Política Internacional e Geopolítica
a policrise do mundo globalizado

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

PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (1)

[FONTE: ISW, 4/05/2026]

Key Takeaways

1. Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses.
2. Russia's additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia's growing economic issues.
3. Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues.
4. Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Orikhiv.
5. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 268 long-range drones against Ukraine overnight.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (2)

[FONTE: ISW, 4/05/2026]



A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (3)

[FONTE: ISW, 4/05/2026]

Toplines

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Karakurt-class small missile ship, a Russian patrol boat, and a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker near the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, and that the strikes also significantly damaged the oil loading infrastructure at the port.[1] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) noted that the Karakurt-class small missile ship was equipped with an unspecified launcher (presumably a Kalibr cruise missile launcher) and eight Kalibr cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and a sea-based Pantsir-M naval air defense system at the time of the Ukrainian strike.[2] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 3 shows heat anomalies at the port of Primorsk.[3] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on May 3 that Russian air defenses downed over 60 Ukrainian drones on the night of May 2 to 3 and acknowledged that Ukrainian drones caused fires near the port of Primorsk.[4] Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces also struck two Russian shadow fleet ships at the entrance to the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, with unmanned surface vessels (USVs).[5] Satellite imagery captured on May 3 indicates that Ukraine's April 28 to 29 and April 30 to May 1 strikes against the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station, Perm Krai, burned roughly 70 percent of the station, destroyed all the tanks with a 50,000 cubic meter capacity, and halted operations

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (4)

[FONTE: ISW, 4/05/2026]

Russia's additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia's growing economic issues. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on May 3 that the Russian federal budget expects to receive an additional 200 billion rubles in revenue due to rising oil prices over an unspecified period, but that Russia's income revenue and expenditures over the past two months (since about March 2026) have remained at similar levels.[11] Russian military recruiters notably increased sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers in mid-February 2026 after previously decreasing sign-up bonuses in 2025.[12] The Associated Press (AP) reported on May 2 that the economic impact of Ukraine's intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in the Russian rear remains unclear, as rising oil prices driven by the Iran war and the easing of US sanctions may help the Kremlin replenish revenues.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure have caused Russia to lose at least $7 billion in revenue since the start of 2026, and that Ukrainian strikes have left several of Russia's key oil ports, such as Ust-Luga and Primorsk in Leningrad Oblast, operating below capacity.[14] The International Energy Agency's (IEA) April 14 Oil Market Report found that Russian crude and oil product exports rose by 320,000 barrels per day month-on-month, hitting 7.1 million in March 2026 and almost doubling Russian oil export revenues to $19 billion from $9.7 billion due to the rising prices.[15] The IEA noted that it remains unclear whether Ukraine's strikes in April 2026 will disrupt this trend.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (5)

[FONTE: ISW, 4/05/2026]

Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues. Sberbank CFO and Management Board Deputy Chair Taras Skvortsov stated on April 29 that Russia expects the ruble to weaken in the second half of 2026 with forecasted exchange rates of 80 to 90 rubles per $1 US dollar compared to current exchange rates at around 75 rubles per $1 US dollar.[16] Skvortsov noted that the ruble will likely weaken more in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. Skvortsov stated that new Russian tax laws intended to replenish the budget have led Russian businesses and consumers to use cash payments more often, which Skvortsov warned could worsen the economic situation in Russia by increasing the size of Russia's grey economy, which increases the costs of goods and services without generating desired tax revenues.[17] The Kremlin has enacted a series of economically sub-optimal policies, such as increasing the value-added tax (VAT) and lowering the key interest rate despite high Russian inflation, while also steadily depleting its sovereign wealth fund's liquid reserves to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, which Russia's economy will struggle to overcome despite temporary cash influxes from global oil price spikes.[18]

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (6)

[FONTE: Encyclopedia Britannica]



A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (7)

[FONTE: Chatham House, 2/03/2026]

The Iran war exposes the limits of Russia's leverage in a fragmenting regional order

The war will not affect Russian plans in Ukraine – but it will likely force a rethink of long-held Russian strategic concepts.

In a diplomatic note to the Iranian government dated 29 March 1944, Vyacheslav Molotov, then foreign minister of the Soviet Union, noted that 'the Soviet Union [couldn't] remain indifferent to the fate of Iran'. That statement crystallized a perennial tenet of Soviet foreign policy – one that still synthesizes much of Moscow's approach to the Middle East today: Iran is not a dispensable peripheral actor. It is a structural node on the southern flank of the Russian Central Asian zone of influence.

The current military confrontation between Iran on the one side, and the United States (US) and Israel on the other, might well push this logic to its limits. Moscow may be forced to navigate a new and possibly perilous geometry of utility, ideology, and strategic restraint.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (8)

[FONTE: Chatham House, 2/03/2026]

Russia's reckoning

Russia's public posture in response to the military action against Iran has been one of sharp rhetorical condemnation. Moscow has labelled the strikes 'unprovoked acts of armed aggression' and warned of regional and global instability unless diplomacy is restored.

But Russia will obviously not enter into any kind of military confrontation with the US and Israel. Nor has it sent Tehran the least sign that it may provide any form of support.

The Kremlin's next steps will likely be calibrated to uphold its credibility as a counter-Western partner but avoid being drawn into a second high-intensity conflict. It will also seek to preserve bargaining space with Washington on other issues – not least the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Until the situation in Iran is clarified, the keywords for Moscow will be 'strategic hedging'. In other words, it will seek to make the most of the US distraction in the hope of depriving Kyiv of media oxygen and pushing the war on Ukraine into the background.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (9)

[FONTE: Chatham House, 2/03/2026]

The nuclear dimension: From energy cooperation to strategic risk

But the current developments in Iran are not without deeper implications for Moscow, particularly relating to the nuclear question.

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), enrichment levels and stockpiles were embedded in a negotiated framework in which Russia was an instrumental participant. That framework is now gone.

US and Israeli strikes during June's so-called 'Twelve-Day War' had already significantly degraded elements of Iran's enrichment infrastructure. The ongoing war is now moving to the next level, shifting the nuclear issue from managed diplomacy and short-term surgical strikes to outright coercive force with a clear longer-term ambition of regime change.

For Moscow, this changes the calculus in three ways. First, a weakened, yet unresolved nuclear file preserves Iran's strategic relevance while increasing the volatility surrounding the country. Any engagement with an Iranian regime that has now struck at almost every country across the Arabian peninsula won't go without a political risk.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (10)

[FONTE: Chatham House, 2/03/2026]

Risk spill-over, regional alignment, and Russia's options

A prolonged war raises critical questions about spill-over effects – from refugee flows to the proliferation of arms and militant networks. For Russia, whose southern flank security strategy has historically relied on internal and regional stability, this is not peripheral.

At the same time, Russia's options are constrained. It cannot militarily balance the US–Israel coalition in the Middle East. And it lacks the economic weight to fully underwrite Tehran if Iran is isolated post-conflict.

Moscow must also navigate the China variable, since Beijing – not Moscow – might well come out as a more consequential external actor in a post-war Iran than one might think.

Thus, Russia is faced with a strategic dilemma: should it prioritize managed distancing and diplomatic leverage, or entrench deeper into a partnership that exposes it to systemic risk and greater regional geopolitical volatility?

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (11)

[FONTE: Iran International, 29/04/2026]

As Tehran praises Moscow, critics ask where Russia was



Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. April 27, 2026

As Iranian officials continue to tout a "strategic partnership" with Russia, rare public criticism has emerged over Moscow's muted response to the recent war.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (12)

[FONTE: Iran International, 29/04/2026]

“Moscow will inevitably have to answer to history for this silence,” he told Shargh.

In comments to ILNA, Izadi said Russia had the capacity to do more and may even have been able to help prevent the war.

“Unfortunately, in my view, the Russians were not as active in this war as they should have been, even though they have—and had—the capacity to act and possibly even take measures to prevent the war,” he said.

Izadi suggested Moscow’s restrained response may have been shaped by self-interest. He cited higher oil revenues following the easing of US sanctions on Iran, the diversion of global attention from the war in Ukraine and the depletion of NATO military resources.

“It is unacceptable that a war of this scale occurs in Russia’s neighborhood, involving a country like Iran, and that the Russians, for whatever reason—even focusing on Ukraine, oil sales, or any other reason—show no reaction and do not support Tehran,” he said.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (13)

[FONTE: Iran International, 29/04/2026]

Russia has repeatedly offered to store Iran's enriched uranium. Alexey Likhachev, head of Russia's state nuclear corporation, described Russia as "the only country with a positive track record of cooperation with Iran" and said Moscow was ready to facilitate such a transfer, though Tehran has so far shown little interest.

That has sharpened questions in Iran over the practical limits of the relationship.

The S-400 question

Despite a 20-year strategic partnership agreement signed in 2025, the pact includes no mutual defense obligations in the event of an attack.

Meanwhile, promised military cooperation appears limited. A senior Revolutionary Guard official said in January 2025 that Iran had ordered Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, but no verified reports of their delivery have emerged.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (14)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (15)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

— *What is the state of Russia's economy in one word?*

— *Good.*

— *And in two words?*

— *Not good.*

This old joke, apocryphally attributed to Russia's former president Boris Yeltsin, neatly summed up the state of the country's economy in the 1990s. It also captures the impact on Russia of the war in Iran today. Whether the ceasefire holds or the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz escalates the war, Europeans can use Russia's mixed fortunes to increase their leverage over Moscow.

The good

In the short term, from Russia's point of view, this war is a gift that keeps on giving.

First comes the money: surging energy prices and the Trump administration's decision to lift sanctions on Russian oil add around $150m a day to the Kremlin's straining coffers. Ukrainian estimates suggest that is roughly how much Moscow spent on its war each day last year.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (16)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

Next are the holes in Ukraine's and the rest of Europe's defences. America and its allies are burning through Patriot ballistic missile interceptors at quite a rate. Based on publicly available data, in just the first week of the war, they used more than Ukraine has received in total since April 2023. The US produces a maximum of 650 of the most advanced interceptors annually, with plans to increase this to 2,000 a year by 2033. Yet Russia makes up to 1,000 of various types of ballistic missiles a year.

Supplies of interceptors thus fall well short of what Kyiv needs. Moscow will exploit this. It is also safe to assume the deficit will continue for years, even if the boost in US production happens as scheduled. But it is not only Ukrainian defences that will be affected: several other European countries placed orders months ago, only to see their deliveries diverted to Ukraine or delayed due to production bottlenecks. Once the active phase of fighting in Iran really ends, the US is likely to prioritise replenishing its own military stocks. This will create an even bigger shortfall in Europe.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (17)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

The not so good

And yet, US president Donald Trump's gift to Russia stops giving quite as much in the longer term.

First, money alone cannot fix a "not good" economy. The oil-price windfall is inadequate to plug the Kremlin's budget holes; it certainly cannot address the structural problems with the Russian economy, which are getting worse with each day of President Vladimir Putin's aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, analysis from *Re:Russia* suggests intensifying Ukrainian attacks on Russia's oil-exporting ports have temporarily erased two-thirds of Russia's oil windfall from the Iran war. Even if Moscow fixes the damage, Kyiv is likely to continue with these strikes. Russia can of course also step in to replace the oil Iran supplied to China. But, as many in Moscow's expert circles already fear, this will only deepen its economic dependence on Beijing.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (18)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

Then, there may be a loss of the Russian footprint in Iran and diminished diversification options for Moscow. The chaos of war and its aftermath are not conducive to long-term energy and infrastructure projects. The war has already put on hold two of Russia's nuclear power plants in Iran (one under construction and one planned); Russian companies' oil and gas exploration in the country has also stopped. Moscow's long-term ambition to diversify transit routes through the "North-South" corridor linking India to Russia via Iran is also up in the air. The project has questionable economic benefits. But the Kremlin prized its strategic value of reducing Russia's dependence on Western routes to access global markets.

Third, the war—whatever its trajectory—may also affect Russia's web of relations on the other side of the Persian Gulf. The Kremlin has invested in Arab Gulf states to diversify its energy transit routes, security and defence contracts and create more options to circumvent Western sanctions. But Gulf monarchies' security concerns may lead them to move even closer to Washington due to future threats from Iran. This means their relationship with Moscow might get more hands-off.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (19)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

How to turn "not good" into leverage

There are no ideal options. But going back to Russian gas and oil, as some European politicians have advocated, is undoubtedly among the most short-sighted and damaging. It would amount to Europeans renting a house from a known arsonist: it sure is cheap, but they cannot be certain the owner won't set it on fire (again) to weaken and blackmail them. Going back to Russian energy imports would also fill Putin's pockets for the very war in Ukraine Europeans have been trying to stop. Helpfully, others have already set out fiscal and energy measures Europeans can adopt now to avert an economic crisis without playing with fire.

"Going back to Russian gas and oil, as some European politicians have advocated, is among the most short-sighted and damaging options. It would amount to Europeans renting a house from a known arsonist: it sure is cheap, but they cannot be certain the owner won't set it on fire (again) to weaken and blackmail them"

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (20)

[FONTE: ECFR, 14/04/2026]

Europeans can also weaken Russia's hand in Ukraine. Absent the necessary supplies of Patriots, Europeans should help Kyiv at least boost other types of air defence, including those made in Europe like MBDA's Aster 30. (France's recent budgeting law imposes a 30% production increase of these in the coming years.) Europeans must also invest in Ukraine's homegrown drone and missile interception programme, even with lingering uncertainties around the country's interception capabilities. Continuing to boost Europe's defence spending, reinforcing NATO's eastern flank and addressing Russia's ongoing sabotage, disinformation and corruption operations and other hybrid attacks will also close off options for Moscow to manipulate European politics and increase Europe's own deterrence and leverage against Russia.

In other words, helping the "not good" impact of the Iran war on Russia arrive more quickly should become a conscious strategy for Europe. Because the stronger Europe is—and the weaker Russia becomes—the less likely it is that the old continent will seal off yet another Faustian bargain with Moscow.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (21)

[FONTE: ASPI, 2/04/2026]

Zelensky's Gulf Tour: Exporting Drone Know-How, Importing Alliances

2 Apr 2026

As Iranian drone attacks expose Gulf vulnerabilities, Ukraine exports battlefield expertise in air defence. Kyiv turns wartime innovation into strategic partnerships with energy-rich Middle Eastern states

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (22)

[FONTE: ASPI, 2/04/2026]

The magnitude of Iranian strikes on energy and civilian infrastructure prompted the Gulf Arab states to reach out to Ukraine for expertise and know-how on countering Iranian and Russian drones cheaply. At least 11 requests came from the countries targeted by Iran, from both government and private enterprises, which desire to learn quickly about **cheap and effective solutions to detect and intercept drones**. Teams of Ukrainian military specialists were deployed to the Middle East to train and equip the beneficiary countries. Two advantages of Ukrainian drone specialists make them stand out. First, they have **real combat experience** countering Iranian drones. Second, their relatively cheap drone interceptors have proven effective against Russian copies of Iranian drones. Throughout the end of March, Ukraine signed a 10-year air defence agreement with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (23)

[FONTE: ASPI, 2/04/2026]

As Russia expands its drone army – both in terms of unmanned vehicles and operators – and **Iran shows good learning capacity** in using its drones beyond the Ukrainian military theatre, the West and its allies must speed up their preparedness. China has large amounts of cheap drones that could be used for any attack on Taiwan. If North Korea acquires the same technology and knowledge, then similar patterns of military or hybrid operations can expand to other parts of the world.

The lessons that Gulf States did not learn from Ukraine's experience **caused the current unpreparedness in the face of the ongoing Russia-inspired Iranian drone attacks**. The US and its allies must find cheap and effective ways to counter a sky full of drones, and Ukraine offers some battle tested expertise. Expensive interceptors like those used in Israel are not enough, nor sustainable. The strain on the energy infrastructure in the Gulf should now alert state and private actors alike in other regions. Today's drone attacks by rogue states effectively paralyze the energy sector; tomorrow, this tactic could endanger other critical infrastructure in the Americas, Europe or Asia. The recent moves by Ukraine and the Gulf Arab states shows that some actors are heeding the warnings from current drone warfare.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (24)

[FONTE: Breaking Defense Europe, 30/04/2026]

Russia's windfall from the Iran war is temporary. Ukraine's isn't.

Kyiv, unlike Moscow, has secured strategic advantages from the war in Iran, writes Artur Kalandarov.

Ukrainian soldiers prepare FPV drones as military mobility of Ukrainian soldiers continue in the direction of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine (Anadolu via Getty Images)

When the US and Israel began military operations against Iran on Feb. 28, Russia was quickly identified as a chief beneficiary of the chaos that ensued.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (25)

[FONTE: Breaking Defense Europe, 30/04/2026]

Yet, for all these benefits, none of them will result in a strategic windfall for Russia. In fact, Ukraine will likely emerge as the bigger beneficiary long term — if Kyiv and its allies are able to take advantage of the moment.

Energy prices may remain elevated in the short-term, benefitting Russia, but a cessation of hostilities will likely resume costs per barrel that are unfavorable to Moscow's undiversified economy. Despite the US lifting some restrictions on Russia's energy sector, the EU has committed to maintaining its sanctions, and Russian tankers remain under threat from Ukrainian attacks and European seizure. Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries and other sites relevant to energy will also continue to harm Moscow's capacity to sell oil and gas.

Geopolitically, Russia's support for Iran has likely harmed the country's relationships with the Gulf states. From providing Iran with targeting data and drones to issuing public pronouncements of solidarity with Tehran, the Kremlin has created ample fodder for years of grievances, even if both sides keep their differences out of the public

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (26)

[FONTE: Breaking Defense Europe, 30/04/2026]

Ultimately, Kyiv will emerge from the Iran war with durable, long-lasting agreements that will foster closer political, military, and economic ties with a group of nations who have the resources to support Ukraine's current struggle, and the nation's postwar reconstruction. Given the presence of American military bases in the region, and the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to Europe's energy security and the global economy, it is in the national security interests of both Washington and Europe to encourage regional powers to tie up with Ukraine.

Kyiv's traditional supporters can use their substantial diplomatic heft to encourage the Gulf monarchies to treat Ukraine as a trusted and capable partner. This may include potential multilateral arrangements that tie security assistance from Ukraine to strategic investments and pressure on Moscow by the countries reeling from Iran's attacks. The US and many European states also have more experience than Ukraine in navigating the Middle East's complex political systems and incentive structures. Active guidance on their part may help Ukraine secure balanced agreements more quickly. Over time, stronger defense and economic ties between Kyiv and the Gulf monarchies will lessen the need for Europe to provide assistance to Ukraine — a return on investment for any European nations who help make deals now.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (27)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

The Global Story

The Global Story

How Ukraine won a battle with robots alone

BBC Audio | The Global Story | How Ukraine won a battle with robots alone

For the first time in history a country has apparently won a battle using only robots, without a soldier on the ground put at risk. Ukraine claims to have recently taken over a Russian position – forcing Russian soldiers to surrender – using robotic systems alone.

President Zelensky has been asking the world for help to fight Russia since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. But in the years since, Ukraine has revolutionised the technology of warfare with battlefield robots and drones, and now other countries are turning to it for its technology and expertise.

We speak to the journalist and defence expert Mark Urban about how Ukraine went from needy to needed.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (28)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

Inside Ukraine's robot war revolution

A Ukrainian commander tells POLITICO how robotic systems are transforming the battlefield, in a development with the potential to reshape how wars are fought.

By **VERONIKA MELKOZEROVA**



A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (29)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

POLITICO talked to the Ukrainian commander in charge of that assault, who described how it was conducted and the broader impact of Kyiv starting to use more ground-based robots to preserve the lives of its soldiers.

“In conditions of dense saturation of the sky with UAVs, on the modern battlefield ground robotic systems allow for dangerous work to be carried out without involving personnel,” said Mykola Zinkevych, commander of the Third Assault Brigade’s ground robotic systems unit.

Maksym Vasylchenko. CEO and co-founder Tencore. |Tencore

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (30)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

Change of thinking

Ukrainian command was initially unconvinced about ground robots as there were too few skilled operators. That changed, however, after several innovative brigades tested them in different environments and proved their value.

Adding to the need to take the tech more seriously was the success of aerial drones, where Ukraine has established an advantage over Russia and is now pummeling its troops and logistics in a "kill zone" far behind the front lines.

"Rapid expansion of the kill zone is another key factor that forced the army to rethink the role of the ground robots," said Yuriy Poritskiy, CEO of the DevDroid defense company.

As a result, Ukraine is seeing an explosion of robot designs. Some 200 Ukrainian ground robot producers and the military have already moved from testing to being integrated with military units.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (31)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

A Ukrainian serviceman from the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade controls unmanned ground vehicles on a training ground at an undisclosed location in eastern Ukraine on August 13, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. | Genya Savilov/ AFP via Getty Images

"Our goal is to perform 100 percent of front-line logistics by robotic systems," Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said last week. "In the first half of 2026, due to increased demand, we will contract 25,000 ground robotic systems, which will be delivered to the front. This is twice as much as in the entire year 2025."

TerMIT, developed by Ukraine's Tencore company, is a tracked ground robot that can carry up to 400 kilograms at a top speed of 15 kilometers per hour and operates at a range of up to 40 kilometers. It's used for everything from cargo transport to medical evacuations, and combat when equipped with machine guns and grenade launchers and is in service with the Third Assault Brigade, as well as more than 50 other units.

A guerra no Irão, a Ucrânia e a Rússia (32)

[FONTE: Politico, 22/04/2026]

Robots meet reality

Land-based robots have advantages over their airborne cousins — they can carry much larger payloads, can last longer and can fight on the ground with armor protection and heavier weapons.

The Third Brigade has been actively using ground robots for more than two years. Now Ukraine's defense ministry aims to link up that tech with its human assault forces.

"Such an approach already showed good results in the south of our country, where we liberated a big chunk of territory thanks to the new units," the ministry said.



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (1) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]



Source: UN Trade and Development, based on data provided by Clarksons Research 2026.

Notes: In 2024, total oil transported through the Strait was around 20 million barrels per day (bpd), or the equivalent of 25 per cent of global seaborne oil trade. Crude oil and condensate account for 14 million bpd and petroleum products for 6 million bpd. LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gas, LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas, dry bulk includes grains.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (2) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]

But ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz have come to a near halt.

Total number of daily ship transits through Strait of Hormuz



Source: UN Trade and Development, based on data provided by Clarksons Research Shipping Intelligence Network.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (3) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (4) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]

When oil prices go up, food prices often go up.

Monthly food price index and crude oil prices, January 1990 to February 2026



Source: UN Trade and Development, based on the FAO Food Price Index and the World Bank (Pink Sheet).

Note: Oil prices correspond to the price of crude oil, Brent, US$ per barrel.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (5) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]

When gas prices go up, fertilizer prices often go up.

Monthly natural gas price index and prices of selected nitrogenous fertilizers, January 1990 to February 2026



Source: UN Trade and Development, based on World Bank (Pink Sheet).

Note: Fertilizer prices in US$ per metric tonne. Natural gas index corresponds to the average gas prices of Europe, US and Japan (LNG), with weights based on 5-year average consumption volumes.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (6) [FONTE: UNCTAD, 10/03/2026]



O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (7) [FONTE: Dylan Spencer / The Conversation, 4/03/2026]

Far from random, China's global port network is clustering near the world's riskiest trade routes

Dylan Spencer • Published: March 4, 2026 2.39pm CET

The silhouettes of the container cranes in the Port of Balboa in Panama City on Feb. 24, 2026. Martin Bernetti/ AFP via Getty Images

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (8) [FONTE: Dylan Spencer / The Conversation, 4/03/2026]

In late February 2026, the Panamanian government took control of two ports in the Panama Canal that had been operated by a Hong Kong conglomerate for two decades. The move is the latest in a long-simmering legal battle after Panama's high court voided the company's contracts.

Far from just a local dispute, however, the episode has drawn in the United States and China, whose competition over global ports and trade routes has intensified in recent years, including in the crucial Panama Canal Zone, where China's presence has repeatedly drawn the ire of the Trump administration.

Chinese firms now own or operate terminals at more than 90 ports worldwide, including many of the busiest. The network spans Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with growing activity in South America.

The scale of China's involvement in overseas ports has fueled debate over whether these investments are purely commercial or serve broader strategic goals.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (9) [FONTE: Dylan Spencer / The Conversation, 4/03/2026]

The importance of chokepoints

Some sea routes are more important than others. The Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are examples of chokepoints – narrow routes through which large volumes of global trade and energy shipments must pass.

In our findings, countries near primary or secondary chokepoints, such as Panama or countries bordering the Dover Strait, such as France, were substantially more likely to host a Chinese-affiliated port. Put simply, proximity to critical trade bottlenecks strongly predicts Chinese investments.



O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (10) [FONTE: Dylan Spencer / The Conversation, 4/03/2026]

This makes economic sense. China depends heavily on maritime trade to sustain economic growth. And ports near chokepoints sit along the world's most sensitive shipping corridors and offer long-term commercial access in strategic locations.

Despite concerns in the West that Beijing is developing ports for military reasons, not every port is a naval base in disguise.

Most Chinese-affiliated facilities are commercial terminals. However, commercial infrastructure can still have strategic value. China's first overseas military logistics base in Djibouti sits alongside the Chinese-operated Doraleh port complex. A report from the Congressional Research Service notes that the facility supports naval operations and regional access in the western Indian Ocean.

That does not make other Chinese-owned or operated ports military installations. But control over terminals, logistics platforms, and supply chain data can shape economic and security relationships over time.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (11) [FONTE: Dylan Spencer / The Conversation, 4/03/2026]

Broader implications

Whatever the motivations behind Chinese investments, their implications extend beyond local trade and logistics.

Ports are no longer just local infrastructure projects. They are nodes in global supply chains and increasingly in geopolitical competition.

And while not every investment signals a covert military ambition, it would be naive to treat all port projects as politically neutral.

Recent U.S. policy responses reflect these growing concerns. In early 2026, the White House outlined a plan to strengthen the U.S. shipping industry and reduce reliance on foreign-controlled maritime infrastructure. The administration has also taken a closer look at foreign involvement in key facilities in the Western Hemisphere, including ports linked to the Panama Canal.

Such moves suggest that control over maritime infrastructure is no longer viewed in Washington as just a commercial issue but increasingly as a matter of economic and national security.

And as the map of countries with Chinese-affiliated ports suggests, Beijing’s investments are following the world’s most consequential trade routes not by accident, but by design.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (12) [FONTE: Hutchinson Ports]



O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (13) [FONTE: Hutchinson Ports]

CHINA

HONG KONG

1. Kwai Tsing Port (HIT, COSCO-HIT & ACT)
2. River Trade Terminal

MAINLAND CHINA

3. Hutchison Ports YANTIAN
4. Huizhou Ports (HICT & HPIC)
5. Jiangmen International Container Terminals
6. Nanhai International Container Terminals
7. Ningbo Beilun International Container Terminals
8. Shanghai Mingdong Container Terminals
9. Shanghai Pudong International Container Terminals
10. Xiamen International Container Terminals

INDONESIA

11. Hutchison Ports Indonesia (JICT & Koja)

MALAYSIA

12. Westports Malaysia

MYANMAR

13. Hutchison Ports MITT

PAKISTAN

14. Hutchison Ports KICT
15. Hutchison Ports Pakistan

SOUTH KOREA

16. Hutchison Ports Busan
17. Hutchison Ports Gwangyang

THAILAND

18. Hutchison Ports Thailand

VIETNAM

19. Hutchison Ports SITV

AUSTRALIA

20. Hutchison Ports Brisbane
21. Hutchison Ports Sydney

MEXICO

1. Hutchison Ports EIT
2. Hutchison Ports ICAVE
3. Hutchison Ports LCT
4. Hutchison Ports TIMSA

PANAMA

5. Hutchison Ports PPC — Balboa
6. Hutchison Ports PPC — Cristobal

THE BAHAMAS

7. Hutchison Ports Bahamas (FCP & FHC)

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (14) [FONTE: Juan Pablo Spinetto / Japan Times, 4/02/2026]

China is losing more than just two ports in Panama

U.S. gains leverage in region as Panama voids Chinese-controlled port deals

Juan Pablo Spinetto

The Panamanian Supreme Court's ruling on Thursday night invalidating Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings' contract to operate two key ports at either end of the Panama Canal caps a month marked by high-profile strategic defeats for Beijing in the region.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (15) [FONTE: Juan Pablo Spinetto / Japan Times, 4/02/2026]

The ruling in Panama, however, may prove the most consequential setback of all. The canal remains one of the world's most strategic infrastructure assets, handling roughly 5% of global trade. China is the largest user of the waterway after the U.S., quietly building a string of assets around it, even if the canal itself remains firmly under the independent control of the Panama Canal Authority.

Although these two ports were until now formally in the hands of a private conglomerate like CK Hutchison, Beijing has never dispelled concerns about its influence over them, particularly after it moved to block their divestment to a BlackRock-led consortium last year. Ironically, if there was ever any doubt about their huge geopolitical value, China's attempt to derail that deal, along with the intense lobbying it deployed in Panama to protect its position, laid bare the high stakes.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (16) [FONTE: Juan Pablo Spinetto / Japan Times, 4/02/2026]

After becoming the first Latin American country to join China's Belt and Road initiative, Panama under President Jose Raul Mulino has moved back toward its historically close alignment with Washington. Donald Trump's return to the White House a year ago, armed with a more interventionist vision for the hemisphere and explicit threats to reassert U.S. control over the canal, left Panama's traditionally U.S.-sensitive elite with little room to maneuver — even though the ports concession had triggered legitimate grievances since its rushed renewal in 2021, well before Trump turned his focus to the canal. If the revived Monroe Doctrine needed a real-world win, this decision provides one. The rum was surely flowing at the U.S. Embassy in Panama City after the ruling.

China has hardly lost its footing in Latin America. Panama has been careful to guarantee the canal's neutrality and has a plan to ensure the reliability of its logistics supply chain until new concessions are tendered. More broadly, China will continue seeking inroads across the region through commercial partnerships, political alliances and soft power, leveraging its massive trade ties, particularly in South America. As outlined in its latest strategic policy paper released in December, the Chinese government maintains an ambitious cooperation agenda spanning trade, infrastructure, finance, energy, manufacturing, food, technology and more.

But last week's court ruling is one more sign that the geopolitical competition for Latin America is sharpening — and not necessarily in China's favor.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (17) [FONTE: AP News, 2/04/2026]

U.S. NEWS

Rubio accuses China of ‘bullying’ for holding up Panama-flagged ships after canal clash



1 of 5 | A bulk carrier and a cargo ship transit the Panama Canal in Panama City, Thursday, March 12, 2026. (AP Photo/Matias Delacroix)

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (18) [FONTE: AP News, 2/04/2026]

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Thursday accused China of "bullying" by detaining or holding up dozens of Panama-flagged ships — though for a short period of time — after the Central American country seized control of two critical ports on the Panama Canal earlier this year from a subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based company.

China denies the allegations. Panama has been caught in a broader rivalry between the United States and China after U.S. President Donald Trump accused Beijing last year of running the Panama Canal. The Trump administration sees the critical maritime trade route as strategically important, both commercially and militarily, and Trump has talked about retaking the Panama Canal since his campaign.

"China's decision to detain or otherwise impede Panama-flagged vessels engaged in lawful trade destabilizes supply chains, raises costs, and erodes confidence in the global trading system," Rubio said on social media. "The United States stands with Panama against any retaliatory actions against its sovereignty and will always support our partners in the face of bullying."

Of the 124 ships detained in Chinese ports for inspection in March, 92 — or nearly 75% — were Panama-flagged, according to public data from Tokyo MOU, a regional port state control organization comprising 22 member authorities in the Asia-Pacific region. The Panama-flagged ships were typically detained for a few days — as short as one day or as long as 10 days — before being released.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (19) [FONTE: US Department of State, 28/04/2026]

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Declaração conjunta em apoio à soberania do Panamá emitida por Estados Unidos da América, Bolívia, Costa Rica, Guiana, Paraguai e Trinidad e Tobago

TRADUÇÕES EM PORTUGUÊS

28 DE ABRIL DE 2026

COMUNICADO DE IMPRENSA

ESCRITÓRIO DO PORTA-VOZ

O texto da declaração a seguir foi divulgado pelos governos de Estados Unidos da América, Bolívia, Costa Rica, Guiana, Paraguai e Trinidad e Tobago.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (20) [FONTE: US Department of State, 28/04/2026]

Nós, as nações de Bolívia, Costa Rica, Guiana, Paraguai, Trinidad e Tobago e Estados Unidos, atuando em conjunto em nossa missão comum de garantir a segurança do nosso hemisfério, reafirmamos que a liberdade da nossa região não é negociável. Estamos acompanhando com vigilância a pressão econômica direcionada pela China e as recentes ações que afetam embarcações com bandeira do Panamá. Essas ações — após a decisão da Suprema Corte independente do Panamá relativa aos terminais de Balboa e Cristóbal — constituem uma tentativa flagrante de politizar o comércio marítimo e infringir a soberania das nações do nosso hemisfério.

O Panamá é um pilar do nosso sistema de comércio marítimo e, como tal, deve permanecer livre de qualquer pressão externa indevida. Quaisquer tentativas de minar a soberania do Panamá são uma ameaça a todos nós.

Expressamos solidariedade ao Panamá. Por meio do nosso compromisso renovado com a paz, a segurança e a cooperação hemisférica, permanecemos dedicados a enfrentar todas as ameaças a fim de garantir que as Américas continuem sendo uma região de liberdade, segurança e prosperidade.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (21) [FONTE: Logan MacMillen / Asia Times, 2/05/2026]

Donroe Doctrine is becoming everything China feared

Donald Trump has shut Hormuz, ring-fenced Latin America and rewritten the global maritime order — all at China's expense

by Logan McMillen May 2, 2026

The Donroe Doctrine has China firmly and punitively in its sights. Image: YouTube Screengrab

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (22) [FONTE: Logan MacMillen / Asia Times, 2/05/2026]

On April 28, the State Department issued a joint statement "in solidarity with Panama" in response to an uptick in detentions of Panama-flagged vessels at Chinese ports, which it characterized as "a blatant attempt to politicize maritime trade."

This comes on the heels of a targeted lawfare campaign by American and Panamanian officials to dispossess Chinese logistics infrastructure at the Balboa and Cristobal terminals, and within a broader maritime context that has seen the US blockade the Strait of Hormuz, enter a defense partnership with Indonesia and put out aggressive statements about Peru's Port of Chancay.

The co-signatories on the statement include Costa Rica, Bolivia (more on that later), Paraguay, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago.

It's difficult to overstate the irony of this about-face on Panama. Just months ago, the US was pursuing a two-pronged strategy of diplomatic coercion via bilateral security dialogues and lawfare through a highly politicized audit of Chinese concessions near the Panama Canal.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (23) [FONTE: Logan MacMillen / Asia Times, 2/05/2026]

This culminated in an utterly predictable Panamanian Supreme Court ruling against port operator CK Hutchinson, resulting in its eviction and replacement with a subsidiary of the Danish logistics firm Maersk.

Recall that the Trump administration's opening position in these negotiations was threatening to retake the Panama Canal by force, and the State Department's lofty rhetoric about defending Panama's "sovereignty" and rejecting "politicization" starts to ring hollow.

The co-signatories joining the US in this declaration of "freedom" may seem random; however, they map perfectly onto America's long-term economic and security priorities in the region.

Guyana is the world's breakout producer of sweet light crude and is benefiting from new investments downstream amid America's blockading of the Persian Gulf, while Trinidad is a major producer of petrochemicals like urea and ammonia.

Costa Rica is a reliable American ally that operates the most technologically advanced port in the Caribbean, and Paraguay is likely in the mix as the only remaining South American country that recognizes Taiwan.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (24) [FONTE: Logan MacMillen / Asia Times, 2/05/2026]

His recent decision to replace the head of the state-owned lithium company, Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos, signals that he is willing to break off deals made with China and Russia under Bolivia's previous socialist government, provided that Western capital can offer a guaranteed market.

For Paz's foreign ministry, signing a US-directed statement recognizing Panama as a "pillar of our maritime trading system," is a low-friction, transactional diplomatic play.

Bolivia's potential as a commodity export powerhouse depends on cooperation with its longtime rival, Chile, for port access. (Chile has its own highly profitable lithium sector, and is the reason why Bolivia has no coastline to begin with).

By aligning with the United States against China, Bolivia is signaling to countries like Panama and Chile that it is willing to play by the same American-directed rules as everyone else, in exchange for access to their logistics infrastructure.

O choque energético, o canal do Panamá e a rivalidade EUA-China (25) [FONTE: Logan MacMillen / Asia Times, 2/05/2026]

Of course, America's diplomatic maneuvering in Panama and Bolivia cannot be understood in a vacuum. In the Persian Gulf, the US military is blockading the flow of flagship light and heavy crude to Asian markets.

Meanwhile, the State Department is working diligently in the Caribbean to dispossess Chinese logistics capital through diplomatic coercion and lawfare.

In this context, it's becoming increasingly clear that the objective of the so-called "Donroe Doctrine" is not to benevolently integrate the US and Latin America's economies, but to force capital out of West Asia and back to the Western Hemisphere by establishing new maritime trade routes.

Bibliografia