


Política Internacional e Geopolítica a policrise do mundo globalizado

**INSTITUTO CULTURAL
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PARTE I – TEMA PRINCIPAL

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (1)

[FONTE: Graham Allison / Foreign Affairs,

Março/Abril 2020]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMENTARY

Graham Allison

The New Spheres of Influence Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers

March/April 2020

By **Graham Allison**

In the heady aftermath of the Cold War, American policymakers pronounced one of the fundamental concepts of geopolitics obsolete. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described a new world “in which great power is defined not by spheres of influence . . . or the strong imposing their will on the weak.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that “the United States does not recognize spheres of influence.” Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed that “the era of

of influence hadn’t gone away; they had been collapsed into one, by the overwhelming fact of U.S. hegemony.

Now, however, that hegemony is fading, and Washington has awakened to what it calls “a new era of great-power competition,” with China and Russia increasingly using their power to assert interests and values that often conflict with those of the United States. But American policymakers and analysts are still struggling to come to grips with what this new era means for the U.S.

States, that will require accepting the reality that there are spheres of influence in the world today—and that not all of them are American spheres.

THE WORLD AS IT WAS

Before making pronouncements about the new rules of geopolitics, post-Cold War U.S. secretaries of state should have looked back to the final months of World War II, when U.S. policymakers were similarly resistant to accepting a world in which spheres of influence remained a central feature

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (2)

[FONTE: Graham Allison / Foreign Affairs,

Março/Abril 2020]

almost two centuries of the United States staking claim to its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Such pronouncements were right in that something about geopolitics had changed. But they were wrong about what exactly it was. U.S. policymakers had ceased to recognize spheres of influence—the ability of other powers to demand deference from other states in their own regions or exert predominant control there—not because the concept had become obsolete. Rather, the entire world had become a de facto American sphere. Spheres of influence had given way to a sphere of influence. The strong still imposed their will on the weak; the rest of the world was compelled to play largely by American rules, or else face a steep price, from crippling sanctions to outright regime change. Spheres

Unipolarity is over, and with it the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order.

role in the world. Going forward, that role will not only be different; it will also be significantly diminished. While leaders will continue announcing grand ambitions, diminished means will mean diminished results.

Unipolarity is over, and with it the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order. For the United

of geopolitics. Competing views on the issue lay at the core of a debate between two top Soviet experts in the U.S. government.

On February 4, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta. At Roosevelt's side was his translator and principal adviser on the Soviet Union,



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (3)

[FONTE: Graham Allison / Foreign Affairs,

Março/Abril 2020]

NATO offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine (which led to Georgian overconfidence, ending in the country's partial dismemberment by Russia), a stubborn disregard of brute facts has been counterproductive.

THE MUSEUM OF RETIRED INTERESTS

When it comes to doing what it can, Washington should focus above all on its alliances and partnerships. If China is destined to be “the biggest player in the history of the world,” as the longtime Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once claimed, the United States must work to assemble allied powers who together will constitute a correlation of forces to which China will have to adjust.

This logic is most evident in the economic arena. Before the Trump administration ended U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that trade agreement promised to bring together countries accounting for 40 percent of global GDP under a common set of rules on everything from tariffs to state-owned enterprises to labor and environmental standards—providing a counterweight

Washington will need partners—but partners that bring more in assets than they introduce in risks. Unfortunately, few of the United States' current allies meet this standard. The U.S. alliance system should be subjected to a zero-based analysis: every current ally and partner, from Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand to Latvia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, should be considered in terms of what it is doing to enhance U.S. security and well-being, and with what risks and costs. Alliances are not forever. Historically, when conditions have changed, particularly when a focal enemy has disappeared or balances of power have shifted dramatically, so, too, have other relationships among nations. Most Americans today have forgotten an era in which NATO had a counterpart in Asia, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), and even an analogue in the Middle East, CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization); both of those are now artifacts in the museum of retired national interests. As Kennan noted, “There is more respect to be won . . . by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most

NATO launch an immediate military response, in accordance with its Article 5 guarantee? Should it? If the answer to any of those questions is not a straightforward yes—and it is not—then the time has come for an alliance-focused version of the stress tests for banks used after the 2008 financial crisis.

Such an approach is all the more important given the realities of nuclear weapons in this new world. Both China and Russia have reliable second-strike nuclear capabilities—that is, the ability to withstand an initial nuclear attack and conduct a retaliatory strike that could destroy the United States. Accordingly, not only is nuclear war not a viable option; even a conventional war that could escalate to nuclear war risks catastrophe. Competition must thus be tempered by caution, constraints, and careful calculations in risk taking. For a nation that has accumulated a long list of entanglements with nations that may have, or may imagine they have, a blank check from Washington, this creates a big problem. The line between reassuring an ally and emboldening its leadership to act recklessly is a fine one.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (4)

[FONTE: Graham Allison / Foreign Affairs,

Março/Abril 2020]

PRESENT AT THE (RE-) CREATION

Strategy is the purposeful alignment of means and ends. Among the many ways in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch—when the means an actor can organize and sustain are insufficient to achieve the stated ends—and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but unachievable end. The United States’ twenty-first-century wars in the Middle East offer vivid examples of both.

Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security.w

The basic view of the United States’ role in the world held by most of today’s foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that followed the U.S. victory in the Cold War. That world is now gone. The consequences are as profound as those that Americans confronted in the late 1940s. Accordingly, it is worth remembering how long it took individuals now revered as “wise men” to understand the world they faced. Nearly five years passed between Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” an early warning of Cold War competition, and the policy paper NSC-68, which finally laid out a comprehensive strategy. The confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign policy community today should thus not be a cause for alarm. If it took the great strategists of the Cold War nearly five years to forge a basic approach, it would be beyond hubris to expect this generation to do better.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (5) [FONTE: Michael Beckley / Foreign Affairs, 4/02/2026]

There Is Only One Sphere of Influence | Foreign Affairs



The Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., January 2026 Tyrone Siu / Reuters

After the United States captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and President Donald Trump revived talk of acquiring Greenland, commentators reached for old clichés: the rebirth of the Monroe Doctrine, the return of great-power spheres of influence, the end of Pax Americana. But these episodes revealed something more exceptional. The world today has only one true sphere of influence. The United States alone dominates a vast home region, not merely as a buffer against competitors such as China and Russia, but as a hemispheric base from which American power and commerce can project outward, largely unconstrained by rivals.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (6)

[FONTE: Michael Beckley / Foreign Affairs,

4/02/2026]

This configuration has no modern precedent. During the [Cold War](#), the American sphere was confronted by a vast Soviet one. In earlier, multipolar eras, European powers ruled overseas empires and planted colonies deep in the Western Hemisphere, contesting U.S. influence even close to home. But that world is long gone. The American sphere now stands alone. China and Russia cannot consolidate control over their own regions, much less project sustained power into the United States' backyard. They can intimidate neighbors and sow disruption, but their influence quickly runs into resistance and chokepoints. The result is not multipolarity but stark asymmetry: one consolidated American sphere and contested space everywhere else.

This asymmetry produces U.S. dominance, but of a dangerous kind. A one-sphere world leaves Chinese leader [Xi Jinping](#) and Russian President Vladimir Putin too aggrieved to accept the status quo and the United States too secure to take Eurasian threats seriously until they erupt. It also tempts Washington to trade stewardship of a global order for coercive rule in its own backyard, swapping forms of power that compound through trade and alliances for ones that breed backlash through resource extraction and imperial policing.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (7) [FONTE: Michael Beckley / Foreign Affairs, 4/02/2026]

Yet this same imbalance also creates an opening. The [United States](#) can use its sphere not as a substitute for international order, but as its foundation. A one-sphere world gives Washington two rare advantages: unmatched power and a secure home base from which it could, if necessary, disengage from Eurasia. That pairing—strength with a credible exit option—is already sharpening incentives among U.S. allies to rearm. While pundits fixate on Davos speeches, states on the frontlines of Chinese and Russian coercion are starting to rebuild their militaries, industries, and supply chains, reviving what the liberal order gradually lost over time: capable partners for the United States. For the first time in decades, the outlines of a tougher, more resilient free world are coming into view. Whether these efforts endure will depend on whether the United States can avoid China and Russia's greatest mistake—treating partners as vassals rather than contributors to shared strength.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (8)

[FONTE: Michael Beckley / Foreign Affairs,

4/02/2026]

ONLY GAME IN TOWN

Many analysts argue that U.S. primacy is fading and that the world is reorganizing into multipolar spheres. Some even urge Washington to grant [China](#) a sphere of influence in Asia and grant Russia one in eastern Europe in exchange for peace. But spheres of influence are not diplomatic concessions. They are political facts, produced by power, geography, and, above all, the choices of weaker states. A country commands a true sphere of influence only when its neighbors defer to it on security, when foreign rivals cannot intervene decisively, and when control can be sustained without the constant use of force. When those conditions are absent, simply recognizing a sphere changes nothing.

Historically, spheres of influence have been built in two main ways: through conquest, or by binding neighbors with security guarantees, market access, and institutions that make exit prohibitively costly. The methods of construction differ, but the requirements do not. A true sphere demands military dominance, economic centrality, and staying power. By those standards, the United States possesses a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. No other power has a comparable one.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (9)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-

Hooper / Foreign Affairs, 16/05/2026]

Spheres by Default

How U.S. Concessions Are Quietly Becoming Chinese Influence

REBECCA LISSNER AND MIRA RAPP-HOOPER

May 16, 2026



Chinese leader Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump in Beijing, May 2026

BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI / POOL / REUTERS

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência?(10)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper/ Foreign Affairs, 16/05/2026]

Since U.S. President Donald Trump took office last January, analysts have debated whether he is pursuing a sphere of influence strategy—an approach by which great powers divide the world into privileged blocs, with little concern for the interests or preferences of the smaller states that those blocs subsume. In the affirmative view, the Trump administration is laying claim to the Western Hemisphere—including through military and influence campaigns in Venezuela and Cuba—while leaving China to expand its political, military, and economic influence in Asia. Yet the lavish but substantively modest summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping held this week delivered no such arrangement. Trump did not definitively sell out Taiwan or other U.S. Indo-Pacific allies while in Beijing, which was both a relief and an affirming outcome for those who reject the spheres of influence approach.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (11)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper / Foreign Affairs, 16/05/2026]

Both sides of this debate, however, rely on an outdated conception of what it means for great powers to divvy up the globe. In the twenty-first century, spheres of influence can emerge not only as forms of military and geographic dominance, as they did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also in critical technology or infrastructure domains. Moreover, such spheres need not come about through explicit agreement—they can come about by default. Seen in these terms, a Chinese sphere in Asia is very much still possible. And it becomes even more likely as Trump considers concessions to Xi. For instance, after the summit, when Trump was asked about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Trump said that he would “make a determination over the next fairly short period,” and later referred to the Taiwan arms deal as a “very good negotiating chip.”

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (12)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper / Foreign Affairs. 16/05/2026]

A NEW SPHERE

There is ample precedent for great powers divvying up the world. At key moments in history, when the terms of geopolitics were heavily contested, new power balances emerged through negotiation. After the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia created the Concert of Europe, agreeing to political boundaries designed to maintain a continental equilibrium and thereby prevent war. More than a century later, after the cataclysms of the two world wars, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Yalta to determine the postwar divisions of Germany and Europe—a model many have invoked when raising the question of whether Trump will attempt some such great-power condominium with Xi, whereby the United States and China give each other a wider berth in their respective regions.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (13)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper / *Foreign Affairs*, 16/05/2026]

Yet a bargain resembling either of these historical models is neither realistic nor consonant with Trump's actual foreign policy. Far from retreating to the Western Hemisphere or investing to consolidate the United States' position there, as A. Wess Mitchell recently advocated in [Foreign Affairs](#), the president started a war with Iran that has metastasized into an open-ended military adventure in the Middle East. In Europe, despite spasmodic diplomacy, Washington has proved unwilling to impose an unfavorable deal on Ukraine or to otherwise grant Russia the inroads it seeks on the continent. Notwithstanding the administration's strategy documents and professions of prioritization, the president remains engaged around the world, albeit on his own terms, and seems to consider U.S. interests to be truly global in nature. Trump may welcome other powers deferring to the United States in the Western Hemisphere, but he has shown little indication of reciprocal deference. A great-power condominium of the nineteenth- or twentieth-century variety is not in sight.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (14)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper / Foreign Affairs, 16/05/2026]

If the United States is to retain access to and influence in the most vital regions, strategists must update their understanding of how modern spheres are built and the varied forms they can take. The Soviet bloc during the Cold War, for instance, was a closed sphere of exclusion, in which the dominant power exercised top-down hegemonic control, blunting outside political, economic, and security influence. But modern spheres of influence can also be open. In an open sphere, the great power has considerable influence but remains unable to exclude other states from operating diplomatically, economically, and militarily within its bloc. Although China is nowhere near consolidating a closed sphere in the Indo-Pacific, its rapid accumulation of influence could yield an open sphere in short order—particularly if paired with American distraction and retreat.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (15)

[FONTE: Rebecca Lissner e Mira Rapp-Hooper / Foreign Affairs, 16/05/2026]

Yet contemporary spheres of influence may also manifest in new ways. Powerful states can bend the domestic politics of weaker ones in their favor through AI-enabled disinformation campaigns, cyber-based election interference, or corrupt backroom deals with government officials. Taiwan is subject to more disinformation and cyberattacks than any country on earth, as Beijing tries to bend elite and public perception to its advantage. Foreign-built infrastructure projects, including many of those promised by China's Belt and Road Initiative, can also compromise weaker states' political independence, saddling them with untenable debt burdens and forcing them to enact changes to local laws and regulations. And control over digital infrastructure could allow powerful countries to undermine others' sovereignty by curtailing their access to AI models, cloud services, or telecommunications networks at will—or, more subtly, by wielding inappropriately obtained data, covert or overt censorship, and surveillance as tools of influence.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (16)


4/02/2026]

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

COMMENTARY

Why spheres of influence are useless

Carlo Bastasin
February 4, 2026



An abstract photo depicts a crystal ball influenced by an artistic colorful light play background. (FOTO MAXIM via Shutterstock)

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (17)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

A nalysts often describe today's world as multipolar, with great powers seeking to assert distinct "spheres of influence." In the United States, this framing recurs in debates over U.S. interests in the world. Yet even as competition with China intensifies, American strategy—as illustrated by the 2025 [National Security Strategy](#)—emphasizes a focus on the Western Hemisphere.

This commentary argues that "spheres of influence" are not economically and strategically tenable for the United States and China. Both powers are far from being self-sufficient regional economies and fundamentally depend on the global economy for their sustainability. China's policymakers seem aware of the need for global scale. It should also be clear to U.S. policymakers that dominating neighboring regions would not ensure U.S. economic stability.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (18)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

The impossibility of autarky

Geopolitical fragmentation inevitably entails some form of economic and financial fragmentation. A “spheres of influence” scenario would require China and the United States to retreat into their respective economic backyards. Both powers are indeed seeking to become more self-sufficient in areas where they depend on international partners. However, given their current economic and financial structures, genuine self-sufficiency is likely unattainable.

Both China and the United States face structural savings-investment imbalances that make a closed-economy model unsustainable. China records a national savings rate exceeding 43% of gross domestic product (GDP)—far more than it can productively invest at home—while the United States saves only 18% of GDP, too little to finance the investment needed to maintain its technological leadership.


Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (19)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

Decomposition of changes in current account into contributions from savings and investments

■ Investment ■ Private saving ■ Public saving



Source: International Monetary Fund

B | Foreign Policy
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Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (20)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

The United States' and China's parallel economic imbalances have created a structural complementarity that has sustained global growth for years: Chinese savings financed American consumption, while the U.S. market absorbed Chinese production. Over the 12 months through September 2025, the United States ran a [total trade deficit ↗](#) of around \$1 trillion, while China posted a surplus exceeding \$1.2 trillion. According to the International Monetary Fund's [2025 External Sector Report ↗](#), these current account divergences markedly increased in 2024, driven by domestic macro imbalances.

Public discourse in both countries rarely acknowledges these domestic imbalances. Yet the economic evidence undermines the notion that either power can become self-sufficient within a regional sphere of influence. Latin America, often cited as the United States' natural economic hinterland, cannot provide the necessary capital that the American economy requires. The region has an [average savings rate ↗](#) of around 18% of GDP, which is insufficient even for its own developmental needs.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (21)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

China faces similar constraints. Although China would face more favorable conditions from trading with Indo-Pacific economies, these economies could not absorb China's excess manufacturing output. The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while growing strong, import less than half of China's global surplus and often serve as transit hubs for the re-export of Chinese goods to third countries. China's trade with Europe, Latin America, and Africa—plus its \$1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative across more than 140 countries—demonstrates that global engagement is an economic necessity for Beijing.

Chinese interest in Arctic routes is particularly revealing. China has defined itself as a “near-Arctic state” as global warming opens new routes for trade and passage through the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route, for example, could reduce the distance between Shanghai and Rotterdam by approximately [3,000 nautical miles](#). China has massively invested in Russia and the Nordic countries to enhance its presence along the Arctic Sea routes. This strategy only makes sense in a logic of global, not regional, trade.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (22)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings,

4/02/2026]

From cooperation to zero-sum competition

For decades, Sino-American economic relations were effectively cooperative. China exported goods and capital—at its peak, purchasing more than \$1 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities—while America provided technology and markets. This arrangement made both countries' imbalances sustainable.

Today, however, the dominant narrative presents competition as zero-sum, with China as the potential winner, and the United States determined not to be the victim. U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports rose from an average of 3% in 2017 [to over 47%](#) by the end of 2025. China responded with export controls on rare earth minerals, technological restrictions, and its own tariffs. Military and geopolitical posturing increasingly overshadow the economic rationale that once sustained cooperation.

Against this backdrop, characterized by the demise of multilateral institutions, geopolitical analysts revive the notion of “spheres of influence.” Yet spheres of influence cannot make the Chinese or the American economy self-sufficient. They could, at best, represent a temporary phase if paired with internal economic rebalancing: China should increase private consumption, currently stuck at 38% of GDP (versus 55%-60% in developed economies), while the United States should increase private savings. Both objectives would be achievable through comprehensive welfare reforms.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (23)

[FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings, 4/02/2026]

As controversial as it may sound, a European-style welfare model—universal healthcare, robust pensions, and extended social protections—could serve both needs. In China, it would reduce precautionary household savings (which accumulate for health care, education, and old age), stimulating consumption. In the United States, where out-of-pocket health care spending and pension insecurity depress savings, more robust welfare would increase domestic capital accumulation.

While politically unlikely, the European approach illustrates that strong welfare states promote internal stability, reduce inequality, and limit incentives to wage war. A strong welfare state may reduce economic dynamism (average EU growth was 1.5% annually versus 2.3% in the United States between 2010 and 2023). However, it also fosters societies that are more concerned with internal cohesion than with seizing other countries' wealth. Over the long term, such stability could support the international cooperation needed for global economic sustainability.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (24) [FONTE: Carlo Bastian / Brookings, 4/02/2026]

Conclusion

The thesis of regional spheres of influence fundamentally underestimates the nature of the American and Chinese economies. Both require global markets: China to export its surplus production and capital; the United States to import standardized goods and financing, while concentrating resources on high-return advanced technology sectors.

The current competition, conceived as a zero-sum game, is economically irrational and potentially catastrophic. The political conditions for cooperation are not yet mature, but economic incentives should push both powers toward a new cooperative equilibrium. Spheres of influence could only serve as a temporary, transitional phase if paired with internal reforms that rebalance economic models—a long and politically complex process.

20th-century economic history teaches that not even the Cold War succeeded in creating self-sufficient blocs. To think that in the 21st century, with today's more highly integrated value chains, the United States and China can prosper in regional watertight compartments is an illusion. The question is not whether they will need to cooperate, but when and under what conditions.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (25)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]

The Multipolar Delusion

And the Unilateral Temptation

C. RAJA MOHAN

March/April 2026 *Published on February 17, 2026*



U.S. flags flying at the base of the Washington Monument, November 2025
KENT NISHIMURA / REUTERS

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (26) [FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs, 17/02/2026]

From Washington to Beijing and Moscow to New Delhi, a consensus is emerging that the world has entered a multipolar era. Political leaders, diplomats, and analysts routinely declare that unrivaled American dominance has ended and global power is now dispersed across multiple centers. The assertion has become so commonplace that it is often treated as a self-evident fact rather than a proposition to be examined. Even officials in the United States, long the principal beneficiary of the unipolar post–Cold War order, have adopted this language. At the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, Secretary of State Marco Rubio observed that Washington’s moment as the sole superpower was historically “not normal” and that the international system would inevitably tend toward multipolarity. Rubio’s statement appeared to echo the growing belief in China, Russia, and much of the developing world that the United States’ power is declining and its long-standing global primacy is unsustainable.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (27) [FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs, 17/02/2026]

This seeming convergence obscures a difference in how the various players define “multipolarity.” For the [Trump administration](#), acknowledging multipolarity doesn’t mean accepting limits on American power. Instead, it serves as a justification for abandoning the traditional U.S. conception of global leadership and the responsibilities that come with it. The idea of multipolarity allows Washington to pursue a narrower, more transactional foreign policy—one focused on extracting advantage rather than underwriting order, unconcerned with the maintenance of institutions or norms that do not serve immediate American interests. For China, Russia, and many developing countries, by contrast, multipolarity is not merely descriptive but aspirational. It is a political project aimed at constraining American dominance, eroding Western-led institutions, and constructing alternative models of governance, development, and security in which the United States is not the only country in charge.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (28)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]

POLE POSITION


Claims that the world is becoming multipolar rely on observable indicators of the growing strength of emerging powers, including shifts in relative shares of global GDP and the construction of new development and governance institutions headquartered outside the United States and Europe. These changes show that power is distributed more widely today than at the end of the Cold War. But they do not necessarily signify a transformation in the structure of the international system.

Defined narrowly, a pole is a state or bloc that possesses comprehensive capabilities to shape the international system. A pole is not merely influential in one or two domains, such as nuclear warfare or trade, but rather must be capable of projecting military power globally, sustaining technological and industrial leadership, anchoring alliances, shaping norms, providing public goods, and absorbing systemic shocks. When measured against this more demanding standard, the number of genuine poles in the world today is the same as it has been for the past 35 years: one. Only the United States has this global reach and power.


Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (29) [FONTE: Visual Capitalist, 2/02/2026]



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (30) [FONTE: Visual Capitalist, 2/02/2026]



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (31) [FONTE: Visual Capitalist, 18/02/2025]



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (32)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]

Constraints on American power—high national debt, domestic political division, frictions with U.S. allies, and resentment against U.S. policies in the so-called global South—are real and growing, but they do not negate the United States' position as the only credible pole in the system. Even Trump's threats to cut the funding of domestic universities and research agencies, for instance, are unlikely to destroy their preeminence. The depth of the U.S. private sector and the strength of its civil society limit the damage that any president can cause. And the United States' enviable geography, which includes ample natural resources and physical distance from the Eurasian landmass that has long been the main theater of global conflict, gives the United States a large margin of error in its foreign policy choices.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (33)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]


Many analysts argue that the world is evolving toward bipolarity as China continues to rise. In its 2025 National Security Strategy, for instance, the United States acknowledged that China is a “near peer.” China has become a major economic and technological power: its economy has reached about two-thirds the size of that of the United States, its nuclear arsenal is estimated to have tripled in size since 2020, and it is building up its military to counter U.S. influence along the first island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines in the western Pacific.

Yet China remains some distance from being a true pole in the international order. Its growth rate is slowing and is likely to slow even further because of demographic decline and the outsize role of state-owned enterprises in its economy. Its currency lacks global reach: few international transactions are conducted in renminbi because of strict capital controls and a lack of financial transparency. China’s military has strengthened its position in East Asia but lacks the logistics networks, access to bases, and alliances required to project power worldwide. And its much-heralded development programs, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, have supplemented rather than replaced U.S.-anchored global governance institutions such as the World Bank.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (34) [FONTE: OEC - Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024]


Exports from United States to China in 2024

Total: \$145B



Exports from China to United States in 2024

Total: \$453B



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (35) [FONTE: US Census Bureau]

2025 : U.S. trade in goods with China

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. Table reflects only those months for which there was trade.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2025	9,901.3	41,639.2	-31,737.8
February 2025	10,461.6	31,635.4	-21,173.8
March 2025	11,458.2	29,383.7	-17,925.5
April 2025	8,193.1	25,378.1	-17,185.0
May 2025	6,553.3	20,493.9	-13,940.5
June 2025	9,443.6	18,948.7	-9,505.1
July 2025	9,298.4	26,411.4	-17,113.0
August 2025	8,271.9	25,132.6	-16,860.7
September 2025	8,380.2	23,414.7	-15,034.5
October 2025	8,950.5	23,887.2	-14,936.8
November 2025	7,008.4	20,950.7	-13,942.3
December 2025	8,387.9	21,104.3	-12,716.4
TOTAL 2025	106,308.4	308,379.7	-202,071.3

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (36)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]

Efforts to build countervailing coalitions to the United States have also faltered. Despite China's and Russia's claims that they have a "no limits" partnership, their relationship rests on uneasy foundations and is shaped by historical mistrust and asymmetric dependence. In the early stages of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the "elder brother" on which communist China depended for political support; now, Russia is the junior partner, heavily reliant on China for imports of industrial and dual-use goods—those valuable for both military and civilian purposes, such as machine tools—and as a market for its energy exports. BRICS has also expanded, and the list of countries seeking to join is long. But BRICS is not a cohesive coalition, nor is it likely to position itself against the United States. Instead, most of its members are eager to strike deals to work with Washington. The inclusion of numerous pairs of regional rivals—India and China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Ethiopia—also limits the effectiveness of BRICS as a geopolitical tool to pursue any particular strategic objective.

Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (37)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]

WITH GREAT POWER COMES NO RESPONSIBILITY


The revised world order is one in which the United States sheds the responsibilities of a unipolar power but remains the sole force that can shape the international system. Over the past decade, China and Russia have used their military advantage to alter territorial realities: China has aggressively reclaimed land in the South China Sea, for instance, and Russia has conquered and annexed large swaths of Ukrainian territory. The United States, which previously criticized such actions, now also openly employs force to advance its interests. But whereas the leaders of previous U.S. administrations cloaked interventions in liberal rhetoric, Trump frames them explicitly in terms of American power. In a remarkable interview with CNN after the operation to capture Maduro, the Trump adviser Stephen Miller bluntly articulated the administration's worldview: we live, he said, in a world "that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power: these are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time."



Da hegemonia unipolar à multipolaridade e esferas de influência? (38)

[FONTE: C. Raja Mohan / Foreign Affairs,

17/02/2026]


In his second term, Trump has welcomed the drumbeat heralding the arrival of multipolarity not as a challenge but as a message that the United States no longer needs to be responsible for global order. In Trump's multipolar vision, every country can exercise its power as it sees fit—but given the gaps in market and military power between the United States and everyone else, only Washington gets to exercise its power unconstrained. The United States is outwardly accepting the shared premise of multipolarity but reaping the benefits of continued unipolarity.

The world today has transformed dramatically since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States became the sole superpower. But now, as then, there is little prospect for a credible challenger to U.S. hegemony. The unipolar moment never truly ended; it has merely changed. Unlike just after the end of the Cold War, the United States today feels the need to vigorously assert itself with no qualms about the consequences of exercising its dominance. That is what the Trump administration is doing. And for the foreseeable future, no other country or coalition can stop it. 



PARTE II – NOTAS BREVES


A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (1) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]



A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (2) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]


Facts

Also Known As	Formosa • Republic of China • Chung-hua Min-kuo • T'ai-wan
Head Of Government	Premier: Su Tseng-chang
Population	(2021 est.) 23,487,000
Currency Exchange Rate	1 USD equals 27.775 Taiwan new dollar
Seat Of Government	Taipei
Head Of State	President: Tsai Ing-wen
Form Of Government	multiparty republic with one legislative house (Legislative Yuan [113 ¹])
Official Language	Mandarin Chinese
Official Religion	none
Official Name	Chung-hua Min-kuo (Republic of China)
Total Area (Sq Km)	36,197
Total Area (Sq Mi)	13,976
Monetary Unit	New Taiwan dollar (NT\$)
Population Rank	(2021) 57
Population Projection 2030	23,557,000
Density: Persons Per Sq Mi	(2021) 1,680.5
Density: Persons Per Sq Km	(2021) 648.9
Urban-Rural Population	Urban: (2018) 78.2% • Rural: (2018) 21.8%
Life Expectancy At Birth	Male: (2018) 77.6 years • Female: (2018) 84.1 years
Literacy: Percentage Of Population Age 15 And Over Literate	Male: not available • Female: not available
Gni (U.S.\$ '000,000)	(2019) 610,872
Gni Per Capita (U.S.\$)	(2019) 25,881




A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (3) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Ethnic composition (2003)



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
Taiwan religious affiliation (2005)



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
A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (4) [FONTE: Encyclopædia Britannica]

Taiwan major export destinations (2018)





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Taiwan major import sources (2018)



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A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (5) [FONTE: Chiang Kai-Shek (imagem à esquerda) Encyclopædia Britannica]



A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (6) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]

Taiwan in Time: The great retreat

The KMT's massive transportation of people, goods, artifacts, military and government institutions to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War was mostly complete by the time the central government started operating in Taipei

By Han Cheung / Staff reporter

Taiwan in Time: Dec. 5 to Dec. 11

Shortly after noon on Dec. 10, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) finished their last meal in China. The elder Chiang's mood was solemn as they headed to Chengdu's military airport. Without saying a word, he boarded the plane to Taiwan.

By that time, the transfer of people, public property and military and governmental institutions to Taiwan was mostly complete. A day earlier, the Republic of China's Executive Yuan held its 102nd meeting — its first in Taipei.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (7) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]



Members of the Republic of China Army board a ship bound for Taiwan in 1949.

Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

The Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) retreat to Taiwan in 1949 after losing the Chinese Civil War was a lengthier and more monumental, taking place over the course of more than a year with countless freight and air trips.

Before deciding on Taiwan, the KMT entertained the idea of retreating to western China. Many officials opposed the move, as it was too close to the rapidly advancing People's Liberation Army, which knew the terrain well.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (8) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]



Chiang Kai-shek, center, visits Taiwan in 1946. Three years later, it would become his permanent home.


Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Chang argued that Taiwan's subtropical climate, abundant resources and advanced infrastructure left behind by the Japanese would be able to support a massive population influx. The Taiwan Strait would make it difficult for the People's Liberation Army to mount an immediate attack, and the US would be more likely to protect such a strategic location.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (9) [FONTE: Taipei Times, 5/12/2021]

Chang also believed that the people of Taiwan would welcome the “motherland” government after years of Japanese rule, and that it was relatively free of communist influence. The suppression of the 228 Incident a year previously would further deter people from causing unrest, making it a “stable” base for the KMT to prepare their counterattack.

THE BIG MOVE



By the time People’s Liberation Army soldiers took over Nanjing’s Presidential Palace in April 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s retreat to Taiwan was already under way.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (10)

[FONTE: United Nations / The General Assembly, 25/10/1971]

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

*1976th plenary meeting,
25 October 1971.*

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (11)

[FONTE: USC, US-China Institute]



Originally published in July 2011 and updated in February 2022.



Time, July 26, 1971

As a candidate and in press conferences as president, Richard Nixon argued that the United States and the world would benefit from engaging China. He felt this was intrinsically important because of China's size and inevitable importance. Nixon also saw China as a useful counterbalance to the Soviet Union. From the first days of his presidency he sought to signal China's leaders that he was willing to talk. The Americans sent private signals through Paris, Warsaw, and via the leaders of Romania and Pakistan. The documents summarized and linked to below detail these efforts which ultimately produced Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing July 9-11, 1971. Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, flew to Beijing from Pakistan. His meetings there produced an agreement that President Nixon would visit China. Nixon went in February 1972.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (12) [FONTE: Governo de Taiwan]

● Diplomatic Allies



country with whom we currently have
diplomatic relations

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (13) [FONTE: Governo de Taiwan]

East Asia and Pacific



Marshall Islands Republic of Nauru Palau



Tuvalu

Africa



Eswatini

Europe



Holy See

Latin America and Caribbean



Belize Republic of Guatemala Haiti




Republic of Honduras Republic of Paraguay



St. Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia St. Vincent & the Grenadines

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (14) [FONTE: Statista, 2024]



A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (15) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

China's National Defense in the New Era

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July 2019

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A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (16) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

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A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (17) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

I. International Security Situation

China's Security Risks and Challenges Should Not Be Overlooked

China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China's overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development. Nevertheless, it also faces diverse and complex security threats and challenges.

The fight against separatists is becoming more acute. The Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), stubbornly stick to "Taiwan independence" and refuse to recognize the 1992 *Consensus*, which embodies the one-China principle. They have gone further down the path of separatism by stepping up efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for *de jure* independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence. The "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the peaceful reunification of the country. External separatist forces for "Tibet independence" and the creation of "East Turkistan" launch frequent actions, posing threats to China's national security and social stability.

China's homeland security still faces threats. Land territorial disputes are yet to be completely resolved. Disputes still exist over the territorial sovereignty of some islands and reefs, as well as maritime demarcation. Countries from outside the region conduct frequent close-in reconnaissance on China by air and sea, and illegally enter China's territorial waters and the waters and airspace near China's islands and reefs, undermining China's national security.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (18) [FONTE: China's National Defense in the New Era, 2019]

II. China's Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era

The socialist system of China, the strategic decision to follow the path of peaceful development, the independent foreign policy of peace, and the best of cultural traditions – considering peace and harmony as fundamentals – determine that China will pursue a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.

Resolutely Safeguarding China's Sovereignty, Security and Development Interests

To solve the Taiwan question and achieve complete reunification of the country is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and essential to realizing national rejuvenation. China adheres to the principles of “peaceful reunification”, and “one country, two systems”, promotes peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and advances peaceful reunification of the country. Meanwhile, China resolutely opposes any attempts or actions to split the country and any foreign interference to this end. China must be and will be reunited. China has the firm resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession of any part of its territory by anyone, any organization or any political party by any means at any time. We make no promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and the very small number of “Taiwan independence” separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (19) [FONTE: CSIS, 2023]



A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (20) [FONTE: CSIS, 2023]

Conditions for Success

Analysis of the 24 game iterations showed four necessary conditions to defeat a Chinese invasion.

1. Taiwanese forces must hold the line.

Recommendation: Strengthen Taiwanese ground forces. Because some Chinese forces will always land on the island, Taiwanese ground forces must be able to contain any beachhead and then counterattack forcefully as Chinese logistics weaken. However, the Taiwanese ground forces have severe weaknesses. Therefore, Taiwan must fill its ranks and conduct rigorous, combined arms training. Ground forces must become the center of Taiwan's defense effort.

2. There is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan.

Recommendation: In peacetime, the United States and Taiwan must work together to provide Taiwan with the weapons it needs; in wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan, U.S. forces must quickly engage in direct combat. In the Ukraine war, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have not sent troops directly into combat but have sent massive amounts of equipment and supplies to Ukraine. Russia has been unable to interdict this overland flow. However, the “Ukraine model” cannot be replicated in Taiwan because China can isolate the island for weeks or even months. Taiwan must start the war with everything it needs. Further, delays and half measures by the United States would make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, allow China to create a stronger lodgment, and raise the risk of escalation.


3. The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations.

Recommendation: Deepen diplomatic and military ties with Japan. While other allies (e.g., Australia and South Korea) are important in the broader competition with China and may play some role in the defense of Taiwan, Japan is the linchpin. Without the use of U.S. bases in Japan, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft cannot effectively participate in the war.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (21) [FONTE: NYT, 14/05/2026]

Xi Warned of the 'Thucydides Trap.' What Is It?

China's leader reached for Greek history to warn the United States of what can happen when a rising power meets an incumbent one.



A statue of Thucydides, the Athenian general and historian, outside the parliament building in Vienna. Eye Ubiquitous/Universal Images Group, via Getty Images

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (22) [FONTE: NYT, 14/05/2026]

The Chinese president invoked a warning from the Classical world, when the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta went to war, saying that the United States and China should beware the “Thucydides Trap” in their own relations.

Mr. Xi cited the concept, popularized in recent decades, as he warned that Beijing and Washington could enter an “extremely dangerous place” if President Trump sought to impede China as it asserted itself over Taiwan.

The trap referred to by Mr. Xi was named for Thucydides, the ancient Athenian general, whose account of the Second Peloponnesian War (431 B.C. to 404 B.C.) is considered one of the first written military histories.

In it, Thucydides argued that the war between Athens and Sparta was driven by the threat posed to an established power by one gaining strength. “The rise of Athens frightened Sparta and forced them into war,” wrote Thucydides. (The precise translation is contested among classicists).

For some scholars, the war — and the explanation offered for it in that ancient passage — presaged nearly every major conflict to follow. The international relations theorist Graham Allison dubbed it the “Thucydides Trap” in the early 2010s.

“The idea is that when an established, great power is met with a rising power, conflict between the two is certainly likely if not inevitable,” said Daniel Sutton, a classicist at the University of Cambridge who studies Thucydides, on Thursday.

In Mr. Xi’s version of the analogy, an emboldened China is the Athens to an American Sparta. Neither role is especially attractive: Athens lost the war, its empire and most of its influence. Sparta won, but its dominance among Greek city states also waned after a few decades.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (23) [FONTE: Graham Allison / The Atlantic, 24/09/2015]

The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?

In 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed.

By [Graham Allison](#) September 24, 2015



Mike Blake / Damir Sagolj / Reuters / alessandro0770 / Shutterstock / Zak Bickel / The Atlantic

When Barack Obama [meets this week](#) with Xi Jinping during the Chinese president's first state visit to America, one item probably won't be on their agenda: the possibility that the United States and China could find themselves at war in the next decade. In policy circles, this appears as unlikely as it would be unwise.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (24) [FONTE: Graham Allison / The Atlantic, 24/09/2015]

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides's Trap. The [Greek historian's metaphor](#) reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after [analyzing the historical record](#). In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of not just the challenger but also the challenged.

Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides's Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.

A questão de Taiwan e a possibilidade de uma guerra EUA-China (25)

[FONTE: Graham Allison / The Atlantic, 24/09/2015]

	Period		Ruling Power	Rising Power		Result
1	First half of 16th century		France	Hapsburgs		War
2	16th–17th centuries		Hapsburgs	Ottoman Empire		War
3	17th century		Hapsburgs	Sweden		War
4	17th century		Dutch Republic	England		War
5	Late 17th–early 18th centuries		France	Great Britain		War
6	Late 18th–early 19th centuries		United Kingdom	France		War
7	Mid-19th century		United Kingdom, France	Russia		War
8	19th century		France	Germany		War
9	Late 19th–early 20th centuries		Russia, China	Japan		War
10	Early 20th century		United Kingdom	United States		No war
11	Early 20th century		Russia, U.K., France	Germany		War
12	Mid-20th century		Soviet Union, U.K., France	Germany		War
13	Mid-20th century		United States	Japan		War
14	1970s–1980s		Soviet Union	Japan		No war
15	1940s–1980s		United States	Soviet Union		No war
16	1990s–present		United Kingdom, France	Germany		No war

Bibliografia

