

Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
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SESSÃO N° 10
3/11/2025**



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica. IMAGEM: Wikimedia Commons]



Abdel Fattah al-Burhan



See article: [flag of the Sudan](#)



Audio File: National anthem of Sudan

Head Of Government: Prime Minister: Kamil Idris³

Capital: [Khartoum](#)⁵

Population: (2025 est.) 48,945,000

Head Of State: President: Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan⁴

Form Of Government: transitional government³

Official Languages⁶: Arabic; English

Official Religion: See footnote 7.

Official Name: Jumhūriyyat al-Sūdān^{1, 2} (Republic of the Sudan)

Total Area (Sq Km): 1,840,687

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (3)

[FONTE: BBC, 19/12/2023]



Both Sudan and the South are reliant on oil revenue, which accounts for 98% of South Sudan's budget. They have fiercely disagreed over how to divide the oil wealth of the former united state - at one time production was shutdown for more than a year. Some 75% of the oil lies in the South but all the pipelines run north.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (4)

[FONTE: BBC, 19/12/2023]

Geography




The two Sudans are very different geographically. The great divide is visible even from space, as this Nasa satellite image shows. The northern states are a blanket of desert, broken only by the fertile Nile corridor. South Sudan is covered by green swathes of grassland, swamps and tropical forest.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (5)

[FONTE: BBC, 19/12/2023]

Distribution of ethnic groups




Sudan's arid north is mainly home to Arabic-speaking Muslims. But in South Sudan there is no dominant culture. The Dinkas and the Nuers are the largest of more than 200 ethnic groups, each with its own languages and traditional beliefs, alongside Christianity and Islam.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (6)

[FONTE: BBC, 19/12/2023]

Water and sanitation



In the Sudanese states of Khartoum, River Nile, and Gezira states, two-thirds of people have access to piped drinking water and pit latrines. In South Sudan, boreholes and unprotected wells are the main drinking sources. More than 80% of South Sudanese have no toilet facilities.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (7)

[FONTE: BBC, 17/04/2023]

Sudan crisis: Burhan and Hemedti - the two generals at the heart of the conflict

17 April 2023

James CopnallBBC Sudan analyst



Getty Images

Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (L) and Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (R) both lead powerful forces

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (8)

[FONTE: BBC, 17/04/2023]

Life in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, and in many other parts of the country, has taken a sudden, very dramatic turn for the worse.

At the heart of it are two generals: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The two worked together, and carried out a coup together - now their battle for supremacy is tearing Sudan apart.

The relationship between the two goes back a long way.

Both played key roles in the counter-insurgency against Darfuri rebels, in the civil war in Sudan's western region that began in 2003.

Gen Burhan rose to control the Sudanese army in Darfur.

Hemedti was the commander of one of the many Arab militias, collectively known as the Janjaweed, which the government employed to brutally put down the largely non-Arab Darfuri rebel groups.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (9)

[FONTE: BBC, 17/04/2023]

Hemedti was simply a militia leader "playing a counter-insurgency role, helping the military", while Gen Burhan was a career soldier, though "with all the ambitions of the Sudanese officer corps, anything was possible".

The military has been running Sudan for most of its post-independence history.


The government's tactics in Darfur, once described by Sudan expert Alex de Waal as "counter-insurgency on the cheap", used regular troops, ethnic militias and air power to fight off the rebels - with little to no regard for civilian casualties.

Darfur has been described as the first genocide of the 21st Century, with the Janjaweed accused of ethnic cleansing and using mass rape as a weapon of war.

Hemedti eventually became the commander of what could be described as an offshoot of the Janjaweed, his RSF.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (10)

[FONTE: BBC, 13/11/2025]



Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (11)

[FONTE: BBC, 13/11/2025]



Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (12)

[FONTE: BBC, 13/11/2025]

Who are the RSF fighters?



Reuters

The RSF was allied with the military until they fell out

The RSF was formed in 2013 and [has its origins in the notorious Janjaweed militia that brutally fought rebels in Darfur](#), where they were accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the region's black African, non-Arab population.

Since then, Gen Dagalo has built a powerful force that has intervened in conflicts in Yemen and Libya.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (13)

[FONTE: BBC,4/11/2025]

He made his money selling camels and gold. Now this warlord controls half of Sudan



Anadolu via Getty Images




Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as "Hemedti", has emerged as a dominant figure on Sudan's political stage, with his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now controlling half of the country.


The RSF scored a notable victory recently when it overran the city of el-Fasher, the last garrison held by the Sudanese army and its local allies in the western region of Darfur.



Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (14)

[FONTE: Wilson Center, 19/12/2024]

Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and UAE

Sudan's African neighbors also have considerable sway over the situation. To the east, Ethiopia and Eritrea are now [supporting](#)  the paramilitaries of the RSF, which recently fought alongside Ethiopia against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which in turn is supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Other former rebel groups in Darfur and armed groups in eastern Sudan are [fighting](#)  alongside the RSF. The head of the Beja Conference, Mussa Mohamed Ahmed, the advisor to former president Omer El-Basher, is backing the SAF. He recently just [returned](#)  from Eritrea after spending months among his remaining troops and recruits; most hail from his ethnic group of El-Beja tribes.

Egypt, for historical reasons, has always supported the Sudanese army, which was founded during the British-Egyptian colonial administration more than 100 years ago. At the time, the Sudanese and the Egyptian armies were founded as one body. Now, the Egyptian air force has been accused of intervening in Sudan by the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo Hemedti, in his latest [speech](#)  on 10 October following the group's defeat in Jabel Moya in the province of Sennar.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance [Dam](#) —fiercely opposed by Egypt—further complicated the issue. Cairo is standing with the SAF because it reportedly [supports](#)  the TPLF rebels.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (15)

[FONTE: Wilson Center, 19/12/2024]

Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and Iran

Russia and Ukraine paradoxically take the same sides in the war in Khartoum. Both support the SAF diplomatically and militarily. Russia continues to support Sudan's regime as it has historically done at the UN Security Council. Ukraine's backing of the SAF came in light of its opposition to the Wagner group, which supported the RSF before and after the war. The Wagner Group's involvement in the Ukraine conflict is evident.

A source at the army's airbase in Omdurman, the twin city of the Sudanese capital, said that early in the war, Ukrainian teams came to their base to fix some of the fighter jets damaged by RSF weapons. The air force is the only advantage that the SAF has over the RSF, which has increased the number of its soldiers during the course of this war; its leaders [alleged](#) [↗](#) that they are now over a million strong.

Ukrainian and Russian fighters were [seen](#) [↗](#) in different parts of Sudan, both in Omdurman in government-controlled areas and Russian fighters were seen in El-Geneiana, the capital of West Darfur State.

Turkey has reportedly [offered](#) [↗](#) its famous Bayraktar drones to the army, and Qatar is also supporting the SAF. It is quite understandable why these two countries are backing the army, which now has Islamist factions fighting alongside it, such as the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik [brigade](#) [↗](#). The former Omer El-Basher regime, which the Islamists backed, came to power in a coup and ruled for 30 years.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (16)

[FONTE: Wilson Center, 19/12/2024]

The impact of foreign intervention

As a result of interventions and support to Sudan's warring parties, 11 million Sudanese people have been displaced from their homes, making it the world's largest displacement crisis. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been [killed](#) [↗](#). Sudan is now facing the most significant famine in the world, making it currently the most catastrophic humanitarian crisis, [according](#) [↗](#) to the UN. The warring sides were both [accused](#) [↗](#) of committing ethnic cleansing and genocide, especially the RSF in West Darfur State's El-Geniena.

Apart from the humanitarian impact, there is also a political impact; the interests of the different sides in this conflict have complicated the situation further and made any diplomatic or peaceful solution to the war more difficult.

For example, the SAF refused to participate in any talks in which the UAE was a mediator or even a supervisor, accusing the country of supporting its rivals. It also filed a [complaint](#) [↗](#) against that country and Chad at the UN Security Council.

The SAF has also rejected all the African initiatives to stop the war proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (representing the east and horn of Africa), African Union, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia after accusing them of supporting their rivals.

The RSF is more flexible in this matter. It has accepted every initiative by any country wanting to stop the war in Sudan through peaceful and diplomatic discourse, except Hemeti's last [speech](#) [↗](#), in which he accused Egypt of supporting the SAF and demanded that the country stop importing Sudanese products to its northern neighbor.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (17)

[FONTE: Chatam House, Março 2025]



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Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (18)

[FONTE: Chatam House, Março 2025]

Summary

- Gold has long been a conflict commodity in Sudan and continues to be the subject of intense competition between national and subnational military actors and political elites. Control and rivalry over gold was an important factor in the two largest acts of mass violence in Sudan's recent history: the October 2021 coup and the ongoing civil war since 2023.
- The multi-billion-dollar trade of gold sustains and shapes Sudan's conflict. This commodity is the most significant source of income for the warring parties – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – feeding an associated cross-border network of actors including other armed groups, producers, traders, smugglers and external governments. Through gold, Sudan's civil war is deeply intertwined with the wider region, connecting distant geographies via networks of authority and violence that are not confined to nation-state borders.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (19)


[FONTE: Chatam House, Março 2025]

- As the key backers of the SAF and the RSF, respectively, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have significant influence over Sudan's conflict. In recent years, most of Sudan's gold has ended up in the UAE, a gold hub that both warring parties are reliant on for clearing financial transactions. Since the outbreak of the war, the SAF, which holds the largest gold-producing areas, has increasingly sought to divert gold through Egypt, much of which is smuggled.
- While Egypt and the UAE may benefit economically in the short term from Sudan's gold trade, their continued pursuit of opposing interests in Sudan, via the scramble for valuable resources, but also in terms of security, politics and ideology, risks further fragmenting the country. The potential resulting destabilization will jeopardize the long-term strategic interests of both Egypt and the UAE in Sudan and in the broader Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (20)

[FONTE: Chatam House, Março 2025]

Figure 1. Armed actor territorial control in Sudan, March 2025



Source: Based on map produced by Thomas van Linge, <https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1896244871641670034>.

Note: The production of this map is intended to show the general areas of control by key conflict parties, recognizing that there are significant limitations with accurately depicting contested areas and that the situation on the ground is rapidly changing. The map does not infer acceptance by Chatham House of the depicted areas of territorial control. SPLM-N = Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North; SLA = Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; SLA-TC = Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Transitional Council; SSPDF = South Sudan People's Defence Forces.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (21)

[FONTE: Chatam House, Março 2025]

Sudanese gold producers, traders, engineers and miners who have been forcibly displaced by the war have resorted to exporting their expertise to established mining areas across the borders in northern Chad, southern Egypt and South Sudan.

Smuggling via Libya, conversely, has reflected the relative political, economic and security influence of the LAAF in relation to Sudanese armed actors. Both the RSF and the SAF have sought to control the lucrative and essential illicit fuel trade from southern Libya, which has scaled up dramatically since 2022 as a result of elite capture of Libya's oil sector.⁹⁵ Demand and the cost of fuel increased during the war in Sudan as a result of scarcity.⁹⁶ The LAAF and its local Subul al-Salam allies likely supplied the RSF with fuel before the war and shortly after it began, as part of regular trading and security assistance, and at the same time small amounts of gold from al-Muthaleth were smuggled via Libya. However, the RSF was forced to abandon control of Sudan's borders with Libya in August 2023, which were taken over by the SAF and Joint Darfur Forces,⁹⁷ meaning that fuel from Libya has largely been going to SAF-aligned zones, and not those held by the RSF. The

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (22)

[FONTE: ISPI, 30/04/2025]

The Role of Gold in the Sudanese War

30 Apr 2025

The exploitation, smuggling, and militarisation of gold resources have intensified the conflict, drawing in both local and international actors with competing interests.

ISPI ITALIAN INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL STUDIES



When the civil war broke out in Sudan in April 2023, gold soon became pivotal in analyses of the conflict, both as a [means](#) of waging the war and as one of its [causes](#). The role of the UAE and (especially at an early stage of the war) of the Russian Wagner Group, has been well established by both field reports and global gold trade

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (23)

[FONTE: ISPI, 30/04/2025]

The rise – and military capture – of gold mining

Until around 2010, gold played a relatively [minor](#) role in Sudan's economy. Industrial gold mining was limited to a single site opened in the northeast in 1992. Artisanal mining remained negligible. However, the economic crisis triggered by the **impending secession of South Sudan in 2011** – which would result in the loss of 75% of Sudan's oil reserves and 90% of its foreign exchange earnings – created conditions conducive to the expansion of this activity. Amid soaring unemployment and inflation, **many young Sudanese turned to artisanal mining for their livelihoods**. This grassroots gold rush was not initially outlawed. Instead, the Government sought to harness its revenue-generating potential through indirect regulation.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (24)

[FONTE: ISPI, 30/04/2025]

Three key developments in 2011–12 elevated gold to a national strategic asset. First, South Sudan's official secession deprived Sudan of its primary source of revenue, which accounted for more than [half](#) of its national budget and around 95% of exports, resulting in a **major economic crisis**. Second, artisanal miners discovered a large gold deposit in the Jebel Amer region of North Darfur. Third, the global [rise](#) in gold prices made the mineral a viable substitute for lost oil revenues. In response, the al Bashir Government moved to centralise control over gold. In 2012, the [Sudan Gold Refinery](#) was opened in Khartoum under the Central Bank's ownership. All legally exported gold had to pass through this facility, and the export of unrefined ore was banned. That same year, **gold constituted 60% of Sudan's exports**.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (25)

[FONTE: 20/05/2025, Darfur 24]



Sudan's Gold Production: In the Midst of a Devastating War

20 MAY 2025

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (26)

[FONTE: 20/05/2025, Darfur 24]

The discovery of gold in Jebel Amer brought sudden wealth to a previously peripheral region of North Darfur. Customary authorities in the area established effective local governance structures, including mining committees to manage access and collect fees. But the central Government, eager to assert control, perceived this autonomy as a threat. When a high-level Government delegation [failed](#) to negotiate control over the local gold trade in late 2012, the area was violently seized.

Janjaweed militias under Musa Hilal attacked the Beni Hussein community in what was officially described as “tribal conflict.” In reality, this was a continuation of Darfur’s earlier [scorched-earth tactics](#), now driven by competition over gold. By 2017, control of most mines in North Darfur had shifted to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). While gold extraction remained mostly artisanal, **the RSF-related Al Gunade company took control of the processing of gold tailings** as well as gold exports from the region.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (27)

[FONTE: ISPI, 30/04/2025]]

Partners in gold

While it is nearly impossible to accurately trace the provenance of gold from specific areas in the country, there is evidence that, in the early weeks of war, the [flight of foreign \(including Moroccan, Russian and Australian\) mining companies](#) mostly affected SAF-controlled areas in the North-East, where most of gold extraction is industrial. By contrast, RSF areas, which are **dominated by small-scale artisanal mining**, seem to have suffered less. A [report](#) by the UN panel of experts on Sudan estimates the gold production of RSF-controlled areas in 2024 to be 10 tonnes of gold, for a value of USD 860 million. The decline in gold production at Jebel Amer was at least partially offset by the discovery and occupation of new extraction sites in North Darfur and other areas under RSF control.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (28)

[FONTE: ISPI, 30/04/2025]]

Notwithstanding the unreliability of official figures due to the pervasiveness of gold smuggling (estimated at about [50–80%](#) of the entire production), **the vital importance of gold as a revenue source** has been testified by the intense activities of both sides to keep the sector running and even expanding, which has led to a reported [doubling](#) of the overall Sudanese gold production.

The United Arab Emirates remains the most important [buyer](#) of Sudan's gold, as it has been since at least the early 2010s. **Sudanese gold reaches Dubai through various routes**, and from there it enters international markets. Evidence collected by a [Reuters report](#) suggests that there was some sort of informal agreement throughout the 2010s between al Bashir and the RSF to enable Al Gunade to export gold through unofficial routes up to 2018. At the same time, Hemedti demonstrated his loyalty to the Government by pledging over USD 1 billion to the Sudanese Central Bank at the peak of the economic crisis in 2018.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (29)

[FONTE: Science, 26/02/2025]

How many have died in Sudan's civil war? Satellite images and models offer clues

Barred from the country, researchers try to monitor death and destruction from afar



Satellite images captured on 3 February (left) and 10 February (right) reveal that the main market in Zamzam camp in North Darfur in Sudan was attacked. 2025 MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES VIA GETTY IMAGES

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (30)

[FONTE: Science, 26/02/2025]

At Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab, researchers are poring over satellite images and thermal sensing data captured over the Darfur region of Sudan over the past few weeks, looking for telltale signs of recent violence. Where a hospital stood just a few weeks ago, there may only be scarred ruins today. A graveyard on the edge of a town has undergone a sudden expansion. Entire villages have been torched.

The lab, part of Yale's School of Public Health, is one of several groups gauging the devastation caused by the brutal civil war in Sudan. The conflict, drowned out in the media by other wars and political upheaval, has resulted in the worst famine in 40 years, disease outbreaks, and the destruction of vital infrastructure, and has driven more than 14 million people from their homes. The recent U.S. freeze on foreign aid, which has provided billions of dollars to Sudan since the conflict began, has deepened the crisis. But assessing the toll, which can guide humanitarian responses and help investigate war crimes, can only be done from afar.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (31)

[FONTE: Science, 26/02/2025]

As a result, estimates of how many people have died from fighting and related causes have varied from 20,000 up to 150,000. "We can't responsibly give a number," says Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Humanitarian Research Lab. "Many who would do the counting are dead or displaced." But the few data available show that "absolutely more people are dying of starvation and disease than bullets and bombs," says Maha Sulieman, a doctor and director of outreach for the nonprofit Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA).

Since April 2023, the government's Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been battling the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an outgrowth of the Janjaweed militia that slaughtered at least 200,000 people in Darfur at the turn of the century. A U.N. fact-finding mission in September 2024 concluded both sides have committed an "appalling range of harrowing human rights violations and international crimes," including mass rape, arbitrary arrests, and torture. They have also destroyed hospitals, schools, communication networks, and water and electricity supplies. The U.S. Department of State has charged the RSF with genocide against non-Arab ethnic minority groups. The SAF and RSF are both using starvation as a weapon, blocking food, medical supplies, and other aid from reaching many of the estimated 30 million people who desperately need them.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (32)

[FONTE: Science, 26/02/2025]

The Yale researchers don't produce death estimates, but other groups do. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), an independent nonprofit that monitors conflicts around the world, relies on death estimates from international nongovernmental organizations and other partners, traditional media, and verified Telegram and WhatsApp accounts. In December, it estimated that since the start of the conflict, at least 28,700 Sudanese had died from "intentional injuries," including 7500 civilians. That conservative number does not include those who died from war-related malnutrition and disease.

Maysoon Dahab at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and colleagues think the toll is far higher. Death estimates often rely on hospital or morgue records, she explains. "But what about people never buried or who never made it to the hospital?" Her team used a modeling technique that compares data from multiple sources, including surveys and obituaries posted by first responders, to estimate that Khartoum state alone—where the best data were available—had more than 26,000 deaths from intentional injury between April 2023 and June 2024—higher than ACLED's estimate for the entire country during the same period—and more than 61,000 deaths from all causes combined, a 50% increase over the prewar death rate.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (33)

[FONTE: Science, 26/02/2025]

Sarah Elizabeth Scales of the University of Nebraska Medical Center and colleagues have adopted another way to estimate the total number of deaths: multiplying the number of direct deaths from violence by a factor based on past experience. In 2008, for example, the secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development estimated, based on 24 small-scale surveys, that there were 2.3 indirect deaths for every direct death from violence during the earlier Darfur genocide. Using that multiplier, Scales and colleagues conservatively estimated the total deaths since the start of the current war until October 2024 at 62,000. But calculating these ratios is hard, de Waal says. Based on other armed conflicts around the world, the secretariat has reported that the multiplier ranged from three to 15. Other estimates are lower.

Raymond says such estimates are no substitute for attempting to collect mortality data directly while the war continues. "Since September 2023 we have been screaming at the top of our lungs that international health care organizations and funders should prioritize mortality data collection," he says. But, "They want to wait to do a body count until the conflict is over." He worries things in Sudan will only get worse: "We haven't hit bottom yet."

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (34)

[FONTE: Rightly Livelihood, Novembro 2025]



EMERGENCY RESPONSE ROOMS

Sudan

AWARDED 2025

Emergency Response Rooms

“For building a resilient model of mutual aid amid war and state collapse that sustains millions of people with dignity.”

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) are a Sudanese grassroots, community-led network that has become the backbone of the country's humanitarian response amid war, displacement and state collapse. Building on local traditions of mutual aid, ERRs operate in all 18 states, providing healthcare, food assistance, education, civilian protection and psychosocial support where many international aid organisations cannot reach. Their work has sustained millions and champions a model of decolonised humanitarian aid that restores dignity and decision-making power to local communities.

Emerging from the Neighbourhood Resistance Committees that played a key role in the 2019 Sudanese Revolution, ERRs organised their first community kitchens and health services to help communities cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. When war broke out in April 2023, Sudan's already severe humanitarian crisis became the world's largest, and ERRs expanded to fill critical gaps left by a collapsing economy and state institutions. With nearly 26,000 volunteers, ERRs continue to evacuate civilians, run hospitals and support survivors of conflict-related sexual violence.

Sudão: uma guerra esquecida (35)



[FONTE: Rightly Livelihood, Novembro 2025]



A lifeline in the world's greatest humanitarian crisis

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has endured coups, military rule, civil wars and genocide. The 2019 revolution ousted Omar al-Bashir and briefly raised hopes for democracy through a power-sharing deal between the military and civilian leaders, but a 2021 military takeover ended the transition. By April 2023, rival military factions plunged the country into war, unleashing the world's largest humanitarian crisis: over 30 million people need humanitarian assistance, 12 million have been displaced and 2 million are facing famine as of July 2025.

Two years into the war, vast areas of the country remain unreachable as fighting continues to destroy public infrastructure, limiting access to clean water, healthcare and food. In this context, Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) have become the primary lifeline for communities across all 18 Sudanese states. Operating under constant threat from both warring parties, ERRs deliver health services, food aid, education, protection for civilians, psychosocial support and evacuation assistance.




PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (1) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

How the US is preparing a military staging ground near Venezuela

By Reade Levinson, Ricardo Arduengo, Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart, Jonathan Saul, Michael Pell, Clare Farley, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa, Jon McClure and Mariano Zafrá
Published Nov. 2, 2025 06:12 WET



Note: Recent sightings of U.S. military vessels and aircraft as of October 31.
Sources: Reuters reporting, MarineTraffic, FlightRadar24, Sentinel-2, Planet Labs PBC

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (2) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

The United States military is upgrading a long-abandoned former Cold War naval base in the Caribbean, a Reuters visual investigation has found, suggesting preparations for sustained operations that could help support possible actions inside Venezuela.

The construction activity at the former Roosevelt Roads naval base in Puerto Rico — shuttered by the Navy more than 20 years ago — was underway on September 17 when crews began clearing and repaving taxiways leading to the runway, according to photos taken by Reuters.

Until the Navy withdrew from the facility in 2004, Roosevelt Roads was one of the biggest U.S. naval stations in the world. The base occupies a strategic location and offers a large amount of space for gathering equipment, one U.S. official said.

In addition to the upgrades of landing and take-off capabilities at Roosevelt Roads, the U.S. is building out facilities at civilian airports in Puerto Rico and St Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The two U.S. territories sit roughly 500 miles from Venezuela.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (3) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

Since early September, the United States has carried out at least 14 strikes against alleged drug vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing 61 people.

The strikes on alleged drug vessels have increased tensions with Venezuela and Colombia and drawn attention to a part of the world that has received limited resources within the U.S. military in recent years.

Asked for comment on the military expansion in the region, the White House said President Donald Trump had promised on the campaign trail to take on the region's drug cartels.

“He has taken unprecedented action to stop the scourge of narcoterrorism that has resulted in the needless deaths of innocent Americans,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said in a statement to Reuters.

The U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean began in August with the arrival of warships, a nuclear-powered submarine, fighter jets and spy planes.

The Ford aircraft carrier strike group, with roughly 10,000 troops and dozens of aircraft and weapons systems, is on its way from the Adriatic Sea. One of the Ford's destroyers cleared Gibraltar on October 29, according to satellite imagery and ship tracking data.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (4) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

Building up Caribbean bases

Some of the most dramatic infrastructure improvements are occurring at the former Roosevelt Roads base, where crews are upgrading taxiways with improvements that analysts say would enable use by fighter jets as well as cargo planes.

Mark Cancian, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and senior adviser with the CSIS, said the changes were consistent with preparations for an increase in landings and takeoffs of military aircraft.




Satellite imagery shows recent improvements to a taxiway at the northern end of the former Roosevelt Roads military base in Ceiba, Puerto Rico.

Sources: Google Earth / Airbus, Planet Labs PBC

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (5) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

The images, from Henry E. Rohlsen Airport, show active construction near the apron, where planes are parked and serviced. Improving aprons could allow more U.S. military aircraft to park and refuel, the U.S. officials told Reuters.

The airport authority said the apron construction viewed was a Federal Aviation Administration project designed to improve commercial aprons. “The project was neither designed nor executed for a specific operational purpose,” said Monifa Brathwaite, a spokesperson for the Virgin Islands Port Authority.



Sources: Google Earth, Planet Labs PBC

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (6) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]


Air power off the Venezuelan coast

A ramp-up of U.S. military aircraft is also underway. Along with the Ford aircraft carrier, which can hold more than 75 military aircraft, the Pentagon has sent in 10 F-35 advanced aircraft and spy planes, according to previous Reuters reporting.

In late October, the U.S. Air Force flew supersonic Lancer bombers from Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas and Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota off the coast of Venezuela, according to flight tracking data.



Rockwell B-1B Lancer flights



Source: FlightRadar24

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (7) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]

On October 15, three B-52 bombers took off from Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, Louisiana, and circled off the coast of Venezuela before returning to base, according to flight tracking data.



Boeing B-52 Stratofortress flights




Source: FlightRadar24

The military is also shipping in materiel. Reuters tracked dozens of flights into the region by C-17 cargo aircraft. The airports interviewed by Reuters said the

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (8) [FONTE: Reuters, 2/11/2025]



Source: [FlightRadar24](https://www.flightradar24.com)



Crews load cargo onto a C-17 cargo aircraft at Mercedita International Airport (left) and a drone view shows the MV Ocean Trader (right) docked at the port of Ponce, Puerto Rico, October 27, 2025. REUTERS/Ricardo Arduengo

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (9) [FONTE: NYT, 18/11/2025]

Trump Said to Authorize C.I.A. Plans for Covert Action in Venezuela

The president has signed off on possible operations inside Venezuela but has also reopened back-channel communications with the government of President Nicolás Maduro.

Nov. 18, 2025

Mr. Trump has signed off on C.I.A. plans for covert measures inside Venezuela, operations that could be meant to prepare a battlefield for further action, these people said. At the same time, they said, he has authorized a new round of back-channel negotiations that at one point resulted in President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela offering to step down after a delay of a couple of years, a proposal the White House rejected.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (10) [FONTE: NYT, 18/11/2025]

It is not clear what the covert actions might be or when any of them might be carried out. Mr. Trump has not yet authorized combat forces on the ground in Venezuela, so the next phase of the administration's escalating pressure campaign on the Maduro government could be sabotage or some sort of cyber, psychological or information operations.

The president has not made a decision about the broader course of action to pursue in Venezuela, nor publicly articulated his ultimate goal beyond stemming the flow of drugs from the region. And military and C.I.A. planners have prepared multiple options for different contingencies.

Military planners have prepared lists of potential drug facilities that could be struck. The Pentagon is also [planning for strikes on military units](#) close to Mr. Maduro. Mr. Trump held two meetings in the White House Situation Room last week to discuss Venezuela and review options with his senior advisers.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (11) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

Trump's Venezuelan gamble: what is the endgame with Maduro?

The Venezuelan president appears relaxed dancing on stage while US military pressure builds in what may be a phoney war to try to force him into exile



Maduro has launched "Plan Independencia 200" deploying defence forces as tensions rise with the United States

MÉRIDA GOVERNORATE/REUTERS

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (12) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

Reinforcing the White House message that “all options are on the table”, off Venezuela the largest American naval flotilla in the since the Cold War is amassing. One third of the entire actively deployed assets of the US navy are now in the Caribbean basin.

The armada is led by the world’s largest and most advanced aircraft carrier, USS Gerald Ford, backed up by B-52H strategic bombers and F-35 stealth fighters.

- **[What is Operation Southern Spear?](#)**

As yet, none of this weaponry has been used directly against Venezuela. Missile attacks — there have been at least 21 — have instead been directed at small, [alleged drug-carrying speedboats](#) in the Caribbean and the East Pacific. Eighty-three people have been killed in a mission that many maritime and international law experts have said is of highly dubious legality.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (13) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]



A video on the X account of the US secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, of “a lethal strike on a vessel carrying narcotics” in the Eastern Pacific Ocean

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Untroubled by that, Trump has claimed that he will probably move the anti-drug operation “to land”, but he has never specified if he means Venezuelan territory.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (14) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]



The armada led by USS Gerald Ford

US NAVY/REUTERS

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (15) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

Some see this as a phoney war, a version of the gunboat diplomacy — using the threat of warfare as a means of forcing co-operation — championed by one of the relatively few US presidents who Trump has said he admires: Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt.

In 1903 Roosevelt sent a warship to support Panamanian rebels fighting for independence from Colombia. Not a single shot was fired, but the show of force helped Panama gain its independence. Shortly afterwards the new government signed over to the US sovereignty of a strip of land that became the Panama Canal Zone.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (16) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]



President Roosevelt
BETTMANN

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (17) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

Eric Farnsworth, a former State Department official at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said: “The best way to ensure that force is not used to dislodge Maduro is to ensure that he is convinced that it will be used.”

The endgame that the administration appears to be seeking is that Maduro, 63, together with his senior leadership, goes into exile, without conflict. One western diplomat said: “The operation here is not primarily about drugs, it is about solving the Venezuelan problem.”

Since taking over from the late socialist firebrand Hugo Chávez in 2013, the president has overseen the economic downfall of a country with more oil reserves than Saudi Arabia. Over the past decade eight million people — a quarter of the population — have migrated. While most went to neighbouring countries, an estimated 700,000 reached the US.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (18) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

The authoritarian's public response to all this pressure has been to give the impression Maduro is not in the least bit concerned. On Saturday he danced on stage in Caracas to a reggaeton tune over a recording of his voice rapping the words, "no war, peace". Last week he recorded his own schmaltzy version of John Lennon's *Imagine*. It has played repeatedly on state TV ever since.



Maduro recorded a version of John Lennon's *Imagine*

The choice of song was deliberate. *Imagine*, written in 1971 during the Vietnam War, helps reinforce one of the Venezuelan government's consistent warnings to Washington: that it risks entering another military quagmire it will regret.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (19) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

That narrative is angrily disputed by the main block of the Venezuela opposition, which insists a collapse of the regime, however achieved, would be welcomed by an overwhelming majority of the population, as the election last year demonstrated. Maduro, it says, is paying the price for not taking a peaceful opportunity to stand down, after he lost that vote.

In an interview with The Washington Post published on Saturday, [María Corina Machado](#), the Venezuelan opposition leader, said: “We’re not asking for regime change. We’re asking for respect of the will of the people and the people will be the one that will take care and protect this transition so that it is orderly, peaceful, and irreversible. Machado was banned by the regime from standing as a candidate in the vote but organised the campaign for González. She has been in hiding, apparently in Venezuela, since January.

Trump has indicated he is prepared to talk to Maduro, possibly in the coming days. On Friday he delivered an enigmatic message to Fox news. He said: “I can’t tell you what I’m going to tell him, but I have something very specific to say.”

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (20) [FONTE: WSJ,30/11/2025]

The High Stakes in Venezuela - WSJ

President Trump is in a high-stakes showdown with Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro and the dictator's backers in Havana and Moscow. One of the two presidents is going to lose, and it will be Mr. Trump if Mr. Maduro isn't ousted one way or another.

Mr. Trump has never said explicitly that regime change is his goal in Caracas, but the evidence is clear that it is. He's predicted Mr. Maduro's days are numbered, and Mr. Trump is gradually raising political pressure with the message that the dictator should go into exile for his own good, and perhaps survival.

The President has assembled an invasion-sized naval force in the Caribbean, including a carrier task force. The political cover for this intimidation campaign is that Mr. Trump is fighting drug cartels, but you don't send 25% of the Navy's deployed warships, F-35 fighters, and thousands of Marines merely to blow up drug boats.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (21) [FONTE: Times, 24/11/2025]

But what if Mr. Maduro doesn't leave on his own? The dictator is clearly nervous, alternating between pleas for "peace" and defiant calls for national resistance. He is also mobilizing his military for conflict.

He may not be entirely master of his own fate. Cuba's intelligence service is solidly behind him and no doubt is urging him to stay. Our sources believe Cuban intelligence is working closely with Mr. Maduro's military counterintelligence network, the DGCIM. They work together to spy on the country's officer corps to disrupt a potential coup attempt.

Venezuela matters to Cuba as a force for revolution on the Latin American continent. Leaders in Havana also know that if Mr. Maduro falls to a pro-American government, Mr. Trump may next turn his attention to them. They know Secretary of State Marco Rubio's history as an enemy of the Castros and the Latin left.

Venezuela is also important to Moscow, which reportedly sent a general to Caracas recently to advise the Maduro forces. The Kremlin loves to bedevil the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere and disrupt pro-American

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (22) [FONTE: WSJ, 30/11/2025]

All of which is to say that the Trump-Maduro showdown has global and regional implications. If Mr. Trump withdraws his Caribbean flotilla with Mr. Maduro still in power, the Venezuelan strongman will have won. The world will see that he was able to stand up to American power in the Yankee's backyard. Smaller regional nations like Trinidad and Tobago that have sided with the U.S. against Mr. Maduro will become new targets for Cuban disruption.

If Mr. Maduro calls Mr. Trump's naval bluff, the President may have to take direct military action to oust the dictator. If this includes special forces raids or other boots on the ground, American casualties are possible. This is a much higher domestic political risk than cruise missile strikes or B-2 bomber raids. All the more so when Mr. Trump's isolationist base is braying that he promised to end wars, not start them. He'll also get no help from Democrats.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (23) [FONTE: WSJ, 30/11/2025]

We think deposing Mr. Maduro is in the U.S. national interest given how he has spread refugees and mayhem in the region. No one should think this would be an American "coup." Venezuelans voted overwhelmingly to elect the opposition in the 2024 presidential race, but Mr. Maduro refused to cede power. Deposing him in favor of the elected president would restore democracy.

But it isn't clear how the Venezuelan military would respond to U.S. intervention. Let's hope the CIA is working the case well for a change, and that local forces would break for the democrats. But Mr. Trump would have to be prepared in any case to help the new government defend itself.

If Mr. Maduro flees and the democrats take over, it will be a giant step for freedom in the region. Would the Cuban people rise up against their dictators next? Mr. Trump would have his second foreign-policy victory after bombing Iran's nuclear facilities.

But if Mr. Maduro refuses to leave, and Mr. Trump shrinks from acting to depose him, Mr. Trump and the credibility of the U.S. will be the losers. Mr. Trump chose this showdown, and it will cost America and the region dearly if Mr. Maduro emerges triumphant.

O regresso do intervencionismo dos EUA na América Latina? (24) [FONTE: Chappatte, 3/02/2019]



Bibliografia

