


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a era da imprevisibilidade

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
SESSÃO Nº 27**

7 / 5 /2025



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (1) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (2) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Population: (2025 est.) 23,607,000³

Form Of Government: interim government¹

Official Language: Arabic

Official Religion: none²

Official Name: Al-Jumhūriyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Sūriyyah (Syrian Arab Republic)

Total Area (Sq Km): 185,180

Total Area (Sq Mi): 71,480

Monetary Unit: Syrian pound (S.P)

Population Rank: (2025) 59

Population Projection 2030:
28,647,000

Density: Persons Per Sq Mi: (2025)
330.3

Density: Persons Per Sq Km:
(2025) 127.5

Urban-Rural Population: Urban:
(2024) 58% • Rural: (2024) 42%

Life Expectancy At Birth: Male:
(2022) 72.8 years • Female: (2022)
75.8 years



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (3) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Ahmed al-Sharaa


president of interim government of Syria



Ahmed al-Sharaa (born 1982, [Riyadh](#), Saudi Arabia) is a militant [Islamist](#) who became [president](#) (2025–) of [Syria](#)'s [interim](#) government after leading the lightning offensive in 2024 that toppled the dynastic Pres. [Bashar al-Assad](#). He commanded one of the leading factions of the [Syrian Civil War](#) (2011–), known as [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham](#) (HTS), which was first formed as an [affiliate](#) of [al-Qaeda](#). Because of that former association, Sharaa and HTS are designated as terrorists by several countries—including the [United States](#), the [United Kingdom](#), and [Turkey](#) (Türkiye), as well as the [United Nations](#) and the [European Union](#)—although he and his organization cut ties with al-Qaeda in about 2016. He has since sought to recreate his image and in January 2025 ordered HTS (and all other armed groups) to disband. Before replacing Assad as the de facto leader of Syria, Sharaa went by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.


A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (4) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Syria ethnic composition (2000)



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (5) [FONTE: Encyclopaedia Britannica]

Syria religious affiliation (2000)



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (6) [FONTE: Fabrice Balanche / Revue Conflits, 25/03/2025]

Geography of the Alawites Massacre

The early-March 2025 massacres against the Alawites caused the deaths of thousands of people. Analyzing these events helps to understand the motivations of their perpetrators and the sequence of operations.



Published in French in [Revue Conflits](#), March 25, 2025.

Le bilan des massacres d'alaouites dans la région côtière, en mars 2025, ne pourra probablement pas être établi avec précision. Les seules informations dont on dispose deux semaines après ces tragiques événements sont les chiffres fournis par l'OSDH, qui fait état de 1 376 victimes civiles entre le 6 et le 9 mars. Il est important de noter que les violences ont débuté dès le 4 mars dans le quartier alaouite de

Daatour ([Ahmad al-Sharaa est responsable du massacre des alaouites – Fabrice Balanche](#)), à Lattaquié, et qu'elles se sont prolongées au-delà du 9 mars, bien que leur ampleur ait diminué.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (7) [FONTE: Fabrice Balanche / Revue Conflits, 25/03/2025]

Les massacres dans la région alaouite en mars 2025



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (8) [FONTE: Fabrice Balanche / Revue Conflits, 25/03/2025]

Sous le regard des autorités

La concentration de massacres sur le littoral, facilement accessible par la route, entre Lattaquié et Banias montre la responsabilité des forces de sécurité du nouveau régime syrien. Les autorités ne pouvaient pas ignorer les événements qui se déroulaient dans leur région, car elles disposaient de postes de police à Lattaquié, Banias et Jableh. C'était aussi le cas dans la plaine du Ghab, entre Massyaf, Tel Salhab et Jesser al-Shoughour. Les groupes prétendent « irréguliers » ont donc agi sous la supervision des forces de sécurité du nouveau régime.

La concentration des massacres de grande ampleur dans le nord de la région alaouite pourrait corroborer [la thèse officielle](#) du nouveau régime à Damas, qui affirme qu'il s'agit d'une répression contre une « *insurrection fomentée par les fidèles de l'ancien régime* ». Il est vrai que c'est dans cette région que l'ancien régime recrutait majoritairement ses forces de sécurité, tandis que le sud de la région alaouite, situé plus loin du clan Assad, servait principalement de réservoir de fonctionnaires civils. Il est faux de croire que la violence a éclaté le 6 mars, comme l'affirme Damas.


A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (9) [FONTE: Fabrice Balanche / Revue Conflits, 25/03/2025]

En réalité, elle a commencé le 4 mars avec l'assaut du quartier alaouite de Daatour par les forces du HTS, suivi le lendemain par l'attaque du village sacré de Dalyeh. La soi distant « insurrection » n'était autre qu'une réaction de défense des alaouites. Certes, parmi les plus déterminés figuraient d'anciens militaires et membres des services de sécurité, qui ne voulaient pas se laisser arrêter. Ils n'avaient en effet pas la capacité offensive nécessaire pour s'emparer de la région côtière et y créer un « réduit alaouite ».

La violence des nouvelles autorités islamistes fut indiscriminée : des femmes, des enfants, des personnes âgées furent massacrés. Ce sont principalement les jeunes hommes qui ont été visés. Ce n'était pas parce qu'il avait appartenu ou aurait pu appartenir à l'armée et aux services secrets du régime précédent, mais bien parce que la communauté alaouite devait être anéantie. Maintenant, les hommes alaouites savent qu'ils peuvent être exécutés pour leur affiliation confessionnelle, ils doivent donc fuir le pays pour préserver leur vie. Les femmes et les enfants les accompagneront ou les rejoindront.

Voilà la principale raison de ces massacres : l'épuration ethnique envers une communauté accusée d'être complice du régime des Assad et la haine religieuse.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (10) [FONTE: Middle East Institute]



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (11) [FONTE: BBC, 1/05/2025]

Deadly clashes in Syria's Druze areas raise fears of widening unrest

Deadly clashes between Islamist armed factions, security forces and fighters from the Druze religious minority near Damascus are another sign of the continuing fragility of the security situation in Syria after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad.

Outside players have once again been involved, with Israel saying it carried out air strikes to protect Druze civilians.

It marks another fault-line in Syria, which has been left fractured and divided in the wake of 13 years of devastating civil war and decades of authoritarian rule by the Assad dynasty.

The new Syrian authorities have said they are determined to bring unity and stability, but many inside and outside the country still point to their roots in jihadism and remain suspicious of their agenda.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (12) [FONTE: BBC, 1/05/2025]

Syrian authorities said security forces were deployed to Ashrafiyat Sahnaya to restore security and stability, accusing what it called "outlaw groups" based there of instigating the clashes.

But the spiritual leader of Syria's Druze community, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, condemned the violence as an "unjustifiable genocidal campaign" and said people had been defending their homes from attacks by extremists.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 101 people have been killed this week in Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, the mainly Druze suburb of Jaramana, and the southern province of Suweida, which has a Druze majority.

The UK-based monitoring group said that included 71 members of the Druze community, including 10 civilians and 35 gunmen who were shot dead in an "ambush" while travelling from Suweida to Damascus on Wednesday, as well as 30 members of the security forces and allied armed groups.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (13) [FONTE: BBC, 4/04/2025]



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (14) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 1/04/2025]

Turkey moves to take control of Syria's strategic T4 air base: Sources



[Turkey](#) has begun efforts to take control of [Syria's](#) Tiyas air base, also known as T4, and is preparing to deploy air defence systems there, sources familiar with the matter told Middle East Eye.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (15) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 1/04/2025]

A source familiar with the matter told MEE that Turkey has begun moving to take control of the T4 air base, located near Palmyra in central Syria.

"A Hisar-type air defence system will be deployed to T4 to provide air cover for the base," the source said.

"Once the system is in place, the base will be reconstructed and expanded with necessary facilities. Ankara also plans to deploy surveillance and armed drones, including those with extended strike capabilities."

The source added that the base would help Turkey establish aerial control across the region and support its efforts to combat IS, which still has cells operating in the Syrian desert.

Ankara eventually aims to establish a layered air defence system in and around the base, which would have short-, medium- and long-range air defence capabilities against a variety of threats, from jets to drones to missiles.

A second source noted that the presence of Turkish air defence systems and drones would likely deter Israel from launching air strikes in the area.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (16) [FONTE: Middle East Eye, 1/04/2025]

Unnerving Israel

Israel has regularly targeted Syrian military installations since Assad's government collapsed in December, with a recent surge in operations around T4. Last week, the Israeli air force [struck](#) T4 and the Palmyra air base, targeting runways and strategic assets.

An Israeli security source told the media on Monday that any Turkish air base in Syria would undermine Israel's freedom of operation. "This is a potential threat that we oppose," the source said.

Tensions between Turkey and Israel have escalated since the start of Israel's war on Gaza in 2023, ending a brief period of reconciliation between the two countries.

The collapse of the Assad government and Turkey's emergence as a dominant power in Syria have further alarmed Israel, which now sees Ankara as a potentially greater threat in the region than Iran.

"We targeted the T4 military base recently to send a message: we will not allow any threat to our operational freedom in the air," the Israeli security source [told](#) the Jerusalem Post.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (17) [FONTE: Anadolu, 5/04/2025]

Anadolu films Israeli-targeted T4 air base in Syria



HOMS, Syria/ISTANBUL

Anadolu captured footage of the T4 Airbase in central Syria, a facility that has Israel is trying to destroy with airstrikes.

The T4 Airbase, located west of the ancient city of Palmyra in Homs province, was used for years by the now-ousted regime of Bashar Assad.

One of the country's largest military airfields, the base spans a wide area, featuring long runways and extensive aircraft parking zones.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (18) [FONTE: Anadolu, 5/04/2025]



Strategically positioned in central Syria, T4 is connected by roads to major cities such as Homs and Damascus, offering significant logistical advantages.

The base was modernized during the Cold War with support from the Soviet Union and served as one of the most important operational bases for the regime's air force. It was also used by Russian and Iranian military forces.

After the collapse of the regime, Israel stepped up attacks on the base, which it occasionally targeted for housing Iranian forces, aiming to render it completely inoperative.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (19) [FONTE: BBC, 4/04/2025]

Israeli strikes in Syria a challenge to Turkey

4 April 2025

A growing confrontation between Israel and Turkey over influence in Syria is posing a serious challenge for Syria's fragile new government.

On Wednesday night, Israel bombed several military targets in Syria, including two airports – Hama military airport and the T4 base near Homs.

Syria's foreign ministry said the bombardment virtually destroyed the Hama base. A prominent Syrian human rights group said four defence ministry employees were killed, and a dozen other people injured.

[The air strikes hit Syria](#), but their real target was Turkey.

Shortly afterwards, Israel's foreign minister accused Turkey of playing a "negative role" in Syria, and Israel's defence minister warned Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, that he would "pay a very heavy price" if he allowed "hostile forces" to enter his country.

Ankara is currently negotiating a joint defence pact with Sharaa's new government, and there have been widespread reports that Turkey is moving to station aircraft and air defence systems at Syria's T4 and Aleppo airbases.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (20) [FONTE: BBC, 4/04/2025]

Relations between Israel and Turkey have nose-dived since the Gaza war began in October 2023, with Ankara introducing trade restrictions and accusing Israel of genocide.

That regional tension is now playing out on new ground in Syria.

After the air strikes on Wednesday, Turkey's foreign ministry accused Israel of destabilising the region by "both causing chaos and feeding terrorism" and said it was now the greatest threat to the security of the region.

But foreign minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters news agency that his country was not seeking confrontation with Israel, and that Syria could set its own policies with its southern neighbour.

Syria's new leader has repeatedly signalled that he was not looking for confrontation with Israel. Soon after sweeping President Bashar al-Assad from power last December, he told the BBC that Syria would not pose a threat to any country.

He has even left the door open to normalising diplomatic relations with Israel in the future, telling the Economist last month that Syria wanted peace with all parties, but that it was too early to discuss such a sensitive issue.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (21) [FONTE: BBC, 4/04/2025]

Once an implacable enemy of Syria's former president and his Iranian ally, Israel is also suspicious of Sharaa, a man who once led the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda and whose new government is backed by Turkey.

Since he took power, Israel's military has repeatedly pounded Syrian weapons stores, airfields and other military sites left by the former regime, to avoid them falling into enemy hands, it says.

It has also occupied a demilitarised buffer zone, set up after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and has sent forces onto the Syrian side of a nearby mountain, setting up nine bases across the area.

Israeli troops are also making regular incursions into Syria's south-western provinces, vowing to prevent the presence of any armed groups or government forces there.

Earlier this week, the local government in the southern city of Deraa said nine civilians were killed in an Israeli bombardment, during the deepest incursion there yet by Israeli forces.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (22) [FONTE: i24NEWS, 4/05/2025]

Turkish warplanes face off with Israeli fighters over Syria - reports

Turkish planes reportedly encountered the Israeli aircraft during a series of strikes in Syria, which targeted pro-Ankara militias

[i24NEWS](#)

May 04, 2025 at 02:42 PM ■ latest revision May 04, 2025 at 09:29 PM



An Israeli F-15 Eagle seen over the skies of Haifa in northern Israel Jack GUEZ / AFP)

An aerial confrontation took place between Israeli and Turkish forces in Syrian airspace, according to media reports on Sunday. According to the *Sözcü* Turkish opposition media, Turkish F-16s reportedly entered Syrian airspace over the weekend and sent "warning messages" to Israeli planes involved in a wave of strikes there.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (23) [FONTE: i24NEWS, 4/05/2025]

The Israel Defense Forces denied such reports. According to the Turkish media outlet, the incident occurred as part of one of the most intense Israeli operations since the fall of the Assad regime. Several of the strikes' targets were reportedly pro-Turkish militias operating in northern Syria, including the Sultan Murad and Suleyman Shah brigades, which are affiliated with Ankara.

According to various Turkish sources and *Reuters*, Turkey seeks to strengthen its military presence in Syria in the post-Assad era, and these warnings come in this context as Israel has also asserted its military force. Turkish units reportedly aim at establishing themselves permanently in several strategic airbases, including the T4 base in Homs and another in Hama, deploying notably drones and air defense systems.

In early March, Israel allegedly struck the T4 base a few hours before the arrival of a Turkish military delegation that came to evaluate the site. The infrastructure, including the control tower and runways, were said to have been destroyed. Ankara accuses Israel of seeking to destabilize Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently stated that "Israeli attacks compromise the balance in the region since the fall of the Syrian regime."

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (24)

[FONTE: Ariane Bonzon / Le Monde Diplomatique, Maio 2025]

Turkey: wanting to have it both ways on Israel

Internally, the Syrian question – and Ankara's determination to maintain a strong influence within that country – can be the object of disagreements between Erdoğan's Islamo-nationalist government and its opponents; it could partly explain the imprisonment of the president's main rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the highly popular mayor of Istanbul and Republican People's Party (CHP) figure. But the main opposition party also sees the Israel-Palestine conflict differently from Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP). On this issue, the AKP has to reckon with the moderation of its CHP rival, which is gaining ground, pressure from the most radical wing of political Islam, and its own hesitations.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (25)

[FONTE: Ariane Bonzon / Le Monde Diplomatique, Maio 2025]

The Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 came just as Turkey was preparing to normalise relations with Israel. Erdoğan did not condemn the attack and rejected the use of the term 'terrorist', describing Hamas as a 'group of freedom fighters who are striving to protect their lands'

Turkey believed it needed to play an anti-Israel, pro-Palestine card to be seen as a major player in the Arab world. In reality, more than Erdoğan, it was Ahmet Davutoğlu – ideologue, creator of the 'strategic depth' doctrine, later advisor, then foreign minister and eventually prime minister – who, from 2007, reoriented Turkish foreign policy in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (26)

[FONTE: Ariane Bonzon / Le Monde Diplomatique, Maio 2025]

'Turkey was legitimising Hamas'

That October Turkey offered to host some of the most senior Hamas commanders who had just been released in exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Gallia Lindenstrauss, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, describes how 'Ankara turned a blind eye to the movement's activities: money laundering and importing goods from Iran [subject to embargo] to Gaza via Turkey. The Turkish government gave passports to Hamas leaders, then it gave them citizenship.' Former Israeli diplomat Alon Liel adds, 'Turkey was allowing Hamas to establish its headquarters there and enabling it to devote itself to the Palestinian struggle for the West Bank. It was legitimising Hamas.'

In Netanyahu's eyes, Turkey is now the closest enemy. If Ankara requested a no-fly zone in the north of Syria or took charge of the air space, it would be seen as a casus belli by the Israeli prime minister, who intends to maintain freedom to carry out airstrikes there and in Iran Player in current talks on Syria

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (27)

[FONTE: Ariane Bonzon / Le Monde Diplomatique, Maio 2025]

In the presidential palace in Ankara, it is no secret that Tel Aviv played its part in the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) offensive, which was supported by Erdoğan's government, and contributed to the downfall of the Assad regime. Israeli bombardments exhausted Hizbullah and weakened Iran, both former Assad supporters. Nor is the fate of the Shia movement lamented in Ankara: it fought the opposition forces – including jihadists – backed by Turkey. Basically,' explains Henri Barkey, emeritus professor of international relations at Lehigh University (Pennsylvania), 'Israel and Turkey find themselves in similar situations in Syria. Both occupy a significant amount of Syrian territory. They face parallel security challenges: the Kurds for the Turks, and Hizbullah and other groups for Israel. Neither wants to see the Iranians return, even though that's unlikely to happen.' The weakening of Iran, a historic rival, suits Turkey.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (28)

[FONTE: Ariane Bonzon / Le Monde Diplomatique, Maio 2025]

The convergence of interests has not prevented tensions from increasing since Assad's fall. 'Syria will become a new source of discord between the two countries,' Barkey predicts. Israel is wary of Turkish influence on the new government in Damascus and wants a weak, decentralised Syria. It has long occupied the Golan Heights well beyond the buffer zone established in the wake of the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and expresses its determination to 'defend' the Druze people against the new Syrian government.

Furthermore, the Israeli foreign minister has described the Kurdish people as the country's 'natural ally' (*Times of Israel*, 10 November 2024). And political scientist Halil Karaveli believes an independent Rojava – a currently autonomous Kurdish enclave in the northeast of Syria – is all the more of a headache for Turkey given that it could 'provide Israel with a strategic ally at the crossroads of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the Levant'. Besides, Karaveli concludes, 'Israeli ambitions are largely behind the current historic Kurdish opening,' following Abdullah Öcalan's February 2025 call for the PKK to lay down its arms.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (29)

[FONTE: Giorgio Cafiero / Responsible Statecraft, 29/04/2015]

Can Trump cool Turkey-Israel tensions over Syria?

With US withdrawal looming, both powers are testing a fragile detente with competing visions of Damascus's future



A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (30)

[FONTE: Giorgio Cafiero / Responsible Statecraft, 29/04/2015]

Since Bashar al-Assad's ouster late last year, however, dynamics have shifted, transforming Syria into an arena of Turkish-Israeli competition. A major source of tension between Turkey and Israel stems from the former's desire to see Syria emerge as a strong, unitary state with a

Turkey-oriented government in Damascus while the latter wants Syria permanently weak and divided along ethno-sectarian lines.

The Israeli government's perspective is that Turkey's growing clout in post-Ba'ath Syria poses a grave threat to the Jewish state. At the start of this year, an Israeli government committee that assesses regional security issues put out a [report](#) warning that Syria's new Sunni Islamist authorities might pose a graver threat to Israeli security than Syria did under Assad. The committee [considered](#) the possibility of the new Damascus government becoming a "proxy" of Ankara, citing "Turkey's ambition to restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory."

Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other officials in Ankara have used strong language to condemn Israel's aggression, not only in [Gaza](#) and [Lebanon](#), but also in [post-Assad Syria](#).

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (31)

[FONTE: Giorgio Cafiero / Responsible Statecraft, 29/04/2015]

An intensifying showdown

[Israel](#) began [bombarding](#) Damascus and other parts of Syria, while also illegally [usurping](#) more Syrian land past the Golan Heights, in the immediate aftermath of the former regime's collapse nearly five months ago.

Then late last month and at the start of this month, Israeli military operations [struck](#) Syrian bases in which Ankara had indicated interest following much talk about Turkey formalizing a military alliance with post-Ba'ath Syria. Ultimately, Israel wants to prevent a future in Syria where Ankara acts as Syria's security guarantor and can effectively deter the Israelis from carrying out bombing or ground attacks on Syrian territory at will, which has been happening since Assad's ouster, and was also taking place to a significant degree during Assad's final years in power.

The Israelis have gone as far as [lobbying](#) Washington to support a Russian military presence in the country to serve as a bulwark against Turkish influence.

A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (32)

[FONTE: Giorgio Cafiero / Responsible Statecraft, 29/04/2015]

The US role

While tensions between these two U.S. allies over the "New Syria" remain hot, Washington is a center of gravity. The [Trump administration](#) has signaled its determination to pull Turkey and Israel back from their hostilities.

"When we consider that the U.S. plans to withdraw its troops by the end of the year [and] is imposing an agreement between the [Syrian Democratic Forces] and Damascus, and Turkey's efforts to form an anti-ISIS coalition with Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, the picture becomes quite clear," Dost said.

"As it withdraws from Syria, the U.S. government would like to leave behind an environment where its allies can reach an understanding. It will also want to ensure normalization between Israel and Syria before leaving," she added.


A competição entre a Turquia e Israel pelo controlo da Síria (33)

[FONTE: Giorgio Cafiero / Responsible Statecraft, 29/04/2015]

"In my view, when Trump spoke positively about Turkey's strong role in Syria and told Netanyahu to 'be reasonable,' it was a warning to Israel that it had gone too far in its actions there. This amounted to an acknowledgment of Turkey as a balancing power. Netanyahu was not pleased but had no choice but to accept it," Caner said.

"Trump essentially told Netanyahu to respect Turkey's priorities and positions. It's hardly necessary to state how much Israel relies on U.S. backing, so Trump's warning was intended to put the brakes on Israel's activities in Syria — and I believe it will," he added.

Recognizing Trump as a "leader who speaks the language of power," Dost noted his respect for Erdogan's "success in bringing about change in Syria" but she does not believe that issues concerning Ankara's role in post-Assad Syria will fuel much tension between the White House and Netanyahu's government. In Dost's opinion, the real issue is Washington's diplomatic engagement with [Iran](#) on the nuclear file with ongoing talks set to continue in May.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (1) [FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]

Iran

COUNTRY SPOTLIGHT

Iran's nuclear ambitions have been a focus of international diplomacy for decades. Faced with accusations of nuclear weapons pursuits in violation of its NPT commitments, Iran concluded a 2015 agreement, the JCPOA, to restrict its nuclear program. However, the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the deal and subsequent Iranian violations cast doubt on the deal's future.

See Iran's performance in


[Nuclear Security Index](#) ↗

[Global Health Security Index](#) ↗



Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (2)

[FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]



Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (3) [FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]

Analysis

on Iran



DATABASE — Mar 11, 2025

The CNS Iran Missile and SLV Launch Database

Collection of Iranian missile tests including the date, time, missile name, launch agency, facility name, and test outcome. (CNS)

INTERACTIVE & VISUALIZATION — Jun 30, 2015

Iranian Ballistic Missile Models




FACT SHEET — Aug 4, 2020

Iranian Centrifuge Model Collection



Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (4) [FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]

Nuclear



- ▶ In February 2024, Iran announced the start of construction of four new nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 5,000 megawatts; Iran plans to produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by 2041
- ▶ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded in 2015 to restrict Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief
- ▶ Possesses complete uranium fuel cycle capabilities
- ▶ Nuclear program and personnel have been targets of sabotage and assassinations

Biological



- ▶ Denies acquisition or production of biological weapons
- ▶ Has sophisticated biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
- ▶ Engages in dual-use activities which "raise concern" with U.S. government


Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (5) [FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]

Missile



- ▶ Large, increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile and space launch programs
- ▶ Initially received foreign assistance, particularly from North Korea, but today possesses indigenous capabilities
- ▶ Supplies missiles and rockets to partner and proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen

Chemical



- ▶ Suffered severe losses from Iraqi chemical weapons use during the Iran-Iraq War
- ▶ Acknowledges development of limited chemical weapons capability in 1980s but denies ever weaponizing or using chemical weapons
- ▶ Rejects U.S. claims that Iran supplied Libya with chemical munitions in 1980s


Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (6) [FONTE: NTI - Nuclear Treat Initiative]

Missile



- ▶ Large, increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile and space launch programs
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Chemical



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Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (7) [FONTE: Daniel B. Shapiro / The Atlantic Council, 11/04/2025]

The Iran nuclear talks are Trump's decisive moment on military strikes

April 11, 2025

By [Daniel B. Shapiro](#)

US President Donald Trump has worked quickly to overcome Iranian resistance to nuclear talks, now set to launch in Oman on April 12. Trump has been clear in his desire to resolve the issue diplomatically and avoid war in the Middle East. But he and his team surely know that within a relatively short time, he is likely to face the decision point on whether or not to pursue a military strike.

The timing, need, and opportunity may never be more compelling. And, arguably, a military option is more feasible now than at any time in recent decades.

Trump has set a sixty-day target to reach a deal. The Iranians will be adept at extending that timeline. But if negotiations peter out and the looming reimposition of sanctions—the snapback—occurs, with an Iranian response, Washington will reach a crisis. For Trump, that will be the point of decision over escalation.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (8)

[FONTE: Daniel B. Shapiro / The Atlantic Council, 11/04/2025]

Based on all Iranian behavior in previous rounds of negotiations, there is no reason to believe Tehran would agree to these terms. Iran has for decades worked to assemble an industrial nuclear program, which the regime believes to be key to its survival. The notion that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at age eighty-five and nearing the end of his rule, would agree to give it all up is implausible.

If, somehow, Iran did show openness to a full dismantlement, it would surely insist on major sanctions relief in exchange. Iranian leaders could only justify accepting what they would see as humiliating terms on the nuclear program if it would bring dramatic economic relief to their people.

But US sanctions against Iran encompass a wide range of goals beyond its nuclear program. Designations include constraints on Iran's ballistic missile program, its proliferation or acquisition of advanced military equipment, Tehran's vast terrorist proxy network (including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen), and its human rights abuses. Some of these sanctions, such as those contained in the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, could only be removed through legislation. There is scant appetite in the US Congress for this level of sanctions relief against a long-time adversary.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (9) [FONTE: Daniel B. Shapiro / The Atlantic Council, 11/04/2025]

Potential outcomes

Given these challenges, three options are likely to emerge from the negotiations: One, a limited deal that does not fundamentally dismantle Iran's program, but buys some time; two, no deal, the deadline approaching, and the imposition of snapback sanctions, leading to a crisis; and three, a military strike against the nuclear program.

There is precedent for the limited deal option. In 2013, Iran agreed to the Joint Plan of Action, which provided limited sanctions relief in exchange for Iran freezing certain aspects of its nuclear program and modestly (and reversibly) downgrading others. A "less-for-less" deal of this type could conceivably kick the can down the road, relieving Trump or Khamenei from having to make a fateful decision. It could include a new United Nations Security Council Resolution extending the snapback timeline.

But now, Iran's program is at such an advanced stage that a freeze would still leave it capable of breaking out at a time of its choosing. By all estimations, Iran sits on the threshold of nuclear breakout—the ability to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium to assemble a nuclear device. In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [reported](#) that Iran had tripled its stockpile of sixty percent enriched uranium in just three months and now possessed enough—if enriched to ninety percent—to manufacture several weapons. 5

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (10) [FONTE: Reuters 2/05/2025]

How Trump blindsided Netanyahu with his Iran nuclear gamble

WASHINGTON, May 2 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump blindsided Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last month with a gamble on [immediately opening negotiations](#) with Iran. Now, the success of those talks hinges on winning a handful of key concessions to stop the Islamic Republic developing a nuclear bomb, eight sources said.

The pivot to negotiations with Iran in April was a shock for Netanyahu, who had flown to Washington seeking Trump's backing for military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities and learned less than 24 hours before a joint White House press event that U.S. talks with Iran were starting within days, four sources familiar with the matter told Reuters.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (11) [FONTE: Reuters 2/05/2025]

A deal may not look radically different to the former pact, which he called the worst in history, but would extend duration to 25 years, tighten verification, and expand so-called sunset clauses that pause but don't completely dismantle aspects of Iran's nuclear program, all the sources said.

Under the terms being discussed, Iran would limit stockpile size and centrifuge types, and dilute, export or seal its 60 percent uranium stock under unprecedented International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) scrutiny - all in exchange for substantial sanctions relief, all the sources said.

The U.S. State Department, Iran's foreign ministry and Netanyahu's office did not respond to requests for comment.

Dennis Ross, a former negotiator under both Republicans and Democrats, said that any new agreement must go further than the JCPOA by imposing a permanent, structural change in Tehran's nuclear capabilities - shrinking its infrastructure to the point where developing a bomb is no longer a practical option.

"Anything less would leave the threshold threat intact," he told Reuters.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (12) [FONTE: Reuters 2/05/2025]

The proposals do not seek to dismantle Tehran's nuclear infrastructure entirely as Israel and some U.S. officials want, but aim to lock in permanent constraints on uranium enrichment that deter any breakout, the sources said.

U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff appeared to acknowledge that position in comments last week, [but later said](#) Iran must "stop and eliminate" enrichment.

One way out could be for Iran to accept long breaks to the enrichment program, through an extension of sunset clauses, said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow and the founding director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

"The Iranians, if they were smart, they would settle for much longer sunset clauses going into the future," Vatanka said, emphasizing the importance of each side being able to claim victory in the talks.

Another possible compromise could involve Iran retaining minimal enrichment, with 5,000 centrifuges, while importing the rest of the enriched uranium, possibly from Russia, one of the three Iranian sources, a senior security official, told Reuters.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (13) [FONTE: Axios 5/05/2025]

Trump will only accept "total dismantlement" of Iran's nuclear program



U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks to graduating students at the Coleman Coliseum at the University of Alabama on May 01, 2025 in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Trump's remarks come the day before commencement ceremonies. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

[President Trump](#) said the goal of the negotiations with Iran is to achieve "full dismantlement" of Tehran's nuclear program.

Why it matters: Trump's remarks in an "Meet the Press" interview aired Sunday are the first time he's publicly announced the ambitious goal since nuclear talks began with Iran a month ago.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (14) [FONTE: Axios 5/05/2025]

Between the lines: Trump's statement settles an internal debate within the administration about what the goal of the talks with Iran should be.

- The more hawkish voices in the administration, backed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, say the U.S. must demand the full dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program and do it by military force if Iran refuses to accept it.
- The other camp within the administration thinks Iran will not accept full dismantlement of its nuclear program and has suggested the U.S. agree to some uranium enrichment in order to get a deal and avoid a military strike that could lead to a war with Iran.

State of play: Iran said several times in public — and made it clear in private — during the U.S. negotiations that it will not accept full dismantlement of its nuclear program.

- U.S. and Iranian negotiators are expected to meet later this week for the fourth round of nuclear talks.
- Trump's statement will likely have a significant influence on the next round of negotiations.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (15) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 5/05/2025]

Netanyahu threatens Houthis, and Iran, as cabinet convenes after missile hits airport

Premier endorses Trump post vowing to hold Iran responsible for 'every shot fired' by Yemen group, as IAF probe says 'technical malfunction' likely behind air-defense failure



Smoke in the area of Ben Gurion Airport after a ballistic missile was fired at Israel from Yemen on May 4, 2025 (Screen grab from social media used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (16) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 5/05/2025]

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday vowed to retaliate against the Houthis in Yemen and to act against “their patron” Iran, hours after the rebel group [struck](#) Ben Gurion Airport with a ballistic missile.

“We, along with the entire world, are under threat from the Houthis. We will not tolerate it and will take very strong retaliatory action against them,” the premier told Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, who is in Israel on an official visit, according to a readout from his office.

“We will always remember that they acted under the orders and with the support of their patron — Iran,” the premier added. “We will do what needs to be done to deliver a proper warning to Iran that we cannot tolerate such acts.”

Netanyahu on Sunday also endorsed a message by US President Donald Trump, in which the American leader vowed to hold Iran responsible for the Houthis’ actions.

In his post, Trump also asserted that “Iran has played ‘the innocent victim’ of rogue terrorists from which they’ve lost control, but they haven’t lost control.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (17) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 7/05/2025]

Reports: Iran pressed Houthis into truce with US to build 'momentum' in nuclear talks

Two Iranian officials say Tehran persuaded Yemen rebel group to stop attacking US shipping; Washington sources say Oman-mediated move aimed at furthering nuclear negotiations



Iran leaned on Yemen's Houthi rebel group to reach a truce with the US over attacks in the Red Sea in a move aimed at pushing along negotiations for an agreement over Tehran's nuclear program, according to reports.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (18) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 7/05/2025]

Trump, who withdrew the US from a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers, has signaled confidence in clinching a new pact that blocks Iran's path to a nuclear bomb, but has threatened to attack if diplomacy fails.

While announcing the truce with the Houthis, Trump, who is set to visit the Middle East this month, also said he had a "very, very, very big announcement to make... like as big as it gets... and it's really positive." The president said he would only give details later in the week.

Oman later revealed it had mediated the ceasefire deal, according to which neither side will target the other, including US vessels in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

According to CNN, negotiations between the US and the Houthis were stimulated by remarks from US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who [last week posted to X](#) that Iran "will pay the CONSEQUENCE at the time and place of our choosing" if it continues "lethal support to the Houthis."

A US official said the Trump administration did not notify Israel ahead of time of an agreement with the Houthis to halt attacks.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (19) [FONTE: Washington Post, 2/05/2025]

Inside Waltz's ouster: Before Signalgate, talks with Israel angered Trump

The fired national security adviser engaged in intense coordination with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about military options against Iran ahead of an Oval Office meeting between the Israeli leader and Trump, two people said.



Susie Wiles, White House chief of staff, and Michael Waltz, when he was still President Donald Trump's national security adviser, in the Oval Office in April. (Al Drago/For The Washington Post)

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (20) [FONTE: Washington Post, 2/05/2025]

Waltz appeared to have engaged in intense coordination with Netanyahu about military options against Iran ahead of an Oval Office meeting between the Israeli leader and Trump, the two people said.

Waltz “wanted to take U.S. policy in a direction Trump wasn’t comfortable with because the U.S. hadn’t attempted a diplomatic solution,” according to one of the people.

“It got back to Trump and the president wasn’t happy with it,” that person said.

Netanyahu’s office released a statement Saturday confirming that he met with Waltz ahead of his Oval Office visit with Trump but denying that he had “intensive contact” with him.

A spokesman for Waltz did not respond to a request for comment. Wiles said: “Mike and I have been friends for many years and I have a great deal of respect for him.”

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (21) [FONTE: Washington Post, 2/05/2025]

During his first term, Trump had little choice but to draw from traditional Republicans to stock his White House. Now, thanks to a broader generational shift within the Republican Party, a younger cohort has known no one but Trump as their standard-bearer. And the president himself has grown more focused on finding people loyal to him who will execute his plans.

Rubio, the temporary replacement, hails from the same traditionalist wing of the Republican Party as Waltz. But he has more readily shed his old views, officials say, and has emerged as a forceful spokesman for Trump. That includes policy on Russia and Ukraine, where the secretary of state has threatened both sides that Washington could walk away from peace talks, with the consequences seemingly worse for Kyiv.

Waltz's ouster came even as some other prominent members of the administration, including Vice President JD Vance, tried to throw him a lifeline, two senior White House officials said Friday. Vance took Waltz on a March trip to Greenland, which Trump has said he wants the U.S. to acquire. The decision to take him along was in part to boost the embattled adviser days after the Atlantic reported that Waltz had inadvertently included the magazine's editor on a planning chat coordinating military action in Yemen, one of the officials said.

Um novo acordo sobre o programa nuclear do Irão? (22)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Chappatte, 13/05/2018]



Sugestões de leitura

