

# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
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**SESSÃO N° 25**

**8/4/2026**



# **PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL**

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (1)



[FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 5/04/2026 e 7/04/2026]

← **Truth Details**



23578 replies



**Donald J. Trump**  



@realDonaldTrump

Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the Fuckin' Strait, you crazy bastards, or you'll be living in Hell - JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah. President DONALD J. TRUMP

**20.1k** ReTruths **86.9k** Likes

Apr 05, 2026 at 1:03 PM



**Donald J. Trump**  

@realDonaldTrump · 3h

A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don't want that to happen, but it probably will. However, now that we have Complete and Total Regime Change, where different, smarter, and less radicalized minds prevail, maybe something revolutionarily wonderful can happen, WHO KNOWS? We will find out tonight, one of the most important moments in the long and complex history of the World. 47 years of extortion, corruption, and death, will finally end. God Bless the Great People of Iran!

 9.5k

 9.74k

 41k



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (2)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Where are Iran's power plants that Trump has threatened to destroy?

*US President Donald Trump has threatened to destroy power plants and bridges by 8pm Tuesday if Iran doesn't open the Strait of Hormuz.*




The reactor building at the Russian-built Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant as the first fuel is loaded, on August 21, 2010 in Bushehr, southern Iran [IIPA via Getty Images]

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (3)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Iran's main population centres

With a population of about 92 million, Iran is the world's 17th most populous country. Most of its people live in the western half, with Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan the three largest cities.



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (4)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

Iran has a mixture of gas, coal, hydro, nuclear and oil-fired power plants, but most are gas-fired. In the north and centre of the country, clusters of gas-fired plants supply electricity to the country's largest population centres, including Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan and Mashhad.

Another major concentration of power plants lies along the Gulf coast. These plants sit close to major gasfields and ports, allowing large thermal stations to run on abundant natural gas.

The coast is also home to the [Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant](#), Iran's only nuclear power facility, which has a capacity of 1,000MW. The US and Israel have repeatedly hit this nuclear power plant, raising risks of radioactive contamination far beyond Iran's borders, the state-run Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) has warned.



A satellite image shows new reactors under construction at the Bushehr site in Iran in this handout image dated January 1, 2025 [Maxar Technologies/Handout via Reuters]

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (5)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Which are Iran's most important power plants?

Iran's largest power plants include:

- **Damavand (Pakdasht) Power Plant** – Near Tehran.  
**Fuel:** Natural gas (combined-cycle).  
**Capacity:** 2,868MW.
- **Shahid Salimi Power Plant** – Neka, along the Caspian Sea coast.  
**Fuel:** Natural gas.  
**Capacity:** 2,215MW.
- **Shahid Rajaee Power Plant** – Near Qazvin.  
**Fuel:** Natural gas.  
**Capacity:** 2,043MW.
- **Karun-3 Dam** – Khuzestan Province.  
**Fuel:** Hydropower.  
**Capacity:** 2,000MW.
- **Kerman Power Plant** – Kerman.  
**Fuel:** Natural gas.  
**Capacity:** 1,912MW.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (6)


[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Where are Iran's major power plants?

Iran operates hundreds of power plants, forming one of the largest electricity systems in the Middle East, to supply energy to its 92 million people.

Fuel classification (number of plants)

■ Gas (79) ■ Hydro (14) ■ Mixed (2) ■ Coal (1) ■ Nuclear (1) ■ Oil (1)



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (7)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## **How does Iran generate its electricity?**

Iran's electricity system relies heavily on large thermal power plants fuelled by natural gas. The country has one of the world's largest natural gas reserves, and this fuel forms the backbone of its power system.

In 2025, 86 percent of Iran's electricity came from natural gas.

Oil-fired plants provide a smaller share, generating roughly seven percent of electricity. Some power stations switch to diesel or fuel oil when natural gas supplies are tight, especially during winter demand peaks.

Hydropower accounts for about five percent of electricity. Large dams on rivers such as the Karun River generate power by using flowing water to spin turbines.

Nuclear energy contributes around two percent of the country's electricity, mainly from the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Iran's only operational nuclear reactor.

Renewables such as solar and wind play a very small role, together accounting for less than one percent of electricity generation.


Overall, more than 90 percent of Iran's electricity comes from fossil fuels, making it one of the most gas-dependent power systems in the world.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (8)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## How does Iran generate its electricity?

Natural gas accounts for nearly 86 percent of Iran's electricity production.



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (9)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## In maps and photos: Five Iranian civilian bridges at risk of US strikes

*A look at the multimillion-dollar mega structures that could be threatened by Trump's 'Bridge Day' ultimatum.*



A bridge struck by US air strikes on April 2, 2026, is seen in the city of Karaj, west of Tehran [File: Vahid Salemi/AP]

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (10)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (11)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Persian Gulf Bridge (Qeshm Island)



The Persian Gulf Bridge, with its massive foundations and caissons, is under construction [File: Courtesy of Creative Commons]

- **Location:** Hormuzgan province
- **Dimensions:** 3.4km (2.1 miles) long
- **Status:** unfinished (15 to 18 percent physical progress)
- **Background:** The Persian Gulf Bridge was a “dream project” for more than 50 years, and ground was broken in 2011. While the bridge remains unfinished due to funding hurdles, its massive underwater foundations and caissons are in place. Once completed, it will connect Qeshm Island – the largest of Iran’s islands in the Gulf, believed to be home to an underground missile arsenal – to Bandar Abbas, Iran’s biggest mainland port.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (12)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Lake Urmia Bridge (Shahid Kalantari Bridge)



The Shahid Kalantari Bridge crosses the salt lake of Urmia in northwestern Iran [File: Atta Kenare/AFP]

- **Location:** between East and West Azerbaijan provinces
- **Dimensions:** 1.7km (1 mile) long
- **Background:** inaugurated in November 2008 after 29 years of highly complex construction due to the hypersaline and muddy nature of the lake bed
- **What is at risk:** This bridge connects Tabriz and Urmia, cutting the driving distance between the cities from 240km to 130km (150 to 80 miles). Beyond severing civilian movement between two major provinces, destroying it could trigger an ecological disaster by dumping 35km (22 miles) of steel pilings and concrete into an already shrinking lake.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (13)

[FONTE: Al-Jazeera, 6/04/2026]

## Sadr Multilevel Expressway

The expressway bridge is located in Tehran [File: Marica van der Meer/Arterra/Universal Images Group via Getty Images]

- **Location:** Tehran
- **Dimensions:** 11km (7 miles) long, supported by 234 pillars
- **Background:** Inaugurated in November 2013, the bridge is the 11th highest in the world and the longest multilevel bridge in the Middle East.
- **What is at risk:** Built entirely by Iranian engineers despite sanctions, this is a daily commuter artery for millions of people in Tehran. An attack here could cause massive urban casualties, destroy a key artery for the capital's transport system and plunge Tehran's emergency evacuation systems into chaos.

## Karun 4 Arch Bridge

The Karun-4 Dam, the largest double-arch dam in the Middle East, in Lordegan, Iran [File: Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images]

- **Location:** Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province
- **Dimensions:** 378 metres (1,240ft) long, 3,800 tonnes
- **Background:** Designed and constructed entirely by Iranian experts, the bridge was inaugurated in 2015.
- **What is at risk:** As Iran's longest arch bridge, it is a crucial route between Shahr-e-Kord and Izeh. Because it is suspended directly over a dam reservoir and is located close to the dam, bombing it risks causing secondary damage to the hydroelectric facility, potentially leading to fatal flooding for downstream communities.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (14)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (15)

[FONTE: The Independent, 1/04/2026]

## **Qeshm: Iran's fortress island with an underground 'missile city' threatening US troops in Hormuz**

Qeshm is one of two Iranian islands in focus as the US weighs an invasion to break the lock on the Strait

Qeshm is a 558sq mile stretch off mainland Iran that has been fortified with an underground missile "city" that is used intermittently to attack ships passing through the waterway.

In peacetime, Qeshm is a tourist destination dotted with salt caves and the remnants of fortifications installed by European empires. The Royal Indian Navy operated out of the island until 1863 and the last coaling station for the Royal Navy was abandoned in 1935 at the request of the Shah.

Since then, Iran has reconstituted the island with missiles, drones and fast-attack boats. Exact details are kept confidential, but retired Lebanese Brigadier-General Hassan Jouni, a military and strategic expert, told [Al Jazeera](#) that the island has the ability to strike from an underground "missile city".

According to Can Kasapoğlu, a defence analyst, satellite imagery suggests Iran has installed a "significant portion of its anti-ship missiles in underground launch positions on Qeshm".

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (16)

[FONTE: The Independent, 1/04/2026]

Kharg island handles some 90 per cent of Iran's oil exports, and taking it [would give the US the ability to disrupt Iran's energy trade](#) and place enormous pressure on the economy. Iran has fortified the island with additional surface-to-air missiles and laid traps including anti-personnel and anti-armour mines in the waters surrounding it, CNN reported, citing people familiar with US intelligence.

Qeshm, meanwhile, operates as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) "primary denial hub", a much larger base designed to shut the door on traffic approaching the Strait of Hormuz, Mr Kasapoğlu explained.

"Taking Qeshm is also most likely the harder fight," he wrote. "The island's size, terrain, and proximity to the mainland favour the defender. Iranian reinforcement efforts there would likely be continuous."



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (17)

[FONTE: Middle East Broadcasting Networks, 4/03/2026]

## Iran's "Aircraft Carriers" and Control of Hormuz



["Iran's aircraft carriers"](#) that never leave their positions" — this is how Tehran describes its network of islands in the Strait of Hormuz; an integrated military system comprising radars, missile platforms, runways, and bases for fast boats and submarines, positioned within a narrow maritime corridor only tens of kilometers wide, through which nearly one-fifth of global oil trade passes.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (18)

[FONTE: Middle East Broadcasting Networks, 4/03/2026]

Tehran's operational weight in the strait is concentrated on seven main islands positioned along or adjacent to shipping lanes.

Qeshm Island, the largest island in the Gulf, comes at the forefront, as it represents a forward base practically connected to the city of Bandar Abbas, giving it a central role in logistical and operational support. The island hosts military infrastructure that includes missile storage sites, surveillance facilities, and bases for fast boats and drones, making it closer to an "operations center" within the strait.

Amid military escalation, Qeshm has emerged as a direct target for U.S. and Israeli strikes, with reports indicating that facilities and ports on the island have been targeted.

Estimates from research centers indicate that any operation to reopen navigation in the Strait of Hormuz would require, in addition to naval deployment, the neutralization of missile capabilities and coastal platforms relied upon by Iran, including those deployed on key islands such as Qeshm.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (19)

[FONTE: Middle East Broadcasting Networks, 4/03/2026]


[Reports](#) indicate that controlling Larak could limit Iran's ability to harass ships and lay mines and might help the United States break Tehran's grip on transit through the strait. At the same time, it warns that the island is heavily fortified, making it a difficult target for any military operation.

There is also Kish Island, which is used as a naval support platform alongside its economic role. Although it does not match the importance of Larak or Qeshm in terms of direct impact on navigation, it represents operational depth and logistical support thanks to its airport and free zone facilities, especially since its airport was among the targets struck in the early days of the war.

In addition to the seven islands directly linked to the strait, [Kharg Island](#) has emerged in recent military discussions as a different type of target in terms of function; it does not directly control transit lines in Hormuz, but it represents the economic heart of Iran's energy network.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (20)


[FONTE: Wikimedia Commons]



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (21)

[FONTE: RUSI, 3/12/2013]

## The Three Islands: Mapping the UAE-Iran Dispute



For over forty years, the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb has been a sore in relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran. Initially occupied by Iran in 1971 during the time of the Shah and the formation of the UAE, the islands are a useful study of a seemingly intractable territorial dispute between a small set of city states and a regional hegemon.

For the UAE, careful management of the dispute is crucial to neither exasperate conditions and provoke Iran into a more forceful response, possibly targeted at the UAE mainland, nor to give Iran leave to argue that the UAE has dropped its 'misunderstood' claims to the islands. Long-term management rather than short-term resolution appears to be the best course of action.

For Iran, the dispute is a matter of Emirati misunderstanding. Iran needs little more than for the status quo with the UAE to continue, leaving it free to concentrate on its myriad of other concerns. Yet as the security situation in the Middle East has convulsed in recent years, and international focus has turned more harshly on Iran, an emboldened UAE could, in theory, take advantage of such change to press its point.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (22)

[FONTE: RUSI, 3/12/2013]

## THE THREE ISLANDS

Mapping the UAE-Iran Dispute

KHALID S. Z. AL-NAHYAN



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# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (23)

[FONTE: RUSI, 3/12/2013]

## I. INTRODUCTION

FOR over forty years, the dispute over the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb<sup>1</sup> has been a sore in relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran. Initially occupied by Iran in 1971 during the time of the Shah and the formation of the UAE, the islands are a useful study of a seemingly intractable territorial dispute between a small set of city states and a regional hegemon. Though the intensity of the conflict has varied over time, there are no signs of an imminent change to the status quo or, indeed, a resolution. Throughout the years of the dispute, there has been a curious continuity of Iranian policy and action on the matter; despite a revolution (and the evolving foreign policy of the revolutionary regime), Iran's stance on the islands has been remarkably consistent. Even the recent turbulence of Middle Eastern affairs, with the unforeseen eruption of Arab protest, is unlikely to have affected the environment such that a change in the current parameters of the dispute would be *probable*. However, if political change should affect Tehran's strategic calculus in some way, then there

might be the *possibility* of a change in the Iranian position in the long term towards the islands.

The long-running dispute has centred on three small islands, located in the Gulf between Iran on the northern side and the emirates to the south (see Map of the Gulf). The dispute is a bilateral one, but external states and regional organisations, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the US, as the major military power in the region, have also had roles to play. Neither they nor the wider geopolitical significance of the Gulf region can be ignored in examining this dispute.

The dispute demonstrates that territory still very much matters in international relations. Border conflicts between India and Pakistan, Chinese claims to Tibet and Taiwan and its recent, heady clashes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to say nothing of the Palestinian conflict, all show that the strength of issues related to borders, territory and sovereignty are as important as ever in many parts of the world. In South America, Argentina continues its belligerent rhetoric against Great Britain over the ownership of the Falkland Islands, whilst in the Mediterranean, Morocco and Spain have debated since Moroccan independence in 1956 the sovereignty of the Peñón de Alhucemas islands. China has continued to push the bounds of its territory, by naming Sansha its latest city despite the contestation of the ownership of the South China Sea islands by several Asian nations.<sup>2</sup>

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (24)

[FONTE: RUSI, 3/12/2013]

## VII. CONCLUSION

IN the overall context of Middle Eastern politics and regional tensions, the three islands dispute, over the islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb, is of lesser significance, dwarfed as it is by the Arab-Israeli conflict, the antagonism of Iranian foreign policy, the concerns over nuclear proliferation and the threat of terrorism. All have implications for states outside of the region, as they all recognise that they have a stake in the future of the Gulf.

Though many states have expressed a view on the dispute, it does not figure prominently in the foreign policies of any states outside of the UAE and Iran. For Iran, the dispute swings in its level of importance. As it has control of the islands and is thus able to frame the dispute as it sees fit – a misunderstanding on the part of the UAE – the dispute could very well roll on without variation from this status. However, as the changing events of the region's political upheavals and increase in economic sanctions have shown, the islands have a role to play, both as a rallying point of domestic opinion, and

more importantly as a lever with which to exert maximum control over the Strait of Hormuz.

For the UAE, things are markedly different. Over the years, they have collected significant regional and outside support for their claims to the sovereignty of the islands, and worked tirelessly to keep the dispute on the international agenda. However, no state has been willing to provide anything more than basic diplomatic support and neither the GCC nor the UN has managed to bring about any significant change. For the moment, the status quo is tenuously stable, and though they may not like it, both regional and external powers perceive the dispute not to be a direct threat to peace and security. Iran has presented them with a *fait accompli*. For the international community, the islands' sovereignty issue is simply not important enough to risk further alienating Iran and raising tensions in the Gulf. This is particularly true at a time when, in the wake of the Middle East's political transitions, the internal security of individual states is increasingly uncertain and unpredictable.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (25)

[FONTE: Embaixada dos Emirados Árabes Unidos nos EUA]



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## OCCUPIED UAE ISLANDS

The United Arab Emirates has consistently and forcefully protested Iran's illegal occupation of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs from the moment Iranian military forces occupied the three islands on 30 November 1971, just two days before the establishment of the UAE.

The UAE first took this matter to the United Nations Security Council on 9 December 1971 because of Iran's infringement of the sovereignty of the UAE and its violation of the UN Charter. At that time, the Security Council deferred action to allow the parties an opportunity to negotiate. Since then, the UAE government has consistently sought a diplomatic resolution to this matter, calling to resolve the dispute through direct, meaningful negotiations or arbitration, or to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for final resolution in accordance with international law.

Fifty years after the initial invasion, the UAE still holds out its offer to Iran to resolve this dispute via one of the three options listed above; unfortunately, Iran has rejected such suggestions, and continues to refuse to discuss sovereignty over any of the islands.



*Unofficial map. For illustrative purposes only*


# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (26)

[FONTE: WSJ, 1/0472026]

## U.A.E. Wants to Force Hormuz Open and Is Willing to Join the Fight

Gulf state begins effort to persuade U.S. and others to open waterway by any means necessary

April 1, 2026 at 7:25 am



WSJ's Shelby Holliday breaks down the training, equipment and operations of the Marine Corps's expeditionary units as several get deployed to the Middle East amid a war with Iran. Photo: Lance Cpl. Victor Gurrola/U.S. Marines/Planet Pix/Zuma Press

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (27)

[FONTE: WSJ, 1/04/2026]

The United Arab Emirates is preparing to help the U.S. and other allies open the Strait of Hormuz by force, Arab officials said, a move that would make it the first Persian Gulf country to become a combatant, after being hit by [Iranian attacks](#).

The U.A.E. is lobbying for a United Nations Security Council resolution that would authorize such action, the officials said. Emirati diplomats have urged the U.S. and military powers in Europe and Asia to form a coalition to open the strait by force, the officials said. A U.A.E. official said the Iranian regime thinks it is fighting for its existence and is willing to bring the global economy down with it in a chokehold on the strait.

The U.A.E. official said the country had reviewed its capabilities to assist in securing the strait, including efforts to help clear it of mines and other support services.

The Gulf state has also said the U.S. should occupy islands in the strategic waterway including Abu Musa, which has been held by Iran for a half-century and is claimed by the U.A.E., other Arab officials said.


# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (28)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (29)

[FONTE: Conselho de Cooperação do Golfo]



The screenshot shows the official website of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). At the top, there is a navigation menu with links for 'About GCC', 'General Secretariat', 'Joint Gulf Action', 'Media Center', and 'Contact us'. A search bar and language selector are also present. Below the navigation is a banner image of a building. The main content area is titled 'Member States' and features six cards, each representing a GCC member state. Each card includes the national flag, the state's name, and a brief description. The states shown are United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. Each card has a right-pointing arrow at the bottom, indicating that more information is available for each state.

**United Arab Emirates**  
The United Arab Emirates consists of seven emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and...

**Kingdom of Bahrain**  
Bahrain is a constitutional kingdom located in the heart of the Arabian Gulf, west of the Asian continent, and is distinguished by its...

**Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic state, with full sovereignty, whose religion is Islam.

**Oman**  
The Sultanate of Oman is located in the far south-east of the Arabian Peninsula. Between latitudes 40.16 and 26.20 degree...

**Qatar**  
The State of Qatar is an independent, sovereign state in the Middle East, a peninsula located in the Arabian Gulf. Sinc...

**Kuwait**  
The government system in the State of Kuwait is an emiri-democratic. The State of Kuwait has sovereignty and a constitution. It is...

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (30)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

## Gulf Cooperation Council

Map of the constituent countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**, political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. The GCC was established in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Arab and Islamic cultures. Presidency of the council rotates annually.

Arguably the most important article of the GCC charter is Article 4, which states that the alliance was formed to strengthen relations among its member countries and to promote cooperation among the countries' citizens. The GCC also has a defense planning council that coordinates military cooperation between member countries. The highest decision-making entity of the GCC is the Supreme Council, which meets on an annual basis and consists of GCC heads of state. Decisions of the Supreme Council are adopted by unanimous approval. The Ministerial Council, made up of foreign ministers or other government officials, meets every three months to implement the decisions of the Supreme Council and to propose new policy. The administrative arm of the alliance is the office of the Secretariat-General, which monitors policy implementation and arranges meetings.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (31)

[FONTE: Conselho de Cooperação do Golfo]

The screenshot displays the GCC website's 'Joint Gulf Action' section. At the top, there is a navigation menu with links for 'About GCC', 'General Secretariat', 'Joint Gulf Action', 'Media Center', and 'Contact us'. To the right of the menu are icons for a moon, font size adjustment (A<sup>-</sup> A<sup>+</sup>), search, and a globe. The main heading is 'Joint Gulf Action', followed by the subtext 'View the latest agreements, achievements and projects of GCC'. Below this are three circular icons: a blue one with a document and checkmark for 'Uniform agreements, regulations and laws'; a red one with a target for 'Achievements of the Cooperation Council'; and a green one with the GCC logo for 'Joint Gulf projects'. Further down are two large colored boxes: a light blue one for the 'Digital Library of the General Secretariat of the Cooperation Council for the Arab...' with a 'Go To Platform' button, and a light orange one for 'Takamul' with the text 'At Takamul, we aim to move facilities towards a digital transformation that...' and another 'Go To Platform' button. At the bottom, a horizontal line connects the flags of the six member states: Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (32)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

GCC agreements typically focus on either security or economic coordination. In terms of security coordination, policies have included the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force in 1984, a joint military venture based in Saudi Arabia, and the signing of an intelligence-sharing pact in 2004. The first significant deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force was in 2011 in Bahrain to guard government infrastructure against an uprising there during the Arab Spring protests. Economic coordination included attempts at economic union, though integrative agreements were often lacklustre in comparison with policy coordination. An agreement to launch a single regional currency similar to the euro by 2010 saw little movement apart from the establishment of a monetary council in 2009. Coordination in tax policy proved fruitful, however: a customs union was implemented in 2015, and the member states began rolling out a value-added tax of 5 percent in 2018. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tended to lead policy coordination. They were the first countries to send troops to Bahrain in 2011 and the first countries to levy the value-added tax.

While membership of the GCC remained consistent throughout its first several decades, changes in regional relationships sometimes led to speculation on changes in membership. Expansion appeared possible when the interests of Gulf countries aligned with those of other Arab states. Jordan and Morocco, two other Arab monarchies, were invited to join the GCC in 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring uprisings. Morocco declined, while Jordan's application remained delayed because of internal GCC disagreements. Conflicting interests at times led to rifts. Egypt and fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain instated a blockade against Qatar in 2017. In December 2018 Qatar's emir skipped the GCC's annual summit and sent an envoy instead, though he sent his prime minister in 2019 as tensions seemed to thaw. The blockade was lifted during the following annual summit, held in January 2021, with Qatar's emir in attendance.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (33)

[FONTE: Sheikh Nawaf bin Mubarak Al-Thani / RUSI, 30/03/2026]

## **The Gulf Does Not Want This War to Continue**

There is a stubborn assumption in parts of Washington and Europe that the Gulf Arab states quietly want this war to continue until Iran is badly weakened. That reading is too neat, too lazy, and in Qatar's case, plainly wrong.

Qatar does not want this war to continue. That much is clear from its public posture, its diplomacy and the logic of its national interests. Beyond Qatar, the picture across the GCC is not perfectly homogeneous, and it would be unserious to pretend otherwise. These are different states, with different threat perceptions and different strategic habits. Oman is not Bahrain. Qatar is not the UAE. Saudi Arabia carries its own long memory of direct attacks and proxy escalation. Even so, if one steps back and looks at the public statements, the economic realities and the conduct of most GCC governments, the broad direction is unmistakable: this is not a region pushing for a prolonged war with Iran. It is a region trying to limit the damage.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (34)

[FONTE: Sheikh Nawaf bin Mubarak Al-Thani / RUSI, 30/03/2026]

*Qatar built an economic model that depends on reliability: reliable gas exports, reliable logistics, reliable diplomacy and the reputation of being a place that works*

And for the most part, that model worked.

Yes, there were moments of real danger. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were targeted, directly or through proxies, in ways that were serious and unacceptable. No one serious should minimize that history. But over nearly half a century of the Islamic Republic's existence, those episodes, however alarming, were intermittent rather than defining. They did not destroy the Gulf's basic formula for prosperity. The region still grew. It still built. It still attracted capital, expanded ports and airlines, and projected stability far beyond what many expected.

That is why the idea that the GCC is now pushing for a wider or longer war makes so little sense.

War with Iran is not an abstract geopolitical exercise for the Gulf. It hits infrastructure, shipping, aviation, insurance, tourism, banking, investor confidence, energy markets and every quiet calculation made by businesses deciding whether the region is safe enough for long-term exposure. The longer this war goes, the more those calculations change.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (35)

[FONTE: Wikipedia]

**Al Jazeera Media Network (AJMN)**<sup>[a]</sup> is a **Qatari news** media organization headquartered in **Wadi Al Sail, Doha**.<sup>[3]</sup> It is a **statutory private foundation** for **public benefit**, and is primarily funded by the government of Qatar.<sup>[4][5]</sup> The network's flagship channels include **Al Jazeera Arabic** and **Al Jazeera English**, which cover regional and international news, alongside the digital platform **AJ+**. Al Jazeera is available in more than 150 countries and territories and has a global audience of over 430 million people.<sup>[6]</sup>

Originally conceived as a satellite TV channel delivering Arabic news and **current affairs**, it has since evolved into a multifaceted media network encompassing various platforms such as online, specialized **television channels** in numerous languages, and more. The network's news operation currently has 70 **bureaus** around the world that are shared between the network's channels and operations.<sup>[7]</sup>

The network has often been targeted by foreign governments upset with its reporting.<sup>[8]</sup><sup>[9][10]</sup> During the **Qatar diplomatic crisis**, several Arab countries severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a blockade. One of their demands was the closure of Al Jazeera.<sup>[11]</sup> Other media networks have spoken out against this demand.<sup>[12]</sup> Critics often view Al Jazeera Arabic as being influenced by **Qatar's foreign policy**.<sup>[13][14]</sup>

## Al Jazeera Media Network



شبكة الجزيرة الإعلامية  
**ALJAZEERÁ MEDIA NETWORK**

<b>Native name</b>	شبكة الجزيرة الإعلامية
<b>Company type</b>	<b>Statutory private foundation</b> for <b>public benefit</b>
<b>Industry</b>	<b>Mass media</b>
<b>Founded</b>	1 November 1996; 29 years ago
<b>Founder</b>	<b>Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani</b>
<b>Headquarters</b>	Qatar Radio and Television Corporation Complex, <b>Wadi Al Sail</b> , Doha, Qatar
<b>Area served</b>	Worldwide
<b>Key people</b>	<b>Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani</b> (chairman)

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (36)

[FONTE: Wikipedia]

**Al Arabiya** (**Arabic**: العربية, **romanized**: *al-ʿArabiyyah*; stylized as **al arabiya** العربية) is a Saudi Arabian **state-owned international** Arabic-language television **news channel**. It is based in **Riyadh** and operates as a subsidiary of the **MBC Group**, a major **media conglomerate** in the **Middle East and North Africa**.<sup>[1][2]</sup>

## History [ edit ]

Al Arabiya was originally launched in **Dubai Media City, United Arab Emirates**, on 3 March 2003.<sup>[3][4][5]</sup> An early funder, the production company Middle East News (then headed by Ali al-Hedeithy), said the goal was to provide "a balanced and less provocative" alternative to **Al Jazeera**.<sup>[6][7]</sup>

A **free-to-air** channel, Al Arabiya broadcasts standard newscasts every hour, as well as talk shows and documentaries. It has been rated among the top pan-Arab stations by Middle East audiences.<sup>[8][9]</sup> The news organization's website is accessible in Arabic, English, **Urdu**, and **Persian**.

On 26 January 2009, U.S. President **Barack Obama** gave his first formal interview as president to Al Arabiya,<sup>[10]</sup> delivering the message to the **Islamic world** that "Americans are not your enemy," while also reiterating that "Israel is a strong ally of the United States" and that they "will not stop being a strong ally of the United States".<sup>[11]</sup>

**Al Arabiya**  
العربية



Logo since February 2026

<b>Country</b>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>
<b>Broadcast area</b>	<b>Worldwide</b>
<b>Headquarters</b>	<b>Riyadh, Saudi Arabia</b>
<b>Programming</b>	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Arabic</b>
<b>Picture format</b>	<b>1080i (HDTV) 576i (SDTV)</b>

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (37)

[FONTE: Al-Arabiya, 7/04/2026]

## Iran is more of an enemy to Arabs than to the Gulf

07 April ,2026: 08:37 PM GST



Some intellectuals and commentators believe that the Iranian regime is waging a war on the Gulf states, but is not necessarily an enemy to Arab countries. They argue that Gulf countries want to drag Arab states into a needless hostility with the Iranian regime. The reality, however, is that Tehran is more of an enemy to Arabs than to the Gulf states themselves, and that its harm is greater to Arab capitals than to Gulf capitals.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (38)

[FONTE: Al-Arabiya, 7/04/2026]

There are two reasons for this:

First: The Iranian regime has exploited the fragility of certain Arab states, infiltrated them, and effectively occupied them, something that has not occurred in the Gulf.

Second: Tehran has managed to weaken national identity, invest in sectarian identity, and create internal conflicts among the people of the same country. It has succeeded in this in Arab states and failed in Gulf states.

To further explain the first reason, it can be said that some Arab countries have been far more severely harmed by the Iranian regime, to an extent incomparable to what has happened in the Gulf. The damage caused by missiles and drones is temporary material damage that can be repaired. The war has shown that Gulf states possess advanced air defenses capable of protecting their territories, and they will undoubtedly emerge victorious from this war against a defeated and devastated Iranian regime.

Gulf states have remained resistant to Iranian infiltration, despite attempts to plant cells and carry out terrorist operations, and have remained resilient. The hostility of the Iranian regime toward Gulf states over decades has been a source of concern, but it has not crippled their economies or hijacked their political decision-making. In contrast, other Arab countries have suffered greatly from Iran.

# As múltiplas facetas da guerra no Irão (39)

[FONTE: Al-Arabiya, 7/04/2026]



Take Iraq as an example. Iraq is a country with the resources, intellect, and history to make it a successful state, but Iranian interventions have weakened it. After 2003, Tehran exploited the political and security vacuum and built a deep network of influence within the state. It created militias affiliated with it and influenced political decision-making. Iraqi national figures were forced either into silence or into exile in protest against Iranian dominance over their country.

In this case, Iran's hostility toward Iraq appears more destructive compared to Gulf states that are capable of protecting themselves. The result is that Iraq is a country with vast wealth, but with constrained sovereignty, and its decision-making is not fully independent.

Lebanon is another example, where the country is experiencing widespread destruction due to the Iranian regime. Hezbollah has tied Lebanese decision-making to Iran's regional project, and the result is clear: The paralysis of Lebanese state institutions, economic collapse, and international isolation.

Syria continues to suffer from the consequences of Iranian dominance. Elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guard have intervened directly, and Syrian territory has been violated through the deployment of sectarian militias from multiple locations. Syrians have paid an enormous material and human cost as a result of this intervention.

Palestine and Yemen are other examples. Iran is more of an enemy to these countries than to the Gulf, which has protected its sovereignty and resources.





## **PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES**

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (1) [FONTE: Nações Unidas / UNHR]

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UNIVERSAL INSTRUMENT

## Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

ADOPTED  
**12 August 1949**


# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (2) [FONTE: CICR]



## Even wars have rules. What does that mean?

It means: You do not attack civilians. You limit as much as you can the impact of your warfare on women and children, as well as on other civilians. You treat detainees humanely. You do not torture people.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (3) [FONTE: CICR]



## 1. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE SCENE

Today we begin a series of lectures on the law of armed conflict, which is also known as the law of war, international humanitarian law, or simply IHL.

To begin, I'd like to take a guess at what you're thinking right now.

Some of you are probably thinking that this is an ideal opportunity to catch up on some well-earned rest. "Thank goodness I'm not on the assault course or on manoeuvres. This is absolutely marvellous. I can switch off and let this instructor ramble on for 45 minutes. I know all about the Geneva Conventions anyway – the law is part of my culture and our military traditions. I really don't need to listen to all this legal 'mumbo jumbo'."

The more sceptical and cynical among you might well be thinking along the lines of a very famous orator of ancient Rome – Cicero. He thought, "laws are silent amidst the clash of arms". In other words, war by its very nature is beyond the law. Wars break out when the rule of law breaks down, so there are no longer any rules. It's like finding yourself in the middle of a football / cricket / hockey match without referees or umpires, so just go for it. "We have to win at any cost, so let's forget the legal do-gooders."

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (4) [FONTE: CICR]

## 4. WHEN DOES THE LAW APPLY?

The law of armed conflict applies even if there has been no formal declaration of war. It applies in two quite different types of situation.

[Slide 20] International armed conflicts, e.g. the Gulf War, the Falklands/Malvinas War

[Slide 21] Non-international armed conflicts, e.g. Sri Lanka, Chechnya

Before defining these terms, it is worth mentioning why we now refer to **conflict** and not **war**. The answer is straightforward. Under the 1945 United Nations Charter, adopted just after the horrors of World War II, the use of force by one State against another is prohibited (Article 2). States may resort to force in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence (Article 51) or as part of military sanctions authorized by the Security Council (Articles 43-48). Since then, therefore, States have avoided declaring war. The 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted the more general term “armed conflict” deliberately to cover the complete range of situations and to avoid legal arguments over the exact definition of war. States today are less inclined to speak of war or admit that a state of war exists, but as we all know armed conflicts certainly do.

**An armed conflict** arises whenever there is fighting between States or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups or just between organized armed groups.

**An international armed conflict** arises when one State uses armed force against another State or States. The term also applies to all cases of total or partial military occupation, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. It is now irrelevant whether the States concerned consider themselves to be at war with each other or how they describe the conflict. An international armed conflict is considered to be over once active hostilities or territorial occupation have ceased. POWs still held by the parties nevertheless remain under the protection of the law until their ultimate release.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (5) [FONTE: CICR]

## **TREATY LAW**

---

Treaty law is based on:

### **Geneva law**

This branch of the law is aimed at protecting the victims of a conflict who are in the power of the adversary – civilians, or you, too, if you have been wounded or taken prisoner of war (POW). The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are aimed at exactly those situations. They protect the wounded and sick on land and at sea, prisoners of war and civilians.

### **Hague law**

This is very much practical soldier's law. Its aim is to lay down rules for the conduct of operations, on how the fighting is to be carried out, by stating, for example, what you can attack and how you should attack it. It gives rules which limit the destructive effects of combat exceeding what is really necessary to achieve the military aim or mission.

### **Developments in treaty law**

In order to protect civilians from the effects of the fighting, rules were needed not just to protect them from the enemy, but also on how the fighting had to be carried out. As the law evolved, it therefore sought to keep pace with changes in warfare and meet both requirements. The 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions do just that: they often combine and update elements of Hague and Geneva law.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (6) [FONTE: CICR]

## **STATE RESPONSIBILITY**

---

States signatory to the Geneva Conventions undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. They further undertake to ensure that the texts of the Conventions are disseminated as widely as possible, in particular to the armed forces. A party to the conflict violating the provisions of the law of armed conflict will, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It is responsible for all acts committed by its armed forces.

There are other, equally important reasons to be familiar with the law of armed conflict and to comply with it. Compliance also:

- underlines the true professionalism of members of the armed forces;
- enhances morale and discipline;
- ensures the support of the civilian population at home and in the theatre of operations;
- makes reciprocal treatment, for example of the wounded and sick and prisoners of war, more likely;
- improves the prospects for a return to lasting peace (lingering bitterness caused by inhuman or brutal behaviour in conflict will slow down any peace process);
- ensures that the military effort is concentrated on defeating the adversary and not on unnecessary and counterproductive operations.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (7) [FONTE: CICR]

## 5. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Just as military operations have principles of attack, defence, withdrawal, etc., so does the law of armed conflict contain a set of clearly defined principles. These principles are practical, reflect the realities of conflict and, most important of all, do not include anything that a professional soldier could not apply in battle. They strike a balance between humanity and military necessity, and are valid at all times, in all places and under all circumstances. You are not free to do what you want. As commanders or staff officers, it is of the utmost importance that you know and understand these principles. They must be taken into account as a matter of routine in any military appreciation, planning and indeed training that you undertake. Soldiers under your command must also understand them. You will find the following principles throughout the law of armed conflict.

### DISTINCTION

[Slide 22]

You must always clearly **distinguish between combatants and civilians or the civilian population as such**. Combatants may of course be attacked unless they are out of action, i.e. they are *hors de combat*. Civilians are protected from attack but lose that protection whenever they take a direct part in hostilities **for the time of their participation**. Similarly, you must always **distinguish between military objectives which can be attacked and civilian objects which must be respected**. The word “object” covers all kinds of objects, whether public or private, fixed or portable.

### PROPORTIONALITY

[Slide 23]

When military objectives are attacked, civilians and civilian objects must be spared from incidental or collateral damage to the maximum extent possible. Incidental damage must not be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage you anticipate from your operations. Excessive use of force quite clearly violates the law of armed conflict.

## MILITARY NECESSITY

[Slide 24]

This principle is enshrined in the preamble to the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, which states that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy” and that “for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men”. Today we would of course also include women.

This principle is entirely practical. It accepts the realities of battle. It allows for whatever **reasonable force is necessary, is lawful and can be operationally justified in combat to make your opponent submit**.

Activities which are clearly unnecessary militarily are prohibited.

The principle of military necessity protects good commanders and allows them to fulfil their mission. If an action is necessary – fine, then carry it out. Just ensure it is within the law and complies with all the other principles, in particular those of distinction and proportionality. You must never use military necessity as an excuse for slackness, indifference, poor planning or leadership. Military necessity is built into the law; it cannot be invoked to justify violations of the law.

## LIMITATION

[Slide 25]

In any armed conflict, the right of the parties involved to choose methods and means of warfare **is not unlimited**, i.e. IHL limits how weapons and military tactics may be used.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (8) [FONTE: Politico, 6/04/2026]

## **Pentagon's new plans in Iran give Trump a way out of war crime accusations**

Defense officials are expanding a list of strike options.

04/06/2026 06:45 PM EDT



Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks with reporters during a news conference with President Donald Trump and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Gen. Dan Caine at the White House on April 6, 2026. | Mark Schiefelbein/AP

The Pentagon is expanding a list of Iranian energy sites it can target for attacks to include ones that provide fuel and power to both civilians and the military, a likely workaround if the administration is accused of war crimes for striking basic infrastructure.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (9) [FONTE: Politico, 6/04/2026]

Trump on Monday threatened a situation “where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12:00 tomorrow night, where every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding and never to be used again.”

But Pentagon officials have debated whether that justification is valid, according to a third official who, like others interviewed, was granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. The tension revolves around where to draw the line between military and civilian targets, such as water desalination plants, which could be considered targets because military forces also need water to drink.

Trump has threatened to launch strikes on infrastructure Tuesday night if the Iranians don’t reach a deal with the U.S. by 8 p.m. Eastern time. The U.S. alone has hit more than 13,000 targets in Iran, according to U.S. Central Command.

The Pentagon referred questions to the White House.

“It’s the job of the Pentagon to make preparations in order to give the commander-in-chief maximum optionality,” said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt. “It does not mean the President has made a decision. The Iranian regime has until 8:00 p.m. tomorrow to make a deal with the United States. If they fail to do so, the president will send them back to the Stone Age, just as he promised.”

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (10) [FONTE: Politico, 6/04/2026]

The Geneva Convention, which spells out the international humanitarian law, allows for leeway when strike sites are used by both the military and civilians.

"Before targets get approved, they have to go under operational legal review," said Sean Timmons, a former Army Judge Advocate General. "Some civilian infrastructure, if dually used by the military, can under the laws of war be a legitimate target. The concern that people have, that this will get excessive, is legitimate ... but there are checks and balances."

But Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last year [gutted the Pentagon offices that assist](#) with military targeting and preventing civilian harm, which may mean less oversight of such issues.

Hegseth instead chose to [reduce the number](#) of employees working on the issue from 200 to less than 40. The laid-off staff assisted military commanders in choosing targets that would spare civilian lives, and investigated strikes after they occurred to better spare civilians in the future.

Hegseth last month announced he would further cut the lawyers who advise commanders of an operation's legality, known as judge advocate generals. He [fired Army, Navy and Air Force lawyers in the first days of the administration.](#)

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (11) [FONTE: The Independent, 7/04/2026]

## The dubious justification behind the Pentagon's potential plan to attack Iran's water treatment plants

With just hours left until Trump's Tuesday night deadline, the Pentagon is compiling a list of energy sites to target

The Pentagon is considering [strikes on Iranian infrastructure](#) that serves both civilian and military purposes, such as water desalination plants, according to a new report.

Some U.S. military officials say the "dual-use" of these assets would render them legitimate targets. However, other Pentagon brass has questioned the validity of this justification, according to *Politico*.

"The tension revolves around where to draw the line between military and civilian targets, such as water desalination plants, which could be considered targets because military forces also need water to drink," the outlet reported.

This dual-use justification could help the Trump administration [defend against war crimes allegations](#) but legal experts say that it still risks breaching international law.

On Tuesday morning, President Donald Trump threatened that "a whole civilization will die tonight" if Iran's leaders do not agree to a [proposed peace deal](#) by 8 p.m. (ET). On Monday, the president vowed to decimate "every bridge" and "[every power plant](#)" in Iran by midnight Tuesday.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (12) [FONTE: The Independent, 7/04/2026]

## **Experts warn striking civilian sites is 'prohibited'**

A number of experts, however, have cautioned that the bombardment of dual-use sites would run afoul of the law.

"Intentionally attacking civilian infrastructure such as power plants is generally prohibited," Erika Guevara Rosas, Amnesty International's senior director of research, advocacy, policy and campaigns, told *The Guardian*. "Even in the limited cases that they qualify as military targets, a party still cannot attack power plants if this may cause disproportionate harm to civilians."

Retired Air Force Lt. Col. Rachel VanLandingham, who served as the head of international law at Central Command during the Iraq war, said Trump's apocalyptic rhetoric raises major concerns.

"By saying we're just going to bomb everything, bomb every single bridge, every single power plant that serves civilians, that is threatening indiscriminate attack," she told PBS News. "And it is one of the most horrible war crimes there are because it brings us back, straight back down the slippery slope to total warfare."

A spokesperson for U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned that destroying infrastructure used by civilians is forbidden under international law.

"Even if specific civilian infrastructure were to qualify as a military objective," an attack would still be prohibited if it risks "excessive incidental civilian harm," Stephane Dujarric told *The Washington Post*.

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (13) [FONTE: The Independent, 7/04/2026]

The past few decades have seen a “[dangerous rise](#)” in the targeting of dual-use sites in warfare, including in Syria, Ukraine and Gaza, which in some instances have led to legal repercussions, according to the *Yale Law Journal*. In 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for two Russian officials accused of ordering attacks on power infrastructure in Ukraine.

Since the Iran war broke out in late February, the U.S. has struck more than 13,000 targets inside the country, according to U.S. Central Command — and at least some civilian sites have been attacked.

A February 28 strike on a girl’s school [killed at least 175 people](#), mostly children, according to Iranian officials. A preliminary Pentagon investigation determined the U.S. was responsible, according to *The New York Times*. Earlier this week, Trump celebrated the [destruction of a major bridge in Iran](#), which Iranian officials said killed eight people and injured nearly 100 more.

On Monday, Trump brushed aside fears of hitting civilian power plants, insisting he’s “not worried” and accused Iran of violating the law.

“You know what’s a war crime? Having a nuclear weapon,” Trump said. “Allowing a sick country, with demented leadership, [to] have a nuclear weapon — that’s a war crime.”

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (14) [FONTE: Tribunal Penal Internacional]

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Internationale

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Criminal  
Court

Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute

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## About the Court



The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.

**"This cause ... is the cause of all humanity"**

*Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan*

# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (15) [FONTE: Tribunal Penal Internacional]

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# As infra-estruturas com o alvo de guerra: a questão da (i)legalidade (16) [FONTE: Tribunal Penal Internacional]

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## GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AT FORTY

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TARIK M. YOUSEF AND ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR



## THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

International Humanitarian Law in War

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