



# **Política Internacional e Geopolítica a polícrise do mundo globalizado**

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL  
D. ANTÓNIO FERREIRA GOMES  
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes  
SESSÃO N° 27  
22/4/2026**



# **PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL**

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (1)

[FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 17/04/2026]



**Donald J. Trump**  

@realDonaldTrump · 20h

THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ IS COMPLETELY OPEN AND READY FOR BUSINESS AND FULL PASSAGE, BUT THE NAVAL BLOCKADE WILL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AS IT PERTAINS TO IRAN, ONLY, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS OUR TRANSACTION WITH IRAN IS 100% COMPLETE. THIS PROCESS SHOULD GO VERY QUICKLY IN THAT MOST OF THE POINTS ARE ALREADY NEGOTIATED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP

 1.53k

 6.65k

 29.5k



**Donald J. Trump**  

@realDonaldTrump · 21h

IRAN HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THE STRAIT OF IRAN IS FULLY OPEN AND READY FOR FULL PASSAGE. THANK YOU!

 3.13k

 8.62k



 43.7k



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (2)

[FONTE: Donald J. Trump / Truth Social, 17/04/2026]



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump · 20h


Now that the Hormuz Strait situation is over, I received a call from NATO asking if we would need some help. I TOLD THEM TO STAY AWAY, UNLESS THEY JUST WANT TO LOAD UP THEIR SHIPS WITH OIL. They were useless when needed, a Paper Tiger! President DJT

 2.21k

 7.17k

 31.6k



Donald J. Trump  

@realDonaldTrump · 20h

The U.S.A. will get all Nuclear “Dust,” created by our great B2 Bombers - No money will exchange hands in any way, shape, or form. This deal is in no way subject to Lebanon, either, but the USA will, separately, work with Lebanon, and deal with the Hezboolah situation in an appropriate manner. Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are PROHIBITED from doing so by the U.S.A. Enough is enough!!! Thank you! President DJT

 2.31k

 8.25k

 38.2k



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (3)

[FONTE: Abbas Araghchi / X, 17/04/2026]



**Seyed Abbas Araghchi**

@araghchi

Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Iran • Telegram: [t.me/s\\_a\\_araghchi](https://t.me/s_a_araghchi) • Instagram: [@araghchi](https://www.instagram.com/araghchi)



**Seyed Abbas Araghchi** @araghchi · 22 h



Traduzido do Inglês [Mostrar original](#)

De acordo com o cessar-fogo no Líbano, a passagem para todos os navios comerciais pelo Estreito de Ormuz é declarada completamente aberta pelo período restante do cessar-fogo, na rota coordenada já anunciada pela Organização de Portos e Marítima da República Islâmica do Irã.

6 mil

32 mil

122 mil

7 mi



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (4)

[FONTE: The Hill, 17/04/2026]

## **Iranian state news outlet questions foreign minister's 'unexpected tweet' on Hormuz Strait**

An Iranian state news outlet on Friday questioned the "unexpected tweet" from Iran's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi about the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following the start of Israel and Lebanon's 10-day ceasefire.

Araghchi [wrote on the social platform X](#) that the Strait of Hormuz was open "for all commercial vessels... for the remaining period of ceasefire," which Iran's government [announced earlier in the day](#).

The Fars News Agency, reacting to the post, [wrote on X](#) that along with Araghchi's "unexpected tweet about the liberation of the Strait of Hormuz, and following Trump's subsequent nervous saber-rattling, Iranian society has been plunged into an atmosphere of confusion," according to X's translation from Persian.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (5)

[FONTE: The Hill, 17/04/2026]

"They [Iranians] accept it, but it is expected that at least a clear explanation be provided regarding the 'reason for silence,'" [the agency continued](#). "Public opinion raises this question: if it is in the country's interest that the details of the negotiations or recent developments not be publicized, why is this very interest and the reason for avoiding transparency not explained to the people?"

The Fars News Agency [called on its government](#) to not "allow the enemy's narrative and hostile media to fill the created narrative vacuum by toying with the spirit and psyche of society."

"These days, Twitter and short, pithy statements are no longer a suitable medium for persuading domestic public opinion; rather, even this very 'not explaining' requires explanation," the agency wrote in its [last post in the thread](#).

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (6)

[FONTE: BBC, 18/04/2026]

09:38 BREAKING

## Iran's military closes Strait of Hormuz again - state media

Iran's military says it is resuming its control of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian state media.

The Fars News Agency, which is linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Iranian Students News Agency and state broadcaster IRIB cite a statement from the IRGC saying that the strait will return "to its previous state", with armed forces controlling the area.

We previously saw some shipping vessels transiting the waterway - but it's unclear how much marine traffic has made it through the critical shipping lane.

The military statement accuses the US of "piracy", saying that its "so-called blockade" amounts to maritime robbery. Iran previously said that it would shut the strait if the US continued its blockade of its ports.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (7)

[FONTE: BBC, 18/04/2026]


11:55 **BREAKING**

## Tanker comes under fire from Iranian gunboats, says UKMTO

A tanker in the Strait of Hormuz says it has come under fire from two gunboats operated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, according to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO).

The incident took place 20 nautical miles north-east of Oman. The tanker and crew have been reported safe, UKMTO adds.

Separately, at least two merchant vessels say they were hit by gunfire as they attempted to cross the strait, three sources have told the Reuters news agency.



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (8)


[FONTE: ISW, 17/04/2026]

## Key Takeaways

1. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait. These conditions include: 1) only commercial vessels not “related to belligerent countries” may transit the strait, 2) vessels must transit the strait via Iran’s approved transit route through Iranian territorial waters, and 3) vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces. These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States.
2. The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open.” The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.
3. Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line. CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade. Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have approached the US blockade line to exit the strait. These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait.
4. There continue to be significant gaps between the US and Iranian negotiating positions, and the status of the negotiations remains unclear. The two sides disagree on several core issues, according to US, Iranian, and other officials and sources on April 16 and 17.
5. Some Iranian regime officials seek a preliminary agreement to extend the ceasefire to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement. CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile force, and Iran would almost certainly continue to do so if the United States and Iran agreed to a preliminary agreement and extended the ceasefire.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (9)

[FONTE: ISW, 17/04/2026]



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (10)


[FONTE: ISW, 17/04/2026]

**The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the strait is “completely open.”**[9] Araghchi stated that, in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open” to “all commercial vessels” for the duration of the ceasefire.[10] Araghchi added that vessels must transit along Iran’s “coordinated route,” in reference to the Iranian-approved transit route.[11] US President Donald Trump amplified Araghchi’s statement that the strait is open.[12] IRGC-affiliated media outlets, including Fars News and Mehr News, criticized Araghchi’s post and argued that his statement created confusion, which allowed Trump to shape the narrative about the Strait of Hormuz.[13] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei defended Araghchi’s statement and said that the decision to “open” the Strait of Hormuz was “not solely the decision of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.”[14]

**The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.**[15] Anti-regime media previously reported that internal disagreements within the regime disrupted the Islamabad talks and prompted senior Iranian officials to order the Iranian negotiating delegation to return to Tehran.[16] These reports suggest that different factions within the Iranian regime have very different negotiating positions. The factional infighting in the regime has been exacerbated by the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who used to cohere the regime’s various factions and act as an arbiter between the factions. The absence of a strong leader to keep IRGC factions in line means that these factions will likely continue to play a dominant role in shaping Iranian decision-making.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (11)

[FONTE: ISW, 17/04/2026]



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (12)

[FONTE: ISW, 17/04/2026]

**Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line.**[17] US forces are enforcing a blockade on Iranian ports, not the strait itself.[18] CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade.[19] Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have moved toward the US blockade line to exit the strait.[20] These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait. The *Wall Street Journal* reported on April 17 that at least five Iranian-linked tankers heading from the Gulf of Oman to Malaysia altered course after the US Navy warned that it could intercept ships transporting Iranian oil in international waters.[21]

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (13)

[FONTE: Steve Prest / RUSI, 15/04/2026]

COMMENTARY

## The 'US blockade' of Iran: How It Might Function (Or Not!)

Commodore (Ret'd) Steve Prest

15 April 2026 ⌚ 9 Minute Read

SHARE



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (14)

[FONTE: Steve Prest / RUSI, 15/04/2026]

## A Strategic Shift

Such a move represents a shift in strategy from the US with regard to its conflict with Iran. There is no doubt that the might of the US Armed Forces has been brought to bear with devastating effect against large parts of Iran's military, political and industrial infrastructure. Militarily it has been a largely one-sided fight and although Iran has landed a number of blows, these are nothing compared to the pummelling that it has received from the US and Israel.

Nonetheless, the Iranians have long prepared for such an eventuality and have not sought to go toe-to-toe with the US on the seas or in the air. They have dispersed, hidden and dug-in much of their capability to make it both hard to find and hard to strike. It is not known how much remains, but no one thinks that the Iranian ability to make mischief in the region has been eliminated.

This has enabled Iran's continued ability to strike a range of targets in the Gulf region with drones and ballistic missiles, the targets of which have included US bases as well as the economic interests of their neighbours. The aim, whilst seeking to denude what they can of the US capability, is to apply diplomatic and economic pressure both directly and indirectly to the US to bring an end to hostilities.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (15)

[FONTE: Steve Prest / RUSI, 15/04/2026]

## So, How is it Going to Work?

The first thing is that much of the maritime traffic that might have been expected to ply their trade from Iranian ports will, most likely, be deterred by the declaration of the blockade in the first instance. Even where ships might previously have been content to trade with Iran during such hostilities, the risk of being interdicted and impounded by the US Navy will be beyond the risk threshold for many commercial operators.

Nonetheless, there may well be some who are tempted to run the risk. So, what happens then?

The Middle East is the 'patch' of the US Fifth Fleet, and they will already have a comprehensive intelligence picture of merchant shipping traffic in the area. The challenge will be to track those who seek to disguise their movements. That is to say, those whose Automatic Identification System (AIS) is providing a report of the ship's location and movements different to the reality. For example, AIS could be manipulated to say the ship was at anchor somewhere in the Northern Gulf when, in fact, they had slipped across to Kharg Island to fill up their tanks. The open-source data would show that they had never moved, but in reality they are now running the blockade. Especially perplexing if they then enter a third-nation's port before trying to exit the Strait. How many port visits ago does a visit to Iran have to have been for it to count?

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (16)

[FONTE: Steve Prest / RUSI, 15/04/2026]

But boarding may not be required. A radioed instruction to divert the ship to anchorage or to a harbour under escort may be sufficient. But to where? It is unlikely that Oman would want to be the repository for such vessels – that would put them in a very awkward position with their neighbours. The same is true for Pakistan. It is hard to see anywhere else nearby that might be suitable. And even if you find such a port, what then? Do you seize the vessel and/or the oil for your own as spoils of war? Impound it until hostilities have ceased and then let it on its way? Or something else? These are questions I have not yet heard discussed or answered in the discourse.

To conclude. The strategic switch of the US to targeting Iran's petrostate economy directly is a smart move. It is likely to destabilise the regime in the way that air bombardment has not. It does not preclude a return to the more direct application of violence, but it will be cheaper and less risky for the US. There are practicalities that need to be worked out, but these are not insurmountable in the execution of the blockade. The biggest risk, however, is from escalation either directly or indirectly with some of the big economies (such as China) that will now come under increased pressure as a result of this action. It remains to be seen how they will respond but, if the impacts start to bite, respond they will. We live in dangerous times.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (17)


[FONTE: ISW, 20/04/2026]

## Key Takeaways

1. Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait's role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran's ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
2. Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait.
3. US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19.
4. US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran's participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however.
5. Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose.
6. A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.


# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (18)

[FONTE: ISW, 20/04/2026]



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (19)

[FONTE: ISW, 20/04/2026]



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (20)

[FONTE: CNN, 20/04/2026]

## Iran cargo ship seized by US could become 'spoils of war'



The US made good on its threat to board and seize any vessel defying its blockade of Iran's ports on Sunday, with footage released by the military showing a guided-missile destroyer firing on the Iran-linked M/V Touska, and once it was disabled, Marines rappelling from helicopters onto its deck.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (21)

[FONTE: CNN, 20/04/2026]

## How was the M/V Touska stopped?

CENTCOM says the US destroyer hit the Touska with “several rounds” from its 5-inch gun.

Video provided by the Navy shows the warship firing three shots at Touska after warning its crew to evacuate the ship’s engine room.

“US Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit later boarded the non-compliant vessel, which remains in US custody,” a CENTCOM statement said.



CENTCOM video shows US marines boarding Iranian-flagged vessel

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (22)

[FONTE: CNN, 20/04/2026]

Analyst Carl Schuster, a former US Navy captain, told CNN it would probably take at least two hits from the destroyer's gun to knock out the Touska's diesel engine. All three fired by the Spruance in the CENTCOM-supplied video appeared to have hit, he said.

Schuster said it's likely the vessel would need to be towed after the hits.

## **What happens next?**

The Touska will be taken to an anchorage or port for inspection or valuation, Schuster said.

Once that is done and its cargo can be determined it could eventually become property of the US government as a "prize," experts say.

"Under the laws of naval warfare, you can seize a vessel in these circumstances (that) has tried to run a blockade," Jennifer Parker, a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and a former Royal Australian Navy officer, told CNN.

"If they choose to keep it for the long term, it would need to go through a prize court, which would need to be established," she said.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (23)

[FONTE: CNN, 20/04/2026]

"It can be treated as a 'spoils of war,'" Schuster said, like any enemy combatant or materials seized from an enemy in the course of armed conflict.

As for the fate of the *Touska's* crew, that would depend on their nationalities, Parker said.

"If it was Indian or Filipino sailors, I would suspect the crew would just be taken off the vessel and repatriated."

If the crew are Iranian, they may be detained, or possibly if members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were aboard, they could be held as prisoners of war, Parker said.

If the *Touska* was carrying any weapons or armaments for Iran, the crew would likely be detained, she said.

CNN has reached out to Central Command for comment on the nationality of the crew and the status of the cargo ship.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (24)

[FONTE: IEA, 14/04/2026]



International  
Energy Agency

## Oil Market Report

**14 April 2026**

- Oil demand is expected to contract by 80 kb/d this year, as the Iran war upends our global outlook. This is 730 kb/d less than in last month's *Report* and a forecast 1.5 mb/d 2Q26 decline would be the sharpest since Covid-19 slashed fuel consumption. Initially, the deepest cuts in oil use have come in the Middle East and Asia Pacific, mainly for naphtha, LPG and jet fuel. However, demand destruction will spread as scarcity and higher prices persist.
- Global oil supply plummeted by 10.1 mb/d to 97 mb/d in March, with continued attacks on energy infrastructure in the Middle East and ongoing restrictions to tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz leading to the largest disruption in history. OPEC+ production fell 9.4 mb/d m-o-m to 42.4 mb/d while non-OPEC+ supply declined 770 kb/d m-o-m to 54.7 mb/d, as lower Qatari output offset gains in Brazil and the United States.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (25)

[FONTE: IEA, 14/04/2026]

- Global crude throughputs continue to struggle with disruptions to feedstock supplies and infrastructure damage that are tightening global product markets. In April, Middle East and feedstock-constrained refineries in Asia have cut runs by around 6 mb/d, to 77.2 mb/d. Global crude runs are now expected to decline by 1 mb/d on average in 2026, to 82.9 mb/d. Refining margins temporarily surged as middle distillate cracks reached all-time highs.
- Global observed oil inventories fell by 85 mb in March, with stocks outside of the Middle East Gulf drawn down by a significant 205 mb (-6.6 mb/d) as flows through the Strait of Hormuz were choked off. At the same time, with limited outlets after the effective closure of the Strait, floating storage of crude and oil products in the Middle East rose by 100 mb and onshore crude stocks in the region were up by 20 mb. China added 40 mb of crude to tanks.
- Oil prices posted their largest-ever monthly gain in March in the wake of the most severe oil supply shock in history. Spot crude benchmarks and differentials soared, outpacing futures markets, as refiners anxiously scrambled to replace locked in Middle Eastern cargoes. At the time of writing, North Sea Dated crude was trading around \$130/bbl – \$60/bbl above pre-conflict levels.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (26)

[FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

## **\$133 vs. \$99. What Is the Real Price for a Barrel of Oil?**

Prices for physical oil are becoming detached from what is implied in financial markets

Which oil price is the right one? These days, the price of a physical barrel of oil is significantly higher than what oil prices in financial markets suggest.

Dated Brent, which reflects oil for actual physical delivery 10 to 30 days out, has risen to \$132.74 a barrel as of Monday. Brent futures for the nearest delivery settled at \$99.36 a barrel. The gap between the two prices is historic, according to Gary Ross, chief executive officer of Black Gold Investors. Never has the market seen an oil-market disruption of this size, or such uncertainty over what might happen next, he added.

One explanation is the severe physical shortage in oil markets. This tends to amplify the spread between spot and futures prices. Front-month futures are actually quite disconnected from the physical barrels—both in timing and physical reality, Dave Ernsberger, president of S&P Global Energy, said on the sidelines of the CERAWEEK conference last month. This means the futures price doesn't necessarily converge with the spot price, according to Ernsberger.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (27)

[FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

The disconnect is especially stark for Brent, the international benchmark. The current front-month Brent futures are for June delivery, which is two months out. Brent futures don't actually convert to physical delivery. They settle into an index price that is derived from the physical market at that time. The front-month U.S. benchmark crude, the WTI, is for May and settles physically.

Secondly, oil price moves are so volatile that traders aren't willing to place big bets in futures markets. Hedge funds and algorithmic traders have fairly modest positions in oil futures, said Iliia Bouchouev, managing partner of Pentathlon Investments. Professional traders largely don't expect the oil market to normalize by June, when the front-month Brent futures expire, Bouchouev said. But traders who hold that view aren't willing to place big bets on it because the market is so volatile.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (28)

[FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

The risk is that big price swings can trigger margin calls. As Ross put it: "You can be dead right, but you could also be dead if [the trade] goes badly." Traders are measured on a risk-adjusted basis, so when volatility on an asset is too high, they tend to allocate less, Bouchouev said. Fast-growing options markets exaggerate the price moves in both directions.

And just who is causing the severe price swings? It may be easy to point the finger at individual investors, computer algorithms or generalists, but that doesn't seem to be a satisfactory explanation. Some huge oil-futures trades were suspiciously well timed relative to President Trump's social-media posts. For example, more than \$760 million worth of Brent and WTI futures [changed hands](#) about 15 minutes before Trump announced in a Truth Social post that he was postponing strikes on Iranian plants thanks to "productive" talks with Iran. The White House has [warned staff](#) against insider trading. The last thing traders want is to be caught on the wrong side of insider bets.

A third reason: Financial oil markets simply have a more balanced mix of buyers and sellers right now. In the physical market, there are clearly more buyers desperate for oil than sellers, whose supply is stuck in the Middle East.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (29)

[FONTE: Hamidreza Azizi / Substack, 13/04/2026]



Iran's IRGC-Navy "Shahid Mahdavi" floating base. Still floating...

The negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad ended without even a framework agreement, with both sides maintaining maximalist positions while avoiding immediate escalation. The outcome is neither peace nor a return to open warfare, but rather an unstable equilibrium in which diplomacy and preparations for conflict proceed in parallel. This situation is increasingly shaped by a new factor: systematic economic pressure stemming from the threat or implementation of a blockade of Iran's maritime routes.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (30)

[FONTE: Hamidreza Azizi / Substack, 13/04/2026]

## **The Strategic Leverage of Hormuz and Its Limits**

Control over the Strait of Hormuz remains the central point of contention. While Washington seeks to neutralise this leverage through naval presence and the threat of blockade, Tehran views it as a core element of both deterrence and bargaining power. The failure of negotiations confirms that Iran is unwilling to relinquish this card, even at the cost of increased economic pressure.

From a U.S. perspective, a blockade is intended to disrupt Iran's export capacity and weaken its negotiating position. Operationally, however, such a measure is highly demanding and exposes U.S. naval forces to asymmetric threats from the IRGC, including anti-ship missiles, naval mines and unmanned systems. Furthermore, any interdiction of third-party vessels, particularly Chinese-linked shipping, would carry significant escalation risks.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irã (31)

[FONTE: Hamidreza Azizi / Substack, 13/04/2026]

## **Economic Dimension: Iran's Structural Vulnerability**

The economic impact of a potential blockade is substantial and represents one of the few instruments capable of materially affecting Tehran's strategic calculus. Estimates indicate approximately USD 435 million in combined daily losses in exports and imports, equivalent to roughly USD 13 billion per month (Maleki, 2026).

Iran's economy is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes through the Persian Gulf. More than 90% of its external trade transits the Strait, while the oil and gas sector accounts for around 80% of government export revenues and nearly a quarter of GDP. A critical node in this system is Kharg Island, which handles approximately 92% of Iran's crude oil exports and is geographically confined within the Gulf, with no viable alternative export route.

A blockade would effectively eliminate exports of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. In parallel, petrochemical exports and the majority of non-oil commodities—also dependent on ports such as Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaei), Imam Khomeini and Assaluyeh—would be halted. Alternative routes, including the Jask terminal and Chabahar port, operate at limited capacity and cannot compensate for more than a fraction of the disrupted throughput.

# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (32)

[FONTE: Hamidreza Azizi / Substack, 13/04/2026]

## **Economic Warfare in Hormuz: Who Can Endure the Greater Burden?**

With the announcement of a potential blockade, the conflict has entered a phase where the decisive variable is no longer solely military capability, but the capacity to absorb systemic economic shock. The central question is whether Iran, as the direct target of maritime interdiction, or the global economy, structurally dependent on uninterrupted energy flows through Hormuz, is better positioned to endure sustained disruption.

The Strait functions as a critical artery of the global energy system, through which a substantial share of oil and LNG exports transit. Any prolonged disruption generates immediate second-order effects, including price volatility, supply chain instability, and broader macroeconomic stress across energy-importing economies. This structural interdependence inherently limits the effectiveness of a blockade as a unilateral coercive tool.



# O bloqueio do estreito de Ormuz e o contra-bloqueio dos portos do Irão (33)

[FONTE: Hamidreza Azizi / Substack, 13/04/2026]

## **Conclusion: Between Time and Exhaustion**

The current phase of the conflict represents a transition from kinetic confrontation to a hybrid model of economic pressure and diplomatic competition. Iran retains operational capability and strategic leverage through Hormuz, while simultaneously facing progressive economic degradation.

Time has thus emerged as the decisive variable. The United States seeks to accelerate Iran's economic exhaustion, while Tehran aims to prolong the confrontation until the costs become politically unsustainable for its adversaries. In this environment, there is no rapid resolution. The conflict is evolving into a protracted strategic contest, in which outcomes will be determined not by a single decisive engagement, but by the cumulative effects of military pressure, economic constraints and diplomatic manoeuvre.



## **PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES**

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (1)

[FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (2)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

## Facts


<b>Also Known As</b>	Lubnān • Al-Jumhūriyyah al-Lubnāniyyah • Republic of Lebanon
<b>Head Of Government</b>	Prime Minister: Nawaf Salam
<b>Capital</b>	<a href="#">Beirut</a>
<b>Population</b>	(2026 est.) 5,821,000
<b>Head Of State</b>	President: <a href="#">Joseph Aoun</a>
<b>Form Of Government</b>	unitary multiparty republic with one legislative house (National Assembly [128 <sup>1</sup> ])
<b>Official Language</b>	Arabic <sup>2</sup>
<b>Official Religion</b>	none
<b>Official Name</b>	Al-Jumhūriyyah al-Lubnāniyyah (Lebanese Republic)
<b>Total Area (Sq Km)</b>	10,452
<b>Total Area (Sq Mi)</b>	4,036
<b>Monetary Unit</b>	Lebanese pound (LBP)
<b>Population Rank</b>	(2026) 117
<b>Population Projection 2030</b>	5,938,000



# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (3)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

**Lebanon ethnic composition (2000)**



© Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.


# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (4)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

## Lebanon religious affiliation

2012

2005



- Shi'i Muslim
- Sunni Muslim
- Maronite (Eastern-rite Roman Catholic)
- Greek Orthodox
- Druze
- Greek Catholic
- other

Lebanon: Religious affiliation

© Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (5)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

## Lebanese National Pact

Lebanese history

**Lebanese National Pact**, [power-sharing](#) arrangement established in 1943 between [Lebanese](#) Christians and Muslims whereby the president is always a [Maronite Christian](#) and the [prime minister](#) a [Sunni](#) Muslim. The speaker of the National Assembly must be a Shi'í Muslim. [Amendments](#) proposed in the 1943 Ta'if Accord that helped end the [Lebanese Civil War](#) transferred many presidential powers to a cabinet divided evenly between Christians and Muslims.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (6)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (7)

[FONTE: Arab News / AFP, 26/03/2026]

## FIGHTING NEAR THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER

Hezbollah strongholds facing Israeli assault since March 16



Source: AFP

ARAB NEWS

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (8)

[FONTE: Times of Israel, 8/04/2026]

## **IDF says 50 fighter jets dropped 160 bombs on 100 Hezbollah targets in 10 minutes**

By Emanuel Fabian



The large wave of Israeli airstrikes against Hezbollah across Lebanon involved 50 fighter jets dropping some 160 bombs on 100 targets within 10 minutes, according to the military.

The wave of strikes was given the internal codename "Eternal Darkness."

The IDF said it bombed around 100 Hezbollah command centers and other military infrastructure in Beirut, the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon during the strikes.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (9)

[FONTE: BBC, 17/04/2026]

---

## What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire

The terms of the deal specify that the ceasefire will last for 10 days, with the possibility of it being "extended by mutual agreement" if negotiations show signs of progress.

According to further details provided by the US State Department:

- Israel retains its "right to take all necessary measures in self-defence, at any time, against planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks"
- Lebanon must take "meaningful steps" to prevent Hezbollah and all other "rogue non-state armed groups" from carrying out attacks against Israeli targets
- Those involved recognise that Lebanon's security forces have exclusive responsibility for Lebanon's security
- Israel and Lebanon requested that the US continues to facilitate further direct talks with the objective of "resolving all remaining issues"

The statement added that the truce was a "gesture of goodwill" by Israel intended to enable "good-faith negotiations towards a permanent security and peace agreement" between the two parties.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (10)

[FONTE: BBC, 17/04/2026]

## What has the reaction been?

Israel and Lebanon's leaders have both welcomed the truce, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling it an "opportunity to make a historic peace agreement".

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said: "We all stand before a new phase: the transition from working towards a ceasefire to working towards permanent agreements that preserve the rights of our people, the unity of our land, and the sovereignty of our nation."

Hezbollah also signalled a willingness to participate in the ceasefire but said it must include "a comprehensive halt to attacks" across Lebanon and "no freedom of movement for Israeli forces".

When asked about disarmament, senior Hezbollah leader Wafiq Safa told the BBC: "Not until a proper ceasefire, a real one. Not until Israeli withdrawal."

The Iran-backed group, while deeply embedded in Lebanon, is not part of the Lebanese government's security apparatus.

On Tuesday, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on X: "In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through [the] Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire." This is due to expire on 22 April.

Iran's Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), later called the post "bad and incomplete", saying such passage would be considered "void" should the US naval blockade continue.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (11)

[FONTE: CNN, 17/04/2026]

**With a ceasefire in Lebanon, Trump has forced Netanyahu's hand – again**



*Tel Aviv —*

The call that [US President Donald Trump](#) predicted didn't happen, but he left little doubt about what would come next.

On Thursday morning, Trump said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would speak to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. It would have been the first direct contact in decades between the leaders of the two neighboring countries, which have no diplomatic relations. Trump declared that it would provide for "a little breathing room."

But against the backdrop of a hot war between Israel and Iranian proxy Hezbollah, Aoun [declined the call](#).

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (12)

[FONTE: CNN, 17/04/2026]

But without Trump's approval, Netanyahu has little room to maneuver. Although the temporary ceasefire is supposed to last 10 days, it's clear Trump intends for it to hold. "It has been my Honor to solve 9 Wars across the World, and this will be my 10th," he boasted on social media.

In a security-cabinet meeting on Wednesday evening, Israeli leaders discussed the possibility of a temporary ceasefire. But there was no vote and no admission that an end to the war may be just days away. On Thursday evening, moments before Trump announced a ceasefire in Lebanon, Netanyahu convened his security cabinet again for a remote consultation.

Israelis – politicians and residents alike – learned about the ceasefire not from Netanyahu but from a Trump social media post.

"At this stage of the war, which he entered into largely due to Netanyahu's persuasion, Trump has become the final, if not the exclusive, arbiter," wrote Amos Harel, Haaretz's military analyst. "Just as Trump forced the conclusion of the previous 12-day war against Iran in June, he has now imposed temporary ceasefires in Iran and in Lebanon."

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (13)

[FONTE: CNN, 17/04/2026]

## **Forcing Netanyahu's hand – over and over**

In total, Trump has forced Netanyahu's hand on at least five separate occasions, including the two wars with Iran. The US president pressured Netanyahu into a [ceasefire with Hamas](#) in Gaza, and he compelled Netanyahu to call Qatar and apologize for a failed Israeli strike in Doha targeting Hamas leaders. Lebanon is just the latest example.

And in each case, Israel fell short of the decisive victory it desired ... and which Netanyahu had promised. In Gaza, Hamas has firm control over the half of the coastal territory not occupied by Israel. In Lebanon, Hezbollah remains a formidable threat capable of launching drones and rockets at Israel. In Iran, the regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is now the regime of his son, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

The Israeli military has expanded its territorial grip on each front, holding more land in Gaza, [Lebanon](#) and [Syria](#). And, at least as of now, there has been no real pressure from the White House for Israeli forces to withdraw. For Netanyahu, these swaths of land are deeper security zones, which Israel may well hold for years. But they are far from victory.

Israel's adversaries have no doubt been weakened, but they have survived.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (14)

[FONTE: Orient Le Jour, 18/04/2026]

## Désarmement du Hezbollah : l'exécutif va-t-il profiter de la trêve pour avancer ?

Yara ABI AKL



Et maintenant, que fera le Liban face au Hezbollah ? Cette question est sur toutes les lèvres depuis l'entrée en vigueur, dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, du cessez-le-feu conclu avec Israël grâce à une médiation américaine. D'autant que la prorogation de la trêve de dix jours est tributaire d'une action sérieuse du gouvernement libanais en matière de désarmement de la milice chiite, comme l'accord le stipule. Une obligation que le cabinet Salam entendrait remplir en se tournant de nouveau vers l'armée qui devrait être chargée de consacrer le monopole des armes sur l'ensemble du territoire libanais. De quoi redonner vie aux fameuses décisions des 5 et 7 août 2025 sur le monopole des armes, au grand dam du Hezbollah. C'est au moins ce qui ressort de la réunion ministérielle quotidienne tenue vendredi au...

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (15)

[FONTE: Orient Le Jour, 18/04/2026]

## **Du Sud à la banlieue de Beyrouth, les messages du Hezbollah**

À peine le cessez-le-feu temporaire de 10 jours est-il entré en vigueur à minuit que des tirs nourris, accompagnés d'explosions d'obus, ont commencé à retentir, poussant les habitants à croire que la trêve n'était pas respectée. En réalité, il s'agissait de partisans du Hezbollah qui, depuis la banlieue sud, exprimaient leur joie à l'entrée en vigueur de cette trêve. Surtout qu'ils se considèrent victorieux après 45 jours de combats acharnés au sud du pays notamment.

Comme toujours, il existe plusieurs versions de cet événement, et chaque partie impliquée se considère comme victorieuse. Et c'est donc pour imposer leur version aux Libanais que les partisans du Hezbollah auraient tiré de façon aussi intensive pour que personne – ni les partis politiques, ni les responsables, ni même l'armée libanaise – ne puisse faire la sourde oreille.

La version du Hezbollah est la suivante : l'Iran lui aurait communiqué, dès mercredi midi, qu'une trêve serait probablement conclue au Liban, pour accompagner celle qui a été conclue entre Washington et Téhéran. Elle devrait donc être annoncée de façon imminente par les Américains, à la demande des négociateurs iraniens qui n'ont cessé de faire pression pour que le Liban soit inclus dans tout accord avec eux. Toutefois, l'annonce de la trêve a été reportée jusqu'à jeudi soir, sur l'insistance de la partie israélienne, qui voulait prendre le contrôle de Bint Jbeil et y prendre une photo de ses soldats dans le stade municipal où Hassan Nasrallah avait prononcé le « discours de la victoire » du 26 mai 2000.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (16)

[FONTE: Orient Le Jour, 18/04/2026]

Dans ce cadre, le Hezbollah met actuellement l'accent sur l'afflux des habitants de Dahié et du Liban-Sud chez eux. Il pense ainsi adresser un message clair à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur pour rappeler que les chiites ne sont pas prêts à vider leurs régions ou à les laisser entre les mains des Israéliens. Ils constituent une des composantes majeures du pays et ils n'accepteront pas de devenir d'éternels déplacés ou de laisser leurs terres aux Israéliens. Il veut aussi rappeler que l'État libanais est responsable de cette communauté, au même titre que les autres composantes du tissu social du pays.

Le Hezbollah cherche ainsi, à travers ses partisans, à rappeler aux responsables libanais qu'il n'est pas question pour lui de rééditer l'expérience de l'accord de cessation des hostilités entré en vigueur le 27 novembre 2024. L'un de ses points accordait aux Israéliens le droit de se défendre s'ils se sentaient menacés. Ce qui leur a permis de multiplier pendant 15 mois les violations, sans être inquiétés. Cette fois, le Hezbollah laisse donc entendre que la situation est différente et qu'il n'acceptera pas que les Israéliens continuent à l'attaquer lorsqu'ils le voudront, tout comme il refuse qu'ils restent dans les points qu'ils continuent d'occuper au Sud. Comment s'y prendra-t-il ? Et comment le Liban pourra-t-il imposer de nouvelles conditions aux Israéliens lors des négociations prévues ? Pour l'instant, il n'y a aucune réponse et tous les regards se portent sur les négociations entre l'Iran et les États-Unis.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (17)

[FONTE: WSJ, 30/03/2026]

## Lebanon Expelled Iran's Ambassador. He Refused to Leave.

Diplomat's defiance shows the Lebanese government's weakness as war returns to the country



Demonstrators attend a rally in support of Hezbollah on Thursday outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Anwar Amro/AFP/Getty Images

Days after being expelled from Beirut, Iran's ambassador is refusing to leave, highlighting the Lebanese government's weakness as the country once again becomes a battlefield for stronger powers.

Lebanon's foreign ministry declared Ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani persona non grata last week and ordered him out of the country by Sunday. The government was upset that the Lebanese militia Hezbollah had triggered a new Israeli invasion of the country by launching attacks on Israel in support of its sponsors in Iran.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (18)

[FONTE: NYT, 17/04/2026]

## Why Lebanon Has Long Struggled to Contain Hezbollah

Lebanon's government has been caught between Western demands to disarm the Shiite Muslim militant group and fears of inflaming sectarian tensions.

April 17, 2026



A Hezbollah flag at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Beirut, Lebanon, last month. Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

A 10-day cease-fire that Lebanon and Israel agreed to appeared to be holding on Friday, but absent from the agreement was one of the two warring parties: Hezbollah, the Iran-backed, Lebanese militia that the Israeli military had been fighting.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (19)

[FONTE: NYT, 17/04/2026]

[In statements](#) after the U.S.-brokered truce was announced, Hezbollah made vague reference to the cease-fire but did not commit to adhering to it. The group set off the latest round of fighting last month by attacking Israel in solidarity with Iran, soon after the start of the U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign there. Israel responded to Hezbollah's attacks by launching airstrikes across Lebanon and widening a ground invasion of the country's south.

The truce's viability could hinge on Lebanon's ability [to curb Hezbollah](#), which it has struggled to do for decades.


For years, the Lebanese government has been caught between Western demands to disarm the group, which the United States has long designated a terrorist organization, and fears of inflaming sectarian tensions, which were at the heart of a bloody 15-year civil war in Lebanon that ended in 1990.

Hezbollah is a Shiite militant group that [emerged in the 1980s with Iranian backing](#) and grew into Lebanon's most powerful fighting force. To its [supporters](#), it was a protector of the Shiite Muslims of Lebanon from Israel, which occupied southern Lebanon for nearly 20 years, as well as from other sects' militias in the country. It also ran a network of social services like schools, clinics and hospitals.

Hezbollah still has political influence in Lebanon, though [less than it once did](#). The group exerts de facto control over large areas of the country's south and poses a credible challenge to the Lebanese government's authority.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (20)

[FONTE: Omar Harkous / The Beiruter, 20/11/2025]



The screenshot shows the top portion of a news article. At the top, the logo for 'The Beiruter' is centered, with navigation links for POLITICS, ECONOMY, TECHNOLOGY, OPINION, SPECIALS, and THE B. The article title is 'Lebanon... Independence in an era of lost sovereignty'. Below the title is a sub-headline: 'Lebanon's independence remains fragile, undermined by militias, regional influence, political paralysis, and economic collapse.' The author is listed as 'By Omar Harkous | November 20, 2025' and the reading time is '7 min'. Social media sharing icons for X, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Email are present. The main image is a stylized illustration of two white hands with black cuffs, holding a broken chain. Below the hands is a red semi-circle and a green pine tree, set against a bright green background.

**The Beiruter**

POLITICS ECONOMY TECHNOLOGY **OPINION** SPECIALS THE B


## Lebanon... Independence in an era of lost sovereignty

Lebanon's independence remains fragile, undermined by militias, regional influence, political paralysis, and economic collapse.

By Omar Harkous | November 20, 2025

Reading time: 7 min

X f WhatsApp Email



# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (21)

[FONTE: Omar Harkous / The Beiruter, 20/11/2025]

Lebanon's "independence" remains a postponed state, as the country has, over the past decades, been transformed into a frontline tool in regional and international struggles. At times it served as an instrument within the orbit of Egypt's late president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s; later it fell under the tutelage of Hafez al-Assad, who handed that system to his son Bashar; and after the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, Assad effectively "gifted" Lebanon to Hezbollah, which anchored the country as an Iranian bargaining card in its standoffs with successive U.S. administrations.

Lebanon, the region's once-advanced model, has seen its model of freedom of expression and economic openness vanish. Paradoxically, it now stands outside the major political currents shaping the contemporary Middle East. Meanwhile, Syria, emerging from a devastating civil war, is gradually regaining a place in regional and international equations; Iraq has become a central platform for Washington-Tehran negotiations. Lebanon, once a hub of regional economic decision-making and the financial gateway between the Arab world and the West, has been turned by Tehran into a bargaining chip in recent years. Its institutions are blocked by an internal militia structure and incapacitated by an elite that uses militia power to cement its own dominance.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (22)

[FONTE: Omar Harkous / The Beiruter, 20/11/2025]

## **A paralyzed parliament... And a 40-year crisis of power**

Hezbollah leads this obstruction through various tools, sometimes by blocking roads with motorcycles, sometimes by shutting down institutions. Despite the post-2024 war environment that should have forced change and a return to state authority, Hezbollah and its many allies in the political system are working to block any political pathway incompatible with their regional calculations.

Eighty years after independence and tens of thousands of deaths in internal and external wars, the sovereignty question remains unresolved. Today, the Lebanese seek to move past the logic of “tutelage” toward a new concept of institution-building and corruption-free governance: an independence from weapons and from regional entanglements.

Hezbollah, however, presents its familiar narrative: that “the resistance” liberated the south in 2000, withstood Israel in 2006, and that the 2024 war proved the necessity of retaining weapons. Yet this narrative ignores a fundamental truth: Hezbollah’s military power grants it veto authority over decisions of war and peace and places Lebanon squarely within Iranian regional strategy. It overlooks that in 2000, U.S. and French pressure forced Israel to implement UN Resolution 425 and withdraw; that in 2006, Lebanon’s infrastructure was destroyed due to Hezbollah’s unilateral military adventurism as Iran’s nuclear negotiations hit a dead end; and that in the 2024 “support war” aiding Hamas in Gaza, the remnants of Lebanon’s economy nearly collapsed after whole villages in the south were destroyed, while the ceasefire terms granted Israel the right to pursue Hezbollah operatives rebuilding their military and financial networks.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (23)

[FONTE: Omar Harkous / The Beijuter, 20/11/2025]

## **A state without an economy**

Since 2019, Lebanon has been mired in an economic collapse that has rippled across security, politics, and the judiciary. Then came the Beirut Port explosion, triggered by ammonium nitrate, leaving devastation that will require years and immense resources to rebuild. The World Bank ranks this crisis among the worst globally in modern history.

Its effects on the military and security institutions have been catastrophic: salaries for soldiers and officers have lost most of their value; spare parts for weapons and equipment are nearly nonexistent except through American and Arab aid; and a silent exodus of skilled personnel has drained capacities. Without U.S. support, army units would be operating at a bare minimum. The risk is clear: financial collapse turning into security collapse, then into total sovereign collapse.

After the fall of the Assad regime's control in Syria, major arms and money-smuggling routes from Iran to Hezbollah halted. But, according to international research centers, the closure of airports to Iranian flights forced Tehran and Hezbollah to build new routes quickly: networks of Lebanese money changers, cash-based businesses, transfers via Turkey and Iraq, maritime shipments of disassembled military equipment reassembled in Lebanon, and transfers in gold and cryptocurrencies.

The U.S. Treasury estimated Iran's funding for Hezbollah at around \$1 billion in a single year to rebuild its military strength after the 2024 war. Even more alarming: Iran is no longer only transferring weapons; it is now exporting the technology and expertise needed to produce missiles and drones inside Lebanon, mirroring its support to the Houthis in Yemen.

# O cessar-fogo no Líbano (24)

[FONTE: Omar Harkous / The Beiruter, 20/11/2025]

## **Can independence be saved?**

Independence in Lebanon has never been complete, undermined by regional and international interference and by authorities unwilling to protect the country and its people, rather than plunging them into the burdens of surrounding conflicts. Today, Lebanon is more threatened than ever: militias operating outside the state, no commitment to an international rescue plan, continued political paralysis, and systematic smuggling of weapons and money, all eroding international trust.

Saving independence requires far more than statements, celebrations, or contradictory political positions. It requires: Disarming militias and restoring the state's monopoly over force; Judicial reform; Rebuilding trust with the international community; A complete separation between the state and regional conflict axes; Pursuit of peace that safeguards Lebanon with both Syria and Israel.

Until that happens, Lebanon will continue living in an eroded independence, suspended sovereignty, and a state waiting for its rebirth.

# Bibliografia

