

# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
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# **PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL**

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (1) [FONTE: União Europeia]

## Hungria

### Panorâmica

**Capital:** Budapeste

**Língua oficial da UE:** húngaro

**Adesão à UE:** 1 de maio de 2004


**Moeda:** forint húngaro (HUF). A Hungria está atualmente a preparar a adoção do [euro](#).

Membro do **espaço Schengen** desde [21 de dezembro de 2007](#)

**Números importantes:**

- Superfície: 93 012 km<sup>2</sup>
- População: 9 539 502

(Fonte: [Eurostat](#) — dados de 2025 relativos à [dimensão geográfica](#) e à [população](#))



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (2) [FONTE: União Europeia]


## Sistema político

A Hungria é uma **república parlamentar**. O poder executivo é exercido pelo primeiro-ministro, que é o chefe de governo. O papel do presidente, que é o chefe de Estado, é principalmente representativo. A Hungria está dividida em 19 condados, a capital Budapeste e 25 cidades com direitos de condado.

## Comércio e economia

O PIB per capita da Hungria, de 29 400 EUR, situa-se abaixo da média da UE (38 100 EUR). Representa 1,1 % do PIB total da UE.

(Fonte: Eurostat — dados de 2023 relativos ao [PIB per capita](#) e ao [PIB](#))



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (3) [FONTE: União Europeia]

## Orçamento e financiamento

### De que forma beneficia a Hungria do orçamento da UE?

O orçamento da UE permite garantir que a Europa continua a ser uma força democrática, pacífica, próspera e competitiva. A UE utiliza-o para financiar as suas prioridades e **projetos** de grande dimensão **que a maioria dos países da UE não conseguiria financiar individualmente.**

Os [benefícios](#) decorrentes da adesão à UE superam significativamente a dimensão das contribuições do orçamento da UE e há muitos exemplos disso. **Todos os Estados-Membros beneficiam** de fazer parte do mercado único, de uma abordagem partilhada para fazer face aos desafios comuns da migração, do terrorismo e das alterações climáticas, e de ganhos concretos, como melhores infraestruturas de transportes, serviços públicos modernizados e digitalizados e tratamento médico de ponta.


A contribuição de cada Estado-Membro para o [orçamento da UE](#) é **calculada de forma equitativa.** Quanto maior for a economia do país, maior é a sua contribuição e vice-versa.

O orçamento da UE não se destina a dar e receber, trata-se de contribuir coletivamente para fazer da Europa e do mundo um lugar melhor para todos nós.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (4) [FONTE: Enciclopédia Britânica]



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (5) [FONTE: Lyubosvit]



### ☰ About the region



Zakarpattia is one of the most original corners of Ukraine. This is a region with the unique geopolitical and geographical location (covering the south-west part of the Ukrainian Carpathians and Dunabe lowland). Due to its geographical features Zakarpattia has been for long a convenient junction between the countries of Northern and Southern, Eastern and Western Europe.

The territory of Zakarpattia Region is 12.8 thousand square km. By administrative-territorial division this is 13 districts, 10 cities including three cities of regional submission. There are 608 settlements in the region on the whole. The number of population of Zakarpattia is 1.2 million people.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (6) [FONTE: Lyubosvit]

The region is multinational. Ukrainians (78.4%) are the main and native population. Also Hungarians, Russians, Romanians, Slovaks and gypsies or representatives of more than 30 nationalities live in the wonderful land.

Zakarpattya Region has a complex historical background. Its territory has been populated for ages. The first mention about human life on the region's territory dates at the early Palaeolithic (about 500 thousand BC).

Among the archaeological sights of the first half of 1st millennium AD there are in Zakarpattya well-known Carpathians' mounds. The scientists established that these were made by the ancestors of Slavic tribes of White Croats. The wonderful natural pearl had known many lords. In IX-X centuries the territory of Zakarpattya was comprised in Kyiv Russia. In XI-XIII centuries and until XX century the present Zakarpattya Region territory belonged to Hungary or Austro-Hungary, in 1918-1919 to Hungary, in 1919-1939 was merged to Czechoslovakia and named "Transcarpathian Russia", in 1939-1944 returned to Hungary.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (7) [FONTE: Kafkadesk]



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (8) [FONTE: Kafkadesk]

## **On this Day, in 1945: Carpathian Ruthenia was annexed by the Soviet Union**

**On June 29, 1945, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, pressured by Czech and Slovak communists, signed a treaty with the Soviet Union ceding Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union.**

Following [the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918](#), the historic region of Transcarpathia, situated at the border between Central and Eastern Europe, became part of the newly-formed Kingdom of Hungary.

But after the Paris Peace Conference, the area was annexed by Czechoslovakia and officially renamed to Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the country's fourth province after Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.

However, as a result of the 1938 Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was forced to cede southern Carpathian Ruthenia to Hungary while the remainder of the region received autonomy and was renamed to Carpathian Ukraine.

Following [the Slovak proclamation of independence](#) and the Nazis' seizure of the Czech lands in March 1939, Carpathian Ukraine declared its independence from Czechoslovakia as the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, before being immediately occupied and annexed by Hungary.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (9) [FONTE: Kafkadesk]

The Hungarian invasion, which provisionally restored the former counties of Ung, Bereg and Máramaros, was followed by weeks of terror in which more than 27,000 people were shot dead without trial and investigation.

After [the German occupation of Hungary](#), the pro-Nazi policies of the Hungarian government resulted in the setting up of 17 ghettos in Carpathian Ruthenia; of more than 100,000 Carpathian Ruthenian Jews, around 90,000 were murdered, many of them at Auschwitz.

But in October 1944, Carpathian Ruthenia was taken by the Red Army, leading many ethnic Hungarians to flee the area as those who remained were deported to labour camps in the Soviet Union.

A Czechoslovak delegation was quickly dispatched to the area to mobilise the liberated local population to form a Czechoslovak army and to prepare for elections. But the Soviet military prevented them from establishing a cooperative relationship with the local national committees promoted by the Soviets, despite protests from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile.

In June 1945, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, pressured by Czech and Slovak communists, signed a treaty with the Soviet Union ceding Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets. A year later, Transcarpathia became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as the Zakarpattia Oblast.

Today part of Ukraine, with smaller parts in Slovakia and Poland, Carpathian Ruthenia is an ethnically diverse region, inhabited by Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Polish, Jewish and Romani minorities.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (10) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

## How Transcarpathia's Hungarian past set up its tumultuous present (VIDEO) - May. 04, 2018

Veronika Melkozerova · Published May 4, 2018. Updated March 22 at 4:10 pm



*Editor's Note: This is the fourth installment in the Kyiv Post's "Honest History" project, a series that debunks myths about Ukrainian history used by propagandists. The stories and videos are supported by the Black Sea Trust, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the Black Sea Trust, the German Marshall Fund or its partners.*

**BEREHOVE, Ukraine** — Fresh trouble with a difficult neighbor is brewing for Ukraine, but this time it's not only from Russia. Leaders in Hungary, a nation of 9.8 million people that borders Ukraine's southwestern Zakarpattia Oblast, 800 kilometers southwest of Kyiv, is making Ukraine's life as difficult as possible.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (11) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

As Russia did in eastern Ukraine, Hungary is extending its influence in Zakarpattya, trying to dictate to Ukraine how to conduct its internal affairs, accusing it of suppressing the Hungarian minority, and even threatening to block Ukraine's integration into the European Union and NATO.

## **Today's conflict**

The tensions between Ukraine and Hungary flared up in September, when the Ukrainian parliament introduced legislation that makes Ukrainian the only language of education in the country's state schools. Although the new language law was aimed mostly at cutting the influence of the Russian language, it angered most of Ukraine's neighboring countries, who saw it as suppressing their national languages as well.

Tensions with Romania and Poland on this issue have been solved diplomatically, but Russia and Hungary have been using the language law to claim Ukraine is discriminating against national minorities.

The shift to the right in European politics isn't helping matters: the radical Hungarian political party Jobbik, which in 2014 openly called for Zakarpattya to be united with Hungary, took 26 seats in the Hungarian parliament and came second after current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's ruling alliance Fidesz-KNDP (133 seats) in Hungary's parliamentary election on April 8.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (12) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

In turn, Ukrainian nationalists' provocations against Hungarian flags, and what the Security Service of Ukraine has claimed was a Russian instigated attack on a Hungarian cultural center in Zakarpattya, were widely covered in both the Hungarian and Russian media.

Now Ukraine's plan to restore a military base in Berehove, a city of 20,000 residents some 10 kilometers away from the Hungarian border, has become the latest sore point in Ukrainian-Hungarian relations.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó expressed his concerns about the plan, which would see some 800 Ukrainian soldiers being based in the area, which is populated mostly by ethnic Hungarians. Szijjártó said the Ukrainian government considered the Hungarian minority a threat to Kyiv and called this situation "disgusting" on March 19.

But despite Hungary's widespread involvement in the region, Zakarpattya is far from being dominated by ethnic Hungarians. In reality, it is a multinational land. According to the last national census in 2001, Zakarpattya was mostly inhabited by Ukrainians (1 million), Hungarians (151,000), Romanians, Russians, Roma, Slovaks, Germans and Jews.

So why is Hungary intervening in Ukrainian affairs in Zakarpattya now? The reasons lie in the region's past.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (13) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

## **Lost empire**

Zakarpattia, a region of 12,800 square kilometers in the western area of the Carpathian Mountains, only became part of Ukraine about 70 years ago, after World War II in 1946.

The Soviet Union positioned that as “the restoring of historical justice” — bringing back a land mostly inhabited by Ukrainians. But Hungary saw the loss of this territory as a great injustice.

Over the courses of the 19th and 20th centuries, the area was under control of the Austrian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, the short-lived Carpathian Ukraine, then Hungary, the Soviet Union, and independent Ukraine.

Before World War I, Hungary had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the second largest state in Europe after the Russian Empire. During the 1914–1918 war, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in alliance with the German Empire, Osman Empire and the Bulgarian Kingdom, fought against the Allied Forces of the United Kingdom, France and Russia.

It lost the war, and also territories that are now part of today's Serbia, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (14) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

## **Hungarians in Ukraine**

Ukraine's neighbors should now leave the historical tensions in the past and learn to live in peace and harmony under the modern order, Kenyyz said.

But Hungary has not forgotten that it once owned Zakarpattya.

The current Hungarian government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban has been conducting nationalist conservative policy, and has made Hungarians living abroad one of its main focuses.

Soon after Orban came to power in 2010, Hungary adopted a simplified procedure for granting Hungarian citizenship.

As of 2016, more than 760,000 foreigners had received it, with only 28,000 applications being rejected.

Up to 100,000 citizens of Zakarpattya have received Hungarian passports, according to Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Vasyl Bondar.

This is roughly the number of the Hungarian diaspora in the region. And Hungarians have recently confirmed their support for the nationalist Orban: his party won 133 out of 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament at the election on April 8.

Of the territories that used to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ukraine has the smallest Hungarian diaspora: Some 100,000 people, almost all of them in Zakarpattya.

In comparison, as of 2013 there were 1.2 million Hungarians living in Romania, some 459,000 in the Slovak Republic, and 251,000 in Serbia.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (15) [FONTE: Kiyv Post, 4/05/2018]

## **Political quarrels**

Hungary, meanwhile, claims that a Ukrainian nationalist resurgence is spoiling Kyiv's relations with its neighbors. Since Ukraine introduced the school language law in September, Hungary has been blocking the meetings of the Ukraine-NATO Commission.

In response, the Ukrainian government has promised to postpone the implementation of the law until 2023.

"We're not against learning Ukrainian, we just want to have a choice, as in a democratic country," Csatory says, speaking in Ukrainian.

He learned the language while studying history at Uzhhorod University.

Unlike him, most senior members of the Ukrainian-Hungarian community don't speak Ukrainian.

Younger people speak Ukrainian as a foreign language. There are more than 90 public schools in Zakarpattya where children study in Hungarian.

When the new language law comes into force in 2023, they will have to switch to Ukrainian.

But Csatory thinks this won't be possible. "The government wants our kids to learn Ukrainian like Ukrainian kids do, using the same textbooks. But here there has to be a special approach — to teach Ukrainian as a foreign language," he says.

Budapest's tough response to Ukraine's language legislation has in turn provoked a reaction from Ukrainian nationalists in Zakarpattya.

Local nationalist organization Svoboda in November ripped the Hungarian national flag from Berehove City Council building.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (16) [FONTE: Engelsberg Ideas, 11/04/2016]

## Hungary's long rebellion against the West



Hungary's 2026 election is not only about policy, but competing interpretations of history. Through this struggle, we glimpse a broader western crisis over sovereignty, belonging and memory. The East-West dichotomy has haunted Hungarian leaders since the Middle Ages, a dilemma rooted largely in the country's geopolitical position. Indeed, many have asked, is Hungary fundamentally a western state that periodically doubts itself?

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (17) [FONTE: Engelsberg Ideas, 11/04/2016]

The Battle of Mohács is considered a central trauma point in Hungarian history. On 29 August 1526, the army of Suleiman I, Sultan of the [Ottoman Empire](#), crushed the Christian forces at Mohács in the southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary. This decisive defeat ultimately brought an end to the kingdom's medieval political and economic significance, led to its partition, ushered in a century and a half of partial Ottoman rule, and facilitated the gradual expansion of Habsburg influence. The [House of Habsburg](#) eventually came to dominate the entirety of the former Hungarian territories, ruling over them until the end of the First World War. Consequently, Mohács has long been interpreted as marking the collapse of Hungary's medieval grandeur and the beginning of centuries of 'foreign' domination.

Contemporary [memory politics](#) surrounding Mohács remains highly controversial. Hungary's medieval role as *antemurale Christianitatis* (the bastion of Christendom) has been projected onto its opposition to illegal migration, often illustrated through images depicting refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. Nonetheless, the country's observer status as the only Christian member state in the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) suggests a more complex narrative. In May 2025, Hungary became the first observer state to organise an informal summit for the OTS, with the stated aim of strengthening its role as a mediator between East and West and further ensuring the security of its energy supply.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (18) [FONTE: Engelsberg Ideas, 11/04/2016]

In Hungarian memory, the First World War is inseparable from the internationally lesser-known term Trianon. Signed on 4 June 1920, the [Treaty of Trianon](#) formally ended the war for Hungary, dismantling its half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and stripping the country of roughly two thirds of its territory and one third of its Hungarian-speaking population.

The treaty did more than redraw borders: it embedded a narrative of collective victimhood and injustice at the heart of modern Hungarian identity. In the interwar period, this narrative fuelled revisionist ambitions to reclaim lost lands, drawing Hungary into the Tripartite Pact in November 1940 and into war against the Soviet Union in June 1941. Trianon illustrates, therefore, how historical trauma, when internalised as national destiny, can shape foreign policy choices and strategic alignments. The later trope of 'abandonment by the West' – retrospectively linked to Mohács – further reinforced a pattern in which external alliances are judged less by pragmatic calculation than by their perceived loyalty to Hungarian sovereignty. This legacy remains politically potent.

By granting citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad after 2010, Orbán transformed a historical grievance into a durable electoral and geopolitical instrument. The policy symbolically transcends Trianon's borders while materially reshaping Hungary's electorate. That Hungarian citizens in neighbouring states can register to vote by mail in national elections since 2011, while many Hungarian labour migrants in Western Europe can only vote in person, underscores how memory politics intersects with institutional design. Trianon is therefore not only commemorated – it is operationalised.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (19) [FONTE: Engelsberg Ideas, 11/04/2016]

In today's context, the most consequential reinterpretation of history concerns Hungary's nearly 45 years of state socialism. The Hungarian People's Republic, established in 1949, was a Soviet-backed one-party dictatorship that crushed the 1956 revolution with military force. Yet from the early 1960s until 1989, it evolved into a comparatively moderate and consumer-oriented authoritarian regime (the so-called 'goulash communism'), trading political conformity for rising living standards and limited economic liberalisation. After 1989, this past was widely understood as a period of lost sovereignty, reinforcing the aspiration of 'returning to Europe', institutionalised through NATO membership in 1999 and EU accession in 2004.

What is striking today is not the memory of communism itself, but its inversion. Once a staunch anti-communist who built his early political identity on opposition to Soviet domination, Orbán has gradually reframed Hungary's post-1989 trajectory. Since 2010, and particularly following his rapprochement with Vladimir Putin, the [language of empire](#) has shifted westward: Brussels, rather than Moscow, is cast as the primary threat to Hungarian sovereignty. In this narrative, the European Union assumes the role once assigned to the Kremlin, while Russia is recast as a defender of national identity and Christian civilisation. Orbán [declared](#) in February 2026 that 'those who love freedom should not fear the East, but Brussels. The "Putin, Putin, Putin" mantra is crude and unserious; but Brussels is a tangible reality, and a direct source of danger.' In doing so, he was not merely repeating his long-standing criticism of EU institutions. He was relocating the historical memory of subjugation. By redirecting the symbolism of 1956 away from Moscow and toward Brussels, he transforms the foundational trauma of Soviet domination into a justification for resistance against Western integration.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (20) [FONTE: Engelsberg Ideas, 11/04/2016]

For western audiences, Hungary's story raises urgent questions: How resilient are supranational norms when confronted with politicised memory, and how should integration accommodate persistent historical grievance? Orbán's image as a defender of European culture, built on a selective use of historical memory, illustrates the broader challenges facing liberal democracy, multiculturalism and national sovereignty, showing how historical grievance can be mobilised to shape contemporary politics.

In the parliamentary elections scheduled for 12 April 2026, Orbán's main challenger is the centre-right, pro-EU and Atlanticist Tisza Party, led by Péter Magyar – once closely affiliated with Orbán's regime and now his most promising opponent. While Magyar shares certain conservative and nationalist values with the governing Fidesz party and frequently invokes historical references in his rhetoric, he pursues a distinctly different diplomatic orientation. He has [announced](#) that, if elected, his first official visit will be to Poland in the name of the 'thousand-year Polish–Hungarian friendship', followed by trips to Vienna and Brussels.

Whoever comes to power in April 2026 will inherit a national consciousness shaped by victimhood and defiance. Without critically engaging with this past, Hungary risks letting historical grievances continue to define both its future and its place within the broader tensions of the West.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (21) [FONTE: William Natrass, Politico, 15/09/2024]

## Hungary's 'pro-Russia' stance was inevitable

The posture is the result of historical and recent political factors, many of which have been shaped by Orbán himself.



Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán traveled to Moscow for the funeral of Mikhail Gorbachev. His attendance leaves Europe questioning if Hungary is pro-Russia | Evgenia Novozhenina/AFP via Getty Images

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (22) [FONTE: William Natrass, Politico, 15/09/2024]

Within Europe, the country stands out like a sore thumb. And with broad support for Orbán’s non-interventionist policy, the question of involvement in the war isn’t even a major wedge issue domestically. So, is it reasonable to claim that Hungary is “pro-Russia”?

The short answer is no. Hungary’s ambivalent stance is the inevitable result of a combination of domestic political influences, as well as its complex relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the West. In many ways, it is the story of the country’s recent history.

The main problem with the simple pro-Russia label is that Hungarian attitudes toward Russia and Russians are far from friendly. Perceptions of Russia are still colored by Soviet forces crushing the Hungarian uprising of 1956, just as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia haunts Czechs and Slovaks to this day. Even Orbán himself was a fervent anti-communist campaigner in the twilight years of the Eastern Bloc.

Pro-Russia social currents are also arguably much weaker in Hungary than among its Slavic neighbors. Nationalist movements in Slovakia, Serbia and the Czech Republic often share a sense of ideological kinship with Russia, one linked to suspicion of the West, seeing Ukraine’s pro-Western policy as something akin to a betrayal of Slavic identity.

However, such interpretations of the war don’t exert the same sway in Hungary because Hungarians aren’t Slavic — neither do they nurture positive attitudes to Russians in general.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (23) [FONTE: William Natrass, Politico, 15/09/2024]

Relations between Budapest and Kyiv took a dramatically negative turn in recent years, when Ukraine introduced restrictions on national minorities intended to combat Russian influence. Hungarians claim minority communities in Transcarpathia — a region of Ukraine ceded by Hungary after World War I — faced hostility because of these policies.

Since then, Orbán has been accused of fostering resentment. Tensions flared in 2018 over a video that apparently showed diplomats illegally issuing Hungarian passports to people in Transcarpathia. Later, in 2019, Hungary was accused of trying to influence the outcome of elections in the region, and blocked Ukraine's NATO membership negotiations over the row.

Today, from the Donbas to Kosovo, events are again proving the potency of nationalist narratives over lost territory and peoples separated by the claimed injustices of history. Yet, in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the simple fact that many Hungarians have negative views of both Russians and Ukrainians is pertinent.

And while these views have clearly influenced Hungarian government policy on both military aid and sanctions, other historical, economic and cultural factors have played their part as well.

Many Hungarians worry about the gravitational pull that wars can have on neighboring countries. In the early 1990s, Hungary only narrowly escaped being sucked into the wars in the Balkans, after it was revealed that Budapest had been supplying tens of thousands of Kalashnikov rifles to Croat forces.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (24) [FONTE: William Natrass, Politico, 15/09/2024]

Orbán's economic model built around geopolitical ambivalence has influenced the country's resistance to energy sanctions as well. Orbán describes Hungary as a "transit economy," which can only thrive by drawing investment and opportunities from both East and West.

In this context, German-Russian energy cooperation is paradoxically believed to be fundamental to Hungarian national security. Orbán argues that the German-Russian energy axis remains the only way to stop Eastern Europe from becoming "dependent on the Americans" for energy and military protection. Though, his warning against American energy dominance does seem bizarre given that Hungary, Germany and others have had few qualms about relying on Russia.

Finally, the economic arguments against cutting Russia off dovetails with Hungary's growing cultural rift with the West. The progressive values rejected by Orbán are also mocked by Moscow, and Orbán has portrayed the country as emblematic of traditional mores. "Russians speak an old language. When we listen to them, it's as if we are hearing the sounds of the past," he said.

With Orbán presenting Western progressivism to Hungarians as dangerous, it should come as no surprise that Russia's more traditional cultural values exert a certain appeal. As Attila Demkó, head of the Center for Geopolitics at Budapest's Mathias Corvinus Collegium, says: "After 12 years of pressure from the EU and the West," many Hungarians fall into the trap of feeling that "if the West is 'bad,' there must be some 'truth' in what Russia is doing."

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (25) [FONTE: ECPS, 2021]



## Viktor Orbán: Past to Present

BY BULENT KENES

### ABSTRACT

Today, Hungary could be defined as, at best, an “illiberal democracy.” Some even argue that the country is now a crude autocracy. Orbán is personally described as “irredentist,” “right-wing populist,” “authoritarian,” “autocratic,” and “Putinist.” He’s also been called a “strongman” and a “dictator.” Orbán has outmaneuvered his opponents and tightened his clutch on power. He makes no secret of his plans to rule Hungary for the foreseeable future.

**BULENT KENES** is an academic and a journalist who has over 25 years of professional experience. He has managed multiple publications, both in Turkish and English.

**ECPS Leader Profile Series** offer analyses of political leaders and prominent public figures with populist tendencies. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed by the author are only attributable him and not to any institution with which they are associated.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (26) [FONTE: ECPS, 2021]


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According to Paul Lendvai, Viktor Orbán, whose rhetoric so stirred Hungarians in 1989, was no idealist; he was, rather, a budding opportunist getting an early taste of power. Gabor Fodor, an Orbán rival who was once his close friend, observed that even as a young man, Viktor Orbán “was already possessed of those domineering, intolerant ways of thinking and behaving that are all too evident in him today.”

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
A number of post-2010 laws and policies went against European political standards. Therefore, Hungary confronted fierce criticism from the EU governing bodies as well as Western constitutional experts. Observers assessed that Hungary made a “sharp U-turn” in its political development and is “retreating from democracy” towards “a one-party state” under the rule of Orbán.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (27) [FONTE: Freedom House]



*Since taking power in the 2010 elections, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) party pushed through constitutional and legal changes that have allowed it to consolidate control over the country's independent institutions.*

## Research & Recommendations



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (28) [FONTE: About Hungary / News in Brief]



NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: “Hungarians beyond the borders have the most at stake in this election”

“Everyone across the country understands what is at stake,” he said.

Apr 9, 2026

NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: We will never allow anyone to blackmail Hungary

At a campaign rally in Sopron, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán delivered a speech centered on national sovereignty, economic security, and the stakes of the upcoming election, presenting the vote as...

Apr 8, 2026




NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: “Hungary must stay out of the war and its financing”

“We will decide whether Hungarian money goes to Szombathely or to Donetsk.”

Apr 2, 2026



# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (29) [FONTE: About Hungary]

NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: If we do not want Hungary to be stripped of its resources, we need a national government

At a campaign rally in Szentes, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said the upcoming election will decide whether Hungary keeps a national government or ends up with a pro-Ukrainian one.

Apr 1, 2026



N

NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: Only a national government can stop Hungarians from being stripped of what is theirs

At a campaign rally in Ócsa, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said the upcoming election is not only about war and security, but also about whether Hungary can protect the money of families, pensioners, and young people.

Mar 31, 2026

N

NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: We are the ones celebrating, they are the ones trying to spoil it

At a campaign rally in Szolnok, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán framed the upcoming election as a decisive moment not only for Hungary's economic future, but also for its unity and resilience in the face of mounting external pressure.

Mar 30, 2026

N

NEWS IN BRIEF

## PM Orbán: "Ukrainians are trying to create a pro-Ukraine government in Hungary, but Zelensky's plan will not succeed"

"They came with money, with an oil blockade, and with spies—but we will not let them influence Hungary's future."

Mar 29, 2026

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (30) [FONTE: Wikipedia]










## Fidesz - União Cívica Húngara

Fidesz - União Cívica Húngara <i>Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség</i>	
	
<b>Presidente</b>	Viktor Orbán
<b>Fundação</b>	30 de março de 1988 (38 anos)
<b>Sede</b>	Budapeste  Hungria
<b>Ideologia</b>	Conservadorismo nacional Populismo de direita Iliberalismo Euroceticismo Democracia cristã <sup>[a]</sup>
<b>Espectro político</b>	Direita à extrema-direita

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (31) [FONTE: Wikipedia]

## Resultados Eleitorais

### Eleições legislativas

Data	Cl.	Votos	%	+/-	Deputados	+/-	Status
1990	5.º	439.481	8,9%		22 / 386 		Oposição
1994	6.º	379.295	7,0%	▼ 1,93	20 / 386 	▼ 2	Oposição
1998	1.º	1.263.522	28,2%	▲ 21,18	148 / 386 	▲ 128	<b>Governo</b>
2002	2.º	2.306.763	41,0%	▲ 13,89	164 / 386 	▲ 16	Oposição
2006	2.º	2.272.979	42,0%	▲ 0,96	141 / 386 	▼ 23	Oposição
2010	1.º	2.706.292	52,7%	▲ 10,7	227 / 386 	▲ 86	<b>Governo</b>
2014	1.º	2.264.486	44,9%	▼ 7,86	117 / 199 	▼ 110	<b>Governo</b>
2018	1.º	2.824.206	49,3%	▲ 4,40	117 / 199 	= 0	<b>Governo</b>
2022	1.º	2.794.052	53,6%	▲ 4,32	119 / 199 	▲ 2	<b>Governo</b>

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (32) [FONTE: ECFR, 9/04/2026]

● European Power

## Why Orbán and Hungary are not one and the same

ECFR's new public opinion polling reveals most Hungarians do not share Orbán's views on Hungary's place in the world. If the opposition wins the election on April 12th, the new government will have a mandate to reorientate the country's foreign policy towards Europe



**Piotr Buras** ✕  
Head, ECFR Warsaw  
Senior Policy Fellow



**Pawel Zerka** ✕  
Senior Policy Fellow

Commentary · 9 April 2026 · 4 minute read



People gather at a rally for the Tisza Party as Peter Magyar, a Hungarian prime ministerial candidate, speaks in Budapest on March 15 · picture alliance / NurPhoto | Balint Szentgallay ©


# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (33) [FONTE: ECFR, 9/04/2026]

## The EU is not an enemy

Orban has spent many of his years as prime minister painting the EU as an enemy of the Hungarian people. This does not seem to have worked. In early 2026 three-quarters of Hungarians trust the EU “completely”, “somewhat” or “a little”; only 15% do not trust it at all. Trust in the bloc does not even divide voters of the two main parties to a significant degree: an overwhelming majority (95%) of voters of Tisza trust the EU at least “a little”; so do two-thirds of Fidesz supporters. And people trust the EU more than they trust any Hungarian political leader or their country’s media and judiciary.

### To what extent do you trust the following people and institutions?

Hungarian population, in %



Source: Online poll conducted in Hungary by Stratega Research and Mandate Research between 26 March and 1 April 2026 on a sample of 1,001 adult citizens. - Get the data ECFR · ecf.eu

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (34) [FONTE: ECFR, 9/04/2026]


## Ukraine is divisive

On the surface, voters of the two main parties diverge as one might expect on Ukraine. A majority of Tisza voters (57%) say Hungary's next government should take a "very different approach" to the war from the current one. Among Fidesz voters, 72% prefer to stay on the same course. Most Tisza voters (61%) would also support the next government in allowing the transit of military aid to Ukraine through Hungary, while most Fidesz supporters (77%) would oppose it.

But when asked about specifics, Tisza voters are split down the middle. This applies to financial support for Ukraine, the country's EU membership and perceptions of President Volodymyr Zelensky (whom 44% of Magyar's electorate consider a "good" leader for his country—but 42% a "bad" one).

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (35) [FONTE: ECFR, 9/04/2026]


**To what extent would you support or oppose the next Hungarian government providing financial support for Ukraine?** By voter intention, in %



Source: Online poll conducted in Hungary by Stratega Research and Mandate Research between 26 March and 1 April 2026 on a sample of 1,001 adult citizens. · Get the data  
ECFR · ecf.eu

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (36) [FONTE: ECFR, 9/04/2026]

**Which of the following best describes the direction Hungary's foreign policy should take? By voter intention, in %**



- Closer alignment with European partners
- Balancing relations between the West, Russia, and China
- Don't know
- None of the above
- Closer alignment with the United States under President Trump
- Strengthening ties with Russia and China

Source: Online poll conducted in Hungary by Stratega Research and Mandate Research between 26 March and 1 April 2026 on a sample of 1,001 adult citizens. · Get the data  
ECFR · ecf.eu

In terms of alignment with countries in the EU, the camps look for different allies. Magyar's supporters prefer closer relationships with Germany, Austria and Poland. Unsurprisingly, those voting for Orban mainly pick Robert Fico's Slovakia as a country Hungary should build alliances with.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (37) [FONTE: Wikipedia]

O **Partido Respeito e Liberdade** (em [húngaro](#): *Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt*, **TISZA**), também chamado de **Partido Tisza**, é um partido político [húngaro](#) de [centro-direita](#).<sup>[2][3]</sup> Ganhou notoriedade quando o então membro do [Fidesz](#), [Péter Magyar](#), se juntou a ele; membros do movimento não partidário de Magyar, o "Erga-te Comunidade Húngara", ocuparam a maioria dos lugares na [eleição parlamentar europeia de 2024](#)<sup>[4]</sup> e, em 7 de junho de 2024, ganharam sete assentos no [Parlamento Europeu](#).<sup>[5]</sup>

## Ideologia

O Tisza é um partido de centro-direita membro do [Partido Popular Europeu](#). Descreve um dos seus objetivos como "mostrar que nós, [conservadores](#), [democratas cívicos](#), [sociais-democratas](#) e [liberais](#), somos antes de mais nada húngaros".<sup>[6]</sup>

Ainda que profundamente conservador,<sup>[7]</sup> Magyar escolheu se filiar ao partido por este procurar atuar como um [partido pega-tudo](#). Magyar falou inúmeras vezes sobre a criação de uma "terceira força política" na Hungria para abolir o "sistema de cooperação nacional", que é usado pelo Fidesz para manter o controle sobre a sociedade em geral.<sup>[8]</sup> Ele também defendeu a liberdade de expressão depois que vários membros foram demitidos de seus empregos civis após suas aparições públicas em manifestações contra o governo.<sup>[9]</sup>

Magyar liderou vários protestos contra o que considera o "estado mafioso", sendo a [anticorrupção](#) parte fundamental da maioria dos partidos antigoverno como o Tisza.<sup>[10]</sup> Contudo, o partido descartou a cooperação com a oposição por considerá-la cúmplice do governo.<sup>[11]</sup> Também propôs desclassificar os documentos secretos dos agentes da [era comunista](#) para esclarecer os ganhos de riqueza pessoal durante o rápido período de privatização na década de 1990.<sup>[12]</sup>

<b>Partido Respeito e Liberdade</b> <i>Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt</i>	
	
<b>TISZA PÁRT</b>	
<b>Líder</b>	<a href="#">Péter Magyar</a>
<b>Fundador</b>	Attila Szabó
<b>Fundação</b>	23 de outubro de 2020 (5 anos)
<b>Sede</b>	Eger,  Hungria
<b>Ideologia</b>	<a href="#">Partido pega-tudo</a> <a href="#">Europeísmo</a> <a href="#">Anticorrupção</a> <a href="#">Conservadorismo</a>
<b>Espetro político</b>	<a href="#">Centro-direita</a>
<b>Membros (2024)</b>	<span style="color: green;">▲</span> 19
<b>Afiliação europeia</b>	<a href="#">Partido Popular Europeu</a> <sup>[1]</sup>
<b>Assembleia Nacional</b>	0 / 199
<b>Parlamento Europeu</b>	7 / 21
<b>Cores</b>	 Azul-marinho  Vermelho  Verde
<b>Página oficial</b> <a href="https://magyartisza.hu">magyartisza.hu</a> 	

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (38) [FONTE: BBC, 11/04/2026]

## Péter Magyar, the former Orbán ally vying for power in Hungary



"Now or never," Péter Magyar has been telling Hungarians, in a breathless campaign across the country in the run-up to 12 April elections that opinion polls suggest he can win.

This 45-year-old former Fidesz party insider represents the biggest threat to Viktor Orbán's rule in Hungary since he won the first of four consecutive victories in 2010.

Magyar's slogan dates back to a revolutionary poet's 19th Century rallying cry to rise up for the homeland.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (39) [FONTE: BBC, 11/04/2026]

Magyar promises to tackle corruption, improve the economy and he has sought to woo Hungary's disadvantaged Roma community. He has also promised to unlock billions of euros in EU funds, frozen largely because of concerns over Hungary's rule of law.

But Orbán has depicted him as a "puppet" of the EU and Ukraine, and he has been wary of getting too close to Brussels and has promised voters "we are the real party of peace".

His self-confidence stems from a deep understanding of the rival he faces.

Until February 2024, Magyar was very much part of the Fidesz family.

He joined the party at university and married one of its rising stars in Judit Varga, with whom he had three children.

Then Magyar stunned Hungarians with a live appearance on a pro-opposition YouTube Channel called Partizán.

In a country of 9.6 million people, a million watched as a solemn Péter Magyar explained why he had had enough of his own party.

"Everyone warned me against it, friends, family people I know," he told presenter Márton Gulyás. "Obviously I've been in this system, in this circle, for a very long time."

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (40) [FONTE: BBC, 11/04/2026]



By autumn 2024, Magyar's new party was ahead of Fidesz in the polls and he tore into Orbán's close ties with Russia as they led rival marches marking Hungary's 1956 uprising against the Soviet Union.

While Orbán labelled Tisza as "warmongers" indulging in a "Brussels war march", Magyar taunted the prime minister as the man who had in 1989 called for Russian troops to leave Hungary but now trampled on the legacy of 1956 and was "the most loyal ally of the Kremlin".

"Mr Prime Minister, why won't you say 'Russians go home' any more?" he asked.

Magyar is no liberal. He has openly derided the liberal opposition that tried to take Orbán on in the past, only to see the Fidesz leader storm to a two-thirds majority it needed to mould the constitution.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (41) [FONTE: Politico, 13/04/2026]

## Orbán just lost his populist touch

The Hungarian PM misread his electorate by bashing the EU and Ukraine. Instead, people cared more about his cronyism and economic mismanagement.

[COPY LINK](#)



Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán addresses supporters at the Balna centre in Budapest. | Arpad Kurucz/Anadolu via Getty Images

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (42) [FONTE: Politico, 13/04/2026]

## **It's the economy, stupid**

Despite their nativist and sovereigntist principles, and advocacy of countries “taking back control” of their political and cultural destinies, there was absolutely no holding back by global far-right luminaries as they issued ever bleaker and more frantic warnings of what would befall Hungary in the event voters had the temerity to vote for change and end Orbán’s goulash populism.


But these grand appeals and lectures fell flat with a Hungarian electorate that had more parochial concerns about paying bills, getting jobs and receiving decent medical care.

“The foreign meddling just didn’t matter,” said Márton Tompos, an opposition lawmaker with the centrist Momentum party, which stood aside in this election to give Magyar’s Tisza party a clear, unencumbered run against Orbán.

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (43) [FONTE: Politico, 13/04/2026]

## First results in Hungary's pivotal election

First results of the party list vote in Hungary's 2026 general election; 93 of the 199 seats in Hungary's parliament are filled this way.



DK, Jobbik, MM, MSZP, LMP and PM ran together in a united opposition bloc in 2022.



Source: National Election Office

# A Hungria, o iliberalismo e a União Europeia (44) [FONTE: Politico, 13/04/2026]

“Take Vance: He’s absolutely unknown to the Hungarian public, so thinking his presence would change anything was naive at best,” Tompos told POLITICO. The display of transatlantic loyalty was never going to alter the political equation in Hungary, where disapproval of the ruling Fidesz party revolved around the country’s internal rot.

Maybe calling in the American cavalry wasn’t naive, but an act of desperation. Orbán was out of other ideas in his battle with Magyar, a Fidesz defector who unlike previous challengers understood the system Orbán had built and refused to give ground when it came to patriotism and embracing national symbols. Magyar urged his supporters to bring national flags to campaign rallies. He sometimes wore traditional embroidered Hungarian shirts. He turned up as a spectator to soccer matches and, unlike Orbán, shunned the VIP boxes and sat with ordinary fans in the stands.

He was also succinct in dealing with foreign interference, arguing that any meddling whether from Washington, Brussels or Moscow was unwelcome: Hungarians would make up their own minds. It was a strong patriotic line that made Orbán look more like the stooge.



## **PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES**

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (1) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]


## The Age of Forever Wars

*Why Military Strategy No  
Longer Delivers Victory*

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

May/June 2025

*Published on April 14, 2025*



# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (2) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]

In Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the United States and its coalition allies unleashed massive land, air, and sea power. It was over in a matter of weeks. The contrast between the United States' grueling and unsuccessful war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's in Afghanistan could not have been more stark, and the speedy victory even led to talk of a new era of warfare—a so-called revolution in military affairs. From now on, the theory went, enemies would be defeated through speed and maneuver, with real-time intelligence provided by smart sensors guiding immediate attacks using smart weapons.

Those hopes proved short-lived. The West's counterinsurgency campaigns of the early decades of this century, which came to be labeled “forever wars,” were not notable for their rapidity. Washington's military campaign in Afghanistan was the longest in U.S. history,

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (3) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]

The idea that surprise offensives could produce decisive victories began to be embedded in military thinking in the nineteenth century. But again and again, forces that undertake them have shown how difficult it is to bring a war to an early and satisfactory conclusion. European military leaders were confident that the war that began in the summer of 1914 could be “over by Christmas”—a phrase that is still invoked whenever generals sound too optimistic; instead, the fighting would last until November 1918, concluding with fast offensives but only after years of devastating trench warfare along almost static frontlines. In 1940, Germany overran much of western Europe in a matter of weeks by means of a blitzkrieg, bringing together armor and airpower. But it could not finish the job, and after initial rapid advances against the Soviet Union in 1941, it was drawn into a brutal war with enormous casualties on both sides that would only end nearly four years later with the total collapse of the Third Reich. Similarly, the decision by Japan’s military

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (4) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]

Once military planners accept that any major contemporary war might not end quickly, they are required to adopt a different mindset. Short wars are fought with whatever resources are available at the time; long wars require the development of capabilities that are geared to changing operational imperatives, as demonstrated by the continual transformation of drone warfare in Ukraine. Short wars may present only temporary disruptions to a country's economy and society and do not require extensive supply lines; long wars demand strategies for maintaining popular support, functioning economies, and secure ways to rearm, restock, and replenish troops. Long wars also require constant adaptation and evolution: the longer a conflict lasts, the more pressure there is for innovations in tactics and technologies that might yield a breakthrough. Even for a great power, failure to prepare for and then rise to meet these challenges could be disastrous.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (5) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]

## **NO END IN SIGHT**

In commentary on contemporary warfare, the distinction between “winning” and “not losing” is vital yet hard to grasp. The difference is not intuitive because of the assumption that there will always be a victor in war and because, at any time, one side can appear to be winning even if it has not actually won. The situation of “not losing” is not quite captured by terms such as stalemate and deadlock since these imply little military movement. Both sides can be “not losing” when neither can impose a victory on the other, even if one or both are on occasion able to improve their positions. This is why proposals to end protracted wars normally take the form of calls for a cease-fire. The problem with cease-fires, however, is that the parties to the conflict tend to regard them as no more than pauses in the fighting. They may have little effect on the underlying disputes and may simply offer both sides the opportunity to recover and reconstitute for the next round. The cease-fire that ended the Korean War in 1953 has lasted for over 70 years, but the conflict remains

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (6) [FONTE: Lawrence D. Freedman / Foreign Affairs, 14/04/2025]

Wars start and end through political decisions. The political decision to initiate armed conflict is likely to assume a short war; the political decision to bring the fighting to an end will likely reflect the inescapable costs and consequences of a long war. For any military power, the prospect of drawn-out or unending hostilities and significant economic and political instability is a good reason to hesitate before embarking on a major war and to seek other means to achieve desired goals. But it also means that when wars cannot be avoided, their military and political objectives must be realistic and attainable and set in ways that can be achieved by the military resources available. One of the great allures of military power is that it promises to bring conflicts to a quick and decisive conclusion. In practice, it rarely does.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (7) [FONTE: BBC, 12/04/2025]

## After Iran talks falter, the big question is what happens next?



File photo of US Vice-President JD Vance on the phone with Donald Trump during a recent trip to Hungary

Twenty-one hours was not enough to end 47 years of hostility between Iran and the US.

The historic high-level talks in Islamabad, during a pause in weeks of grievous war, were always unlikely to end any other way.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (8) [FONTE: BBC, 12/04/2025]

Both the US and the Iranian delegations came to Islamabad emboldened by their belief that theirs was the winning side in this war.

And they engaged knowing that, if they failed, there was the option to keep fighting – whatever the spiralling pain for their own people and a world reeling from the cost of this conflagration.

There was also what Dr Sanam Vakil of Chatham House describes as a "limited psychological understanding of the adversary and what compromises are needed for a real deal".

Vance spoke of good news – "we've had a number of substantive negotiations" - and there was bad news: "We have not reached an agreement."

And he made it clear that was "bad news for Iran much more than the United States of America".

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei criticised the US's "excessive demands and unlawful requests" in a post on X.

And its parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led Iran's negotiating team, wrote that "the opposing side ultimately failed to gain the trust of the Iranian delegation in this round of negotiations".

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (9) [FONTE: BBC, 12/04/2025]

Iran is indicating it's ready to keep talking. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar urged all sides to uphold the fragile ceasefire and said they would continue their efforts to encourage dialogue - sentiments being echoed in other concerned capitals.

If history provides any lessons, the last time Iran reached a nuclear deal with the US and other world powers in 2015, it took 18 months of breakthroughs and breakdowns.

Trump has made it clear he doesn't want to get bogged down in protracted negotiations. Vance previously warned that the US would not be receptive if Tehran tried to "play us".

Pakistani journalist Kamran Yousef - in a legion of journalists who pulled all-nighters to provide non-stop coverage with very few details - declared that this round was one of "no breakthrough but no breakdown either".

The world waits for a verdict.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (10) [FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 12/04/2025]



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump · 2h

So, there you have it, the meeting went well, most points were agreed to, but the only point that really mattered, NUCLEAR, was not. Effective immediately, the United States Navy, the Finest in the World, will begin the process of BLOCKADING any and all Ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz. At some point, we will reach an “ALL BEING ALLOWED TO GO IN, ALL BEING ALLOWED TO GO OUT” basis, but Iran has not allowed that to happen by merely saying, “There may be a mine out there somewhere,” that nobody knows about but them. THIS IS WORLD EXTORTION, and Leaders of Countries, especially the United States of America, will never be extorted. I have also instructed our Navy to seek and interdict every vessel in International Waters that has paid a toll to Iran. No one who pays an illegal toll will have safe passage on the high seas. We will also begin destroying the mines the Iranians laid in the Straits. Any Iranian who fires at us, or at peaceful vessels, will be BLOWN TO HELL! Iran knows, better than anyone, how to END this situation which has already devastated their Country. Their Navy is gone, their Air Force is gone, their Anti Aircraft and Radar are useless, Khamenei, and most of their “Leaders,” are dead, all because of their Nuclear ambition. The Blockade will begin shortly. Other Countries will be involved with this Blockade. Iran will not be allowed to profit off this Illegal Act of EXTORTION. They want money and, more importantly, they want Nuclear. Additionally and, at an appropriate moment, we are fully “LOCKED AND LOADED,” and our Military will finish up the little that is left of Iran! President DONALD J. TRUMP

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (11) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



# O cessar-fogo no Irã na era das “guerras intermináveis” (12) [FONTE: Reuters, 12/04/2026]

## **US blockade of Iran will be major military endeavor, experts say**



U.S. President Donald Trump watches a match during the UFC 327 event at Kaseya Center in Miami, Florida, U.S., April 11, 2026. REUTERS/Kevin

WASHINGTON, April 12 (Reuters) - A U.S. naval blockade of Iran is a major, open-ended military endeavor that could trigger fresh retaliation from Tehran and put tremendous strain on an already fragile ceasefire, experts say.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (13) [FONTE: Reuters, 12/04/2026]

"Trump wants a quick fix. The reality is, this mission is difficult to execute alone and likely unsustainable over the medium to long-term," said Dana Stroul, a former senior Pentagon official during the Biden administration now at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

## **IRANIAN RETALIATION**

The U.S. military has not offered basic details yet about the blockade, including how many U.S. warships will enforce it, whether warplanes will be used and whether any Gulf allies will assist in the effort. Central Command declined to respond to requests for comment.

With enough warships, the U.S. Navy could set up a blockade that intimidates many commercial tankers from trying to power through with Iranian oil, experts say.

But would the United States be prepared to board and seize — or even damage or sink — ships that try to break the blockade? What if they carry oil for China, a major power, or U.S. partners such as India or South Korea?

# O cessar-fogo no Irã na era das “guerras intermináveis” (14) [FONTE: Reuters, 12/04/2026]

And what would Iran do? Retired Admiral Gary Roughead, a former chief of U.S. naval operations, cautioned that Iran could fire on ships in the Gulf or attack infrastructure of the Gulf states that host U.S. forces.

"I honestly believe that if we begin to do it, that Iran will have some kind of a reaction," Roughead said.

Iran's threats to shipping have caused global oil prices to skyrocket about 50% since the U.S. and Israel launched the war on February 28.

Trump said on Sunday that the price of oil and gasoline [may remain high](#) in the United States through November's U.S. midterm elections, which could see Trump's Republicans lose control of the U.S. Congress if there is a public backlash. The war has already been unpopular.

## **GAS PRICE PROBLEM**

Frustrated by Iran's refusal to end the war on his terms, Trump on Sunday also floated the possibility of a resumption of U.S. strikes inside Iran, citing missile factories as one possibility.

U.S. Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, questioned the strategy, noting Iran could send speedboats to mine the strait or put bombs against tankers.

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (15) [FONTE: AXIOS, 13/04/2026]

## Trump pitches Iran blockade as boon to U.S. oil

Ben Geman



Carson, Calif. — An aerial view shows Marathon Petroleum's Los Angeles refinery, one of the largest on the West Coast, as global oil supply disruptions linked to tensions with Iran push gas prices higher, March 10, 2026. Photo: David McNew/Getty Images

President Trump is pairing his Iran blockade with a sales pitch: Countries squeezed by the Strait of Hormuz — especially China — should buy more oil from the U.S. instead.

**Why it matters:** The U.S. rise to become the world's largest oil and gas producer — and largest exporter of liquefied natural gas — provides geopolitical leverage that Trump is attempting to wield.

**Driving the news:** "China can send their ships to us. China can send their ships to Venezuela," Trump said on Fox's "Sunday Morning Futures."

# O cessar-fogo no Irão na era das “guerras intermináveis” (16) [FONTE: AXIOS, 13/04/2026]

**Reality check:** The U.S. is already among the world's largest oil exporters.

- But it doesn't have the capacity to come close to replacing the massive flows normally moving through the Strait of Hormuz.
- And crude oil is not always interchangeable. Refiners in different regions use different types of oil. The U.S. exports mostly light grades.

**The big picture:** U.S. crude oil export volumes bounce around but generally [run in the range](#) of 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels per day.

- They were 3.9 million barrels per day in January, the last month with robust federal data. More recent — and preliminary — weekly data show 4.2 million the week of April 3.

**Threat level:** The Iran war has halted [20 million barrels per day](#) of crude and petroleum products that typically travel through the Strait, which handles about a fifth of the global oil trade.

- Only a fraction of that is replaced by crude volumes getting onto the market via Saudi Arabia's east–west pipeline to the Red Sea.
- Persian gulf oil producers, lacking export routes, have cut output by 8–10 million barrels per day by some estimates.

# Bibliografia

