



Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

SESSÃO Nº 2

8/10/2025



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (1) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

President Donald J. Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict

“

1. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors.
2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.
3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.
4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (2) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.

6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (3) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement.

9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of State to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (4) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (5) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors.

14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (6) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (7) [FONTE: FT, 29/09/2025]

17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (8) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]

Netanyahu secures key edits to Trump plan to slow and limit Israel's withdrawal from Gaza

US proposal for ending war says IDF will only pull back when specific benchmarks met and buffer zone to be established, after earlier version was more vague on Israel's red lines



O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (9) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]

"Now the whole world, including the Arab and Muslim world, is pressuring Hamas to accept the terms that we created together with Trump, to bring back all the hostages — the living and the dead — while the IDF stays in the majority of the Strip," Netanyahu said in a [video](#) he posted to social media.

"Who would have believed it?!" Netanyahu exclaimed in Hebrew as he basked in the terms of Trump's plan.

Netanyahu was naturally trying to frame the trip positively to his base back home amid headlines from earlier in the day focusing on his [apology](#) to Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Abdulrahman Al Thani for Israel's strike targeting Hamas leaders in Doha.

But the premier did, in fact, have a lot to celebrate, as he managed to secure significant 11th-hour changes to the proposal regarding the scope and nature of the IDF's withdrawal from Gaza, along with the disarmament of Hamas.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (10) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]

Hamas's central demand from the beginning of the war has been for Israel to completely withdraw from Gaza in exchange for the hostages.

And while it has expressed willingness to give up governing control of Gaza, the surrender of its weapons has been a red line, as it recognizes that they are essential for the group to maintain a degree of influence in the Strip.

Benchmarks for withdrawal

The US sought to address both of these issues, but did so somewhat vaguely in the version of its Gaza peace proposal that it presented to Arab and Muslim partners

last week.

Point 3 of what was then a 21-point plan obtained by The Times of Israel stated that "Israeli forces will withdraw to the battle lines as of when the [US special envoy Steve] Witkoff proposal was presented to prepare for hostage release."

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (11) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]


As Netanyahu mentions in his video, the map shows that Israeli troops will be able to remain in the majority of the Gaza Strip even after the first pullback of IDF troops in preparation for all of the hostages to be released.

They will then be able to remain in those positions until the International Stabilization Force (ISF) of Arab and Muslim countries is prepared to deploy and fully operate to disarm Hamas, the plan states.

Even after the second phase of the withdrawal, the IDF will remain in over a third of the Strip, the map indicates.

The third withdrawal will clear the final troops out of Gaza, but the map shows that a security buffer zone will be established along the perimeter of the entire Strip, another Israeli demand aimed at mitigating the threat of another October 7-like invasion.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (12) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]



O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (13) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]

Arab mediator less bullish than Netanyahu

A diplomat from one of the mediating countries reflected that while Arab and Muslim leaders got important face time with Trump last week during a multilateral meeting on the UN General Assembly sidelines, Netanyahu managed to secure “the last word,” convincing Washington to make additional changes to the plan at a point in the process when it was much harder for them to intervene.

Speaking to Trump last also allowed Netanyahu to secure something of a concession from the US president when the latter made a point of acknowledging the Israeli premier’s “understand[able] opposition to a Palestinian state” — somewhat deflating the proposal envisioning a pathway to a Palestinian statehood, even if that pathway was far from definitive.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (14) [FONTE: Times of Israel, 30/09/2025]

The Arab diplomat said it will be difficult to convince Hamas to accept the US proposal as is, given that it would force the terror group to give up all of its leverage by releasing all remaining hostages in the first 72 hours of the deal, while initially only securing a very partial withdrawal of Israeli troops.

The diplomat said it will likely take at least several days for Hamas to respond at which point it will likely have amendments of its own that it will try to submit like Netanyahu did, though, Witkoff in the past has demanded that Hamas accept his proposals as is.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (15) [FONTE: BBC, 30/09/2025]

Trump's Gaza plan is a significant step - but faces fundamental obstacles

US President Donald Trump said his plan for ending the war in Gaza was potentially one of the greatest days in the history of civilisation, and one that could bring "eternal peace in the Middle East".

The hyperbole was characteristic. However, his 20-point proposal, announced at the White House on Monday as Trump met the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is still a significant diplomatic step - if not quite matching his exotic overstatement.

The plan amounts to a shift in the Trump administration's position on a post-war future for Gaza, and adds more pressure than Washington has applied this year on Netanyahu to accept a deal.

Whether it can become a reality in the coming weeks will depend heavily on the same issues that have always been fundamental: whether both Netanyahu and the leadership of Hamas now see greater gains in ending the war than in continuing it.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (16) [FONTE: BBC, 30/09/2025]

Hamas' response to this proposal is not yet clear. A pessimistic assessment came from one Hamas figure, who earlier hinted to the BBC that the terms largely failed to safeguard Palestinian interests and the group would not accept any plan that did not guarantee Israel's withdrawal from Gaza.

Netanyahu, standing next to the US president, said Israel accepted Trump's 20 principles, even though a leader in the far-right flank of his coalition had already rejected some of them.

But acceptance of Trump's principles alone is not the same as actually ending the war. And while Netanyahu rejects this accusation, his domestic opponents say he has form for spiking an emerging deal if it endangers his political survival at home.

In that sense, the proposal may not be enough to get the breakthrough Trump clearly wants. It still contains significant obstacles for the political constituencies of both Israel and Hamas that could prevent them ultimately reaching a deal.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (17) [FONTE: BBC, 30/09/2025]

There is also enough ambiguity in the plan that either side can appear to accept it while using the course of further negotiations to sabotage it, blaming the other side for its failure.

This has been a pattern over months of negotiations. And if that happens, it is clear where the Trump administration will stand - on the side of Israel.

Trump made this clear to Netanyahu, telling him on Monday that if Hamas did not agree to the proposal then he would have America's "full backing to do what you would have to do".

Although Trump presented this as a deal, it is in reality a framework for further negotiations - or as he put it at one point, a series of "principles". This is far from the kind of detailed plan that would need to be agreed to end the war.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (18) [FONTE: BBC, 30/09/2025]

It then envisages the establishment of a local, technocratic administration in Gaza to run day-to-day services, overseen by the "Board of Peace" who would be based in Egypt.

Remaining Hamas members who "commit to peaceful co-existence" and to decommission their weapons would be given amnesty and others would be exiled. An international "stabilisation" force created by the US and Arab countries would take over security in Gaza, ensuring the demilitarisation of Palestinian armed factions.

Palestinian statehood is mentioned, but only in the vaguest of terms. The plan suggests that if the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority is reformed, conditions "may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood".

The Arab countries see Trump's proposals as a significant breakthrough for them. In part because they have disposed of [his February Gaza "Riviera" plan which would have involved the forced displacement of Palestinians.](#)

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (19) [FONTE: BBC, 30/09/2025]

They also have at least the mention of Palestinian statehood, even if there is no commitment to it.

And the US plan says "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza" - albeit with no similar pledge for the occupied West Bank. This a vital clause for the Arab nations, even if it is contradicted by another line in the plan which says Israel will still maintain its forces in the "security perimeter" of Gaza.

On the Israeli side, Netanyahu says the entire framework is consistent with his objectives for ending the war. That is, to see Hamas disarmed, Gaza demilitarised and no future Palestinian state being established.

But it is still unclear whether the clauses on disarmament and Palestinian statehood will be accepted by parts of his government, or whether he might use this pressure to add or "refine" clauses.

Much now depends on the response from Hamas.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (20) [FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 3/10/2025]



Donald J. Trump 
@realDonaldTrump

Hammas has been a ruthless and violent threat, for many years, in the Middle East! They have killed (and made lives unbearably miserable), culminating with the October 7th MASSACRE, in Israel, babies, woman, children, old people, and many young men and women, boys and girls, getting ready to celebrate their future lives together. As retribution for the October 7th attack on civilization, more than 25,000 Hammas "soldiers" have already been killed. Most of the rest are surrounded and MILITARILY TRAPPED, just waiting for me to give the word, "GO," for their lives to be quickly extinguished. As for the rest, we know where and who you are, and you will be hunted down, and killed. I am asking that all innocent Palestinians immediately leave this area of potentially great future death for safer parts of Gaza. Everyone will be well cared for by those that are waiting to help. Fortunately for Hammas, however, they will be given one last chance! Great, powerful, and very rich Nations of the Middle East, and the surrounding areas beyond, together with the United States of America, have agreed, with Israel signing on, to PEACE, after 3000 years, in the Middle East. THIS DEAL ALSO SPARES THE LIVES OF ALL REMAINING HAMAS FIGHTERS! The details of the document are known to the WORLD, and it is a great one for ALL! We will have PEACE in the Middle East one way or the other. The violence and bloodshed will stop. RELEASES THE HOSTAGES, ALL OF THEM, INCLUDING THE BODIES OF THOSE THAT ARE DEAD, NOW! An Agreement must be reached with Hammas by Sunday Evening at SIX (6) P.M., Washington, D.C. time. Every Country has signed on! If this LAST CHANCE agreement is not reached, all HELL, like no one has ever seen before, will break out against Hammas. THERE WILL BE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (21) [FONTE: NYT, 5/10/2025]

Strong-Armed by Trump, Netanyahu Embraces Gaza Deal as a Personal Win

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel took credit for an emerging agreement, but it was clear that President Trump was calling the shots.



Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel at the White House following a meeting with President Trump last week. Doug Mills/The New York Times

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (22) [FONTE: NYT, 5/10/2025]

Mr. Netanyahu asserted in a brief, televised address to the nation on Saturday that the plan was the result of a diplomatic move that he had coordinated over weeks, and jointly presented, with Mr. Trump and his team.

Mr. Trump told it a bit differently. In a conversation on Saturday with a leading Israeli correspondent [for Axios](#) and for Israel's most popular news channel, the president suggested that he had strong-armed a somewhat reluctant Mr. Netanyahu into accepting the terms.

"I said, 'Bibi, this is your chance for victory,'" Mr. Trump related, referring to Mr. Netanyahu by his nickname. "He was fine with it," Mr. Trump continued, adding, "He's got to be fine with it. He has no choice. With me, you *got to be fine*."

Mr. Netanyahu is in no position to defy Mr. Trump while facing international censure over Israel's conduct in the war and growing international isolation, analysts say, increasing its reliance on the United States.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (23) [FONTE: NYT, 5/10/2025]

For months Mr. Netanyahu has been engaged in a delicate balancing act. He has been determined to fulfill his pledge of total victory over Hamas, whose attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, ignited the war, and to ensure his own political survival by appeasing his far-right coalition partners who oppose any deal that leaves Hamas standing.

At the same time, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed and hunger has run rampant, has stirred global wrath. Polls have [shown](#) that a majority of Israelis, long skeptical of the chances of a “total victory,” favor ending the war in order to get the hostages back. And Mr. Trump’s patience appears to have worn thin.

“It doesn’t look like Hamas is leaving, and it doesn’t look like the total victory he promised,” Mitchell Barak, an Israeli pollster who worked as an aide to Mr. Netanyahu in the 1990s, said of the prime minister. “I think he realized his credit with Trump ran out.”

Unlike the defiant stance Mr. Netanyahu often took against the Biden administration or President Barack Obama, Mr. Barak said: “For the first time Netanyahu cannot disregard the wishes of an American president, because of the way Trump operates. Trump is unpredictable and will not fall in line with the Israeli position.”

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (24) [FONTE: NYT, 5/10/2025]

Mr. Trump humiliated Mr. Netanyahu in the eyes of many Israelis by putting him on the phone to the prime minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, to apologize for Israel's botched [attempt last month to kill Hamas leaders](#) in the Qatari capital, Doha. The White House issued [a photograph](#) of Mr. Netanyahu reading his written apology into the receiver as Mr. Trump propped the phone on his lap.

In addition, Mr. Trump and his team compelled Mr. Netanyahu to sign onto a clause in the deal promising, however vaguely and subject to conditions, a "credible pathway" to Palestinian statehood, when one of his main calling cards has been the prevention of a Palestinian state.


"His entire career has been in a free fall in the last few days," Mr. Barak said, adding, "He agreed to everything."



Still, other experts note that as Israel's longest-serving prime minister, Mr. Netanyahu has survived many a knock to his image in the past.

"Bibi has the ability to know what the other side wants and needs," said Mazal Mualem, an Israeli political commentator for Al-Monitor, a Middle East news site, and the author of a biography of the Israeli leader. "He knows when to show restraint."

So far, Ms. Mualem said, Mr. Netanyahu appears to have convinced his party and his political base that the deal is a win for Israel and is owning it.

O plano dos EUA para o fim da guerra em Gaza (25) [FONTE: Nicola Jennings / Guardian, 6/10/2025]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (1)

[FONTE: FT, 23/09/2025]

Russian fuel exports drop as Ukraine intensifies its strikes on oil refineries

Kyiv accelerates drone campaign aimed at reducing Moscow's ability to fund its war



A huge fireball and thick smoke rise above the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Russia after a drone strike last month © Eyepress via Reuters

Ukraine's drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have disrupted domestic supplies and pushed Russia's diesel exports towards their lowest levels since 2020.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (2)

[FONTE: FT, 23/09/2025]

Sixteen of Russia's 38 refineries have been hit since the start of August, some of them multiple times, including one of Russia's largest fuel-processing facilities, the

340,000 barrel-a-day plant at Ryazan, close to Moscow.

The strikes have disrupted more than 1mn barrels a day of Russia's refining capacity, according to Energy Aspects, a research group. Diesel exports, if they maintain the current rate, will fall to the lowest monthly total in September since 2020, according to both OilX and Vortexa, which track cargoes.

"It seems to be the most effective campaign that Ukraine has carried out so far," said Benedict George, head of European petroleum products pricing at Argus, which reports commodity prices.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (3)

[FONTE: FT, 23/09/2025]

Last week, Zelenskyy told reporters, including the Financial Times, that Ukraine was increasing its long-range drone production and intensifying its strikes on Russia's energy infrastructure to bring the war closer to the Kremlin.

"Once the number of drones matches the Russians', they will feel the fuel shortage and loss," he said. "We already see this increasingly. More drones are reaching targets."

Among the dozens of damaged Russian oil and gas facilities were also some located more than 1,000km from the Ukrainian border, according to officials in Kyiv and independent analysts.

Last Thursday, Ukrainian drones flew about 1,400km and hit the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat oil refinery and petrochemical plant in central Russia's Bashkortostan. Ukraine's SBU security service took credit for the strike that it said hit the centre of the facility, sparking a "strong fire."

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (4)

[FONTE: FT, 23/09/2025]

[Russia](#) is the second-largest diesel exporter in the world, with about half its cargoes going to Turkey, followed by other markets in west and north Africa and Brazil — as the EU and UK do not directly import the Russian fuel. While Moscow has imposed export bans on Russian gasoline for the most part of this year, its diesel sales abroad have so far been unrestricted.

George said Turkey had turned to India and Saudi Arabia to make up for the shortfall, and that premiums for diesel have risen this month to about \$25 to \$30 a barrel over the price of benchmark Brent crude oil. This is the highest level since summer, when Israel's war with Iran [sent prices to a 15-month high](#) over supply fears.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (5)

[FONTE: FT, 23/09/2025]

Diesel premium rises

Premium for European diesel over Brent crude (\$)



Source: Argus

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (6)

[FONTE: Oil Price, 26/09/2025]

Forget OPEC Warnings The Real Oil Shock Is Happening Inside Russia



Ukraine's drone and missile strikes on Russian refineries, depots, and ports have taken over 1 million bpd of refining capacity offline. Despite talk of an oil glut and OPEC+ output hikes, global crude prices remain stable.

Russia is forced to export more crude while facing domestic fuel shortages and unrest.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (7)

[FONTE: Oil Price, 26/09/2025]

Almost daily, reports are showcasing the strategic success of Ukraine's campaign, which, in addition to its battlefield tactics, has effectively executed precision strikes and drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, fuel depots, and related logistics. These intentional strikes have targeted the Kremlin's economic lifelines, leading some to assert that the most effective sanctions currently hitting Russia's war chest or Putin's lifeline are the Ukrainian drones.

While most energy analysts are still obsessed with OPEC, US shale, or Israel's operations in Gaza, Russia, not only a pivotal player inside the so-called OPEC+ group, but also one of the world's leading oil and gas exporters, is looking at a very dire situation. Ukrainian drones are not only degrading Moscow's ability to turn Russian crude into exportable petroleum products (diesel, gasoline, kerosene) but also forcing Russian refineries to go offline. Both issues are hitting Putin's war economy very hard, as they decrease options to monetize its hydrocarbon potential (exports) and also force higher domestic price settings for Russian citizens and external parties. Lately, in a move to squeeze Russia really, Ukraine has increased its attacks on Russian oil ports, in a move to hit export potential, while in the end forcing Russian crude oil production to be shut in.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (8)

[FONTE: Oil Price, 26/09/2025]

The current situation, combined with increased geopolitical risks and strong global demand, suggests a potential shift towards a bullish environment. Even OPEC+'s theoretical [production and export increases](#) may not be enough to mitigate this shift, or in some cases, may not be sufficient at all. This potential for a bullish market should prompt all market participants to adopt preparedness and strategic planning.

The latest reports from Russia indicate that Ukrainian drones have hit dozens of Russian fuel facilities, while at the same time, maritime drones and missiles are being used. The potential of Ukraine's latest military addition, the Flamingo Missile, could be a watershed development. This missile can reach much further into Russian territory with a larger payload, potentially causing significant damage to key oil and gas infrastructure. Western and Russian outlets have also indicated that over a million barrels per day of refining throughput is being hit or removed from the market, as major refineries and pipeline centers are being shut down or taken offline. For global oil markets, Russia's exports are significant, as it is a leading exporter of diesel, fuel oil, and kerosene. The potential impact of the Flamingo Missile, combined with the ongoing drone attacks, underscores the evolving nature of the geopolitical risks in the oil market.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (9)

[FONTE: Oil Price, 26/09/2025]

While global markets are being hit increasingly, even if additional Russian crude is exported, the situation has become very dire. Independent reports from Russia indicate [severe fuel shortages](#) in several regions of the country, not only impacting the war economy sectors (manufacturing, defense) but also increasing the potential for internal unrest. Russian oligarchs have been complaining about the fuel and energy situation for weeks. While Russian refineries, which supply the domestic market, are affected, seaborne crude flows are increasing, as Moscow is forced [to export more](#). Russia doesn't hold vast crude oil storage facilities or volumes, leaving it with no option but to export crude. Some Asian markets will be happy, as most Russian seaborne volumes will head there. Still, regional markets for Russian products will be struggling to find additional supplies.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (10)

[FONTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5/09/2025]

Ukraine's Flamingos take to the skies

Fire Point's new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile could have far-reaching implications for Ukraine's deep-strike campaign against Russia, while also reflecting a broader trend within the cruise-missile field.

Figure 1: Fire Point FP-5 *Flamingo* cruise missile



Range*: 3,000 km
Warhead mass: 1,150 kg
Guidance: Satellite navigation
Engine: Ivchenko AI-25TL

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (11)

[FONTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5/09/2025]

While having stayed mainly out of the limelight, the Ukrainian start-up Fire Point has [established](#) itself in the course of the war as a player in the one-way attack uninhabited aerial vehicle (OWA UAV) field, with its FP-1 OWA UAV featuring prominently in Ukraine's OWA deep-strike campaign against Russia. Building on this experience, the company [recently unveiled](#) its first cruise missile, named FP-5 *Flamingo*. Outside Ukraine, the British-Emirati company Milanion had previously [promoted](#) the design under the same designation. It remains unknown whether Milanion contributed to the missile's development or was simply marketing the design for overseas clients on behalf of Fire Point.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (12)

[FONTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5/09/2025]

The *Flamingo*'s impact on Ukraine's deep-strike campaign will depend not only upon the missile's maturity, quality and survivability but also the scale of its production. Fire Point claims it currently has the capacity to produce up to [one missile per day](#), with ambitions to increase daily output to seven by October. The use of second-hand Al-25TL turbofan engines, widely available from used Aero L-39 *Albatros* trainer aircraft, offers cost advantages but may also create long-term constraints, as it is unclear whether Ukraine's Motor Sich remains capable of manufacturing new units. A further uncertainty concerns sustained government support. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has [stated](#) that production of the missile could be expanded, but also indicated that this would depend upon further successful testing and the availability of funding. According to [Ukrainian media reports](#), the missile might have already seen limited combat use with the launch of a three-unit salvo against a target on the Crimean peninsula on 30 August.

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[FONTE: TASS, 19/08/2025]

Kiev presents Flamingo as its own product, hides collapse of military industry — expert

Alexander Stepanov explained that Ukraine's actual military-technical capacity has been severely diminished by systematic, high-precision strikes carried out by the Russian Armed Forces, utilizing advanced complexes and strike drones

MOSCOW, August 19. /TASS/. The so-called first Ukrainian ballistic missile of indigenous manufacture, Flamingo, unveiled recently by Kiev, is in fact a product of the Emirati-British company Milanion Group. This revelation suggests an attempt by Ukraine's political leadership to conceal the true extent of its military-industrial decline, Alexander Stepanov, a military expert at the Institute of Law and National Security of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

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[FONTE: TASS, 19/08/2025]

Recently, Efrem Lukatsky, a photojournalist from the Ukrainian bureau of the Associated Press, published the first image of the missile, claiming it as a Ukrainian-engineered development. According to its purported specifications, Flamingo boasts a range of 3,000 km, a flight altitude of up to 5 km, a maximum speed of 950 km/h, a payload capacity of up to one ton, and a wingspan of six meters. Such capabilities could enable Kiev to extend its strike reach deep into Russian territory, potentially targeting critical infrastructure - including nuclear power plants, which are already frequent targets despite international prohibitions.

"However, upon closer examination of the missile's silhouette, experts have identified striking similarities to the FP-5 cruise missile produced by the Milanion Group and showcased at the IDEX-2025 exhibition in February this year. This suggests that foreign-supplied technology is being relabeled as a product of Ukraine's own military-industrial complex, with claims of a groundbreaking Ukrainian innovation circulated widely. The expert emphasized that this latest "wunderwaffe," with its romantic and clickbait-friendly name Flamingo, was promoted internationally through the Associated Press, reaching an audience of over 8,500 media outlets across 121 countries.

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[FONTE: TASS, 19/08/2025]

Large-unit assembly

Experts indicate that the technical design of the FP-5 renders it particularly suitable for operators lacking the resources to execute a full production cycle independently. Instead, they can assemble the weapon from pre-manufactured units and modules supplied from abroad. The FP-5 features a streamlined missile layout, notably with non-folding wings and relatively large dimensions, coupled with an exceptionally heavy warhead. These design choices help offset the moderate accuracy of its inertial-satellite guidance system, ensuring effective performance.

Additionally, the Milanion Group - controlled by the British government and supported by an extensive network of international manufacturing sites - has a longstanding collaboration with Ukrainian Armor. This partnership supplies Ukraine's armed forces with AGEMA unmanned platforms. The AGEMA UGV is an eight-wheel, modular, amphibious unmanned vehicle powered by an internal combustion engine, equipped with advanced hardware and software systems that leverage artificial intelligence

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[FONTE: Washington Post, 29/09/2025]

U.S. considers Ukraine's request for long-range Tomahawk missiles

KYIV — The United States is considering granting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and allowing Kyiv to strike deep into Russia, President Donald Trump's special envoy for Ukraine and Russia confirmed over the weekend.

Tomahawk cruise missiles, which have a range of at least 1,500 miles, would be a major improvement to Ukraine's arsenal and its ability to hit deep inside Russia — including Moscow — something the previous U.S. administration was reluctant to allow.

In an [interview](#) with Fox News on Sunday, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg said Trump had authorized Ukraine to carry out long-range strikes with U.S.-made weapons, adding that "there are no such things as sanctuaries."

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[FONTE: Washington Post, 29/09/2025]

Ukraine already carries out long-range attacks with its fleet of drones, particularly against oil infrastructure, but the Tomahawks would be a major military upgrade. Under President Joe Biden, the United States only reluctantly allowed the use of ATACM missiles inside Russia, with a range of just 190 miles.

Vice President JD Vance, also [interviewed](#) Sunday on Fox News, said Trump has not made a final decision on the sale of Tomahawk missiles to European countries, which would then send them to Ukraine.

Frustrated by gridlock on the Russian side — with the Kremlin refusing to sit down for bilateral or trilateral peace talks brokered by Trump — Vance said Russia had to “wake up and accept reality.”

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[FONTE: Sputnik Global, 30/09/2025]

Lavrov on US Statements on Tomahawks: This is Result of European Pressure on US

"I think this is primarily the result of European pressure on Washington, and Washington wants to show that they take their allies' opinions into account. I don't think we're dealing with a final decision yet. The Americans aren't supplying Tomahawks to everyone," Lavrov told reporters following the XXII meeting of the Valdai International discussion club.

On Sunday, US presidential [special envoy Keith Kellogg](#) said that US President Donald Trump had not made a decision on the possible transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance, in turn, said that Washington is considering Kiev's request to obtain Tomahawks.

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[FONTE: Stephen Bryen / Asia Times, 30/09/2025]

Tomahawks for Kyiv: a dangerous idea

How far Russia would go when provoked directly should be carefully assessed before the US risks a wider war in Europe



A front view of an AGM-109 Tomahawk air-launched cruise missile.

The US is poised to "sell" Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. The US special envoy to Ukraine, retired general Keith Kellogg, says only the final decision has to be made. The US has already agreed, Kellogg said, for deep attacks on Russian territory, and only the release of the Tomahawks is pending, a decision left to US President Donald Trump.

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[FONTE: Stephen Bryen / Asia Times, 30/09/2025]

While it may be regarded as an open and shut case by Washington, that does not take away the decision as reckless and escalatory. It puts the US on a direct collision course with Russia, one that could lead to a war in Europe.

The Tomahawk cruise missile was originally intended to give the US nuclear triad a system that could successfully deliver nuclear weapons against the USSR. The idea was to create a system that was nearly impossible for Soviet air defenses to counter, after it became clear that conventional bombers – especially the B-52 – could not operate from high altitude over Soviet territory.

Tomahawk was designed to fly “nap of the earth” missions. That is, once it was over Soviet airspace, it was designed to drop down to near tree-top heights and follow the contours of the earth, making timely detection difficult if not impossible.

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[FONTE: Stephen Bryen / Asia Times, 30/09/2025]



Launch of a Tomahawk from a US guided missile destroyer

Tomahawks came in three broad versions known as ALCMs (pronounced alk-ems), GLCMs (pronounced glick-ems) and SLCMs (pronounced slick-ems). ALCMs are air launched cruise missiles typically carried by B-52 bombers. GLCMs are ground launched cruise missiles and SLCMS are sea-launched cruise missiles that can be carried by surface ships, mainly destroyers that today include the AEGIS air defense system, and submarines.

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[FONTE: Stephen Bryen / Asia Times, 30/09/2025]

No one can say how many Tomahawk cruise missiles (and launch platforms) can be delivered to Ukraine. Nor do we know how well the Russians can cope with this weapon. Russian air defenses have evolved over the years and are far better than they were when the Tomahawk first came on line in 1983. However, as recent events demonstrate in the case of long-range drones, there are plenty of holes in Russian air defense coverage.

One of the reasons why the US is seeking to try for a knock-out blow on Putin and Russia is Washington's fear that Russia [may launch a new, devastating offensive](#) in Ukraine aimed at regime change there. The Russian strategy, until now, has been to break the Ukrainian army and force the current Ukrainian regime to step down.

There are various reports coming out that say Russia is getting ready for a big push, but so far at least the reports cannot point to hard evidence this is so. Similarly, there are reports that Ukraine plans a big offensive of its own, likely aimed at Crimea. Where Ukraine would get the troops for any such operation remains unclear – especially since the troops would have to be pulled from the front lines elsewhere, exposing Ukraine's army to Russian exploitation of the shift in forces.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (23)

[FONTE: Jennifer Kavanagh / Responsible Statecraft, 30/09/2025]

Russia likely laughing off Trump's 'open door' to Tomahawks

The idea that the US would send this advanced weapon system to Ukraine is not serious. So why are we talking about it?



A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (24)

[FONTE: Jennifer Kavanaugh / Responsible Statecraft, 30/09/2025]

When asked on Sunday if reports that President Donald Trump was considering providing Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles were true, [Vice President J.D. Vance](#) left the door open.

The President was selling, not gifting, weapons to Ukraine, Vance clarified, and would make the final decision about what capabilities Ukraine might receive.

If the [Trump administration](#) is hoping that toying with this proposal to furnish Ukraine with more advanced, longer-range missiles will give it leverage over Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is mistaken. Ukraine does not have the ability to launch Tomahawk missiles, and U.S. stocks of these weapons and their delivery systems are far too few and far too valuable for the Pentagon to agree to part with them.

Such rhetorical and unrealistic military threats are counterproductive, telegraph desperation, and create unnecessary escalation risks.

A nova fase da guerra na Ucrânia (25)

[FONTE: Jennifer Kavanaugh / Responsible Statecraft, 30/09/2025]

That President Trump would now consider this request seriously is surprising. After all, his administration [reimposed limits](#) on Ukraine's use of U.S.-provided long-range missiles months ago, restricting them to targets inside Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Providing Ukraine with new cruise missiles that can reach even farther into Russian territory would be at odds with this position and with Trump's waning interest in offering Ukraine additional military assistance of any kind.

To be sure, President Trump often changes his mind. But even if Russia's [continued escalation](#) in Ukraine and incursions into [NATO airspace](#) in recent weeks have altered Trump's attitude, there is little chance that the United States can or would provide Kyiv with Tomahawk missiles. In fact, rather than exerting pressure on the Russian president, talk of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles is fanciful and detached from military realities, and Putin clearly knows this.

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[FONTE: Jennifer Kavanagh / Responsible Statecraft, 30/09/2025]

Tomahawk missiles can be [fired in three ways](#), from a guided missile destroyer; from Ohio, Virginia, and Los-Angeles class submarines; and using the new [ground-based Typhon system](#), which was developed by the

U.S. Army. Ukraine does not have any of these capabilities and has next zero chance of procuring them in the near or medium term.

For starters, [Ukraine's navy](#) is small and lacks surface combatants, attack submarines, and the personnel to operate either. With U.S. [ship and submarine-building](#) under strain, it is unlikely Washington would consider selling these platforms to Ukraine.

Ukraine might have the personnel needed to operate the new ground-based Typhon system, but it is equally unlikely that the Pentagon would agree to sell this new hardware to Ukraine. The United States only has [two working Typhon batteries](#), with a third in progress. Two of these systems are intended for use in Asia and one is earmarked for possible deployment to Germany. The United States has not agreed to sell the advanced system to any ally or partner — in part due to scarcity and in part due to the sensitivity of the technology — and it is hard to fathom that Ukraine will be the first.

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[FONTE: Jennifer Kavanagh / Responsible Statecraft, 30/09/2025]

Finally, there is the question of escalation, which Trump and his national security team has continued to attend to closely. Providing Ukraine a capability that can strike deep inside Russia creates a tremendous risk, especially since use of these missiles would require U.S. intelligence and targeting assistance. If Moscow believes that there is real threat to regime targets or to pieces of its nuclear infrastructure, the [potential for nuclear escalation](#) could become intolerably high. Even as he has become more frustrated with Putin, Trump has indicated zero interest in this type of outcome or any U.S. action that might drive Putin further from the negotiating table.

As the war drags on, it is understandable that Trump and his national security team are looking for new ways to coerce Putin into ending his battlefield campaign. To work, however, new threats must be credible, both politically and militarily. The proposal to send Ukraine Tomahawks is neither, and is more likely to evoke more laughter in the Kremlin than fear.

In the end, the best path to ending the war in Ukraine continues to be doubling down on diplomacy, even if the bargaining process is slow, frustrating, and doesn't yield immediate results.

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[FONTE: Hector / Cartooning for Peace, 3/10/2025]



Bibliografia

