



Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

SESSÃO N° 16

28 /1/2026



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (1) [FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 21/01/2026]

← Truth Details

7151 replies

Trending ▾



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump

Based upon a very productive meeting that I have had with the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, we have formed the framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland and, in fact, the entire Arctic Region. This solution, if consummated, will be a great one for the United States of America, and all NATO Nations. Based upon this understanding, I will not be imposing the Tariffs that were scheduled to go into effect on February 1st. Additional discussions are being held concerning The Golden Dome as it pertains to Greenland. Further information will be made available as discussions progress. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and various others, as needed, will be responsible for the negotiations — They will report directly to me. Thank you for your attention to this matter!

DONALD J. TRUMP

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

13.4k ReTruths 57.8k Likes

Jan 21, 2026 at 7:27 PM

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (2) [FONTE: FT, 22/01/2026]

Trump's Greenland pivot leaves Europe flummoxed

EU leaders to meet as US president drops tariffs and military threat to take Arctic island from Denmark



Mette Frederiksen, Emmanuel Macron, Giorgia Meloni and Friedrich Merz are some of the EU leaders who will attend a summit on Thursday to discuss the bloc's relationship with the US © FT montage

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (3) [FONTE: FT, 22/01/2026]

The unexpected move has upended a summit that was envisaged to develop a united front against Trump's economic coercion and his desire to conquer European territory, three EU officials said, and raised the question of just how long transatlantic trust could last.

"Based upon a very productive meeting that I have had with . . . Rutte, we have formed the framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland and, in fact, the entire Arctic Region," Trump posted on his Truth Social platform.

"Based upon this understanding, I will not be imposing the Tariffs that were scheduled to go into effect on February 1st," Trump added. Asked shortly after if he had spoken to other European leaders about his shift, Trump replied: "Yes."

The initial threat — also made via social media five days previously — to impose 10 per cent tariffs on exports from Denmark and five other EU states plus the UK and Norway, had sparked the biggest crisis in the transatlantic relationship for decades.

EU leaders will want to discuss what the framework is about, what implications it would have for Danish sovereignty, how it would engage Denmark's Nato partners and what it might cost the Europeans. But underlying it all will be the question of whether the US president can be trusted to stick to an agreed outcome.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (4) [FONTE: FT, 22/01/2026]

By setting aside some of the most aggressive threats over Greenland, Trump also left European leaders in a discussion where competing national interests – whether on trade, Greenland, Ukraine or the transatlantic alliance – were more likely to come to the fore.

“He’s appearing more flexible which is dangerous for EU unity, as he’s obviously appealing to different views among the member states,” said one of the officials involved in the summit preparations.

Trump’s statement said that “additional discussions are being held concerning The Golden Dome as it pertains to Greenland”, referring to his administration’s proposed [missile defence initiative](#).

Trump said his vice-president JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and special envoy Steve Witkoff would be involved in the negotiations over Greenland.

Denmark and [Greenland](#) have been clear on one point since Trump first expressed an interest in acquiring the island in 2019: the territory is not for sale.

Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Denmark’s foreign minister, reacted cautiously to Trump’s announcement, saying he had spoken briefly to Rutte. He insisted that “it is not going to happen that the USA will own Greenland. That is a red line”.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (5) [FONTE: AP / The Local Denmark, 22/01/2026]

Denmark says NATO chief cannot negotiate on its behalf

[AFP](#)



Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen after the meeting in the Foreign Policy Committee at Christiansborg in Copenhagen on Tuesday, January 20th, 2026. . Photo: Thomas Traasdahl/Ritzau Scanpix

Trump backed down on threats to seize Greenland by force after meeting Rutte on Wednesday, saying he had reached a "framework" of a deal on the Danish autonomous territory.

Details of the agreement made at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss ski resort of Davos remain scant.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (6) [FONTE: AP / The Local Denmark, 22/01/2026]

"The position of Denmark and that of Greenland are the same, and no negotiations were held yesterday with NATO about our sovereignty," Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told Danish television.

"Of course it is only Denmark and Greenland themselves that can make decisions on issues concerning Denmark and Greenland," she said earlier in a statement.

Frederiksen also called for "constructive" talks over Greenland that respect the territorial integrity of the EU and NATO member.

"We can negotiate all political aspects: security, investment, the economy. But we cannot negotiate our sovereignty. I have been informed that this has not been the case," the Danish PM said in a statement.

The comments came after US President Donald Trump abruptly announced he was scrapping tariffs against Europe and ruling out military action to take Greenland from Denmark.

The agreement, he told reporters at the World Economic Forum in Davos, was negotiated with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

Rutte said the subject of Greenland's sovereignty "did not come up" in his talks with Trump.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (7) [FONTE: The Economist, 21/01/2026]

The true danger posed by Donald Trump

Despite a tactical retreat, great risks remain

Jan 21st 2026



EUROPEANS EXPECTED a diatribe, but in Davos Donald Trump was almost conciliatory. He demanded “right, title and ownership” of Greenland, but abandoned tariffs, ruled out force and later hailed a new “framework” and a possible deal.

That should be a relief to America’s allies everywhere. A crisis that threatened to engulf the transatlantic alliance has eased. But for how long? This may be only a tactical retreat. Mr Trump has coveted Greenland for years. In setting out his claim he spoke about NATO with a scorn that should put the capitals of Europe on [high alert](#).

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (8) [FONTE: The Economist, 21/01/2026]

With Greenland, Europe was lucky. It got through this round because Mr Trump chose to pick a fight over a prize of **almost no strategic value** to America. Mr Trump argues, correctly, that the Arctic will be contested as its melting ice admits the world's shipping. Greenland is a site for America's future "Golden Dome" missile-defence system. If the island belongs to America, neither Russia nor China will dare strike it.

But Greenland already has an American base to deter aggressors. If it comes under attack, Denmark and its European allies would have a powerful interest to protect it. America can do much of what it wants in Greenland under today's treaties and, under the new framework, Denmark could strengthen them. The extra benefit of being able to colour in the map is nugatory.

All this helped Europeans explain that the potential cost to America was not worth it. Mr Trump's bluster about levying tariffs led some European countries to threaten retaliation. The markets took note of the harm a trade war and a security crisis could inflict on America. Public opinion there is broadly against a costly takeover. Under fierce European lobbying, Congress showed rare signs of standing up to Mr Trump.

The moral is that, to get America's president to retreat, you have to convince him that you will impose a price on him. In most of their dealings with Mr Trump, European leaders have treated him with sycophancy truffled by the odd, muted objection. This time, they were more assertive and it worked.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (9) [FONTE: The Economist, 21/01/2026]

That is where the good news ends. At Davos Mr Trump talked about owning Greenland—which means that he could yet seek leverage by reviving tariffs or even the threat to use force. Even if he doesn't and America and Denmark successfully negotiate a revised treaty that remains short of sovereignty, Europeans should heed the language in his speech. It betrayed an ominous contempt for Europe and for the value to America of the transatlantic alliance as it works today.

Mr Trump said that America has paid "100%" for NATO and never got anything in return. Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, gripes that America has spent \$22trn more than freeloading Europeans on defence since 1980. The administration's security strategy warned that Europe faces "civilisational erasure" from immigration and may soon no longer be a reliable ally.

That is a travesty of NATO's history and Europe's future. It is true that, since the end of the cold war, the alliance's European members have spent too little on defence. But during it, they were a bulwark against Soviet expansion and shared a belief in democracy and freedom. In any case, they are beginning to spend more money again, partly because of Mr Trump's hectoring, but mostly because of the growing threat from Russia.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (10) [FONTE: AXIOS, 22/01/2026]

5 winners from Trump's Greenland climbdown

DAVOS, Switzerland — A four-day [Greenland crisis](#) that roiled global markets, endangered the transatlantic alliance and dominated Davos ended Wednesday the same way it began: with a [post on Truth Social](#).

Why it matters: Details remain thin on [President Trump's](#) "framework of a future deal" with NATO, but the immediate crisis appears defused in a way that allows virtually every party to claim a win — or at least take a breath.

1. Trump — whose speech at the World Economic Forum drew such demand that a stampede nearly broke out at the doors — claimed the Greenland deal gives the U.S. "everything we needed."

- Even with concessions falling far short of total control, Trump can tout the "Art of the Deal" to his base and retreat from an issue that [polls even worse than](#) his handling of the Epstein files.
- The "[Trump Always Chickens Out](#)" (TACO) mockery popularized on Wall Street may sting, but the president's MAGA machine is already moving to sell the deal as a total victory.

2. For Denmark and Greenland, the most acute and explosive threat was removed when Trump ruled out the use of military force.

- The preliminary framework Trump discussed with NATO chief Mark Rutte also includes a commitment to [respect Denmark's sovereignty](#) over Greenland, two sources briefed on the proposal told Axios.
- The longer-term objective — strengthening Arctic security and limiting Chinese and Russian influence — is a strategic interest shared by the U.S., Denmark and their allies.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (11) [FONTE: AXIOS, 22/01/2026]

3. Europe avoided a potentially catastrophic trade war, stood united against Trump's threats and used the crisis to accelerate plans to [reduce its dependence](#) on the U.S. It's not alone moving that way, either.

- Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney was the [surprise star of Davos](#), drawing a standing ovation and extensive media coverage for his blunt diagnosis of a "rupture" in the U.S.-led order.

4. Markets flexed their muscle as a meaningful constraint on Trump's behavior, with the president acknowledging onstage that plummeting stocks had "cost us a lot of money."

- As Trump's tariff threat evaporated, the stock market surged and long-term bond yields fell.

5. Even Davos itself emerged with its relevance renewed, having served as the stage where a true geopolitical crisis was tested, negotiated and pulled back from the brink.

- The oft-caricatured conference remains a factory of buzzwords, but this year's theme — "The Spirit of Dialogue" — proved oddly prophetic.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (12) [FONTE: Euractiv, 23/01/2026]

Von der Leyen says EU unity helped defuse Trump's Greenland threat

The bloc's firm, non-escalatory approach helped avert escalation with Washington, the Commission chief said

Euractiv • Last updated: Jan 23, 2026 - 10:26



European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa address reporters after Thursday's summit. (EU COUNCIL PHOTO)

The EU's firm but non-escalatory response was decisive in persuading US President Donald Trump to step back from threats over Greenland, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Thursday.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (13) [FONTE: Euractiv, 23/01/2026]

Speaking at a press conference, von der Leyen said the bloc's unity and restraint had been instrumental in getting Trump to drop his threats on Wednesday.

"It was very clear in the discussion that we were successful withstanding, by being firm but non-escalatory and most importantly, very united," the Commission president said.

Asked by *Euractiv* whether other factors – including diplomacy by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, domestic US politics or market volatility – had played a greater role, von der Leyen acknowledged their possible influence but insisted EU strategy was central.

"All the elements you have just mentioned may also have played a role without any question, but without firmness, non-escalatory responses, and unity in the European Union, they would not have worked," she said.

EU capitals had been divided over how to respond to Trump's aggressive posture on Greenland. [France](#) pushed for the immediate activation of the bloc's anti-coercion instrument, its most powerful trade defence, while Italy's [Giorgia Meloni](#) and Germany's Friedrich Merz urged a more measured approach.

Von der Leyen suggested the EU was ready to retaliate had the tariffs been imposed on 1 February, though neither she nor Costa referred explicitly to the anti-coercion instrument – informally dubbed the "[trade bazooka](#)".

"We are well prepared with trade countermeasures and non-tariff instruments if tariffs would have been applied," she said.

Both leaders also urged the European Parliament to move ahead with [ratification](#) of the EU-US trade agreement, which some MEPs had threatened to suspend earlier this week.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (14) [FONTE: Aaron Blake / CNN, 22/01/2026]

Trump's Greenland framework sounds a lot like an already existing 1951 deal

[Aaron Blake](#)



After President Donald Trump said suddenly Wednesday that he had secured the “framework of a future deal” on Greenland, nearly everyone involved was conspicuously tight-lipped about what it entailed.

Asked to detail the terms, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte simply referred to Trump’s social media post, which [included almost none](#).

When CNN’s Kaitlan Collins asked Trump whether it met his demand to own Greenland, he [paused and avoided the question](#). He said instead, “It’s a long-term deal.” He called it “infinite,” and said, “It’s a deal that’s forever.”

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (15) [FONTE: Aaron Blake / CNN, 22/01/2026]

That response appears to be telling in more than one way.

Not only did Trump tellingly avoid the question about his central demand (which he appears to have folded on), but he referred to an aspect of the framework that ... already exists in a security agreement the US has with Denmark, which controls Greenland.

That deal, which was forged in 1951, [already allowed](#) for an American military presence on Greenland in perpetuity. Yet Trump keeps talking about that as if it's a major advance.

"There's no time limit," he repeated Thursday morning on Fox Business Network.

Indeed, while we have much to learn about the details, and the details still need to be ironed out – CNN reported Thursday that [no actual document exists yet](#) – much of what we have learned sounds a lot like what the United States already had.

And that, in turn, makes it look a whole lot like Trump folded – or TACOed, as is the current parlance.

Here's [what we think we know](#) about the framework, which is still just a verbal understanding between Trump and Rutte

- It involves discussions about updating that 1951 deal.
- Trump claimed it would allow for "total access" for defense – including the placement of the [Golden Dome defense system](#), similar to Israel's.
- The updated deal could include specific provisions barring Beijing and Moscow from operating in Greenland, suggested a NATO spokesperson.
- It also appears to involve an enhanced role for NATO in Greenland.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (16) [FONTE: U.S. Department of State / Defense Greenland]

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 04-806

DEFENSE

Greenland

**Agreement between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and DENMARK**

Amending and Supplementing the
Agreement of April 27, 1951

Signed at Igaliku August 6, 2004

with

Joint Declarations



AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, INCLUDING THE HOME RULE GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND, TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT OF 27 APRIL 1951 PURSUANT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK CONCERNING THE DEFENSE OF GREENLAND (DEFENSE AGREEMENT) INCLUDING RELEVANT SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS RELATED THERETO

The Parties

- Considering the development of Greenland since the conclusion of the Defense Agreement, including the change of Greenland's status from colony to that of an equal part of the Kingdom of Denmark under the Constitution and the establishment of a wide ranging Greenland Home Rule;
- Considering that the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark always consults and cooperates closely with the Home Rule Government of Greenland in affairs of state of particular importance to Greenland;
- Considering United States military activities since the conclusion of the Defense Agreement, including the reduction of defense areas in Greenland;
- Wishing to facilitate and improve local cooperation between the United States military authorities and the Danish authorities, including Greenland Home Rule authorities;
- Considering their common goal of international peace and peaceful co-existence, and respecting the important contribution of Greenland to this end;
- Acknowledging Greenland's contribution to the mutual security interests and its consequent sharing of the associated risks and responsibilities, and the commitment of the Parties to continuing close cooperation within NATO in ensuring North Atlantic security;

NOTE and AGREE as follows:

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (17) [FONTE: U.S. Department of State / Defense Greenland]

Article 1: Defense Areas

1. Thule Air Base is the only defense area in Greenland. The provisions of Article II of the Defense Agreement shall apply to the establishment of new defense areas.

2. The flag of the Kingdom of Denmark, the flag of Greenland and the flag of the United States shall fly over Thule Air Base. To facilitate cooperation concerning the protection and internal security of Thule Air Base, Danish and Greenland authorities shall assist the United States authorities as requested and appropriate, and consistent with existing agreements and arrangements.

Article 2: NATO Status of Forces Agreement

1. The Parties note that the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) has applied in Greenland since 1955.

2. The Parties agree that the terms of Article VII of the Defense Agreement shall apply as a supplementary agreement to the NATO SOFA between the Parties.

3. The Parties agree that the terms of Article VIII of the Defense Agreement are superseded by the corresponding provisions of the NATO SOFA.

4. The Parties agree that the terms of Article IX of the Defense Agreement shall apply as a supplementary agreement to the NATO SOFA between the Parties.

5. The Parties agree that the first sentence of Article X of the Defense Agreement is deleted, and that the term "such NATO agreement" in that Article refers to the NATO SOFA.

Article 3: Local Cooperation

1. The Parties confirm that:

a. The provision contained in the final clause of the second sentence of Article VI of the Defense Agreement, relating to contact between United States personnel and the local population, was revoked in 1986 and is not in effect.

b. In the exceptional case of planned landings of military aircraft in Greenland outside airports, the Government of the United States consults with and informs the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, in order to ensure due protection of the environment and hunting areas in Greenland.

c. Consistent with the Defense Agreement, as amended herein, and the Memorandum of Understanding of March 13, 1991, and without prejudice to other relevant agreements and arrangements between the Parties, the Government of the United States will consult with and inform the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, prior to the implementation of any significant changes to United States military operations or facilities in Greenland.

2. The Parties agree that to enhance local cooperation

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (18) [FONTE: U.S. Department of State / Defense Greenland]

a. The Home Rule Government of Greenland may appoint a representative with whom the U.S. commanding officer at Thule Air Base will consult on local affairs that affect the Home Rule Government of Greenland. The appointment of such a representative does not affect the status of the Danish liaison officer in relation to the U.S. commanding officer.


b. The Parties note and declare that they shall consult without undue delay regarding any question which one of the Parties may raise concerning matters pertaining to the U.S. military presence in Greenland and covered by the Defense Agreement and this agreement. To the extent that such matters cannot be resolved through local consultation, the Parties shall consult with each other either in the Permanent Committee or through diplomatic channels, as appropriate.

Article 4: Entry Into Force and Amendment

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature, and shall remain in force for the duration of the Defense Agreement. This Agreement may be amended at any time by mutual agreement of the Parties.


Done at Igaliku this sixth day of August 2004 in duplicate, in the English and Danish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America




Colin L. Powell

For the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland



Per Stig Møller
For the Government of Denmark



Josef Motzfeldt
For the Home Rule Government of Greenland

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (19) [FONTE: George Allison /UKDJ, 22/01/2026]

NATO shifts Arctic command under Norfolk headquarters

NATO has elevated the strategic importance of the High North by realigning its operational command boundaries, placing the Arctic and Nordic region under a single transatlantic command structure centred on Joint Force Command Norfolk.

[George Allison](#) January 22, 2026



The move significantly strengthens NATO's ability to plan, coordinate and respond across the northern flank.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (20) [FONTE: George Allison / UKDJ, 22/01/2026]

Speaking after the Military Committee meeting in Brussels, Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexis Grynkewich confirmed that the alliance has already adjusted its internal command geography to reflect the changing security environment. He explained that operational boundaries were restructured so that Nordic nations and Arctic responsibilities now sit together under one headquarters.

"One of the things that we recently did was realign the boundaries of our operations areas," Grynkewich said. "That put all of the Nordic nations in the Arctic under one command, our Joint Force Command in Norfolk."

While presented as a technical adjustment, the change carries strategic weight. Joint Force Command Norfolk was originally reactivated to protect Atlantic sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. By extending its remit northward, NATO is effectively reinforcing the transatlantic link in the High North without formally creating a new Arctic operation or standing force. Grynkewich stressed that the move does not represent the launch of a dedicated Arctic mission, nor has political guidance been issued to begin detailed planning. However, he made clear that the alliance is deliberately positioning itself to respond quickly if required.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (21) [FONTE: George Allison / UKDJ, 22/01/2026]

The choice of Norfolk is significant. As a US-led command with a strong maritime focus, it provides a framework that naturally integrates American and European forces across the North Atlantic and Arctic approaches. Grynkewich noted that the headquarters is already well postured to handle northern issues due to its geographic responsibilities and existing expertise.



“That command is very well postured to continue looking at Arctic issues,” he said.

NATO officials made clear however, that this adjustment fits within the alliance’s broader 360-degree defence posture rather than representing a shift away from priorities elsewhere. Grynkewich argued that deterrence in the Arctic cannot be treated as a standalone problem, particularly as climate change opens new maritime routes and increases military activity in the region.

“We have a 360-degree approach to the threat,” he said, adding that NATO has already been conducting Arctic operations and exercises and will continue to do so while awaiting further political direction.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (22) [FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 20/01/2026]



Donald J. Trump  
@realDonaldTrump



4.57k ReTruths 19.1k Likes

Jan 20, 2026 at 6:00 AM

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (23) [FONTE: Politiken, 22/01/2026]

Trump and Rutte have a framework deal on Greenland, but details are murky. It may involve U.S. bases with sovereign authority, challenging Greenland's autonomy.

Rutte and Trump's framework deal could see Greenland yield sovereignty to U.S. bases



U.S. President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, on January 21, 2026. Foto: Jonathan Ernst/Ritzau Scanpix

JACOB FUGLSANG
USA-korrespondent



LYT TIL ARTIKLEN



GEM ARTIKLEN

NEWS

22. JANUAR 2026, 07.32

KOMMENTARER

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (24) [FONTE: Politiken, 22/01/2026]

Will the U.S. now have bases in Greenland with American sovereignty, only to be used for military purposes?

We don't know. The framework agreement reached between U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remains as dark as a January night.

This article is a translation

This article was originally published in Danish. It has been translated with the help of AI and subsequently proofread by a member of the editorial staff.

Read more about how to [subscribe to Politiken Edition here](#)

But we do know that Rutte has been working on the idea for some time, according to [The New York Times](#). Officials who have anonymously discussed the idea compare it to Britain's bases in Cyprus, which are considered British territory. According to them, the idea was brought up during the meeting between Rutte and Trump.

Britain has two military base areas in Cyprus, called Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which together form the so-called Sovereign Base Areas. These areas are British sovereign territory and do not fall under Cyprus or the EU, even though they are located in the middle of the island.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (25) [FONTE: Politiken, 22/01/2026]

Britain has two military base areas in Cyprus, called Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which together form the so-called Sovereign Base Areas. These areas are British sovereign territory and do not fall under Cyprus or the EU, even though they are located in the middle of the island.

Sovereignty was established in 1960 when Cyprus became independent and is internationally recognized. It is narrowly defined: the bases can only be used for military purposes and cannot be developed as colonies. Britain has full legal and administrative control in the areas, even though Cypriot civilians live there, and Cyprus has no sovereign authority there.



Well it's a little bit complex but we'll explain it down the line

Trump was asked by CNN whether the desire for ownership had been abandoned.

Rutte has envisioned this framework as a way to satisfy Trump's desire to acquire new territory. The question is whether it can fit within the Danish Realm and not deprive Greenlanders of their independence.

Several uncertainties

On Wednesday evening, Trump wrote on Truth Social that he and Rutte have now »formed the framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland and, in fact, the entire Arctic Region.«

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (26) [FONTE: Politiken, 22/01/2026]

What will Trump say next?

In the days ahead, everyone will be watching to see whether Trump is actually ready to climb down from the lofty perch he's put himself on. The framework deal was struck just hours after Trump told the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in the Alpine town of Davos that the United States should own Greenland. That won't happen if Rutte's plan goes ahead.

Something that might indicate Trump is retreating from the desire for ownership was when he was asked by CNN if that wish had been abandoned.

»Well it's a little bit complex but we'll explain it down the line,« Trump replied, who is usually not afraid to be assertive on uncertain grounds.

Today will likely bring updates from both Greenland and Denmark. Neither country was at the table when the framework deal was struck. They need to be included as things move forward, because as Greenlandic MP Aaja Chemnitz wrote in a Facebook post: »NATO has no unilateral mandate to negotiate anything without us in Greenland. Nothing about us, without us.«



U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media as he leaves the convention center during the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos on January 21, 2026. Foto: Fabrice Coffrini/Ritzau Scanpix

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (27) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

How Britain's Bases in Cyprus Could Be a Blueprint for Trump's Greenland Deal

NATO officials signaled that an agreement with Mr. Trump on Greenland may be modeled on Britain's Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. Here's what that may mean.

Jan. 22, 2026



O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (28) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

Few details have emerged about the framework of a tentative deal that President Trump said he had reached with NATO over Greenland, but one proposal under discussion would allow the United States to own pockets of land in Greenland for military bases.

Western officials [who spoke to The New York Times](#) compared the idea to a 60-year-old agreement under which Britain operates sovereign military bases on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Those bases, known as Sovereign Base Areas, or S.B.A.s, occupy an unusual position in international law, one that is deeply rooted in Britain's colonial history.

Experts said that Mr. Trump may be interested in a similar type of arrangement because the bases could give the United States a permanent presence in Greenland while offering greater control over the region and possibly the ability to exploit natural resources in the territory and the Arctic.

Greenland's prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, said on Thursday, however, that he was not in favor of giving the United States sovereignty over military bases there.

"We are ready to discuss a lot of things," Mr. Nielsen said, adding, "Sovereignty is a red line."

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (29) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

Here's what to know about the bases in Cyprus and what they might signal for Greenland, a semiautonomous territory of Denmark.



Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain speaking at the Akrotiri British Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus, in 2024. Pool photo by Kirsty Wigglesworth

The bases grant more control than traditional military posts.

The British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus consist of two large areas in the southwest and southeast of the island, making up about 100 square miles. They were established in 1960 as part of an agreement that gave Cyprus independence from Britain.

The bases are British overseas territories, like Bermuda and the Falkland Islands, and while the bases resemble U.S. military outposts around the world — like the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba or Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan — the territories in Cyprus are very different. They are not merely areas where military powers exercise control, but are subject to British sovereignty.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (30) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

“It means that officially British law applies, and that the Sovereign Base Areas are actually not in the Republic of Cyprus or the E.U.,” said Prof. Costas M. Constantinou, who teaches International Relations at the University of Cyprus.

The Sovereign Base Areas have separate court systems and police agencies. The borders, however, are largely open and no passport is needed for Cypriots to enter. Over the years, the S.B.A.s have also harmonized their laws on civilian affairs with those of Cyprus, Professor Constantinou said.

He said that the idea of creating American bases in Greenland similar to the ones Britain maintains in Cyprus would likely be much more beneficial to the United States than taking over all of Greenland, which Mr. Trump said was his initial goal.

A similar arrangement, he said, would allow the United States to avoid the expensive and sticky issues that come with governing populations, as the British learned well in Cyprus, while also allowing the bases to “come under full U.S. control.”

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (31) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

The bases could be a jumping off point for resource exploitation.

The S.B.A.s in Cyprus do not grant Britain an exclusive economic zone in the country, which would allow Britain to exploit natural resources in the waters near the bases, said Prof. Andreas Stergiou, who teaches about European institutions and international relations at the University of Thessaly in Volos, Greece, and is an expert on security issues in the eastern Mediterranean.

"The United Kingdom never, never attempted to raise a claim in the mineral exploitation of Cyprus," he said. "Because they don't have full sovereignty."

In Greenland, however, that is something Mr. Trump could negotiate, Professor Stergiou said.

"If the United States intends to exploit the minerals that are to be found in and around Greenland, they have to include a special provision in the treaty," he said.

"Just by establishing a military facility there, they do not get the right, even if the military facility enjoys the special privileged status of the British sovereign military bases of Cyprus," he added. "It's not enough."

The United States already has one military base in Greenland, in the territory's north, and it enjoys sweeping military access to the territory. Creating a sovereign base, however, could be a "steppingstone," Professor Stergiou said. It could allow the United States to raise additional "sovereign claims," which are generally given more weight in international law, in future disputes over resources in the Arctic.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (32) [FONTE: NYT, 22/01/2026]

The bases could lead to tensions at home and abroad.

If Cyprus is any guide, establishing a sovereign base area on Greenland could lead to tensions with locals and other world powers.

Britain initially paid to use the land in Cyprus, giving the local government around 12 million Cyprus pounds (roughly \$33 million) from 1960 to 1965, before halting payments. Since then, there have been a number of [unsuccessful attempts](#) by Cyprus to force Britain to pay for the use of the land.

Professor Stergiou said it was possible that a sovereign U.S. military presence in Greenland would draw similar attention.

"The bases might enhance the security environment and the security of Greenland," he said. "However, it entails the risk to embroil Greenland into conflicts Greenland has nothing to do with."

Greenlanders [gathered in several cities and towns](#) last weekend to protest Mr. Trump's plans to take over the territory.

In Cyprus, protests against the British bases have never snowballed or become overly violent, Professor Constantinou said, because the country has for decades been distracted by its own political and ethnic disputes.

He also noted that there are locals who support the British military presence on the island, especially those who are employed by the S.B.A.s.

While people in Greenland and Denmark await more details about agreement between Mr. Trump and NATO, some argue that any deal establishing a sovereign base area would be a reversal of the international principles of self-determination that have been in place since the end World War II.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (33) [FONTE: Cyprus Mail, 22/01/2026]

'Cyprus-style' solution touted for future of Greenland



File photo: A Trump aeroplane lands in Greenland

A solution resembling that of the United Kingdom's sovereign base areas on Cyprus has been suggested as a potential way to resolve an ongoing dispute between United States President Donald Trump and the Danish government over the future of Greenland, according to reports on Thursday.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (34) [FONTE: Cyprus Mail, 22/01/2026]

The *New York Times* quoted a Nato official who attended meetings on the matter at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss ski resort of Davos as having "compared the concept to the United Kingdom's bases in Cyprus, which are regarded as British territory".

It also said that a second official "**also confirmed that the idea for**



Greenland was modelled after the sovereign British bases in Cyprus".

The UK retained two sovereign bases in Cyprus, in Akrotiri and in Dhekelia, when it relinquished control of the rest of the island upon its independence in 1960. Neither base was ever incorporated into the Republic of Cyprus and both are sovereign British territory.

British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper appeared reluctant on Thursday to suggest that such an arrangement could also be made in Greenland, telling the BBC that "Greenland is clearly part of the Kingdom of Denmark" and that "that remains unwavering".

Cooper was in Davos on Thursday and was asked specifically about the prospect of American sovereign base areas, but said instead that Nato is working on an "overarching framework" which could include an "arctic sentry, similar to the Baltic sentry we already have within Nato".

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (35) [FONTE: UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum]



CYPRUS SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS

Both the Sovereign Base Areas consist of coastal areas of the island, with rolling terrain and cliffs. The Western SBA includes also the low terrain around the Salt Lake, with marshes and beaches, formed naturally between the main island and the former island of Akrotiri. Neither SBA includes any of the mountain ridges in central Cyprus.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA



O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (36) [FONTE: UK Sovereign Base Area Administration]

Background

Geography

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, situated some 40 miles south of Turkey, 60 miles west of the Syrian coast and 220 miles north of Egypt. It has a land area of 9,251 square kilometres and a total population of about 790,000. The island has been divided for some 40 years by a United Nations buffer zone known as the 'Green Line'. Her Majesty's Government (HMG) recognises only the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which administers the southern two-thirds of the island, but not the so-called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'

The Sovereign Base Areas

The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, usually referred to as Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) and Eastern Sovereign Base Area (ESBA), are those parts of the island which remained under British jurisdiction on the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, HMG retained sovereignty over the SBAs, which cover 3% of the land area of Cyprus, a total of 98 square miles (47.5 at Akrotiri and 50.5 at Dhekelia). However, HMG does not own most of the land. About 60% is privately owned; some 20% is UK MOD-owned or leased land; with the remaining 20% being Crown land held by the Administration (including forests, roads, rivers and Akrotiri Salt Lake). In addition to the Sovereign Bases themselves, the Treaty of Establishment also provides for the continued use by the British Government of certain facilities within the Republic of Cyprus, known as Retained Sites, and for the use of specified training areas in the Republic of Cyprus. Please click [here](#) to link to a map showing the location of the SBAs within Cyprus.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (37) [FONTE: UK Sovereign Base Area Administration]

The boundaries of the SBAs were drawn in 1960 to include the major military installations and to exclude villages and towns. There are three Republican “enclaves” within the Dhekelia SBA – Ormidhia, Xylotymbou and Dhekelia power station. However, as a result of the events in 1974 and other developments over the years, about 10,000 Cypriots now live in the SBAs. In addition, approximately 3,800 military and UK-based civilian personnel and their dependants work or live on the Bases. The SBAs are retained as military bases – not “colonial ” territories. This is the basic philosophy of their administration as set out by HMG in its 1960 Declaration on the Administration of the Areas, usually known as Appendix O. This stated that the main objectives to be achieved in the administration of the areas were to be:

- *Effective use of the SBAs as military bases;*
- *Full co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus; .*
- *Protection of the interests of those resident or working in the SBAs.*

The Secretary of State for Defence confirmed HMG’s continuing commitment to the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus in a Statement to Parliament on 15 December 2011. Because the SBAs are primarily required as military bases, the Administrator reports to Secretary of State for Defence in London. It has no formal connection with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the British High Commission in Nicosia, although there are close informal links with both on policy matters.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (38) [FONTE: UK Gov. Blog / 9/02/2021]

Overseas Bases in focus: Cyprus

Conrad Beckett • 9 February 2021



Each year thousands of military and civilian personnel are deployed to Britain's overseas bases, and Strategic Command leads defence on supporting those bases.

Britain maintains a number of Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus which include Akrotiri, Episkopi, Dhekelia and Ayios Nikolaos. These have remained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom on the island of Cyprus since its independence in 1960.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (39) [FONTE: UK Gov. Blog / 9/02/2021]



The SBA Administration plays a key role in maintaining a close relationship with the Republic of Cyprus, and Area Offices, manned by Locally Employed Civilians (LECs) in both Dhekelia and Akrotiri, are the main conduit between the organisation and the Cypriot citizens living within the SBAs. They also liaise with residents and the Republic of Cyprus authorities on numerous issues, including land development and business licences.

British Forces Cyprus, the military arm of the Bases, is well-known throughout Cyprus and has its headquarters in Episkopi. It is very much the public face of the organisation, and is led by a two-star military commander who has a dual-role: the SBA Administrator (the head of the SBAs) and Commander British Forces Cyprus.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (40) [FONTE: UK Gov. Blog / 9/02/2021]



The military personnel of BFC are located in both the Eastern SBA and the Western SBA. They have an important role in demonstrating UK Sovereignty in the SBAs and maintaining control of its Retained Sites. BFC also maintain a world class training hub for visiting UK military personnel, and provide essential support to operations across the world.

There are Resident Infantry Battalions (RIBs) stationed in Dhekelia and Episkopi, who are accompanied by their families, and the RIBs carry out a range of on-island roles such as the Regional Standby and Enhanced Light Force Battalion. At present, the 2nd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment are based in Episkopi, and the 1st Battalion, The Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment are based in Dhekelia.

O fim da crise da Gronelândia entre os aliados da NATO? (41) [FONTE: Cartoon de Chappatte / Le Temps, 21/01/2026]



Trump fait trembler Davos

21 janvier 2026



Mots-clés : Suisse, Davos, World Economic Forum, Trump, Pouvoir, Diplomatie, OTAN, ONU, Economie, Climat, Environnement

© Chappatte dans Le Temps, Genève



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A transformação mundial em curso (1)

[FONTE: Fórum Económico Mundial, 20/01/2026]



FORUM IN FOCUS

Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada

Jan 20, 2026



A transformação mundial em curso (2)

[FONTE: Fórum Económico Mundial, 20/01/2026]

Today I will talk about a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints.

On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the other countries, especially intermediate powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.

The power of the less power starts with honesty.

[Carney returns to speaking in English]

It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

And this aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable, as the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself.

And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along, to accommodate, to avoid trouble, to hope that compliance will buy safety.

Well, it won't.

So, what are our options?

A transformação mundial em curso (3)

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called *The Power of the Powerless*, and in it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

And his answer began with a greengrocer.

Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: 'Workers of the world unite'. He doesn't believe it, no-one does, but he places a sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persists – not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this “living within a lie”.

The system's power comes not from its truth, but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes from the same source. When even one person stops performing, when the greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack. Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

A transformação mundial em curso (4)

[FONTE: Fórum Económico Mundial, 20/01/2026]

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

A transformação mundial em curso (5)

[FONTE: Fórum Económico Mundial, 20/01/2026]

Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving are under threat. And as a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

And this impulse is understandable. A country that can't feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself, has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let's be clear eyed about where this leads.

A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and less sustainable. And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate.

Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

A transformação mundial em curso (6)

[FONTE: Fórum Económico Mundial, 20/01/2026]

Argue, the middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

But I'd also say that great powers, great powers can afford for now to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.

But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination. In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain strong, if we choose to wield them together – which brings me back to Havel.

What does it mean for middle powers to live the truth?

First, it means naming reality. Stop invoking rules-based international order as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is – a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests, using economic integration as coercion.

A transformação mundial em curso (7)

[FONTE: Alejandro Reyes / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

ARGUMENT *An expert's point of view on a current event.*

Carney Come Lately

The Canadian leader's Davos speech is a masterclass in realism—and an overdue admission of hypocrisy.

By [Alejandro Reyes](#), an adjunct professor and senior fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong.



Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivers a speech during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 20. FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Listen to this article

◀ - 1.0x + ▶



00:00 / 10:46

[Share feedback](#)

A transformação mundial em curso (9)

[FONTE: Alejandro Reyes / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

The timing mattered, too. Carney did not come to Davos only from Ottawa. He came via Beijing, where Canada had just concluded a new “strategic partnership” with China. That diplomatic prelude gave his Davos message a different weight. Canada was not merely describing a harsher world. It was adjusting to one.

Carney called the rules-based international order a “pleasant fiction,” warned that major powers were increasingly acting as if they faced “no constraints,” and rejected the hope that compliance would buy safety. His message was blunt—and persuasive.

Yet there is a problem at the heart of his speech. It is not that Carney is wrong. It is that he is late—and lateness shapes credibility.

Carney framed his appeal around “middle powers,” countries that cannot dictate global outcomes but can pool leverage and build coalitions. It is an attractive image but an increasingly imprecise category. In a world structured by China-U.S. rivalry, “middle power” risks becoming shorthand for almost everyone outside the two poles: states that are not writing the rules yet can be made to live with outcomes they did not choose.

A transformação mundial em curso (10)

[FONTE: Alejandro Reyes / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

The more useful question is not whether a country is “middle” but how much agency it retains—how much latitude it has to hinge between the rival poles, diversify, and still act in its own interest without being disciplined by dependency. This was what Carney’s speech was really about. Canada is not discovering powerlessness; it is discovering constraint.

Days earlier in Singapore, Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing offered a [parallel diagnosis](#) at the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting of defense officials: The rules-based order is fading, enforcement is weakening, and smaller states are right to worry about a world where “might is right.” Yet his framing carried a different undertone. For Singapore, this is not a shocking rupture from a comfortable past. It is the underlying condition of international life, managed through capability, relevance, and coalition-building. Both Chan and Carney reached for the same now common aphorism—if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu—but in Singapore’s case, it lands less as theater than as doctrine.

A transformação mundial em curso (10)

[FONTE: Alejandro Reyes / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

Carney applied the metaphor to the international order. For decades, he said, countries such as Canada joined the institutions, praised the principles, and benefited from stability. But they also understood that the story was “partially false.” Trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. International law was applied with varying rigor depending on who was accused and who was harmed. Still, Canada kept the sign in the window.

This is where the speech becomes quietly incriminating. Carney’s honesty is refreshing, but it also exposes complicity. The order endured not only because great powers dominated but because partners accepted the gap between rhetoric and reality as the price of predictability. The lie persisted because it was useful, expedient, and profitable.

Carney described this as a bargain that no longer works. True. But it raises the question that he did not confront directly: If Canada knew, why did it avoid calling out double standards when the costs were borne by weaker states?

A transformação mundial em curso (10)

[FONTE: Alejandro Reyes / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]


Carney was right that U.S. hegemony delivered public goods. But hegemony also delivered exemptions. For much of the global south, the defining feature of the order was never that rules restrained the strong. It was that rules were frequently applied through power. This is why today's Western anxiety does not automatically translate into moral authority. It seems more like well-deserved comeuppance. When Canada speaks of rupture, others hear continuity.

Carney's pre-Davos China visit underscored what has changed. It is not only that the United States has become more openly transactional. It is also that China has become powerful enough to set terms in domains where it once had to accept them. Major powers increasingly treat rules as instruments—including Washington and Beijing.

Canada is therefore not navigating a world with one hegemon and a stable institutional canopy. It is navigating a competitive environment between two system-shaping powers, each with its own tools of leverage and each willing to use dependence when it serves strategic aims. Carney's pledge to avoid being forced to choose between "hegemons and hyper-scalers" is apt. It is also revealing. The new era is not only about alliances. It is about the infrastructure of modern life: data, compute, capital, standards, networks.

A transformação mundial em curso (11)

[FONTE: FT, 21/01/2026]



US foreign policy [+ Add to myFT](#)

Who wants to join Donald Trump's 'Board of Peace'?

Leaders from Qatar, Israel, Egypt and Belarus are among those who have accepted an invitation to join Donald Trump's Board of Peace © FT montage

A fledgling club of autocrats, strongmen and monarchs is taking shape as US president tries to recast the global order

A transformação mundial em curso (11)

[FONTE: FT, 21/01/2026]

Six monarchs, three ex-Soviet apparatchiks, two military-backed regimes and a leader sought by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes.

Those are among the inaugural members of Donald Trump's "[Board of Peace](#)", a nascent and idiosyncratic rival to the UN that has rattled Europe and delighted the autocracies seeking to ingratiate themselves in the US president's new world order.

"It's going to be the most prestigious board ever formed," [Trump](#) promised before the official unveiling. "I have some controversial people on it but these are people that get the job done, these are people that have tremendous influence."

That was even before Russian President [Vladimir Putin](#) had finished "studying all the details" of his personal invitation to join, and decided if he would pay \$1bn for lifetime membership of an institution with one lifetime chair: Trump himself. The US president said on Wednesday evening that Putin was aboard.

The board began as the brainchild of Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, as a means to end the war in [Gaza](#). But it has grown, within just a few weeks, into a cure-all for all the world's conflicts.

A transformação mundial em curso (12)

[FONTE: FT, 21/01/2026]

Which countries have agreed to join Trump's Board of Peace?

Country	Accepted	Rejected
Israel	✓	-
Azerbaijan	✓	-
United Arab Emirates	✓	-
Morocco	✓	-
Vietnam	✓	-
Kazakhstan	✓	-
Hungary	✓	-
Argentina	✓	-
Armenia	✓	-
Belarus	✓	-
Egypt	✓	-
Kosovo	✓	-
Pakistan	✓	-
Paraguay	✓	-

A transformação mundial em curso (13)

[FONTE: FT, 21/01/2026]

Pakistan	✓	-
Paraguay	✓	-
Albania	✓	-
Uzbekistan	✓	-
Bahrain	✓	-
Saudi Arabia	✓	-
Jordan	✓	-
Turkey	✓	-
Qatar	✓	-
Indonesia	✓	-
Norway	-	✗
Sweden	-	✗
France	-	✗
Slovenia	-	✗

Countries who have formally accepted or rejected an invitation to join Trump's Board of Peace as member states; latest available information as of January 21 7pm GMT

A transformação mundial em curso (14)

[FONTE: FT, 21/01/2026]

Executive appointments to Trump's Board of Peace

Individuals appointed to one of the executive boards

 <p>Marco Rubio US secretary of state US</p>	 <p>Steve Witkoff US special envoy to the Middle East US</p>	 <p>Jared Kushner Trump's son-in-law and businessman US</p>	 <p>Marc Rowan Chief executive and co-founder of Apollo Global Management US</p>	 <p>Robert Gabriel US deputy national security adviser US</p>	 <p>Major General Jasper Jeffers III Appointed commander of the International Stabilization Force in Gaza US</p>
 <p>Ajay Banga President of the World Bank Group INDIA/US</p>	 <p>Sir Tony Blair Former UK prime minister UK</p>	 <p>Hakan Fidan Turkish minister of foreign affairs TURKEY</p>	 <p>Ali Al-Thawadi Qatari diplomat QATAR</p>	 <p>Major General Hassan Mahmoud Rashad Director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service EGYPT</p>	 <p>Reem Al-Hashimy Emirati minister for International Cooperation UAE</p>
 <p>Sigrid Kaag UN special coordinator for Middle East peace process NETHERLANDS</p>	 <p>Yakir Gabay Businessman CYPRUS/ISRAEL</p>	 <p>Nickolay Mladenov Appointed director-general of Gaza Board of Peace BULGARIA</p>			

Latest available information as of January 21 7pm GMT

A transformação mundial em curso (14)

[FONTE: Richard Gowen / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

ARGUMENT *An expert's point of view on a current event.*

The Board of Discord

Trump's "Board of Peace" is neither an alternative to the U.N. nor a harmless vanity project but a threat to international cooperation.

By **Richard Gowen**, the program director for global issues and institutions at the International Crisis Group, and **Daniel Forti**, the head of U.N. affairs at the International Crisis Group.



U.S. President Donald Trump (seated) holds up his signature on the founding charter during a signing ceremony for the "Board of Peace" at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 22. CHIP SOMODEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES

A transformação mundial em curso (15)

[FONTE: Richard Gowen / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

When nations decide to create international organizations, they usually take some time to work out the details. The United States and its allies spent [four years](#) gradually laying the groundwork for the United Nations during the Second World War. But President Donald Trump is not a fan of such drawn-out processes.

Last week, two months after the U.N. Security Council [authorized](#) the creation of a "Board of Peace" to oversee the U.S.-brokered cease-fire in Gaza, the White House sent [invitations](#) to about 60 governments to join the new "nimble and effective international peace-building body."

Washington also shared a draft charter for the board that expands its scope from Gaza to addressing conflicts everywhere. Recipients had a week at most to decide whether to sign on. By Jan. 22, when Trump held a signing ceremony to launch the board at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, more than 20 states ranging from Albania to Vietnam had volunteered to participate.

A transformação mundial em curso (16)

[FONTE: Richard Gowen / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

The speed with which the new organization emerged is not its only remarkable feature. It is also one of the most lopsided international political structures imaginable. The [charter](#), which makes no reference to the Security Council resolution that gave the board its Gaza mandate, much less to the U.N.'s founding documents, contains many of the features common to such international agreements, such as details of its legal status and voting procedures. It even declares that board will have its own seal.

But it also stipulates Trump, appointed as the inaugural chairman of the board in his personal capacity, will have near-total power to veto its decisions. It then offers states the chance to pay at least \$1 billion to secure permanent membership of the organization's decision-making executive board as opposed to a standard three-year term.

While some analysts have written this off as a vanity project or baroque money-making scheme, others [see](#) it as a malign effort to reshape the international system by creating an alternative decision-making forum to the Security Council.

A transformação mundial em curso (17)

[FONTE: Richard Gowen / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

Board of Peace looks like a framework for his freewheeling diplomacy, not the painstaking business of making peace deals stick over time.

The board—which is supposed to meet at the leaders' level at least annually—could prove to be a useful space for its members to kick around solutions to some conflicts that the U.N. has been unable to handle, particularly in regions that are well-represented on the board. The countries signing on to the new institution in Davos include some—such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—that have backed different sides in Sudan's grim [civil war](#). If Trump uses the Board of Peace as a framework—or a diplomatic fig leaf—for these powers to de-escalate the Sudanese war or other proxy conflicts, then that would be a diplomatic and humanitarian coup.

But the board will be handicapped when it comes to dealing with other major conflicts, especially those involving major U.S. competitors.

Washington invited both Russia and China to join up, and Moscow has said that it is studying the proposal. Trump claimed on Jan. 21 that Russian President Vladimir Putin had accepted but this remains uncertain; Putin has [floated](#) the idea, perhaps mischievously, of paying \$1 billion for membership out of frozen Russian assets.

A transformação mundial em curso (18)


[FONTE: Richard Gowen / Foreign Policy, 22/01/2026]

Even if the Board of Peace is not a credible institutional alternative the U.N., the mere fact that Trump created it is likely to hasten this trend. The board's very existence confirms that the United States, the primary founder of the U.N. system eight decades ago, is no longer committed to it. This is bad news for U.S. diplomats in New York City, who may find it harder to persuade other powers that there is much point in bargaining about problems such as stabilizing [Haiti](#)—where the administration does want U.N. help—if Washington's attention lies elsewhere. Some may further feel that the United States conned them when setting up the board last year. Beyond New York, more powers may see incentives to set up unilateral counterweights to the board that would exclude the United States.

Given the Trump administration's general skepticism toward international institutions, Washington may actually welcome some of this disruption. As senior Trump advisor Stephen Miller [told](#) CNN after the U.S. raid on Venezuela at the start of January, the administration sees a world that is governed by strength and power, not laws and institutions.

The Board of Peace may have many of the formal features and protocols of a standard multilateral institution, but it may ultimately be a symptom—and an accelerant—of the decline of the multilateral security system.

Bibliografia



NATO in the Trump Era An Alliance of Interests?

ZACHARY SELDEN

