


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a era da imprevisibilidade

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

SESSÃO N° 32

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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (1)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]

1947


Fraught Beginnings



Indian soldiers arriving in Srinagar, Kashmir, in November 1947 to fight Pakistani militias for control of the region. Bettmann

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (2)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]



By The New York Times

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (3)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]

1972

An Official Division



President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, center, shaking hands with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India in June 1972 after they agreed to establish the "line of control" in Kashmir. To Mr. Bhutto's left is his daughter Benazir Bhutto, who would become Pakistan's prime minister years later. Punjab Press, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (4)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]

1999

Peace Talks Come Up Short



War raged over Kashmir between India and Pakistan in 1999, just months after the countries agreed to pursue a more lasting peace. Aijaz Rahi/Associated Press

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (5)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]

2019

India Cracks Down



Protesters throwing stones in Srinagar in August 2019, days after India stripped Kashmir of its partial autonomy. Atul Loke for The New York Times

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (6)

[FONTE: NYT, 10/05/2025]

2025

A Terrorist Attack



Indian security officers near Pahalgam, in southern Kashmir, after gunmen attacked Indian tourists there on April 22. Dar Yasin/Associated Press

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (7)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

Crisis Without Closure: India-Pakistan Confrontation in an Era of Fragile Deterrence

The current tense phase of relations reflects a breakdown of the old deterrence logic.



Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Adampur Air Force base, in Punjab, on May 13, 2025.

Credit: [Press Information Bureau, Government of India](#).

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (8)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

Now that the hostilities have stopped and the mutual “understanding” to halt the violence appears to be holding, it has raised some pertinent questions. One such question concerns the evolving military doctrines of both India and Pakistan and what this recent conflagration means for the two sides. While a broader conflict was averted, the May 6-10 engagements suggest an intensifying contest not just on the battlefield, but in the realm of military signaling and strategic posturing between these nuclear-armed countries. While New Delhi’s actions reflect an apparent shift toward establishing and enforcing an “escalation dominance” framework as a normative to dictate the tempo and terms of engagement, Islamabad’s response appeared seemingly calibrated to reassert the pre-crisis status quo.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (9)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

As events unfolded during the standoff, India seemed intent on shaping the operational environment more assertively while simultaneously limiting Pakistan's scope for narrative or strategic equivalence. This included efforts to have Pakistan's traditional Gulf allies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pressure Islamabad against responding militarily to India's May 6-7 strikes. It also explains India's restraint in acknowledging certain Pakistani claims about May 6-7 aerial engagements between their air forces, including reported aircraft losses incurred by the Indian Air Force (IAF), like a Rafale fighter. This suggests a deliberate effort to manage both the kinetic and narrative dimensions of the conflict.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (10)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

Is Operation Sindoor a Tactical Inflection Point?

The events of May 6-7 marked a qualitative shift from the prevailing strategic status quo. After 26 tourists were killed in a terrorist attack on April 22 in the Pahalgam area of Jammu and Kashmir, The Resistance Front, widely seen as a local proxy for Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), took responsibility initially. In retaliation, India launched Operation Sindoor and conducted airstrikes.

The attacks targeted what the Indian government labeled as important logistical assets of various militant groups and launchpads within mainland Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, thereby marking a sharp increase in scale and intent. New Delhi asserts that it has have killed some prominent “terrorists” and destroyed the terror infrastructure at Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Muridke, Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Bhimber, which, it claimed, were being operated by Kashmir-focused groups such as LeT, JeM, and Hizbul Mujahideen.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (11)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

Extra-Regional Actors and the Search for Off-Ramps

In the past, extra-regional actors such as the United States and the Gulf monarchies have been instrumental in de-escalating India-Pakistan tensions. Their intervention tended to make both sides step back from imminent confrontations with minimal harm to their reputation and room to spin their own narratives of control. For example, in the 1999 Kargil War, U.S. President Bill Clinton was instrumental in persuading the Pakistan Army, led by General Pervez Musharraf, to stop fighting and retreat from the Himalayan hills. But in this recent face-off, while Saudis, Emiratis, and Americans did make an effort to assist in toning down the hostility, the effect seemed restricted in the early stages.

In addition, India's increasing strategic capital on account of its expanding economic muscle and growing military power, along with its U.S.-encouraged role as a key counterweight to China in the broader Sino-American dynamic, gives it more leverage in avoiding outside mediation.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (12)

[FONTE: The Diplomat, 13/05/2025]

The current phase in India-Pakistan relations reflects a breakdown of the old deterrence logic. Both countries are learning to adapt to an increasingly opaque, asymmetric, and technologically advanced battlefield. While India's efforts to enforce its escalation dominance may appear bold, it is equally a risky attempt at managing the pace and narrative of war. At the same time, Pakistan's response, while reactive and symbolic, is also fraught with potential for miscalculation.

As such, under this changing strategic environment, the weakness of de-escalation mechanisms or channels of crisis communications adds a layer of volatility to an already inflammable situation. In the absence of any effective diplomatic engagements or regional conflict resolution mechanisms, normalizing these cycles of episodic hostilities that consistently lower the escalation threshold underpinning military dynamics between New Delhi and Islamabad has adverse implications not just for these two countries but also for the region and beyond.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (13)

[FONTE: France 24, 14/05/2025]

Chinese weapons pass combat test in India-Pakistan clash – with flying colours



File photo of Pakistani Air Force J-10 fighter jets taken during the national day parade in Islamabad on March 23, 2025. © Aamir Qureshi, AFP

The recent military engagement over Kashmir by South Asia's arch enemies saw India deploy its French and US weapons against Pakistan's new range of sophisticated Chinese arms. In its first battlefield test against Western arms, Chinese weapons mostly hit the mark, sparking interest in some military circles and alarm in some capitals.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (14)

[FONTE: France 24, 14/05/2025]

In the aftermath of Saturday's ceasefire, attention has focused on Islamabad's new range of Chinese weapons and defence systems that finally saw combat during the May 7-10 India-Pakistan armed clash. It came as India's newly acquired arsenal of mostly Western arms took on China's increasingly sophisticated military hardware.

'Big victory for China in terms of perception'

The odds were in New Delhi's favour ahead of its retaliation for the April 22 terror attack. With its first strikes, India signalled a break from its traditional doctrine of strategic restraint, hitting targets not just in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and remote border regions, but in the country's political heartland Punjab province.

India's escalation raised international alarm bells on the second day of clashes, when it hit the Nur Khan air base in Rawalpindi, a garrison city near Islamabad. Situated just a short distance from the headquarters of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, which oversees and protects the country's nuclear arsenal, the Nur Khan base is a key hub for the country's military.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (15)

[FONTE: France 24, 14/05/2025]

Another surprise was Pakistan's robust response to the Indian escalation.

Pakistan's claim that its J-10 fighter jets brought down India's French-made Rafales sparked exultation on Chinese social media platform, Weibo, with many users speculating that buyers will probably soon be flocking to Chinese arms manufacturers.

India's decision to neither confirm nor deny the loss of its top-end fighter jets has added credence to the downing claims. While Rafale manufacturer Dassault Aviation did not respond to FRANCE 24's request for a comment, [Reuters](#) reported that at least one of India's downed fighters was a Rafale. A [Washington Post](#) analysis conducted by three ordnance experts concluded that verified images from the downing site showed the debris was "consistent with at least two French-made fighter jets flown by the Indian air force – a Rafale and a Mirage 2000".

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (16)

[FONTE: France 24, 14/05/2025]

The takeaways of the May 7-10 military engagement for Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Washington DC-based Stimson Center, are two-fold. "The first one is that the Indian weapons system is not as effective as a lot of people thought they would be," she noted. "The second takeaway is that the Indian strategic intent could be more ambitious than a lot of people had expected."

While cautioning that it's still too early to "jump to conclusions", Carlotta Rinaudo, a China expert at the International Team for the Study of Security Verona, notes that perception is key in initial assessments. "And this was a big victory for China in terms of perception," she said, referring to the performance of China's J-10 jets. "For a country that hasn't fought, theoretically, any war since the war with Vietnam in 1979, for a country that hasn't really engaged in war and its own weapons don't really have that sort of global recognition as, let's say, French weapons or American weapons, this is a big, big victory in terms of perception," she added.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (17)

[FONTE: France 24, 14/05/2025]

Not just cheap, but good

India's image on the global geopolitical stage has been enhanced in recent years with the country emerging as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region. Its recent arms acquisitions made headlines as Prime Minister [Narendra Modi](#), in a bid to upgrade the country's ageing mostly Russian-supplied arsenal, signed billion-dollar arms deals with France and the US.

During the 2017-2021 period, India was the world's largest arms importer, according to the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute \(SIPRI\)](#), slipping to second place after Ukraine following the Russian full-scale invasion.

Pakistan meanwhile was moving away from its [Cold War](#) reliance on US weapons as Washington ended its proxy war against the [Soviet Union](#) in neighbouring [Afghanistan](#) and finally pulled out of the war-torn country in 2021 after years of US frustrations over the Pakistani military's commitment to its war on terror.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (18)

[FONTE: BBC, 18/05/2025]

Is China the winner in the India-Pakistan conflict?

8 days ago

Share  Save 

Anbarasan Ethirajan
South Asia Regional Editor



Chinese warplanes, used by Pakistan, made their combat debut during the recent hostilities

The four-day conflict between arch-rivals India and Pakistan this month ended with a ceasefire and both claiming victory – but it now appears that China's defence industry might also be an unlikely winner.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (19)

[FONTE: BBC, 18/05/2025]

A Reuters report quoting American officials said Pakistan possibly had used the Chinese-made J-10 aircraft to launch air-to-air missiles against Indian fighter jets. Pakistan claiming victory after hugely relying on Chinese weapons systems in an active combat situation is being seen by some experts as a boost for Beijing's defence industry but some also disagree with the claim.

Some of the experts have called this a "DeepSeek moment" for the Chinese weapons industry, referring to January this year when the Chinese AI start-up shook US giants with its cost-effective technology.

"The aerial fight was a big advertisement for the Chinese weapons industry. Until now, China had no opportunity to test its platforms in a combat situation," Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, told the BBC.

The Beijing-based analyst said the outcome of the air duel showed "China has some systems that are next to none". Shares in the Chinese Avic Chengdu Aircraft company, that manufactures fighter jets like the J-10, surged by up to 40% last week after the reported performance of the fighter jet in the India-Pakistan conflict.

O conflito Índia-Paquistão e as suas repercussões político-militares (20)

[FONTE: BBC, 18/05/2025]

Professor Walter Ladwig from the King's College in London said it was yet to be determined whether the Chinese jets had actually outmanoeuvred the Indian Air Force (IAF) planes, particularly the Rafale.

"In a standard military doctrine, you would suppress the enemy's air defences and get air superiority before you struck ground targets. Instead, it appears the IAF's mission was clearly not to provoke any Pakistani military retaliation," he said.

Mr Ladwig thought that the Indian pilots were given instructions to fly despite the fact that the entire Pakistani air defence was on high alert and their jets were already in the sky. The IAF hasn't given details of the mission or about its air operations strategy.

Beijing also hasn't made any comment on reports of the J-10 taking down Indian fighter jets, including the Rafale. But unconfirmed reports of the J-10 bringing down a Western weapon system has triggered jubilation and triumphalism on Chinese social media.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (1)

[FONTE: Maps of the World]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (2)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Felix Heiduk, Gudrun Wacker

From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific

 Deutsch

Significance, Implementation and Challenges

SWP Research Paper 2020/RP 09, 01.07.2020, 43 Seiten

doi:10.18449/2020RP09

- More and more states and regional organisations employ the term “Indo-Pacific”. It is increasingly supplanting the previously common term, “Asia-Pacific”. In Europe, only France has so far presented its own “Indo-Pacific” concept.
- The term “Indo-Pacific” is used to refer to various, sometimes divergent, concepts. These in turn are based on very different ideas on regional order. What they all have in common is the reference to the importance of a rules-based international order.



SWP

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (3)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

- “Indo-Pacific” is a political term and therefore neither purely descriptive nor value-neutral. In particular, the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept aims to contain China and is thus an expression of the growing strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In Beijing, “Indo-Pacific” is primarily understood as a U.S.-led containment strategy directed against China.
- Other actors, for example ASEAN or India, emphasise aspects such as economic prosperity, connectivity and multilateral cooperation in their Indo-Pacific concepts.
- The EU and its member states are under increasing pressure from Washington to commit themselves directly or indirectly to the “Indo-Pacific” – and thus, from a U.S. perspective, for Washington and against Beijing. In their deliberations, Europeans should not succumb to this zero-sum logic.
- The EU and its member states have at their disposal three (ideal type) approaches: “equidistance”, “alignment” and “autonomy”. In order to be able to choose one option, Europeans must define their economic, security and normative interests in the region and provide the necessary resources for their advancement.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (4)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

“Indo-Pacific”: The Construction of a Region


The “Indo-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific region” has enjoyed growing popularity for over ten years as a geographical and strategic construct in the foreign and security policy discourse in Japan, the United States, Australia, India, France and some Southeast Asian states. Many see “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographical and strategic frame of reference that has at least partially come to replace the previously dominant “Asia-Pacific” construct.

The term has found its way into official documents such as national security strategies or defence white papers as well as into the rhetoric of the elites. It is also increasingly being discussed in think tanks and academic institutions. As a result, it has become a kind of “geopolitical nomenclature”.¹

Although each country has its own understanding of the concept, in terms of both the geographical extent of the Indo-Pacific region and its strategic orientation and essential attributes, there is a common denominator: The two oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, are imagined as *one* contiguous area. This understanding is based on the fact that the vast majority of the world’s flows of goods, but also energy supplies, are transported via sea routes that traverse these two oceans. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is currently *the* arena in which growing rivalry between the United States and China in Asia is being played out. Accordingly, it has gained in importance geopolitically and geo-economically over the last two decades. Moreover, many Asian actors see it not only as a “purely” geographical construct but also as an alternative to the Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) (see blue box on page 8). Geopolitical and geo-economic aspects are thus closely intertwined in the Indo-Pacific.


O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (5)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (6)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]



O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (7)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

The Indo-Pacific: Emergence, Objectives, Key Issues and Ideas on Regional Order

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States

President Donald Trump first presented his “vision” of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in November 2017 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hanoi.⁶ President Barack Obama had already strategically connected the Indian and Pacific Oceans to form an “Indo-Pacific” region and outlined plans for an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) in addition to the political and military “pivot to Asia”.⁷ In contrast to the Obama administration, however, the Trump administration sees the “Indo-Pacific region” as a central foreign and economic policy arena for dealing with China. In 2018 Vice President Mike Pence drew considerable attention when he delivered a speech denouncing China’s behaviour and condemning its repeated interference in the internal affairs of other states (including the United States) and its aggressive policy in the South China Sea.⁸ Soon afterwards then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson defined the “less responsible” approach of an increasingly powerful China to international standards and Beijing’s deliberate undermining of the “international rules-based order” as Washington’s main challenge.⁹

Donald Trump seeks to implement a reorientation of U.S. policy towards China through the FOIP. This approach is based on his criticism of the previous administration’s Asia policy, which in his view initially announced an “Asia pivot” and later a rebalancing to the region but never fully implemented it.¹⁰ At the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called on “friends” of the United States to “choose” between the systems of the United States and China when considering whom to cooperate with.¹¹

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (8)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific": From strategy to vision

The term "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" was not coined by U.S. President Donald Trump but has its origins in a speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (see timeline on page 12). In 2007, during his first term in office, Abe delivered a speech entitled "Confluence of the Two Seas" to the Indian Congress. In it, he presented his vision of closer political and economic connectivity between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It was a vision based on intensive cooperation among the democratic states of the region, which was to serve as the centre of a network spanning the entire Indian Ocean and the Pacific and make way for a "free flow of persons, goods, capital and knowledge" that would guarantee "freedom and prosperity". According to Abe, the security of the shipping routes is of central strategic importance in this respect. Abe's connectivity concept also emphasises "universal" norms, which are intended to closely link the democracies in the region politically and economically and to regulate the behaviour of non-democratic states, above all China.³⁸

Abe's connectivity concept emphasises "universal" norms that closely link the democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this context, Abe also proposed in 2007 to establish the Quad, consisting of Japan, Australia, India and the United States. However, Abe's first term in office lasted only one year, so that the corresponding concepts were only brought to life in his second term of office, which began in 2012.

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (9)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Australia and the Indo-Pacific as a solid regional reference framework

For Australia, the Indo-Pacific has become *the* regional frame of reference for its own geographical and strategic positioning since 2013; the term “Indo-Pacific” is firmly anchored in official documents. It was used as early as 2012 in a government *White Paper*, but only twice, to denote a geographical arc spanning the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.⁶⁰ The Australian Defence White Paper of 2013,⁶¹ in contrast, devotes an entire chapter to the concept (with a total of 56 mentions). Its use continues in the Defence White Paper of 2016⁶² and the Foreign Policy White Paper of 2017.⁶³ Since then, the concept has been a central theme in speeches by politicians⁶⁴ and is also discussed in academic circles.

In 2012, Rory Medcalf, one of Australia’s best-known security policy experts, presented a groundbreaking article on the term “Indo-Pacific”.⁶⁵ In recent years, academic texts on Australia’s strategic positioning have focused on the Sino-American conflict, power shifts in the region and the rules-based international order – all of which are discussed within the framework of the Indo-Pacific.⁶⁶ Two predominant traditions in Australia’s foreign policy are highlighted in these texts, both of which employ the concept of “Indo-Pacific”: Australia as a middle power on the one hand; and as a “dependent ally” of the United States on the other.⁶⁷

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (10)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

India's "Act East" policy and the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific experienced one of its constitutive moments in India in August 2007, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his speech to parliament on the "confluence of the two seas".⁸³ Nevertheless, very few official Indian documents on the Indo-Pacific have been issued to date, although it should be noted that the Indian government does not publish white papers on foreign or defence policy. A more specific document, the *Indian Maritime Security Strategy* of 2015, refers in its introduction to a shift in global focus from the "Euro-Atlantic" to the "Indo-Pacific" and links the latter concept to India's "Act East" policy.⁸⁴ The *National Security Strategy*, commissioned by the Indian opposition party Congress and published in March 2019, also mentions "Indo-Pacific" seven times. Among other things, it calls for priority to be given to harmonizing the various views of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework.⁸⁵

Representatives of Indian think tanks regularly discuss both the term "Indo-Pacific" and India's handling of it; they have also identified contradictions and ambiguities in India's strategy.⁸⁶ India's "Look East" policy (since 1991) and later "Act East" policy (since 2014), with its focus on Southeast Asia, fits into the wider Indo-Pacific framework, with priority given to strategic and security aspects over economic issues.⁸⁷

Traditional pillars of Indian foreign policy play a central role in the interpretation of the Indo-Pacific concept.

Traditional pillars of Indian foreign policy, i.e. non-alignment and strategic autonomy, play a decisive role in India's interpretation of the Indo-Pacific concept.⁸⁸

O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (11)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

Different concepts of the Indo-Pacific in comparison

☐ Excluding China ☒ Including China

Actor	Term/Label	Key elements	Main initiatives	Ideas on regional order
ASEAN	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ASEAN at the heart of regional cooperation ("ASEAN centrality") - Maintaining a rules-based order - Strengthening multilateral cooperation 	none	multilateral
Australia	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) - Opening up new markets for trade and investment - Improving connectivity through infrastructure development - Providing alternatives to the "Belt and Road" Initiative (BRI) - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in Papua New Guinea and in the South Pacific) - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, Japan, India - "2+2" dialogues with India, Japan, USA - Revival of the Quad - Strategic dialogues ASEAN countries - Arms exports to partners in Asia - Bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements 	<p>Trade policy: multilateral</p> <p>Security policy: bilateral, minilateral</p>
India	Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - ASEAN at the heart of regional cooperation ("ASEAN centrality") - Improvement of connectivity through infrastructure expansion - Providing alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in South Asia) - Asia – Africa Growth Corridor - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, Japan and Australia - "2+2" dialogues with Australia, Japan and USA 	<p>Trade policy: bilateral</p> <p>Security policy: multilateral</p>
Japan	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (until 2018: Strategy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quad - Opening up new markets for trade and investment - Improvement of connectivity through infrastructure expansion - Providing alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in East Africa and South and Southeast Asia) - Asia – Africa Growth Corridor - Expansion of security cooperation with USA, India and Australia - "2+2" dialogues with USA, India and Australia - Revival of the Quad - Bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements 	<p>Trade policy: multilateral</p> <p>Security policy: bilateral, minilateral</p>
United States	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Containment of China - Maintaining a rules-based order - Enhanced security cooperation in the framework of the Quad - Free, fair and reciprocal trade - Improving connectivity through infrastructure development, alternatives to BRI - Safeguarding the freedom of navigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure projects (especially in the Western Pacific) - Expansion of security cooperation with Japan and Australia and India - "2+2" dialogues with Japan, Australia and India - Revival of the Quad - Modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces - Arms exports to partners in Asia - Bilateral trade agreements 	bilateral

Sources: Official documents issued by the respective countries.

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O mundo em transformação: a centralidade do Indo-Pacífico (12)

[FONTE: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, 2020]

China's Response to the Indo-Pacific

Officially the term “Indo-Pacific” is not (yet) used in China and therefore does not appear in key documents, such as the Defence White Paper of July 2019.¹²⁰ The term has been used occasionally in Chinese Foreign Ministry press conferences, but always exclusively by foreign journalists. Chinese officials consistently adhere to the expression “Asia-Pacific” in their answers. As late as March 2018, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that the concept of the Indo-Pacific was as short-lived as the foam on the two seas.¹²¹

As far as academic publications are concerned, until 2017 the “Indo-Pacific” was mentioned in relatively few articles (2016: 126; 2017: 202). From 2018 onwards, however, its appearance has increased rapidly (2018: 793; 2019 to October: 612).¹²² It has apparently been accepted that this concept is not going to disappear anytime soon – at least not from the foreign and security policy vocabulary of the United States – and that it is important to gain a better grasp of the new construct. The majority of academic papers published by think tanks and universities refer to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy; the roles of Japan, Australia and India are also regularly analysed. A number of texts compare the Indo-Pacific strategy with China's own BRI. In Chinese media, articles by international policy experts also address or comment on the Indo-Pacific concept.¹²³ A distancing from the term is already evident from the fact that it is placed in quotation marks in most Chinese publications.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (1) [FONTE: National Museum of Australia]



From left: Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell, Australian Chief of General Staff, Major-General William Gentry, New Zealand Chief of General Staff and Admiral Arthur Radford, US Commander in Chief Pacific, gather in Honolulu for the first meeting of ANZUS military representatives

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica; logo do Pacto ANZUS]

ANZUS Pact

ANZUS Pact, formally **Pacific Security**

Treaty, security **treaty** between **Australia**, **New Zealand**, and the **United States** that was signed

in San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 1, 1951, for the purpose of providing mutual aid in the event of

aggression and for settling disputes by peaceful means. It came into force in 1952. The three countries' initials provided the acronyms for the treaty and the organization that grew out of it. The United States offered the pact to Australia as compensation for the prospect of Japanese rearmament. Under the terms of the treaty, the three nations maintained a consultative relationship with each other and strove to ensure their **collective security** in the Pacific region.

In the mid-1980s New Zealand instituted an antinuclear policy, one of whose provisions was the banning of nuclear-armed vessels from its ports, including those of the U.S. Navy. In response, the United States formally suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand in 1986 and reduced the two countries' military ties. The three nations remained formal parties to the treaty, but in practical terms ANZUS was inoperative from then on.

Date: September 1, 1951

Participants: **Australia** • **New Zealand** • **United States**

Key People: **Sir Robert Menzies**



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (3) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]


Briefing

Sep 25th 2021 edition >

The new geopolitics of Asia

AUKUS reshapes the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific

A major submarine deal underscores how the new theatre for great-power competition is maritime



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (4) [FONTE: Governos dos EUA / White House, 15/09/2021]



BRIEFING ROOM

Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS

SEPTEMBER 15, 2021 • STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

As leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, guided by our enduring ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order, we resolve to deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. As part of this effort, we are announcing the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called “AUKUS” — Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Through AUKUS, our governments will strengthen the ability of each to support our security and defense interests, building on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties. We will promote deeper information and technology sharing. We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (5) [FONTE: Governos dos EUA / White House, 15/09/2021]

As the first initiative under AUKUS, recognizing our common tradition as maritime democracies, we commit to a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability. We will leverage expertise from the United States and the United Kingdom, building on the two countries' submarine programs to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.

The development of Australia's nuclear-powered submarines would be a joint endeavor between the three nations, with a focus on interoperability, commonality, and mutual benefit. Australia is committed to adhering to the highest standards for safeguards, transparency, verification, and accountancy measures to ensure the non-proliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology. Australia remains committed to fulfilling all of its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state, including with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our three nations are deeply committed to upholding our leadership on global non-proliferation.

Recognizing our deep defense ties, built over decades, today we also embark on further trilateral collaboration under AUKUS to enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability. These initial efforts will focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (6) [FONTE: World Nuclear Association, 2021]



Nuclear-Powered Ships

(Updated June 2021)

- **Nuclear power is particularly suitable for vessels which need to be at sea for long periods without refuelling, or for powerful submarine propulsion.**
- **Over 160 ships are powered by more than 200 small nuclear reactors.**
- **Most are submarines, but they range from icebreakers to aircraft carriers.**
- **In future, constraints on fossil fuel use in transport may bring marine nuclear propulsion into more widespread use. So far, exaggerated fears about safety have caused political restriction on port access.**

Work on nuclear marine propulsion started in the 1940s, and the first test reactor started up in USA in 1953. The first nuclear-powered submarine, *USS Nautilus*, put to sea in 1955.

This marked the transition of submarines from slow underwater vessels to warships capable of sustaining 20-25 knots submerged for weeks on end. The submarine had come into its own.

Nautilus led to the parallel development of further (*Skate*-class) submarines, powered by single pressurised water reactors, and an aircraft carrier, *USS Enterprise*, powered by eight Westinghouse reactor units in 1960. A cruiser, *USS Long Beach*, followed in 1961 and was powered by two of these early units. Remarkably, the *Enterprise* remained in service to the end of 2012.

By 1962 the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines operational and 30 under construction. Nuclear power had revolutionised the Navy.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (7) [FONTE: World Nuclear Association, 2021]

Nuclear Naval Fleets

Russia built 248 nuclear submarines and five naval surface vessels (plus nine icebreakers) powered by 468 reactors between 1950 and 2003, and was then operating about 60 nuclear naval vessels. (Bellona gives 247 subs with 456 reactors 1958-95.) For operational vessels in 1997, Bellona lists 109 Russian submarines (plus four naval surface ships) and 108 attack submarines (SSN) and 25 ballistic missile ones apart from Russia.


At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, there were over 400 nuclear-powered submarines operational or being built. At least 300 of these submarines have now been scrapped and some on order cancelled, due to weapons reduction programmes*. Russia and the USA had over 100 each in service, with the UK and France less than 20 each and China six. The total today is understood to be about 150, including new ones commissioned**. Most or all are fuelled by high-enriched uranium (HEU).

* In 2007 Russia had about 40 retired submarines from its Pacific fleet alone awaiting scrapping. In November 2008 it was reported that Russia intended to scrap all decommissioned nuclear submarines by 2012, the total being more than 200 of the 250 built to date. Most Northern Fleet submarines had been dismantled at Severodvinsk, and most remaining to be scrapped were with the Pacific Fleet.


** Late in 2019: USA 70, Russia 40, China 19, UK 10, France 9, India 3.

India launched its first nuclear submarine in 2009, the 6000 dwt *Arihant* SSBN, with a single 85 MW PWR fuelled by HEU (critical in August 2013) driving a 70 MW steam turbine. It is reported to have cost \$2.9 billion and was to be commissioned in 2016. The second and slightly larger Arihant-class SSBN, the *INS Aridaman* is being built at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam, and was due to be launched in 2018 and commissioned by 2022. It will have a more powerful reactor. Another three Arihant-class vessels launched by 2023 and then six SSBN twice the size of Arihant-class and six nuclear SSNs are planned, the latter being approved by the government in February 2015. The SSNs will be a similar size to Arihant-class SSBN and powered by a new reactor being developed by BARC. India is also leasing an almost-new 7900 dwt (12,770 tonne submerged) Russian *Akula II*-class nuclear attack submarine for ten years from 2010, at a cost of \$650 million: the *INS Chakra*, formerly *Nerpa*. It has a single 190 MWt VM-5/OK-659B (or OK-650B) PWR driving a 32 MW steam turbine and two 2 MWe turbogenerators.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (8) [FONTE: Statista, 2025]



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (9) [FONTE: The Economist, 25/09/2021]



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (10) [FONTE: Reuters, 10/07/2024]

Why Indo-Pacific countries are joining the NATO summit




NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivers remarks at NATO's 75th anniversary summit in Washington, U.S., July 10, 2024. REUTERS/Elizabeth Franz [Purchase Licensing Rights](#)

WASHINGTON, July 10 (Reuters) - Joining this week's meeting of NATO leaders in Washington will be some countries far from Europe or North America - Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

Who is coming and what is the link between NATO, which was founded to help the North Atlantic region counter the threat from the Soviet Union, and countries in Asia and the Pacific?

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (11)

[FONTE: SciencesPo / Center for International Studies]



O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (12) [FONTE: Reuters, 10/07/2024]

What is behind NATO's interest in the region?

U.S. allies globally are increasingly aligned in their opposition to Russia's war in Ukraine, and Moscow's "no limits" partnership with China, which is helping to reconstitute the Russian military.

In 2022, NATO members [identified China as a potential threat](#) for the first time. At the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, they condemned China and Russia for "their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order," and warned about Beijing's "coercive tactics" to divide the Alliance.

A draft of the Washington summit statement called China a "decisive enabler" of Russia's Ukraine war effort and said Beijing poses systemic challenges to Europe and to security.

It stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific to NATO, saying developments there directly affect Euro-Atlantic security, and welcomed enhanced cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners to support Ukraine.

U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan said the NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners would launch four new joint projects - on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cybersecurity.

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (13) [FONTE: Reuters, 10/07/2024]

What steps have NATO members taken in the Indo-Pacific?

Recent years have seen some stepped up European engagement in the Indo-Pacific, notably Britain's involvement with the U.S. in the AUKUS project to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.

However, most European defense engagement in Asia has been ad hoc and modest, involving occasional patrols or exercises by small visiting forces. Many NATO allies and Indo-Pacific countries do not want to see the alliance expanding its remit beyond the North Atlantic theater.

A proposal to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo, which angered China, [was blocked by France](#) last year.

What is next for NATO involvement in the region?

Some analysts contend that Europe's NATO members must boost their ability to deal with European security challenges to enable the U.S. to focus on Asia and threats posed by China, including the dispute over Taiwan, the democratic island Beijing claims as its territory.


Christopher Johnstone, a former senior official in Biden's National

Security Council, said the biggest contribution Europe could make was "to ensure that it is prepared to shoulder the burden of deterrence against the Russian threat in the event of a Taiwan or other contingency in the Indo-Pacific."

O reposicionamento geopolítico dos EUA no Indo-Pacífico (14)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Michel Ramirez 8/12/2019]






PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (1)

[FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 26/05/2025]



A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (2)

[FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 26/05/2025]



Donald J. Trump ✓

@realDonaldTrump

I've always had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY! He is needlessly killing a lot of people, and I'm not just talking about soldiers. Missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever. I've always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that's proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia! Likewise, President Zelenskyy is doing his Country no favors by talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don't like it, and it better stop. This is a War that would never have started if I were President. This is Zelenskyy's, Putin's, and Biden's War, not "Trump's," I am only helping to put out the big and ugly fires, that have been started through Gross Incompetence and Hatred.

9.43k ReTruths **40.9k** Likes

May 26, 2025 at 1:46 AM

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (3)

[FONTE: Politico, 26/05/2025]

Trump says Putin 'has gone absolutely CRAZY!'

"Missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever," Trump says in an excoriating post aimed at the Russian president.



"I've always had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him," Donald Trump said. | Alexander Kazakov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (4)

[FONTE: Politico, 26/05/2025]

U.S. President Donald Trump called Vladimir Putin "absolutely CRAZY" and said the Russian leader "is needlessly killing a lot of people, and I'm not just talking about soldiers" in a Truth Social post on Sunday.

The comments indicate that Trump's position on the Kremlin is hardening as his attempt to broker an end to the Russian war falters with no breakthrough in sight. The post came after Russia launched a massive attack on Ukraine over the weekend, lobbing drones and missiles at 30 cities and villages and killing at least 12 people, including three children.

"Missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever," Trump said Sunday evening. "I've always said that he [Putin] wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that's proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia!"

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (5)

[FONTE: Politico, 26/05/2025]

Trump's criticism of the Russian president raises the prospect that the mood has shifted against Putin in the U.S. administration, which initially took a more sympathetic approach to Moscow's position in the war. Trump has repeatedly blamed Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for starting the conflict and for prolonging it, even though Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion in February 2022.

The weekend's immense attack on Ukraine, just a week after Trump and Putin held a two-hour call to discuss a U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire, appears to have escalated the American president's ire.

"I've always had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him," Trump said.

But while Trump's post harshly criticized Putin, he also again took aim at Zelenskyy, who has long been the main outlet for his frustration over the war. Trump said Zelenskyy "is doing his Country no favors by talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don't like it, and it better stop."

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (6)

[FONTE: Sputnik, 26/05/2025]

Trump's Missing the Point on Russia's Strikes — Here's Why Ukraine Had It Coming

Yesterday (Updated: Yesterday)



© AP Photo / Alex Brandon

Subscribe



Donald Trump recently expressed confusion and disapproval over Russia's strikes against Ukraine. But with all due respect, Mr. President — you're missing the full picture. Here's why Ukraine deserves every missile and drone fired its way:

1. Ukraine Targets Civilians Daily

Ukrainian forces routinely strike Russian civilians using kamikaze drones. In recent weeks alone, they've launched hundreds of UAVs at peaceful targets — homes, vehicles, infrastructure. Most are shot down, but not all.

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (7)

[FONTE: Sputnik, 26/05/2025]

2. They Tried to Hit Putin

On May 20, during a [visit to the Kursk region](#), President Putin's helicopter found itself in the middle of a Ukrainian drone swarm. According to air defense commander Yuri Dashkin, Russian forces repelled the strike and kept the president safe.

3. Red Square Was a Target Too

Ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade, Ukraine threatened a [terrorist attack on Moscow's Red Square](#). The FSB prevented a planned strike just two days before. Trump was even told about this by Putin himself.


4. Ukraine Is Pushing It — Hard

From glorifying attacks on civilians to plotting acts of terror, Ukraine's behavior goes far beyond traditional warfare. And the West stays silent.

5. Russia's Response? Precise and Legal

In contrast, Russian strikes hit strictly military and strategic infrastructure. No civilian targets, no games. Just legitimate responses to a reckless adversary.

Trump may be confused — but Russia's message is clear. Enough is enough.



A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (8)

[FONTE: CNN, 27/05/2025]

Trump's talk on Ukraine is cheap, but the Kremlin has set him a pivotal test



CNN —

When it comes to ending [the war in Ukraine](#), President Donald Trump's statements and social media posts have become meaningless.

Receding chances for a ceasefire and peace deal soon will depend instead on whether he finally finds the steel to reinforce his rhetorical [lashing of President Vladimir Putin](#) over the weekend with action.

The Kremlin is betting he won't.

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (9)

[FONTE: CNN, 27/05/2025]

Still, the intensifying Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians appear to be a deliberate Russian test for Trump, a week after his hyped [call with Putin](#), which made no progress toward peace despite the White House spin.

There are two routes Trump can take, assuming he's ready to abandon the embarrassing position of being constantly played by Putin.

He could impose new sanctions against Russia, which he previously argued would hamper diplomacy. He told reporters in New Jersey on Sunday this was "absolutely" a consideration. Trump could also save lives in Ukraine by emulating his predecessor Joe Biden and asking Congress to approve new shipments of arms and ammunition to the country.

But this option would mean a massive turnaround that would be embarrassing politically, since Trump's opposition to spending billions of dollars in Ukraine is a foundation of his second presidency. And it would mean the president accepting that, as was the case for many of his recent predecessors, his belief that he could manage Putin was flawed.

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (10)

[FONTE: CNN, 27/05/2025]

There is another possibility — one that Ukraine and its European allies fear. Trump could throw up his hands and argue that neither side wants peace and it's time for the US to walk away. Russia would then press on with its war of attrition and attacks on civilians. Its land grab would be validated, creating a disastrous precedent for European security and US disengagement.

This isn't an academic prospect. An isolationist streak running through the MAGA movement meant that recent hints by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance that the US could step back seem like more than a mere negotiating tactic.

And one way to read Trump's Truth Social post on Monday was as a smokescreen for a US withdrawal. "This is a War that would never have started if I were President. This is Zelenskyy's, Putin's, and Biden's War, not 'Trump's,'" the president wrote.

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (11)

[FONTE: CNN, 27/05/2025]

The case for tougher US action

There's one good reason why Trump might change his mind: His credibility is on the line after his bold predictions that he could [end the war in 24 hours](#) were exposed as a fantasy.

One option would be for Trump to introduce the secondary sanctions on Russia he has sometimes floated. These would target financial institutions, companies and other entities that continue to do business with Moscow.

Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal have a new bill that would impose stiff sanctions on nations that still engage with Russia. This could hurt US adversaries such as China. But it could also disrupt Trump's relations with allies like India — a big customer of Russian cut-price oil. The senators already have 81 co-sponsors, meaning the bill could be quickly passed if Trump wanted, sending a tough message to Russia.

A política externa dos EUA e a guerra Rússia-Ucrânia: um crescente desinteresse? (12)

[FONTE: CNN, 27/05/2025]

The dangers of escalating the war into a more direct confrontation between Russia and the West should not be dismissed. This was a major consideration for Biden, too, and the ex-president's slow testing of Russian red lines was a constant frustration for his critics. But Trump's caution makes Biden look like a hawk.

Still, perhaps Putin has finally pushed Trump into a long-delayed epiphany

"There have been statements and expressions of irritation and frustration coming from President Trump and others in the administration before, even threats of sanctions, but so far nothing," former US Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor told Isa Soares on CNN International on Monday.

"So, the question will be, is this time enough to have these sanctions imposed? And not just the sanctions; there has to be support for the Ukrainian military as well."

Retired US Army Major Mike Lyons thinks Trump may be creating political space for himself.

"Who's that (Truth Social) message for? (He is) obviously saying that to Vladimir Putin, but I think he's selling that to the American public to gauge whether or not it would be popular for him to get more involved and have the country more involved inside Ukraine right now," Lyons told CNN's

Sugestões de leitura

