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D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (1) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]

Inside the US capture of Nicolás Maduro | CNN Politics


It was just like watching television.

Huddled in a draped-off room at Mar-a-Lago around screens set up for his viewing pleasure — including, according to photos released by the White House, a live feed of social media messages on X — President Donald Trump watched and listened as highly trained American Delta Force soldiers rushed into Nicolás Maduro's home in Caracas, where the Venezuelan leader was sleeping alongside his wife.



Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (2) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]

American helicopters were soon gliding across the sea, 100 feet above the dark water, toward Caracas. A couple of hours later, Maduro was in US custody, handcuffed, dressed in gray sweatpants and wearing blackout goggles, according to a picture Trump posted on Truth Social on Saturday morning.



Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (3) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]

TRUTH.

← **Truth Details**

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3267 replies



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump

The United States of America has successfully carried out a large scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the Country. This operation was done in conjunction with U.S. Law Enforcement. Details to follow. There will be a News Conference today at 11 A.M., at Mar-a-Lago. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP

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Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (4) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]

'Pretty much an ultimatum'

Late last month, the CIA carried out a [drone strike on a port facility](#) on the coast of Venezuela, sources familiar with the matter previously told CNN, marking the first known US attack inside that country. The strike targeted a remote dock on the Venezuelan coast that the US government believed was being used by the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua to store drugs and move them onto boats for shipping, the sources said.

No one was present at the facility at the time it was struck, so there were no casualties, according to the sources.


Despite the plans being drafted to oust Maduro, many White House officials had continued to hold out hope in recent weeks that the Venezuelan president would voluntarily step down, two senior White House officials told CNN.

During a phone call between Trump and Maduro in November, the American president repeatedly stressed to the Venezuelan leader that "it would be in his best interest" to step down and leave the country, one official said, calling the conversation "pretty much an ultimatum."

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (5) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]

How Maduro was moved from Venezuela to the US

In the early morning hours of January 3, US military personnel extracted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from his compound in Caracas. He's now being held in Brooklyn, New York, and is expected to face drug-trafficking charges. Here's what we know so far about his movements:



Note: Reporting as of January 4, 2026, at 3 p.m. ET

Source: CNN reporting

Graphic: Renée Rigdon and Thomas Bordeaux, CNN

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (6) [FONTE: CNN, 4/01/2026]



"I want to be clear about one thing: Nicolas Maduro had multiple opportunities to avoid this," Rubio said Saturday. "He was provided multiple, very, very, very generous offers and chose instead to act like a wild man, chose instead to play around, and the result is what we saw tonight."

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (7) [FONTE: NYT, 4/01/2026]

Trump Says U.S. Is 'In Charge' of Venezuela, While Rubio Stresses Coercing It

The secretary of state said that a military "quarantine" on some oil exports would stay in place to put pressure on the country's acting leadership.

Jan. 4, 2026



Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (8) [FONTE: NYT, 4/01/2026]

When asked how the United States planned to govern Venezuela, Mr. Rubio did not lay out a plan for a U.S. occupation authority, like the one that the George W. Bush administration put in place in Baghdad during the [Iraq War](#), but instead spoke of coercing a Venezuelan government run by allies of the jailed leader Nicolás Maduro to make policy changes.

U.S. forces will continue to prevent oil tankers on a U.S. sanctions list from entering and leaving the country until the government opens up the state-controlled oil industry to foreign investment — presumably giving priority to American companies — and makes other changes, he said on “Face the Nation” on CBS News.

“That remains in place, and that’s a tremendous amount of leverage that will continue to be in place until we see changes, not just to further the national interest of the United States, which is No. 1, but also that lead to a better future for the people of Venezuela,” he said.

And in a testy exchange later on “Meet the Press” on NBC News, Mr. Rubio complained that people were “fixating” on Mr. Trump’s declaration at a news conference in Florida on Saturday that the U.S. government would run Venezuela. He added that “it’s not running — it’s running policy, the policy with regards to this.”

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (9) [FONTE: Bloomberg,3/01/2026]

How Venezuelan Oil Factored Into US Seizure of Maduro



Fire at Forte Tiuna, Venezuela's largest military complex, is seen from a distance after a series of explosions in Caracas on Jan. 3. *Photographer: STR/AFP*

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (10) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 3/01/2026]

What role does Venezuela's oil play in the world market?

While Venezuela has some of the world's largest oil reserves, its role as a player in global markets has significantly declined since 2015. It currently produces around a million barrels a day, about one-third of its 1990s peak and less than 1% of global output. Most of Venezuela's oil goes to China.

The US airstrikes didn't affect Venezuela's main oil terminal at Jose, the Amuay refinery and the Orinoco heavy oil belt where most of the country's production comes from, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

A US blockade on sanctioned oil tankers in recent weeks didn't significantly affect world oil prices, though several tankers veered away from Venezuela to avoid the risk of seizure. The blockade also impeded the arrival of naphtha, a blendstock that Venezuela needs to pump and transport its sludge-like oil.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (11) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 3/01/2026]

Is the US likely to seize Venezuelan oil assets?

At a news conference following Maduro's seizure, Trump said the US administration of Venezuela [would include deploying](#) US oil companies to the country. "We're going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure ... and start making money for the country," Trump said.

The US president emphasized that his decision to depose Maduro was driven by his conviction that Venezuelan leaders had "stolen" US investment in the country's energy sector.

"We built Venezuela's oil industry with American talent, drive and skill, and the socialist regime stole it from us during those previous administrations, and they stole it through force. This constituted one of the largest thefts of American property in the history of our country," Trump said.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (12) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 3/01/2026]

What has been the role of US oil companies in Venezuela?

US oil companies were the main architects of Venezuela's oil industry starting a century ago, building the country into a leading US supplier. Venezuela became a founding member of [OPEC](#) in 1960.

The industry was nationalized in the mid-1970s and reopened to foreign investment in the 1990s. Maduro's influential predecessor Hugo Chávez expropriated major US oil projects in 2007. [Exxon Mobil Corp.](#) and [ConocoPhillips](#) pulled out and later won sweeping international arbitration awards for the seizure of their assets.

Chevron was the only US oil company to remain in Venezuela. The Houston-based company currently has a restricted license from the US Treasury Department to operate in four joint ventures with state-owned [Petróleos de Venezuela SA](#). Chevron accounts for about a quarter of Venezuelan production.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (13) [FONTE: The Atlantic, 4/01/2026]

Trump Threatens Venezuela's New Leader With a Fate Worse Than Maduro's

The president told *The Atlantic* that Delcy Rodríguez needs to comply with U.S. wishes—or else.

By Michael Scherer



Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (14) [FONTE: The Atlantic, 4/01/2026]

IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW this morning, President Donald Trump issued a not-so-veiled threat against the new Venezuelan leader, Delcy Rodríguez, saying that “if she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro,” referring to Nicolás Maduro, now residing in a New York City jail cell. Trump made clear that he would not stand for Rodríguez’s defiant rejection of the armed U.S. intervention that resulted in Maduro’s capture.

During our call, Trump, who had just arrived at his golf club in West Palm Beach, was in evident good spirits, and reaffirmed to me that Venezuela may not be the last country subject to American intervention. “We do need Greenland, absolutely,” he said, describing the island—a part of Denmark, a NATO ally—as “surrounded by Russian and Chinese ships.” And in discussing Venezuela’s future, he signaled a clear shift away from his previous distaste for regime change and nation building, rejecting the concerns of many in his MAGA base. “You know, rebuilding there and regime change, anything you want to call it, is better than what you have right now. Can’t get any worse,” he said.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (15) [FONTE: The Atlantic, 4/01/2026]

The severe tone he took with Rodríguez contrasted with the praise he had offered her yesterday, hours after U.S.-military forces attacked Caracas and captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, for criminal prosecution. Trump said in a news conference after the attack that Rodríguez had privately indicated a willingness to work with the United States, which Trump declared would temporarily “run” her country.

“She’s essentially willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again,” he said yesterday.

Rodríguez rejected that suggestion moments later, declaring that the country is “ready to defend our natural resources” and that the nation’s defense counsel remained prepared to carry out the policies of Maduro, whose return she demanded. “We shall never be a colony ever again,” she said. The prospect of Maduro’s government continuing to resist the U.S. raised the risk of a protracted fight for control of Venezuela that would require increased U.S.-military involvement and even occupation. Trump yesterday signaled his willingness to order a second wave of military actions in Venezuela, should he deem it necessary.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (16) [FONTE: The Atlantic, 4/01/2026]

When I asked this morning why nation building and regime change in Venezuela would be different from similar efforts he previously opposed in Iraq, Trump suggested posing the question to former President George W. Bush.

“I didn’t do Iraq. That was Bush. You’ll have to ask Bush that question, because we should have never gone into Iraq. That started the Middle East disaster,” Trump said.

Read: Even close allies are asking why Trump wants to run Venezuela

Trump has said he believes that the United States needs to maintain control over the Western Hemisphere, invoking his own version of the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, which rejected European colonialism in the hemisphere. He calls his approach the “Donroe Doctrine.” But in the interview, he said that the decision to kidnap the Venezuelan president was not made simply because of geography.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (17) [FONTE: The Atlantic, 4/01/2026]

I asked him whether the attack on Venezuela could indicate a willingness to take military action to seize control of Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, which has rejected American territorial claims. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said yesterday that the world should take notice after the Venezuela operation. “When he tells you that he’s going to do something, when he tells you he’s going to address a problem, he means it,” Rubio said. Trump has repeatedly said that the U.S. “needs” to control Greenland.

Trump said it was up to others to decide what U.S.-military action in Venezuela means for Greenland. “They are going to have to view it themselves. I really don’t know. He was very generous to me, Marco, yesterday,” Trump said. “You know, I wasn’t referring to Greenland at that time. But we do need Greenland, absolutely. We need it for defense.”

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (18) [FONTE: El País, 5/01/2026]

Delcy Rodríguez llama a la cooperación con Estados Unidos mientras Trump exige “acceso a todo” en Venezuela

“Nosotros estamos al cargo” en Venezuela, insiste el presidente de Estados Unidos



La vicepresidenta ejecutiva de Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, en una reunión con su gabinete @DELCYRODRIGUEZV (EFE)

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (19) [FONTE: El País, 5/01/2026]

En su primera comunicación como nueva [“presidenta encargada de Venezuela”](#), [Delcy Rodríguez](#), ha lanzado un mensaje de conciliación a Estados Unidos que contrasta con el habitual tono beligerante usado por el chavismo contra Washington, mientras Donald Trump mantiene su tono amenazante al reclamar a la nueva líder “acceso a todo” en el país suramericano y sostiene que “nosotros estamos al cargo”.

A menos de 48 horas [del ataque que descabezó el régimen con la detención de Nicolás Maduro](#) en su escondite, Rodríguez, lejos de confrontar, ha tendido un puente al enemigo. “Extendemos la invitación al Gobierno de los EE UU a trabajar conjuntamente en una agenda de cooperación, orientada al desarrollo compartido, en el marco de la legalidad internacional y fortalezca una convivencia comunitaria duradera”, se lee en su cuenta de Instagram.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (20) [FONTE: El País, 5/01/2026]

El tono de Rodríguez en este mensaje está lejos de los términos habituales que el chavismo dedica a Washington. No hay mención al imperialismo, a violaciones del derecho internacional o al robo de los recursos naturales, acusaciones recurrentes en estos cuatro meses de escalada de la tensión entre ambos. [La condena al intervencionismo de Estados Unidos](#) en Venezuela es ahora una frase tibia: “Nuestro país aspira a vivir sin amenazas externas”.

En una apelación directa al presidente Donald Trump, Rodríguez escribe: “Nuestros pueblos y nuestra región merecen la paz y el diálogo, no la guerra. Ese ha sido siempre el predicamento del presidente Nicolás Maduro y es el de toda Venezuela en este momento. Esa es la Venezuela en la que creo, a la que he dedicado mi vida. Mi sueño es que Venezuela sea una gran potencia donde todos los venezolanos y venezolanas de bien nos encontremos”.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regreso da diplomacia da canhoneira (21) [FONTE: El País, 5/01/2026]

“Queremos acceso a todo lo que pidamos, acceso al petróleo y a otras cosas que hacen falta para reconstruir el país, a carreteras y a puentes para reconstruirlos”, ha sostenido Trump en declaraciones desde el avión presidencial Air Force One, en el que se trasladaba de regreso a Washington tras dos semanas en su residencia de Mar-a-Lago en Florida. “Si [las nuevas autoridades] no se comportan, habrá un segundo ataque”, ha amenazado el mandatario, que ya en una entrevista para el mensual *The Atlantic* había advertido al Gobierno venezolano de que “lo pagará muy caro” si no sigue las instrucciones que le dicte Washington.

A bordo del avión presidencial, Trump ha vuelto a repetir esa amenaza y apuntar que, en ese caso, [Rodríguez “lo podría tener peor que Maduro”](#), retenido en un centro de detención en Nueva York y que este lunes comparecerá ante un juez para responder sobre cuatro cargos de narcotráfico y delitos de armamento.

Según el presidente, en las conversaciones que su equipo ha mantenido con la dirigente venezolana, “aún no hemos llegado” a hablar sobre la liberación de presos políticos en el país caribeño, una de las reclamaciones del movimiento opositor que encabezan [María Corina Machado y Edmundo González](#).

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (22) [FONTE: WSJ, 4/01/2024]

A New Trump Game Plan Takes Shape: Strike and Coerce - WSJ

WASHINGTON—The U.S. raid that [snatched Venezuela's president](#) capped a month of aggressive military action by President Trump that also included targeting alleged extremists in northern Nigeria, attacking Islamic State [militants in Syria](#) and threatening [to restrike Iran](#).

The flurry of military moves underscored Trump's reliance on the surprise use of force during his second term—an emerging doctrine to strike and then coerce that is likely to be sorely tested as the White House seeks [to press Venezuela](#) and other countries he targets to comply with his demands.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (23) [FONTE: WSJ, 4/01/2024]

In returning to a form of “gunboat diplomacy” in Venezuela, Trump has largely spurned the usual veneer of armed interventions—acting without an Oval Office speech justifying the attack, congressional authorization, a promise of elections in a foreign land or even a detailed plan for its future.

The [operation in Caracas](#), which involved inserting U.S. Army Delta Force commandos and use of more than 150 warplanes, shared some of the features of Trump’s other operations this year, such as the B-2 bomber attack on Iran’s nuclear sites and its nearly two-month-long operation against the Houthis in Yemen.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (24) [FONTE: WSJ, 4/01/2024]

It disrupted the status quo but stopped short of a major commitment of ground forces that might give the White House more influence over Venezuela's future while risking deeper involvement and more American lives.

Trump has boasted that it was a model for future military action, telling Fox News on Saturday it was "an incredible thing" and insisting "we can do it again, too. Nobody can stop us."

Yet it is also a strategy that risks overstressing the Pentagon if Trump continues the intense pace of armed interventions abroad or gets bogged down in open-ended conflicts if his limited military moves don't achieve his goals.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (25) [FONTE: WSJ, 4/01/2024]

Trump has been careful to avoid many of the pitfalls of past U.S. military interventions by limiting operations, as he did with a one-day attack on Iran's nuclear facilities in June. He has abruptly halted military operations and declared victory, as he did when he [ceased strikes on Houthi militants](#) in Yemen last year after they agreed to stop attacks on U.S. ships in the Red Sea. The Houthis continued their missile and drone attacks on Israel.

In Venezuela, however, the administration has far-reaching goals and a strategy for achieving them that appears in flux.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled Sunday that the Trump administration was counting on a naval blockade of oil exports to pressure the country's authorities to yield to U.S. demands that Venezuela allow Western companies access to oil fields that were nationalized years ago and halt cooperation with Iran, Cuba, China and Russia.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (26) [FONTE: James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1971]

STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: 16

GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY

Political Applications of
Limited Naval Force

James Cable

1971
CHATTO & WINDUS, LONDON

for
THE INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (27) [FONTE: James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1971]

INTRODUCTION

We have no more reason to believe that the days of gunboat diplomacy are over than to believe that the threat of force will not be used on land and in the air.

*Millar*¹

GUNBOAT diplomacy is most familiar, but will never be employed in these pages, as a term of abuse, a metaphorical epithet for almost any kind of attempt by one government to exert an unwelcome influence on the policy of another. It is often applied to situations involving no threat or use of naval force, sometimes even to disputes in which the only pressures employed are economic or diplomatic.

This degeneration of a phrase that was once exactly descriptive stems from the belief that gunboat diplomacy is a technique as obsolete as the vessels that used to sustain it. Both are vaguely supposed to have vanished with the passing of Victorian imperialism, the first under the pressure of altered political attitudes, the second in response to the advance of naval technology. Indeed, even naval officers are sometimes unaware that the 1969–70 edition of *The Military Balance*² credits the Chinese People's Republic with 300 gunboats, that the United States had to develop new types of gunboats for use off the coasts and in the rivers of Vietnam and that, on 8 July 1969, a Soviet gunboat was reported by the Chinese Government to have shot at Bata Island in the Heilung Kiang (Amur) river 'in a frenzied way'.³

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (28) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]

Gunboat diplomacy: How classic naval coercion has evolved into hybrid warfare on the water

Andrew Latham • Published: October 20, 2025 2.15pm CEST



The USS Sampson docks at the Amador International Cruise Terminal in Panama City on Sept. 2, 2025.

[Daniel Gonzalez/Anadolu via Getty Images](#)

Published: October 20, 2025 2.15pm CEST

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (29) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]

Over the summer, the United States [deployed warships to the Caribbean](#) – ostensibly to menace drug traffickers but also as a none-too-subtle warning to Venezuela. Earlier in the year, a U.S. Navy destroyer [bobbed along waters close to Iran](#) for similar reasons. And in the Taiwan Straits and Pacific, [China and the U.S.](#) frequently show off their respective maritime military might.

Close to 200 years after first being used to assert geopolitical dominance, [gunboat diplomacy](#) is very much alive and well.

In fact, the tactics employed by the U.S., China and others today fit naval strategist James Cable's [classic formulation](#) for gunboat diplomacy as "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or avert loss."

The ships, boats and objectives have shifted since Cable first penned his [now-classic definition in 1971](#), to be sure. But the core logic is the same: Conducted in tandem with political diplomacy, deploying state-of-the-art military vessels off or near a rival's coast makes one hell of a statement.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (30) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]

Gunboat diplomacy sets sail

Gunboat diplomacy originally took shape in the mid-19th century during an era of industrial navies, imperial rivalry and weak international law.

Steam power and heavy guns delivered mobility and shock, while diplomacy often happened via a few warships off a harbor, a short blockade or a punitive raid. These were highly visible acts, clearly attributable and designed to stop just short of war.

U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Perry's fleet known as "[Black Ships](#)" on account of their painted hulls are seen as the archetype. Anchoring in Tokyo Bay throughout 1853–54, they helped secure the [Treaty of Kanagawa](#) in 1854, forcibly opening the Japanese ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American ships.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (32) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]



A painting depicting U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry landing in Japan for talks on March 8, 1854. [Bettmann/Getty Images](#)

Similarly, during [the Don Pacifico affair of 1850](#), British navy squadrons pressured Greece to compensate a British subject.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (33) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]

Maritime policy in the modern age

Today global and regional great powers jostle with one another for power and influence across the intertwined domains of global economics, technology standards, information and law. That geopolitical environment has further called for adaptation of gunboat diplomacy.

It has resulted in states being pushed to compete with one another in the [gray zone between peace and war](#).

Analysts now describe a "[maritime hybrid warfare](#)" rather than out-and-out naval confrontation. This consists of a persistent, below-threshold uses of legal, informational and paramilitary tools alongside limited force to make routine activity at sea – transits, resupply, repairs – riskier, slower and more expensive.

The tool kit of maritime hybrid warfare blends nonmilitary coast guards with maritime militias, [legal moves](#), cyber and electronic interference and pressure on undersea infrastructure.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (34) [FONTE: Andrew Latham / The Conversation, 20/10/2025]

And then there is the U.S.

Since early September 2025, counternarcotics and maritime security operations in the [southern Caribbean](#) have involved a conspicuous U.S. Navy and Coast Guard presence, high-seas interdictions and publicly released videos of precision strikes on small boats near Venezuela.



The Trump administration has framed these actions as part of a “[non-international armed conflict](#)” with drug cartels. But functionally, this is [gunboat diplomacy](#).

Indeed, gunboat diplomacy remains what it has always been: the application of limited, credible maritime power to shape the behavior of other states. Only now, nations have found a way to update an old strategy to make it relevant – and useful – to navigating a 21st-century waterscape.

Os EUA, a Venezuela e o regresso da diplomacia da canhoneira (35) [FONTE: Emanuele Del Rosso /

Cartoon Movment, 4/1/2026]





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (1) [FONTE: Foreign Policy 19/12/2025]

Trump's Western Hemisphere Pivot Is Real

Enforcing a 21st-century Monroe Doctrine means recalibrating U.S. defense posture.

Ryan C. Berg • December 19, 2025, 12:01 AM



A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter of the United States Marines is seen parked on a runway at Jose Aponte de la Torre Airport, formerly Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, on Sept. 13. A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter of the United States Marines is seen parked on a runway at Jose Aponte de la Torre Airport, formerly Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, on Sept. 13. Miguel J. Rodriguez Carillo/AFP via Getty Images

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (2) [FONTE: Foreign Policy 19/12/2025]

The Trump Corollary's emphasis on a "potent restoration of American power and priorities" calls upon the Monroe Doctrine's history. Concerned with hemispheric instability, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 annual message to Congress famously overhauled the Monroe Doctrine with Roosevelt's own corollary, declaring that "flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence" would bring the United States "to the exercise of an international police power" in the region. Positive identification with the Roosevelt Corollary foretells Trump's aim for muscular engagement in Latin America.

The Trump Corollary likewise invokes the Lodge Corollary, which resolved that neither foreign powers nor foreign companies could control territory or harbors in the Americas from which they could exercise "practical power of control" and threaten the United States. Named after Henry Cabot Lodge, this corollary emerged from the Massachusetts senator's resolution opposing the acquisition of Magdalena Bay, Mexico, by a Japanese company. Today, Chinese companies are involved in more than three dozen ports in the Western Hemisphere. Old challenges are resurfacing in a new century.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (3) [FONTE: Foreign Policy 19/12/2025]

The Trump Corollary also suggests that great-power competition has entered a new period. After an initiation of competition in the first Trump and Biden administrations, the United States perceives an onset of the contest's "consolidation phase." In this phase, rival powers gird themselves: solidifying their immediate neighborhoods, demanding more of their alliances, and institutionalizing the competitive environment across diplomatic, economic, technological, and military domains.

Trump's new NSS—and its focus on consolidating the Western Hemisphere while pursuing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific—should be read in light of where the United States perceives itself to be in the timeline of great-power competition. Take it from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine, who said recently at the Reagan National Defense Forum, "Over the last few years, we haven't had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood; I suspect that's going to change."

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (4) [FONTE: Foreign Policy 19/12/2025]

On Dec. 5, 2025, the U.S. Army activated the Western Hemisphere Command, a new headquarters for both the Northern and Southern commands. The proactive measure is an efficient start, but the administration should continue to eliminate redundancies and improve resource allocation across the Americas. Crises, security challenges, and natural disasters do not respect borders. Nor should countries such as Mexico and the Bahamas linger artificially cleaved from their southern neighbors in a distinct combatant command.

The new NSS has identified the direction. Now, the Trump administration must execute this much-needed course correction. In drawing on the Monroe Doctrine, the 2025 strategy reveals a fundamental truth about U.S. power: The United States cannot persist as a superpower without securing its hemisphere. Redressing Washington's neglect of the Americas will have global implications, not the least of which is extirpating the malign influence of the United States' adversaries from its neighborhood.

Can the Trump administration turn this well-grounded strategy into a successful set of policies? The next three years will tell us.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (5) [FONTE: US Department of War, 10/12/2025]


Army Activates U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command in Historic Transition Ceremony

Dec. 10, 2025 • By Army Sgt. Maj. Jeremy Crisp, U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command •


The Army activated the U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command in a ceremony held Dec. 5 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina — uniting U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South into a single, four-star operational headquarters.



A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (6) [FONTE: US Department of State]



The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of the US Department of State website with links for Newsroom, Business, Employees, Students, Travelers, Passports, and Visas, along with social media icons for Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and Email. Below the navigation bar, the U.S. Department of State logo and seal are displayed. The breadcrumb trail reads "Home > Biographies > Marco Rubio". The main heading for the biography is "Marco Rubio" with three stars above it, followed by "SECRETARY OF STATE" and "JANUARY 21, 2025 - PRESENT".



Marco Rubio

Secretary of State Marco Rubio was born in Miami, Florida in 1971. He is the son of Cuban immigrants who left Cuba in pursuit of the American Dream. His father worked as a banquet bartender, while his mother split time as a stay-at-home mom and hotel maid. From an early age, Rubio learned the importance of faith, family, community, and dignified work.

Rubio is passionate about the American Dream because he's lived it himself. He was drawn to public service in large part because of conversations with his grandfather, who witnesses how communism destroyed his homeland. After meeting and marrying his wife Jeanette, he served as a City Commissioner in West Miami and as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives. In 2010, he won a seat in the U.S. Senate. He served as U.S. Senator until 2025.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (7) [FONTE: US Department of State]

During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Rubio was committed to serving the people of Florida and ensuring America remained a strong, resilient nation for generations to come. He was a Senior Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vice Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a member of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.

Rubio wrote and passed the *Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act*, which represents the greatest turning point in U.S.-China relations in decades. He also co-led the *Hong Kong Relations Act*, and the *VERDAD Act*. During the first Trump Administration, he worked with the President to hold members of the Cuban regime accountable, including the dictatorship's military holding company. He also created the Paycheck Protection Program, which helped save millions of small businesses in America when the COVID pandemic hit.

In November 2024, President Trump nominated Rubio to serve as

America's Secretary of State. Secretary Rubio was the first cabinet member who was confirmed in the second Trump Administration. He received a historic unanimous vote of 99-0 in the U.S. Senate.

Rubio was sworn in as the 72nd Secretary of State on January 21, 2025. The Secretary's main priority is to have a Department of State that puts America First.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (8) [FONTE: NYT, 26/01/2019. IMAGEM: Encyclopedia Britannica]



On Venezuela, Rubio Assumes U.S. Role of Ouster in Chief

Jan. 26, 2019

WASHINGTON — His hand chopping in the air, his voice stern and stalwart, he declared that it was time for the regional despot to go and warned of the consequences if he did not. With a commander in chief's resolve, he vowed that the United States would do whatever it took to protect its own diplomats on the ground.

It was not the commander in chief but Senator Marco

Rubio, the Florida Republican who nearly three years after losing his own bid for the presidency has become a lead policy architect and de facto spokesman in a daring and risky campaign involving the United States in the unrest that is now gripping Venezuela.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (9) [FONTE: NYT, 26/01/2019]

Through sheer force of will and a concerted effort to engage and educate President Trump, Mr. Rubio has made himself, in effect, a virtual secretary of state for Latin America, driving administration strategy and articulating it to the region from the Senate floor, as he did the other day, and every television camera he can find. Perhaps no other individual outside Venezuela has been more critical in challenging President Nicolás Maduro.

"He's picked a battle he can't win," Mr. Rubio, 47, said of Mr. Maduro in an interview on Friday. "It's just a matter of time. The only thing we don't know is how long it will take — and whether it will be peaceful or bloody."

It was Mr. Rubio who has been whispering in Mr. Trump's ear since the early days of his presidency about the depravity of Mr. Maduro's government and the need for American leadership. And it was Mr. Rubio along with Vice President Mike Pence and others who urged the president to back an opposition leader seeking to unseat Mr. Maduro.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (10) [FONTE: The Christian Science Monitor, 17/12/2025]

Many in Cuban diaspora find anti-Castro soulmate in Marco Rubio

Whitney Eulich • Dec. 17, 2025, 2:07 p.m. ET



The first group of 82 Cuban refugees arrives in Miami from Varadero, Cuba, Dec. 1, 1965.

United States belligerence in South America is at a new high, with the launch of military strikes and the seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela, followed by President Trump's order Tuesday for a "complete blockade" of sanctioned oil tankers going to or from that country. The moves mark a distinct shift in regional foreign policy from the anti-interventionism of recent decades.

But for one cohort in South Florida, this is just what they have been waiting for. Washington's new activism brandishes the U.S. presence and policies that Cuban Americans here have supported since fleeing their country following the arrival of Fidel Castro and his communist plans in 1959. To many, it stems from having one of their own, Cuban-immigrant-raised Marco Rubio, at the helm of U.S. international affairs.

"That's our boy," says Lorena Cabrera, walking her two small dogs through the Cuban Memorial Park in Little Havana on a recent afternoon. She is referring to Mr. Rubio, who is serving as both secretary of state and interim national security adviser, and who many see as the central force behind the Trump administration's hard line stance in Latin America this year.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (11) [FONTE: The Christian Science Monitor, 17/12/2025]

Why We Wrote This

The Trump administration's more aggressive approach to Latin America is welcomed by many in the Cuban diaspora. They see one of their own – Secretary of State Marco Rubio – as an architect of the shift that, for them, has been a long time coming.

The Cold War ended 35 years ago, and U.S. foreign policy – no longer consumed by the communist threat – shifted to a focus on terrorism and drug trafficking. However, for many on the political right in Latin America, and within the Cuban diaspora in South Florida, the danger of communism never went away. Mr. Rubio's rise has given broader reach to the Cuban diaspora's worldview, shaped by a historic loss of freedom, community, property, and human rights in their homeland.

"The U.S.'s new philosophy on foreign affairs reflects the perspectives of most of us inside the Cuban American community: To end the regime in Venezuela ... and of course, the one in Cuba," says Miguel Cossio, chief operating officer of the American Museum of The Cuban Diaspora in Miami.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (12) [FONTE: The Christian Science Monitor, 17/12/2025]

Converging on Venezuela

Today, from Mexico to Chile, it is common for leftist political candidates to be labeled communists by their opponents. Electorally, it's "very, very effective," says Dr. LeoGrande.

What appears to be shifting, however, is Washington's readiness to adopt a similar outlook. President Donald Trump stepped into the fray of [Honduras's November](#) presidential election to call the front-runner a "borderline communist," and he referred to New York City mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani as a "100% Communist Lunatic" the same month. In Florida, the state government introduced a new curriculum to teach the risks and realities of communism in public schools.

Anastasios Kamoutsas, the Florida commissioner of education, expects other school districts in the country to adopt something similar. "What Mamdani is pushing is very similar to what Fidel Castro was pushing in communist Cuba. It's important that our students understand these policies and where they can end up," he says.

Mr. Trump's new National Security Strategy places the U.S.'s geopolitical focus squarely on the Americas. It frames Latin America as the source of some of the United States' most serious problems - drug trafficking, immigration, Chinese investment - and calls on the region as a whole to work toward U.S. goals.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (13) [FONTE: The Associated Press / NPR 15/12/2024]

Trump appoints foreign policy adviser Richard Grenell as special missions envoy

The Associated Press • December 15, 2024 6:30 AM ET



Richard Grenell speaks during a ceremony in Belgrade, Serbia, in October 2023. President-elect Donald Trump has announced he's picked the longtime foreign policy adviser to serve as an envoy for special missions

WEST PALM BEACH, Fla. (AP) — President-elect Donald Trump announced Saturday that he's picked longtime foreign policy adviser Richard Grenell to serve as an envoy for special missions, tasking him with helping the incoming administration deal with some of the toughest foreign policy challenges.

Grenell served as ambassador to Germany during Trump's first administration, special presidential envoy for Serbia and Kosovo peace negotiations, and did a stint as acting director of national intelligence.

He was also a contender to serve as secretary of state, but Trump opted to nominate Florida Sen. Marco Rubio.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (15) [FONTE: Responsible Statecraft 13/02/2025]

Grenell vs. Rubio: Team Trump's competing Latin America visions

Old maximalist policies vs. making deals with adversaries — which one wins out?

Secretary of State Marco Rubio's five-country tour of Central American allies last week — the first time in a century the U.S.'s top diplomat has made their inaugural foreign trip to [Latin America](#) — was aimed at curtailing China's growing regional influence, stemming the flow of migrants and drugs to the U.S. and identifying "safe third countries" that will temporarily hold thousands of Trump's deportees.

Yet the administration's first stop in the region was not, in fact, to a close friend but rather to an adversary: Venezuela's embattled socialist leader Nicolás Maduro, whom presidential envoy Richard Grenell rewarded with a surprise visit to Miraflores Palace on January 31.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (16) [FONTE: Responsible Statecraft 13/02/2025]

Grenell, who [referred](#) to Maduro as the country's president and said Trump wanted a "different relationship" with the country, was on a laser-focused mission to bring back detained Americans and secure a commitment from Maduro to receive deported Tren de Aragua gang members, according to a pre-trip call with reporters [held](#) by the State Department's Latin America envoy Mauricio Claver-Carone.

Yet the questions surrounding Grenell's visit only a day before Rubio's trip are just the tip of the iceberg in a series of emerging contradictions in President Trump's incipient Latin America policy — notably between hardline hawks focused on rewarding allies and punishing enemies (represented by Rubio and his fellow Cuban-American ally Claver-Carone), and White House officials like Grenell whose realpolitik and strategic engagement with adversaries to advance national interests could prevail.

As a result, some Republican lawmakers have found themselves in the uncomfortable position of trying to reconcile Trump's transactionalism toward the region's illiberal regimes with Rubio's maximalist hardline, complicated by their razor-thin majority in Congress.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (17) [FONTE: Ricardo Sucre Heredia / El Co-Operante 16/06/2025]

Venezuela: entre la visión de Marco Rubio y la de Richard Grenell

La política de los EUA hacia el gobierno de Maduro se mueve en dos canales que hoy chocan entre sí. El “canal Grenell” y el “canal Rubio”. El primero busca conversar con el gobierno venezolano para lograr que los intereses de los EUA sean satisfechos. Por ejemplo, la liberación de norteamericanos detenidos en Venezuela. Grenell platica pero no para reconocer a Maduro. Que puede terminar en un reconocimiento, es posible, pero no es ahora. El “canal Rubio” es negar cualquier relación con el ejecutivo venezolano y plantea un nuevo empaque a la “tesis de la presión y el quiebre”. El nuevo formato es la tesis que a Maduro lo sostienen “la plata y las armas” por lo que, si se “cortan las fuentes de financiamiento al régimen”, la “plata” escaseará y “las armas” pugnarán por “los negocios” que perderán, y eso traerá el esperado “quiebre de la coalición dominante” que abrirá la puerta a la luminosa transición de la que habla la oposición Machado. Mi pronóstico es que el “canal Rubio” fracasará y a Trump no le quedará otra alternativa que considerar el “canal Grenell”



Publicado 6 meses. / 16 junio, 2025

Por **Ricardo Sucre Heredia** [🐦](#)



A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (18) [FONTE: Ricardo Sucre Heredia / El Co-Operante 16/06/2025]

En este artículo analizo las dos políticas y qué se puede vislumbrar para las relaciones entre Venezuela y los EUA.

Richard Grenell persigue una comunicación con el gobierno de Maduro. En redes sociales lo pintan como una persona que plantea que el gobierno de Maduro sea reconocido. No es así. Grenell lo que realmente quiere es una comunicación con el ejecutivo venezolano. De aquí que siempre destaca que cuando habla con el gobierno, **“me demandan cosas, pero les digo que no es una negociación sino un intercambio”**.

En una entrevista que Steve Bannon le hizo a Grenell el 20 de mayo, el segundo comentó, a propósito de la extensión de la licencia a Chevron que en ese momento era un tema de debate, que la ampliación de la licencia a la petrolera sería para “construir confianza” con el gobierno de Maduro, porque la diplomacia se mueve así, “pequeñas concesiones para construir confianza”.

Esta es la visión de Grenell: no es reconocer al gobierno sino establecer un canal de comunicación para lograr los puntos de la agenda de la “America First”. Una visión pragmática y no de valores. Grenell no busca hablar con el gobierno para que éste modere en materia de represión del Estado o del autoritarismo. **Sencillamente es hablar con el ejecutivo criollo para alcanzar los intereses nacionales de los EUA.** Conversar sin reconocimiento lo que, eventualmente, puede llevar a una conversación sobre temas no pragmáticos como derechos y el asunto de la alternancia. Pero hoy es una conversación pragmática, no de principios. Tal vez para construir confianza primero hay que hablar de lo instrumental y después se pasa a los valores. Los EUA hoy están en lo primero. Dado la personalidad de Trump, lo segundo no luce estar en el interés de los EUA.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (19) [FONTE: Ricardo Sucre Heredia / El Co-Operante 16/06/2025]

Aunque la visión de Grenell no es la que domina la política oficial de los EUA, contra el enviado especial se hacen campañas en contra. El 6 de junio el New York Post, medio que parece cercano a la oposición de María Corina Machado y a la de Marco Rubio, aseguró que en la Casa Blanca hay “un escándalo” porque Grenell “negocia con Maduro a espaldas de Trump”. No creo sea así. Más bien, **pienso que es una campaña para desacreditar al enviado especial de Trump por parte del sector que no quiere ninguna relación con Maduro, para que esa relación no se de y “marcar” a Grenell como “normalizador”**, frase que encanta a cierta oposición, aunque lleva una gran vida de lo más “normal” dentro del sistema autoritario, sin cuestionarlo fuera de tuiters.

Entro en la postura del secretario de Estado. La posición de Marco Rubio es más sencilla. Es no “darle ni agua” al gobierno de Maduro. Esto se traduce en la tesis de “cortar las fuentes de financiamiento del régimen criminal”.

Esta nueva versión de la “presión y el quiebre” parte de la idea que el ejecutivo nacional no es tal sino una “banda de criminales”.

Al seguir la lógica de San Agustín quien hizo la distinción entre la política y una “banda de ladrones”, el “régimen” no tiene reglas, límites o visión, por lo que cada una de las “bandas de ladrones” lucha por sus intereses que son “los negocios”. Si se corta la fuente de ingreso para “los negocios” y al ser una “banda de criminales” donde no hay unidad o lealtad, las “bandas” se pondrán a pelear entre sí y eso llevará, al “aumentar los costos de permanencia en el poder”, a que la “banda de criminales” se fracture en pedazos lo que abrirá la puerta a la esperada “transición”.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (20) [FONTE: Ricardo Sucre Heredia / El Co-Operante 16/06/2025]

Maduro no es presidente, de acuerdo con esta tesis. Es “jefe de la banda”, pero no tiene la confianza de los otros “capos”. Simplemente está allí porque garantiza un “orden para el robo”. Si se logra que no haya “más que robar”, entonces Maduro perderá la confianza y será retado por otro “pran”, y en esa pelea, se generará el tan esperado “quiebre de la coalición dominante”.

Esta es la tesis de Rubio que comparte la oposición Machado con el planteamiento del “criminal hub” el que es una “amenaza a la seguridad hemisférica”.

De lo anterior se deduce que al ser una “banda de criminales” no aplica la lógica política - negociaciones, competencia, poder con límites, pugnacidad- sino la del “law enforcement”. Es decir, una fuerza armada basada en la “ley” -entre comillas, al ver el “Estado policial” que se erige en los EUA, sin contrapesos; el ICE va en camino a ser un suprapoder, seguido por el FBI y también el Norte avanza en su particular “unión cívico-militar” que se vio durante las protestas en Los Angeles- que ponga “ley y orden” y acabe con la “banda de criminales” cuya única negociación posible -la llamada “transición ordenada”- es acordar los “términos de la salida”. Es decir, la capitulación de la “banda” o de su principal “capo”, que es Maduro, de acuerdo con la visión Rubio-Machado.

Es una posición que no admite interpretaciones: al gobierno de Maduro no hay que darle concesiones de ningún tipo porque eso es “normalizar” a la “banda de criminales”.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (21) [FONTE: Ricardo Sucre Heredia / El Co-Operante 16/06/2025]

¿Dónde queda Trump en estas visiones? Es difícil ubicar a Trump en una u otra de las visiones. No obstante, su comportamiento tiende a respaldar la visión de Rubio. No solo porque es su secretario de Estado -no va a contrariar a un alto miembro de su gobierno- sino porque Trump, hasta ahora, parte de una premisa frente al gobierno de Maduro: estaba a punto de ser derrocado a finales de Trump I pero llegó Biden y lo salvó con las “licencias Biden”. Por eso Trump apoyó a Rubio. No solo por los votos de los “Crazy Cubans” que necesitó para aprobar leyes de su gobierno, **sino porque el presidente de los EUA realmente cree que Maduro estaba a punto de caer en 2020 cuando no fue así.**

En todo caso, **su peor momento fue de 2014 a 2019, pero en 2020 ya el gobierno había superado la prueba que sería tumbado.** Derrotó a la oposición insurreccional y al interinato que contó con el apoyo -como se decía en ese entonces- de “más de 60 países” y Guaidó llegó a niveles de popularidad similares o mayores a los de Chávez en su mejor momento. Pero Trump cree lo contrario. Por eso se pone al lado de Rubio, aunque no despacha a Grenell a pesar de las “bolas” que dicen que lo hace. Ni siquiera lo ha hecho con Musk.

¿Cuál puede ser el pronóstico de esta tensión entre la “visión Grenell” y la “visión Rubio”? Cabe esperar una suerte de “tiempo muerto” **para ver si “cortar las finanzas a la banda de criminales” tiene éxito.** Pienso que no la tendrá -como el famoso “quiebre”- pero pasará un tiempo antes de que esto se haga visible. Principalmente para Trump que experimentará su segunda derrota ante el ejecutivo de Maduro. **Trump tendrá dos opciones: o profundiza más “la presión” -será forzado para que lo haga, por los “Crazy Cubans” y la oposición Machado para evadir la derrota- o se mueve a la propuesta de Grenell y se abre o se refuerza, otra vez, un canal con el gobierno de Venezuela. Mi pronóstico es que Trump se moverá al “canal Grenell” dentro de un tiempo.**

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (22) [FONTE: Mariángel Velásquez Rincón / El Co-Operante 19/12/2025]

Gil critica a Marco Rubio y lo tilda de "mentiroso y acomplejado"

El titular de Relaciones Exteriores venezolano cuestionó la trayectoria de Rubio, señalando que durante sus 14 años como senador y un año como secretario de Estado "no logró" ningún avance significativo en política exterior y lo acusó de ser un "experto en promover golpes de Estado, intervenciones, guerras eternas y cambios de régimen"

Mariángel Velásquez Rincón • 19 diciembre, 2025



A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (23) [FONTE: Mariángel Velásquez Rincón / El Co-Operante 19/12/2025]

En su [cuenta en Telegram](#), Gil detalló que sostuvo una conversación telefónica con su homólogo iraní, Abás Araqchí, en la que analizaron “los recientes acontecimientos en el Caribe, especialmente las amenazas, actos de piratería de Estados Unidos y el robo de buques cargados de petróleo venezolano”.

Según el canciller, Irán manifestó “una plena muestra de solidaridad” y expresó su disposición a brindar cooperación para contrarrestar lo que describió como acciones estadounidenses que buscan “imponerse por la fuerza militar, en violación de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y del derecho internacional”.

Durante la llamada, ambos funcionarios también repasaron el estado de las relaciones bilaterales “en el marco del acuerdo estratégico” entre Venezuela e Irán.

En contexto

Desde septiembre, Estados Unidos mantiene operaciones navales y aéreas en zonas cercanas a Venezuela, bajo el argumento de combatir el narcotráfico. Caracas ha calificado esta presencia como “hostil”, alertando sobre un posible prelude a acciones militares. Washington también ha vinculado a Maduro con el denominado Cartel de los Soles, declarado por EE. UU. como organización terrorista extranjera el pasado 24 de noviembre.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (24) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]



Venezuela's Maduro Offered the U.S. His Nation's Riches to Avoid Conflict

Venezuela's autocrat had proposed allocating his country's oil wealth and other natural resources to the U.S. and ending deals with American adversaries to appease President Trump.

A statue of a hand holding a drilling rig near the headquarters of Venezuela's state oil company in Caracas. Adriana Loureiro Fernandez for The New York Times

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (25) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]

Under a deal discussed between a senior U.S. official and Mr. Maduro's top aides, the Venezuelan strongman offered to open up all existing and future oil and gold projects to American companies, give preferential contracts to American businesses, reverse the flow of Venezuelan oil exports from China to the United States, and slash his country's energy and mining contracts with Chinese, Iranian and Russian firms.

The Trump administration ended up rebuffing Mr. Maduro's economic concessions and [cut off diplomacy](#) with Venezuela last week. The move effectively killed the deal, at least for now, the people close to the discussion said.



A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (26) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]

Marco Rubio, the U.S. secretary of state and national security adviser, has been the leading voice in the administration's push to oust Mr. Maduro. He has called Mr. Maduro an illegitimate leader who is a "fugitive from American justice" and has been skeptical of the diplomatic approach conducted by a special U.S. envoy, Richard Grenell.

Proponents of diplomacy acknowledge that Mr. Rubio's hard line approach has prevailed for now. But they believe their efforts could eventually bear fruit, pointing to Mr. Trump's sudden reversals on other major foreign policy issues, such as [the war in Ukraine](#), [trade with China](#) or [Iran's nuclear program](#).

This article is based on interviews with more than a dozen American and Venezuelan representatives of disparate factions calling for diplomacy with Mr. Maduro. They described their discussions on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (27) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]

While Mr. Grenell and Venezuelan officials made progress on economic issues, they failed to agree on Mr. Maduro's political future, according to the people close to the negotiations.

Venezuela's foreign minister, Yván Gil, said in an interview last month that Mr. Maduro would not negotiate his exit.

Mr. Maduro has repeatedly repressed democratic challenges to his rule after assuming the presidency in 2013. He held on to power last year after losing a presidential election [by rigging the results](#) and [brutally suppressing protests](#).

Mr. Grenell declined to comment for this article. The State Department, the White House and Venezuela's government did not respond to requests for comment.

In Washington, American officials offer differing assessments of the talks. One U.S. official said the reports of negotiations over the lifting of sanctions and access to the Venezuelan market was "not an accurate assessment of what took place."

But other American officials said U.S. and Venezuelan officials held repeated talks over what economic normalization would look like, including access to Venezuelan energy markets by American companies and a lifting of U.S. sanctions.

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (28) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]

Venezuela's state oil company has given Chevron, the largest American company working in Venezuela, full control of their joint oil projects and the two entities have discussed giving Chevron a stake in another major oil field.

Venezuelan officials have worked to repair relations with another U.S. oil giant, ConocoPhillips, which left Venezuela in 2007 after the government seized its operations. Mr. Maduro's government and Conoco have been negotiating an oil trading deal as recently as this year, according to two people familiar with the talks.

Chevron said its business dealings in Venezuela comply with all applicable Venezuelan and U.S. laws. Conoco did not respond to a request for comment.

The outreach by Venezuelan officials and business leaders came closest to achieving a diplomatic breakthrough in May, according to the people briefed on the talks.

As a sign of good will, Mr. Grenell that month orchestrated the return of a Venezuelan toddler [stranded in the United States after her parents were deported](#), giving Mr. Maduro a domestic political win. Venezuela's government reciprocated shortly afterward by [releasing a U.S. Air Force veteran jailed in the country and delivering him to Mr. Grenell](#).

A política e estratégia dos EUA face à Venezuela (29) [FONTE: NYT, 18/10/2025]

Mr. Grenell's economic negotiations with Mr. Maduro's envoys faced strong opposition from Mr. Rubio, a Cuban American and former senator who has long viewed Mr. Maduro's downfall as a crucial step to ending the Communist dictatorship on the island.

The proponents of economic engagement with Mr. Maduro have managed to score minor victories.

Chevron got its U.S. Treasury license to operate in Venezuela reinstated in July, [according to the Venezuelan government](#). The company succeeded in overturning the [ban imposed by Mr. Trump months earlier](#) after a concerted lobbying push in Washington, according to people familiar with the deal.

The Treasury Department on Wednesday [issued another license](#) that in effect allows Shell, Europe's largest energy company, to restart work in Venezuela. Under a new permit, Shell could begin producing gas from a massive offshore Venezuelan field as soon as next year, according to a person familiar with the deal.

The gas from the field, known as Dragon, will be processed and sold from neighboring Trinidad.

Shell directed questions to the license holder, the government of Trinidad & Tobago, whose officials did not respond to a request for comment.

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Trump Calls Off Diplomatic Outreach to Venezuela

The move paves the way for a possible military escalation against drug traffickers or the government of Nicolás Maduro.

President Trump has called off efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement with Venezuela, according to U.S. officials, paving the way for a potential military escalation against drug traffickers or the government of Nicolás Maduro.

Richard Grenell, a special presidential envoy and interim executive director of the Kennedy Center, had been leading negotiations with Mr. Maduro and other top Venezuelan officials. But during a meeting with senior military leaders on Thursday, Mr. Trump called Mr. Grenell and instructed him that all diplomatic outreach, including his talks with Mr. Maduro, was to stop, the officials said on Monday.



Richard Grenell, a special presidential envoy and executive director of the Kennedy Center, had been leading negotiations with Venezuela's leader, Nicolás Maduro, and other top Venezuelan officials. Eric Lee/The New York Times

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Mr. Trump has grown frustrated with Mr. Maduro's failure to accede to American demands to give up power voluntarily and the continued insistence by Venezuelan officials that they have no part in drug trafficking.

American officials have said that the Trump administration has drawn up multiple military plans for an escalation. Those operations could also include plans designed to force Mr. Maduro from power. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state and national security adviser, has called Mr. Maduro an "illegitimate" leader and repeatedly cited a U.S. indictment of him on drug trafficking charges.

Mr. Rubio had described Mr. Maduro as a "fugitive from American justice," and the United States increased the reward for Mr. Maduro to \$50 million.

A White House official said Mr. Trump was prepared to use "every element of American power" to stop drugs from entering the United States and had been clear in his messages to Mr. Maduro to end Venezuelan narcotics trafficking.

Bibliografía

