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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (1) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

Trump's war: the kind of military misadventure that ends empires

History's lessons are unsparing about what Trump's micro-military fiasco is costing a country already in imperial decline



An anti-American mural on April 12, 2026, in Tehran, Iran. Photo: Majid Saeedi / Getty Images via Common Dreams

Writing more than 2,000 years ago, the Greek historian [Plutarch](#) gave us an eloquent description of what modern historians now call "[micro-militarism](#)."

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (2) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

When an imperial power like Athens then, or America now, is in decline, its leaders often react emotionally by mounting seemingly bold military strikes in hopes of regaining the imperial grandeur that's slipping through their fingers.

Instead of another of the great victories the empire won at its peak of power, however, such military misadventures only serve to accelerate the ongoing decline, erasing whatever aura of imperial majesty remains and revealing instead the moral rot deep inside the ruling elite.

There is mounting historical evidence that America is indeed an empire in steep decline, while President Donald Trump's war of choice against Iran is becoming the sort of micro-military disaster that helped destroy successive empires over the past 2,500 years — from ancient Athens to medieval Portugal to modern [Spain](#), Great Britain, and now the [United States](#).

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (3) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

And at the core of every such ill-fated war-making decision lay a problematic leader, often born into wealth and prestige, whose personal inadequacies reflected and ramified the many irrationalities that make imperial decline such a painful process.

During that demoralizing downward spiral, imperial armies, so lethal in an empire's ascent, can err by plunging their countries into draining, even disastrous

"micro-military" misadventures—psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the loss of imperial power by trying to occupy new territories or display awe-inspiring military might.

Although such micro-militarism often chose targets that proved strategically unsustainable, the psychological pressures upon declining empires are so strong that they all too often gamble their prestige on just such misadventures.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (4) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

Not only did such disasters add financial pressures to a fading empire's many troubles, but in a humiliating fashion, they also invariably exposed its eroding power while exacerbating the destabilizing impact of imperial decline in the capitals of empire (whether Athens, Lisbon, Madrid, London, or [Washington](#), DC).

In our moment, when the bombs stop falling and the rubble is finally cleared from the streets of [Tehran](#) and [Beirut](#), the impact on US global power of such a de facto defeat will become all too clear—as alliances like [NATO](#) atrophy, American [hegemony](#) evaporates, legitimacy is lost, global disorder rises, and the world economy suffers.

Let me now turn from the disasters of the present imperial moment to the lessons of history to explore the sort of lasting damage that Donald Trump's micro-military misadventure in the Middle East might be inflicting on this country's declining imperium.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (5) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Suez Canal, sea-level waterway running north-south across the **Isthmus of Suez** in **Egypt** to connect the **Mediterranean** and the **Red** seas. The **canal** separates **Africa** from **Asia**, and it provides the shortest **maritime** route between **Europe** and the lands lying around the **Indian** and western **Pacific** oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily used **shipping** lanes. The canal extends 193 km (120 miles) between **Port Said** (Būr Sa'īd) in the north and **Suez** in the south, with dredged approach channels north of Port Said, into the Mediterranean, and south of Suez. The canal does not take the shortest route across the **isthmus**, which is only 121 km (75 miles). Instead, it utilizes several lakes: from north to south, **Lake Manzala** (Buḥayrat al-Manzilah), Lake Timsah (Buḥayrat al-Timsāḥ), and the Bitter Lakes—Great Bitter Lake (Al-Buḥayrah al-Murrah al-Kubrā) and Little Bitter Lake (Al-Buḥayrah al-Murrah al-Ṣuḡhrā). The Suez Canal is an open cut, without **locks**, and, though **extensive** straight lengths occur, there are eight major bends. To the west of the canal is the low-lying delta of the **Nile River**, and to the east is the higher, rugged, and arid **Sinai Peninsula**. Prior to construction of the canal (completed in 1869), the only important settlement was Suez, which in 1859 had 3,000 to 4,000 inhabitants. The rest of the towns along its banks have grown up since, with the possible exception of Al-Qanṭarah.




A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (6) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

When first opened in 1869, the canal consisted of a channel barely 8 meters (26 feet) deep, 22 meters (72 feet) wide at the bottom, and 61 to 91 meters (200 to 300 feet) wide at the surface. To allow ships to pass each other, passing bays were built every 8 to 10 km (5 to 6 miles). Construction involved the excavation and dredging of 74 million cubic meters (97 million cubic yards) of sediments. Between 1870 and 1884 some 3,000 groundings of ships occurred because of the narrowness and tortuousness of the channel. Major improvements began in 1876, and, after successive widenings and deepenings, the canal by the 1960s had a minimum width of 55 meters (179 feet) at a depth of 10 meters (33 feet) along its banks and a channel depth of 12 meters (40 feet) at low [tide](#). Also in that period, passing bays were greatly enlarged and new bays constructed, bypasses were made in the Bitter Lakes and at Al-Ballāḥ, stone or [cement](#) cladding and steel piling for bank protection were almost entirely completed in areas particularly liable to [erosion](#), tanker anchorages were deepened in Lake Timsah, and new berths were dug at Port Said to [facilitate](#) the grouping of ships in convoy.

Plans that had been made in 1964 for further enlargement were overtaken by the [Arab-Israeli war](#) of June 1967, during which the canal was blocked. The canal remained inoperative until June 1975, when it was reopened and improvements were recommenced. In 2015 the Egyptian government finished a nearly \$8.5 billion project to upgrade the canal and significantly increase its capacity; nearly 29 km (18 miles) were added to its original length of 164 km (102 miles).

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (7) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

GLOBAL SHIPPING ROUTE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL: DALIAN, CHINA, TO ROTTERDAM, NETHERLANDS



A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (8) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

End of the British Empire at Suez

Arguably, when it came to imperial decline, however, the most revealing date was 1956.

The place was London, the seat of the once-proud British Empire, where the suffocating stress of a painful, protracted global imperial retreat had pushed British

conservatives into a disastrous micro-military intervention at Egypt's Suez Canal, leading to what one British diplomat would term the "dying convulsion of British imperialism."

In July 1956 (as described in my recent book ["Cold War on Five Continents"](#)), Egypt's charismatic president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, ending British colonial control there, electrifying the Arab world, and elevating himself to the first rank of world leaders.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (9) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

Although British ships could still pass freely through the canal, the country's conservative prime minister, Anthony Eden, a vain aristocrat and determined defender of empire, would be deeply unsettled, if not unhinged, by Nasser's assertive nationalism. Indeed, his leadership throughout the crisis would prove so unbalanced that senior Foreign Office officials would become [convinced](#) "Eden has gone off his head."

In response to the news of the canal's nationalization, an apoplectic Eden would immediately convene a council of war at 4:00 in the morning. Calling Nasser a "Muslim Mussolini," a reference to the former fascist ruler of Italy, Eden ordered "him removed and I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt."

Making his meaning perfectly clear, Eden asked his foreign minister: "What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or 'neutralizing' him as you call it?" He then added pointedly: "I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him murdered."

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (10) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

With the British secret service MI6 failing in multiple assassination attempts, however, Eden's government began plotting with the French and Israelis to launch a secret, two-phase invasion of the Suez Canal Zone.

On October 29, the Israeli army led by the dashing General Moshe Dayan swept across the Sinai Peninsula, destroying Egyptian tanks and bringing his troops within 10 miles of the canal. Using that fighting as a pretext for its own intervention (supposedly to restore peace), in just three days, an armada of six Anglo-French aircraft carriers smashed the Egyptian air force, destroying 104 of its new Soviet MIG jet fighters and 130 additional aircraft.

With Egypt's strategic forces destroyed and its military virtually helpless before the might of that imperial juggernaut, Nasser deployed a geopolitical strategy brilliant in its simplicity. He had dozens of rusting cargo ships filled with rocks and then scuttled them at the canal's northern entrance, quickly closing one of the world's main maritime choke points and so cutting off Europe's [oil](#) lifeline to the Persian Gulf.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (11) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

By the time 22,000 British and French forces began storming ashore at the canal's north end on November 6, their objective of securing the free movement of ships had already been snatched from their grasp.

By the end of that micro-military disaster, Britain would be reprimanded by the [United Nations](#); its currency would require an International Monetary Fund [bailout](#) to save it from utter collapse; its aura of imperial majesty would have evaporated; and the once mighty British Empire would be on the road to [extinction](#).

In retrospect, the Suez Crisis would not only expose the full-scale decline of British power, but also show the world that the country's ruling Conservative establishment, with its illusions of imperial and racial superiority, was no longer capable of global leadership.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (12) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (13) [FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]

Strait of Hormuz, only sea channel linking the [oil-rich Persian Gulf](#) (west) with the [Gulf of Oman](#) and the [Arabian Sea](#) (southeast). In March 2026, amid the [2026 Iran war](#), threats and attacks by [Iran](#) on ships passing through the strait led to a more than 95 percent drop in traffic, leading to the biggest disruption ever in the global oil supply and a surge in the price of other critical [commodities](#).

More than 20 percent of global oil and [liquefied natural gas](#) exports passes through the strait, which serves as the primary route for [petroleum](#) exported from [Iran](#), [Iraq](#), [Kuwait](#), [Qatar](#), and the [United Arab Emirates](#) (although the United Arab Emirates has the capability to divert most of its exports through its [Fujairah](#) emirate on the [Gulf of Oman](#)). The exports are geographically focused—about four-fifths go to importing countries in [Asia](#), especially [China](#), [India](#), [Japan](#), and [South Korea](#)—but the volume of the supply has profound impact on pricing worldwide due to the low [elasticity](#) of prices for [petroleum](#) products. Along with the [Strait of Malacca](#) that connects the [Indian Ocean](#) to the [Pacific Ocean](#), the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most [vital](#) oil chokepoints in the global economy.



Strait of Hormuz

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (14) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

America's defeat in the Strait of Hormuz

Another date likely to prove all too significant when it comes to the history of imperial decline is February 28, 2026. The place was Washington, DC, home to what had been history's most powerful imperial state that had dominated much of the globe for nearly 80 years through a mixture of military alliances, deft diplomacy, and economic leadership.

By then, however, cracks had distinctly begun to appear in its edifice of power as US global hegemony faced an increasingly strong economic challenge from China, its massive military suffered two searing defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its economic [globalization](#) produced an angry [populism](#) at home.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (15) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

After a populist campaign based on promises to restore both working-class prosperity and America's global power, [Donald Trump](#) took office a second time in January 2025 [promising](#) a "golden age of America," a "thrilling new era of national success" in which the country would "reclaim its rightful place as the greatest, most powerful, most respected nation on Earth, inspiring the awe and admiration of the entire world."

Born to wealth and privilege himself, Trump returned to office convinced of his unique "[genius](#)" for leadership and [believing](#) that "I was saved by God to make America great again."

Wielding raw economic and military might to compel obeisance from friend and foe alike, the president, inspired by a delusional sense of divine mission, began attempting to bend the world to his will.

But during his first year in office, nothing seemed to work as planned. Indeed, most of his initiatives produced the sort of backlash that only served to show how far the United States had fallen from 1991, when the break-up of the Soviet Union made it the world's sole superpower.

A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (16) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

On February 28, 2026, with his tariff initiative failing and his Greenland gambit checkmated, Trump joined Israel in a seemingly bold strike on Iran that soon had the makings of the sort of fateful “micro-military” maneuver that appears to go with imperial powers in decline.

In the first few days of war, US and Israeli bombing killed Iran’s leadership, destroyed its navy, and eliminated its air defenses, leaving the country seemingly prostrate before the might of America’s air-power juggernaut.

But much as Nasser had done at Suez in 1956, Iran’s leadership reversed the war’s geostrategic balance by closing a critical maritime choke point in the Strait of Hormuz. By striking [five freighters with drones](#) in the first week of war, Iran’s leaders, taking a leaf from Nasser’s geopolitical playbook, effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic, cutting off gas, fertilizer, and oil shipments that plunged the world economy into an [unprecedented energy crisis](#). By the end of March, Iran’s chokehold over the strait was so tight that it began [collecting “tolls”](#) from freighters to permit passage.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (17) [FONTE: Alfred McCoy / Asia Times, 26/04/2026]

Like Britain at Suez in 1956, Washington will likely pay a heavy price for its "micro-militarism" in the Strait of Hormuz. Close allies, the bedrock of US global power for 80 years, have [refused any military support](#) for Washington's war of choice, prompting Trump to call them "cowards."

In response to his thundering threats of civilian and civilizational destruction (both [war crimes](#)), Trump has been [condemned](#) by world leaders. Oblivious to the dangers of war in a region that is the epicenter of global [capitalism](#), Washington is now proving ever more dangerously disruptive of the global economy, making China look like a far more stable choice for world leadership. Moreover, while the [US military](#) has proven its tactical agility in destroying targets, it clearly can no longer capture meaningful strategic objectives.

With its alliances in tatters, its world leadership forfeited, and its aura of military might evaporating, the only trajectory for US global hegemony now seems to be downward (like so many great powers of the past).

By the time Trump's micro-military misadventure in the Strait of Hormuz is over, the decline of US global power will have accelerated drastically and the world will be trying to move beyond the old Pax Americana toward a new, distinctly uncertain global order.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (18) [FONTE: SCMP, 16/04/2026]

China's Wang Yi calls on Iran to ensure freedom and safe passage through Strait of Hormuz



China's top diplomat [Wang Yi](#) sought guarantees of freedom and safety of international navigation through the [Strait of Hormuz](#), in a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, [Abbas Araghchi](#), on Wednesday.

The call is Beijing's latest diplomacy effort on [the Iran war](#) as a US naval blockade of Iranian ports intensifies global energy disruptions and adds uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway off Iran's coast that Tehran effectively closed in response to US-Israeli strikes.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (19) [FONTE: SCMP, 16/04/2026]

Wang said Iran, as a coastal state of the Strait of Hormuz, should have its sovereignty, security and legitimate rights and interests respected and safeguarded.

"At the same time, the freedom and safety of international navigation through the strait should also be ensured, and efforts to restore normal transit through the strait are a shared call of the international community."

According to the Chinese statement, Araghchi said Tehran expected Beijing to play an active role in promoting peace and ending the conflict, and that Iran was willing to continue seeking a rational and realistic solution through peaceful negotiations.

The US blockade followed an [initial round of talks in Islamabad](#) over the weekend that were aimed at permanently ending the conflict but failed to produce an agreement, with divisions remaining over Iran's nuclear programme and the Strait of Hormuz.

A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (20) [FONTE: Reuters, 20/04/2026]

China's Xi, in call with Saudi crown prince, calls for Strait of Hormuz to remain open



BEIJING, April 20 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping called for normal passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz to be maintained, in a phone call on Monday with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman held as Beijing [steps up efforts](#) to help end the [Iran war](#).

China is concerned over renewed instability around the strategic waterway, as a U.S.-Iran ceasefire came under fresh strain after the U.S. seized an Iranian cargo ship and Tehran signaled it would not join new peace talks for now.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (21) [FONTE: Reuters, 20/04/2026]

China is the main buyer of Iranian crude. Iran has largely closed the strait to ships other than its own since the United States and Israel launched the war in February, while Washington has imposed a blockade of Iranian ships since last week.

China advocates an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, and insists on resolving conflicts in the Middle East through political and diplomatic channels, state news agency Xinhua cited Xi as saying.

"The Strait of Hormuz should remain open to normal passage, as this serves the common interests of regional countries and the international community," he told the Saudi leader.

Worries have mounted over the survival of the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran after the U.S. seizure of the Iranian vessel. Trump had credited Beijing with helping to get Iran to the previous negotiations with the U.S. in Pakistan.


The Chinese foreign ministry on Monday [expressed concerns](#) over the "forced interception" by the U.S. of the Iranian ship, while urging relevant sides to abide by the ceasefire agreement.

Xi's call with the Saudi crown prince followed a [meeting in Beijing](#) last week with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, when Xi urged adherence to international law.

Xi also told the Saudi crown prince that China supports countries in the Middle East in "taking their future and destiny into their own hands, and promoting long-term regional stability and peace".

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (22) [FONTE: CGTN, 2021]

Bilateral trade between China and GCC countries in 2021



Fossil fuels exported to China in 2021



A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (23) [FONTE: Xinhua, 14/11/2025]

China becomes Gulf countries' largest trading partner: UK think tank

LONDON, Nov. 13 (Xinhua) -- China has overtaken the United States, Britain, and the Eurozone combined to become the Gulf region's largest trading partner, according to a report released Thursday by the London-based think tank Asia House.

The report, *Middle East Pivot to Asia: The Gulf's Rise as a Global Middle Power*, shows that China's trade with the six Gulf countries reached 257 billion U.S. dollars in 2024, narrowly surpassing the 256 billion U.S. dollars in combined Gulf trade with major Western economies.


Asia House projects that Gulf-China trade will climb to 375 billion U.S. dollars by 2028, widening the trade gap with Western economies to 75 billion U.S. dollars.

According to Asia House, China now accounts for 47 percent of all Gulf trade with emerging Asian economies, with expanding synergies boosting cooperation across non-oil sectors, including renewables, construction, and technology.

The report highlights the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) growing non-oil trade with China, which rose 15 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2025.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (24) [FONTE: SCMP, 20/04/2026]

China's trade with Iran, Gulf states plunges as Strait of Hormuz crisis hits energy flows



China's trade with Iran and Gulf countries fell sharply in March as restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz tightened amid the [US-Israeli war on Iran](#).

Newly released data by Chinese customs showed imports from Iran plunged 48 per cent year on year last month, while exports to the country dropped 90 per cent.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (25) [FONTE: SCMP, 20/04/2026]

Across the broader Middle East, exports to eight Persian Gulf economies – including Saudi Arabia and Qatar – fell by 57 per cent, while imports declined by nearly 33 per cent.

The disruption stems largely from the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow waterway that handles about 20 per cent of global oil. This curtailed crude flows, contributing to a 25 per cent year-on-year drop in China’s oil imports from Gulf countries in March.

The latest data followed Tehran briefly reopening the strait before reversing course within a day, as Washington maintained a [naval blockade on Iranian ships](#) and US President Donald Trump warned Iran not to “hold the US hostage”.

“The Strait of Hormuz has long been recognised as a global chokepoint, but it was not until this conflict that we realised how vulnerable it really is,” said Alfredo Montufar-Helu, managing director at Ankura China Advisors.

A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (26) [FONTE: NYT, 27/04/2026]

The Iran War Is Starting to Expose Cracks in China's Economy

China's strategic reserves of oil and natural gas have insulated it somewhat, but its manufacturing-based economy is beginning to falter.



Chinese-made cars waiting to be exported at a port in Suzhou, China, on Monday. China has sought to increase exports as demand has weakened at home.-/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Rising oil and natural gas prices from the war in Iran are beginning to weigh on the Chinese economy, further slowing already anemic consumer spending and hurting critical export sectors.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (27) [FONTE: NYT, 27/04/2026]

For many weeks, China had appeared to weather the fallout from the war, a view reinforced by fairly strong economic data through March. But with the war in its ninth week with no clear end, cracks are beginning to show.

“The economy is decelerating,” said Alicia García-Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis, a French financial firm. China may struggle to meet this year’s growth target of [4.5 percent](#) or more, she added.

One of the clearest signs of emerging weakness is in car sales and production, often considered early indicators of trouble. Cars are the second-largest purchase for many Chinese households after apartments, and the industry drives demand for steel, glass and other materials.

China’s retail car sales plunged 26 percent in the first 19 days of April from a year earlier, according to the China Passenger Car Association. While part of the drop reflects weaker [electric-vehicle](#) sales after tax incentives expired in December, gasoline-powered cars fared worse, falling by nearly 40 percent.

Falling sales have left dealership lots crowded with unsold cars, triggering production cutbacks. Chinese car factories made 27 percent fewer cars in the first two weeks of April than a year earlier, a sharp pullback even as exports rise.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (28) [FONTE: NYT 27/04/2026]

At first glance, the economy still looks resilient. But a closer look suggests underlying weakness.

This month, China said that its economy grew at an annualized rate of 5.3 percent during the first three months of this year. But most of the strength was in January and February.

Retail sales decelerated in March, rising just 1.7 percent from a year ago. The China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing said inventories of unsold goods continued to build. Michael Pettis, a Peking University economist, said rising inventories could drag on future growth.

On Monday, industrial profits data showed continued strength through March, offering a possible buffer against a downturn. But much of that gain came from chemical and energy firms cashing in on a one-time windfall from higher oil and gas prices after stockpiling cheaply before the war.

China's strategic oil reserves and huge refineries leave it far less exposed than its Asian neighbors. China has also shielded consumers from the full brunt of [rising fuel costs](#), permitting its state-controlled oil companies to pass along only half of any increase in oil prices.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (29) [FONTE: NYT, 27/04/2026]

The picture is grimmer in the toy industry.

Thousands of workers who lost their jobs took to the streets last week in southern China, staging daily protests to demand back pay and compensation from several toy factories that abruptly closed on April 20.

The closures came as costs for plastic, which is made from oil and natural gas, surged after traffic slowed through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to energy buyers around the world. China's [toy industry](#) was already under pressure from rising costs, foreign competition and President Trump's tariffs.

The shuttered factories are in Yulin City, a low-wage toy manufacturing hub about 260 miles west of Hong Kong.

Workers draped banners across factory gates with slogans like, "Give me back my blood and sweat money." In videos, protesters mill quietly while police officers in blue uniforms and reflective vests stand nearby.

Numerous short videos of the protests have circulated online in China. While displays of public unrest are usually censored, these clips have remained, possibly because the protests are peaceful and Beijing has urged companies to meet their obligations to workers.

A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (30) [FONTE: AXIOS, 27/04/2026]

Iran offers U.S. deal to reopen strait but postpone nuclear talks

Why it matters: The diplomacy is in a stalemate, and the Iranian leadership is divided about what nuclear concessions should be on the table. The Iranian proposal would bypass that issue en route to a faster deal.

- But lifting the blockade and ending the war would remove President Trump's leverage in any future talks to remove Iran's stockpile of [enriched uranium](#) and convince Tehran to suspend enrichment — two primary war objectives for Trump.

What to watch: Trump is expected to hold a Situation Room meeting on Iran on Monday with his top national security and foreign policy team, according to three U.S. officials.

- One source said Trump's team would discuss the [stalemate in the negotiations](#) and potential next steps.
- Trump signaled in an [interview](#) with Fox News on Sunday that he wants to continue the naval blockade that is choking off Iran's oil exports, hoping it will get Tehran to cave over the next few weeks.
- "When you have vast amounts of oil pouring through your system ... if for any reason this line is closed because you can't put it into containers or ships ... what happens is that line explodes from within. ... They say they only have about three days before that happens," Trump said.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (31) [FONTE: AXIOS, 27/04/2026]

Behind the scenes: Araghchi raised the plan to bypass the nuclear issue during his meetings in Islamabad, two sources with knowledge said.

- One source said Araghchi made it clear to the Pakistani, Egyptian, Turkish and Qatari mediators over the weekend that there's no consensus inside the Iranian leadership about how to address the U.S. demands. The U.S. wants Iran to suspend uranium enrichment for at least a decade and remove its enriched uranium from the country.

The new proposal, given to the U.S. via the Pakistani mediators, focuses on solving the crisis over the strait and the U.S. blockade first.

- As part of that, the ceasefire would be extended for a long period or the parties would agree on a permanent end to the war.
- According to the proposal, the nuclear negotiations would only start at a later stage, after the strait was open and the blockade lifted.
- The White House has received the proposal, but it's unclear whether the U.S. is willing to explore it.

What they're saying: "These are sensitive diplomatic discussions and the U.S. will not negotiate through the press. As the president has said, the United States holds the cards and will only make a deal that puts the American people first, never allowing Iran to have a nuclear weapon," White House spokesperson Olivia Wales told Axios.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (32) [FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

Iran War Delivers Windfall to America's Oil Country - WSJ



SANTE FE, N. M.—New Mexico churns out about 2.3 million barrels of crude every day, enough to make it the nation's second-largest oil-producing state behind its more famous neighbor, Texas. In fiscal year 2025, New Mexico raked in at least \$7.3 billion in revenue from the output. Now, it stands to make even more.

A guerra no Irã e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (33) [FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

Higher oil prices brought on by [the conflict with Iran](#) might vex the global economy, but for some U.S. states, they are a windfall that will help close budget deficits, fund early childhood education and improve roads.

“At the end of the day, it means more jobs and more opportunities for people,” Jonathan Sena, the mayor of Hobbs, N.M., said of higher oil prices. “Oil-and-gas is the foundation of our economy.” [Hobbs has reaped the rewards](#) of its place in the biggest oil-producing county in the country: As oil prices soar, restaurants and hotels fill up, construction booms and retail sales rise.

Higher oil costs strain the U.S. economy by raising gasoline and diesel prices, and the prices of a myriad of goods and services. But unlike during past oil shocks, the U.S. itself is now a major oil producer, providing insulation for the economy from the worst effects of the war.

The southeast corner of New Mexico hosts some of the most productive wells in the Permian Basin, the nation’s most prolific oil field that extends far into West Texas.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (34) [FONTE: WSJ, 14/04/2026]

The U.S. oil benchmark settled at \$98.71 a barrel Friday. Federal forecasters at the Energy Information Administration expect prices to average around \$76 between March and the end of the year because of the war. Prices averaged about \$65 in 2025. If the forecast holds, the roughly \$11 increase would translate into hundreds of millions of dollars in additional receipts for New Mexico.

Other oil-producing states also are expected to see a short-term boon to their budgets. Alaska faces a \$500 million deficit, but additional revenue expected from rising oil prices means the state won't have to dip as deeply into its savings to plug the gap, said Alexei Painter, who heads the state's legislative finance division.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (35) [FONTE: Gulf News, 17/04/2026]

Oil, gas tanker traffic explodes at Panama canal as global energy routes shift amid Mideast war

Surge in U.S. crude and LNG to Asia turns Panama Canal into key wartime energy artery



The queue of ships crossing Panama Canal as of 6.35am Asia time, April 17, 2026.

Marine Traffic

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (36) [FONTE: Gulf News, 17/04/2026]

A surge of oil tankers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers is crowding the Panama Canal, as shifting global energy routes driven by conflict in the Middle East push the strategic waterway to near-maximum capacity.



Videos circulating online this week show long lines of vessels waiting to transit the canal after loading crude oil and gas shipments from US Gulf Coast ports, underscoring a sharp rise in traffic bound for Asia.

Strong demand





Canal authorities say daily transits have climbed to between 36 and 38 vessels, above earlier projections, with energy shipments accounting for much of the increase.


Reuters reported that demand has been particularly strong among LNG and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carriers transporting US exports to Asian markets.


A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (37) [FONTE: Gulf News, 17/04/2026]

 **Jack Prandelli** 
@jackprandelli · Follow

Look at that map.
Every red arrow is a tanker.
All converging on The Gulf of America.
This is the world rerouting in real time.

-  167 crude tankers declared US destinations
-  103 empty vessels steaming to load American crude
-  US exports already at record 12.7M b/d
-  Heading [Show more](#)



9:19 AM · Apr 16, 2026 

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (38) [FONTE: Oil Price, 25/04/2026]

The Strait of Hormuz May Reopen, But the System Has Already Broken



Reopening Hormuz won't restore normalcy, as traffic remains drastically reduced and shipping behavior has already shifted due to risk and lost trust.

Global trade routes are being structurally rewired, with vessels rerouting, insurance costs surging, and energy flows fragmenting into more regional and resilient systems.

Long-term impacts include higher costs, supply diversification, and increased geopolitical risk, as chokepoints become strategic pressure points rather than reliable transit routes.

A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (39) [FONTE: Oil Price, 25/04/2026]

That behavioral shift is the real story. And this confirms and substantiates what we have already seen in the Red Sea.

The consequences are structural, as evidenced by global trade rerouting on a scale. The Cape of Good Hope has become the default alternative for Asia–Europe flows, adding 10–14 days and thousands of nautical miles to voyages. All parties should realize that this is no longer a temporary detour but is already embedded in network design. Shipping lines are recalibrating schedules, redeploying fleets, and locking in new routing strategies that assume chokepoint instability as a baseline.

The implications for energy markets are and will increasingly become profound. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries roughly 20% of global oil and LNG flows. Its disruption has already triggered what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply shock in modern oil market history. Hydrocarbon prices have surged, while total exports have collapsed. Supply chains have seized up. The longer-term impact will not only be scarcity, but fragmentation.



A guerra no Irão e o fim da hegemonia dos EUA? (40) [FONTE: Oil Price, 25/04/2026]

The most dangerous mistake policymakers can make now is to treat reopening as a resolution. The data shows otherwise. Traffic does not return. Costs do not normalize. Behavior does not revert. The system evolves.

Even today, vessels are still turning back, traffic remains minimal, and operators are staying away. This is the new reality: chokepoints can reopen physically while remaining closed economically.

The long-term consequence is clear. The global maritime and energy system is entering a phase of structural fragmentation. Global trade and energy flows will be more regional, more redundant, and more expensive. Efficiency has given way to resilience. The price of security will be permanently embedded in trade.

Hormuz, like Bab El-Mandeb, is no longer just a passage. It is a fault line. Once that has shifted, it does not simply move back.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

A incógnita do poder militar da China (1)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

China's Military in 10 Charts




Photo: Fabio Murgia/CSIS, Getty Images

A incógnita do poder militar da China (2)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

1. China's Estimated Defense Spending



Constant 2023 U.S. dollars

Source: [SIPRI](#) • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS


China's emergence as an economic superpower has fueled decades of steady increases in military spending. Its official defense budget reached nearly \$247 billion in 2025, but government figures understate actual expenditures. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates China's actual defense spending at about \$318 billion in 2024, while another study places it even higher, at \$471 billion. Whatever the exact figure, the scale and growth of China's defense budget have enabled broad investments in equipment, maintenance, personnel, and training.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (3)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

2. China's Share of Global Defense Spending

China's Share of Global Defense Spending



Constant 2023 U.S. dollars


Source: SIPRI • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

China spends significantly less on defense than the United States, but the gap is shrinking. In 2012, China's defense spending was one-sixth that of the United States; by 2024 that figure had risen to one-third. In the Indo-Pacific, China towers over its neighbors, spending five times as much on defense as Japan and nearly seven times as much as South Korea—two key U.S. allies in the region.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (4)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

3. The Growth of the PLA Navy



Source: [CRS](#); [DOD](#) • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Nowhere has the PLA's progress been more visible than its navy, which is evolving from a coastal force into a "blue-water navy" capable of projecting power globally. The PLA Navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in number of battle force ships around 2014 and is projected to continue growing over the next decade. China still trails the United States in key metrics, like overall ship tonnage, on-ship missile launchers, and experience operating in far seas. Yet China is catching up in these areas. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) assesses that China's ability to perform missions outside of the Indo-Pacific's first island chain is "modest but growing as it gains more experience."

A incógnita do poder militar da China (5)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

4. China's Modernizing Air Forces

Generation of Fighter Aircraft

2nd 3rd 4th 4.5th 5th

2K aircraft

1K

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024


Source: IISS • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

Similar trends are underway in China's air forces. Today, the PLA Air Force and Navy field a significantly larger fleet of combat aircraft than in years past. Most importantly, a growing share of those aircraft are more technologically advanced. The PLA is steadily retiring older second- and third-generation fighters in favor of more modern 4.5-generation and fifth-generation aircraft, like the J-20 fighter, which boasts cutting-edge stealth and precision strike capabilities.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (6)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

6. China's Growing Nuclear Warhead Stockpile




Source: [FAS](#), [DOD](#) • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

The growth of China's nuclear arsenal has become one of the most alarming developments for Washington and its allies. According to estimates, China's nuclear stockpile reached 600 warheads in 2025, more than doubling since 2019. The DOD forecasts that China will continue to expand its nuclear arsenal to reach some 1,500 warheads by 2035. That would put China much closer to parity with the United States and Russia, forcing Washington to contend with not just one nuclear superpower, but two.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (7)

[FONTE: Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart / CSIS, 2/09/2025]

8. Increasing Military and Dual-Use Satellites



ELINT = electronic intelligence; SIGINT = signals intelligence; ISR = intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

Source: [IISS](#) • Chart: Fabio Murgia/CSIS

In modern warfare, having terrestrial systems is no longer enough. Militaries rely heavily on constellations of satellites to collect intelligence, enable communications, and provide targeting and navigation. Xi has emphasized the importance of space for China, describing it as “an important strategic asset for the country.” As of 2024, China had hundreds of military and dual-use satellites in orbit, lofted there by its rapidly advancing space program.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (8)

[FONTE: The War Zone, 25/12/2025]

Chinese Cargo Ship Packed Full Of Modular Missile Launchers Emerges

China has packed a deck of a medium-sized cargo ship with 60 containerized vertical launch cells, radar, and close-in weapons.




| A closer look at the radar and CIWS installation on the vessel. (Chinese internet)

A incógnita do poder militar da China (9)

[FONTE: The War Zone, 25/12/2025]


We had a feeling we would be in for another round of weapons 'reveals' out of China this Christmas, following last year's 'leaks' [of not just one, but two](#) tailless [stealth tactical jet designs](#), among other developments. It appears we are getting at least one installment of this in the form of a medium-sized cargo ship packed full of containerized vertical launchers, along with sensors and self defense systems. The message is clear, China is making it known that it could, and likely will, turn ships from its [behemoth of a commercial fleet](#) into not just shooters, but arsenal ships.



A incógnita do poder militar da China (10)

[FONTE: The War Zone, 25/12/2025]

The vessel has containers packed on its deck, both used for containing weapons and for mounting them, along with sensors. In other words, the layout appears to be designed as something of an improvised superstructure in order to turn the cargo ship into a heavily-armed surface combatant of sorts. This includes the mounting of a large rotating phased-array radar forward of the bridge atop three containers, as well as another domed radar or communications system across the deck from it mounted on two containers.



A incógnita do poder militar da China (11)

[FONTE: Center for Maritime Strategy, 22/01/2026]



Center for Maritime
Strategy

Dual Use Initiative By China Could Exponentially Increase Its Missile Launch Platforms

THE MOC

By John D. McCown

January 22, 2026

A December 25 article in [The War Zone](#), a prominent online publication focusing on military, defense and technology, included pictures of a small cargo ship packed with containerized missile launchers. The modular outfitting with containers included missile radar equipment and an 11-barrel 30 millimeter close-in weapon system for air defense. The [article](#) indicated that most of the deck was covered with containers three lengthwise and five across, each of which included four deployed launch tubes comprising a large [vertical launching system \(VLS\)](#). With 60 cells in total, just that array on a small ship was 63% of the 96 cell VLS on [Arleigh Burke class](#) guided missile destroyers.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (12)

[FONTE: Center for Maritime Strategy, 22/01/2026]

While containerized weapons systems have been around for years, it is startling to see pictures of them combined in a way that a small cargo ship can easily be transitioned into a lethal naval vessel. Such a transition can be temporary, allowing a return to commercial service in what is the ultimate example of a dual use vessel that results in superior overall cost economics. That China completely outfitted such a vessel in a public area where pictures would emerge indicates a desire for this capability to be seen. The uniform containers and the similar bold Chinese writing on each container is likely touting the capability of this configuration. The line between China's commercial and military maritime activities is intentionally blurred as a core component of its national Military-Civil Fusion strategy. This approach prioritizes dual use assets, infrastructure and personnel to support both economic growth and the rapid modernization and expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy.

Today's navies are in a novel tactical era characterized by their ability to deploy missiles. This has resulted in much research and study related to turning merchant ships into warships with missiles. As the pictures from the December 25 article show, China is far along in testing this approach. However, the U.S. in the last five years has been experimenting with such configurations as highlighted in a February 2025 Proceedings article. That article makes the case that the desired 380-ship fleet and the number of ships is the wrong metric. In a world where the number of missiles the U.S. Navy can bring to bear in a confrontation is of foremost importance, these different weapons systems mounted on cargo vessel platforms prove uniquely attractive. That they can be developed in less time and more cost efficiently than traditional naval vessels only adds to their attractiveness.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (13)

[FONTE: Center for Maritime Strategy, 22/01/2026]

What makes a rapid transition from commercial to combatant particularly concerning is to realize how many cargo ship platforms can accommodate this conversion. In that area, the numbers starkly favor China.

The UNCTAD data on merchant vessel fleets by flag registry is illuminating. The vessel types most lending themselves to an open transition to warships by putting a single row of modular units on deck are container ships and dry bulk carriers. Container ships can immediately accommodate such modular units while most dry bulk carriers can with minimal adaptations. Based on June 2025 UNCTAD data, Chinese and Hong Kong flag vessels in container ship and dry bulk categories total 4,339 ships or just over 20% of the worldwide total. That is almost 70 times the U.S. flag total of 63 ships in those categories. This means that that even if this became a policy priority and funding was allocated toward this, the U.S. cannot meaningfully replicate the dual-use capacity China is able to with our own merchant fleet.

Not only are such covert usages of containerized weapons systems harder to detect, but also they can potentially be utilized by more entities including rouge states and even terrorists. In February 2024, Iran test fired two ballistic missiles launched from standard 40' containers at sea. When it is recognized that there are currently the equivalent of 28 million of these 40' x 8' x 8.5' steel boxes existing in the world, any one of which could hide an extraordinarily powerful weapon, the scope of this security issue becomes more apparent. That is a chilling number of platforms that can potentially be placed virtually anywhere.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (14)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]

How China is masking drone flights in potential Taiwan rehearsal


HONG KONG, Feb 26 (Reuters) - A large Chinese military drone has conducted regular flights over the South China Sea in recent months while transmitting false transponder signals that made it appear to be other aircraft, including a sanctioned Belarusian cargo plane and a British Typhoon fighter jet.

Military attaches and security analysts scrutinising the operations say the flights represent a step-change in China's grey-zone tactics in the contested South China Sea and appear to be testing possible decoy capabilities in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (15)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]



[1/2] A satellite image shows large drones at Qionghai Boao International Airport on Hainan Island, China, September 3, 2025.
VANTOR/Handout via REUTERS [Purchase Licensing Rights](#) 

A incógnita do poder militar da China (16)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]

The flight paths often head east from the Chinese province of Hainan towards the Philippines, near the disputed Paracel Islands, and down Vietnam's coast, the flight analysis showed.

Reuters is reporting the scale and complexity of the operations for the first time.


The operations represent a new and elaborate element in China's expanding presence across the South China Sea and around Taiwan as its military responds to Communist Party demands to sharpen the readiness of its forces, according to three regional diplomats, four open-source intelligence analysts and three security scholars familiar with the flight data. The activities include exploiting electronic warfare and deception tactics in real time, they said.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (17)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]

Recorded masked flights since August

Flight tracking data from FlightRadar24 shows 23 drone missions from Qionghai since August.



Sources: FlightRadar24; OpenStreetMap

Sudev Kiyada • Feb 25, 2026 | REUTERS

A incógnita do poder militar da China (18)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]

The flights have mostly appeared on Flightradar24 as an Ilyushin-62 cargo plane operated by Rada Airlines of Belarus but also a Royal Air Force Typhoon, a North Korean Il-62 passenger jet and an anonymous Gulfstream executive jet.

Since mid-December, YILO4200 has also made several flights in northwest China, most recently on February 15 when it appeared as an anonymous Pilatus PC-12, a small turboprop passenger aircraft.

Aircraft registration numbers stem from a coded so-called 24-bit address governed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Broadcast via transponders, the numbers help reveal an aircraft's position, direction and speed.

While unique to each aircraft, the addresses are publicly known and two pilots and two analysts say recoding a transponder to give it a different registration number is possible.

A incógnita do poder militar da China (19)

[FONTE: Reuters, 26/2/2026]

OPERATION COULD SOW CONFUSION

Flying out of Hainan's Qionghai Boao International Airport, the aircraft frequently remained airborne for hours, flying star- or hourglass-shaped patterns over the same areas.

The flight profiles matched those typically associated with large military drones on surveillance operations and covered sensitive parts of the South China Sea, including areas frequented by submarines, four intelligence analysts familiar with the data said.

The Chinese military generally flies its drones "dark", transmitting neither call signs nor registration numbers.

Two flights among the 23 reviewed by Reuters appeared to be particularly unusual: In one, that straddled August 5 and 6, the drone initially transmitted a code belonging to the RAF Typhoon, then switched signal to three other

planes over about 20 minutes, eventually landing as the Rada Airlines plane.

In another, on November 18, the drone was airborne purporting to be the Belarusian plane when the actual Rada Il-62 plane took off near Belarus headed for Tehran.

Bibliografia

