



# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a polícrise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes**

**SESSÃO N° 17**

**4/2/2026**



# **PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL**

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (1)

[FONTE: Time, 26/01/2026]



# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (2)

[FONTE: Time, 26/01/2026]

Exhibit A for this line of argument: Trump's use of tariffs as a kind of diplomatic hammer. After vowing to hike tariffs on virtually every trading partner, he spent much of the year rejiggering taxes on imports across a range of goods and countries. Trump has deployed tariff threats to shape the behavior of India, Pakistan, Canada, Europe, and the U.K.

He's also wielded the threat of military escalation, and of withholding support, to jolt negotiations in Mexico, the Middle East and elsewhere. His White House has demanded rare earth mineral access from Ukraine in exchange for U.S. assistance. He has told advisers that backing for European defense will increasingly require material commitments to American arms manufacturers.

These moves reflect a worldview in which American power is transactional—not a public good but an asset to be traded. Anna Kelly, the White House deputy press secretary, says foreign policy decisions come down to ensuring that the benefit to the U.S. is clear and tangible. "All of these decisions are through the lens of 'America first' and have direct impacts on the welfare of the American people," she says.

Yet his foreign affairs efforts are not sitting well with his MAGA base. Once devoted lawmakers like former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene now complain that Trump cares more about burnishing his legacy overseas than bringing costs down at home.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (3)

[FONTE: Time 26/01/2026]

"I think the President is stuck between these two impulses," says Jon Hoffman, a Middle East expert at the Cato Institute. "One is to not get involved in quagmires and yet at the same time to maintain American primacy. So which is it? His Administration is staffed with people on both sides of this."

That tension was on full display in the National Security Strategy the Administration released in December. The 33-page document included a lengthy broadside against Europe, describing the Continent as at risk of "civilizational erasure" and becoming "majority non-European." While Congress moved forward with a bipartisan defense bill reaffirming long-standing commitments to NATO and other allies, the Administration's document recast those same commitments as conditional: Europe would receive continued U.S. security backing only if it increased defense spending, accelerated contributions to American weapons programs, and aligned trade policy with the U.S. Allies that spent decades anchoring their security to the U.S. felt as if they were being put on probation.

Many Trump Administration officials say outmaneuvering China has been their top priority all along. The threat to take back the Panama Canal pushed that country closer into the U.S.'s sphere. The \$20 billion bailout to Argentina's libertarian President Javier Milei headed off Buenos Aires from seeking needed capital from China. His efforts in Venezuela are intended to force out Chinese investments in that country's oil sector. But some pro-Trump strategists question the Administration's focus. While Trump kept in place Biden's submarine deal with Australia, preserving a key pillar of U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, his approach to China has otherwise been more transactional.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (4)

[FONTE: Time, 26/01/2026]

At home, Trump's approval rating slid in December to 36%. His unpopularity puts a limit on how much political capital he can spend on international goals. But Trump insists his globe-spanning diplomacy is domestic policy. He sees himself extracting investment promises from the Gulf to build up manufacturing and tech development in the U.S. He wants to open Venezuela's vast oil reserves to U.S. energy production. He made more European defense investment part of the price for support of Ukraine.

As his first year back in the White House comes to a close, Trump says he wants a string of historic deals in year two—a lasting Gaza peace, an end to the Ukraine war, concessions from China on trade and minerals. He also vows to hold Venezuela firmly inside the U.S. sphere of influence—an update of the 19th century Monroe Doctrine he's dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine." If he achieves even a fraction of this, the world will look different. Certainly the coming 12 months will test whether his roughshod approach to international affairs yields sustainable wins—or simply incubates deeper global instability.

"If we end up with a scenario where U.S. alliance relationships are still intact, but everybody is paying much more and investing much more in defense—that's not the worst outcome in the world," says Brands. But that assessment comes with a warning. Trump's bravado risks undermining trust in the very alliances that have sustained American power. If allies start to believe "the U.S. just fundamentally won't be there when a security crisis comes," Brands says, "then we're looking at a much bigger and more disruptive geopolitical reordering."

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (5)

[FONTE: Peter S. Goodman / NYT, 23/01/2026]

## China Wins as Trump Cedes Leadership of the Global Economy

The president used a keynote speech at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland to renounce the last vestiges of the liberal democratic order.



"Everybody took advantage of the United States," President Trump told an audience at the World Economic Forum on Wednesday. Doug Mills/The New York Times

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (6)

[FONTE: Peter S. Goodman / NYT, 23/01/2026]

"The United States is keeping the whole world afloat," Mr. Trump said. "Everybody took advantage of the United States."

By evening, Mr. Trump had flip-flopped on Greenland. He said in a social media post that he would no longer use tariffs to try to wrest control of the Danish territory, at least while discussions between his top aides and Europeans carried forth. The announcement spared the sovereignty of the island, but there was no taking back the significance of Mr. Trump's attack on the global economic order just hours earlier.

The American president appeared in the same auditorium where, nine years earlier, the Chinese president, [Xi Jinping](#), gave a speech claiming credentials as a champion of international cooperation. Mr. Xi captivated the village of Davos with his endorsement of what he described as "economic globalization." His 2017 address, delivered days before Mr. Trump was inaugurated for his first term, resonated as a clear yet futile effort to stave off the trade war that soon unfolded.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (7)

[FONTE: Peter S. Goodman / NYT, 23/01/2026]

Then as now, deep skepticism greeted China's bid for recognition as a responsible superpower in contrast to Mr. Trump's vision of "America First." China's government has long subsidized the making of factory goods that have threatened jobs from [Indiana](#) to [Indonesia](#). China's surveillance state has jailed dissidents, labor organizers and journalists. Its military has [menaced](#) the self-governing island of Taiwan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. Not even its greatest allies would describe China as a paragon of fair dealing.

Yet in the near decade since, the sense has only been enhanced that China is — at least rhetorically — invested in economic values that Mr. Trump has renounced: engagement in multilateral institutions to advance its causes, faith in the wealth-enhancing powers of global trade and recognition that no country is large enough or powerful enough to go it alone.

Mr. Trump used his 90-minute turn before the global elite to underscore that contrast, even as fundamental doubts remain about the desirability of a world increasingly influenced by Beijing.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (8)

[FONTE: Peter S. Goodman / NYT, 23/01/2026]

“China definitely wants to assume the mantle of being the adult in the room, while the United States continues capriciously showing hostility,” said Eswar Prasad, an international trade expert at Cornell University. “The question is whether the rest of the world is willing to accede. I don’t think the world is ready to carry full on into the embrace of China.”

Europe and China are, in some ways, natural allies in an era when the United States has opted for nationalist brio. Both remain officially committed to the concept of rules-based international trade, even as China is frequently accused of breaching the details. Both affirm the scientific reality of climate change, while mobilizing investment and know-how to combat it.

China is the global leader in clean energy technology, designing and manufacturing [solar cells](#), wind turbines, electric vehicles and [batteries](#). Europe, despite recent step backs, has set ambitious targets to diminish carbon emissions — a fact that Mr. Trump singled out for derision during his speech, while thumping his chest for the American return to fossil fuels.


# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (9)

[FONTE: CNBC, 29/01/2026]

## **Unnerved by Trump, U.S. allies are making nice with China**

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is the latest in a series of Western leaders to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Jan. 29, 2026, 3:07 PM GMT



British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday. Carl Court / AFP via Getty Images

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (10)

[FONTE: CNBC, 29/01/2026]

British Prime Minister [Keir Starmer](#) on Thursday was the latest U.S. ally to meet with Chinese President [Xi Jinping](#) in the wake of Trump's [attack on Venezuela](#), his demands for [control of Greenland](#) and [new tariff threats](#).

These longtime American partners are resetting years of strained relations with the world's second-biggest economy as they hedge against Trump's unpredictability and "America First" agenda.



In particular, countries like Britain and Canada say they are eager to diversify their trade relationships with China and look keen to reduce their dependence on the U.S., which has imposed steep tariffs on friends and foes alike.

Before his meeting with Xi, Starmer said Britain wanted a "more sophisticated" relationship with China. He added that "working together on issues like climate change, global stability during challenging times for the world is precisely what we should be doing."

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (11)

[FONTE: CNBC, 29/01/2026]

Starmer's four-day visit to China, the [first by a British leader since 2018](#), comes on the heels of a [similar trip by Prime Minister Mark Carney](#) of Canada. Carney said after meeting with Xi that the two countries were forming a "new strategic partnership," describing China as a "more predictable" partner.

Carney was the first leader of his country to visit China since 2017, as was South Korean President [Lee Jae Myung](#), who [met with Xi](#) at the start of the year.

The prime ministers of Ireland and Finland have also visited Beijing this month, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected to make a trip in late February.

Starmer's trip to China is a "positive step for both sides," said Jean-Pierre Cabestan, an associate researcher at the Paris-based Asia Centre.

"Everyone is getting more realistic with China in a global environment where there are more and more unpredictable developments because of the U.S.," he told NBC News.

China, meanwhile, "is happy to see so many visitors because it demonstrates that China is important, that it's not isolated one way or another, despite its political regime [and] its friction with the U.S.," said Cabestan, who is based in Hong Kong.

U.S. allies aren't alone in beating a path to Beijing — Trump himself is planning a trip to China in April.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (12)

[FONTE: CNBC, 29/01/2026]

While Britain and other countries were thinking about resetting relations with China even before Trump returned to office, “what the uncertainty brought on by the Trump administration has done is to accelerate that momentum,” said Ja Ian Chong, an assistant professor of political science at the National University of Singapore.

At the same time, “there remain questions about how much they are actually able to achieve” with China, he said.

For example, while China still offers robust business opportunities, its economy has slowed and consumption is sluggish, so “it’s not the sort of windfall that maybe some might be expecting.”

“If there’s any hope for exports, they may have to be adjusted to the reality that is the Chinese economy today,” Chong said.

Like other U.S. allies, Britain also has disputes with China on a range of issues including alleged Chinese spying and cyberattacks, Chinese industrial overcapacity, [Russia’s war against Ukraine](#) and China’s human rights record.

For Britain, a particularly sensitive issue is the crackdown on free speech in [Hong Kong](#), a Chinese territory that was a British colony.

Starmer told reporters after his meeting with Xi that they had a “respectful” discussion about [Jimmy Lai](#), a media tycoon and pro-democracy activist who is a British national. Lai, 78, is waiting to be sentenced and could face life in prison after being [convicted on national security charges](#).

China may currently offer more predictability than Trump’s dizzying foreign policy, but that isn’t always a good thing, said Chong.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (13)

[FONTE: Muhammad Azzam / China Focus, 30/01/2026]

## **When the West Looked East: A Paradigm Shift**

Jan 30, 2026

**Mark Carney's visit to China was a significant development in contemporary global politics, reflecting not only growing Western engagement with the East, but also signaling a broader shift in which the East itself is emerging as a focal point of global political and economic attention.**



# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (14)

[FONTE: Muhammad Azzam / China Focus, 30/01/2026]

For the international community, the four-day visit to China in January of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is nothing short of a paradigm shift. Within the previous paradigm—one that had persisted for centuries—it was inconceivable for a Western state such as Canada to engage strategically with an Eastern state such as China in this manner.

In the final phase of this earlier paradigm, ever since the United States assumed leadership of the Western world, Western countries have largely operated in accordance with American preferences and—willingly or not—have aligned themselves with its positions. Eastern countries, particularly Russia and China, have seen the situation more or less through the same lens as the one adopted by the United States.

Western democracies are now confronted with a Trumpian America—an America fundamentally different from the one they had known before. The earlier United States had never really appeared to be an open threat to its allies. It did not issue explicit threats to them. But Trump has told Canada that it should declare itself the 51st state of the United States and submit to the authority of the American government. He has persistently referred to former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as “Governor Trudeau.”

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (15)

[FONTE: Muhammad Azzam / China Focus, 30/01/2026]

## **The other side**

On the other hand, there stands China, the world's second-largest economy and also the second-largest military and political power. Its leadership is neither trigger-happy nor inclined to use threatening language on virtually every occasion and in every matter. Especially in its dealings with weaker countries, China's approach is marked by goodwill and respect. Even toward the United States, its posture is not provocative but grounded in dignity, sovereignty and equality. Its leadership is conveying to the world a message of peace, development, coexistence and shared prosperity. It is genuinely practicing respect for the sovereignty of all countries. It is strengthening international law, international institutions and international agreements. It treats all countries with dignity and equality.

Trumpian America is different. It operates on a doctrine of dominance and power. It seeks to impose and resolve all matters and conflicts through the use of coercive force, whereas China, grounded in the principles of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, is winning hearts and minds in developing countries. Even developed countries have come to understand this contrast and have begun to reorient their foreign policies and international relations accordingly.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (16)

[FONTE: Muhammad Azzam / China Focus, 30/01/2026]

## **Divided global community**

Divisions within the human community have brought nothing but pain and suffering. The division between East and West is one such cleavage. It offers no real benefit to ordinary people. On the contrary, it creates obstacles and hardships. Both East and West must accept one another if the global community is to become a human community in the true sense. Together, East and West can eradicate ignorance, poverty, disease and war from the world.

For the sake of human welfare and progress, the East has long embraced, with an open heart, the international institutions, principles, and laws established by the West.

The East has the potential to play a leading role in shaping a more inclusive and cooperative global order. The East, like the West, possesses the competence and capacity to provide leadership to the world. Trudeau's arrival in Beijing and the warm reception extended by China's leaders were welcome news for those who advocate global peace and international stability.

The visit was a significant development in contemporary global politics, reflecting not only growing Western engagement with the East, but also signaling a broader shift in which the East itself is emerging as a focal point of global political and economic attention. More important, the visit may be seen as a positive step toward bridging long-standing global divides.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (17)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

## Washington's Silence in Asia Is a Gift to Beijing

The Trump administration has done little as China threatens U.S. allies.

By Mira Rapp-Hooper, a partner at the Asia Group and a visiting senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Ely Ratner, a principal at the Marathon Initiative.

January 28, 2026, 10:31 AM



An illustration shows Donald Trump with his back toward a map of the land masses of Taiwan and Japan with the shape of China to his left.

Aida Amer illustration for Foreign Policy

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (18)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

As the world braces for U.S. President Donald Trump's next foreign policy shock, a far quieter American defeat has been unfolding in Asia. Since the fall, the Trump administration has stood silent as China unleashed its fury on both Japan and Taiwan, leaving two close U.S. allies to fend for themselves.

Trump's reticence is not accidental. Beyond a narrow set of economic issues, the U.S. president has evinced little interest in China's profound challenge to the United States, much less how that is playing out in the Indo-Pacific. In a sharp departure from bipartisan policy over the past decade, including Trump's first term, the new administration has spent the past several months in a coordinated effort to curry favor with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of Trump's planned trip to Beijing in April.

For the sake of what will be, at best, a lavish welcome and a modest trade deal, Trump has softened the United States' China policy across the board, including by rolling back essential export controls on sensitive semiconductors and [scrapping](#) plans to levy sanctions on China for large-scale cyber intrusions in the United States. And that's all in addition to leaving U.S. allies in the lurch.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (19)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

It's not just European partners who are struggling. Washington's Indo-Pacific allies have good reason to worry. Xi has already manipulated Trump into showing the region that the United States will slink away from long-standing interests at Beijing's behest. China is not just isolating and intimidating close American partners—it is also demonstrating to the rest of Asia that U.S. commitments are up for negotiation **if the price is right.**



Trump, wearing a suit and white USA hat, stands behind a lectern and mic as he speaks. Next to him, Takaichi smiles and raises a fist. Both wear business formal attire. Teleprompters are seen on either side, with dozens of members of the military in camouflage uniform out of focus in the crowd behind them.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi raises her fist as U.S. President Donald Trump speaks aboard the USS George Washington in Yokosuka, Japan, on Oct. 28, 2025. Tomohiro Ohsumi/Getty Images

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (20)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

That applies even for countries that have courted Trump. By any measure, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first encounter with the U.S. president was a smashing success. Takaichi, on the conservative wing of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has often been compared to Trump by the Japanese press, and the two leaders displayed an instant rapport at their late October summit in Tokyo, announcing major initiatives on shipbuilding and critical minerals. The prime minister **heralded** "a new golden age" in bilateral ties and, before departing Tokyo, Trump **pledged**, "Anything I can do to help Japan, we will be there."

Yet within a week, the president had already abandoned his new ally. Appearing before Japan's parliament in early November, Takaichi was asked about the implications of a conflict over Taiwan. She offered a sober assessment: a Chinese assault on Taiwan could constitute a "**survival-threatening situation**" under Japanese law, thereby permitting military intervention.

While Takaichi's statement was more frank than any past Japanese prime minister's, it was an accurate description of Japan's Taiwan conundrum. Nearly all of Japan's sea lanes, critical energy supplies, and commercial traffic pass near Taiwan. A Chinese invasion there would almost certainly spill into waters and airspace surrounding Japan's southern archipelago. Acknowledging these realities is not saber-rattling; it is basic strategic candor. What's more, for many months, Trump administration officials had been pressing U.S. allies, including Japan, to take a bigger stake in a possible Taiwan crisis as part of its push to share the burdens of defense.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (21)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

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Beijing responded with a swift, if characteristic, temper tantrum. A senior Chinese diplomat in Osaka [posted](#) on social media that Takaichi's "dirty neck" should be "cut off." (The post was later deleted.) State media launched a propaganda barrage questioning Japanese sovereignty over its outlying islands. Beijing [issued](#) travel advisories warning citizens against visiting Japan, [banned](#) Japanese seafood imports, and [blocked](#) Japanese artists from performing in China. Washington's response? Deafening silence.

More than a week passed before the Trump administration even acknowledged that any of this was happening. When it did, the message came not from the secretary of defense or national security advisor, but in the form of a vague [tweet](#) by a deputy spokesperson at the State Department.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (22)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

Days later, Trump held a phone call with Xi, who took the opportunity to **impress** the fundamental importance of Taiwan to China. By contrast, Trump's **own account** of the call ignored the issue entirely, instead touting the United States' relationship with China as "extremely strong!"

According to reports, Trump then reached out to Takaichi and asked her to tone down the rhetoric on Taiwan in an extraordinary instance of the United States representing China's position to a U.S. ally. No senior U.S. official mentioned Washington's alliance commitments or warned China against economic coercion. Nor did the United States rally other partners, such as the Group of Seven, to stand beside Japan and push back against Beijing.



A white plane with a red circle on it flies over a small, mountainous island surrounded by open ocean. Low clouds hang in the sky in the distance.

A patrol plane of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force flies over the disputed islets known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and Diaoyu Islands in China in the East China Sea on Oct. 13, 2011. AFP via Getty Images

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (23)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

Japan isn't the only partner receiving the silent treatment from the Trump administration. In late December 2025, Taiwan **announced** a record \$11.1 billion U.S. arms package, giving Beijing just the pretext it was looking for to demonstrate that such cooperation comes with a cost. The PLA responded with its **largest exercise** in the area since 2022, firing rockets into Taiwan's contiguous zone for the first time and **explicitly** rehearsing how to block foreign forces from coming to the island's aid.

A threatening PLA pattern is now unmistakable: Each major exercise compresses the buffer zones around the island, normalizes operations closer to Taiwan's shores, and raises the baseline for what Beijing treats as routine—gradually eroding the geographic and psychological space around Taiwan that has kept the peace for decades.



A soldier in camouflage, helmet, and sunglasses is seen from below with a drone flying against the cloudy sky above him.

A Taiwanese reconnaissance soldier controls a surveillance drone during a deep battle exercise simulating how to curb invading forces from pushing forward on the outskirts in Taichung, Taiwan, on July 16, 2025.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (24)

[FONTE: Mira Rapp-Hooper e Ely Ratner / FP 26/01/2026]

Beijing's success at playing Trump has been as impressive as it is dangerous. China is charging ahead with its strategy to divide the United States from its Asian allies while playing to the president's ego and dangling just enough economic carrots to keep the administration wanting more. Trump is set to visit China this spring, touting his "great relationship" with Xi and increasingly speaking of a "G2" great-power condominium in which the United States and China cut deals without others' participation.

As part of his upcoming visit to Beijing, Trump's trade deal is unlikely to address any fundamental issues related to China's problematic economic practices. Instead, Xi will likely get what he wants by committing to additional agricultural purchases in exchange for lower U.S. tariffs and possibly further concessions on export controls. Reportedly, the Trump administration is even considering changing the United States' declaratory policy on Taiwan to further satisfy Beijing. In the semantically tangled world of Taiwan policy, every word matters, and this kind of giveaway could have far-reaching consequences.

Doing so will risk a series of effects that are categorically counter to U.S. interests, including those espoused by the Trump administration. Further acts of accommodation to Beijing—even in the form of seemingly small changes to long-held policy, such as adopting language that the United States "opposes" (rather than "does not support") Taiwan independence—will signal to Taipei that Washington is no longer as reliable an ally, and that no one should expect support from the U.S. military if push comes to shove. Taiwan's politics will be further shaped by this poisonous skepticism, weakening support for defense spending and bolstering leaders who advocate for capitulation to China's pressure.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (25)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

## HOW TRUMP IS MAKING CHINA GREAT AGAIN-AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR EUROPE

**Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard**

January 2026

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### SUMMARY

- Around the world, many people expect China's—already considerable—global influence to grow over the next decade, and more now view Beijing as an ally or necessary partner.
- For much of the world, America is globally influential and will continue to matter, but few people expect it to gain in influence.
- In most countries, expectations of Trump are lower than 12 months ago. His first year back in power seems to have caused dramatic shifts of opinion in some places, including India and South Africa.
- In Russia, more people now see Europe as an adversary, while views of America have softened. In China, the EU is held to be a power player that strikes its own stances distinct from those of America.
- Europeans are the world's chief pessimists. They lack faith in the EU's ability to deal on equal terms with the US or China and worry about Russian aggression and nuclear weapons.
- European leaders should share greater honesty about where Europe stands in this post-Western, "China first" world in order to devise a successful strategy to navigate it.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (26)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

## Making China great again

Donald Trump did not go into politics to make China great again. But that is what the latest poll of global public opinion from the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests he has done in the eyes of the world.

A year on from Trump's return, in countries across the globe, many people believe China is on the verge of becoming even more powerful. Even before Trump's dramatic intervention in Venezuela, his aggressive "America First" approach was driving people closer to China. Paradoxically, his disavowal of the liberal international order may have given people licence to build stronger links to Beijing, since they no longer feel the need to fall in line with a US-led alliance system. Meanwhile, "the West" seems to be a spent geopolitical force for the foreseeable future. America's traditional enemies fear it less than they once did—while allies now worry about falling victim to a predatory US.

This splitting of the West is most visible in Europe, and in what others think of Europe. Russians now regard the EU as more of an enemy than they do the US; and Ukrainians look more to Brussels than to Washington for succour. Most Europeans no longer consider America a reliable ally, and they are keen to rearm. These are the main findings of a new poll of 25,949 respondents across 21 countries conducted in November 2025—one year after Trump's triumphant victory in the last presidential election—for ECFR and Oxford University's Europe in a Changing World research project, the fourth in a series of such [global surveys](#). While the data predate Trump's operation in Venezuela, many of the trends identified here seem to prefigure it, and one imagines they might even be reinforced by this intervention.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (27)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]



The world appears to be becoming more open to China; or at least not fear it—an evolution that is in keeping with dominant Chinese interpretations of global geopolitics. As ECFR set out in *The Idea of China* last year, Xi Jinping and others believe the world is experiencing “great changes unseen in a century”, entailing (although not confined to) a power shift from West to East. One way the Chinese are dealing with this—and with America’s hegemony—is to work with other countries to “democratise international relations” by giving non-Western countries more of a voice. In a global order in which (as this year’s survey shows) publics feel their countries are freer than ever to choose their friends, the results of the poll will be music to the ears of decision-makers in Beijing. For decision-makers in Europe, however, the question is how to live in the truly multipolar world many Europeans have long dreamed of, but perhaps never imagined would take shape in quite this way. They also worry the Venezuela intervention legitimises the idea of China and Russia having their own spheres of influence.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (28)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

## Dollar dominance remains strong in reserves, trade, and transactions

Click to compare to other major currencies



INDICATOR DEFINITIONS




Updated November 2025

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (29)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

## Dollar dominance remains strong in reserves, trade, and transactions

Click to compare to other major currencies



# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (30)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

## Dollar dominance remains strong in reserves, trade, and transactions

Click to compare to other major currencies



INDICATOR DEFINITIONS

Updated November 2025

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (31)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]



## Tracking the dollar's international use




The dollar and euro collectively form nearly 80 percent of global foreign exchange reserves. While the dollar-share is on a very modest long-term declining trend, its lost share has been distributed among several currencies.

1 of 6

## Renminbi has not yet made inroads in international reserves

Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves

Percentage  Aggregate (in USD Trillions)




Source: [IMF COFER](#).


# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (32)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

## What does it take to be a reserve currency?

The table below identifies the six essential qualities of a reserve currency. This new analysis evaluates the currencies included in the IMF's Special Drawing Rights basket as well as the Indian rupee and Russian ruble against the criteria and allows us to demonstrate why the dollar is the global reserve currency.

Click on the bubbles to see the indicators 



# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (33)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

## Key takeaways

**The dollar's role as the primary global reserve currency remains secure in the near and medium term.** The dollar continues to dominate foreign reserve holdings, trade invoicing, and international currency transactions.

**All potential rivals, including the euro, have a limited ability to challenge the dollar in the immediate future.** While the dollar's share of global reserves is on a modest long-term declining trend, its lost share has been distributed among several currencies.

**BRICS members aim to leverage financial technology to create a multipolar global currency system.** They are focused on building domestic digital payment systems and piloting cross-border applications to facilitate trade in local currencies.

**Attempts to de-dollarize were seemingly scaled back at the 2025 BRICS Summit in Brazil,** as member nations—facing some of the highest US tariffs rates globally—have become hesitant to publicly challenge dollar dominance. However, initiatives to build alternative payment systems continue under the radar, with sanctions evasion being a key motivator.

**BRICS will only go as far to de-dollarize as China takes them.** The renminbi was estimated to be used in almost 50 percent of intra-BRICS trade. China continues to expand its renminbi settlement mechanism, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). In 2025, CIPS partnerships became more global with the largest banks in South Africa and the UAE joining.

**US President Donald Trump's trade policies are causing some countries to push forward with attempts to diversify away from the dollar, including China.** The administration seeks to curb de-dollarization efforts by employing tariffs as a punishment. But BRICS members have continued their long-term pattern of reducing their dollar reserves and increasing gold holdings.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (34)

[FONTE: Atlantic Council / Novembro 2025]

[WHY BRICS?](#)

[WHY RMB?](#)

[WHY CIPS?](#)

[WHY SWAP LINES?](#)

Click on the **red** dots to learn more about the underlying data.

## Brazil

What is happening?

Why is it happening?

What will happen next?

Brasília is supporting the expansion of infrastructures that advance the renminbi's role in the economy. The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) has established a swap line with the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and announced a renminbi clearing house in Brazil to facilitate trade in local currencies with China. Nevertheless, the dollar remains entrenched in Brazil's foreign exchange reserves and export settlement.

## Russia

What is happening?

Why is it happening?

What will happen next?

The renminbi displaced the dollar as Russia's most traded currency in 2023, while renminbi and gold have become Russia's primary reserve assets. Russia and China have set up a currency swap instrument with a daily cap of 10 billion renminbi, and a cap of 20 billion renminbi on the first and last two trading days of each month. Four Chinese financial institutions with Russian operations are direct participants of CIPS.

[READ THE FULL ASSESSMENT](#)

SIZE OF SWAP LINES WITH CHINA



NUMBER OF DIRECT MEMBERS OF CIPS



## India

What is happening?

Why is it happening?

What will happen next?

India has avoided any initiatives that would help prop up renminbi in the global economy and has instead focused on expanding bilateral currency agreements that facilitate trade in rupees. These efforts have prioritized large trading partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and regional allies, as well as existing multilateral arrangements such as the Asian Clearing Union. Simultaneously, India has been implementing a long-term strategy to reduce reliance on the US dollar by diversifying its reserves, heavily investing in gold and reducing US Treasury purchases.

[READ THE FULL ASSESSMENT](#)

SIZE OF SWAP LINES WITH CHINA



NUMBER OF DIRECT MEMBERS OF CIPS



## China

What is happening?

Why is it happening?

What will happen next?


China has established bilateral swap lines—an agreement between two central banks to exchange currencies—with all the BRICS members except for India, Ethiopia, and Iran and with more than [forty central banks around the world](#). China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) settlement mechanism has grown rapidly and currently includes [176 direct and 1,461 indirect participants](#). CIPS is built in-part to rival SWIFT's messaging system and dollar-based settlement mechanisms. In 2023, [renminbi surpassed the dollar as China's](#) most used cross-border currency, although its share of global trade invoicing remains far behind the dollar. The share of renminbi in global foreign exchange reserves in the third quarter of 2024 dropped to 2.2 percent, from a peak of 2.8 percent in the first quarter of 2022.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (35)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

**Looking ahead, do you think China will have more or less global influence over the next decade, as compared to today, or will its influence remain unchanged? In %**

- More global influence
- No change—it has global influence now and still will
- Don't know or refuse to answer
- No change—it does not have global influence now and still will not
- Less global influence




\*Simple average across ten EU countries polled (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria).

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (36)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

**Which of the following countries or regions, if any, do you think will be the world leader in the production of electric cars in 10 years' time? 2023 v 2025, in %**



\*Simple average across eight EU countries polled (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Estonia and Portugal).

ECFR · ecf.eu


Not only do more people think China is on the rise geopolitically and leading in important industries, but few seem to fear this course of events. Only in Ukraine and in South Korea do majorities of people view China as either a rival or an adversary. Since last year, even more people see China specifically as an ally in both South Africa and Brazil. This turnaround is yet greater in India. Relations between New Delhi and Beijing have traditionally been rocky; despite this, nearly half of Indians see China as either an ally or a necessary partner.

# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (37)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

**Generally speaking, thinking about China, which of the following best reflects your view on what they are to your country? In %**

- An ally—that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner—with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or refuse to answer
- A rival—with which we need to compete
- An adversary—with which we are in conflict



\*Simple average across ten EU countries polled (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria).


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# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (38)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]

**Looking ahead, do you think the US will have more or less global influence over the next decade, as compared to today, or will its influence remain unchanged? In %**

- More global influence
- No change—it has global influence now, and still will
- Don't know or refuse to answer
- No change—it does not have global influence now and, still will not
- Less global influence



\*Simple average across ten EU countries polled (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria).


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# A China e as divisões do Ocidente (39)

[FONTE: European Council on Foreign Relations / Policy Brief, Janeiro 2026]



**Generally speaking, thinking about the US, which of the following best reflects your view on what they are to your country? In %**

- An ally—that shares our interests and values
- A necessary partner—with which we must strategically cooperate
- Don't know or refuse to answer
- A rival—with which we need to compete
- An adversary—with which we are in conflict




\*Simple average across ten EU countries polled (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria).

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## **PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES**

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (1) [FONTE: União Europeia]



# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (2) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## O que é o alargamento?

O alargamento ocorre quando novos países aderem à União Europeia. Na história da UE ocorreram vários alargamentos, que de cada vez transformaram tanto a UE como os países aderentes.

O alargamento da UE contribuiu significativamente para propagar a estabilidade, a paz e a prosperidade por todo o continente.

## Benefícios para os países que aderem à UE

O alargamento traz muitos benefícios para os novos Estados-Membros, nomeadamente:

- estabilidade política
- liberdade, para os cidadãos, de viverem, estudarem ou trabalharem em qualquer parte da UE
- aumento do comércio através do acesso ao mercado único
- aumento do financiamento e do investimento
- normas sociais, ambientais e de defesa do consumidor mais rigorosas

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (3) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## Que países podem aderir?

Qualquer país europeu pode aderir à UE se cumprir os critérios de adesão, também conhecidos como **critérios de Copenhaga**. Por exemplo, os países que pretendam aderir devem ter:

- instituições estáveis que garantam a democracia, o Estado de Direito, os direitos humanos e a proteção das minorias
- uma economia de mercado viável e capacidade para fazer face à pressão concorrencial do mercado da UE
- capacidade para assumir as obrigações decorrentes da adesão à UE, incluindo a capacidade de aplicar toda a legislação da UE e de aderir aos objetivos da União

## Como se desenrola o processo?

Cada país que solicite a adesão à UE deve cumprir os mesmos requisitos estritos e seguir o mesmo processo rigoroso para se tornar Estado-Membro.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (4) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## Etapa 1: Candidatura

Um país que pretenda aderir à UE deve apresentar um pedido de adesão ao Conselho da UE. Em seguida, o Conselho solicita à Comissão Europeia que verifique a capacidade do país candidato para cumprir os critérios de adesão.

Com base nas recomendações da Comissão, o Conselho decide se concede a esse país o estatuto de **país candidato** e se inicia negociações formais para a sua adesão à União. **Todos os Estados-Membros da UE** devem chegar a acordo sobre esta decisão.

## Etapa 2: Negociações de adesão

Durante as negociações de adesão, o país candidato prepara-se para aplicar a legislação e as normas da UE, também conhecidas como **acervo**.

Ao longo das negociações, a Comissão acompanha os progressos do candidato nestas reformas e mantém o Conselho e o Parlamento Europeu informados através de relatórios e comunicações regulares.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (5) [FONTE: EUR-Lex]

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## Acervo comunitário

O acervo da União Europeia (UE) é a coleção de direitos e obrigações comuns que constituem o corpo do direito da UE e está incorporado nos sistemas jurídicos dos Estados-Membros da UE. O acervo da UE evolui continuamente ao longo do tempo e inclui:

- o teor, os princípios e os objetivos políticos dos Tratados da UE;
- qualquer legislação adotada para aplicar tais Tratados e a jurisprudência elaborada pelo Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia;
- as declarações e as resoluções adotadas no quadro da UE;
- medidas nos domínios da política externa e de segurança comum, bem como da justiça e dos assuntos internos;
- acordos internacionais que a UE celebra e acordos celebrados entre os próprios Estados-Membros relativamente às atividades da UE.

Antes de aderirem à UE, os países candidatos são obrigados a aceitar este acervo. As derrogações (exceções) ao acervo são concedidas em circunstâncias excepcionais e são de âmbito limitado. Os países candidatos têm a obrigação de incorporar o acervo na respetiva ordem jurídica nacional até à data da sua adesão efetiva à UE e deverão passar a aplicá-lo a partir dessa data.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (6) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## Chapters of the acquis



Chapter 1: Free movement of goods



Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers



Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services



Chapter 4: Free movement of capital



Chapter 5: Public procurement



# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (7) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

Chapter 6: Company law

+

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law

+

Chapter 8: Competition policy

+

Chapter 9: Financial services

+

Chapter 10: Information society and media

+

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development

+

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy

+

Chapter 13: Fisheries

+

Chapter 14: Transport policy

+

Chapter 15: Energy

+

Chapter 16: Taxation

+

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (8) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy	+
Chapter 18: Statistics	+
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment	+
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy	+
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks	+
Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments	+
Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights	+
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security	+
Chapter 25: Science and research	+
Chapter 26: Education and culture	+
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change	+
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection	+
Chapter 29: Customs union	+
Chapter 30: External relations	+
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy	+
Chapter 32: Financial control	+
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions	+

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (9) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## Etapa 3: Adesão

Uma vez concluídas as negociações, a Comissão dá o seu parecer sobre se o candidato está pronto para se tornar Estado-Membro. Se a Comissão considerar que o candidato está pronto, é elaborado um **tratado de adesão**. Este documento descreve em pormenor os termos e condições da adesão do país à UE.

O tratado de adesão deve então ser aprovado pela Comissão Europeia, pelo Conselho Europeu e pelo Parlamento Europeu antes de ser **assinado e ratificado** por todos os Estados-Membros da UE e pelo país candidato.

O país candidato adere oficialmente à UE na data indicada no respetivo tratado de adesão.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (10) [FONTE: Comissão Europeia]

## Processo especial para os Balcãs Ocidentais

Os parceiros dos Balcãs Ocidentais seguem um processo de alargamento único, denominado **Processo de Estabilização e de Associação (PEA)**. Os parceiros atualmente envolvidos neste processo são a Albânia, a Bósnia-Herzegovina, o Kosovo, o Montenegro, a Macedónia do Norte e a Sérvia.

O objetivo do PEA é estabilizar estes parceiros do ponto de vista político e económico, para que, por fim, estejam prontos a aderir à UE. A UE tenciona alcançar este objetivo:

- prestando assistência financeira
- facilitando o acesso aos mercados da UE
- promovendo a cooperação entre os países da região

A Comissão Europeia adotou recentemente um **Plano de Crescimento para os Balcãs Ocidentais**. O objetivo deste plano é preparar os parceiros dos Balcãs Ocidentais para a adesão através de reformas económicas e investimentos e trazer alguns dos benefícios da adesão à UE aos cidadãos da região.



# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (11) [FONTE: Financial Times, 16/01/2026]

## EU 'membership-lite' plan for Ukraine spooks European capitals

Reforms under discussion would tear up accession rules to allow Kyiv to join in a potential peace deal



European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy prior to a meeting in Brussels last year. Photograph: EPA

Brussels is drafting proposals to tear up the [EU](#) accession system used since the cold war, replacing it with a contentious two-tier model that could fast-track [Ukraine's](#) entry in any peace deal to end [Russia's](#) invasion.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (12) [FONTE: Financial Times, 16/01/2026]

Ukraine, which became a formal EU candidate country soon after Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, sees membership as a foundational element of its postwar future and a definitive statement about its pro-western alignment.

A reference to Kyiv joining the EU in 2027 is included in drafts of a US-led 20-point peace plan under negotiation, despite EU officials estimating that the country may need a decade of reform to meet the EU's strict entry criteria.

But commission officials understand that Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelenskiy will only be able to accept other aspects of a possible peace deal, such as giving up territory to Russia, if he can present EU membership as the positive outcome.

The preliminary plan under discussion would enable Ukraine to join the bloc but with far less decision-making power. Normal voting rights, for instance, would not initially be available to Ukraine in leaders' summits and ministerial meetings, according to the officials.

Under the proposals still being developed, Kyiv would gain incremental access to parts of the bloc's single market, its agricultural subsidies and its internal development funding after meeting post-membership milestones.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (13) [FONTE: Financial Times, 16/01/2026]

"Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures... We're not undermining enlargement. We're enlarging the concept of enlargement," said one senior EU diplomat briefed on the concept. "The rules were written more than 30 years ago. And they need to be more flexible. This is a once-in-a-generation moment and we have to meet it."

But diplomats from EU member states and other aspirational members that have been involved in informal discussions with the commission about the proposal said there was deep unease about the concept. Some fear it would have a negative impact on the bloc's future stability, cheapen the value of membership and upset other candidate countries.

"It's a trap set by Putin and Trump and we are walking into it," said a second EU diplomat, citing the risk to the bloc's unity.

"The EU is once again stuck between a rock and a very hard place," said Mujtaba Rahman, Europe managing director at Eurasia Group. "It has no choice but to expedite Ukraine's accession, yet doing so will open a Pandora's box of political and policy risks no one in Brussels quite fully understands."

Ukraine's progress through the existing membership process has been held up by Hungary, which has blocked the unanimous approval required to formally open and close each of its 35 so-called accession "chapters".

EU and Ukrainian officials believe that if the US is a signatory to the eventual peace plan, it will force Budapest and its close ally president Donald Trump to give way.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (14) [FONTE: Financial Times, 16/01/2026]

But a large group of existing EU members, while keen to support Ukraine, are fiercely resistant to any measures that would either create loopholes in the rules or set up a two-tier membership system, four bloc diplomats said.

"You can't have a merit-based process with a fixed completion date," said one of those diplomats.

"Try to force this down the throat of the member states and they will never accept it," said a senior EU official, warning it would open a damaging rift between Brussels and member states.

Other officials said any move to adjust the enlargement process would also disrupt the ambitions of other accession candidates, and pose wider questions about how the EU interacts with its close neighbours.

Montenegro and Albania are closest to gaining membership in terms of progress through the chapters, and may feel like they are being offered a less appealing prize, three of the seven people said.

It would also raise questions about whether other states that have made little or no progress towards membership in recent years – such as Bosnia and Turkey – would be offered the same enlargement-lite option.

It is unclear how it would affect the European Economic Area countries such as Norway, which are part of the single market without voting rights, or other non-accession but close partner countries such as the UK.

"You're posing huge, difficult questions with something like this," said a third senior EU diplomat. "There are so many unforeseen outcomes possible."

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (15) [FONTE: Politico, 16/01/2026]

## Countries split over plans for two-tier EU

New proposals will offer the chance to become a member of the EU while limiting some decision-making rights — and prospective members are divided.

[COPY LINK](#)



Countries that have waited years to join the EU are divided over plans being drawn up in Brussels to let them become members without the customary full voting rights. | Robert Ghenent/EPA

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (16) [FONTE: Politico, 16/01/2026]

BRUSSELS — Countries that have waited years to join the EU are divided over plans being drawn up in Brussels to let them become members without the customary full voting rights.

Among the handful of nations in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans in line to join the bloc, a split is emerging over the conditions attached to their applications. Some insist they should get the bloc's full benefits — whereas others are happy just to be around the table.

To appease concerns from existing members that a bigger EU would make it harder to take unanimous decisions, the European Commission is mulling granting new members full voting rights only after the EU has overhauled the way it functions.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (17) [FONTE: Politico, 16/01/2026]

The push would make it more difficult for individual countries to wield their vetoes and would stop policies from being derailed. At present, new members get full voting rights straightaway, as happened when the most recent country to join the EU, Croatia, entered in 2013.

Among the powers that could initially be limited is the right of new entrants to block sanctions, among other issues that currently require every EU country to be on board. Navigating around veto threats from populist governments in Hungary and Slovakia has proven time-consuming for leaders.

The prospect of joining without full voting rights is drawing mixed reactions from candidate countries.

Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania — which has now opened all of the so-called negotiating clusters it will have to work through — told POLITICO the measures are a “good idea” and that his country would even accept for a period of time not having a commissioner of its own in Brussels.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (18) [FONTE: Politico, 16/01/2026]

Moldova, whose membership application is twinned with that of Ukraine, has said it wants to see the details of the proposals.

“We stand ready to assume responsibilities at an early stage and would welcome the opportunity to participate in, and help shape, these discussions,” said a senior Moldovan official, granted anonymity to speak frankly. “At the same time, full membership — with equal rights and full participation in EU decision-making — must remain the clear and ultimate objective.”

Ukraine, which has conducted wide-ranging reforms as part of the accession process even as it faces Russia’s aggression, has been reluctant to support the idea.

“If we speak about EU membership, it has to be fully-fledged,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in November.

Montenegro, the candidate country most advanced on its accession path, also insists there is no need to revisit the terms under which it is granted membership, and expects to conclude the vetting process this year.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (19) [FONTE: Politico, 16/01/2026]

The plan regarding reduced voting rights was floated late last year by officials and pro-EU governments to breathe life into an expansion process that is also being blocked by Hungary and a few other capitals over fears it could bring unwanted competition for local markets or compromise security interests. Hungary has repeatedly threatened to veto Ukraine's joining the EU.

The EU's enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, told POLITICO that concrete proposals will be put forward "in February or March."

She added that "a completely new element" is driving a new sense of urgency: "We have external destructive forces that would like to see us fail — they are working against our candidate countries, but we are the main target."


The plan will need to be developed in detail by the Commission before being presented to national leaders and likely discussed at future European Council summits, as well as assessed by lawyers to see how it fits in with the EU's foundational treaties.

While the candidates are deep into the reforms needed to become members of the bloc, Kos said there is still work to be done to convince existing members that sufficient safeguards will be in place. "Negotiations are a technical part; we have to consider the political part, which is the member states," she said.

# Um processo rápido de alargamento da União Europeia? (20) [FONTE: Cartoon de Patrick Chappatte, 15/12/2013]

A European Ukraine?

December 15, 2013



# Bibliografia

