


# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a era da imprevisibilidade**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes  
SESSÃO N° 38**

**16 / 7 /2025**



## PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL



# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (1) [FONTE: WTO]



WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION

## **Principles of the trading system**

The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. They deal with: agriculture, textiles and clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards and product safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system.

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (2) [FONTE: WTO]

## Trade without discrimination

**1. Most-favoured-nation (MFN): treating other people equally** Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members.

This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment ([see box](#)). It is so important that it is the first article of the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade \(GATT\)](#), which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority in the [General Agreement on Trade in Services \(GATS\)](#) (Article 2) and the [Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights \(TRIPS\)](#) (Article 4), although in each agreement the principle is handled slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main areas of trade handled by the WTO.

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (3) [FONTE: ICC]



## Why the most-favoured nation principle matters for business

In today's interconnected global economy, understanding the rules that govern international trade is essential for businesses of all sizes. One of the most fundamental yet frequently misunderstood concepts is the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle.

This document explains what MFN means in practical terms and why it matters for business operations (whether the business exports or not).

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (4) [FONTE: ICC]

## **Why does the MFN principle matter for businesses?**

The MFN principle provides businesses with a stable and predictable trading environment. Businesses worldwide—from multinational enterprises to small- and medium-sized companies—rely on the consistent application of MFN treatment to maintain competitive access to global markets. This principle, together with the legal binding of stable levels of tariffs, directly impacts operational planning, investment decisions, and supply chain management across all sectors of the global economy.

**Example:** Imagine a small company exporting handcrafted furniture. Without MFN, it might face a 15% tariff in one market while its competitor from another country faces only 5% for similar products. The MFN obligation ensures that once the importing country gives that 5% rate to any one country, all other WTO members get the same benefit automatically (except where a 5% tariff is granted under a free trade agreement, see below). This predictability helps businesses price their products competitively and plan with confidence.


# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (5) [FONTE: ICC]

## Can countries still negotiate special trade deals despite the MFN principle?

Yes, while WTO rules promote non-discrimination, they allow exceptions to the MFN obligation:

- **Free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions:** Countries can enter into FTAs and customs unions, granting each other preferential treatment for trade in goods and services. For instance, Canada's FTA with South Korea eliminates tariffs on many Canadian goods entering the Korean market, giving them an advantage over goods from countries without such an agreement. To benefit from the MFN exception, according to the WTO rulebook, FTAs and customs unions must meet certain conditions (e.g. parties to such agreements must eliminate tariffs and other restrictions of commerce on *substantially all trade* with an FTA or a customs union).
- **Developing country preferences:** Developed nations can offer reduced tariffs to products from developing countries to support their economic growth. For instance, a garment manufacturer in a developing nation might benefit from lower or zero tariffs when exporting to wealthier markets, helping create jobs and support economic development.

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (6) [FONTE: WTO]



# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (7) [FONTE: ICC]

**Figure 1: The relationship between reciprocal and retaliatory tariffs and the most-favoured nation principle**

Type of tariff	Simple explanation	MFN compatibility
<b>Reciprocal tariffs</b>	“We’ll charge you what you charge us” approach where countries match each other's tariff levels	Violates MFN obligation if applied selectively to specific countries  Also, illegal if exceeding WTO bound rates (maximum tariff ceilings, which cannot be exceeded without compensating affected parties)
<b>Retaliatory tariffs</b>	Punitive tariffs imposed in response to another country's actions	MFN-compliant only when authorised through WTO dispute settlement or applied as temporary safeguards under strict WTO conditions

Source: ICC (2025), Why the most-favoured nation principle matters for business

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (8) [FONTE: Kristen Hopwell / Politico, 17/06/2025]

## To save the global economy, kick the US out of the WTO

The magnitude of Trump's rule violation is entirely without precedent and demands an unprecedented response.

BY KRISTEN HOPEWELL

*Kristen Hopewell is a professor and Canada research chair in global policy at the University of British Columbia. She is the author of "Clash of Powers" and "Breaking the WTO."*

With U.S. President Donald Trump threatening to jack up tariffs to massive heights starting July 9 — including 50 percent tariffs on nearly all goods from the EU — the global economy hangs on a cliff edge.

Last week, the bloc floated the idea of creating an alternative to the World Trade Organization (WTO), cooperating with like-minded countries to maintain the rule of law in trade. But there is a better option: Keep the WTO, but kick out the U.S.



# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (9)

[FONTE: Kristen Hopwell / Politico, 17/06/2025]

Since his reelection, Trump has essentially launched a full-scale assault on the global trading system, terrorizing countries around the world with a seemingly endless barrage of tariffs and threats. The U.S. leader isn't even pretending to abide by WTO rules anymore.

Moreover, his tariffs threaten to send the world back to the 1930s, when the spread of trade protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies — spurred by America's Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act — exacerbated the Great Depression.

Under these circumstances, allowing the U.S. to remain a member makes a mockery of the institution and its principles. And countries committed to preserving a rules-based trading order need to fight back and defend the system, punishing his blatant violation of WTO rules.

# O contexto da relação comercial UE-EUA: os acordos da OMC (10) [FONTE: Kristen Hopwell / Politico, 17/06/2025]

This is why WTO members must come together in a clear rejection of Trump's trade aggression and show that it won't be tolerated. What once would have been inconceivable has now become a necessity: The only way to preserve the rules-based system is to expel or suspend the U.S.

The mechanism to do this exists. Although the WTO has no specific procedures for expelling a member, it is possible under Article X, which sets out procedures for amending the WTO agreement. The U.S. could be expelled from the organization by a two-thirds majority vote to alter the agreement. If it refuses to accept the changes, then a three-fourths majority would be required.

The U.S. shouldn't be allowed to continue enjoying the benefits of membership without any responsibility to uphold its obligations. And denying it the rights of WTO membership could finally create the necessary leverage and force Trump to abandon his destructive tariffs.

The U.S. president has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the WTO — it's time to call his bluff.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: as dificuldades do passado (1)

[FONTE: Benefícios da TTIP, Serviço das Publicações da União Europeia, 2016]



Parceria Transatlântica de  
Comércio e Investimento (TTIP)

Rumo a um acordo comercial  
entre a UE e os EUA

## Benefícios da TTIP

15

Quatro benefícios do comércio e investimento

Quatro benefícios dos acordos comerciais da UE

## Nove benefícios da TTIP

A TTIP pode ajudar-nos a:



1. expandir a nossa economia



2. criar postos de trabalho mais bem remunerados



3. oferecer uma maior escolha



4. incentivar mais investimento



5. proteger os direitos das pessoas  
no trabalho e o ambiente



6. moldar a globalização



7. abrir os nossos mercados



8. reduzir os encargos das empresas  
da UE



9. estabelecer novas  
regras comerciais

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: as dificuldades do passado (2)

[FONTE: Benefícios da TTIP, Serviço das Publicações da União Europeia, 2016]

## Nove benefícios da TTIP

A TTIP pode ajudar-nos a:



1. ... expandir a nossa economia

O comércio é importante para a nossa economia. Os dados mostram que os acordos comerciais da UE geram crescimento económico e criam novas oportunidades para as empresas da UE <sup>[11]</sup>.

A TTIP faz parte integrante dessa política. Estudos independentes sugerem que esta parceria tornaria mais fácil e menos oneroso para as empresas da UE, especialmente as mais pequenas, exportar para os EUA e desenvolver os seus negócios <sup>[12]</sup>.



2. ... criar postos de trabalho mais bem remunerados

31 milhões de postos de trabalho na Europa dependem das exportações. Os estudos demonstram que podem ser até 16 % mais bem remunerados do que outros tipos de empregos <sup>[13]</sup>.

5 milhões de postos de trabalho já dependem das exportações para os EUA <sup>[14]</sup>. E a TTIP criaria ainda mais emprego.



3. ... beneficiar de uma maior escolha enquanto consumidores

A abertura dos nossos mercados implicaria uma maior gama de bens e serviços para os consumidores e para as empresas <sup>[15]</sup>.



4. ... incentivar mais investimento

A UE e os EUA já são os maiores investidores estrangeiros nas duas economias <sup>[16]</sup>.

A TTIP instituiria regras claras e previsíveis para ajudar as empresas da UE a expandirem-se e a competirem, gerando crescimento e postos de trabalho.



5. ... proteger os direitos das pessoas no trabalho e o ambiente

A TTIP colocaria a sustentabilidade em primeiro plano. Contribuiria para assegurar que as empresas gerem as suas cadeias de abastecimento globais de forma responsável, prestando contas sobre as suas decisões e com transparência.

Incluiria ainda disposições específicas sobre todos os aspetos, desde a biodiversidade até às normas internacionais do trabalho.



6. ... moldar a globalização

A TTIP instituiria novas normas e regras fundamentais, que poderiam servir de modelo para o comércio mundial.

Por sua vez, isso poderia ajudar-nos a manter a nossa influência e a promover os nossos interesses num mundo de economias em rápida expansão.

### NOVE BENEFÍCIOS DA TTIP

17

A TTIP poderia consegui-lo, ao:



7. ... abrir os nossos mercados

A TTIP suprimiria ou reduziria os impostos que as exportações da UE ainda enfrentam nas alfândegas dos EUA.

Também permitiria oferecer mais tipos de serviços nos EUA, ganhar mais concursos públicos neste país e acelerar os controlos de produtos nas alfândegas.



8. ... ajudar a reduzir os encargos das empresas da UE

A TTIP reuniria as autoridades reguladoras da UE e dos EUA para ajudar a reduzir os encargos com a burocracia das empresas exportadoras, tais como a obrigação de testar e aprovar os produtos duas vezes. Estes encargos afetam especialmente as pequenas empresas.

As autoridades reguladoras analisariam em que casos as atuais normas da UE e dos EUA são equivalentes e cooperariam mais estreitamente no desenvolvimento de regulamentação no futuro, por exemplo, em matéria de carros elétricos, sem comprometer a proteção das pessoas ou do ambiente.



9. ... instituir novas regras comerciais

A TTIP instituiria regras novas e mais claras para tornar o comércio mais fácil e equitativo. Estas incidiriam em domínios desde a burocracia nas alfândegas nos serviços aduaneiros à concorrência livre e leal.

Além disso, adotaria medidas para ajudar as pequenas empresas a tirar o máximo partido da TTIP.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: as dificuldades do passado (3) [FONTE: US Trade Representative]



OFFICE of the UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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### Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) is an ambitious, comprehensive, and high-standard trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU). T-TIP will help unlock opportunity for American families, workers, businesses, farmers and ranchers through increased access to European markets for Made-in-America goods and services. This will help to promote U.S. international competitiveness, jobs and growth.

The U.S. and EU economies are two of the most modern, most developed, and most committed to high standards of consumer protection in the world. T-TIP aims to bolster that already strong relationship in a way that will help boost economic growth and add to the more than 13 million American and EU jobs already supported by transatlantic trade and investment. T-TIP will be a cutting edge agreement aimed at providing greater compatibility and transparency in trade and investment regulation, while maintaining high levels of health, safety, and environmental protection. T-TIP presents an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen the bond between vital strategic and economic partners.

In an effort to continue providing the public with information on T-TIP, this website includes a number of resources, they include a [summary of U.S. objectives](#), [negotiating round and public forum information](#), [T-TIP blog posts](#), [facts sheets](#), [reports](#), and [press releases](#).



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: as dificuldades do passado (4) [FONTE: European Commission]

 European Commission

EN

Trade and Economic Security

[Home](#) | [EU trade relationships by country/region](#) | [Development and sustainability](#) | [Enforcement and protection](#) | [Help for exporters and importers](#) | [Analysis and assessment](#) | [Trade topics](#)

[Home](#) > [EU trade relationships by country/region](#) > [Countries and Regions](#) > [United States](#) > EU negotiating texts in TTIP

## Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Documents

The TTIP negotiations were launched in 2013 and ended without conclusion at the end of 2016. A [Council decision of 15 April 2019](#) states that the negotiating directives for the TTIP are obsolete and no longer relevant.

Country or region	United States
Trade topics	Negotiations and agreements

### TTIP Reader's guide

**Textual proposals** are the European Union's initial proposals for legal text on topics in TTIP. They are tabled for discussion with the US in negotiating rounds. The actual text in the final agreement will be a result of negotiations between the EU and US.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: as dificuldades do passado (5)

[FONTE: Rem Korteweg / Centre for European Reform, 21/02/2017]

## The end of the transatlantic trade consensus?

by Rem Korteweg


21 February 2017

**Trump, Brexit and European scepticism about TTIP spell the end of transatlantic leadership on trade. With America looking inward, and Britain absorbed by Brexit, the EU must act to avoid the collapse of the liberal economic order.**

It is easy to blame Donald Trump for the stalled talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Trump's scepticism about free trade has been on open display ever since he decided to run for the US presidency. One of his first acts after his inauguration was to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact with 11 Pacific states negotiated by his predecessor, and announce that he would renegotiate parts of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico and Canada.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (1) [FONTE: Parlamento Europeu, 2025]

## Trade in goods and services between the EU and the US 2010-2023, in billions of euros





# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (2) [FONTE: Eurostat, 2025]

## Trade with the United States by EU Country

Table 1a shows the imports of goods from the United States by EU country in 2024. The 3 largest importers from the United States in the EU were Germany (€69 billion), the Netherlands (€68 billion) and France (€44 billion). Luxembourg (31.4%) had the highest share for the United States in its extra-EU imports.

EU imports of goods from the United States, 2024		
	€ million	% of the United States in extra EU imports
Germany	68 968	15.2
Netherlands	68 166	15.7
France	44 075	17.5
Belgium	31 401	17.6
Italy	25 889	10.8
Spain	24 160	12.5
Ireland	21 257	27.6
Poland	12 125	10.6
Sweden	6 512	11.3
Denmark	5 915	15.7
Austria	4 802	11.3
Czechia	3 486	5.7
Finland	2 593	12.0
Portugal	2 415	8.8
Greece	2 161	5.3
Hungary	1 664	4.2
Lithuania	1 614	12.4
Romania	1 314	3.7
Slovenia	1 218	2.7
Croatia	785	8.1
Slovakia	766	3.6
Luxembourg	601	31.4
Bulgaria	419	2.0
Estonia	311	9.5
Malta	280	9.2
Cyprus	245	4.9
Latvia	242	6.3

Source: Eurostat (online data code: DS-059331)

eurostat

Table 1a: EU imports of goods from the United States, 2024  
Source: Eurostat [Comext \(ds-059331\)](#)

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (3) [FONTE: Eurostat, 2025]

Table 1b shows the exports of goods to the United States by EU country in 2024. The three largest exporters to the United States in the EU were Germany (€161 billion), Ireland (€72 billion) and Italy (€65 billion). Ireland (53.7%) had the highest share for the United States in its extra-EU exports.

	€ million	% of the United States in extra EU exports
Germany	161 215	22.7
Ireland	72 085	53.7
Italy	64 759	21.2
France	47 064	17.2
Netherlands	43 430	16.5
Belgium	32 958	20.2
Spain	18 179	12.3
Austria	16 218	25.7
Sweden	15 811	19.1
Poland	11 634	12.7
Denmark	8 522	15.3
Finland	6 972	23.0
Czechia	6 580	13.1
Portugal	5 318	23.2
Hungary	5 008	15.2
Slovakia	4 478	18.9
Greece	2 412	10.7
Romania	2 284	8.8
Lithuania	1 847	15.2
Bulgaria	1 082	7.0
Slovenia	941	2.9
Croatia	805	9.7
Estonia	714	15.0
Latvia	531	9.2
Luxembourg	423	14.5
Malta	268	15.3
Cyprus	53	1.9

Source: Eurostat (online data code: DS-059331)


eurostat 

Table 1b: EU exports of goods to the United States, 2024  
Source: Eurostat [Comext \(ds-059331\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&code=ds-059331)

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (4) [FONTE: Eurostat, 2025]

The trade in goods balance in 2024 between the EU countries and the United States is shown in Table 1c. It shows that 20 EU countries had a trade surplus with the United States. The largest surplus was held by Germany (€92 billion), followed by Ireland (€51 billion) and Italy (€39 billion). There were seven EU countries that had a trade deficit with the United States. The largest deficit was held by the Netherlands (€25 billion), followed by Spain (€6 billion).

EU trade balance of goods with the United States, 2024 (€ million)	
	€ million
Germany	92 247
Ireland	50 828
Italy	38 870
Austria	11 415
Sweden	9 299
Finland	4 379
Slovakia	3 711
Hungary	3 344
Czechia	3 094
France	2 989
Portugal	2 903
Denmark	2 607
Belgium	1 557
Romania	970
Bulgaria	664
Estonia	402
Latvia	289
Greece	250
Lithuania	233
Croatia	20
Malta	-12
Luxembourg	-178
Cyprus	-191
Slovenia	-277
Poland	-491
Spain	-5 981
Netherlands	-24 736

Source: Eurostat (online data code: DS-059331)

eurostat 

Table 1c: EU trade balance of goods with the United States, 2024

(€ million)

Source: Eurostat [Comext \(ds-059331\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&code=ds-059331)

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (5) [FONTE: Eurostat, 2025]

## Context

Trade is an important indicator of Europe's prosperity and place in the world. The bloc is deeply integrated into global markets both for the products it sources and the exports it sells. The EU trade policy is one of the main pillars of the EU's relations with the rest of the world.

Because the 27 EU Member States share a single market and a single external border, they also have a single trade policy. EU Member States speak and negotiate collectively, both in the [World Trade Organisation](#), where the rules of international trade are agreed and enforced, and with individual trading partners. This common policy enables them to speak with one voice in trade negotiations, maximising their impact in such negotiations. This is even more important in a globalised world in which economies tend to cluster together in regional groups.

The openness of the EU's trade regime has meant that the EU is the biggest player on the global trading scene and remains a good region to do business with. Thanks to the ease of modern transport and communications, it is now easier to produce, buy and sell goods around the world which gives European companies of every size the potential to trade outside Europe.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (6)

[FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 8/07/2025]



Donald J. Trump

@realDonaldTrump · 18h

As per letters sent to various countries yesterday, in addition to letters that will be sent today, tomorrow, and for the next short period of time, TARIFFS WILL START BEING PAID ON AUGUST 1, 2025. There has been no change to this date, and there will be no change. In other words, all money will be due and payable starting AUGUST 1, 2025 - No extensions will be granted. Thank you for your attention to this matter!



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


36.1k



Donald J. Trump

@realDonaldTrump · 1d



3.12k



4.57k



21.6k



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (7)

[FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 8/07/2025]



Donald J. Trump    
@realDonaldTrump

A new Study by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), led by Highly Respected Chair, Dr. Stephen Miran, has found that Tariffs have had ZERO IMPACT on Inflation. In fact, the Study shows that Import Prices are actually DROPPING, just like I always said they would. The Fake News and the so-called “Experts” were wrong again. Tariffs are making our Country “BOOM.” Many new Factories, Jobs, and TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS in Investments are pouring into the U.S.A. Someone should show this new Study to “Too Late” Jerome Powell, who has been whining like a baby about non-existent Inflation for months, and refusing to do the right thing. CUT INTEREST RATES JEROME — NOW IS THE TIME!

**8.47k** ReTruths **33.6k** Likes

Jul 08, 2025 at 8:08 PM

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (8) [FONTE: Deutsche Welle, 8/07/2025]

## **Trump says August 1 is final deadline**

On Tuesday, Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform that "there would be no change" to the August 1st deadline, amid speculation that there would be another extension.

Trump had warned that letters were being sent out on Monday, alerting other nations to the latest plans in his trade war.

He then added that the US would impose a 25% tariff on imports from two of its closest allies, Japan and South Korea [starting on August 1](#), apparently unveiling the first two [trading partners](#) to receive a "letter."

"If, for any reason, you decide to raise your tariffs, then, whatever the number you choose to raise them by, will be added on to the 25% that we charge," Trump told Japan and South Korea in letters released on his Truth Social platform.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (9) [FONTE: Deutsche Welle, 8/07/2025]

## **EU wants 'fast' deal**

The European Union is aiming to get a deal done before the August 1 deadline.

EU economy commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis told reporters in Brussels on Tuesday that "the faster we can reach the agreement, the better."

"That would remove uncertainty surrounding these tariff questions and indeed we see that it is weighing on the economy and also on investment decisions of the companies," Dombrovskis said.

"We have been working with this ninth of July deadline in mind, but as I outlined, as it seems, the US have now postponed in a sense this deadline to first of August, so that gives us a bit more time, but from our side we remain concentrated," Dombrovskis added.

According to Reuters news agency, citing EU sources on Monday, the bloc did not expect to receive a tariff letter from Trump. However, on Tuesday, Trump told reporters during a cabinet meeting that he was "probably two days away" from sending the EU a letter. Trump added that the EU "has been very nice to us" and "we will see what happens."



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (10) [FONTE: Reuters, 26/06/2025]

## **Germany's Merz urges 'quick and simple' EU-US trade deal**



German Chancellor Friedrich Merz speaks during a press conference, on the day of the European Union leaders summit in Brussels, Belgium June 26, 2025. REUTERS/Christian Hartmann [Purchase Licensing Rights](#)

BRUSSELS, June 26 (Reuters) - German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Thursday the EU should do a "quick and simple" trade deal with the United States rather than a "slow and complicated" one.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (11) [FONTE: Reuters, 26/06/2025]

With the clock ticking before a tariff respite expires on July 9, Merz said time was of the essence.

"We have less than two weeks until July 9 and you can't agree a sophisticated trade agreement in that time," he told reporters.

Merz said German industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mechanical engineering, steel, aluminum and cars were already being burdened with high tariffs that businesses were in danger.

Merz also said von der Leyen had suggested that Europeans build a new trade organisation that could gradually replace the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has struggled to function effectively in recent years.

He said the idea was in its early stages but could include mechanisms to resolve disputes, as the WTO was meant to do.

"You all know that the WTO doesn't work any more," he said.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (12)

[FONTE: Kiel Institute, N° 125 (2025|Q2)]



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (13)

[FONTE: Kiel Institute, N° 125 (2025|Q2)]

## **GERMAN ECONOMY IN SUMMER 2025: SIGNS OF RECOVERY AS ECONOMY BOTTOMS OUT**

*The German economy is showing signs of recovery. GDP increased considerably at the start of the year, and businesses are feeling more optimistic about the future. However, economic momentum is likely to remain subdued for the time being, partly due to the negative impact of U.S. trade policy. In addition to the negative effects of higher tariffs, the impact of front-running exports to the United States—which contributed to the strong start to the year—will also be felt over the next few quarters. The pace of expansion will pick up noticeably in the coming year, as the greater fiscal leeway of the new German government comes into play. We assume that the expansionary fiscal policy will increase the GDP growth rate by 0.8 percentage points in 2026, while higher U.S. tariffs are expected to dampen growth in sum by 0.3 percentage points this and next year. Against this backdrop, we expect GDP growth rates of 0.3 percent this year (spring forecast: 0.0 percent) and 1.6 percent in 2026 (spring forecast: 1.5 percent), which is slightly higher than our previous forecast. In addition to U.S. trade policy, German exporters are suffering from a significant loss in competitiveness. Inflation is expected to decline to 1.6 percent in 2026, primarily due to lower energy prices, down from 2.2 percent this year. Given rising incomes, private consumption is expected to increase notably this year and next year. Investment is set to bottom out after declining for the past three years. More favorable financing conditions and, in 2026, expansionary fiscal policy will contribute to the recovery of investment. As the economy recovers, the labor market is expected to overcome its current weakness, and unemployment will decline again next year. The government's budget deficit is expected to rise to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2026. A decrease to 2.1 percent is expected for the current year (2024: 2.7 percent).*

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (14)

[FONTE: Kiel Institute, N° 125 (2025|Q2)]

**Table 1:**  
**Key indicators**

	2023	2024	2025	2026
Gross domestic product (GDP), price-adjusted	-0.3	-0.2	0.3	1.6
Gross domestic product, deflator	6.1	3.1	2.5	2.3
Consumer prices	5.9	2.2	2.2	1.6
Labor productivity (per hour worked)	-0.6	-0.1	0.3	0.8
Employment (1000 persons)	46,011	46,081	46,055	46,195
Unemployment rate (percent)	5.7	6.0	6.3	6.1
<i>in relation to nominal GDP</i>				
Public sector net lending	-2.5	-2.7	-2.1	-3.5
Gross public debt	62.9	62.5	62.7	63.9
Current account balance	5.6	5.7	5.4	4.9

GDP, consumer prices, labor productivity: percentage change on previous year; unemployment rate: as defined by the Federal Employment Agency.

Source: Federal Statistical Office, *Fachserie 18, Series 1.2*; Federal Employment Agency, *Monthly Bulletin*; Federal Employment Agency, *Employment Statistics*; shaded: Kiel Institute forecast.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (15)

[FONTE: Kiel Institute, N° 125 (2025|Q2)]

**Tabelle 2.1:**  
**Projections and assumptions on the international environment**

	2024				2025				2026			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
ECB key interest rate	4.00	3.75	3.50	3.00	2.50	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Long-term interest rate	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
US-dollar/euro exchange rate	1.09	1.08	1.10	1.07	1.05	1.12	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.13
Price competitiveness	91.9	92.1	92.2	91.5	91.0	92.6	92.6	92.5	92.4	92.2	92.0	91.8
Export markets	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Oil price	81.9	85.0	78.7	73.9	74.8	65.0	63.1	62.7	62.9	63.2	63.5	63.9
Gas price	27.4	31.7	35.4	43.2	46.8	35.5	35.4	36.4	36.5	32.8	32.5	33.4
Electricity price	69.2	72.9	78.3	109.4	116.1	71.7	87.4	87.4	78.5	78.5	78.5	78.5

ECB key interest rate: deposit facility rate (end of quarter); long-term interest rate on 9–10 year bonds (quarter average); price competitiveness: against 60 trading partners, based on consumer price inflation; index: 1991:I = 100, increasing values indicate deterioration of price competitiveness; export markets: GDP growth in 41 countries, weighted with shares in German exports, change over previous quarter. Oil price: US-Dollar per barrel North Sea Brent. Gas price: Euro per MWh (TTF). Electricity price (Phelix, Baseload).


Source: ECB, *Monthly Bulletin*; Deutsche Bundesbank, *Monthly Bulletin*; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, LSEG Datastream, EEX, ENDEX; Kiel Institute calculations; shaded: Kiel Institute forecast or assumption.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (16)

[FONTE: Kiel Institute, N° 125 (2025|Q2)]

## 3. External trade


**Figure 3.1:**  
Exports



Quarterly data: Volumes, seasonally and calendar adjusted.  
Annual data (boxes): Volumes, change in percent.

Source: Federal Statistical Office, *Fachserie 18, Series 1.2 and 1.3*; shaded: Kiel Institute forecast.

**Figure 3.3:**  
German export markets



Annual data, volumes; GDP growth in 64 countries, weighted with shares in German exports.

Source: Federal Statistical Office, *Fachserie 7 Series 1*; national sources; Kiel Institute calculations and forecast.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (17) [FONTE: Euronews, 27/06/2025]

## **Let's create a new World Trade Organization - Von der Leyen**

European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen has proposed to EU leaders the launch of a Europe-led initiative to establish a structured trade cooperation with Asian countries, potentially laying the groundwork for an alternative to the gridlocked World Trade Organisation (WTO).





# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (18) [FONTE: Euronews, 27/06/2025]

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented leaders with different options of trade deals, labelling as the most attractive a closer cooperation between the EU and members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional trade pact of 11 Pacific Rim countries and the UK.

She introduced the initiative as a potential first step toward reshaping the global trade order.

"I said that we can think about this as the beginning of redesigning the WTO—of course, understanding what should be reformed positively within it," von der Leyen told reporters after the summit.

She stressed the importance of learning from the WTO's shortcomings and showing the world that "free trade based on rules" remains achievable with a wide group of willing partners.

"This is a project we should truly engage in. CPTPP and the European Union—that's my team," she said, adding that the EU must take the lead in managing this initiative.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (19) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia, 26/06/2025]

## Multilateral trading order strengthened as UK joins interim appeals system

The EU welcomes the decision of the United Kingdom, announced today, to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) in the WTO.

After Paraguay and Malaysia also joined recently, the MPIA now covers 57 WTO Members and 57.6% of world trade [\[1\]](#).


Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič said: "Given the current trade tensions, the MPIA is ever more important. It ensures the final and orderly resolution of trade disputes among its participants and supports rules-based trade. With each new country joining, we increase the stability of multilateral trading relations. This is why I warmly welcome the UK, Paraguay and Malaysia among the MPIA participants. I stress that the MPIA is open to all WTO Members."

The MPIA guarantees its participants access to a functioning dispute settlement system in the WTO, as a stop-gap solution in the absence of a functioning WTO Appellate Body. It ensures that rules can be enforced and trade disputes can be orderly resolved, without appealing "into the void".

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (20) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia, 26/06/2025]

## Background

Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators selected randomly from the pool of 10 appeal arbitrators set up by the countries participating in the MPIA. It comprises persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the WTO Agreements. It is open to all members, to offer a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system.

The original pool of arbitrators was composed in July 2020. Following a merit-based process in which MPIA participants put forward candidates and conducted interviews, the pool was recently partially [re-composed](#)  to include new arbitrators.

Paraguay joined the MPIA on 6 May and Malaysia on 23 May. With the UK, the MPIA now covers Australia, Benin, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Macao (China), Mexico, Malaysia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (21) [FONTE: Politico, 30/06/2025]

## **‘Goodbye Trump, hello Asia’ is the EU’s new trade strategy. Will it work?**

Ursula von der Leyen wants the EU to team up with a 12-nation Pacific trade group. That could serve as a new platform for fans of rules-based trade.



Trump's unilateral and arbitrary tariffs have tested EU chief executive Ursula von der Leyen's patience and resolve. | Alejandro Zepeda/EFE via EPA

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (22) [FONTE: Politico, 30/06/2025]

Trump's unilateral and arbitrary tariffs — which could ratchet up to 50 percent from July 9 if EU and U.S. negotiators fail to cut a trade deal — have tested EU chief executive Ursula von der Leyen's patience and resolve. Her response? To team up with the CPTPP, a Pacific-centric trade group that includes like-minded nations such as Japan, Australia, Canada and Mexico.

Between them, the 39 countries of the EU and (deep breath) Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership account for 30 percent of world trade. Forming a coalition of the willing could, boosters argue, mark a first step toward reconfiguring the international trade order and escaping the institutional paralysis besetting the World Trade Organization.

In a pitch to EU leaders, von der Leyen turned previous comments on possible cooperation with the CPTPP into more of a reality. The new grouping would redesign the rules of global trade, she said, reforming or perhaps even replacing the global trade rules body.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (23) [FONTE: Politico, 9/07/2025]

## Take it or leave it? EU faces dilemma in tariff showdown with Trump.

The EU faces an agonizing choice between taking the deal on Trump's desk or trying to drive a harder bargain.

BRUSSELS — A U.S. trade proposal that could land in the European Union's inbox imminently will confront it with a momentous choice: accept a far-from-perfect offer now or gamble to secure last-minute exemptions for key industries.

Earlier this week, Washington floated a deal that would lock in a baseline tariff of 10 percent and provide some relief to the European aircraft and spirits industries.

And now the Donald Trump administration is claiming that a deal is imminent.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (24) [FONTE: Politico, 9/07/2025]

## **Playing defense**

The prospect of a deal — whatever shape it might take — confronts the EU with a tricky dilemma: accept the offer on the table or try to drive a harder bargain after Trump postponed his tariff deadline by three weeks to Aug. 1.

“If we receive a letter from the U.S., we have to discuss whether we accept it,” senior European lawmaker Bernd Lange, who has chaired the European Parliament’s trade committee for over 10 years, told reporters on Wednesday. “A deal is not a diktat.”

Washington gave no indication in its offer this week, however, that it would exempt sensitive industries such as cars, steel and aluminum or pharmaceuticals, as requested by the EU. Nor has Brussels won any guarantees that Washington won’t make further U-turns on tariffs.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (25) [FONTE: Politico, 9/07/2025]



So far, EU chief executive Ursula von der Leyen has portrayed her strategy — of mostly playing defense in the difficult negotiations — as working. | Guillaume Horcajuelo/EPA

So far, EU chief executive Ursula von der Leyen has portrayed her strategy — of mostly playing defense in the difficult negotiations — as working.

And she has a point: The EU hasn't received a letter from Trump of the type sent to Japan and South Korea, threatening a 25 percent tariff on all exports. At least not yet.

Beyond the disastrous impact that such high tariffs would have on European exporters, von der Leyen is acutely aware that the bloc's security at a time of Russian aggression is also at stake. This is forcing her trade team to tread carefully with Trump, who in addition to getting tough on tariffs has threatened to withdraw U.S. military support for Ukraine.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (26) [FONTE: Politico, 9/07/2025]

The Commission's negotiation course, so far, broadly echoes calls by some of the EU's heavyweight member countries, such as Germany or Italy, for a quick deal with the U.S. — even at the price of potentially painful concessions.

Speaking at a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, Trump said of the EU that “they’re very tough, but now they’re being very nice to us, and we’ll see what happens.”

## **Toughening up**

The question is: Does being nice get you anywhere?

Not all diplomats and policymakers in Brussels think so. Lange, a German Social Democrat, has warned that a one-sided deal could fail to win the support of Parliament.

The U.K. and Vietnam — which have already sealed deals with the U.S. — “both wanted quick results and the U.S. emerged as the big winner in the end,” Lange warned in an interview with Germany’s RND newspaper group.

The extended deadline “plays in the EU's favor,” said David Kleimann, a senior trade expert at the ODI think tank in Brussels, pointing to pending U.S. court proceedings against Trump’s tariffs and internal coordination requirements within the EU.

# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (27)

[FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 12/07/2025]



Donald J. Trump

@realDonaldTrump · 1d

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 2025

Her Excellency  
Ursula von der Leyen  
President of the European Commission  
Brussels

Dear Madam President:

It is a Great Honor for me to send you this letter in that it demonstrates the strength and commitment of our Trading Relationship, and the fact that the United States of America has agreed to continue working with The European Union, despite having one of our largest Trade Deficits with you. Nevertheless, we have decided to move forward, but only with more balanced and fair TRADE. Therefore, we invite you to participate in the extraordinary Economy of the United States, the Number One Market in the World, by far. We have had years to discuss our Trading Relationship with The European Union, and have concluded that we must move away from these long-term, large, and persistent, Trade Deficits, engendered by your Tariff, and Non-Tariff, Policies and Trade Barriers. Our relationship has been, unfortunately, far from Reciprocal. Starting on August 1, 2025, we will charge The European Union a Tariff of only 30% on EU products sent into the United States, separate from all Sectoral Tariffs. Goods transshipped to evade a higher Tariff will be subject to that higher Tariff. Please understand that the 30% number is far less than what is needed to eliminate the Trade Deficit disparity we have with the EU. As you are aware, there will be no Tariff if The European Union, or companies within the EU, decide to build or manufacture product within the United States and, in fact, we will do everything possible to get approvals quickly, professionally, and routinely – In other words, in a matter of weeks.

The European Union will allow complete, open Market Access to the United States, with no Tariff being charged to us, in an attempt to reduce the large Trade Deficit. If for any reason you decide to raise your Tariffs and retaliate, then, whatever the number you choose to raise them by, will be added onto the 30% that we charge. Please understand that these Tariffs are necessary to correct the many years of European Union Tariff, and Non-Tariff, Policies and Trade Barriers, which cause the large and unsustainable Trade Deficits against the United States. This Deficit is a major threat to our Economy and, indeed, our National Security!

Tariff, and Non-Tariff, Policies and Trade Barriers, we will, perhaps, consider an adjustment to this letter. These Tariffs may be modified, upward or downward, depending on our relationship with your Country. You will never be disappointed with The United States of America.

Thank you for your attention to this matter!

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

DONALD J. TRUMP  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1.19k

3.62k

16k



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (28) [FONTE: Reuters, 11/07/2025]

## **US customs duties top \$100 billion for first time in a fiscal year**

WASHINGTON, July 11 (Reuters) - U.S. customs duty collections surged again in June as President Donald Trump's tariffs gained steam, topping \$100 billion for the first time during a fiscal year and helping to produce a surprise \$27 billion budget surplus for the month, the Treasury Department reported on Friday.

The budget data showed that [tariffs](#) are starting to build into a significant revenue contributor for the federal government, with customs duties in June hitting new records, quadrupling to \$27.2 billion on a gross basis and \$26.6 billion on a net basis after refunds.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (29) [FONTE: Reuters, 11/07/2025]

The budget results are likely to reinforce Trump's view of tariffs as a lucrative revenue source and as a hammer to enforce non-trade foreign policy. He said on Tuesday that "the big money" would start to flow in after he imposes higher "reciprocal" tariffs on U.S. trading partners on August 1.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on X that the results show the U.S. "reaping the rewards" from Trump's tariff agenda.


"As President Trump works hard to take back our nation's economic sovereignty, today's Monthly Treasury Statement is demonstrating record customs duties – and with no inflation!" Bessent said.


For the first nine months of fiscal 2025, the customs take reached records of \$113.3 billion on a gross basis and \$108 billion on a net basis, nearly double the prior-year collections. The government's fiscal year ends on Sept. 30.



# A relação comercial UE-EUA: que perspectivas? (30)

[FONTE: Cartoon de Paresh Nath / Cagle Cartoons, 2018]





## PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (1) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]






# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da Califórnia / Los Angeles (2) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



**Quick Facts**

1 of 4

  
**CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC**

See article: [flag of California](#)

**Capital:** [Sacramento](#)

**Population**<sup>1</sup>: (2020) 39,538,223;  
(2024 est.) 39,431,263

**Governor:** [Gavin Newsom](#)  
(Democrat)

**Date Of Admission:** September 9,  
1850

**U.S. Senators:** [Alex Padilla](#)  
(Democrat) • [Adam Schiff](#)  
(Democrat)

**State Nickname:** Golden State

**State Motto:** "Eureka (I Have Found It)"

**State Bird:** California valley quail

**State Flower:** [California poppy](#)

**State Song:** "I Love You, California"

**Seats In U.S. House Of Representatives:**  
53 of (435)

**Time Zone:** Pacific (GMT – 8 hours)

**Total Area (Sq Km):** 423,967

**Total Area (Sq Mi):** 163,695

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (3) [FONTE: RAND]



**RAND Social and  
Economic Well-Being**

Focus Areas

Research & Commentary

Programs & Centers

Projects

## Mass Migration

Every year, millions of people leave their homelands to start their lives somewhere else.

Some seek to find a promising new job, strengthen family ties, or engage in new cultural opportunities. Some are seeking relief from crushing poverty or a lack of economic prospects. Others are fleeing war or persecution. Still others are escaping the effects of a long-term drought, a devastating hurricane, or some other kind of climate change–related disaster.

Although individuals' reasons for wanting to resettle vary, steadily rising numbers of migrants over the past two decades suggest that migration management is becoming one of the most pressing issues of this century. And there are no signs that this trend is slowing. Thus, many host and home communities and countries are urgently revisiting or developing new migration policies.

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (4) [FONTE: RAND]



**RAND Social and  
Economic Well-Being**

Focus Areas

Research & Commentary

Programs & Centers

Projects

## **Tackling the Biggest Migration Policy Issues**

RAND has worked closely with national and international agencies, particularly in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Australia, to assess how host- and home-country governments, donor nations, and multilateral agencies can manage policies associated with today's vast migrant flows.

RAND's interdisciplinary work tackles three areas that represent some of the biggest migration policy issues over the next decade: migration resulting from conflict, migration resulting from climate change or natural hazards, and management of migration across the United States southern border.



# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (5) [FONTE: US Facts, 2023]

Population • Immigration

## How many immigrants are in California <sup>▼</sup>?

**About 10.6M in 2023.** This translates to approximately 27.3% of the population, or roughly 2 in 7 residents in California. Immigrants were defined as foreign-born residents, which included people who became US citizens, were authorized to come to the US (e.g., for work), or were undocumented residents.

In 2023

10.6<sub>M</sub>

California residents were foreign-born

In 2023

2 in 7


California residents were foreign-born

Source: United States Census Bureau

>

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (6) [FONTE: US Facts, 2023]

**In California, 27.3% of the population was foreign-born in 2023.**



**Source: United States Census Bureau**



# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (7) [FONTE: US Facts, 2023]

California metro areas		By state
Average foreign-born share of the population from 2018 to 2022		
1.	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metro Area	39.7%
2.	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area	32.4%
3.	San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA Metro Area	30.9%
4.	El Centro, CA Metro Area	30.6%
5.	Salinas, CA Metro Area	28.9%
6.	Merced, CA Metro Area	26.3%
7.	Stockton, CA Metro Area	23.9%
8.	San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA Metro Area	22.6%
9.	Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA Metro Area	22.2%
10.	Napa, CA Metro Area	22.2%

Source: United States Census Bureau



# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (8) [FONTE: PPIC, Janeiro 2025]

FACT SHEET • JANUARY 2025



PPIC

PUBLIC POLICY  
INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA

## Immigrants in California

Marisol Cuellar Mejia, Cesar Alesi Perez, and Hans Johnson


### **California has more immigrants than any other state.**

- ▶ California is home to 10.6 million immigrants—22% of the foreign-born population nationwide.
- ▶ In 2023, the most current year of data, 27% of California's population was foreign born, the highest share of any state and more than double the share in the rest of the country (12%).
- ▶ Almost half (45%) of California children have at least one immigrant parent.
- ▶ A third (34%) of prime-working-age adults—those 25 to 54—are foreign born; [half \(52%\) of all foreign-born Californians](#) are in this age group.

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (9) [FONTE: PPIC, Janeiro 2025]

The share of immigrants in California has stabilized in recent decades at relatively high levels

Immigrants as a share of the total population (%)



Source: US Census Bureau, decennial censuses (1850–2000), American Community Survey 2008–2012 5-Year Estimates and 2023 1-Year Estimates.


# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (10) [FONTE: PPIC, Janeiro 2025]

## Californians have a favorable view of immigrants, but opinions have shifted recently.

- ▶ When asked in February 2024 whether immigrants are a benefit to California because of their hard work and job skills or a burden because they use public services, 60% of Californians say immigrants are a benefit—down from [66% in June 2023](#) and 78% in February 2021.
- ▶ Four in ten Californians say the border situation has reached a crisis level. Two-thirds of residents think border policy should focus on ensuring the process for who is admitted is more efficient, while about a third say it should focus on blocking migrants crossing the border.

## Asia remains the leading source of recent immigrants to California

Annual number of immigrants moving to California



Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates.

Notes: Annual inflow of persons moving to California from abroad. Based on the country where the person lived 1 year before the survey date.

Sources: American Community Survey and decennial census data from the US Census Bureau and IPUMS; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0 (University of Minnesota, 2024); California Department of Finance; [Pew Research Center](#); PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government (PPIC, February 2024).



# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (11)

[FONTE: David Ignatius / Washington

Post, 10/06/2025]

## **Democrats ignored border politics. Now the consequences are here.**

To fight Trump's excesses on immigration,  
Democrats need to show they are credible on the  
issue.



California National Guard troops are deployed at the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building in Los Angeles on Tuesday during protests against federal immigration sweeps. (Mike Blake/Reuters)

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (12)

[FONTE: David Ignatius / Washington Post, 10/06/2025]

When I see [activists carrying Mexican flags](#) as they challenge ICE raids in Los Angeles this week, I think of two possibilities: These “protesters” are deliberately working to create visuals that will help Trump, or they are well-meaning but unwise dissenters who are inadvertently accomplishing the same goal.

Democrats’ mistake, over more than a decade, has been to behave as though border enforcement doesn’t matter. Pressured by immigrant rights activists, party leaders too often acted as if maintaining a well-controlled border was somehow morally wrong. Again and again, the short-term political interests of Democratic leaders in responding to a strong faction within the party won out over having a policy that could appeal to the country as a whole.

When red-state voters and elected officials complained that their states were being overwhelmed by uncontrolled immigration over the past decade, Democrats found those protests easy to ignore. They were happening somewhere else. But when red states’ governors pushed migrants toward blue-state cities over the past several years, [protests from mayors and governors](#) finally began to register. But still not enough to create coherent Democratic policies, alas.

# A questão migratória nos EUA: o caso da California / Los Angeles (13)

[FONTE: David Ignatius / Washington Post, 10/06/2025]

Since his first term, Trump has clearly wanted a military confrontation with the left over immigration or racial issues. Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helped talk Trump out of invoking the Insurrection Act in 2020 to contain the unrest that followed the death of George Floyd. But this time, Trump faces no opposition. He is surrounded by yes-men and -women.

The saddest part is that Democrats still have no clear policy. Some blue-state mayors and governors have pledged to provide “sanctuary” for migrants, but they don’t have good arguments to rebut Trump’s claim that they’re interfering with the enforcement of federal law. In some cases, sanctuary has meant refusing to hand over undocumented migrants convicted of violent crimes, former DHS officials tell me. That’s wrong. The courts have limited Trump’s most arbitrary policies and his defiance of due process, but not his authority to enforce immigration laws.

California Gov. Gavin Newsom (D) this week chose sensible ground to fight, [filing a lawsuit](#) challenging Trump’s authority to override gubernatorial power by federalizing National Guard troops when there isn’t a “rebellion” or “invasion.” There is no evidence of such extreme danger — or that local law enforcement in Los Angeles can’t handle the problems.

But Newsom’s smart pushback doesn’t get Democrats out of addressing an issue they’ve been ducking for more than a decade: Do they have the courage to enforce the border themselves?

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[FONTE: Harvard University / Samuel P. Huntington, 2004]

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## Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity

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## Abstract

In his seminal work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington argued provocatively and presciently that with the end of the cold war, "civilizations" were replacing ideologies as the new fault lines in international politics.

His astute analysis has proven correct. Now Professor Huntington turns his attention from international affairs to our domestic cultural rifts as he examines the impact other civilizations and their values are having on our own country.



America was founded by British settlers who brought with them a distinct culture including the English language, Protestant values, individualism, religious commitment, and respect for law. The waves of immigrants that later came to the United States gradually accepted these values and assimilated into America's Anglo-Protestant culture. More recently, however, national identity has been eroded by the problems of assimilating massive numbers of primarily Hispanic immigrants, bilingualism, multiculturalism, the devaluation of citizenship, and the "denationalization" of American elites.

September 11 brought a revival of American patriotism and a renewal of American identity. But already there are signs that this revival is fading, even though in the post-September 11 world, Americans face unprecedented challenges to our security. *Who Are We?* shows the need for us to reassert the core values that make us Americans. Nothing less than our national identity is at stake. Once again Samuel Huntington has written an important book that is certain to provoke a lively debate and to shape our national conversation about who we are.

— Abstract



# Sugestões de leitura





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