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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (1) [FONTE: BBC, 20/02/2026]

Trump says world has 10 days to see if Iran agrees deal or 'bad things happen'



Trump told the Board of Peace, Trump said that talks with Iran have been 'very good' but historically difficult.

US President Donald Trump says the world will find out "over the next, probably, 10 days" whether the US will reach a deal with Iran or take military action.

At the first meeting of his Board of Peace in Washington DC, Trump said of negotiations with the Islamic Republic about its nuclear programme: "We have to make a meaningful deal otherwise bad things happen."

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (2) [FONTE: BBC, 20/02/2026]

At the first meeting of his Board of Peace in Washington DC, Trump said of negotiations with the Islamic Republic about its nuclear programme: "We have to make a meaningful deal otherwise bad things happen."

In recent days, the US has surged military forces to the Middle East, while progress was reported at talks between American and Iranian negotiators in Switzerland.

The Iranian government has told the UN Secretary-General that it will regard US bases in the region as legitimate targets if used in any military aggression against Iran.

Tehran's UN mission said in a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres that Trump's rhetoric signalled a real risk of an attack - but it said Iran did not want a war.


Democratic lawmakers, and some Republicans, have voiced opposition to any potential military action in Iran without congressional approval.

In his remarks, Trump noted that Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who is also Trump's son-in-law, had "some very good meetings" with Iran.

"It's proven to be, over the years, not easy to make a meaningful deal with Iran," he said. "Otherwise bad things happen."


EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (3) [MAPA: WSJ, 20/02/2026]

U.S. military assets near Iran



Note: As of Feb. 17. Precise locations not known, general area locations shown.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (4) [MAPA: WSJ, 20/02/2026]



THAAD


Missile defense system

In operation: 2008

Range: 124 miles

Max. speed of interceptor missile: 6,138 mph

Crew: 90 soldiers



Air and missile defense system

In operation: 1982

Range: 62 miles


Max. speed of interceptor missile: 3,836 mph

Crew: 90 soldiers

While the U.S. military buildup in Iran is smaller than the 1991 Gulf War, it is the [largest buildup of air power in the region](#) since the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (5) [MAPA: WSJ, 20/02/2026]

U.S. ship deployments in past conflicts



Source: Mark Cancian and Chris Park at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Ming Li/WSJ

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (6) [FONTE: BBC, 20/02/2026]

Satellite images have also shown that Iran has reinforced military facilities, and the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has posted messages to social media threatening US forces.

"The US President constantly says that the US has sent a warship toward Iran. Of course, a warship is a dangerous piece of military hardware," one of Khamenei's posts read.

"However, more dangerous than that warship is the weapon that can send that warship to the bottom of the sea."

Several members of US Congress have expressed opposition to any military action against Iran.

California Democrat Ro Khanna and Kentucky Republican Thomas Massie have said they will try to force a vote on the matter next week, citing the 1973 War Powers Act.

The act grants Congress the ability to check the president's power to commit the US to armed conflict.

"A war with Iran would be catastrophic," Khanna posted on social media. "Iran is a complex society of 90 million people with significant air defences and military capabilities."

He also said thousands of US troops in the region "could be at risk of retaliation".

The chances of passage in both chambers of Congress are not strong.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (7) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

The US could strike Iran. Here's how Tehran is getting prepared



A member of the Iranian Army attends a joint naval exercise between Iran and Russia in southern Iran in this handout image obtained by Reuters on February 19. *(Iranian Army/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)*

As the United States continues a significant **military buildup** in the Middle East, Iran has taken steps to signal its readiness for war, including fortifying its nuclear sites and rebuilding missile production facilities.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (8) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Iranian and US negotiators held indirect talks in Geneva for three-and-a-half hours on Tuesday, but it ended with no clear resolution. Iran's top diplomat Abbas Araghchi said both sides agreed on a set of "guiding principles," but US Vice President JD Vance said the Iranians had not acknowledged "red lines" set by US President Donald Trump.

Despite ongoing talks, the White House has been briefed that the US military could be ready for an attack by the weekend, after a buildup in recent days of air and naval assets in the Middle East, sources familiar with the matter told CNN.

Amid the threat of war, Iran has spent recent months repairing key missile facilities and heavily damaged air bases while further concealing its nuclear program. It has appointed war veterans to its national security structures, conducted maritime wargames in the Persian Gulf and launched an intense crackdown on domestic dissent.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (9) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Repairs

In June last year, Israel launched a **surprise attack** on Iran that destroyed parts of its nuclear program, severely damaged missile production sites and killed key military commanders. Over the ensuing 12-day conflict, Iran retaliated by launching hundreds of missiles and drones at Israeli cities, while the US struck three Iranian nuclear sites – with US President Donald Trump claiming they had been “totally obliterated.”

Western nations have consistently failed to persuade Iran to curb its **missile program**, which Tehran regards as a central pillar of its military strength and a right to its self-defense.

Despite suffering heavy losses in the war with Israel, satellite imagery analysis reveals that Iran has rebuilt damaged missile facilities.

Satellite imagery of the Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad, captured on January 5, shows that of the dozen structures destroyed by Israel, three have been rebuilt, one has been repaired while three others are currently under construction. The facility houses silo launch sites critical for firing ballistic missiles with earthwork and construction around them.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (10) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Reconstruction at the Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad

Despite suffering heavy losses in the war with Israel, satellite imagery analysis reveals that Iran is rebuilding damaged missile facilities.



Note: Satellite image as of January 5, 2026.

Sources: Airbus (satellite image), CNN reporting
Graphic: Annette Choi and Farida Elsebai, CNN

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (11) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Two other military bases have also undergone extensive repairs. At the northwestern Tabriz air base linked to Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles, taxiways and runways have been restored. In another a missile base in the north of the city, extensive work has been conducted after the war. All the entrances were reopened after being bombed shut, the support area by the entrance was mostly rebuilt and some tunnels are now open, according to a CNN analysis and Sam Lair, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS).

At Hamadan Airbase in western Iran, craters created by bombs on the runway have been filled and aircraft shelters repaired, according to a CNN analysis and Lair.

Iran has also swiftly rebuilt its largest and newest solid-propellant missile production facility in Shahrud, a technology that allows for the rapid deployment of longer-range missiles.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (12) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Fortifying nuclear facilities


Despite expressing flexibility in limiting its nuclear program, Iran is rapidly fortifying several of its nuclear facilities, using concrete and large amounts of soil to bury key sites, according to new satellite imagery and analysis from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).

High-resolution satellite imagery from February 10, 2026, analyzed by ISIS, shows Iran continuing to harden tunnel entrances at the underground complex carved into Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz. Fresh concrete is visible at both the western and eastern entrances, increasing protection that could help shield the facility from potential airstrikes, alongside trucks and other construction equipment at the site.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (13) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

Tunnel fortification at Pickaxe Mountain

A tunnel entrance located close to Natanz Nuclear Facility is fortified with concrete-reinforced headworks.



Note: Satellite image as of February 10, 2026.

Sources: Vantor (satellite image), CNN reporting
Graphic: Annette Choi and Farida Elsebai, CNN

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (14) [FONTE: CNN, 20/02/2026]

War games

As Iranian negotiators engaged with the US in Geneva, Iran launched naval drills in the Persian Gulf to demonstrate its disruptive capabilities to Washington's regional allies.

In a first, the IRGC closed parts of the Strait of Hormuz for a few hours as it conducted naval exercises, according to Iranian media. The critical chokepoint is located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which one-fifth of daily oil global production flow every day.

Iranian officials have previously threatened to close the strait in the face of tensions with the West, a scenario that could cause upheaval in the global energy market.

Iran's navy also held a joint exercise with Russia in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean, where the two sides carried out a drill to "retake a mock hijacked ship," according to Iranian state media.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (15) [FONTE: Vali Nasr / FT, 19/02/2026]

Why Iran is betting on war

Tehran thinks a drawn-out conflict could eventually yield a better deal than what Trump is offering today



A target is destroyed during a military exercise by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in the Strait of Hormuz this month
© Sepah Nawa/AFP/Getty Images

The writer is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and author of 'Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History'

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (16) [FONTE: Vali Nasr / FT, 19/02/2026]

The US appears poised to launch a major military attack on Iran. The last round of talks between the two countries was an opportunity for Iran to avert war but Tehran offered little to Washington. That is not because Iran's rulers are too obdurate and caught up in their old ways of thinking. Rather they are putting little stock in diplomacy and increasingly see war as inevitable. They see talks more as a trap than a solution and seem to view an unavoidable war as more cathartic than a weak deal. They are focused on how to manage it — and even use it to their advantage.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei deeply distrusts the US president. It was Donald Trump who abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal and imposed punitive sanctions, causing the currency crisis which Tehran blames for domestic unrest; then, last summer, he gave a green light to Israel to attack Iran amid ongoing nuclear talks, and then bombed Iran's nuclear programme.

When protesters took to the streets last December and January, Trump encouraged them to topple the Islamic republic and promised US military support to achieve that goal. Iran's government brutally suppressed the protests to avert regime change. After the crackdown, the US then demanded a new nuclear deal. Leaders in Tehran are therefore not convinced that Trump is serious about a deal and fear he is still looking to topple them.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (17) [FONTE: Vali Nasr / FT, 19/02/2026]

The litmus test for Tehran is that talks and any subsequent deal must guarantee Iran will not be attacked; that the US will abide by the deal and lift sanctions, and that it will not insist that Iran give up the right to civilian uranium enrichment. Yet none of these compromises seem to have been on offer in the last two rounds of talks. Instead, the US is demanding that Iran surrender not only its nuclear programme but also its missiles and regional proxies.

Agreeing to these demands would make regime change more probable. In short, the US is seeking full disarmament of Iran without removing the dire circumstances the country faces: severe economic pressure and the constant threat of war. Iran's government fears it would face either a quick collapse or a slow death — as was the fate of Saddam's Iraq after the first Gulf war.

The aim of Iran's diplomacy is not just to avoid a war but to change those circumstances. There is an emerging consensus in Tehran that Iran will not win anything at the negotiating table. It will instead have to accept war, prepare to manage it, and hope that conflict eventually leads to the change it is seeking — by exhausting the US to the point that it abandons the pursuit of future aggression and agrees to a more favourable nuclear deal.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (18) [FONTE: Vali Nasr / FT, 19/02/2026]

Betting on war is dangerous and Iran's rulers may be badly misreading the situation. But a regime that has its back to the wall is most prone to taking perilous risks. For Tehran, last year's 12-day war was not a defeat; it succeeded in bringing superior militaries to a ceasefire short of realising their full war objectives. Despite the initial shock, Iran was able to absorb Israel's devastating blows and then retaliate. In the end, it was the US that asked for a ceasefire. Iran's Revolutionary Guards were not in favour of stopping the war at that point because they sensed Tehran might eventually benefit if the conflict dragged on and Israel's defences were depleted, leading to mounting casualties there.

This time Iran is preparing for a long war — a drawn-out and costly conflict that will affect US allies and interests across the region. But even if the US launches a massive strike and succeeds in impeding Iran's ability to retaliate against US forces or Israel, Tehran may still retain the ability to use its regional proxies, and target oil facilities and energy supply routes. It could even decide to launch much of its arsenal against the US and its allies before the US is able to destroy it, thus quickly escalating the war.

Tehran may calculate that the longer the war lasts and the higher the stakes become, the US will be more likely to look for a way to end it. Negotiations then could yield a different — and more desirable — result for Iran than they will today. Many in the west will interpret this line of thinking as a catastrophic miscalculation that will end in the devastation of Iran and the Islamic republic's downfall. But it would be a mistake if they dismiss it.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (19) [FONTE: Kelley Beaucar Vlahos / RS, 19/02/2026]

Military tankers for Iran attack deploying near Iraq War levels

'Strikes could occur any time now,' say experts who explain what mid-air refuelers mean for sustained operations

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos • Feb 19, 2026



Military experts say the U.S. asset mobilization in the [Middle East](#) theater is now resembling a real staging for war, with the prevailing chatter more about "when" than "if" an attack will happen.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (20) [FONTE: Kelley Beaucar Vlahos / RS, 19/02/2026]

One of the data points catching the eye of these experts is the number of air tankers — military aircraft used to refuel combat fighters in midair — that are in or headed to the region. Open source intelligence [analysts](#) say there are at least 87 such tankers either in CENTCOM theater now (21) or in strategic locations outside that command or staging in [Europe](#). [Most are KC-135 Stratotankers](#), made by Boeing.

"Pulling the hammer back. Strikes could occur any time now," said one retired flag officer when RS asked him about the tankers.

"This is a snap shot of the dynamic movement. What it tells you is we're getting ready for something here," said the retired flag officer. "There's a lot of movement. They are coming from all over the place. It's worldwide. That's always an indicator."

According to the military, there were about [149 KC-135 refuelers](#) operating in the first phase of the March 2003 Iraq War.

"The size of these deployments ...indicates the force is preparing for more sustained operations," said Dan Grazier, retired Marine officer and senior fellow at the Stimson Center. "The strike last year against Iran's nuclear sites involved a lot of moving parts but only lasted about a day. Nearly 100 aerial refuelers in addition to carrier strike groups and fleets of fighters being moved into the region suggests there are plans for a longer operation this time around."

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (21) [FONTE: Kelley Beaucar Vlahos / RS, 19/02/2026]

"Preparations of this kind mere months after the spectacular strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities suggest last year's actions against the regime weren't as successful as touted at the time," noted Grazier, referring to "Operation Midnight Hammer," which Trump declared had destroyed Iran's nuclear enrichment sites.

The retired flag officer said the number of tankers staged across far-flung air bases means we will be taking advantage of all capacity "at all ranges." That includes two tankers at our base at Diego Garcia from which two B-2 Stealth Bombers flew to attack during Operation Midnight Hammer. [According to my colleague Connor Echols](#) today, President Trump [announced](#) Wednesday that he now wants to stop the UK from turning over the Chagos Islands (home to Diego Garcia) to Mauritius, because the base may be necessary to "eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous [Iranian] Regime."

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, says it looks like Trump may have made his decision.


"It's important to understand that Trump has not engaged in any real diplomacy. Rather, the U.S. delegation has largely showed up at the meetings with demands for Iranian capitulation rather than real engagement. The meetings largely serve to check in to see if [Iran](#) is ready to submit to Trump or be bombed," he said. "This is not diplomacy. A deal can be reached, but Trump does not appear to be seriously pursuing it."

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (22) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

What War With Iran Would Look Like

Decapitation strikes against the country are likely. An invasion is not.

Arash Reisinezhad • February 11, 2026, 5:16 AM



U.S. President Donald Trump arrives to speak to troops aboard USS George Washington at Fleet Activities Yokosuka on October 28, 2025 in Yokosuka, Japan.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (23) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

Washington and Tehran may be closer to military confrontation than at any point in memory, but they are not on the brink of war in any conventional sense. The most plausible outcome of the current standoff is not a U.S. invasion of Iran or a full-scale regional war. It is a limited, carefully calibrated strike designed to reshape bargaining dynamics rather than end them.

In recent weeks, the paradox has become impossible to ignore. The United States has dramatically reinforced its military posture in the Middle East, while Iranian officials insist that they will not capitulate under pressure. Yet both sides continue to speak, often simultaneously, about negotiations. This apparent contradiction is not a sign of confusion. It reflects a familiar logic in international politics: war, or the threat of it, as an instrument of bargaining.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (24) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

Under the bargaining model of war, military force is not simply about defeating an adversary. It is about altering perceptions of costs, resolve, and future intentions when diplomacy alone cannot produce credible commitments. What we are witnessing today is not a collapse of diplomacy but its militarization.

Notably, this dynamic is unfolding alongside quiet but ongoing negotiations in Oman, where Iranian and U.S. interlocutors are attempting to probe each other's red lines and willingness to compromise. These talks do not contradict the escalation underway; they are part of it. In bargaining logic, diplomacy and military pressure often advance in parallel, not sequentially.

From Washington's perspective, Iran appears weaker today than at any point in the past decade. Over the last two years, Tehran's regional deterrence architecture, once framed around the so-called Axis of Resistance, has eroded significantly: Hezbollah has been under sustained pressure. Hamas has been largely dismantled as a military force. The Assad regime in Syria has collapsed. Even Iran's own airspace was exposed during the 12-day war with Israel last year, shattering long-held assumptions about its defensive immunity.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (25) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

Iran still possesses substantial missile and drone capabilities, and it may even have expanded parts of its arsenal. More significantly, Iranian missiles partially broke through Israeli Iron Dome during the recent war. But deterrence is not merely about hardware. It is about credibility. And that credibility, particularly Iran's ability to impose unacceptable costs on its adversaries across multiple theaters, has weakened.

This perception has fueled an intense debate inside Washington about how to capitalize on the moment.

One camp argues that this is precisely the moment to escalate pressure. Iran, in their view, is strategically cornered and unusually flexible. Negotiations, therefore, should be used not to stabilize the status quo but to extract maximal concessions on the nuclear program, on missiles, and on regional proxies. Some voices within this camp go further, openly advocating regime change as an attainable goal if sufficient force is applied. The logic is blunt: Iran's deterrence has declined, its allies are weakened, and its leadership is vulnerable. The advocate of this view asks why the United States should throw a lifeline while the Islamic Republic is drowning. Why settle for limited gains when the balance of power appears favorable?

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (26) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

The second camp offers a different reading. Yes, Iran is under pressure, but that is precisely why negotiations may succeed. This group emphasizes that U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently opposed large-scale military interventions and “endless wars.” From this perspective, the current moment presents an opportunity for Trump to claim victory without plunging the United States into another Middle Eastern conflict. A deal achieved under pressure would allow Washington to constrain Iran while reinforcing Trump’s long-standing narrative: that strength, not war, produces results.

Yet Trump faces a dilemma of his own making. By repeatedly pledging support for Iranian protesters and framing Iran’s leadership as illegitimate, he has raised expectations, both domestically and internationally, that go beyond nuclear diplomacy. These commitments narrow his room for maneuver. Doing nothing risks appearing weak. Launching a full-scale war contradicts his core political brand.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (27) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

This is where Trump's correction strategy comes into play: "peace through strength." In this logic, military force is not an end in itself but a tool to compel negotiation on favorable terms. Limited, decisive action is meant to deter adversaries, reassure allies, and demonstrate resolve, without dragging the United States into prolonged conflict.

These dynamics explain why U.S. policymakers see a limited strike, rather than an invasion, as the most attractive tool. A calibrated strike fits this framework far better than either restraint alone or invasion. It signals resolve, satisfies domestic hawks, preserves Trump's anti-forever-war credentials, and, critically, reshapes the bargaining environment ahead of more serious negotiations. A limited strike becomes likely if Iran withholds the kind of concessions Trump needs to claim victory.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (28) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

An invasion of Iran would be strategically irrational. The costs would be enormous, the regional consequences uncontrollable, and domestic support deeply uncertain. The United States does not lack the capacity to invade Iran; it lacks the political and strategic justification to do so. The shadow of Iraq still looms large, and few in Washington believe they could manage Iran's size, population, and internal complexity without triggering prolonged instability.

Beyond the immediate military and political costs, a U.S. invasion of Iran would also represent a strategic self-inflicted wound in the context of great-power competition. A prolonged ground war in Iran would inevitably divert U.S. military, financial, and political resources away from Washington's primary strategic focus: competition with China. An attritional conflict in the Middle East would raise global energy prices, fuel domestic inflation, strain U.S. alliances, and reduce Washington's capacity to project power in the Indo-Pacific

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (29) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

Military planners understand this. So do political leaders. That is why the debate has shifted away from invasion toward more surgical uses of force.

In the scenario being discussed in Washington, the most plausible option is not occupation but decapitation. Such a strike would target a narrow set of objectives: the supreme leader, senior military and political figures, selected nuclear facilities, missile infrastructure, and command and control nodes. This would likely be followed by a U.S. strategy of escalation dominance, similar to the approach that Washington adopted after its assassination of Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani in 2020, aimed at deterring Iran's vowed retaliation from escalating into all-out war. The objective would not be to destroy Iran's capabilities entirely, an impossible task, but to demonstrate overwhelming escalation dominance.

In this anticipated scenario, the message would be unmistakable: The United States can strike at the heart of the Iranian system, absorb limited retaliation, and still control the ladder of escalation.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (30) [FONTE: Arash Reisinezhad/ Foreign Policy, 11/02/2026]

Iran's response, however, remains the biggest unknown. Tehran could choose a limited, symbolic retaliation, calibrated to preserve deterrence and domestic credibility without inviting uncontrolled escalation. Such a response might involve indirect action through regional partners or carefully bounded missile or drone strikes designed to signal resolve while avoiding a direct clash with U.S. forces. This path would align with Iran's long-standing preference for ambiguity and graduated retaliation.

Alternatively, Iran could reject the logic of U.S. escalation dominance altogether. In this scenario, Tehran might conclude that restraint only invites further pressure, responding instead in ways that deliberately widen the conflict and challenge Washington's ability to control the pace and scope of escalation. This could include targeting U.S. assets across multiple regional theaters, threatening maritime chokepoints, or accelerating nuclear activities to alter the strategic calculus.

The danger lies precisely here. Bargaining through force is inherently unstable. Even when both sides seek to avoid full-scale war, miscalculation, misreading of resolve, or domestic pressures can push them beyond intended limits. Once violence becomes the medium of communication, signals are easily distorted, and actions meant to deter can instead provoke. In such an environment, the line between controlled escalation and runaway conflict is thin and often visible only in hindsight.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (31) [FONTE: David E. Sanger / NYT, 19/02/2026]

As Trump Weighs Iran Strikes, He Declines to Make Clear Case for Why

Rarely in modern times has the United States prepared to conduct a major act of war with so little explanation or public debate.

Feb. 19, 2026



President Trump speaking at the inaugural Board of Peace meeting in Washington on Thursday. Tierney L. Cross/The New York Times

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (32) [FONTE: David E. Sanger / NYT, 19/02/2026]

With two carrier groups and dozens of fighter jets, bombers and refueling aircraft now [massing within striking distance of Iran](#), Mr. Trump is threatening another attack. He is doing so without providing assessments about the urgency of the threat or any explanation of why he needs to strike again after claiming the nuclear sites he targeted had been "obliterated."

Though Mr. Trump is largely fixated on the nuclear weapons program, at various moments he and his aides have cited a range of other rationales for military action: protecting the protesters that Iranian forces killed by the thousands last month, wiping out the arsenal of missiles that Iran can use to strike Israel, and ending Tehran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah.

Then there is the question of whether military force, the hammer Mr. Trump reaches for so quickly, can even accomplish those ends. Most of Iran's near-bomb-grade uranium is already buried from the [last strike](#), in June. And it is not clear how airstrikes would immediately aid protesters around the country or persuade Iran to stop funding terror.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (33) [FONTE: David E. Sanger / NYT, 19/02/2026]

Rarely in modern times has the United States prepared to conduct a major act of war with so little explanation and so little public debate. As Mr. Trump gathered the [first meeting of the "Board of Peace"](#) at the White House to discuss the rebuilding of Gaza, he veered briefly into the topic of imminent action in Iran, describing only the vaguest of objectives.

"They cannot continue to threaten the stability of the entire region, and they must make a deal," he said, without describing the scope of that deal. "Bad things will happen if it doesn't" strike that deal, he said, moving back to the topic of Gaza.

There are, of course, huge differences with the Iraq invasion. As in Venezuela, Mr. Trump envisions no ground invasion. That avoids the often-voiced critique of his MAGA base that Mr. Trump is risking another "forever war." Mr. Trump's calculus is clearly that the base will tolerate bombing runs, which demonstrate the unmatched power of American forces to destroy from afar, as long as the risk to American lives is limited.

EUA vs Irão: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (34) [FONTE: David E. Sanger / NYT, 19/02/2026]

During his first presidential campaign in 2016, Mr. Trump harshly criticized the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the Obama administration, declaring he would have walked out of the room during the negotiations. In 2018, he pulled out of the accord, calling it “the worst deal ever.”

But now he is in something of a diplomatic box. He faces pressure to show that any new agreement he reached goes well beyond the 2015 deal. But the Iranians are resisting, and may well run out of time to find a middle ground.

Then there is the question of whether Mr. Trump will risk war with Iran for its refusal to limit the number and range of its missiles, or ease up on protesters. Mr. Trump has not spoken about either of those issues in recent days, but if he signs an agreement that does not address the missiles, he will appear to have sold out Israel. If he signs a nuclear arrangement that does not stop the Iranian security forces to stop shooting protesters, he will have abandoned a generation of Iranians who see the United States as their last chance to open the country up.



And then there is the influence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who has pressed Mr. Trump to finish off the Iranian regime, once and for all.

EUA vs Irã: negociar, usar a força... e voltar a negociar? (35) [FONTE: cartoon de Chappatte / Boston Globe, 9/01/2020]

Trump's long-term goals in Iran

January 9, 2020





PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (1) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]




A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (2) [FONTE: Alekk M. Saanders / Sur,

30/01/2026]

A disputed island named after a Spanish explorer

The Chagos Archipelago and Diego Garcia Island have been in the news this January, with references to the United Kingdom, the United States, and Mauritius. However, few are aware of its historical Andalusian connection



Diego Garcia Island. SUR

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (3) [FONTE: Alekk M. Saanders / Sur, 30/01/2026]

The first European to discover Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean is considered to be Pedro Mascarenhas, a Portuguese explorer and colonial administrator. However, the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago is not named after him.

Portuguese historians claim that the island's name comes from a Spanish explorer who made numerous voyages across the Indian Ocean under the Portuguese flag. So who was Diego García?

Most likely, he was an Andalusian explorer who travelled in the service of both the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. His biography confuses modern historians, as many aspects of Diego García's life remain shrouded in the mists of time. To begin with, the exact date and place of his birth are unknown, and even his nationality is unclear. Some say he was born in 1471 in Lisbon and others in 1496 in Moguer, in today's Huelva province. (The latter seems most likely). What is certain is that Diego García was a resident of Moguer and sailed several times in the service of the Spanish crown.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (4) [FONTE: Alekk M. Saanders / Sur, 30/01/2026]

Diego Garcia's biography confuses modern historians, as many aspects of his life remain shrouded in the mists of time

On one of his first voyages for Spain, he was captain of a ship in the expedition of Díaz de Solís to Río de la Plata, which sailed from the Andalusian city of Sanlúcar de Barrameda in October 1515. He was one of those who returned to Spain a year later with news of large reserves of silver that, according to the indigenous people, could be found in the Sierra de la Plata in South America.


It is also known that in 1520 Diego García, together with Ferdinand Magellan and Juan Sebastián Elcano, set out on a voyage around the world. Diego García was one of the eighteen survivors who returned to Spain in 1522 after finding the western route to the rich Molucca Islands.

Later, Diego García made another voyage to the Moluccas, during which he sailed past the island of Guam, entered the Indian Ocean, and discovered a fertile island about 400 miles from Mauritius, which has since been named after him.

It has been proven that Diego García made his last voyages in the service of the Portuguese crown. This fact explains the lack of information about different periods of his life in Spanish archives. It is not surprising either that he is often presented as a 16th-century Portuguese navigator.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (5) [FONTE: Alekk M. Saanders / Sur, 30/01/2026]

As for Portuguese sources, they confirm that Diego García de Moguer was probably the captain of Pedro Mascarenhas's fleet, which is believed to have "rediscovered" or secured the island in 1544. It is worth noting that alternative theories suggest that the island was named after the Portuguese governor Garcia de Noronha or is a distortion of the phrase Deo Gracias (Thank God).




A sign in Moguer. SUR

Neither is there accurate information about Diego García's death. One version suggests that he died at sea on his return from his 1544 voyage through the Chagos Islands.


Despite other versions and legends, the Andalusian town of Moguer acknowledges that Diego Garcia Island was named after one of its distinguished sons, and on 12 October 1987, it dedicated a street to the navigator, whose name has been associated for centuries with a little-known island in the Indian Ocean.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (6) [FONTE: British Indian Ocean Territory]



History

The islands of the Chagos Archipelago were uninhabited until the late 18th century, when the French established copra plantations using slave labour in 1793. The islands have been British territory since 1814 when they were ceded to Britain with Mauritius (which then included the Seychelles). For administrative convenience, and following the French practice, the islands were administered from Mauritius. As for the population of the islands, after emancipation some slaves became contract employees; the population changing over time by import of contract labour from Mauritius and, in the 1950s, from Seychelles, so that by the late 1960s, those living on the islands were contract employees of the copra plantations. Neither they, nor those permitted by the plantation owners to remain, owned land or houses. They had licences to reside there at the discretion of the owners and moved from island to island as work required.



A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (7) [FONTE: British Indian Ocean Territory]

The islands were constituted as the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965 by an Order in Council under the Royal Prerogative. This comprises all the islands of the Chagos Archipelago and until June 1976 also included the islands of Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar which were then ceded to the Seychelles, of which they are now part. The Order in Council also provided for the appointment of a Commissioner for the Territory. One function conferred on the Commissioner was the power to make laws for the “peace, order and good government” of the Territory.

The UK paid the colony of Mauritius a £3 million grant in recognition of the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago and amongst other legally binding undertakings, gave a commitment, repeated by successive governments, to cede the islands to Mauritius when no longer required for defence purposes. Similarly, the UK also paid for the construction of an airport in Seychelles in recognition of the detachment of their islands, though these were ceded after Seychelles' independence.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (8) [FONTE: British Indian Ocean Territory]

In 1967 the BIOT Administration acquired the land and the commercial interests of the company operating the copra plantations on the island. As the plantations were in economic decline, their future could not be guaranteed. In 1971, the plantation on Diego Garcia was closed when the island was needed for defence purposes. Closures followed later in the other islands of the Chagos Archipelago. The people affected by these closures were the Mauritian and Seychellois contract workers and their families, who were then given the choice of returning to Mauritius or Seychelles. The majority chose Mauritius where they had close ties and were moved between 1968 and 1973.

In 1971 the Commissioner, acting under instructions from Ministers in London, enacted an Immigration Ordinance which made it unlawful for a person to enter or remain in BIOT without a permit, and allowed those remaining to be removed. This formalised in law the removal of the existing civilian population of the territory to Mauritius or Seychelles and effectively established a prohibition on their return.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (9) [FONTE: British Indian Ocean Territory]

Although there are no accurate figures it is believed that between 1400 and 1700 were removed from the islands. In 2002 on the change to British Nationality law many Chagossians who had British Overseas Territories Citizenship automatically, became British Citizens.

Compensation arrangements for the Chagossians were provided by the UK in the 1970s (£650,000 to Mauritius for resettlement) and the 1980s (a further £4m to Mauritius and representatives of the Chagossians in the form of a trust fund).

There is a small community of Chagossians based in Crawley, Sussex, and another in Manchester. There are also communities of former islanders and their descendants remaining in Seychelles and Mauritius. The British Indian Ocean Territory Administration has facilitated several (roughly annual) visits to the Territory by the eldest Chagossians, and a programme of environmental training for UK-based Chagossians that allows some to become involved in scientific work in the Territory.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (10) [FONTE: US Navy]

 An official website of the United States government [Here's how you know](#) ▾



[Installations](#) ▶ [NSF Diego Garcia](#) ▶ [About](#) ▶ [History](#)

HISTORY

The island of Diego Garcia is the largest of the Chagos Islands located on a large shoal area known as the Great Chagos Bank. Diego Garcia was discovered by Portuguese explorers in the early 1500s. It is the largest of 52 islands which forms the Chagos Archipelago located in the heart of the Indian Ocean. The island's name is believed to have come from either the ship's captain or the navigator.

After the island was discovered, it was forgotten on maps until Diego Garcia was rediscovered and claimed by the French in the 1700s, which she remained under until after the Napoleonic Wars - when possession was ceded to the British.

In 1965, with the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), Diego Garcia was under administrative control of the British government. With the formation of BIOT, a formal agreement was signed between the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in 1966, making the island available to satisfy defense needs of both governments.

During the 19th Century, the islands were used as plantations, producing copra and coconut oils. Until 1971, Diego Garcia's main source of income was from the profitable copra oil plantation. Copra oil provided fine machine oil and fuel to light European lamps. Coconut harvests on the island remained constant, until just prior to the arrival of the U.S. Navy Seabees and the start up of U.S. military construction.

Following a decision to establish the U.S. Navy Support Facility based on the 1966 Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and the United States, plantations were closed. In January 1971, U.S. Navy Seabees were transported to the island by landing ship to begin building the U.S. military presence on Diego Garcia.

Following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Diego Garcia saw most of its build-up of any location since the Vietnam War. In 1986, Diego Garcia became fully operational with the completion of the construction program.

Diego Garcia's strategic location and full range of facilities make the island the last link in the long logistics chain; supporting vital U.S. and British Naval presence in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea.

Today, under the command of the Royal Navy Commander, Great Britain maintains a presence on the Island, with the Headquarters, British Forces, BIOT, and the Royal Overseas Police. Diego Garcia is home to 16 separate commands, including the U.S. Navy Support Facility, which functions as the host command.

The mission of the U.S. Navy Support Facility (NAVSUPPFAC) Diego Garcia is:

"To provide logistic support to operational forces forward deployed to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf AORs in support of national policy objectives."

NAVSUPPFAC Diego Garcia occupies a critical part on the "tip of the spear" for U.S. military forces by supporting a multitude of unique and challenging mission requirements.


A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (11) [FONTE: US Navy Seabee Museum]



Naval History and Heritage Command
**U.S. Navy Seabee
Museum**

Diego Garcia

The remote coral atoll of Diego Garcia is the largest of sixty small islands forming the Chagos Archipelago located just south of the equator in the middle of the Indian Ocean. European exploration of the Indian Ocean was spear headed by the Portuguese when Vasco da Gama completed his initial voyage to India in 1499. This, together with the voyages of Columbus (1492 – 1504), opened the way to global imperialism based on sea power. Uninhabited islands like Diego Garcia were prized as a source of fresh water and havens to cast anchor for repairs.



A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (12) [FONTE: US Navy Seabee Museum]

The first European to discover Diego Garcia is disputed, however it was likely during an early 16th century Portuguese voyage the small atoll was found. The first map naming Diego Garcia was created by Edward Wright and published in 1599. Diego Garcia remained uninhabited for nearly 200 years after Wright's map was published. In the late 1700's the French briefly attempted settlement on the atoll before turning over the island to the British in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). With some uncertainty about inclusion and ownership, Diego Garcia was finally solidified as an entity with the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965. Diego Garcia is shaped like a horseshoe at fourteen miles long and four miles wide, surrounding one of the finest natural harbors in the world.

On 24 October 1972 the U.S. and British governments signed an agreement concerning the construction of a United States Naval Communication Station on Diego Garcia. The purpose of the facility was to provide a necessary link in the U.S. defense communications network and furnish improved communications support in the Indian Ocean for ships and aircraft of both governments. The United States was to build the facility using Naval Construction Force personnel. Diego Garcia has since been in continuous operation and is the only island in the BIOT with inhabitants.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (13) [FONTE: US Navy Seabee Museum]



NMCB-62 offloading cargo, Diego Garcia, circa 1970



Diego Garcia Runway, circa 1980s

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (14) [FONTE: US Navy Seabee Museum]

The Diego Garcia base was initially planned as an austere communication station with all necessary supporting facilities, including an airstrip. On 23 January 1971 a nine-man reconnaissance party from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Forty (NMCB-40) landed on the atoll to confirm planning information and carry out a preliminary survey of the beach landing areas. In early March a 50-man party from the same battalion and from Amphibious Construction Battalion Two (ACB-2), as well as other specialist personnel, arrived by LST, and were followed by an advance party of 160 men from NMCB-40. These men were to construct a temporary Seabee camp, water and electrical distribution systems, a dining hall, laundry, refrigeration and storage facilities. Finally, they were to build an interim 3,500-foot airstrip.

The harbor was expanded and became the home of a fleet of seventeen prepositioned ships that carried the equipment, ammunition, and fuel to support a Marine Amphibious Brigade. The island became useful for both routine operations and crisis response.

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions One, Forty, Sixty-two, and Seventy-one were pivotal to the creation and completion of early Diego Garcia.

Now a large-scale, fully functional Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia still benefits from the hard work and expertise of Seabees. Today the United States military uses the atoll for long-range bomber operations, Special Forces staging, the replenishment of naval surface forces, and nuclear powered submarines.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (15)

[FONTE: UK House of Commons

Library, 8/09/2025]


House of Commons
Library

Research Briefing

8 September 2025

By Philip Loft,
John Curtis

2025 treaty on the British Indian Ocean Territory/Chagos Archipelago



Mauritius No. 1 (2025)

Agreement

between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia

Summary

- 1 What does the agreement say?
- 2 What has the government said about the agreement, and what has been the reaction?
- 3 Parliamentary scrutiny of the agreement and its treaty scrutiny role

Summary

On 22 May 2025, the governments of the UK and Mauritius signed an agreement on the sovereignty and future of the Chagos Archipelago, governed by the UK as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The Archipelago includes the US–UK military base, Diego Garcia.

The BIOT is currently one of 14 UK Overseas Territories. The agreement provides for [Mauritius to exercise full sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago](#), with the UK exercising rights on Diego Garcia. The UK Government says this [resolves the long-standing BIOT sovereignty dispute](#) and secures the military base for continued operations in the long-term.

This briefing sets out the contents of the treaty, parliamentary reaction and scrutiny. A bill to implement parts of the treaty in UK law, the [Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill](#), was introduced on 15 July 2025. Second reading is scheduled for 9 September 2025. The [Library bill briefing](#) has more.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (16) [FONTE: UK House of Commons

Library, 8/09/2025]

What does the 2025 agreement say?

The [agreement has 19 articles](#), and is accompanied by an [explanatory memorandum](#).

It says Mauritius is sovereign over all the Chagos Archipelago. The UK will have the right to exercise authority over the Diego Garcia military base, and Mauritius will allow the US and UK to access, maintain, and invest in the base for an initial 99-year period, and it will not allow other powers to use the outer islands around Diego Garcia without agreement with the UK. The period can be extended by a further 40 years, if both parties agree, and extended again after this. The UK will pay Mauritius an annual average of £101 million for 99 years in 2025/26 prices, totalling around £3.4 billion. The [estimate has been verified by the government's actuary department](#).

Mauritius will be free to arrange for resettlement of Chagossians on all the islands of the archipelago except Diego Garcia. It will also establish a marine protected area, with UK support, to protect the environment.

Mauritian Prime Minister, Navin Ramgoolam, said as a result of the agreement that [“we have gained recognition of our sovereignty \[...\] which completes the process of decolonisation which began in 1968”](#).

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (17) [FONTE: UK House of Commons

Library, 8/09/2025]

Why does the UK Government say the agreement is necessary?

Announcing the agreement on 22 May, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said the deal was “absolutely vital” for the “safety and security of the British people”. He said it was needed to end the ongoing UK–Mauritius sovereignty dispute and to guarantee the military base. The US supports the deal.

Mr Starmer cited three main reasons for the agreement:

1. to guarantee the joint US–UK military base for the long term
2. to avert the risk of a future binding legal judgment affecting the UK’s ability to use the military base (for example, the management of satellite communications from the base or access for contractors)
3. to secure the base and the surrounding archipelago against China or other states setting up a presence there

The government has said the costs represent less than 0.2% of the annual defence budget and are in line with wider practice for paying to maintain overseas military bases. There are no lease costs in current arrangements.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (17) [FONTE: US Department of State, 17/02/2026]



United States and Mauritius to Hold Bilateral Security Discussions

MEDIA NOTE

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

FEBRUARY 17, 2026

From February 23–25, the United States and Mauritius will hold discussions in Port Louis led by the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, with participation from across the U.S. interagency.

These discussions underscore the continued importance of the Chagos archipelago and the joint U.S.-UK base on Diego Garcia to our national security. The discussions will focus on bilateral security cooperation and effective implementation of security arrangements for the base to ensure its long-term, secure operation.

The United States supports the decision of the United Kingdom to proceed with its agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos archipelago. The United States reiterates its desire to conclude a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom to guarantee continued use of basing and other facilities in the Chagos archipelago to advance U.S. national security, as well as security and stability across the Indian Ocean.



A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (18) [FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 18/02/2026]

← Truth Details

2743 replies



Donald J. Trump

@realDonaldTrump

I have been telling Prime Minister Keir Starmer, of the United Kingdom, that Leases are no good when it comes to Countries, and that he is making a big mistake by entering a 100 Year Lease with whoever it is that is "claiming" Right, Title, and Interest to Diego Garcia, strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Our relationship with the United Kingdom is a strong and powerful one, and it has been for many years, but Prime Minister Starmer is losing control of this important Island by claims of entities never known of before. In our opinion, they are fictitious in nature. Should Iran decide not to make a Deal, it may be necessary for the United States to use Diego Garcia, and the Airfield located in Fairford, in order to eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous Regime — An attack that would potentially be made on the United Kingdom, as well as other friendly Countries. Prime Minister Starmer should not lose control, for any reason, of Diego Garcia, by entering a tenuous, at best, 100 Year Lease. This land should not be taken away from the U.K. and, if it is allowed to be, it will be a blight on our Great Ally. We will always be ready, willing, and able to fight for the U.K., but they have to remain strong in the face of Wokeism, and other problems put before them. DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA!

7.66k ReTruths 30.6k Likes

Feb 18, 2026 at 6:42 PM

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (19) [FONTE: Telegraph, 19/02/2026]

Trump's Chagos rant means he's preparing to bomb Iran

Analysts told The Telegraph they could be used to ["kick the door in"](#), taking out Iranian defences before the bombers to strike at the heart of the regime.

The [USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier](#), accompanied by three destroyers, has been in position in the Arabian Sea since late January, while the USS Gerald R Ford is heading to reinforce it.

Mona Yacoubian, a former State Department official, warned a conflict with [Iran](#) could quickly become inevitable, regardless of Mr Trump's strategy.

"This massive military build-up together with Iran's sabre-rattling runs the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy," she said.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (20) [FONTE: Telegraph, 19/02/2026]

Just hours before the US president's announcement on his Truth Social platform at 1.42pm EST, the State Department had declared the US supported Sir Keir's Chagos deal.

They all had to pivot on a dime. [Karoline Leavitt](#), the White House press secretary, said Mr Trump's social media post was administration policy since it came "straight from the horse's mouth".

The State Department said, in response to a request to comment by The Telegraph: "The president's Truth Social stands." It did not respond when asked for clarification.

If senior administration figures were blindsided, one senior former Trump official claimed he was not surprised by the development.

Mr Trump's statement was "only a U-turn in that some group in the State Department decided to back the UK's position out of respect for a key ally", he insisted, and the US president "always held the view he expressed again today".

It was no reflection on Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, he added.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (21) [FONTE: Times, 19/02/2026]

UK blocking Trump from using RAF bases for strikes on Iran

The disagreement over the use of British sites is behind President Trump's withdrawal of support for the Chagos Islands deal, The Times understands

• new



President Trump wrote on Truth Social that the US may require the use of Diego Garcia to attack Tehran
DOD/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

President Trump has withdrawn his support for Sir Keir Starmer's deal to hand the Chagos Islands over to Mauritius because the UK has not agreed to allow the use of British bases to attack Iran, The Times understands.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (22) [FONTE: Times, 19/02/2026]

Under international law, there is no distinction between a state carrying out the attack and those in support if the latter have “knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act”.

The Times understands that the UK is yet to give permission for the US to use the bases in the event that Trump orders a strike on Iran, owing to concerns that it would be a breach of international law.

The president spoke to the prime minister on Tuesday night, and the two men discussed Trump’s ultimatum to Iran over its nuclear programme. The following day, [Trump made his statement attacking the Chagos deal](#).

In 2021, John Healey, the current defence secretary, asked in the Commons for clarification from the then Conservative government over the ground rules on the use of British bases by US forces.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (23) [FONTE: Times, 19/02/2026]

In [Trump's statement on Wednesday night](#), the president made an explicit reference to Iran and the role that the UK might play in any attack. He also appeared to suggest that UK support would be legal under international law, as Iran could potentially strike the UK.

“Should Iran decide not to make a Deal, it may be necessary for the United States [to use Diego Garcia](#), and the Airfield located in Fairford, in order to eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous Regime” he wrote on his Truth Social site.

“An attack that would potentially be made on the United Kingdom, as well as other friendly countries.”

He then added: “We will always be ready, willing, and able to fight for the U.K., but they have to remain strong in the face of Wokeism, and other problems put before them.”

The government has repeatedly insisted that a handover deal with Mauritius — expected to cost the taxpayer £35 billion— is needed for security reasons and would avoid a costly legal battle over the territory.

A importância da base de Diego Garcia para as operações militares dos EUA (24) [FONTE: Times, 19/02/2026]



Diego Garcia
AP

She told Times Radio: “We will continue to work with our allies, including the Americans, on this – but first and foremost, the priority must be national security, and that is what this government is determined to deliver.

“Just two weeks ago, they backed the deal, and this week the US backed the deal. Conversations will continue to be had with the Americans and other allies, but, as I’ve said, the priority is our base and national security.”

However, senior government officials privately said the deal could not go ahead without American approval. They described the situation as “bleak”.

Bibliografia

