Política Internacional e Geopolítica

a policrise do mundo globalizado

INSTITUTO CULTURAL
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes

SESSÃO Nº 24
25/3/2026



PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (1) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (2) [FONTE: ISW, 19/03/2026]



As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (3) [FONTE: ISW, 19/03/2026]

Key Takeaways

1. Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.
2. Recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction and the continued success of Ukraine's defensive lines in constraining Russian advances have forced the Russian military command into competing tactical and operational dilemmas on the battlefield.
3. The competing dilemmas that Ukraine has imposed on the Russian military command have likely disrupted Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely formalized some Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements.
5. Tankers carrying Russian oil are reportedly sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo.
6. Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships.
7. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities are attempting to slowly throttle access to Telegram.
8. The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus will likely directly benefit Russia's economy and therefore Russia's war effort.
9. A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18.
10. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Pokrovsk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Hulyaipole direction.
11. · Russian forces launched 133 drones against Ukraine, including in Chernihiv, Volyn, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Lviv oblasts.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (4) [FONTE: AP News, 21/03/2026]

Ukraine faces growing pressure because of the war in Iran as Russia readies a new offensive

With U.S.-brokered Ukraine peace talks on hold due to the war in the Middle East, Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to try to expand his military gains via new offensives against his neighbor that could put even more pressure on Kyiv.

Windfall revenues from surging global oil prices are filling Moscow's war coffers and U.S. air defense assets are being drained quickly by Iranian attacks across the Gulf, raising concerns that little will be left available for Ukraine in the fifth year of Russia's full-scale invasion.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (5) [FONTE: AP News, 21/03/2026]

Ukraine’s European allies have promised to maintain their steadfast support, but continuous bickering over a major 90 billion-euro ($106 billion) European Union loan to cover Kyiv’s military and economic needs for two years has reflected the mounting challenges.

The refusal by NATO allies to commit naval assets to help restore tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has drawn an angry rebuke from President Donald Trump, highlighting another emerging fault line that is fraught with potential repercussions for Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to hold Washington’s attention by offering its expertise in defending against Iranian Shahed drones, sending over 200 military experts to the Gulf. Trump, however, has shrugged off Zelenskyy’s offer of help, saying the U.S. doesn’t need Kyiv’s assistance.

As new signs of a rift emerge in Western alliances, Putin and his generals are pondering plans for the spring and summer campaign across more than the 1,200-kilometer (about 750-mile) front line.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (6) [FONTE: AP News, 21/03/2026]

A possible new push from Russia

Russia's military appears to be readying for a renewed push to claim the part of the eastern Donetsk region that remains under Ukraine's control, as well as possible offensives in several other sectors.

Analysts have observed that Moscow has been building up reserves and its operations are expected to gain tempo as the spring warmth dries the terrain.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, or ISW, has noted that Russian troops have stepped up artillery barrage and drone strikes, seeking to weaken Ukrainian defenses before ground attacks.

Ukraine has sought to derail the Kremlin's plans by launching counterattacks in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, where Russian forces have sought to carve out bridgeheads with an aim to advance toward the regional capitals, which are key industrial hubs.

The ISW said in a recent battlefield assessment that Ukraine's successful retaliation in the Dnipropetrovsk region will likely continue to force Russia to "choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere" on the front, possibly spoiling the anticipated Russian offensive.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (7) [FONTE: AP News, 21/03/2026]

‘Slow war of attrition’

After quick maneuvers by large numbers of tanks and mechanized infantry early in Russia’s 2022 invasion, the fighting has morphed into a war of attrition in which small groups of soldiers fight grinding, house-to-house battles in the ruined towns and villages of eastern Ukraine. The ubiquitous drones have restricted the concentration of troops for any big moves.

Russia also has relied on long-range missiles and drones to pummel Ukraine’s energy facilities and other vital infrastructure.

For the past year, Russia has been able to infiltrate and undermine Ukrainian defensive positions due to the “growing lethality” of Moscow’s attacks and Kyiv’s dwindling troop strength, said analyst Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute.

“Russia is likely able to maintain its current rate of recruitment, despite the punishing rate of casualties” inflicted by Ukraine, he added.

As part of preparing for new offensives, Russia increasingly has sought to enlist students into its newly formed Drone Forces, offering relatively high pay and deployment at a safe distance from the front.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (8) [FONTE: AP News, 21/03/2026]

Trump takes aim at Zelenskyy

The U.S. has granted Moscow a temporary waiver from oil sanctions, allowing sales of Russian crude already at sea — to the dismay of Kyiv and the Europeans.

In addition, Trump has cast Zelenskyy as an obstacle to peace. "He has to get on the ball, and he has to get a deal done," Trump said of the Ukrainian leader earlier this month.

He said in an interview with NBC News that while Putin was ready for a deal, "it's much harder to reach a deal with Zelenskyy."

Trump also rebuffed Zelenskyy's proposal to help protect the U.S. forces and their allies in the Gulf from Iranian drones. "No, we don't need their help on drone defense," Trump told Fox News Radio.

Zelenskyy, who has taken a more practical public stance with Trump after their contentious White House meeting in February 2025, has expressed a growing concern that the Iran war could hurt Ukraine.

He told the BBC this week that he had a "very bad feeling" about the impact of the Middle East conflict on the war in Ukraine, noting that peace negotiations are being "constantly postponed" while Russia was profiting from high oil prices and Ukraine could face a deficit of U.S.-made Patriot missiles.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (9) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Figure 2. Map of regions in Russia (as of July 2025)

Source: Eurasian Research Institute

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (10) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Petroleum and Other Liquids

- Russia's proved oil reserves were 58 billion barrels as of January 1, 2024, according to Rystad Energy.[6]
- Russia produced 9.2 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil in 2024, a decrease of 4% from 9.6 million b/d in 2023 (Figure 3).[7]
- Western Siberia is the main production region for crude oil and condensate in Russia, and upstream oil developments in Russia have primarily been onshore fields in northern areas of the region since the early 2000s.[8]
- Russia produces eight main grades of crude oil. Its major crude oil export is Urals, a medium-sour crude oil produced mainly in Western Siberia and Russia's Volga-Urals region (Table 2).[9] Historically, Urals was the main crude oil grade exported via pipelines from Baltic and Black Sea ports to Western markets, but Ukraine-related sanctions have shifted the trade and pricing of Urals eastward.[10]
- As an OPEC+ participant, Russia announced additional voluntary production cuts for the second quarter of 2024 to 8.978 million b/d.[11] Russia, along with other OPEC+ countries, extended these voluntary cuts through the first quarter of 2025, before beginning to unwind the cuts in April 2025.[12]
- Russia produced 10.5 million b/d in total liquid fuels in 2024, a decrease of 3% from 10.9 million b/d in 2023 (Figure 3).[13] Rosneft, Russia's largest oil producer and a major refiner, accounted for 31% of Russia's annual oil production in 2024 (Table 3).[14]

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (11) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Table 2. Major crude oil grades from Russia

	API gravity	Sulfur content	Regions
Urals	30 to 32	1.3% to 1.5%	Western Siberia and Volga Urals
ESPO	34 to 37	0.4% to 0.6%	Eastern Siberia
Sokol	35 to 37	0.2% to 0.3%	Far East
Varandey	25 to 37	0.2% to 0.5%	Northern
ARCO	23 to 24	2.2% to 2.4%	Northern
Siberian Light	34 to 36	0.2% to 0.6%	Western Siberia
Sakhalin	37 to 45	0.1% to 0.3%	Far East
Novy Port	30 to 35	0.1% to 0.3%	Western Siberia

Data source: McKinsey & Company, Independent Commodity Intelligence Services, Trading Economics, Hydrocarbons Technology, *Pipeline and Gas Journal*, Reuters, Nasdaq, NS Energy, and Mitsubishi Corporation

Table 3. Russia's crude oil and condensate production by company, 2024

Company	**Total production** thousand barrels per day	Percentage of total production
Rosneft	3,308	31%
Gazprom Neft	2,098	20%
Lukoil	1,567	15%
Surgutneftegas	1,136	11%
Tatneft	565	5%
Others	2,029	19%

Data source: Rystad Energy

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (12) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Independent Statistics and Analysis
U.S. Energy Information Administration

+ Sources & Uses + Topics + Geography + Tools + Education + News

Definitions

Key Terms	Definition
API Gravity	An arbitrary scale expressing the gravity or density of liquid petroleum products. The measuring scale is calibrated in terms of degrees API; it is calculated as follows: Degrees API = (141.5 / (sp. gr. 60ºF / 60ºF)) - 131.5 The higher the API gravity, the lighter the compound. Light crudes generally exceed 38 degrees API and heavy crudes are commonly labeled as all crudes with an API gravity of 22 degrees or below. Intermediate crudes fall in the range of 22 degrees to 38 degrees API gravity.
Crude Oil	A mixture of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities. Depending upon the characteristics of the crude stream, it may also include: • Small amounts of hydrocarbons that exist in gaseous phase in natural underground reservoirs but are liquid at atmospheric pressure after being recovered from oil well (casinghead) gas in lease separators and are subsequently commingled with the crude stream without being separately measured. Lease condensate recovered as a liquid from natural gas wells in lease or field separation facilities and later mixed into the crude stream is also included; • Small amounts of nonhydrocarbons produced with the oil, such as sulfur and various metals; • Drip gases, and liquid hydrocarbons produced from tar sands, oil sands, gilsonite, and oil shale. Liquids produced at natural gas processing plants are excluded. Crude oil is refined to produce a wide array of petroleum products, including heating oils; gasoline, diesel and jet fuels; lubricants; asphalt; ethane, propane, and butane; and many other products used for their energy or chemical content.
Crude Oil Qualities	Refers to two properties of crude oil, the sulfur content and API gravity, which affect processing complexity and product characteristics.
Petroleum Administration for Defense (PAD) Districts	Geographic aggregations of the 50 States and the District of Columbia into five districts by the Petroleum Administration for Defense in 1950. These districts were originally defined during World War II for purposes of administering oil allocation. Description and maps of PAD Districts and Refining Districts.
Refinery	An installation that manufactures finished petroleum products from crude oil, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, other hydrocarbons, and oxygenates.
Refinery Input, Total	The raw materials and intermediate materials processed at refineries to produce finished petroleum products. They include crude oil, products of natural gas processing plants, unfinished oils, other hydrocarbons and oxygenates, motor gasoline and aviation gasoline blending components and finished petroleum products.
Sulfur	A yellowish nonmetallic element, sometimes known as "brimstone." It is present at various levels of concentration in many fossil fuels.

For definitions of related energy terms, refer to the EIA Energy Glossary.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (13) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Figure 8. Crude oil exports from Russia by region, 2018–2024
percentage



Data source: Global Trade Tracker and Vortexa
Note: Individual percentages might not add to the total because of rounding. Figure excludes labels for percentages less than 5%.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (14) [FONTE: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025]

Figure 13. Map of major pipelines and ports for Russia's natural gas, 2024



Source: Global Energy Monitor, Reuters, and the Center on Global Energy Policy

Note: *Operable pipeline* may represent pipelines that are temporarily closed or partially active.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (15) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

How a New Russia-China Gas Pipeline Could Reshape Global LNG Trade

Russia and China appear to be moving forward with a major natural gas pipeline between their countries after years of stalled negotiations. Russian energy giant Gazprom PJSC said it has signed a legally binding memorandum with China National Petroleum Corp. to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline.
China has yet to confirm the agreement was struck and key issues such as financing, pricing and the volume of gas that will be sold remain unresolved. But if the conduit from Russia's Arctic Yamal Peninsula to northeast China goes ahead, it would deepen the economic ties between the two neighbors, who have already been growing closer in recent years as Russia grapples with Western sanctions.

The pipeline could also potentially reshape global gas flows next decade. For Russia, Power of Siberia 2 is an opportunity to compensate for some of the lost sales of piped gas to Europe, after the region turned to other sources following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For China, the pipeline offers a hedge against supply risks in the liquefied natural gas market, where its geopolitical rival the US has become the world's biggest exporter of the superchilled, seaborne fuel.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (16) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

New Gas Pipeline Strengthens Ties Between Russia and China

Source: Global Energy Monitor

Note: Data as of December 2024. Power of Siberia 2 route is based on estimates

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (17) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

How big will Power of Siberia 2 be?

Gazprom Chief Executive Officer Alexey Miller has described the planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline network across Russia, China and Mongolia as “the largest, the most massive and capital-intensive gas project in the world.”

There’s more than 4,000 kilometers between the pipeline’s origin point in the Arctic Circle and its potential end point at China’s coastal megacities. It will span 2,600km within Russia alone, stretching across the Siberian forests, before traversing nearly 1,000km through Mongolia and the country’s grasslands.

At full capacity, Power of Siberia 2 will be able to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year, almost as much as the now-dormant Nord Stream 1 pipeline that runs through the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (18) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

How does that compare to Russia's existing pipeline exports to China?

Russia already sends pipeline gas to China via Power of Siberia 1 under a 30-year supply agreement. Flows via this route, which bypasses Mongolia and connects the two countries directly, commenced in 2019 and reached the pipeline's capacity of 38 bcm this year. A second conduit, the Far Eastern route, is expected to start operating in 2027.

Gazprom, which is majority-owned by the Russian government, said it has also agreed with CNPC to increase deliveries via these two gas corridors to a combined 56 bcm, up from their previous deals totaling 48 bcm, Russian state newswire Tass reported. The addition of Power of Siberia 2 could therefore allow Russia to roughly double its pipeline exports to China.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (19) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

Why is the pipeline important to Russia?

Sending more flows eastwards could help Gazprom offset Europe's pivot away from Russian pipeline gas after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Europe's imports of gas have fallen from around 150 bcm in 2021 to less than 10% of that level so far this year. While the region is still buying Russian LNG, the European Union is considering plans to end purchases of all types of Russian gas by the end of 2027.

Pipeline Flows of Russian Gas to the EU Have Slumped

The bloc imports just a fraction of the piped-gas volumes it purchased prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022



Source: Bruegel based on ENTSOG, Gas Infrastructure Europe and data compiled by Bloomberg

Power of Siberia 2 could materially increase the flow of Russian gas to China. And unlike Power of Siberia 1, which transports gas from Eastern Siberia, the new pipeline will send fuel to China from the Yamal gas fields in Western Siberia that used to supply Europe. At full capacity, Power of Siberia 2 would be equivalent to a third of Russia's pre-war gas exports to Europe.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (20) [FONTE: Bloomberg, 9/09/2025]

How does Power of Siberia 2 benefit China?

The pipeline offers China a long-term source of cheap gas. That said, it's more of a "nice to have" than a "need to have." China's gas demand was expanding at a double-digit clip when the deal for Power of Siberia 1 was signed. But growth has been much slower in recent years as the Chinese economy matures and coal and renewables account for a larger share of the country's energy mix.

China is wary of becoming overly dependent on a single gas supplier. Russia is already one of its top sources of pipeline gas and the third-biggest for LNG behind Australia and Qatar. Meanwhile, the global LNG market gives China flexible supply options that don't lock it into a multi-decade agreement. However, with the US being the world's largest exporter, there's a risk that China could become more reliant on LNG cargoes from American producers over time.

Power of Siberia 2 would enable China to hedge that risk and bolster its energy security. A pipeline over land could be more secure than sea routes in the event of instability in the Middle East disrupting shipping, or geopolitical or military tensions with the US and its allies in Asia.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (21) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 16/03/2026]

Why Russia Is Watching Iran Burn

The Kremlin Is in No Hurry to Save Its Closest Partner in the Middle East

ALEXANDER GABUEV, NICOLE GRAJEWSKI, AND SERGEY VAKULENKO

March 16, 2026

Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, committing their countries to oppose interference by third parties in each other's internal and external affairs. Moscow and Tehran celebrated the treaty as the culmination of growing ties between the two regimes.

Yet when the United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran in late February—the second in just eight months, following last summer's 12-day war—Russia mostly stood idly by. Putin called the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei a "cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law," and Russia's foreign ministry called for "immediate de-escalation, cessation of hostilities, and resumption of political and diplomatic processes," but neither statement mentioned U.S. President Donald Trump or raised the possibility of Russia coming to Iran's defense.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (22) [FONTE: BBC, 20/03/2026]



As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (23) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 17/03/2026]

Moscow may have remained true to the letter of the treaty, which doesn't include a mutual defense clause, but it didn't do much of substance to aid a key partner in the Middle East and an important accomplice in Putin's war against Ukraine. *The Washington Post* and CNN have reported that Russia may have helped Iran with targeting data and advanced drone tactics, but such limited assistance is not likely to make a meaningful difference.

The Kremlin's impotence in Iran is in keeping with a familiar pattern: when Russia's friends are in need, Moscow issues strongly worded statements and does little else. In late 2023, Russia failed to intervene in a brief war between its treaty ally, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, allowing Baku to reclaim control over its province of Nagorno-Karabakh. A year later, Moscow let rebel forces topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Within the past year, the United States (along with Israel) bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, military bases, and missile factories; killed high-ranking Iranian officials, military commanders, and nuclear scientists; and abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Moscow's key partner in Latin America, with virtually no Russian interference. All these cases lay bare the limitations of Russia's power to shape outcomes around the world.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (24) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 17/03/2026]

CASHING IN

But even as the relationship between Tehran and Moscow has deepened, the limits of Putin's influence and ability to protect his partners are on full display. Russia has what Iran most wants in a major conflict with Israel and the United States: advanced fighters, air defense systems, and precision munitions, which Russia produces in large numbers. But these are all assets that Russia needs for its own war in Ukraine. Even if Moscow wanted to deliver these systems to Iran, it wouldn't be able to do so fast enough. The training alone of Iranian operators on an S-400 air defense system, for example, would take around six to eight months.

With its military consumed by the war in Ukraine and no appetite to get in the way of a resolute U.S.-Israeli attack, Moscow has offered Tehran little visible assistance beyond diplomatic condemnation and calls for restraint. Also holding Moscow back are the Kremlin's ongoing negotiations with the Trump administration to end the war in Ukraine. The Russian leadership hopes to reap benefits from this performative process, at least in terms of limiting U.S. support for Ukraine and slowing the rollout of new sanctions targeting Russia.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (25) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 17/03/2026]

Higher energy prices would make Russian oil and gas indispensable.

An even greater prize to Russia is the rising cost of energy. Oil prices fell in 2025 because of the decision by OPEC+ to increase production. Russia did not have much spare capacity to expand its oil production, so it could not earn on volume what it lost on price. This decision created a surplus in the market and alternatives to Russian oil for buyers, which, coupled with increasing sanctions pressure from the United States, drove steep discounts on Russian oil. Now the shortage created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is driving up oil prices, giving Russia and its suffering state budget a boost in revenue. Last week, in order to ease pressure on the markets, the U.S. Treasury even issued a 30-day license to enable the sale of Russian crude to India that had previously been sanctioned. The Gulf is also a major supplier of liquefied natural gas; dramatically reduced exports from the region helps Russia sell its own liquefied natural gas, particularly in Asia.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (26) [FONTE: BBC, 26/03/2026]

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (27) [FONTE: Foreign Affairs, 17/03/2026]

A few weeks of disruption to the Gulf's energy supplies might benefit Russia, but not by much; for every $10 increase in the oil barrel price, Russia stands to earn about $95 million dollars a day, not a significant amount in the short run. But if the war were to inflict heavy and lasting damage to the oil and gas infrastructure in the region, that could drive up prices for a considerable time and help fill the Kremlin's coffers. So far, the United States and Israel have held back from damaging Iran's oil export potential and bombing Iranian oil fields and terminals, but that could change in the course of the conflict. Should a desperate Iran seek to cause as much pain to its neighbors and the global economy as possible, the effects on world oil and gas supplies might be more enduring.

Significant and lasting damage to the Gulf's energy infrastructure, coupled with a potentially long period of instability in the Middle East, could finally persuade China to launch new overland oil and gas pipelines from Russia. This is something that Putin has been trying to persuade Chinese President Xi Jinping to do for the last decade, especially since 2022, when Europe started to wind down its energy dependence on Russia. Higher energy prices would also make Russian oil and gas indispensable. European and U.S. policymakers would then face a tough choice: continue tightening sanctions pressure on Russia at a mounting economic cost or soften their stance.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (28) [FONTE: Oil Price, 11/03/2026]

China Stockpiles Soften the Blow of the Global Oil Shock

China holds an estimated 1.2–1.3 billion barrels of crude in strategic and commercial reserves, enough to cover roughly four months of imports, cushioning it from short-term supply shocks.
Beijing has reduced reliance on Middle East flows through pipeline imports, domestic production, and increased purchases of Russian crude.
China continues buying discounted oil from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, while growing electrification and renewables reduce fuel demand.

The world's top crude oil and LNG importer, China, is not as exposed and vulnerable to energy deliveries from the Middle East as one might think.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (29) [FONTE: Visual Capitalist, 6/03/2026]

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (30) [FONTE: Oil Price, 11/03/2026]

China's energy security strategy and plan to aggressively buy cheaper crude, including sanctioned barrels, is insulating the world's second-largest economy, to some extent, from short-lived supply disruptions.

Beijing is estimated to have been amassing crude into commercial and strategic inventories for nearly a year—taking advantage of lower international prices and even lower prices for sanctioned supply out of Iran, Venezuela, and Russia.

Unlike the United States, China does not report inventories. Analysts are looking at overall supply (domestic production plus imports) and refinery processing rates to estimate how much crude is going into strategic or commercial reserves and how much is being processed into fuels.

Analysts estimate that China's total reserves stand at between 1.2 billion barrels and 1.3 billion barrels.

"China currently holds an estimated 1.3 billion barrels of crude in onshore storage, equivalent to around four months of seaborne imports at the 2025 average rate," Emma Li, Lead China Oil Market Analyst at Vortexa, wrote in an analysis on Monday.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (31) [FONTE: Oil Price, 11/03/2026]

Crude Flow Diversification

"China's overall crude supply system demonstrates significant resilience to a temporary disruption at the Strait of Hormuz, supported by diversified suppliers, substantial onshore inventories, and stable pipeline inflows from Russia and domestic production," Li said.

In the weeks before the war, China had reduced exposure to Strait of Hormuz crude oil flows, mostly thanks to the surge in purchases of Russian crude that doesn't travel through the chokepoint in the Middle East.

The share of China's seaborne imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz has dropped from 39% in 2025 to about 33% now, according to Vortexa data.

That's because Chinese imports of Russian seaborne crude have jumped from around 1.2 million barrels per day in 2025 to about 1.8 million bpd now.

Despite being the top crude importer in the world, China is less exposed to the Hormuz crisis than many other buyers in Asia, including India and the developed economies of Japan and South Korea. India relies on the Middle East for about 60% of its crude supply, while Japan's dependence is a massive 90%.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (32) [FONTE: The Diplomat, 17/03/2026]

How the Iran War Could Boost Russia's Role in Asia's Energy Future

If instability around Hormuz persists, it could accelerate Russia's long-planned – and long-stalled – "pivot to Asia."

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (33) [FONTE: The Diplomat, 17/03/2026]

The Israel-U.S. war on Iran and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz have injected a new level of uncertainty into global energy markets. For Asia's major importers, especially China and India, the crisis is an immediate threat: it disrupts crude and liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows and pushes prices higher. For Russia, however, the same shock creates an opening to deepen its long-term role as a core hydrocarbon supplier to Asia.

This is not a story of Russia effortlessly replacing the Middle East. Western Siberia's mature fields are depleting, sanctions have slowed new projects, and export infrastructure to Asia remains limited. But if instability around Hormuz persists, it could accelerate Russia's long-planned "pivot to Asia" by making Russian oil and gas relatively more attractive, and by justifying the large, long-lived investments Moscow needs Asia to help finance.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (34) [FONTE: Visual Capitalist, 5/03/2026]



As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (35) [FONTE: The Diplomat, 17/03/2026]

Hormuz: Asia's Chokepoint and Russia's Opportunity

The Strait of Hormuz is the only sea route from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Roughly 20 percent of global oil consumption and around 30 percent of LNG trade transits this narrow corridor, with most of those flows heading to Asian markets such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Several major shipping firms have now suspended traffic as Iranian strikes and threats make the route too risky to use, even when formally "open."

China and India are among the most exposed large economies. China is the world's largest oil and gas importer. About 13 percent of its crude imports come from Iran, and roughly 40 percent of its total crude imports transit Hormuz. Around 30 percent of its LNG imports come from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which also rely on the strait. India imports close to 85-90 percent of its crude needs, with about half of that oil coming from Gulf suppliers via Hormuz, roughly 2.5-2.6 million barrels per day. It imports around half of its natural gas demand as LNG, more than 50 percent of which comes from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (36) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (37) [FONTE: The Diplomat, 17/03/2026]

Sanctions, technology limits, and domestic bottlenecks mean Russia cannot simply step into the Middle East's shoes, while China and India will keep diversifying away from fossil fuels and any single supplier. Yet if a prolonged Iran war makes Gulf supplies seem structurally less reliable, even a constrained Russia becomes more attractive, potentially tipping decisions on Power of Siberia 2, long-term LNG offtake, and joint upstream projects in Moscow's favor.

In the short term, Russia's gains from the Iran war are mostly about price and volumes: higher benchmark prices support the federal budget, and Asian buyers under pressure from Hormuz disruptions are more likely to keep buying Russian supplies despite sanctions. If the crisis endures, however, it could lock in deeper structural energy ties between Russia and Asia's two biggest importers, reshaping the regional hydrocarbon landscape for decades.

Europe, by contrast, is unlikely to re-embrace Russian energy, with policy focused on diversification and decarbonization rather than re-engagement, leaving Asia as the only realistic anchor for Moscow's energy future.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (38) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

China weathering Iran war with minimal damage

Conflict has disrupted Beijing's energy flows and Gulf strategy but has done little to threaten its broader ambitions

by Denny Roy March 19, 2026

China has been more observer than participant to the Iran war. Image: X Screengrab

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (39) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

Various observers are emphasizing that the US-Israeli war against Iran is either hurting or helping China.

Some argue that "China has a lot to lose," that the war is "unsettling China and its ambitions," or that "Xi Jinping's geopolitical chessboard is starting to collapse." Others contend that the war "could help China," that "China gains [an] edge from Trump's war," or that "Beijing may emerge as the quiet winner."

This is a complicated question involving several factors, some favorable to China's global agenda and some unfavorable. A proper assessment finds that the war is a net negative for China, but not by much.

For China, Iran was a useful but never a vital economic partner. In 2021, China signed a deal to eventually invest US$400 billion in Iran in exchange for a steady flow of oil. China's investment up to the start of the war was only a small fraction of that figure. As University of Pennsylvania analyst Aaron Glasserman summarizes, "Iran needs China, but China does not need Iran."

Regime change in Tehran would not be a serious problem for Beijing. The two countries shared a common opposition to the US global agenda, but their bilateral relationship up to now has been based on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (40) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

As a reminder, Iran is a predominantly Muslim country, and China is infamous for the mass persecution of its Muslim population. Beijing's relationships with other Gulf states are deeper—China has 10 times more trade with Saudi Arabia than with Iran.

Iran's role as an energy supplier has been significant, supplying about 13% of China's oil imports. China bought Iranian oil and gas at discounted prices, saving billions of dollars on its annual fuel import bill.

Nevertheless, a short-term closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about half of China's imported oil and 30% of its imported natural gas passes, is manageable for Beijing.

The country has a strategic petroleum reserve that can cover an estimated 100 to 120 days of normal oil usage. Some tankers bound for China are reportedly getting through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Chinese government is negotiating with Tehran to secure safe passage for all China-bound ships, and is also exploring an alternative route that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz. As a result of the war, China loses prestige relative to the US in one sense but gains it in another.

The Russia-China bloc looks somewhat weaker relative to the US bloc. The military humiliation of Iran occurs as Venezuela and Cuba are also under intense US pressure to sever their close ties with China.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (41) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

Meanwhile, the success of the US and Israeli armed forces has been stunning. Even many Chinese observers are envious of this demonstration of American military prowess in a region nearly halfway around the world.

Chinese international relations scholar Shi Yinhong, for example, said the seizure of Maduro from Venezuela and the strikes against Iran indicate that US military power is "superior" and that America's "methods of warfare have further evolved."

China, for its part, did nothing substantial to help its friend Iran. Chinese officials even denied reports that China was supplying Iran with anti-ship missiles that could be used against US warships.

Russia has reportedly provided Iran with intelligence data to guide strikes against US forces, but this has not significantly hamper the American war effort. The unity of the Global South, of which China implicitly claims to be the leader, is reduced as attacks by Iran on the other Gulf states have caused them to side more closely with the US.

In 2023, China appeared to be a new regional power broker as it mediated a superficial reconciliation between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi touted the agreement as "a major victory for dialogue and peace."

China's "victory" in that case now looks meaningless, as Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, are reportedly encouraging the US not to stop bombing Iran too soon.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (42) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

On the positive side for China, the war against Iran is diverting more US attention and resources toward the Middle East, leaving less to deter Chinese expansionism in eastern Asia — despite the latest US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy prioritizing Asia as second only to the Western Hemisphere in importance.

US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby still insists, "We are laser-focused on the First Island Chain." Yet the US military is withdrawing THAAD and Patriot air defense batteries from South Korea to send to the Gulf, along with a Japan-based amphibious assault ship and 2,000 Marines.

US armed forces are also quickly burning through stocks of precision munitions that would be needed in any war against Chinese forces, including over Taiwan. These include Precision Strike Missiles, Tomahawk land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, and heavy torpedoes (such as the Mk-48 that sunk the Iranian frigate, Dena).

These weapons are expensive and time-consuming to build. Stocks were already too low before the Iran conflict, and replenishment will take two years or more. Some links in the supply chain that feed production are small companies with no surge capability.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (43) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

Does the temporary dip in US capabilities invite a Chinese military attack against Taiwan or one of China's rival South China Sea claimants? Probably not. This scenario implies that Xi Jinping has already decided to settle the dispute by military force and is waiting until his chances of winning are sufficiently high.

It is much more likely, however, that Xi will remain hesitant to go to war, for at least three reasons.

First, a Chinese victory is uncertain, and even a military success (such as Chinese troops occupying Taipei or seizing a rival's South China Sea possessions) would be accompanied by lingering conflict and economic and political turmoil that could endanger the regime.

Second, there is no pressing need for China to take military action now beyond the gray-zone actions that already keep constant and debilitating pressure on its potential regional adversaries.

Third, the next two years are an especially bad time for China to start a war. China's military high command is still reeling from the recent purge of many senior commanders for unclear reasons.

Xi has the chance to secure a major economic deal with the US in the coming months, provided the two countries can avoid a serious falling out. Improved access to US markets and technology remains essential for China to meet its economic development goals.

As consequências da guerra no Médio Oriente para a Rússia e a China (44) [FONTE: Denny Roy / Asian Times, 19/03/2026]

An early bilateral economic deal with the US is desirable for China, but not a desperate need. Goldman Sachs expects China's economy to grow 4.8% in 2026, which is in line with the Chinese government's stated target.

The percentage of Chinese exports the US buys has decreased to 14% as China has expanded its sales to other markets. The current bilateral truce in high tariffs is in force until November 2026, and the two governments could easily agree to extend it.

The delay might indirectly benefit China by slowing US arms sales to Taiwan, as the Trump administration is reportedly considering holding back another arms sale until after the next Trump-Xi meeting.

This is, of course, a fluid situation. Final conclusions about how the war impacts China will depend on how the conflict proceeds—its length, possible escalation and lasting results.

For now, while seeing that the US would still be a formidable opponent in a short war, Beijing also learns that the US is still vulnerable to getting bogged down in the Middle East, and in the process, accruing more international criticism.

What mainly tips the balance of gains and losses for a bystanding Beijing is the possibility of a long-term closure or partial closure of the Gulf to shipping traffic, which could go so far as to trigger a global recession—for which, Chinese officials would say, China is not responsible.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (1) [FONTE: Politico, 16/03/2026]

Trump warns NATO (again) of 'very bad future' if allies don't secure Strait of Hormuz

"It's only appropriate that people who are the beneficiaries of the strait will help to make sure that nothing bad happens there," says U.S. president as Iran war drags on.

Trump said allies could contribute naval assets such as minesweepers — vessels Europe has far more of than the U.S. | Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (2) [FONTE: Politico, 16/03/2026]

"It's only appropriate that people who are the beneficiaries of the strait will help to make sure that nothing bad happens there," Trump said. "If there's no response or if it's a negative response I think it will be very bad for the future of NATO."

Trump said allies could contribute naval assets such as minesweepers — vessels Europe has far more of than the U.S. "Whatever it takes," he said when asked what help Washington expects. In recent days, he has namechecked China, France, Japan, South Korea and the U.K. as countries he expects to assist in the Gulf.

The remarks revive Trump's long-running criticism of NATO. "We've been very sweet," he said, arguing the U.S. had helped European allies over Ukraine and now expects support in return.

European governments have reacted cautiously to Trump's persistent pressure to help him reopen the strait. Germany's Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said he was "very skeptical" that expanding the EU's naval mission would improve security.

EU foreign ministers are meeting Monday in Brussels to discuss a push by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas to deploy additional ships to the bloc's maritime mission.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (3) [FONTE: BBC, 17/03/2026]

Trump says Nato making 'foolish mistake' over Iran

Watch: Trump says US doesn't need help from Nato allies

President Donald Trump has accused Nato members of making a "foolish mistake" by refusing to help the US secure the Strait of Hormuz during the war with Iran.

Despite the pressure on oil prices brought about by severe disruption to the critical waterway amid the conflict, he insisted the US does not need help from its allies.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (4) [FONTE: BBC, 17/03/2026]

He reserved his harshest criticism for the UK, citing its lack of participation and assistance in the US-Israeli strikes on Iran.

Trump said the US-UK relationship was "always the best" until "[Prime Minister] Keir [Starmer] came along".

He also said the war was a "great test" of the alliance's relations with the US.

But when asked if he was considering any retaliatory measures, the president said only that he had "nothing currently in mind".

Trump also complained that Nato allies had benefited from tens of billions of dollars in US backing for Ukraine to fend off Russia's invasion.

"We will protect them, but they will do nothing for us, in particular, in a time of need," the president said on social media.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (5) [FONTE: BBC, 17/03/2026]

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (6) [FONTE: BBC, 17/03/2026]

Only a handful of vessels carrying Iranian oil to countries including India and China have managed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz since hostilities began on 28 February.

Several commercial cargo ships have been struck in the waterway, through which about one-fifth of the world's oil passes.

US officials have still not identified allies willing to help escort ships through the passage.

Many, including the UK, Germany and France - have said they are not ready to make a decision yet.

President Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday that France did not want to get involved.

"We are not a party to the conflict, and therefore France will never take part in operations to reopen or liberate the Strait of Hormuz," Macron said.

Kaja Kallas, the European Union's top diplomat, said on Tuesday: "This is not Europe's war. We didn't start the war. We were not consulted."

"The member states do not have the wish to be dragged into this," Kallas said, according to AP news agency.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (7) [FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 20/03/2026]

Donald J. Trump

@realDonaldTrump · 1d

Without the U.S.A., NATO IS A PAPER TIGER! They didn't want to join the fight to stop a Nuclear Powered Iran. Now that fight is Militarily WON, with very little danger for them, they complain about the high oil prices they are forced to pay, but don't want to help open the Strait of Hormuz, a simple military maneuver that is the single reason for the high oil prices. So easy for them to do, with so little risk. COWARDS, and we will REMEMBER! President DONALD J. TRUMP

6.53k 11k 42.3k

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (8) [FONTE: Donald Trump / Truth Social, 20/03/2026]

Donald J. Trump
@realDonaldTrump

We are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts in the Middle East with respect to the Terrorist Regime of Iran: (1) Completely degrading Iranian Missile Capability, Launchers, and everything else pertaining to them. (2) Destroying Iran's Defense Industrial Base. (3) Eliminating their Navy and Air Force, including Anti Aircraft Weaponry. (4) Never allowing Iran to get even close to Nuclear Capability, and always being in a position where the U.S.A. can quickly and powerfully react to such a situation, should it take place. (5) Protecting, at the highest level, our Middle Eastern Allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and others. The Hormuz Strait will have to be guarded and policed, as necessary, by other Nations who use it — The United States does not! If asked, we will help these Countries in their Hormuz efforts, but it shouldn't be necessary once Iran's threat is eradicated. Importantly, it will be an easy Military Operation for them. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP

10.2k ReTruths **42.4k** Likes Mar 20, 2026 at 9:13 PM

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (9) [FONTE: Politico, 19/03/2026]

Iran war tests Rutte's NATO Trump strategy

A lack of consensus and NATO's limited role in the Middle East make the crisis particularly hard for the alliance chief to resolve.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte listens to U.S. President Donald Trump during a meeting in the White House in Washington on Oct. 22, 2025. | Salwan Georges/The Washington Post via Getty Images

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (10) [FONTE: Politico, 19/03/2026]

"He's calculating there's little to gain by now speaking up," said one NATO diplomat, who like others in this story was granted anonymity to speak freely. "I don't see how he could please [Trump's] desire. So better to lay low — publicly at least."

But the war is putting Rutte in a bind.

Despite Trump's demands, NATO has few powers to act in Iran, while allies' distaste for the war makes it hard to find needed consensus for any alliance involvement. Yet the longer the conflict drags on, the more it saps resources from the alliance's core tasks of supporting Ukraine and preparing for a potential war with Russia.

"It's very clear that whatever is being used in the Middle East right now, in particular air defense systems, will most likely have to be replaced," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior arms researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think tank. "All that comes on top of the already very high demand for arms in Europe."

NATO declined to comment on the record.

Making a Mark

Until now, Rutte has succeeded in keeping Trump from blowing up the alliance by handing the U.S. president wins in key areas like getting allies to boost defense spending and finding an off ramp that allowed Trump to drop his campaign to annex Greenland.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (11) [FONTE: Politico, 19/03/2026]

"Rutte's job is to keep NATO together, and it's hard to see how a rhetorical battle with Trump can help him do that," said Oana Lungescu, a former NATO spokesperson who now works as a senior research fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute think tank.

Out of area

Yet there are limits to how much Rutte can do to assuage Trump over Iran.

That's partly down to a lack of consensus among allies on the war — with many having slammed the conflict that was initiated without consulting them.

While NATO has shot down Iranian missiles directed at Turkey, the U.S. cannot convince allies to join on the basis that its own territory is under threat, said a second alliance diplomat. The alliance's mutual defense clause, "Article 5, applies in the case of an armed attack against an ally, so it's not directly relevant to situations like this," the diplomat said.

The Middle East lies outside the alliance's military "area of responsibility," according to two other alliance diplomats, further complicating a collective response.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (12) [FONTE: Politico, 19/03/2026]

HMS Dragon, which the U.K. diverted from an Arctic mission, sets sail from Portsmouth Harbour on March 10, 2026 for its deployment to Cyprus. | Leon Neal/Getty Images

Defending against Iranian drone and missile counter-attacks has also forced European countries to burn through air defense missiles, depleting stockpiles and hampering NATO's aim to bolster air defenses, said Wezeman, the analyst. France has already warned its stockpile of air-to-air MICA missiles is running low.

It may be only a "matter of weeks" until European countries are forced to decide whether to earmark future deliveries of air defense systems for their Gulf allies or Ukraine, he said.

"Over a longer period of time, it will put a dent in the planning for how to build up the European defences," he said. "And it has an immediate effect on the capacity of Ukraine to defend itself."

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (13) [FONTE: Naval News, 20/03/2026]

The challenges of securing Hormuz as 6 nations issue joint statement

M/R MAYUREE NAREE after the crew abandoned ship following a strike by an Iranian USV during an attempted transit of the Strait of Hormuz. (Royal Thai Navy picture)

The leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and Canada issued a joint statement on the Strait of Hormuz. They expressed their readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait. As things stand today however, such a task appears to be rather difficult.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (14) [FONTE: Naval News, 20/03/2026]

Securing the Strait of Hormuz would be a highly demanding military task. In practice, warships would first need to gather at the entrance of the strait and then escort groups of commercial vessels through the passage in convoy formation. A destroyer or another escort ship could provide a protective screen around several tankers, but that protection would be limited by both time and geography.

If a convoy came under attack from Iranian missiles or drones, the escorting warship would have only seconds to respond. Similar escort and air defence efforts have already been seen in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks, so there is a working model. The problem is that such operations consume major resources and are extremely costly if they are to be sustained for every transit.

The danger would not come only from the air or the shore. Iran could also rely on swarms of fast attack craft operating from nearby coves and coastal bases. That would make every crossing risky, because escort forces would have to deal with several threats at the same time, including missiles, drones, and small boats approaching at high speed.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (15) [FONTE: Naval News, 20/03/2026]

To lower the risk to a manageable level, escorts would need support from helicopters for surveillance and rapid reaction, while combat aircraft would have to monitor the wider area above the strait. Even then, one of the most serious threats would remain naval mines. If mines were laid in the waterway, traffic could be disrupted or stopped entirely until mine countermeasure teams cleared the area. That is a slow and delicate process, especially if it has to be done under the threat of further attack.

For that reason, any serious attempt to secure the strait would likely require more than naval escorts alone. As long as Iranian forces along the coastline remain able to strike from land, sea, or air, the Strait of Hormuz would remain a highly dangerous environment for commercial shipping. Without at least temporary control over the coastal threat, any convoy system would operate under constant risk of ambush.

A NATO: um dano colateral da crise no Estreito de Ormuz? (16) [FONTE: Korea JoongAng Daily,18/03/2026]

Bibliografia