taken before the latest escalations in the [trade war with China](#), so China's favorability score is likely out of date here. Net favorability is calculated as approval of the U.S. minus disapproval.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (14)

[FONTE: Adrian Wooldridge, Bloomberg / Economic Times, 10/03/2025]

Why there's never been a better time to be anti-American

Anti-American sentiment is intensifying globally under the Trump administration due to its perceived arrogance, imperialism and instability. This shift is affecting international relations and eroding domestic support for populist politicians aligned with Trump, while US weakens its alliances, and the axis of autocracy strengthens.

The [Trump](#) administration is boosting a powerful force in global affairs: anti-Americanism.

Canadians have taken to booing the American national anthem and Panamanians to burning US flags. The British tabloids have tarred and feathered Vice President JD Vance for insulting British troops. A carnival float in Dusseldorf, Germany, displayed giant puppets of [Donald Trump](#) and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, shaking hands while squeezing Ukrainian President Volodymyr [Zelenskiy](#) between them into a bloodied pulp. A sign on the float read "Hitler-Stalin Pact 2.0." Back at home, the [Washington Post](#) has published a guide on how to navigate hostility abroad ("dress neutrally, not patriotically").

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (15)

[FONTE: Adrian Wooldridge, Bloomberg / Economic Times, 10/03/2025]

There has never been a better time to be anti-American. Trump embodies everything critics of the US have always warned about, multiplied several times over. Yankee arrogance? He and Vance, in the Oval Office, shamelessly bullied the leader of a nation victimized by the Russian president's aggression. Yankee imperialism? Trump bragged to a cheering Congress that he will take over Greenland "one way or another." Yankee incompetence? His tariffs are destabilizing global stock markets and downgrading his own economy.

Is there anything more to rising anti-Americanism than just anti-Trumpism? I think so. There is intensifying hostility to America's enthusiasm for throwing its political and cultural weight around — a fervor that long predates Trump and is driven as much by the country's command of the world's most powerful technologies as it is by its politics. Living with America is like rooming with badly behaved teenagers who demand constant attention and think they have solved the mysteries of the universe.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (16)

[FONTE: Adrian Wooldridge, Bloomberg / Economic Times, 10/03/2025]

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America's last great cultural export before Trump won the election — wokery — has infuriated people on the right and center with its weaponization of cultural tensions. Its social media sites — particularly Facebook and X, formerly Twitter — are increasingly seen as agents of division and distraction rather than, as they once liked to brand themselves, creators of a global village.

Equally, there's never been a worse time to be pro-American. Champions of the US have traditionally defended the nation (and excused its failures)

on three grounds: that, as the world's greatest power, the US provides stability and security; as the world's leading liberal democracy, it defends and spreads liberal democracy around the world; and that it is an engine of free-market capitalism.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (17)

[FONTE: Adrian Wooldridge, Bloomberg / Economic Times, 10/03/2025]

Anti-Americanism is likely to be transformative in domestic European and international politics if Trump continues with the incendiary acts of his first seven weeks. The sentiment is already eroding the domestic support of populist politicians who have aligned themselves with him.

Nigel Farage, the leader of Britain's Reform Party and a man who has traded on his position as Trump's best friend in the UK, has backtracked on his suggestion that Zelenskiy was "rude" to Trump and denounced Vance as "wrong, wrong, wrong" on British troops. Both the Labour and Conservative parties think Farage's closeness to Trump could prove to be an electoral problem for Reform. The Canadian Conservative Party, which has enjoyed a massive lead in the polls over Prime Minister [Justin Trudeau](#)'s Liberals for two years, has seen its advantage evaporate since January, with a Conservative victory in October's election no longer a foregone conclusion.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (18)

[FONTE: Adrian Wooldridge, Bloomberg / Economic Times, 10/03/2025]

One of the reasons why sensible great powers present themselves as benign defenders of the global order is to prevent smaller powers from ganging up against them. Trump's America has decided to do the opposite. Western powers are forging alliances that exclude (or at least don't include) the US. The [European Union](#), particularly in Germany, is beginning to take its military destiny in its hands after decades of passivity. The EU has struck trade deals with Latin America and Malaysia and has made various side accords with Canada and China. A number of its allies regard the US, in the words of the political scientist Michael Beckley, as "a rogue superpower, a mercantilist behemoth determined to squeeze every ounce of wealth and power from the rest of the world."

Even as America weakens alliances that it has spent the post-World War II era cultivating, the axis of autocracy is doing the opposite. Russia and China have pledged lasting friendship. What used to be called nonaligned powers are queuing up to join the BRICS group of emerging-market nations. The US can no longer assume that other liberal powers will automatically come to its side because of shared interests and culture. Nor can it assume that, when push comes to shove, nonaligned powers will choose America over China.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (19)

[FONTE: Henry Mance/ FT, 28/03/2025]

Anti-Americanism is a mug's game

Boycott Tesla if it makes you feel better — but the best critiques of Trump and Musk will come from the US itself



A giant orange baby balloon was flown over London during President Trump's 2019 state visit © TNS

Perhaps there is one simple reason why Donald Trump's agenda is so hostile to Europe. Trump responds to flattery. Europe offers him almost none.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (20)

[FONTE: Henry Mance / FT, 28/03/2025]

Compare this to the years of George W Bush, the president who claimed he was underestimated before choking on a pretzel, when Americans were routinely mocked as fat, ignorant and arrogant. New Yorkers on holiday were made to feel personally responsible for war crimes. On the eve of the Iraq war, Europeans joked about the difference between yoghurt and Americans. The punchline: after a while, yoghurt develops some culture.

The then French president, Jacques Chirac, liked to say that he had a simple principle in foreign affairs: "I see what the Americans are doing and I do the opposite. That way, I'm sure to be right." How they chuckled. This was the zenith not just of anti-American Islamist terrorism, but of anti-imperialist Latin American populists such as Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales.

But anti-Americanism has changed in 2025. Jokes about nationality don't land as comfortably now. It's rightly unfashionable to blame citizens for their governments, especially if the Americans we are most likely to encounter are despairing Democrats.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (21)

[FONTE: Henry Mance / FT, 28/03/2025]

Anyway, Netflix and social media have bound us all together. You can't really dismiss American culture when you choose to consume it daily. Go to Paris today, and see how readily people speak English. Go to London, and puzzle at the number of NFL fans. Judging by JD Vance's and Pete Hegseth's Signal messages, the Trump team is more anti-European than Europeans are anti-American.

Those repelled by Elon Musk's X have moved to another West Coast-based network, Bluesky. European car buyers boycott Tesla but would buy a good American alternative. Just as the most effective takedowns of Bush came from an American filmmaker, Michael Moore, the best critiques of Trump and Musk will probably also come from the US itself. America is both thesis and antithesis.

Diplomatically too, anti-Americanism doesn't fit the moment. Trump has reconciled with one regime that was fanatically anti-American under Bush — that is, Putin's Russia — and even makes sporadic gestures to *chavista* Venezuela. Europeans are hardly in anti-imperial mood: they want American protection, not withdrawal.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (22)

[FONTE: Henry Mance / FT, 28/03/2025]

The lesson of the Bush years is that presidential idiocy is temporary. Five and a half years after invading Iraq, America elected Barack Obama as president. Anti-Americanism is akin to amputating your broken leg, instead of waiting for it to heal.

But if it's wrong to conflate Americans and their president, it's wrong to disentangle them entirely. Trump reflects half of America. He reflects a society where a democratic majority is prepared to tolerate mass shootings and a warped political system. America provides so much of the world's cultural backdrop that we sometimes mistake it for our own country. It is not, even when a Democrat is president.


Just last spring, during Joe Biden's presidency, the US was [seen unfavourably](#) by at least half the public in Greece, Singapore and Australia, and by more than 40 per cent in Britain and Canada. The next time pollsters ask the question, they will doubtless find record western disillusion.

Europeans — and Canadians and others — are realising that we have our own values and not long to stand up for them. Boycott Philadelphia cream cheese if it makes you feel better. But most Europeans see that the times are now too serious for knee-jerk anti-Americanism.

O anti-americanismo na era Trump (23)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Graeme MacKay / The Hamilton Spectator, 14/06/2018]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (1)

[FONTE: John Keane, China's Galaxy Empire (Oxford University Press, 2024)]



A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (2) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]

The rise of China and the retreat of the US: a new global empire takes shape

Mar 20, 2025



Soldiers from the People's Liberation Army of China, the world's largest standing army, conduct military training in Xinjiang. Photo: AFP

In the first instalment of a two-part commentary prepared for next week's Boao Forum, John Keane, Professor of Politics at the University of Sydney, offers an unorthodox interpretation on the global turmoil triggered by the Trump administration. Maga, he argues, isn't a push to restore America's global dominance, but rather a sign of an empire in retreat, now confronted by a resurgent China – its most significant economic, diplomatic and geopolitical threat since the late 18th century

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (3) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]



Is Trump's "Maga" a restoration of power, or a retreat, as Xi's China emerges as a major global player? Photo: TNS

One trouble with this way of thinking is its blindness to the ways the US squandered its global supremacy and bankrolled the rise of its principal rival during the past four decades. American decline is not recent. Never mind the latter-day pandering to [Vladimir Putin](#)'s Russia. Think of the disastrous military interventions, the wars lost, the botched Blinken-style diplomacy and lies told, the cynical violations of the so-called "rules-based order", and the derision and laughter nowadays generated by a "backsliding" US-style liberal democracy. Then think of the huge historical irony: the way the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and the subsequent material contributions of the US to its sweeping reforms co-produced the return of China, after two centuries of subjugation, to a position of global prominence. The consequence?

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (4) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]

Thanks to the US, technically speaking, China is no longer merely a “country” or a “big power”. It is an empire on the rise. If by empire we mean a supersized polity whose economic, governmental, diplomatic, cultural and military power spills over and spreads far beyond its borders, then the undeniable fact, as I explain at length in *China’s Galaxy Empire* (2024), is that China is rapidly becoming an empire with a global reach. Not only is this fledgling empire a formidable challenge to American global hegemony and a far more robust and determined rival to the American empire than was the Soviet Union. The new Chinese empire is in fact the most serious geopolitical threat the US has faced since its foundation as a republic in the late 18th century.

A new empire

The spinning shadows of Chinese windmills are everywhere on America’s walls, but you wouldn’t know it from the derogatory statements and bleak forecasts made by Maga believers. Orientalist ignorance and denial of China’s imperial ambitions are the underbelly of their belief in US superiority, so let’s consider some of the most important evidence.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (5) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]

Measured by total assets, the four biggest banks in the world are Chinese. China has outflanked bodies such as the [International Monetary Fund](#) and the [World Bank](#) to become the largest global creditor backed by its own financial services institutions such as the [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank](#). China is spearheading the global rebellion against a world financial system defined by the US dollar and its rentier finance capitalist economy; in mid-2023, for the first time, the renminbi topped the US dollar in China's cross-border transactions. With a nearly US\$1 trillion surplus in 2024 – the US hasn't enjoyed a trade surplus since 1975 – China is the largest trading country and owner of half the world's patents.

Despite US-led efforts to “decouple” from China by applying tariff penalties, boycotting its products and services, and banning the sale and import of new communications equipment from [Huawei](#), [ZTE](#) and other Chinese companies, China's economy – unlike the former [Soviet Union](#) –

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (6) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]

is an open political economy shaped by big business entangled with big government. It is a new species of state capitalism which attracts substantial upstream investment from major foreign companies such as [Airbus](#), [Samsung](#), [Toyota](#), German chemicals giant BASF and Singapore's OCBC bank and lithium-ion battery manufacturer Durapower Holdings. China, meanwhile, produces one-third of the world's manufactured goods, more than the US, [Japan](#), [Germany](#), [South Korea](#) and [Britain](#) combined. China is the [European Union](#)'s and [India](#)'s main trading partners in goods. It is the principal investor and trader in the world's most sizeable free-trade zone in [Africa](#); and in Latin America, for the first time in two centuries of independence from the Spanish empire and de facto economic and military dependence upon the US, countries such as [Chile](#), [Peru](#), [Ecuador](#), Uruguay and [Colombia](#) are actively drawing closer to China.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (7) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]


Globally significant shifts are also happening in China in matters of everyday life. After experiencing low levels of life expectancy like those in the West a century ago, life expectancy (78.6 years in 2022 compared with 51 in 1962, according to World Bank data) has surged beyond levels in the US, where healthy life expectancy at birth has been declining. Life expectancy is even higher among China's 400-million strong middle classes, how are beneficiaries of the domestic push towards a "moderately prosperous society". Global expansion has for them become a way of life. Loyal to the system, guided by dreams of house, car and money, frequenters of shopping malls, practised at the art of keeping their heads down – follow the party, but listen to your wife, runs a common joke – the social significance of the new middle classes has been boosted by overseas studying and by massive state investments in higher education: a nearly 10-fold increase during the past two decades. China now produces more STEM graduates than India, the US, Japan, Germany, [France](#), [Italy](#), Britain and [Canada](#) combined.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (8) [FONTE: John Keane, 20/03/2025]

Not to be overlooked is a fact of sobering importance: the People's Liberation Army and its strategy of militarised peace. The PLA is now the globe's largest standing army, with 2 million troops backed by an expanding nuclear arsenal, more submarines than any other power, the world's largest amphibious assault ship, and sophisticated military hardware. The PLA is heavily involved in [United Nations](#) peacekeeping operations. In [Libya](#), [Yemen](#) and [Sudan](#), the PLA has already practised the difficult military arts of evacuating its citizens from conflict zones. Its hand has been strengthened by China's settlement of disputes with neighbouring states, [including India](#). The PLA's militarised peace strategy is backed by a huge military-industrial-aerospace complex featuring mega-companies sporting trade names such as China North Industries Group Corporation and the [Aviation Industry Corporation of China](#). It is reinforced by space-power aspirations, a heavy reliance on smart diplomacy and a commitment to a new and formidable model of warfare that presupposes, runs the Chinese saying, that melons forced from the vine don't taste sweet. Success in war, runs the PLA way of thinking, demands self-control, forbearance and the ability and willingness to wait (*wuwei*, or non-action). Only fools rush into war. Wars are won, or avoided, by outfoxing opponents, wearing down or frightening enemies without firing a single shot.

[FONTE: OEC - Observatory of Economic Complexity]


Exports from China to United States in 2023



A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (10) [FONTE: UN COMTRADE / Coface, 2025]

China exports of intermediate goods to the US

by sector, % of total intermediate good exports




Source: UN COMTRADE, Coface

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (11) [FONTE: UN COMTRADE / Coface, 2025]


US exports of intermediate goods to China

by sector, % of total intermediate good exports



Source: UN COMTRADE, Coface

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (12) [FONTE: Visual Capitalista, 2019]



* Major foreign holders of treasury securities holdings at the end of April 2019

Article and Sources:


<https://howmuch.net/articles/foreign-holders-of-usa-debt>
U.S. Department of the Treasury - <https://home.treasury.gov>

howmuch.net

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (13) [FONTE: USA Facts, 1/08/2024]

Japan and China have been the largest foreign holders of US debt for the last two decades.

Foreign-owned US debt, adjusted for inflation, December 2000–April 2024



From 2000 to 2023, annual totals are based on data from December, while the 2024 data is updated through April. Inflation adjusted to the 2023 calendar year.

Source: [Treasury Department](#) • [Get the data](#) • [Embed](#) • [Download image](#) • [Download SVG](#)

Between 2003 and 2011, Japan and China held 44% or more of all foreign-owned US debt. However, this share has declined over time, and as of 2023, they controlled approximately 25% of foreign-owned debt.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (14) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

The Art of Not Dealing: China's 3-Ring Strategy for a Prolonged Trade War

Beijing is executing a three-layered plan: shoring up its domestic front, tightening the screws on the U.S., and repositioning itself on the global stage.



A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (15) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

As the China-U.S. tariff war enters yet another phase of escalation, with Trump 2.0 proposing new hikes that push the effective U.S. tariff burden on Chinese goods to a staggering 145 percent and Beijing responding by raising its tariffs on U.S. goods to 125 percent, Chinese policymakers have shed any lingering illusions of an imminent thaw. The headlines may center on [retaliatory tariffs](#) and shipping slowdowns, but beneath the surface, a more [consequential shift](#) is unfolding: a long-term strategic recalibration aimed not at out-escalating Washington, but at enduring it.

In addition to matching Washington blow-for-blow, China is moving cautiously yet deliberately to manage exposure, mitigate damage, and reposition itself globally. This emerging strategy is organized into three concentric layers of response. At its core is an all-out push to stabilize the domestic economy. The middle ring focuses on placing targeted pressure back on the United States, measured and mindful of cost-benefit tradeoffs. The outermost circle turns to the broader world, where China is working to counter diplomatic isolation and carve out space in an increasingly polarized global order.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (16) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

Bolstering China's Economy

The most immediate priority is internal resilience. Chinese policymakers are under no illusion that the tariff escalation will subside anytime soon. Accordingly, they've doubled down on their ongoing pivot toward internal demand – now elevated from an economic goal to a strategic imperative. The long-discussed, [intermittently pursued](#) shift toward domestic consumption is no longer optional: it has become the only viable hedge against external coercion, and the system is mobilizing to match.

On the policy front, a broad package of measures is underway. Direct subsidies for vulnerable households, accelerated distribution of consumption vouchers, property market stabilization incentives, tax credits, and both fiscal and monetary support are being prepared for rapid deployment. Local governments have been directed to prioritize household support. Mortgage restrictions will be relaxed in dozens of cities. Subsidies and tax credits will be expanded for childcare, education, and eldercare.

More broadly, Beijing is steering growth toward services, which are less exposed to trade disruptions and more capable of absorbing labor. Inbound tourism is quietly taking on new urgency, bolstered by [relaxed visa policies](#), improved digital payment infrastructure, and curated campaigns targeting high-spending travelers.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (17) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

Hitting Back at the U.S.

The second layer centers on China's posture toward the United States. After raising tariffs on U.S. goods to 125 percent, Beijing signaled that additional moves from Washington would be "ignored" – not because they're inconsequential, but because at the current tariff levels, U.S. products are already economically nonviable in China, and vice versa. Beyond that point, tit-for-tat retaliation loses its strategic value.

Unsurprisingly, China has resorted to more surgical retaliation. Though [not new](#), these targeted strikes are now being deployed with a speed and scale that exceed previous rounds of retaliation. Customs authorities have ramped up scrutiny of U.S. aviation and semiconductor components. U.S. agricultural imports are once again facing logistical hurdles. U.S. companies are encountering new regulatory bottlenecks – just as Washington moves to remove the *de minimis* exemption for Chinese fast-fashion platforms like Shein and Temu.

While Beijing hasn't officially labeled these moves as retaliatory, they function as strategic signals to the U.S. business community: access to China's market can be modulated – and will be.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (18) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

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A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (19) [FONTE: Lizzi C. Lee / The Diplomat, 15/04/2025]

China's Pitch to the Rest of the World

The third layer of China's response unfolds in the global arena. Here, Beijing is working to expand its margins – politically and economically – by doubling down on regional diplomacy and offering itself as a more predictable, if not always less complex, partner.

The recent Central Party Conference on neighborhood diplomacy – the first of its kind since 2013 – was more than symbolic. It marked a pivot toward consolidating ties with regional neighbors as a buffer against great-power pressure. In his keynote, Xi described China's relationships with its neighbors as "at a critical phase," calling for "new breakthroughs" in cooperation. That message now undergirds Xi's visits this week to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia – countries where Beijing is positioning itself as both a partner and a counterweight to U.S. influence.

Easier Said Than Done

Of course, this three-ring strategy is far easier to articulate than to execute.

China's shift toward domestic demand runs up against entrenched obstacles: deep income inequality, patchy social safety nets, high costs for health care and education, and – most critically – a state-led financial system that prioritizes control over consumer empowerment. These are structural, not superficial, barriers. Overcoming them requires rethinking fundamental priorities, from the preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises to the impulse for state-directed investment. Reform in these areas has been long promised, rarely delivered.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (20) [FONTE: Reuters, 21/04/2025]

China warns countries against striking trade deals with US at its expense



A truck carrying containers moves at the Yantian port in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, China April 17, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo [Purchase Licensing Rights](#)

BEIJING, April 21 (Reuters) - China on Monday accused Washington of abusing [tariffs](#) and warned countries against striking a broader economic deal with the United States at its expense, ratcheting up its rhetoric in a spiralling trade war between the world's two biggest economies.

Beijing will firmly oppose any party striking a deal at China's expense and "will take countermeasures in a resolute and reciprocal manner," its Commerce Ministry said.

A estratégia da China na guerra comercial com os EUA (21) [FONTE: Reuters, 21/04/2025]

Earlier this month, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said nearly [50 countries](#) have approached him to discuss the steep additional tariffs imposed by Trump.

Several bilateral talks on tariffs have taken place since, with [Japan](#) considering raising soybean and rice imports as part of its talks with the U.S. while [Indonesia](#) is planning to increase U.S. food and commodities imports and reduce orders from other nations.

CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE

Trump's tariff policies have rattled financial markets as investors fear a severe disruption in world trade could tip the global economy into recession.

On Monday, Chinese stocks inched higher, showing little reaction to the commerce ministry comments, though investors have generally remained cautious on Chinese assets due to the rising growth risks.

The Trump administration also has been trying to curb Beijing's progress in developing advanced semiconductor chips which it says could be used for military purposes, and last week imposed [port fees](#) on China-built vessels to limit China's dominance in shipbuilding.

AI chip giant [Nvidia said](#) last week it would take \$5.5 billion in charges due to the administration's curbs on AI chip exports.

China's President Xi Jinping [visited](#) three Southeast Asian countries last week in a move to bolster regional ties, calling on trade partners to oppose unilateral bullying.

Beijing has said it is ["tearing down walls"](#) and expanding its circle of trading partners amid the trade row.

Sugestões de leitura

